Monday, June 30, 2025

Talk it out

Time again for an open thread.   Now’s your chance to get that off-topic comment off your chest.  The burning philosophical or theological question you’ve been dying to raise?  That political rant you’ve been meaning to inflict on fellow readers of this blog?  Some tweet of mine that you wanted to complain about?  All fair game.  From real numbers to realpolitik, from That ‘70s Show to Kurtis Blow, from monads to gonads, there’s no limit to what you might talk about.  (Other, that is, than the demands of good taste and basic sanity.  So no trolling, please.)  Previous open threads archived here.

Posted by at

225 comments:

  1. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 12:43 PM

    How is the "issue" Protestant interpretation as falling exclusively to the individual in any way avoided in Roman Catholic theology? For instance, though the magisterium or papal supremacy may be appealed to as a norm that stands over the individual, don't individuals also have to interpret these teachings and apply them based on their own personalized conceptions?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. bmillerJune 30, 2025 at 8:32 PM

      I'd say the difference is that Catholics can test their "personalized conceptions" with their living priest, priests or bishops. All faithful Catholics aim to submit to a common authoritative understanding of the faith. Protestants can only ultimately submit to their own "personalized conceptions" as authoritative, although they may object to that characterization.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 12:44 AM

      Some lay Catholics make this argument, perhaps naively. I don't think the more informed to. Feser has discussed this in a blogpost before.

      Most of scripture is pretty clear for most people most of the time, it's not just unintelligible gibberish we impose meaning on. So, there is no issue with just general interpretation. One can, just by reading scripture, come to know what it is saying most of the time. Popular translations all tend to be pretty good too.

      However, it's not completely clear and, despite what Protestants may claim, even essential doctrines are not completely clear. In fact, scripture even says explicitly and clearly that it is not completely clear on essential doctrines, or doctrines necessary for salvation (2 Peter 3:16). This is a concern because Jesus prayed for the Church to be united. When divisions arise about essential doctrines, that threaten to divide the One Body. Schism is a serious concern. If you speak to Protestants though, many seem almost completely unconcerned about schism, which is rather peculiar, given how much Jesus, the Apostles, and the early Church all made a big deal about it. Whats worse is that they have no actually means to achieve unity, which does explain extreme divisions. If there is unity, it can only come by a kind of coincidence.

      An equally important and related concern is that scripture is "set in stone" so to speak. It's not a living document that amends or clarifies itself moving forward, which is particularly a problem as we get further and further removed from the times and places from which scriptures were written. What you have is what you get, and that's that.

      That is why there is a need for a living institution. If disputes arise that threaten to cause schism, a living institution can provide clarification. And, if it is still not clear, or a new group of Christians from a new culture misunderstands, the living institution can reclarify, and reclarify, and reclarify again and again until it is clear.

      That's the difference. It's not that scripture is completely unintelligible until the magisterium clarifies. It's that scripture can't clarify itself. The Magisterium provides an actual mechanism for the Church to be UNITED as One Body in truth.

      Delete
    3. JordanJuly 1, 2025 at 5:33 AM

      You might be interested in reading this article called "The Tu Quoque" from Called to Communion. It's not precisely an answer to the question you raise, but it's very close.

      https://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/05/the-tu-quoque/

      Delete
    4. SMackJuly 1, 2025 at 11:36 PM

      @First anonymous: Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, achieves unity by definition. The Church simply is whoever is in communion with the Bishop of Rome. It technically cannot split, because whatever portion was not with the bishop of Rome would not be the church.

      Were this the the primitive approach to unity, I think Jesus and the apostles would also have spoken very differently than they do. For example, those who "follow Cephas" (I Corinthians 1:12) would have been commended as the correct party. (It's impossible to imagine that verse having been written at some time after the rise of papalism, and the pope being one of the members of the list, and the problem being resolved in the same way Paul resolves it) The pope, then, is not a "means to achieve unity," but a unity-by-definition that seems (to me anyway) foreign to anything that was intended in Scripture or practiced in the first few centuries of the church. (The Council of Nicea, too, is incomprehensible on Roman Catholic premises; to me at any rate.)

      Yet I accept the criticism that Protestants are too cavalier about unity. Roman Catholics too, I think (for the above reason). In fact we should be working it out with drops of blood like those Christ shed the same night He prayed for unity. It happens occasionally (on all sides -- and credit to more recent Roman Catholics on this, for sure), but not often enough; and I entirely include myself here in the accusation. Lord have mercy.

      bmiller, I think I do object, although it's not that I'm offended or anything. Protestants, too, try to submit to an authoritative understanding of the faith (sometimes a living one, always a Scriptural one). And Roman Catholics, too, have to struggle and choose between sources. (Can a divorced and remarried Catholic take communion? Who ya' going to believe, the Vicar or Christ or your favorite Catholic philosophy blog? We may agree on that one, but let's not pretend it's a simple matter of following the current voice of the church.)

      Delete
    5. bmillerJuly 2, 2025 at 9:17 AM

      SMack,

      Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

      Protestants, too, try to submit to an authoritative understanding of the faith (sometimes a living one, always a Scriptural one)

      I wonder if you can clarify this a little more. What living voice is the ultimately authoritative voice to a Protestant? I mean other than one's personal perception that God is speaking to oneself directly through prayer or reading the Bible? Catholics too, read the Bible and pray and feel moved by God, but if they have questions there is a living Church that can give them a final authoritative answer. I have assumed that although Protestants may discuss things with their pastors and fellow believers, there is nothing in principle that demands a Protestant submit their own personal understanding to a living authority.

      The Bible cannot tell a Protestant if he misunderstood it, nor explain how he got it wrong. It seems only a living authority can do that. That was my basic point of distinction.

      Regarding your divorced Catholic scenario. Regardless of the fact that a document on pastoral guidance is not a matter of dogma and so can be (and was and is still) disputed doesn't mean it didn't sow confusion. There may actually be some Catholics who later realize that they were never really divorced and remarried but have been living in adultery for years and years and now repent and commit to live a life of chastity. If they have children is it best for the children that the parents live separately and not a family? Is it scandalous to everyone else to see people known to be in this situation receive communion? But as contested as these questions are, they are prudential and pastoral concerns, not a matter of faith such as declaring that people in a state of mortal sin can receive communion.

      Delete
    6. B&BJuly 2, 2025 at 12:54 PM

      I'm not sure why this posted originally as anonymous, my apologies! I appreciate all the comments. The Called to Communion article was especially interesting. I don't think any of these particular arguments defeat the argument that ultimately personal interpretation is final/necessary, regardless of Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, etc., however that article has a very close analogous argument that I'll have to consider.

      Delete
    7. SMackJuly 2, 2025 at 2:38 PM

      Thank you for the reply, bmiller.

      Some Protestants are exactly as you say, but I think there is a misapprehension that all are -- that "sola scriptura" must mean a person alone in their closet with their Bible listening for God, without more. Plenty of Protestants choose a church using a combination of methods, and then try to submit to that church's teaching and judgment and discipline. Yes, it will be important that the church be viewing Scripture as the ultimate authority whereby it makes its decisions, but one tries to submit to it even when not clearly in agreement. Of course there's a process there that maybe a Catholic doesn't experience -- if the church goes way off the deep end, then one has to re-evaluate commitments, etc.

      My point was just that there may, in practice, be authorities to which we defer, intermediately, on theological issues. I see Presbyterians doing this, for example, as well as Anglicans. ("My church teaches/permits/whatever, so I follow that.") There is still, of course, judgment needed (alas!) in choosing a church.

      If you don't mind my saying so, I think there's tension between your opening and closing paragraphs -- where the opening one contains something of an idealization of what the Roman Church offers its flock. You write,

      "Catholics too, read the Bible and pray and feel moved by God, but if they have questions there is a living Church that can give them a final authoritative answer."

      But in the last paragraph, you let a Catholic off the hook of following Amoris Letitiae, essentially because it's not ex cathedra (not a matter of dogma).

      But tons of things aren't matter of dogma! If I (a putative Catholic) read something in the Bible that confuses me, I can't go get the pope to give an ex cathedra interpretation; and anything less will be subject to unlimited disputation and argument. Priests and theologians disagree with each other about tons and tons of things -- virtually anything that isn't dogmatically defined, and much that is (is the death penalty intrinsically wrong? Who outside the church can be saved and how? Once again on marriage/divorce/communion.)

      (I take your point that they are "pastoral concerns," but almost anything can be framed that way. To me, that can seem like just another way of emphasizing that many of the most pressing questions can *not* be authoritatively dealt with in the advertised way.)

      It is for these reasons that the critique implicit in the original question seems, to me, to have such force. The much-vaunted authoritative guide is not, in practice, much more useful than what Protestants have, or even especially distinguishable; except that sometimes (from where I sit, and respectfully) it goes wrong and requires belief in something that is actually false.

      By the nature of the case, I am focusing on cases where I criticize your church or its claims. I hope this is no taken to express disrespect full-stop, or lack of appreciation for the many riches my Roman Catholic brothers and sisters bring to the Church.

      Delete
    8. bmillerJuly 2, 2025 at 7:32 PM

      SMack,

      Thanks for your thoughtful and reasonable replies.

      I didn't mean to mischaracterize your personal beliefs or lump all the various Protestant churches together in an attempt to tag them all with a belief that only some particular churches hold that is difficult to defend.

      I think most Protestants have a greater familiarity with the Bible than most Catholics and so they certainly surpass Catholics in that area. My opinion is that Protestants should keep it up and shame Catholics into reading their Bibles. I know my interactions with Protestants have deepened my understanding of the Bible, my own faith and where Protestants are coming from. I think it's a good thing to have frank discussions with people of good will in search of the Truth, regardless of their backgrounds.

      Regarding your analysis of my opening and closing paragraphs.
      Yes, if one sets aside distinctions, my post can be read as wanting to have it both ways. Also if we set aside distinctions, you're correct that both Protestants and Catholics disgree with among themselve and from that aspect there is no difference between them. But why would either of us ask the other side to leave aside the distinctions we base our arguments on?

      To me, that can seem like just another way of emphasizing that many of the most pressing questions can *not* be authoritatively dealt with in the advertised way.

      I don't know what you think the "advertised way" is so, for the moment, I think you misunderstand what the Catholic Church teaches.

      From your critique it could seem that it is not clear to you that there is a difference between the question of how to treat people guilty of adultery or murder, than the question of whether adultery or murder is wrong.

      Do you think it would be helpful to focus on an example where you think a Catholic teaching is clearly false?

      Delete
    9. JordanJuly 2, 2025 at 8:00 PM

      @SMack

      This takes us a little far from the original question, but what do you think of the following argument for the necessity of an infallible church?

      1. Jesus founded a church and wants all humans to be a part of that church
      2. Therefore, deliberate schism from the church that Jesus founded is a sin.
      3. Now obstinate heresy is also a sin.
      4. If the church that Jesus founded formally and definitively taught heresy, then her members would only have two options: either schism or heresy
      5. But this would mean that her members would have to sin
      6. But God is just, and cannot allow a situation where a person is forced to sin
      7. So God cannot allow the Church that Jesus Founded to formally and definitively teach heresy.
      8. So the church that Jesus founded cannot formally and definitively teach heresy.
      9. The inability to formally and definitively teach heresy is just what the Catholic Church means by infallible
      10. So the church that Jesus founded is infallible

      We would have to extend the argument to identify any particular church as the church that Jesus founded, but this is the argument that made me accept that it must exist.

      Jordan

      Delete
    10. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 4:10 AM

      bmiller,

      Thank you also for the thoughtful reply, and for the kind things you say about Protestants. Since we are complimenting each other, I will say that I appreciate the respect for tradition and Christian history, the respect for holiness, and the passion for unity of the RCC (among other things).

      When I said the "advertised way," I was mostly just referring to what you had said about Catholics having a living church that can give them a "final, authoritative answer" if they have questions. Not you only -- this is a commonly made claim, in my experience. But, from what I can see, it is more complicated than that in practice; the only unambiguously authoritative answers are the dogmatic definitions; and (1) there is debate about virtually everything else, while (2) there is also debate even about the meaning of the dogmatic definitions, in some cases (which I take to go to OP's question).

      I take your point that I am being too cavalier about pastoral versus theological points. And I'm not trying to accuse Pope Francis of heresy. But if I may push back just a little, it seems to me that both kinds of points are likely to become urgent to a Christian in his daily walk, and he may go to the Bible for answers, and then go to his church when he becomes confused thereby; and if his church tells him, for example (as the Argentine bishop's conference did, with approval by the pope?), that sometimes it is impossible not to sin and that having sex in an adulterous relationship may be the lesser sin; then might I think that the advertised advantage may be surviving on something a little like hair-splitting?

      The actual method by which one obtains the infallible teaching is simply rather obscure. Suppose one is experiencing same-sex attraction. Becoming confused by the Bible (somehow), one decides to seek out authoritative guidance from one's church. Well, if one happens to live in Germany, one might get surprising answers. But OK, conscience still pangs, and perhaps a few rogue priests (or bishops) are not enough for authority. One looks for dogmatic papal or conciliar pronouncements, but finds none. (I think? It's possible I'm missing something here.) Going to faculty members of Catholic universities, one finally is pointed to Thomas Aquinas. Thomas made errors, of course, and is not infallible, but in this case, his teaching seems to be more or less official church dogma; it is in the Catechism! So all is well. The authoritative answer is finally received.

      Next, we marry a Protestant woman. We become concerned whether she can be saved. We find no clear answer in the Bible, so we go to the church. We start out by looking for dogmatic pronouncements. Lo! The Council of Florence and Unam Sanctam have dreadful statements. It seems our wife is condemned for certain. Worse, Vatican I dogmatically forbids us from trying to reinterpret those statements in a way other than how they were originally understood. Glumly, we turn to the Catechism. But what is this?! There is hope after all! Perhaps she can be saved. Thank God for the Catechism.

      Now we are elected governor. Should we support the death penalty? Finding no clear answer in the Bible (I guess?), we turn to the Church. The dogmatic pronouncements seem pretty clearly in favor, to say nothing of church history and tradition. And Vatican I warns us of reinterpretation, of course! Wanting to be extra safe, we turn (of course) to the Catechism. Oh no! It appears times have changed after all. The death penalty is now morally inadmissible -- and this from the pope! Well, that settles it. It's wrong. But what's this? An article by a Catholic philosopher arguing that the catechism/pope are wrong in the light of Catholic tradition and dogma, and not binding on Catholics.

      What to do?

      Delete
    11. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 4:10 AM

      (continued)

      Please forgive the rhetorical flourishes; but my point here is not that the truth is not somewhere in the Catholic church, in each case. Surely, since both sides of each issue are presented with some gravity by major sources, the truth is there. But actually determining is not clearly (to me) easier than what a Protestant goes through, when faced with the same kinds of issues.

      Is my point any clearer, or more fairly made? (I don't mean you'll agree with it, of course.)

      To be fair, I think one "out" that the Catholic has here is to say that the advertisement is simply too aggressive. The Roman Catholic Church is not committed to the proposition that its followers can have all of their questions answered authoritatively; only that she will not teach them anything false, and that belief in the dogmas she does pronounce (and following them in faith and life) will lead to salvation. But then, if one takes that out, one should not continue to use the advertisement! (In an unmodified form.) And I think this position clearly lessens the apparent advantage over Protestants.

      I hope this has clarified what I meant.

      You ask, "Do you think it would be helpful to focus on an example where you think a Catholic teaching is clearly false?"

      I think it would, probably; but I answer that with some trembling, because it would vastly open the scope of this already-in-depth conversation, and threaten to become a serious drain of time and attention. Of course, it's unfair of me to say that I think there are such things and then refuse even to identify one. So I'm torn here. Were it easy to exchange private contact information, I would be more inclined to do so privately. But if you think it important that I do so, I will do so, without committing to follow through to the very bottom of the ensuing discussion.
      Please forgive the rhetorical flourishes; but my point here is not that the truth is not somewhere in the Catholic church, in each case. Surely, since both sides of each issue are presented with some gravity by major sources, the truth is there. But actually determining is not clearly (to me) easier than what a Protestant goes through, when faced with the same kinds of issues.

      Is my point any clearer, or more fairly made? (I don't mean you'll agree with it, of course.)

      To be fair, I think one "out" that the Catholic has here is to say that the advertisement is simply too aggressive. The Roman Catholic Church is not committed to the proposition that its followers can have all of their questions answered authoritatively; only that she will not teach them anything false, and that belief in the dogmas she does pronounce (and following them in faith and life) will lead to salvation. But then, if one takes that out, one should not continue to use the advertisement! (In an unmodified form.) And I think this position clearly lessens the apparent advantage over Protestants.

      I hope this has clarified what I meant.

      You ask, "Do you think it would be helpful to focus on an example where you think a Catholic teaching is clearly false?"

      I think it would, probably; but I answer that with some trembling, because it would vastly open the scope of this already-in-depth conversation, and threaten to become a serious drain of time and attention. Of course, it's unfair of me to say that I think there are such things and then refuse even to identify one. So I'm torn here. Were it easy to exchange private contact information, I would be more inclined to do so privately. But if you think it important that I do so, I will do so, without committing to follow through to the very bottom of the ensuing discussion.

      Delete
    12. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 4:11 AM

      @Jordan,

      Thank you for the question. I think the argument is a nice one in principle, but hugely over-simplistic in the way that formal arguments often are; in particular, I think it sneaks illegitimate assumptions into various words, especially "church."

      It seems to me implicit already in your definition of the word "church" that it is a global, visible, and visibly united body, and moreover that it is a unique and uniquely identifiable such body. Given such hidden premises, it is not too surprising that the argument would lead to Roman Catholicism! "Wants" is another word with hidden important baggage, I claim.

      In the event, Premise 4 is false. If a church is teaching heresy, then breaking communion with it is not schism. So it is not true that these are always the options. The argument seems persuasive, I suggest, because it is already assuming there is an identifiable global church, as mentioned.

      Let me try to approach the argument with some historical and hypothetical examples that (in my view) show the shortcomings of that view.

      Suppose there were churches in two cities, A and B. They found that they disagreed on some seemingly minor point, and B thought that it was so important that it amounted to heresy. Now, B was mistaken on this, although their mistake, too, was not heresy. They therefore withdrew communion from A.

      Surely sin *did happen* here -- B should have worked harder to make sure this really rose to the level of heresy, or perhaps A should have humbly capitulated to prevent the break (or both). But it was not *logically necessary* sin, so it does not entail that God put anybody in a situation where they had to sin. And yet the result is two churches, both preaching the true faith. You might say that B committed schism. But whose sin is that, exactly? Perhaps her bishop's. What is a follower to do -- a miner, say. Is he required to become a theologian and decide whether his bishop decided rightly that this was an issue of such high import? Surely not -- it would break the whole discipline of the church for every decision by a bishop to be revisited by every member on pain of no longer being in Christ's church.

      Perhaps the breach will be healed in the next generation; but then again, perhaps not. Perhaps things will change and develop to make it harder and harder to fix. Perhaps both sides will accumulate minor errors that the other side cannot tolerate to have to accept. Is there sin in this situation? Assuredly! Yet the sin becomes more diffuse and harder to pin down, and harder also to fix. That is not an excuse for not working humbly, and painfully, to do so, however.

      You might say that God would never let such a situation develop; in fact, I think you need such a premise. And I think you sneaked it in in saying Jesus "wants" all humasn to be members of "that church." But unfortunately, history refutes this; even Scripture refutes it. God did not "want" Israel to reject him, choose a king, and then split, but that is exactly what happened. I could multiply examples. But it is always very dangerous to assume that because God forbids something, He will therefore prevent it.

      Delete
    13. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 4:11 AM

      (continued)
      The whole history of the fourth-century church is a dizzying patchwork of my story writ a thousand times (though of course, there were actually *very* important heresies at play in the midst of that tragic chaos). Look at the Antiochian church of the fourth century, where there were two orthodox, Catholic, Trinitarian churches out of communion with each other for decades, in consequence of which John Chrysostom lived most of his life out of communion with Rome, and even St. Miletius -- who chaired the second ecumenical council and is a saint in east and west -- was not recognized by Rome as a bishop during his lifetime.

      What of the western schism? Were vast hordes of European peasants in necessary sin because they lacked the werewithal to track down who was the true one of the three popes, and their leaders happened to choose wrong?

      What, for that matter, of the Great Schism? Were peasants in France, or in Antioch, suddenly guilty of schism because their respective Patriarchs had a falling out? Was their only option to migrate across the world in search of a way to join the One True Church?

      And was the Church of the East, which after its excommunication at the third ecumenical council (now agreed by most on all sides to have been based on a misunderstanding) proselytized Asia all the way to Mongolia and Japan, no longer part of the church of Jesus Christ, and guilty of schism or heresy?

      To all of these, no. There were sins in all these cases, but they were contingent sins, not logically necessary ones, and most of the people in the various churches were not guilty even of those. Provincial failure to accept this led to statements of universality such as those in Unam Sanctam and the Council of Florence that the Roman Church has been trying to water down into nothing for a very long time (to her credit), but she struggles to do so because of her unfortunate doctrine of infallibility.

      So, the argument fails at premise 4 (at least); and I hope the above sketches out why I think that happened because an implausible view of the church was smuggled in.

      Delete
    14. JordanJuly 3, 2025 at 10:51 AM

      @SMack

      Thank you for the thorough reply. I know it can be time consuming to carry on two deep conversations at once, so I'll just ask two clarifying questions for now.

      1. Do you agree that Jesus founded a church?
      2. If so, what do you think is the nature of that church?

      Delete
    15. bmillerJuly 3, 2025 at 11:59 AM

      SMack,

      I agree that my original characterization lacked a whole lot of nuance and qualifications. From my perspective it looks like we could agree that my characterization was correct with the appropriate qualifications. You many disagree, but as you point out we've gone on quite long now, but not unpleasantly.

      Catholics claim that they are guided by Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium. While Protestants claim only the first of the 3. It can be argued that they also adhere to a Tradition of sorts most noticeably the denial of a Magisterium. So that was my condensed point. Catholics can look to the Magisterium, Protestants cannot in theory

      Thanks for listing your examples of confusion within the Church. There's no denying that. But there is also a lot of confusion in the reporting of what those arguments entail. Some unintentional and some I expect intentional. I am not up to speed on the Argentine bishops conference, nor what the specific complaint is regarding what happens in Germany so I will not respond. No doubt there are plenty of churchmen that appear to tip-toe right up to a line without overtly crossing it and thereby people who don't pay close attention get the wrong idea. But there are also plenty of less-than-impartial reporters with an agenda implying a line has been crossed.

      You also listed a bunch of other issues. If you're interested in most if not all of those issues discussed from the Catholic perspective visit catholic.com and although you may not be expecting it, even The Spanish Inquistion! ;-)

      Thanks for the discussion.

      Delete
    16. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 6:58 PM

      bmiller,

      Thank you indeed for the pleasant discussion. I'm sorry for my prolixity, which I sense was rather overwhelming to us both. (It is a flaw.) I am very sorry for any misreporting or conceptual errors in my examples. I tried to be careful and it was not my intention to mischaracterize your church, but it is possible that I did so by accident or misunderstanding, for which I apologize.

      I would say that Protestants view only Scripture as *ultimately authoritative*, but they have a variety of positions on the subsidiary authority of tradition. In all of these, they would remain different from Roman Catholics, I agree. I attempted here to argue that both are, in practice, still left needing to do interpretive work and face uncertainty on many important issues.

      I do try to read Roman Catholic reporting on Roman Catholic issues. Thank you for the suggested resource, which I will pull up a comfy chair and keep an eye on.

      Thank you indeed for an interesting and truth-focused conversation, and I ask one more time for forgiveness for errors or rhetorical flourishes that were more hurtful or truth-avoidant than probative. Let me say in closing that, in the nature of the case, I focused on areas where unclarity or confusion occurs, but it would be unfair not to express my appreciation for the Roman Church's strong and unwavering witness on so many crucial points.

      Delete
    17. SMackJuly 3, 2025 at 7:10 PM

      @Jordan,

      1. Yes.

      2. This is a rather big question, if you'll forgive me. It feels a bit like being asked what I think the nature of God is. Which of course would be a good thing to have an answer to, but is stressful to answer compactly in the context of an internet discussion when someone may be waiting to jump upon a poor choice of words!

      I could say it is "the mystical body of Christ," "the blessed company of all faithful people." I could quote the Nicene Creed (It is "One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic.") I could say it is the communion on earth of all Christ's followers, for whom He died. I could say it is Christ's kingdom made manifest in the world. I could say it is Christ's bride, for which He gave Himself, that "he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." The relationship between these different descriptions could take quite a bit of time to develop and analyze!

      How would you answer the question?

      Delete
  2. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 12:57 PM

    An interesting new argument for the existence of god is the "argument from psychophysical harmony": how do we account for the fact that events that are generally bad for us feel painful (e.g., touching a stove), and events that are generally good for us feel good? For instance, given Chalmers-style naturalistic dualism (in which conscious experience supervenes on certain kinds of information processing), it isn't clear why there should be any such correspondence between what's good for us and the way things feel. I'm curious how such arguments would interact with AT philosophy of mind.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. TalmidJuly 1, 2025 at 8:09 AM

      I suppose that the normal naturalist reply would be a appeal to natural selection: creatures whose conscious experiences tend to match with their sensory processing tend to navegate the world better, so they were more suscessful in reproducing. It seems to me that a epiphenomenalist* would not be capable of appealing to that, of course.

      Sure, Chalmers and other folks still need to adress why do conscious experience and bodily sensory processes interact at all, since these look so unlike in these sort of views. On AT both are part of a living being, for material bodies do have form and other characteristics that are judged to be "secundary" by moderns, so there is no rigid separation at all.

      *suprised that i almost wrote that right at first!

      Delete
  3. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 2:08 PM

    Since God Larry has infinite happiness and his will “in no sense” can be thwarted, what is meant by avoiding sin and going to confession “out of love for God” in perfect contrition? It doesn’t seem to mean “willing the good of the other” since the already has that good.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. TonyJuly 1, 2025 at 6:55 AM

      To love changeable beings capable of gaining or losing happiness includes willing their good, i.e. their happiness. To love a being for which gain and loss is impossible doesn't have the same character: we love God by adhering to him in his goodness, i.e. conforming our wills to his, so that the effect is our love of all things is like to his love of those things (not in His creative love, but in loving rightly in hierarchy, loving the better more and the lesser less, etc), and especially loving them in that way because God loves them so.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 1:15 PM

      Doesn’t conforming our wills to his kind of imply we can do things that thwart the fulfillment of his will, though?

      Delete
  4. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 2:09 PM

    What is your stance on the first ten chapters of Genesis?

    ReplyDelete
  5. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 2:16 PM

    Hello, Feser

    I recently read your blog posts on the kalām cosmological argument (as Craig develops it). I agree with your criticisms (I also discovered your work a couple of years ago, and I wanted to thank you for your work. It has enriched me in innumerable ways). However, as someone familiar with the kalām tradition and Islamic philosophy and theology in general, Craig’s kalām argument is not the kalām argument endorsed by most Islamic theologians in the Middle Ages. It is not in any of the Kalām textbooks of the Muʿtazila, Ashʿari’s, or Maturidi’s, or any works authored by their most famous representatives (al-Ghazali uses it in the Incoherence merely for dialectical purposes, and although he may still have believed its truth, it makes no appearance in book I of his Revival, which is, if I remember, the kalām section of his opus). I won’t reiterate the classical kalām argument here, but you can find it in the article “Mereology in Kalām: A New Reading of the Proof from Accidents for Creation,” by Ayman Shihadeh. If it is correct, it seems to me as though it would be compatible with Aristotelian metaphysics since motion and rest are accidents and do not belong to the quiddity of substances.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 8:32 PM

      Google " Are my theistic arguments dependent upon a metaphysical system" and Craig explains why he prefers the Kalam argument. Craig's Kalam argument is his own version of it.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 11:43 AM

      I agree, anonymous, and thank you for referring this to me. I am actually a big fan of Craig, and he is what inspired me to take a closer look at Islamic tradition. He makes the Kalam argument his own, and what a hell of a job he has done! I didn't mean to give you the impression that I believe that Craig is somehow distorting or misrepresenting the argument, although I see how I came off that way. Rather, what I was saying is that despite Craig's intentions, people familiar with his argument tend to come away with the impression that it is the Kalam cosmological argument. That's not his fault, but it certainly is the case, and one thing I wanted to get across was that the Kalam argument presented by the theologians side steps the problems that plague Craig's version. We all know Craig's argument: (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause, (2) The universe began to exist, (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. Yet in order to get his argument off the ground, it requires that the totality of past events forms an actuality, and that an actual infinite is not possible, and on the grounds of modern science, no less, which is subject to changing scientific literature. If there are any concepts in philosophy that could take up a whole library, it is time and infinity. With the other argument, however, you don't need to defend anything more than presentism and the existence of bodies and accidents, which are uncontroversial. Take a look at the argument:
      Step 1: All bodies exist with accidents like color, motion, position, and size, which they can't exist without.
      Step 2: All accidents, superadded to the essences of bodies, are originated, since they come into being at a specific time and don't last forever.
      Step 3: If a body always has accidents, and all those accidents begin in time, then the body itself must also begin in time (this follows, since a body can't be eternal if it cannot exist without accidents, which are temporal.)
      Step 4: An infinite series of past accidents in a body is impossible because each accident, whether it exists or once existed, is originated; but if the totality accidents have are originated, then the totality cannot be beginningless, and is therefore finite (You can't have a whole made of infinitely many things that all began to exist.)

      Delete
    3. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 11:43 AM

      Step 5: But whatever has a beginning is finite, not infinite, so there must be a first accident, and consequently, a beginning to the body
      Step 6: Since all bodies begin in time (they are contingent), the totality of bodies depends on a first cause that itself does not begin in time (necessary). This is so, since it is impossible for originated things to bring themselves into being, nor can they arise by chance, nor from a chain of other originated things extending infinitely into the past, for such a chain would also, as a whole, require a cause.
      Step 7: This first cause, therefore, must be eternal, not composed, not a body, and not subject to change or accidents, all of which entail origination (the Ashʿari’ and Maturidi’ theologians, in an attempt to secure God's free will against the necessitarianism of Avicenna, and some Muʿtazila, proposed that the attributes, which I will establish in following steps, are addition but not separate from the essence, although their arguments are not terribly convincing).
      Step 8: But whatever is without beginning or end, body or composition, change or accidents, is totally simple and independent, and therefore, perfect. If He were imperfect, He would lack something essential and depend on something else, which not only contradicts His independence, but also implies His potential to change or improve, which contradicts His necessary, unchanging nature.
      Step 9: If the cause of the world acted by necessity, then the world would be eternal. But the world is temporal and contingent, which implies that its existence was selected from among many possibilities. Therefore, the Creator did not act by necessity, but by free volition. Therefore, the necessary, unoriginated cause must possess a will.
      Step 10: The first cause brought everything that exists into being; he must have power over all originated things. If His power were limited, then either something outside Him limits His power, or His power is inherently incomplete. But it cannot be the first, because he would then be dependent on something outside himself, which means that he cannot be perfect after all. But neither can it be that second, since that too would contradict the perfection of the first cause. Therefore, He must have the power to create and control all that is possible.
      Step 11: Since the first cause chose when, how, and what to create, he must have awareness of all possibilities. To choose deliberately, one must know all available options; without knowledge, no intentional choice is possible. If His knowledge were limited or imperfect, however, He would be deficient, which contradicts His necessary, independent, and perfect nature.
      Step 12: Lastly, they derive "life" (most of the kalam theologians referred to the divine attributes in the equivocal or analogical sense, though al-Razi preferred the univocal), since nothing without life can possess knowledge, will, and power. They also derived attributes such as "hearing," "sight," and "speech," since it would be an imperfection for the first cause to lack these traits.

      It just seems to work so much better, thoughts?

      Delete
    4. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 11:59 AM

      I forgot to add that the first cause must also be one, since, per Leibniz's law of Indescriminables, the first cause can be one, and only one.

      Delete
    5. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 12:23 PM

      I would also add that the universe itself must also be temporal (which blocks the object that this argument has only established that the bodies within the universe are temporally originated, and not the universe itself), since they define time as the measure of motion, and all other changes such as motion and rest, expansion and contraction, composition, de-composition, color, shape, and so on as inhering in bodies and substrates, and so on. So, unless the universe is none of these things, which is clearly false, then the universe is not devoid accidents, and is therefore temporal.

      Delete
    6. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 10:57 PM

      The problem with this argument is that rest is not an accident. It is the deprivation of motion. Also, it is conceivable for a body without any accidents to exist

      Delete
    7. TalmidJuly 8, 2025 at 5:46 AM

      "Also, it is conceivable for a body without any accidents to exist"

      Is it? Does not any body need to have accidents like size, circunference, temperature etc?

      Delete
  6. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 2:56 PM

    What is your opinion on Scotus's and Ockham's proofs for God?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. MJRJune 30, 2025 at 9:21 PM

      Read God and Atheism by Bernardino Bonansea. It's the best book on Duns Scotus's argument for God's existence. You can find it used or via interlibrary loan.

      Delete
  7. NoArtworkJune 30, 2025 at 3:24 PM

    Does anybody think about the plight of The Thing?

    The man got touched, gained a monstrous body, but due to second-order effects, is stuck with it and never go back to a more intelligent existence. He ends up making peace with the gain of entropy in his life.

    What about Mikuru from The Melancholy of Haruhi Suzumiya? Haruhi was about to Lot's Wife-ify Mikuru and make her the Bride of The Thing... but out of mercy she stayed her hand.

    Can H. Sapiens sapiens put up with these kinds of potentials indefinitely? What if he chooses wrong? Should he walk around with pins and needles, afraid that one wrong move and... :O?

    ReplyDelete
  8. bmillerJune 30, 2025 at 3:37 PM

    Friday will be the 4th of July, the celebration of the birth of the USA.

    What do American citizens owe their country?

    Aquinas on piety and country:

    I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. On the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.

    The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these....

    I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue....

    God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father."

    So you Americans. This Friday, make sure you praise God and ask God to bless your parents and God bless the USA.

    ReplyDelete
  9. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 4:12 PM

    I misspelled “already” as “Larry” earlier.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. bmillerJune 30, 2025 at 7:59 PM

      Thank goodness. For a minute I thought we had a rare Larrian heretic in the house!

      Delete
    2. EricJuly 1, 2025 at 5:40 PM

      Indeed. I was going to inquire about Larry's attributes.

      Delete
  10. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 4:27 PM

    I was very sad to read the Magisterium AI answer on Hallow when I asked for a history of the Church teachings on Capital Punishment. The response seemed highly curated and white-washed. I even followed up asking how it was Scripture endorsed CP on principle. Is it possible to challenge these AI to educate them or is the fix in ?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. MJRJune 30, 2025 at 9:26 PM

      Can't challenge AI. CP is technically permissible per the Catechism but imprisonment is preferred.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 5:51 AM

      You have no ability to impact the model training as a user, though you could potentially get it to output what you want if you use the right prompts. I think Hallow has a reporting feature if you want to submit a complaint. I'm assuming MAI uses a base model from one of the big tech companies and then does some custom training of the model on Church documents. That means any biases present in the base model will likely filter down to the custom model.

      Delete
  11. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 4:46 PM

    Why so many Anonymous posts?

    ReplyDelete
  12. Scott BuchananJune 30, 2025 at 5:14 PM

    Hi Prof Feser,

    I've noticed a greater frequency of posts on concrete political matters (especially as they concern the actions of the Trump Administration) and less on purely abstract or philosophical issues. I'm certainly not complaining -- I've found such posts to be quite stimulating -- but I was curious as to what prompted this (apparent) change in focus.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Edward FeserJune 30, 2025 at 7:00 PM

      Hi Scott, in my view, the moral integrity of right-of-center politics has been under severe strain over the last year or so (the sellout on abortion and IVF being the most obvious example) and this calls for resistance. That is one reason for the larger number of posts on those topics. Another reason is that since I became a regular contributor to Postliberal Order, the goal has been to try to write an article a month for them. Naturally, that entails writing regularly on topics related to political philosophy.

      Delete
    2. Scott BuchananJune 30, 2025 at 8:09 PM

      Of course. Particularly in relation to the first point, I can see the need for such analysis. This is especially so, given that Trump usually inspires either irrational hostility or obsequious devotion. Your articles have offered a reasoned corrective to these twin extremes.

      Delete
    3. Edward FeserJune 30, 2025 at 8:11 PM

      Much appreciated, Scott, thanks

      Delete
    4. MJRJune 30, 2025 at 9:14 PM

      I miss the philosophy and theology. Anyone can Google up arguments for and against political issues. It's not so easy to do with philosophical and theological matters.

      Delete
    5. NormJuly 2, 2025 at 4:52 AM

      I find myself often confused by Prof's political tweets sometimes.

      Right wing commentary seems to be really all over the place these days.

      I tend to follow catholic figures predominantly.

      But there's often no fixed or determinate structure.

      I think part of the reason is that there is lack of qualification of what they agree with and what they don't when they promote each other's thoughts.

      For example, Prof Chad Pecknold seems content with this new bill and generally speaking seems to concur with the administration often except on issues of intrinsic evil like abortion, IVF etc.

      Sohrab Ahmari is often critical of the administration and he is also critical of the bill but he is critical of the bill for its objectives not because of excessive spending.

      Prof Feser on the other hand is critical of this bill precisely because of the concerns of the debt. Although at the same time Prof recently promoted Hungary's pro family policy. This I think would be consistent with his academic thoughts on government aid, which basically respects the principles of subsidiarity and advocates for govt aid only when necessary.

      I think Prof's position is a middle ground.

      But here's my issue, someone like Sohrab Ahmari is very close to the position of "First fix society and make it more convenient before trying to legislate against abortion".

      This position has been rightly resisted by pro lifers for years. There's a difference between being incremental in one's goals to prevent abortion and to out right use arguments that can undermine the very cause.

      Prof has very admirably defended the cause of pro lifers against Trump's gutting of the platform.It seems to me that Prof has much less in common with a lot of his fellow "post liberals" then he might have initially thought.

      https://x.com/SohrabAhmari/status/1810123836207055233?t=cvDGfUXzSUM9g0yz6QyI4Q&s=19

      It seems to me that there is so much potential in sharing and promoting the work of eminent natural law theorists like Dr Steven Jensen, Dr J Budziszewiski, Dr Feser himself, Fr Kevin Flannery all of whom have made substantial contributions towards illuminating the philosophy on this extremely important issue which concerns the most fundamental and basic right to life.

      It seems unfortunate that we are now at a point where arguments of the kind Ahmari ,like the one above in that tweet,has put forth on abortion seem to have gained a lot of prominence in conservative circles.

      Do take note Prof.

      Cheers

      Delete
  13. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 6:47 PM

    Help me understand how to respond to an argument for naturalism from Hume and Mill and developed by Gilbert Fulmer and David Ramsey Steele. You can find the argument in Gilbert Fulmer’s The Concept of the Supernatural and in Steele’s Atheism Explained.

    The argument is that idea of a supernatural creating agent is incoherent because the power of any agent must reflect some natural fact that lies outside of that being’s creative power. Theists can say God’s omnipotence implies that He exists prior to all natural laws, which He determined and could have chosen to be entirely different. Even the impersonal laws of physics, like E=mc2, originate from the mind of God. The rule could apply to the laws we know, but it cannot hold in all cases. There must be deeper, more fundamental principles to which God is subject: it must be the case, for example, that whatever God wills comes about with absolute certainty. It could be the case that what God wills occurs exactly 50% of the time, or it could be the case that what God wills occurs, but with some inaccuracies. God cannot make it true that everything He wills comes about, it must be a prior existing natural regularity to which God is subject.

    The first thing that comes to mind is that the view of natural laws is incorrect. There are no natural laws imposed on a material world as if by decree. What we describe as natural laws are a description of how things behave given their natures or essences. It isn’t a prior existing law that what God decrees comes about, but simply a description of how things would occur given God’s nature.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 1, 2025 at 5:03 AM

      I think you hit the nail on the head with your last paragraph. It seems like maybe they’re begging the question.

      Delete
    2. JordanJuly 1, 2025 at 5:56 AM

      Your response is the correct one, I'd say. "Natural laws" aren't exterior forces acting on material things. The force of gravity is applied by one object to another, not imposed on both objects "from the outside." Similarly, the truth that "whatever God wills comes about" comes from his nature and is not something he is subject to.

      Delete
    3. TonyJuly 1, 2025 at 7:18 AM

      There must be deeper, more fundamental principles to which God is subject:

      This is true-in-a-sense but also partly unfruitful. God is (in some sense) "bound" by his being divine - he cannot be LIKE dependent creatures, he is "forced" by his "nature" to be perfectly divine in every way. But "nature" here is used analogously, because (unlike with us, where our nature is received according to a specific (divine) plan of subordination to a hierarchy of good, wherein our natures express an ordination to certain goods and not to others), God's "nature" is TO BE all possible goodness, simply, wholly, at once and eternally, not as received but fully in act as completely possessed and active. God therefore knows actively all that might exist if he were to will its existence, but he is not "forced" by his nature to create all such: he is free to create this or that good. And in creating a world of contingent goods (including some with free will), he can will that some things happen in a necessary manner (deterministic causality) while other things happen contingently (non-deterministically), if that's the kind of universe he freely decides to create. In his creation of some laws that operate without contingency (e.g. fundamental aspects of the universe, like force and wave functions) he isn't bound to make all secondary causality operate like that.

      Delete
    4. TalmidJuly 1, 2025 at 8:21 AM

      Barring some theists like Ockham, Descartes and some muslim theological schools i don't think this is to theists problematic at all. The more popular western theistic views tend to reflect a more "platonic" view of there being necessary essences and truths about God and about possible creation, these are not existing things completely beside God, but also not created by Him like creation is.

      St. Augustine take that these eternal truths even imply the existence of God even pressuposes that relation. Dr. Feser defended the argument before.

      Delete
    5. ccmnxcJuly 2, 2025 at 7:40 AM

      I think you also simply have an implicit denial of the cosmological argument(s) here. If there must be something more fundamental than God which is outside of Him, then that thing/principle/law is itself going to be subject to the same problem. So you end up with a vicious regress or circular causation. But if these are impossible, then it's going to have to bottom out somewhere.

      So if the cosmological argument is true, then they will need to provide a reason why this law governing God's action is truly fundamental. Otherwise the objection is simply incorrect.

      Delete
  14. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 7:20 PM

    Help me understand this. If Divine Simplicity implies that God's will is no different from his intellect, doesn't it follow that He must will into existence everything that he knows simply by knowing them?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The ShadowJune 30, 2025 at 8:11 PM

      No, because He wills and knows some things as existing, and others as not existing.

      Delete
    2. The ShadowJune 30, 2025 at 8:19 PM

      To put it another way, God's knowledge doesn't passively respond to things the way ours does - it *creates* things.

      Delete
  15. The ShadowJune 30, 2025 at 8:18 PM

    Here's something I've wondered about for a while.

    Traditionally, angels are thought of as a one-dimensional sequence, with each angel having ones immediately above and below (save for the first and last, of course).

    Angels are differentiated by the number of ideas by which they know God and other things - fewer being more Godlike and thus higher.

    But why should the sequence be one-dimensional? Couldn't one angel know everything by 17 ideas, and another by 17 quite different ideas that carve reality up differently?

    I don't think that would make them the same species, though no doubt "all angels of 17 ideas" would be a genus.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. NLRJuly 1, 2025 at 5:30 AM

      I have had the same thought.

      Would they be in a linear order versus a partial order. For instance, if you order the natural numbers as 1, 2, 3, ... you get a linear order. But you can also order them by their prime factors. Where one number is greater than another (in the partial order), if its prime factors are a subset of another. (See this diagram for an example (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasse_diagram#/media/File:Lattice_of_the_divisibility_of_60.svg)).

      Even just following from the Scholastic-Aristotelian conception of angels, they don't have to form a linear order; it could be a partial order. I think the simplicity and its connection to the Great Chain of Being idea are what have attracted people to the linear order idea. But it doesn't have to be that way.

      Delete
    2. TonyJuly 1, 2025 at 6:48 AM

      I had never heard that the traditional view held a single line of greater and lesser among angels, and always assumed that they were in a hierarchy as rich (or more rich) in variety and complexity as the natural living things' kingdoms. And as complex as the complexity of mathematical entities (like geometrical figures) and so on, which inhabit a complex system of genera. The mere fact that there is an intelligibility to their "greater" and "lesser" among them doesn't preclude this, as with our better-known hierarchies.

      Delete
    3. The ShadowJuly 1, 2025 at 6:42 PM

      NLR: The trouble with a partial order is that it leaves some angels strictly incomparable, which I don't think many people, and certainly not any medieval, would tolerate.

      Tony: On the Thomistic view, each angel is a distinct species, and thus differ in dignity, much as animals are higher than plants and plants higher than inanimate objects. Further, Pseudo-Dionysius had said that even in each choir there was first, middle, and last.

      I suppose that my hypothetical 17-idea angels wouldn't excel each other in dignity in any obvious way, and thus St. Thomas might have argued they would be the same species, which is impossible?

      On the Scotist view it would be otherwise, but I'm convinced by St. Thomas' arguments that matter is necessary to differentiate individuals of a species.

      Delete
    4. NLRJuly 1, 2025 at 8:52 PM

      Yes, some would be incomparable in a partial order. Though I think that is implied by what your earlier example about two angels each with 17 different ideas. The collections of ideas which the two angels possess cannot be compared as either greater or lesser. Or it would require an additional assumption about how ideas must work in order to compare them. I agree that many would not favor such an idea, but what's wrong with angels having complementary, though distinct, roles?

      Mainly, I put forward the partial order as a natural expansion of the linear order idea, but I don't think that angels actually do follow either a partial or a linear order. I really have no idea.

      The scholastic theologians were good men as well as being intelligent, but I don't think their idea of incorporeality fully captures what is beyond the material world we know. We don't have enough experience of it to form the proper ideas.

      Delete
    5. The ShadowJuly 2, 2025 at 9:18 AM

      NLR: A graded poset would formalize the idea of angels that are equal but not identical, I suppose.

      Delete
    6. NoArtworkJuly 2, 2025 at 6:26 PM

      @The Shadow Angles that are congruent but not identical to the representative angle are formalized by cosets, not posets.

      Delete
    7. TonyJuly 2, 2025 at 7:52 PM

      Tony: On the Thomistic view, each angel is a distinct species, and thus differ in dignity, much as animals are higher than plants and plants higher than inanimate objects. Further, Pseudo-Dionysius had said that even in each choir there was first, middle, and last.

      Shadow, I am still not getting it. I know that Aquinas held each angel is a distinct species, and have no problem with that. If you assumed (as analogy) that in every species of animal, there is (by happenstance) at the moment only 1 instance of that species, (and the same for plants), nothing prevents that within one phylum, animals from one order to be better than the animals of another order, even if within each order, all of them might (by supposition) be arranged from first to last in dignity. Or, that ONLY SOME of the animals of Order A are better than some of the animals of Order B, but not all. The key issue is the distinguishing principles, and since there can be MANY DIFFERENT distinguishing principles going from phylum to classes, and from classes to orders, etc, (because there are many different orders within a single class). The Phylum Arthropoda has a zillion different classes within, and then below those classes there will be more zillions of families. If there are 20 different distinctions that set apart the classes of Arthropoda, there might be an ordering between those distinguishing principles that sets them from 1 to 20 in terms of more and less, and yet if there are 25 dividing principles within Class A, and 30 dividing principles within Class B, and again 15 dividing principles within Class A1, and 18 within class B2, it is possible that some of the dividing principles for A1 cause the genus A1n to be lesser in being than the genus of B3k, even though generically A is better than B.

      Analogously: dog breeds can be put on a scale of intelligence (or better, one ONE of the scales of intelligence, because there are several), so that as a breed collies are a lot smarter than Irish setters. But one particular strain of collies, due to being bred for some other trait (say, gentleness), loses some of the typical intelligence of collies and that whole strain ends up dumber than Irish setters. Apply to the differentiating principles of genuses: as long as there are MANY principles of differentiation from a higher level to lower, there will be a multiply-valent system of being, but this doesn't imply a system impossible for God to assign values.

      The trouble with a partial order is that it leaves some angels strictly incomparable,

      I don't think that holds: I think that even if we can't tell if insects are higher or lower than arachnids in the order of being, that doesn't prevent one being greater in being than the other though both are directly "under" Arthropoda. God can know which is more and which is less, even if we don't.

      Delete
    8. TonyJuly 2, 2025 at 8:08 PM

      Because we are only barely beings with intellect (i.e. the lowest sort), and muddled by sin clouding the intellect at that, we understand the mind only poorly. One aspect of that is having poor ability to set forth the right way to separate ideas: it is clear that some ideas are quite distinct from others, while others are closely related, and (perhaps) others are "same" in some sense while "not-same" in some other sense, and so on. The diversification and separation is open to development, and it is unlikely that the final result will be a result that sets forth that there are some specific number X of concepts. The division of ideas is richer than that of the distinction of number. So, while it might be that the principal cause of dignity between angelic classes would be the simplicity of their thought under which they grasp truth more fully, that need not correspond to a NUMBER of root concepts. And the fact of their being 9 choirs might indicate divisions of kinds of thinking (beyond any kinds we have access to) which are diverse in dignity but according to more than 1 differentiating principle. (Would pretty much have to be according to more than 1 principle to get 8 divisions).

      So where NLR says I agree that many would not favor such an idea, but what's wrong with angels having complementary, though distinct, roles?

      I think this is well defensible: There could be several KINDS of divisions of the ways of conceiving truth, and it would still be possible for God to set forth where each one is with respect to others.

      Delete
  16. AnonymousJune 30, 2025 at 9:13 PM

    Hey Professor,

    I've read several of your works and I think one of your great strengths is putting classical Thomistic thinking in conversation with the best and most current thinking in analytic philosophy.

    I've noticed a lot of integralists/thomistic political thinkers spend a lot of their energy on the "major thinkers"' of liberalism. Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau being the big contenders. Many integralist manuals seem to act as if the 20th century never happened. I have a feeling that this is a result of training for many in the classical/great books tradition. It also comports with a narrative I've heard in catholic circles which tends to pin point most of society's ills on the "autonomous" individual who was brought into existence by Luther/Calvin and came to fruition in the excesses of Kant and the dreaded Nihilism/Existentialism of the early 20th century.

    Have you ever considered writing a work on political theory in a similar vein to your "Scholastic Metaphysics," "On the Soul," and "Aristotle's revenge." Shouldn't there be a catholic interaction with the best that liberalism has to offer. Why does it seem that we write books and articles rehearsing the same arguments against Hobbes and Locke, but we don't touch Rawls, Nozick, Cohen, Dworkin, Miller, Sandel, Kekes, Nussbaum, and others. (Your work on Hayek excepted). Wouldn't we do better to interact with the best that the other side has to offer rather than attack Kant for the 30th time?

    Sure it would be a massive project, but surely it is much needed. Hearing Integralists argue is about as frustrating as listening to a metaphsyican speak as though Scotus was the last real thinker and Kripke and Quine et al. had never existed. Any thoughts?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 1, 2025 at 4:58 AM

      I’ve been looking for something similar. Haven’t started reading it yet, but I’m hoping Hittinger’s On the Dignity of Society will come close (although I don’t know if he’ll engage with those liberal thinkers directly).

      Delete
  17. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 12:30 AM

    There's an interesting article by Richard Johns called "Why Physicalism Seems to Be (and Is) Incompatible with Intentionality." I've brought it up before in the comments section of a previous article on this blog (Immortal Souls in Religion & Liberty), but I didn't get a response. And because this is an open thread, so it should be more "on-topic" here, I think it's alright to briefly bring it up once more. Here's the link to the article itself: https://www.newdualism.org/papers-Jul2020/Johns-ActaAnalytica2020_WhyPhysicalismSeemsToBeAndIsIn.pdf

    The entire article is well worth a read, especially because it at least tries to deal with several potential counterarguments. But an extremely simplified summary of the main argument as I understand it is:

    - Physicalism (as defined in the paper) entails that all existing properties are perfectly intelligible to a sufficiently powerful mind. For instance, physics describes the world in mathematical terms, and in principle, a mind could understand everything about mathematics (of course, some things may be too complex for human minds specifically to know, but that's different from something that no mind could understand in principle).
    - We can think about physical properties, and under physicalism, thoughts are physical. So physicalism means some physical properties (including collections of physical properties) are inherently "about" physical properties, and conceptual transparency means a sufficiently powerful mind would be able to logically derive this fact from knowledge of the relevant physical properties (for instance, Laplace's Demon with full knowledge of every physical thing).
    - A physical thought about a physical property either possesses that physical property itself, or it does not. And if thoughts are physical, a thought about a thought is a thought about a physical property. We can think about how physicalism leads to this - for instance, "Some states do not have the physical property they are about." But then a contradiction arises - that thought itself has the property it is about if and only if it does not have that property!

    This does require that intentionality exists and therefore that eliminative materialism is false, but the author briefly states that denying intentionality seems to be self-defeating, and I agree. While I certainly don't agree with everything Dr. Feser says, I think that while it's a somewhat different argument, it could be used to further support his view that meaning and intentionality cannot be reduced to facts that don't themselves mention those concepts, such as facts about causal relationships in the physical world.

    I have been reading many sophisticated attempts to "naturalize" intentionality, including some new ones which I'm not sure whether Dr. Feser has discussed yet. If this new argument works (and I'm not sure if it does), it seems like it would really prove that intentionality can't be physical, no matter how sophisticated physicalists get at trying to show otherwise. I really wonder what the readers and commenters, especially materialists, here think about this argument.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 1, 2025 at 4:52 AM

      Feser has covered another angle of attack here: Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought (https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf).

      Delete
    2. Step2July 1, 2025 at 8:12 AM

      Anonymous,
      Einstein famously called the entanglement aspect of quantum mechanics "spooky action at a distance." Another obscure aspect of motion can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJZ1Ez28C-A

      Explaining biology in terms of chemistry and then chemistry in terms of physics may provide some specific, limited understanding but generally once you extract an emergent property from its normal context you disrupt its clarity.

      I'll skip to the chase and point out animals have memories, intent, communication, ability to navigate and various social drives and behavioral programming. If you want to claim immaterial souls based on those same elements for humans it seems highly implausible they could be denied for other animals.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 11:05 AM

      WOLF BRONSKY, thanks for mentioning the other article. I've read it too (Edward Feser has brought it up a few times before). I know there have been a few criticisms of "Immaterial Aspects of Thought" before, but I haven't really seen any formal criticism of Johns' article, likely because it is so obscure, and I think it might deserve more attention. (Actually, Richard Johns did give a more informal presentation of the argument, specifically discussing the simulation hypothesis, in Medium: https://medium.com/predict/no-were-not-living-in-a-simulation-5baedebe987e and there were two critical comments. The author responded to one, and I agree that one seems to be missing the main point. The other one was a bare statement that computer technology and AI will progress, which, while true, is also not a specific counterargument to the main point.)

      Step2, thanks for the reply! It's particularly nice to see a materialist responding. However, unfortunately I'm not sure what counterarguments specific to this new argument you are making. About your mention of context, Johns does discuss externalism and states that the argument still works even then (the relevant physical facts to know will then include facts about the environment as well as facts about the thinker). In fact, the mention of Laplace's demon means the paradox still seems to apply - under the relevant physicalist assumptions - even with knowledge of every single physical fact that exists. If your mention of context is referring to something else, a clarification would be nice. Are you saying, for instance, that there are physical properties that no mind, however powerful, could ever fully understand even in principle?

      As for nonhuman animals, I'm not a Thomist (I am just interested in learning more about that philosophy because it is an uncommon one in modern times, and so I can critique it better). I have no fundamental problem with the idea that nonhuman animals may have immaterial souls (or properties) - for all I know, they do. With that said, it's unclear whether nonhuman animals can conceptualize physical properties or thoughts in the general way humans can (even if animals can think about specific examples of physical properties). Note that the argument requires a thinker who can think about all physical properties as a general class, and how (the relevant definition of) physicalism means that all existing thoughts are physical. This does not mean that the thinker must be able to comprehend every specific example of a physical property, because some may be too complex, but we must still be able to think about "physical properties" in general for physicalism to have any meaning for us. For another example, we can think about (and write mathematical proofs for) "all integers" as a class, even though some specific integers are so big that they could not fit in the entire observable universe.

      Delete
    4. SMackJuly 2, 2025 at 12:26 AM

      Whether or not it works, OP, this sounds like a beautiful attempt.

      Delete
    5. The DeuceJuly 2, 2025 at 1:05 AM

      Very neat article. I'll give my own summary of what Johns has shown, and where it overlaps with what Ed has said previously.

      As Ed has pointed out before, words in human language have no intrinsic meaning. For instance, the word "cat," whether spoken or written, is in and of itself objectively just meaningless sound waves or squiggly lines on a surface. It refers to cats only by virtue of human convention. Its meaning is extrinsic and derived from the human thoughts about cats that it is used to communicate. Its meaning is also for this reason subjective. There is no objective fact of the matter about what the sound waves or marks on a surface mean, just what human subjects by convention assign to them. The same marks could have a completely different meaning or no meaning in another language.

      Now, human thoughts cannot likewise have meaning in a way that is purely extrinsic, subjective, and derivative from human thought, because that results in a vicious regress. The options are thus to acknowledge that human thoughts have meaning in a way that is intrinsic and objective, or to deny that they have real meaning at all (which is what eliminativists do).

      Furthermore, the truth value of any human thought that expresses a proposition depends on the meaning of the thought. So if human thoughts do not have intrinsic and objective meaning, neither can any proposition that human beings think about (such as physicalism) be objectively true or false.

      Now, I think that this is sufficient on its own to disprove physicalism. If you are acknowledging that my belief that the Big Bang happened is intrinsically, objectively, as-a-matter-of-fact about the Big Bang such that it can be objectively true, or that my belief that physicalism is false is intrinsically and objectively about physicalism, etc, you have already abandoned physicalism. To acknowledge such intrinsic meaning as an objectively real feature of the world but to still call yourself a "physicalist" is a purely rhetorical move that only serves to drain that word of meaning.

      But there is more that a philosopher could say to build on this. For instance, Ed has shown in the paper Wolf linked above that human thought must be immaterial, and not just according to the mechanistic (or "transparent" in John's words) conception of matter advocated by physicalists, but also according to the broader conception of matter allowed by Aristotelians. This is because for thoughts to be objectively truth or false requires that they have a determinacy of content or meaning that nothing material (even by the broader non-mechanistic Aristotelian concept of matter) can have in principle.

      Delete
    6. The DeuceJuly 2, 2025 at 1:06 AM

      (cont)

      Johns, meanwhile, has provided a formal proof of what I said two paragraphs previously: that thoughts cannot possibly have intrinsic and objective meaning given the premises of physicalism. I think this is obvious on its face, but someone who is strongly ideologically committed to physicalism yet who doesn't want to give up on the idea of objective truth (eg a militant atheist who doesn't try to have his cake and eat it too regardless. To that end a formal demonstration is helpful.

      Johns' proof works like this. First, he proves that it is logically impossible for any language to be self-interpreting. What he means by that is that it is impossible for the semantics of any language to be derived from its syntactical rules alone. A language is any formal system for expressing propositional meaning, consisting of symbols that carry individual meaning (aka the semantics of the language, such as the word "cat" and the meaning it carries in English, or the numerals and mathematical symbols in the in the language of arithmetic) and formal "transparent" rules for connecting those symbols together to express propositions. That is to say, the meaning of the symbols used in any language are necessarily extrinsic and derived like the word "cat" in English. He demonstrates this by showing that the idea of a language's syntax determining its semantics necessarily results in contradictions.

      He then shows that, given the premises of physicalism, human thought must be a language in that sense. Given physicalism, reality reduces to a few transparent formal rules (the laws of physics) that dictate how all things behave. These are the syntax of the language. Human thoughts, under physicalism, are just physical configurations of matter that (assuming the physicalist rejects eliminativism) somehow carry meanings like words, and the way they connect together to express propositions is governed by the syntax (the laws of physics) just like anything else. Hence Johns' proof applies and shows that thoughts can have no intrinsic and objective meaning (and hence propositions expressed by the no objective truth value) under physicalism.

      I think his proof absolutely succeeds. I don't think it will dissuade physicalists though, who are already in stubborn defiance of logic to begin with. It's not just the intrinsic and objective meaning of human thought that cannot possibly exist under physicalist premises. NOTHING above the smallest particles governed by the laws of physics can objectively exist given physicalism. To say that some collection of particles comprises a singular whole entity (such as a cat or a human being or a thought with meaning) as a matter of objective fact is implicitly to appeal to the Aristotelean concept of substantial form, and thus to reject physicalism. NO objective wholes are implied by the laws of physics alone. Physicalism thus entails radical nominalism and subjectivism at first glance, that all so-called "emergent" properties only appear to exist as a matter of subjective human projection. But since human subjects and their thoughts also cannot objectively exist given physicalism, and thus can't actually project anything, on closer inspection it entails absolute eliminativism. Since this doesn't make physicalists give up their position, I can't imagine anything else will.

      Delete
    7. Step2July 2, 2025 at 9:08 AM

      Anonymous,
      "Are you saying, for instance, that there are physical properties that no mind, however powerful, could ever fully understand even in principle?"

      I would say the uncertainty principle requires a fundamental degree of indeterminacy of physical fact. Therefore I believe it is consistent under physicalism to say that Laplace’s demon must be fiction.

      To clarify my previous claim, emergent phenomena are analytically nonreductive. So insisting upon linear correspondence between different contextual "levels" produces these sorts of abstract puzzles that aren’t really there.

      Delete
    8. AnonymousJuly 2, 2025 at 11:42 PM

      (Part 1)

      SMack, nice. (I can't say "thank you" because I'm not the one who thought of this argument). The Deuce, I do thank you for your summary, which is much better than my own. The author's attempt to bring mathematical rigor to this topic is certainly interesting, even if I can't be completely sure there isn't a hidden fallacy somewhere. I have read Dr. Feser's arguments about the indeterminacy of the physical, including his claim that no matter how many physical facts we knew, they would not by themselves fix a single determinate meaning. I'd been thinking "How do we know that knowing more physical facts doesn't reduce the number of viable interpretations, so that knowing enough physical facts could let us figure out the correct definite interpretation after all?"

      This is more tangential, but I'm not actually sure about the claim that under physicalism, there is no way to say that a collection of particles objectively constitutes a single entity. I've heard it not just here, but elsewhere, including from people who didn't seem to have nonphysicalist views. However, why doesn't the criterion that the collection of particles must be attracted with strong enough bonds (a criterion that can be expressed in terms of physics) work? It seems to me that a pebble, for instance, is composed of atoms that are strongly bonded to each other and at most much more weakly bonded to the pebble's surroundings, such as soil, air, or water. If you broke the pebble into two pieces, those pieces would be two separate objects because the atomic bonds between the two pieces were broken. Nevertheless, whether physics can explain consciousness or intentionality is a separate problem, and as shown by the Ship of Theseus paradox, it has issues with identity over time as well. Though I'm somewhat inclined towards the idea that there are no objective facts about identity over time, at least for mindless objects (even if Thomists might disagree), the idea that consciousness or intentionality themselves are illusions seems far less plausible and coherent, to say the least.

      Delete
    9. AnonymousJuly 2, 2025 at 11:43 PM

      (Part 2)

      Step2, well... are you a strong emergentist, who believes that there are biological, chemical, etc. phenomena that cannot be deduced even in principle from the underlying physical laws? Because a lot of people, especially physicalists, would argue that those phenomena could be deduced from the laws of physics in principle, even if it's too complex in practice. The interpretation of the uncertainty principle is controversial - it's unclear whether it is merely about our inability to fully measure the physical facts, or more than that, and I don't think it's a barrier to reductionism by itself.

      But I agree that Laplace's demon can't actually exist in the physical universe. The mention was simply to claim that even all the physical facts together cannot fix intentional content. Could a smaller set of some physical facts (about a thinker and perhaps some environmental details, something that a mind inside the universe could know in principle) do the trick by itself? In fact, reductionists about intentionality generally believe it can, in my experience. And if someone says that only all the physical facts in the whole universe determine meaning, that raises the question of how we can know the meanings of our own thoughts, given that we don't know all the physical facts. I think really, the question is whether intentionality can be reduced to any set of facts that can themselves be described in fully nonintentional terms. Do you think it can, or that it cannot be?

      Alright, let's cut to the chase. If the physical facts are indeterminate (as you seem to accept), but thought is determinate, then it seems that thought cannot be physical and physicalism is false. To maintain physicalism, it seems that either you must explain how determinate thought can somehow emerge from indeterminate physical facts (and still be entirely physical), or deny that thought is in fact ever determinate. And if you take the latter, eliminativist position, you need to explain how it can be coherent - how we can rationally understand, much less accept, any view if all our thoughts are indeterminate. (I would be especially interested in seeing how we can accept physicalism if we cannot think about physical properties. There are some arguments that "physical" is not actually well-defined, but those arguments therefore conclude that "physicalism" is not a well-defined position either).

      Delete
    10. The DeuceJuly 3, 2025 at 10:30 AM

      I'm not actually sure about the claim that under physicalism, there is no way to say that a collection of particles objectively constitutes a single entity. I've heard it not just here, but elsewhere, including from people who didn't seem to have nonphysicalist views. However, why doesn't the criterion that the collection of particles must be attracted with strong enough bonds (a criterion that can be expressed in terms of physics) work?

      Well, let's break this down. If bonds above a certain strength constitute an object, there must be some basis by which this is the case.

      Is it because bonds over a certain strength seem to you to be an object? In that case, you've offered a purely nominalistic, subjective basis, not an objective one.

      On the other hand, let's say that it's an objective mind-independent fact of the universe that bonds over a certain strength constitute a singular object. We'll leave aside for the moment why that might be. When matter takes on a form such that its bonds are above that strength, you have an object as a matter of fact. In that case, bond strength over the threshold constitutes a substantial form in the Aristotelian sense.

      In neither case, however, does the bond strength itself tell you what bond strength is the cutoff. But bond strength itself is all that physics tells you or could ever tell you as long as physics consists of quantitative mathematical relationships and measurements.

      Delete
    11. Step2July 3, 2025 at 11:37 AM

      Anonymous,
      "I think really, the question is whether intentionality can be reduced to any set of facts that can themselves be described in fully nonintentional terms."

      I consider it a contextual problem. So if someone assembles a pile of quartz and runs electricity through it, it would be outlandish to assume it could run a software program. If the silicon is purified and shaped into a transistor and multitudes of other factors are present, it is entirely expected to run the software and any discussion of silicon-based computation, which I assume you agree is physical, is only coherent within that specific context.

      "To maintain physicalism, it seems that either you must explain how determinate thought can somehow emerge from indeterminate physical facts (and still be entirely physical), or deny that thought is in fact ever determinate."

      I don't claim any expertise, but it seems like some modality of programs used in robotics could explain data filtering and focused movement which registers biologically as intentionality because of various integrated drives not found in robots.

      I will note the dispute about the meaning of the uncertainty principle implies thoughts are subject to controversy and revision, which doesn't bode well for being determinate and suggests a dependence upon agreement.

      Delete
    12. AnonymousJuly 3, 2025 at 11:04 PM

      Okay, I think I see where you're coming from, The Deuce. I agree that physics itself doesn't give us a definition of "object." However, I feel that if our existing definition of "object" turns out to be expressible in terms that can be explained in physics (for instance, physics can explain why matter sticks together), then we have a physical explanation of objects. I could say more on the topic of what an object is, but I'm not sure whether I want to right now because it's more of a tangent than the main topic of this comment thread. (Though to draw a connection, I would say a similar thing about the definition of "intentionality" as well as "object" - if we can define intentionality in terms expressible in physics, then intentionality is reducible to physics. However, the question is whether intentionality is expressible in such terms in the first place).

      Again, Step2, contextual factors are included in the argument. I will note that the reasons the shaped silicon transistor can do things a pile of quartz cannot are, in fact, ultimately expressible in physical terms, so the differences between the two are physical differences. About your discussion of determinacy and the uncertainty principle:
      - I believe that quantum states themselves can be defined in clear mathematical terms. Some of the properties of these states may be counterintuitive when things are described in terms of ordinary experience, but physicists do know the math. If they didn't have a well-defined knowledge of anything, science would be impossible.
      - Just because there are different theories and interpretations doesn't necessarily mean that physicists' thoughts about each one are themselves indeterminate. Yes, presumably some of them are true and some of them are false in the real world, but we can still know the meaning of something that is false. In fact, we have to know what something means before we can rationally state that it is false.
      - Generally, attempts at reducing intentionality don't directly refer to things that would be seriously affected by the uncertainty principle (such as a particle's exact position or momentum). Instead, they usually invoke macroscale properties (such as causal or functional properties) that aren't so sensitive to the exact microphysical details. In fact, I think this is what you might have been getting at when you mentioned emergent properties earlier. I will note, though, that there is a difference between "different microstates can lead to similar macro properties" and "the macro properties cannot be derived even with full knowledge of the microstate."

      However, I believe the original argument goes through even without going all the way down to fundamental physics, as long as intentionality is supposed to be reducible to any facts that are described in nonintentional terms. (As a side note, I believe Dr. Feser and others with similar views would say that robots, computers, and the like do have intentionality. In that view, however, it is derived from the intentionality of the human designers and users, not intrinsic to the machines themselves and the purely material facts about them). The issue is, as long as we can have thoughts about whatever nonintentionally described facts intentionality is supposed to be reducible to, the paradox can be constructed. So unfortunately, I am still not sure whether your attempted solution works, though I am very curious to hear more. (I have some thoughts about logic and the liar paradox, including variants, but this is getting so long I may not add them to this specific post).

      Delete
    13. The DeuceJuly 4, 2025 at 4:40 PM

      However, I feel that if our existing definition of "object" turns out to be expressible in terms that can be explained in physics (for instance, physics can explain why matter sticks together), then we have a physical explanation of objects.

      All matter "sticks together" to some degree or other. The question here (given the scenario where bonds over a certain strength are what denote an object or whole entity) would be WHY physical bonds over a certain strength denote a singular object or entity.

      For instance, it may be that new causal powers manifests above a certain bond strength, that are objectively not reducible to or deducible from the aggregate powers of the particles involved below that bond strength. For instance, perhaps new chemical powers manifest that can be formalized as "laws of chemistry," which do not in principle reduce to the "laws of physics" describing the aggregate powers of the particles alone.

      In that case, there is objective mind-independent reason why collections of particles above a certain bond strength constitute a single irreducible object or entity.

      Or it may be that there really is nothing that happens above the usual manifestation of the aggregate powers of the individual particles past a certain bond strength, but just a subjective impression in our minds that there is. In that case singular objects or entities only exist as subjective impressions in our minds, and all that exists objectively are disparate particles acting on each other that we have conceptually and arbitrarily lumped together.

      In neither case do the "laws" of physics tell you what an object is, in the first case because you have to go outside them, and in thr second case because there actually are no objects.

      However, the question is whether intentionality is expressible in such terms in the first place

      Agreed. While chemistry may not be reducible to physics, it is still mechanistic, or "transparent" in Johns' terminology. What his paper shows is that the irreducible powers manifest in intentionality cannot in principle be captured in any mechanistic terms.

      Delete
    14. Step2July 5, 2025 at 6:25 AM

      Anonymous,
      I’ll confess I am confused by the side note you provided. If you grant objects can independently operate intentional programs in a way expressible by a physical description, what else is needed? I don't see a reason within the argument to make a distinction between intrinsic or derived.

      The paradox seems like a variant of Gödel’s theorem which illustrates the self-reference limits of formal logic. In that vein, feedback loops may produce the type of solution you are asking for. A Roomba has less range of behavior than an ant, but both have fairly simple recursive programming that can be expressed in physical terms. Further, those mechanisms can create information gaps between the parts and the whole. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feedback#Limitations_of_negative_and_positive_feedback

      Delete
    15. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 4:41 PM

      Step2, the question is whether robots and computers have intentionality purely based on the intrinsic physical facts about them, or whether it is derived from human intentionality. If the latter case is true, then robots and computers cannot - by themselves - be used to show that human intentionality is purely physical, because then we would still need to know why humans have intentionality and whether that is physical or not. For instance, if a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of a Roomba somehow spontaneously formed (this thought experiment may be farfetched - but then again, according to at least some physics theories of the far future, random fluctuations mean anything can form over infinite time), it would behave the same way as a human-designed Roomba. But would this behavior objectively show any more intentionality than a boulder randomly rolling down a hill, which a human could also interpret as intentional? Remember, the ability to interpret things itself requires intentionality, so it can't be true that all intentionality is due to interpretation, as otherwise there would be an infinite regress. This is one reason to distinguish between intrinsic and derived intentionality. As for ants... there's Dr. Feser's view that living organisms in general have intrinsic intentionality, but this is irreducible to the basic laws of physics as those laws are described in nonintentional terms. I myself have personally been more inclined to the view that nonconscious organisms have no intrinsic intentionality and it's just a projection of conscious minds onto them - though I think it is entirely possible that ants specifically are conscious.

      As for the mention of feedback loops, I have read about them and about theories that they are responsible for intentionality before. I think I somewhat understand why people would develop such theories. However, be careful - there are a lot of feedback loops. Do such things as the feedback loops that help maintain the whole biosphere, or even a video camera being pointed at its own video monitor (the latter might happen on accident, without human intentionality getting directly involved), display intentionality? If not, what else objectively distinguishes intentional systems from nonintentional systems? Again, it must be objective and not itself dependent on an interpreting mind. If you say there are no objective criteria, you are an eliminativist and need to explain how eliminativism can be coherent. Furthermore, as I mentioned before, the paradox can only be formulated once there are minds capable of thinking about physical properties and about thoughts in a general, conceptual way, perhaps similarly to how Godel's incompleteness theorems require a formal system complex enough to include enough statements about the natural numbers. This may mean that even if you can define simpler forms of intentionality in purely physical terms, complex, conceptual human intentionality might actually be different in kind, not just in degree.

      (Part 1. I actually have some other things in mind that are more general than the specific responses to Step2, but I'll post them later in Part 2, when I have more time.)

      Delete
    16. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 6:48 PM

      (Part 2)

      When I mentioned logic and the liar paradox earlier, I was thinking about the possibility of the physicalist rejecting the law of the excluded middle to save physicalism from the paradox. One might say that if they're willing to reject logic, they might as well go full eliminativist. However, I've considered independent reasons to reject the law of the excluded middle long before hearing about Johns' argument, such as the original liar paradox itself and the problem of future contingents. (Interestingly, determinism or eternalism mean there is nothing contingent about the future and there can be true or false things about the future now, so they arguably eliminate the latter problem. And while they aren't necessarily tied to physicalism in principle, they're often found together in practice.) Though for the natural language paradoxes, the idea that they are ill-defined due to being circular and statements can't directly set their own truth values is also attractive to me. Also, it just seems weird, to say, the least, if you can't tell whether a physical state has a certain physical property or not even with full physical knowledge.

      Also, I've actually been wondering whether I had counterexamples to claims of physical indeterminacy, such as Dr. Feser's "cat on the mat" example in another post, Quine's "gavagai," and John Haldane's "triangle" versus "trilateral," therefore allowing for a naturalistic, reductionist theory of intentionality. I wonder whether I should talk about it in more detail (even after Johns' argument), maybe even in another comment chain? But briefly, for instance, I was wondering whether a combination of a causal theory for the basic elements plus conceptual role networks for more complex things could work, even if neither of them could explain all intentionality on their own. I think some others are working on something similar too.

      While I am still inclined towards some sort of naturalism over, say, theism, I want to say some of the reasons why I am here. If I remember correctly, I originally found this blog long ago while looking for reviews of Scott Bakker's books, and I found Dr. Feser's articles discussing Bakker's rejection of intentionality. Back then, I didn't really understand the problem of intentionality and assumed that science was going to explain things such as thoughts in physical terms - the idea that they would be "explained away," as it were, seemed like a strawman. I will note that I am very much not religious, and I don't hope for a God, an afterlife, a special cosmic purpose, or things like that. I want to find out the truth, whatever it may be.

      Perhaps somewhat similar to how Dr. Feser describes John Searle in his post about "The road from atheism," it was my reading of David Chalmers' papers about the problem of consciousness that made me wonder whether physicalism could really explain everything after all. Chalmers is a naturalist atheist, yet he argued in great detail that the laws of physics, as currently understood, cannot explain consciousness even in principle. His views on a lot of other topics also seemed surprisingly close to things I'd independently been thinking. (While I only found it later, I think he does believe intentionality may be reducible by combining multiple content-fixing methods - though he believes part of what fixes the meaning of some terms is conscious experience, so he isn't a physicalist reductionist. See his papers on "inferentialism" on his website, consc.net).

      This is getting long again, but to be brief, I am worried if physicalism can explain rationality after all, or whether it leads to global skepticism. I thought physicalism could easily explain rationality earlier, but now, I worry about things such as "what if a neuroscientist manipulating my brain makes me think I reason validly, but I'm actually not reasoning validly?"

      Delete
    17. Step2July 7, 2025 at 7:20 AM

      Anonymous,
      The argument as presented doesn’t make any reference to origins. I will also say if the power is supposedly intrinsic to humans it is unclear how it transfers externally.

      It is rare to find anybody who claims ants are individually conscious; on the other hand many will say an ant colony demonstrates swarm intelligence.

      "... there are a lot of feedback loops."

      I fully agree; there are also lots of organic compounds that aren’t living creatures. My multiple appeals to context appear to be failing.

      "...complex, conceptual human intentionality might actually be different in kind, not just in degree."

      I have no problem saying the property as found in humans is a unique subset that can interact with data in fundamentally different ways than other animals. If you grant that chemistry is a subset of physics it doesn't seem unreasonable to carry the idea further; it is just a distinct property of the larger level.

      Re: natural language and logic.
      Fuzzy logic and related sets try to quantify the ambiguity and probabilities found in natural language while still allowing for absolutes.

      Delete
    18. AnonymousJuly 7, 2025 at 11:24 PM

      The important thing is that the construction of the paradox requires a specification of intentionality in terms that don't themselves presume intentionality, as otherwise the paradoxical statement would be circular, such as in the Grelling-Nelson paradox. So, for instance, if a robot has intentionality only because humans with intentionality constructed it for a purpose, but the humans' own intentionality cannot be reduced to something non-intentional, then the robot's derived intentionality can't fully be reduced to the non-intentional either. This is true even if part of the reason the robot has derived intentionality is due to physical relationships of some sort involving humans, as long as human intentionality itself isn't reducible. Note that I am not presupposing that human intentionality isn't reducible - I am merely talking about a hypothetical here. Also, the argument doesn't actually depend on whether robots have intentionality or not, so I might have unfortunately gotten a bit off-topic. Even if robots don't have intentionality, the argument still goes through as long as someone, such as a human, has intentionality. As for ants, I've read that there are a growing number of scientists who accept the possibility of (individual) insect consciousness, but that is even less relevant to this topic, so that's all I'm going to say about that.

      Again, when I'm talking about specifying intentionality in terms of nonintentional properties, context is included in that. You can give any amount of contextual information you think is relevant. But I think you don't actually have a full theory of intentionality in non-intentional terms - and that's fine. An argument stating "We haven't yet figured out how to derive intentionality from physical properties, so intentionality can't be physical" is obviously fallacious. But I don't think that's the argument I (or Richard Johns, or Edward Feser for that matter) is making. The original argument claims to be a proof that any reduction whatsoever of intentionality to the non-intentional will fail because it will lead to a contradiction. You can criticize this argument, but because it is a purported mathematical proof, the criticism needs to involve actually rigorously showing that there is a flaw in that specific argument. Merely gesturing towards some general ideas without explaining what the exact flaws are isn't enough.

      When I said "different in kind," the "kind" I was referring to was the physical, so I meant "it may be possible that human conceptual intentionality isn't physical, even if simpler forms of intentionality are." I could say the question is whether human intentionality is physical or not, but I think it is even broader - is (conceptual) intentionality reducible to anything whatsoever that can be stated in fully nonintentional terms, similarly to how liquidity can be explained in terms (such as the interaction of atoms) that don't themselves mention liquidity? I suppose it is time to ask: what is your definition of "physical"? (And just in case you want to say that there isn't an exact definition, you then need to explain how "physicalism" can be a position that can be rationally accepted.)

      Delete
  18. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 1, 2025 at 2:41 AM

    Hi Dr. Feser, I've been following the blog for a couple of years and this is the first time I comment. Firstly and foremost, I wanted to thank you for the amazing effort and the quality of your work that made a decisive contribution to convincing me to return to the Catholic Church. I needed to find some rational answers and I was impressed by the clarity and strength of your arguments.

    In your opinion, what's the most effective way of countering Kant's critique of pure reason? Personally I've always felt a strange, intense kind of antipathy for that argument. Even during my atheist years I just couldn't digest the idea that I cannot have access to reality because I am closed in a "box".

    Would an aristotelian/thomistic argument about the determinacy and immateriality of thought, as the one you develop in your paper "Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought" be a relevant answer to that topic? If our thought is immaterial, then it would "escape" the critique of pure reason because there would be no physical organ to "impose" its structure upon a crucial part of our thoughts. Is this answer relevant or am I on a wrong path?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 12:24 PM

      Koons is a Thomistic philosopher. This is his response to Kant. There are many other critiques you can find on the Internet.
      https://www.leaderu.com/offices/koons/docs/lec9.html

      Delete
    2. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 2, 2025 at 5:47 AM

      Thanks anonymous! I've read the article and it seems to me, at first reading, that Koons makes a good point that unobservable entities like forces and processes are also part of the phenomenon, because they are scientifically accessible, and that is sufficient for the cosmological argument to work, which somehow means that God "enters" (or "is accessible") inside the "box" of the phenomenon, as well as being part of the noumenon. Which is exactly what you would expect an entity like God to be able to do.

      I was wondering if we can also say something more about our own intellect: does the immateriality of the intellect allow it to "escape" the "box" of transcendental idealism? When the intellect "conforms to reality" (to use a thomistic expression), does it conform to what Kant would call the noumenon?

      If we say that intellect (conceivability) is different from imagination and perception, then can we say that intellect is able to draw conclusions about the noumenon while imagination and perception are limited to the phenomenon?

      Delete
    3. TalmidJuly 3, 2025 at 10:33 AM

      It seems to me that Kant view of pure reason arrives thanks to his more humean influence. Remember that his project is to explain how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. How can we know necessary truths that apply to the world around us and not only are true thanks to being tautologies?

      If sense experience can't give us ideas like substance, causation, change etc, as Hume famously argued for, them these ideas have to be innate. Even worse to the humean: sense experience necessarily comforms to these ideas, so innate ideas are a thing in a sense.

      But if these ideas are innate how exactly sense experience necessarily conforms to they? How can these give us necessary knowledge of phenomena? His solution was that they in a sense mold our experience, so they necessarily are valid. Also, if these ideas applied to the real world we would face several paradoxes(his antimonies), so we know that phenomena necessarily comforms to these ideas but noumena do not.

      So we can have synthetic a priori knowledge of phenomena because it necessarily comforms to our mind constitution, but can't talk about noumena because it does not comforms to our mind constitution, the road to knowledge of phenomena is of no use here.

      Delete
    4. TalmidJuly 3, 2025 at 10:41 AM

      (Cont.)

      Aristotelian epistemology does not fall into that because it negates the humean view of sense experience. Thanks to the agent intelect, the mind can abstract concepts from sense data that allow us to make synthetic a priori judgments about reality itself, since here the mind does not need to impose order to phenomena, they give order to the mind.

      So Aristotle view on why we can make synthetic a priori judgments is that because the intellect can extract necessary truths from sense experience and them judge about how reality function.

      Kant likely did not know aristotelian, let alone thomistic, epistemology very well, so i imagine that he did not critique the view much, but if the view is defensible(as i believe it is) them his sharp phenomena/noumena distinction seems to me not necessary.

      Delete
    5. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 4, 2025 at 12:55 AM

      Thanks for the reply Talmid! I'll review Aristotelian epistemology once again.

      Delete
    6. TalmidJuly 8, 2025 at 8:15 AM

      Awesome! I think it is a shame that Kant did not interact with it.

      Delete
  19. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 5:42 AM

    Why did Postliberal Order choose Canada's governance slogan as its own slogan? Seems like an awful choice to me.

    First of all, it seems pathetic for a bunch of Americans to have a whole politics blog that's like "I wish we were this one other country." A failure of patriotism, but mostly just sad.

    Secondly, do you guys ever take a look across the border? "Peace, order, and good government" apparently looks like woke madness, abortion, euthanasia, and making it illegal to speak frankly on matters pertaining to the common good! I get that the last one appeals to many of the contributors to Postliberal Order, since many of them would love to see my speech rights curtailed for the sake of the "common good", but I don't think any of you guys are into mass senicide. So, do you ever wonder if this particular plan is fundamentally flawed, since there is a country that is explicitly based on the principles you claim to love, and on rejecting those American notions of freedom that give you the creeps, and that country is way worse than America in terms of most things you all complain about?

    (I gather they use this phrase in Australia, too, but...see above).

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 2, 2025 at 12:53 PM

      If Canada has woke madness, abortion, euthanasia and curtails truthful speech, then whatever its governance slogan may claim that's not peace, order or good government.

      Delete
    2. NoArtworkJuly 7, 2025 at 2:06 PM

      @Anonymous

      I never understood opposition to euthanasia. Only psychopaths think that existence for its own sake is inherently valuable.

      Delete
    3. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 8, 2025 at 6:07 PM

      NoArtwork, isn’t it the opposite?

      Psychopaths are the ones who don’t value life for its own sake. They see people as objects, means to an end, obstacles or tools.

      They lack empathy and moral reasoning rooted in the intrinsic worth of the person.

      Delete
  20. John B.July 1, 2025 at 5:50 AM

    Ed, as an enjoyer of both Aquinas and Hayek, you may have something to offer in response to this question.

    Aristotle says, and Aquinas quotes approvingly (both with and without attribution) that wherever two more or more people are acting for a common end, there is one mind directing them toward that end.  Twentieth century thinkers, from the atheist Friedrich Hayek with his emphasis on spontaneous order to the Catholic and Augustinian Michael Polanyi and his vision of many people moved by the beauty of the truths that God has made them able to perceive in nature, would disagree of course, and might see in such thinking the seeds of the dangerous tyrannies that wrought such havoc on the Central Europe that both men left behind for English freedom.  But there is no need to be so hifalutin: a young man and a young woman, both with loose morals, can meet each other as strangers at a party and pretty quickly start working toward a common end without any one person so directing them.  In fact, they can do this when they are both too drunk to have a one fully working mind between the two of them.  And Aristotle and Aquinas were surely both aware of such things as spontaneous lapses of chastity.  How did they explain these phenomena?

    Short version: how much would Aquinas and Hayek actually disagree on spontaneous order, and how would you expect Aquinas to explain away Hayek and Polanyi's observations of communities (political and economic for Hayek, scientific for Polanyi) that achieve consensus and unity without an explicit monarchy and hierarchy to direct them?

    ReplyDelete
  21. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 6:07 AM

    Hi, we haven't gotten a collection of links to good material in a while, that would be nice, thanks!

    ReplyDelete
  22. ThunderjerkyJuly 1, 2025 at 6:59 AM

    Recently finished Yuk Hi's "On the Existence of the Digital Object." Most of the book is a dialogue between the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Gilbert Simondon on relations, technology, and so on. Pretty interesting especially in the advent of the LLM mania. I recommend for the most part.

    ReplyDelete
  23. TonyJuly 1, 2025 at 7:06 AM

    I would like people's ideas of the best version of the Bible for new adult converts to Catholicism. Probably a study Bible in some degree, but maybe not the most technically deep kind. Perhaps more accessible in language than some versions (like the Douay-Rhiems), because the target audience may have English-as-a-second language issues.

    The old version we used has the New American Bible translation and notes, which I really dislike because of its absolute assumption of effectively un-Catholic versions of hypotheses like the 4 sources of the Pentateuch and the 2-source hypothesis of the synoptic gospels coming from "communities" rather than individuals. Is there any good translation that respects scientifically and historically relevant fields of development but also doesn't treat 19th century hypotheses as if they were proven facts? (Not least because newer science (including archeology) and historical findings often prove ancient interpretations were sound or at least more likely.)

    Oh, it would be good if not too expensive :-), as we have to buy many of them.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 12:27 PM

      Google New Catholic Revised Standard Version

      Delete
    2. JordanJuly 1, 2025 at 1:08 PM

      The Didache Bible from Ignatius Press uses the RSV-Catholic Edition. It would be perfect for adult converts because it has lots of apologetic material and commentary based on the Catechism. Not super cheap, but if you order from the publisher they do offer bulk discounts.

      Their other two Bibles based on the same translation are also good. The Ignatius Bible is the simplest and has the least supplementary material. The Ignatius Catholic Study Bible has the most extensive supplements and would be the most "technically deep" as you describe.

      Generally, the RSV-CE or the ESV-CE are probably going to be better than the NAB translation in terms of the problematic notes you mention. The Augustine Institute publishes several different versions of the ESV-CE, though none of them are really study Bibles as far as I know.

      Delete
  24. NormJuly 1, 2025 at 12:48 PM

    Hi Prof

    I am happy that you were able to patch things up with Damian Thompson.

    When I saw your post about it, I did feel a little bit sad even though I am not a fan of his style.

    Would you like to know why ?

    Well, everytime I open your blog, as it loads the quote of Damian Thompson pops up,

    "A terrific writer" Damian Thompson, Daily Telegraph

    It became something that I am used to seeing so often that I look forward to it appearing as the blog loads, especially with excitement for a new post.

    Anyways, I am happy ya'll are back to being friends.

    Cheers

    ReplyDelete
  25. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 2:36 PM

    is the following method a good approach to moral theology in fiction, and if so, how do I apply it to the other commandments? the 5th commandment forbids killing innocents, excessive force, the sin of wrath, and scandalizing others. the first two pose no problem, since no real person is getting hurt. as for wrath, it's helpful to understand what anger is: a perception of injustice with desire for rectification. since the injustice perceived is fictional and known to be such, any real anger, and therefore any real disordered anger (which is what wrath is) cannot arise in a normal person. with scandal, there must be a sin one is led into, but it can't be any of the ones I went through, as I've described. so, the 5th commandment doesn't forbid action stories, which is what my work will be. I'm no expert on moral theology, but I'd love to hear your thoughts. thank you all in advance!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. JordanJuly 2, 2025 at 11:27 AM

      Most action stories feature protagonists that excel at violence, and some action stories make disordered violence attractive (e.g. Bloodsport, John Wick, Kill Bill). Don't write that kind of story, as it does cause "scandal" in the sense you use it, i.e. a story like that encourages people to approve of or commit evil, thinking that it is good.

      You can write stories with violence or violent protagonists without falling into this trap, but I'd struggle to give general rules. The specifics of the plot and point of view matter a lot. For example, in Pulp Fiction, both Jules and Vincent excel at violence and much of the movie depicts them as admirable or praiseworthy for their life of crime. Yet then God performs a miracle and saves their lives. Vincent responds to this skeptically and continues with his life of violence and crime. Jules responds to it in faith and decides to leave. Vincent dies as a result of his decision, while Jules lives and gives his money away to save the lives of two other criminals. So you have a story with violent protagonists who commit only disordered violence, and yet it ultimately encourages the viewer to see the world as governed by a God who deplores this violence and wants to save people out of it.

      Look at Kill Bill as a problematic example by the same director, in which the protagonist basically just kills her way through hundreds of people for revenge. In the end this violence leads not only to a complete victory, but also to her getting her daughter back, who she didn't even know had survived. That sort of story justifies violent revenge without consequences.

      Pay attention to the specifics of your story, and find someone you respect both morally and intellectually who can give you advice or read your drafts.

      Delete
    2. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 5, 2025 at 9:25 AM

      Wow, nice response, Jordan! I’m not an author, but I’ll enjoy thinking about that when I’m reading or watching fiction. Thanks.

      Delete
  26. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 2:41 PM

    Suppose someone did not want to have any kids not because of wanting to focus on career, but because babies keep you awake screaming every night and have diapers. Would that be a sin? Or wha tif the person didn't want kids because they were afraid the kids might go to hell, or their grandkids, etc. might go to hell?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 5:50 PM

      Yes both are sins if this person is married and probably even if they aren’t. If they’re married, then they ought to accept the fulfilment of marriage, which is children. They also shouldn’t be despairing about children going to hell we should trust in God‘s love. I say only probably if they’re not married because that could either be a sign of something deeper, which is they’re not called to marriage or they just desire to avoid responsibility. The latter is a sin.

      Delete
  27. AnonymousJuly 1, 2025 at 5:58 PM

    How would a Thomist answer the epistemological problem raised by Edmund Gettier in 1963 about the insufficiency of the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief"?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 1, 2025 at 7:42 PM

      For Thomists, knowledge isn’t JTB, it’s when the intellect conforms to reality.

      Delete
  28. AnonymousJuly 2, 2025 at 1:06 AM

    It would be interesting to do a comparison between the God of the Bible and the God of the philosophers. Feser has argued for the latter in his excellent book ”Five Proofs for the Existence of God”. When Moses asks God about his name, God’s answer suggests that He really is the God of the philosophers. But there are difficulties, so it would be good to address this question.

    ReplyDelete
  29. AnonymousJuly 2, 2025 at 2:55 PM

    For decades, I have asked the bishops to declare that banking, as it is currently practiced around the world, is intrinsically evil. They refuse to do so.

    Here is the simple fact: one group of people (banksters) is allowed to counterfeit (create money out of thin air), and the other group of people (non-banksters) are not allowed to do so. Counterfeiting is stealing, even if it is legal. (Abortion is murder, even if it is legal.) Stealing is against the 10 commands, just like murder is.

    The amount of money stolen by modern banking is staggeringly large.

    Am I wrong? The bishops have not told me that I am wrong, nor given me reasons that I am wrong.

    Why won't the bishops respond to my request? Are they scared of the Jews?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. TonyJuly 2, 2025 at 11:03 PM

      You would be on somewhat better ground to assert that modern banking employs usury, which apparently the Church has taught in the past is wrong. I personally think that what the Church taught in the past gradually developed on "the evil of usury", and it is disputable what, precisely is wrong in it and whether it is always present. And the Church, for almost 200 years, has refused to repeat the older prohibitions against usury.

      What you refer to is generally called "fractional reserve banking", and indeed it is nearly universal among bankers. Whether it is "stealing" when the practice is explicitly noticed in their documents might be questioned. How can you be stealing from the opposite party when that person signs the document which says "we are going to create money out of thin air here"? They don't hide the principles of fractional reserve banking, they are taught in every economics class.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 3, 2025 at 4:08 AM

      If I tell you I am going to murder you, does that make it OK?

      If I tell you I am going to steal from you, does that make it OK?

      If I tell you I am going to commit adultery with your wife, does that make it OK?

      Delete
    3. TonyJuly 4, 2025 at 12:37 PM

      If I tell you I am going to steal from you, does that make it OK?

      If I set forth a contract that I am going to take $10 from you in exchange for something else, and you sign it, is it possible for that to be stealing? It might be unjust, if the $10 is an unjust price, but not all injustices are stealing.

      Delete
    4. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 7:18 PM

      But the banksters never said how much (even in percentage) they were going to steal. Can a contract wherein someone will steal an unknown amount from anybody be conscionable?

      Delete
    5. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 7:19 PM

      The original question dealt with "intrinsically immoral". Is it, or not? I say yes!

      Delete
  30. AnonymousJuly 3, 2025 at 5:52 AM

    Hi Professor Feser,

    first of all, thanks for your blog, I really enjoy reading it regularly!

    I have a relatively profane question: As an agnostic, by far my biggest objection against Christianity is the delayed parousia. It seems that many (or even most?) NT scholars agree that Jesus was a failed prophet who falsely predicted the world to end soon.

    In the midst of all the complex philosophical and theological discussions, this simple topic is almost never adressed by Christian philosophers, so I would really be interested in your reply. It seems to me that Jesus being a false prophet disconfirms Christianity/Catholicism in one go, no matter how good your other philosophical arguments are.

    Thanks a lot for your answer and greetings from Germany!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The ShadowJuly 4, 2025 at 8:04 AM

      First off, 'soon' is a word that can mean different things in the mouth of God as opposed to human people, to say the least of it.

      Second, it's not clear to me that Jesus does predict an imminent Parousia. His predictions of the Parousia are interwoven in a complicated fashion with predictions of the destruction of the Temple, which was indeed destroyed 40 years after Jesus' death.

      Third, far more often than the Parousia, Jesus promised that the Kingdom of God was at hand, and that prediction has come abundantly true.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 7, 2025 at 2:09 AM

      The issue of the apparantly delayed Parusia is something that Feser should analyse in detail in his planned book defending Christianity ( and Catholicim in particular ) as the true religeon. It appears for all the world that Jesus promulgated a now falsified prophecy, which therefore disproves his divinity and so falsifies Christianity. If there is a clever and convincing way to circumvent this conclusion, we need to know why an omnipotent and omniscience God would not have made this clearer, instead of permitting a scripture that was sure - in time - to generate skepticism of Christianity, if not outright disbelief.
      Perhaps the professor could make this issue a topic for one of his blog posts some day.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousJuly 7, 2025 at 9:39 AM

      If you read the three synoptic accounts of what is known as the Olivet Discourse carefully you will see that their immediate context is the destruction of the Second Temple, which happened when Jesus said it would, from Mark 13: "As Jesus was leaving the temple, one of his disciples said to him, 'Look, Teacher! What massive stones! What magnificent buildings!' 'Do you see all these great buildings?” replied Jesus. 'Not one stone here will be left on another; every one will be thrown down.'

      "Since Jesus will return from heaven at the end of the world (Acts 1:11), many have understood [the Olivet Discourse] as a reference to the Second Coming. And, because prophecy can have more than one fulfillment, it may point to the Second Coming. However, this wasn’t what it referred to in the events leading up to the destruction of the temple.

      Part of the confusion is caused by the fact that many only study their Bibles and don’t read the historical sources that reveal what happened when Jesus’ words were fulfilled."

      The quote is taken from the following link, which examines those sources and further discusses the meaning of the Olivet Discourse:
      https://www.catholic.com/magazine/online-edition/jesus-botched-predicting-the-end-times

      Also worth noting are the "seventy-weeks" prophecy of Daniel 9, the Kingdom-of-God prophecy of Daniel 2 and the Son-of-Man prophecy of Daniel 7, all of which Jesus very consciously applied to himself and his ministry. That is an additional layer of supernatural foretelling. I say supernatural because only God can know the future with such precision. God bless you and I hope this helped!

      Delete
  31. Erik FJuly 3, 2025 at 10:06 AM

    Hello Dr. Feser and gang,

    My question is one concerning evolution and its implications for A-T metaphysics and the origin of the human person. First, it would seem that if it is possible for all life to have emerged from a common ancestor that there has been a change over time and multiplication of essences. To me this would also seem to imply that in fact there is not a shared essence among species but only enough similarity to unite them with a common identifier (more fundamentally their ability to reproduce), but in reality each member of a species has a different essence, specific to each individual member. This meaning that each successive generation has a slight change in essence from the parent generation, leading over time to macro evolution, and thus emergence of totally different species over time with what we would label as a totally different essence. In actuality there being no shared essences. What is wrong with this thinking?

    The second question is the one concerning the origin of the human person. I read a past blog post by Dr. Feser outlining the argument that intervention by God was necessary to impart a human soul to a human-like species when it had reached a sufficient state to accommodate this. However, I thought the soul was the form of the body? How can it be imparted to a species that is already formed? I have a tough time not viewing the human mind as emergent from matter but also transcendent to it. What is wrong with my thinking here?

    To be clear I am a practicing Catholic, formerly a militant atheist. Embracing A-T philosophy has reenchanted by life. I recall first reading "The Last Superstition" and staying up most of the night reading in bed, with mixed emotions of mirth, wonder, and sadness. Mirth at the brutal dismantling of the "New Atheists" that Dr. Feser performs. Wonder at the power of the classical theist position, with is unparalleled clarity and common sense nature. Finally, with sadness at the fact that no one had ever introduced me to these ideas when I was in the throes of a nihilistic atheism. To make it short. I am in a great debt to you Dr. Feser for your work.

    Back to my questions. The help of Dr. Feser or others on this blog to clarify these problems for me would be very appreciated. Thank you for the work you do Dr. Feser. God bless you and your family.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 3, 2025 at 7:44 PM

      We evolved from animals with animal souls incapable of reason. God created man in His image by infusing a rational soul into the first humans, giving us a rational nature.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJuly 4, 2025 at 12:17 PM

      This is Ficino4ml here - not sure whether I've managed to log on to the Google account. I was wondering along lines a bit similar to those voiced by Erik F:
      We often hear that sciences have discovered a great amount of what we might call “waste” in the universe: 99% of species are extinct, most of the cosmos won’t support life, humans have “design defects” that can be explained by evolution but not easily on a design assumption, etc. Where does this leave the A-T tenet that nature achieves its ends through as few steps or intermediaries as possible? Cf. Aquinas, “Natura enim per pauciora se expedit inquantum potest,” In De Sensu et Sensato l. 8 C107. Do modern scientific theories push us to discard dicta about nature like this?

      Delete
    3. ficino4mlJuly 4, 2025 at 5:43 PM

      I replied earlier but something seemed wrong with the platform. Anyway, I beg pardon if this turns out to be a duplicate.
      I am wondering about something similar to the point that Erik F. raised.
      It is a tenet of A-T that nature "provides for herself through as few things as possible" (Aquinas, In Arist. De Sensu et Sensato C107). But cosmologists describe a universe in which most of it is hostile to life, a planet on which most species have gone extinct, etc. Is that A-T tenet to be given up?

      Delete
    4. bmillerJuly 4, 2025 at 5:54 PM

      What are some examples of "waste" and "design defects"?

      Delete
    5. bmillerJuly 5, 2025 at 1:02 PM

      Erik F,

      Regarding your first question. See if this like helps out:

      https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1073.htm

      Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers;


      Regarding your second question. A human is more than just a corporal soul/matter entity like an animal because of the immaterial part (intellect). Each and every human only actually becomes a human due to God's direct act in the creation of each particular human being. So each person comes into being not as first, a corporal body and then second as a corporal body with a human soul added on. Each human person comes into being fully human from the get go.

      Delete
    6. NLRJuly 6, 2025 at 5:45 AM

      ficino4ml,

      I think this is one of those questions that is hard to get a good enough understanding to answer.

      The scholastics had reasons for thinking what they did, based on observing phenomena on Earth. The scientists also have reasons, in that we now know more about the universe beyond the solar system.

      When they say waste, I suppose the scientists mean that they can imagine a universe in which life is more widely distributed (or at least more visible). But it's one thing to imagine that and another to understand in detail how it might come about and how the way such a universe works would differ from our universe.

      One can imagine a utopian society, but then it's much harder to think about the details. And the details of a different universe would be far beyond a hypothetical human society.

      So, I don't think we can say either way. We just don't know enough to make such a statement about nature as a whole, though we may be able to make it in more limited circumstances.

      Delete
    7. ficino4mlJuly 6, 2025 at 6:16 PM


      @bmiller: both you and Aquinas are equivocating on "existed."

      Delete
    8. ficino4mlJuly 6, 2025 at 8:16 PM

      @NLR: yes, there is much we don't know. Still, if we suppose that, if the ToE is accepted, nature "seeks" to bring about rational animals, why so many steps from the purported origin of the Earth 4.5 billion years ago to the point where Catholics say the first rational animal/human was brought into being? Why so many intervening steps, if nature acquits itself through as few steps as possible?
      A diehard defender of A-T might reply, well, every one of those steps was necessary. No fewer number of steps was possible.
      That contention probably can't, strictly speaking, be falsified. But I see no reason to accept it except to preserve the tenets of A-T.

      Delete
    9. bmillerJuly 7, 2025 at 7:45 AM

      ficino4ml,

      both you and Aquinas are equivocating on "existed."

      Not in the context of A-T thought regarding act/potency. In other words, God's Creation continues to unfold as mentioned in ST First Part, Question 73, Article 1, with the unfolding being the movement from potency to act.

      I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

      Regarding the quote from De Sensu et Sensato:
      In context "nature provides for herself through as few things as possible" is in reference to Aristotles argument that the ancients theory of sight was not parsimonious. In other words postulating emanations from sensible objects was an added unnecessary explanatory step. Like Ockham's Razor it deals with explanations.

      I really don't understand the attempted criticism, because to me it seems like a category mistake. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony has many steps and takes a certain amount of time to listen to from beginning to end, but I doubt Thomas would have complained it was not parsimonious because it takes more than an instant to listen to. Likewise it seems wrongheaded to claim God's creation is taking too long.

      Delete
    10. NLRJuly 7, 2025 at 2:36 PM

      ficino4ml,

      It's a fair criticism that the Aristotelians were too ready to make a categorical statement about how nature works.

      Though that same point can be made with respect to the scientists. Evolution provides a model of how the human species came to be. But when we move beyond saying what we think happened to how it could have been different, we just don't have much to go on.

      It's not just about what actually did happen, but about how evolution might work in a universe like ours and how different forms and capabilities of beings may come about. We only have the example of a single planet, so we can speculate based on what has been observed, but to say definitively that it is waste is reaching too far.

      I'm not an Aristotelian Thomist, so I'm not sure how the question would be answered from that perspective.

      From my own perspective, I would say that those animals, plants, and microbes don't have to be thought of as stepping stones for the emergence of human beings; they can have a reason for existing in their on right. In that case, they don't have to be thought of as waste. I also don't believe that plants and animals are just material or that their essence disintegrates after death, though I recognize that many would disagree.

      Delete
    11. ficino4mlJuly 8, 2025 at 1:15 PM

      @NLR: yes, agree that non-rational creatures exist in their own right. A term like "waste" has to be nuanced, perhaps at greater length than a combox adequately allows.
      I posted my original because I was struck by the difference between the A-T thesis that nature achieves its results/ends "through fewer" and the remarks often made by people who think about science today. For example, the (notorious?) Richard Carrier wrote, "Almost the entirety of our universe is a lethal radiation-filled vacuum, almost the entirety of its contents are lethal stars and black holes, and almost the entirety of what isn’t stars and black holes is a lifeless wasteland of rocks and dust on which nothing can naturally live. The universe is also billions (not mere thousands) of years old; and billions (not a mere handful) of light-years across; and life only slowly arose over billions of years of meandering, unguided natural selection from an initial, single, self-replicating molecule, which evolved into single cells, then into rudimentary colonies of cells, then into the advanced colonies of cells that we now call bodies; and exists now only as, indeed, a scaffolding of cooperating colonies of single-celled organisms ..."

      So I wondered about the "per pauciora." I don't suppose there is a logical contradiction if one can maintain that all the stuff adduced by people like Carrier is "necessary" somehow, or simply is good because it has being, or that production of all that stuff is the set of final causes at which aimed all the relevant efficient causes ...

      Still, doesn't seem as though, if nature is perfected in rational creatures, nature is achieving that end "per pauciora."

      Note that I did not mention God in what I wrote.

      Delete
    12. NLRJuly 9, 2025 at 5:42 AM

      ficino4ml,

      As I understand it, one of the basic principles of Aristotelianism is that we abstract general principles from what we experience through the senses. So, presumably, Aquinas and the other scholastic philosophers had reasons, based on what they observed in the features of life on Earth for their "per pauciora" tenet.

      It's a fair criticism that they might have to revise that principle based on new
      information.

      I'm not defending the "per pauciora" tenet. I'm not familiar enough with it and the role plays in the AT framework to do that. I'm also not claiming that the way the universe is or the history of life on Earth is necessary for the emergence of human beings.

      I recognize that a defender of the "per pauciora" principle could make this argument, but I would say that no one really knows enough to say that something is necessary; we only have the example of one universe and one planet where life exists.

      My main point is that other people who say that we can make definitive statements about the nature of Nature, but from the opposite perspective are also overreaching.

      Delete
    13. bmillerJuly 9, 2025 at 7:36 AM

      I was struck by the difference between the A-T thesis that nature achieves its results/ends "through fewer" and the remarks often made by people who think about science today.

      Occam's razor is a methodology commonly used in scientific investigation today and also in the same way as in Thomas' time. It is certain that modern science has used this methodology in its current theory regarding the age, size and content of the universe. It is a mistake to think Occam's razor has ever implied that a simpler theory is always preferable to one that better fits all the evidence. In other words, if this is meant to be a criticism of A-T philosophy it applies equally to all modern science including the topically relevant Theory of Evolution.

      Delete
    14. ficino4mlJuly 9, 2025 at 5:43 PM

      @bmiller: Occam's Razor is not a methodology. It is a heuristic principle, a rule about we best formulate explanations. The "per pauciora" dictum is a metaphysical principle, not a heuristic principle. It is not about how we formulate explanation. It IS an explanation, namely, of an aspect of how Nature effects its effects.

      Delete
    15. ficino4mlJuly 10, 2025 at 7:22 AM

      @NLR: a further thought about "waste." The "scala naturae" is an Aristotelian construct, as you probably know. That is, A-T speaks of "nature" as actualized in species that actualize grades of perfection on a scale from inanimate bodies to rational ones, sc. humans. (I haven't checked whether angels, or "separated substances," are part of Nature, but at least they are not so in the sense that Nature is the realm subject to generation and corruption.) Aquinas says that "nature proceeds little by little (paulatim) from inanimate to animate things, in such a way that the genus of inanimate things is found prior to the genus of plants..." (In De Memoria C298). This is not talking about a temporal sequence; in Aristotle, it's an ontological gradation. I might think that if we throw in the ToE, which of course is not Aristotelian, then we can allow an uncountable number of species to make up an ontologically-graded "ladder" from most elemental bodies to humans. But this doesn't deal with deaths of individuals within species, before they can reproduce, extinction of species, etc. So I remain unconvinced that nature really does expedite its work "through fewer" in any standard sense of these terms.

      Delete
    16. bmillerJuly 10, 2025 at 9:33 AM

      ficino4ml,

      OK, you made me look it up:

      Google AI: Is heuristic a method?

      Yes, a heuristic is a problem-solving method. It's a technique that employs a practical approach, often using "rules of thumb," to make decisions quickly, especially when finding an optimal solution is impractical or impossible. Heuristics are often used in situations where there is limited time or information, and they can be mental shortcuts that help simplify complex decisions.

      But I assume you would agree that this is a quibble aside from the main argument.

      Google AI: is The "per pauciora" dictum is a metaphysical principle?

      The "per pauciora" dictum, often stated as "Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora" ("It is futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer"), is widely considered an expression of the principle of parsimony. This principle, also known as Occam's razor, according to Wikiwand or Ockham's razor, suggests that the simplest explanation that fits the evidence is usually the best.

      Although the "per pauciora" dictum may suggest the nature of reality is simple, it is primarily an epistemological principle. This means it concerns how knowledge is acquired and how to choose between explanations. It is a heuristic, or rule of thumb, for approaching explanations and theories, not a statement about the world being simple.

      The dictum guides the preference for hypotheses that require fewer assumptions or entities to explain a phenomenon. However, it is not absolute and has limitations, as a more complex explanation may sometimes be correct.

      So maybe the way you are phrasing your contention is leading to my understanding it in this way.

      Aristotle and Aquinas normally claim that the fact that nature acts always and for the most part, if it is not impeded, in predictable ways shows it is directed toward a final cause. So it seems contrary to the norm for them to claim iron-clad certainty that nature "always" acts in a parsimonious way since it could be impeded or affected by a chance event. Do you have a quote from Aquinas, in context, where this tension is examined?

      Regardless, modern science still judges theories about how nature works under the assumption that the best explanation is the simplest one that fits the facts, just as A and A did. An example that comes to mind is the argument over whether the planets orbited the sun in elliptical orbits or whether they orbited the earth in epicycles. Both theories fit the observed data, but the former is simpler and so more preferable...even to atheists.

      Delete
    17. bmillerJuly 10, 2025 at 11:04 AM

      ficino4ml,

      Maybe it's Aristotle's guideline that "Nature does nothing in vain" is at the heart of the matter. This article has a nice discussion of the ins and outs of view. The abstract below summarizes.

      https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319381399_Aristotle_on_Nature_Does_Nothing_in_Vain

      Aristotle’s principle that “nature does nothing in vain” (NDNIV) is central to his teleological approach to understanding organisms. First, we argue that James G. Lennox’s influential account of NDNIV is unsuccessful. Second, we propose an alternative account that includes a natural state model. According to a natural state model of development, an organism will develop toward its natural state unless interfering forces prevent that from happening. Third, we argue that this account also fits Aristotle’s discussion in the Generation of Animals and can explain monstrosities in nature that at first sight seem to be counterexamples to NDNIV. Fourth, we take a broader look at NDNIV, arguing that it does not entail that all structures are teleological (since it accommodates the thought that by-products and some neglected items that Aristotle calls “tokens” are nonteleological), that it does not entail that there is only one function per organ, that NDNIV is not an anthropocentric principle, and that, perhaps surprisingly, the teleological structures of an organism can benefit others apart from the organism and its progeny. Finally, we argue that Aristotle endorsed an empirical justification of NDNIV wherein the principle is justified by its many successful applications.

      Delete
    18. ficino4mlJuly 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM

      @bmiller: I can't read now all that you link. As far as principles and methods go, your first italicized paragraph makes clear that a rule of thumb employed by a method is not the method. Occam's Razor is a normative principle that sets constraints on methods. As a normative principle, it can be called a "rule." The rule that constrains the method is not the method. Nothing new here; poke around in the literature and you'll see lots of specialists saying that Occam's Razor is a heuristic principle. "Heuristic" used as a noun is shorthand for "heuristic process or method," that is, a process or method for finding out things/explaining things. Again, a principle that serves as a norm for a method is not the method.

      Delete
    19. bmillerJuly 10, 2025 at 4:14 PM

      ficino4ml,

      OK. I'll amend the statement:
      Occam's razor is a normative principle that sets constraints on methods commonly used in scientific investigation today and also in the same way as in Thomas' time.

      Delete
    20. ficino4mlJuly 10, 2025 at 5:12 PM

      @bmiller: I was just going to follow up, but thanks for your latest.
      I was pushing how we parse statements about Occam's Razor because earlier, I think you were suggesting that the passage I quoted from Aquinas on De Sensu et Sensato is (just?) a precursor of Occam's Razor. I don't agree at all. In that passage, and in the dictum, "nature does nothing in vain," which you quoted today, Aquinas channeling Aristotle is not making a normative claim about how we should restrict our explanations. He is making a descriptive claim about Nature. That's doing metaphysics. It is not to that question to reply, well, we all apply Occam's Razor to some degree or other. What IS to the question is to establish whether it's true that Nature (let's suppose we hold a shared conception about that term) "expedites itself through fewer [things], as much as it is able." I have been calling that claim into question. I have NOT been calling Occam's Razor into question because OR is not a descriptive claim about what Nature does. It's a normative claim or rule about how we should formulate explanations. So it doesn't help save A-T claims about Nature to say that we all apply Occam's Razor or some earlier version thereof.

      Delete
    21. ficino4mlJuly 10, 2025 at 6:10 PM

      @bmiller: continuing the follow-up,
      I agree with you that the question of final causality lurks behind the question, does Nature truly "expedite itself" through fewer, at least for the most part? Because "se expedit" implies "achieves its ends," or something like that ... I think you'll agree.
      And I am guessing that you'll agree that a Paley-style Watchmaker Argument is not what Aquinas gives us in the Fifth Way and is not what we find in Aristotle.
      In the relevant section of Aq on De Sensu, he says that it's better to say that vision occurs when the medium is moved by the sensible object than to say that vision occurs by direct contact with particles flowing from the object. The reason? "For (enim) Nature achieves its end/expedites itself through fewer [things], as much as it is able/is possible." Here Aquinas explains Aristotle's argument as resting on the premise that "Nature ... " etc. With the inferential particle, enim, Aquinas is presenting this dictum as a premise that provides grounds for Aristotle's conclusion. In other words, Aquinas is saying that because "per pauciora" etc is true of Nature, therefore Aristotle's conclusion about Nature follows.

      Delete
    22. ficino4mlJuly 10, 2025 at 8:00 PM

      As to Nature's parsimony, I offer as counterexamples that which people say are defects of human vision: the notorious blind spot, the "backwards" wiring of the retina, and susceptibility to various vision problems and diseases.

      Delete
    23. bmillerJuly 10, 2025 at 9:14 PM

      NLR,

      Are you still following along? Do you have any questions? Or is this getting boring?

      Delete
    24. NLRJuly 11, 2025 at 4:54 AM

      bmiller,

      I'm still reading the comments in this section. I haven't commented more because I have said everything I want to say about this topic for now.

      Delete
    25. bmillerJuly 11, 2025 at 9:29 AM

      ficino4ml,

      I brought up Occam's Razor because the similarity of it to the Aquinas quote you provided is unmistakeable. When you referred to the statement as the "per pauciora" dictum I used Google AI(aka Gemini) because I had never heard the term before and it also used Occam's Razor in the reply. As I now understand it it seems that you are arguing that Nature does not operate in a parsimonious fashion and therefore it is not a desirable tool of investigation although parsimony may be desirable in non-natural areas of thought. Is that right?

      I'd like to introduce a term so we can keep your distinction. How about "natural parsimony"? If you'd like another term that's fine.

      It seems to me that you have been implying that Aristotle held natural parsimony to be an unequivocal law of nature on the order on non-contradiction so if there is even a single counterexample the idea of natural parsimony is false. If that is the contention, then I think it is a misreading of Aristotle. Ask Google AI using the prompt below and you will find why that misreading is wrong (in addition to the previously linked article:

      Gemini: "Did Aristotle argue that nature always acts in a parsimonious manner without exception?"

      The last link in the reply to the Albertus Magnus Institute has a nice article showing how Aristotle determined that nature does not proceed by chance. It is the regularity everyone sees in nature that is the opposite of chance.

      The first argument proceeds by the essential statement that what happens in nature “comes to be in a certain way, always or for the most part ”. In other words, things come to be in a certain way which is suitable for the thing’s good. In nature there is regularity, things are formed in the way that is proper to them. Nothing that happens by chance happens always or most often, for this is contrary to chance itself – because chance is an accidental cause, its effects are indeterminate. Taking snow for an example: It would be by chance for there to be snow in August, as that is a rare occurrence. Rather, most often there is snow in January, this is natural. So it is clear that all things happen either for the sake of some end, or by chance. As has been stated, in nature things happen always or for the most part, so must be ordered toward an end. Chance is accidental. Nothing that happens by chance happens always and for the most part. Therefore, nature acts for the sake of something.

      It's the "always or for the most part" that is important to note in regard to your counterexamples. Aristotle based his guideline about natural parsimony on the observations that he and others made of nature. Parsimony was observed to be a regular enough feature of nature to rule out chance, so it makes a good tool to use in the investigation of how nature works. Today, scientists are motivated to find a theory to unite the 4 forces (the Grand Unified Theory) and to find a single theory to unit quantum physics and relativity showing that natural parsimony still makes sense. So it seems the idea of natural parsimony is still a desirable tool in current scientific investigation.

      Delete
    26. bmillerJuly 11, 2025 at 11:49 AM

      Hi NLR,

      Glad to hear you are still reading.
      As you can tell, I am trying to show what A-T philosophy has to say about natural parsimony in greater detail and with greater nuance as I think it has been mischaracterized.

      Delete
    27. AnonymousJuly 12, 2025 at 6:08 AM

      @bmiller: you'll notice that I said "at least for the most part" in an earlier comment about Nature's "expediting itself."

      Why doesn't Nature "expedite itself" every time? We both know that Aristotle allows that material conditions can impede Nature from bringing ends to actuality. Tie a wineskin filled with air to a rock underwater, and the air will not be able to reach its natural location above water in this instance. Or there can be a defect traceable to the matter, as in deranged or delerious people ("phrenetici"). Etc.

      But when there aren't impediments, then I read A-T as saying that Nature necessarily "expedites itself through fewer." That's implicit in Aquinas' language in the quotation from In De Sensu. Effectively, "if it is possible, then Nature expedites itself through fewer." Therefore, if it doesn't expedite itself through fewer, then it wasn't possible. Therefore, when there isn't some defect or impediment, Nature's power is sufficient for expediting the end through fewer.

      I think the arguments will boil down to disputing whether a given natural phenomenon is brought above "through fewer" or not. As I said to NLR toward the beginning of this interchange, the person who wants to defend A-T can always argue that a long chain is composed of the fewest links possible. Or one can posit impediments or defects.

      So I probably won't convince you that, if you allow an account of Nature to accommodate the ToE, the number of species that preceded apes, whose DNA somehow survives into the DNA of apes ("survives" can be replaced by some other word), and many of which are now extinct, was the smallest number of species possible for apes to come into being. On the other hand, there are outcomes of evolution that we can say exhibit some parsimony, e.g. a large number of physical structures in "later" species that replicate structures in species that precede them in an evolutionary history. Some structures, though, don't speak parsimony to me; I adduced some earlier.

      I suppose the crux lies in whether one thinks that accounts about nature have to appeal to formal and final causes.

      Delete
    28. bmillerJuly 12, 2025 at 10:06 AM

      Hmm. Looks like Gemini has a slightly different reply now, so here is the link to the Albertus Magnus Institute article:

      https://magnusinstitute.org/magnus-articles/what-does-it-matter-if-nature-acts-for-an-end/

      Delete
  32. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 3, 2025 at 10:41 AM

    Hi anonymous, the central claim of Christianity is the resurrection of Christ from the dead.

    I can't phrase it better than St.Paul in 1st Corinthians 15:12-14: "Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you be saying that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ cannot have been raised either, and if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is without substance, and so is your faith."

    If Christ has been raised from the dead, then Christianity is true, and I don't see why the delayed parousia should be a problem. If Christ has not been raised from the dead, then Christianity is false, and philosophical arguments are limited to establishing whether theism is true.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 3, 2025 at 11:28 PM

      that's true. But is it really historically more certain that Jesus was raised from the dead than that he was a false prophet? It seems to me that the crucial point for all resurrection arguments is the prior probability that God would raise someone like Jesus from the dead. If he was a false prophet, this probability is very low. Hence, in this case one should go for a naturalistic explanation of the resurrection data (e.g. hallucinations, grave robbery, etc.).

      Delete
    2. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 4, 2025 at 1:22 AM

      You can't escape analysing the evidence for the resurrection, if you want to investigate Christianity. If a detective starts with a strong presupposition, then they have already decided the outcome of the investigation before even looking at the facts. That's my 2 cents.

      Delete
    3. The ShadowJuly 4, 2025 at 8:14 AM

      As a great many people have argued, the naturalistic explanations are non-starters. Particularly mass hallucination, which is only ever trotted out to 'explain' miracles.

      Also, let's be careful about the charge of false prophecy. Jonah proclaimed, "Forty days more, and Nineveh will be destroyed!" It didn't happen. Was Jonah a false prophet? No. That was God's word into the situation as it stood; in response to that word, the people of Nineveh freely repented, and God freely chose to forgive.

      Likewise, Isaiah prophesied that Hezekiah would surely die of his illness. Hezekiah prayed for mercy and it was granted him; that didn't make Isaiah a false prophet either. There are other examples.

      Delete
    4. SandyJuly 4, 2025 at 10:53 AM

      The naturalistic explanations are beside the point. The decisive explanation is that the gospels are fictional. There is no convincing evidence to suggest otherwise.

      Delete
    5. AnonymousJuly 4, 2025 at 10:26 PM

      Of course, you can't escape analyzing the resurrection evidence, but my point if this: Even if there was powerful evidence that all naturalistic explanations are highly unlikely, it would be reasonable to go for one of them if the supernatural explanation has an extremely low prior because of Jesus being a false prophet. Also, I am not even sure if I need mass hallucinations to explain the evidence. A few individual (grief-induced) hallucinations plus social contagion effects might do the job.

      Delete
    6. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 5, 2025 at 2:01 PM

      Anonymous, I don't know if I would reason like you. If I were a detective on a crime scene and all the clues pointed to the fact that is very unlikely that Mr. X committed the murder, then I wouldn't accuse him of murder just because I didn't like the answers he gave me when I questioned him on a separate matter.

      Delete
    7. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 8:06 PM

      That seems to be the wrong analogy. It's not about liking the answers, its about prior probability. Here is a better analogy: Suppose there are 2 potential murderers: A and B. Suppose, the evidence points somewhat in the direction of A being the murderer (let's say the DNA found at the gun was 70% similar to A's DNA and only 30% similar to B's DNA. However, suppose I found out that A is a super kind person who never did any crime and even had a good relationship with the victim. On the other hand, B is found to be a serial killer and has had a conflict with the victim and does a motive to kill him. In this case, I should believe that B is the murderer, simply because the prior probability is much higher. It's the same with the resurrection. It seems obvious that God would only raise a true prophet/ Son of God. If we have strong evidence that Jesus was a false prophet, he will most likely not be from God or even be God himself. Hence, the prior probability of God raising him will be very low.
      This is the reason why the delay of the parousia seems to me to be such a devastating objection to Christianity

      Delete
    8. Raffaele AquiloneJuly 6, 2025 at 3:01 PM

      In your analogy: I would still keep an eye on the bigger picture, because facts on the ground matter.

      I get that, right now, you must be really focused on the "delayed parousia" argument and that you must be looking for some specific comment on that. I'm not an expert about that so I won't derail the discussion any further. Thanks for the conversation!

      Delete
  33. TalmidJuly 3, 2025 at 10:50 AM

    How much of a impact do the Theory of Relativity have on kantian epistemology? As i understand it, Kant argued that phenomena necessarily conforms to euclidian geometry, and Relativity uses other kind of geometry to calculate, so it seems understood to disprove the philosopher claim and to some his entire epistemology But it is so?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 3, 2025 at 3:52 PM

      I don't see how this follows at all.
      Kant's point seems (at least to me) to have been that phenomena necessarily conforms to a mathematical spatial structure. Even if Kant thought Euclidean Geometry exhausted the explanation of such a mental structure, it wouldn't necessarily follow that other geometries couldn't fulfill the same category that he was trying to philosophically describe.

      To be clear, I am not a Kantian and thinks his whole magnificent project was a futile house of cards. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see how some interpretations of Relativity (and there is more than one) would revise the Kantian project.

      Delete
    2. TalmidJuly 8, 2025 at 8:59 AM

      Interesting point. That is how i tend to see as well. Kant was wrong for supposing that euclidean geometry was the complete pattern of phenomena, but his project could probably still survive.

      Delete
  34. Geeky CatholicJuly 3, 2025 at 1:21 PM

    So this is a Catholic specific question.... about prayer.

    How does one get petitionary prayers answered with a yea ? (lets take it for granted that I'm going to Sunday Mass, regular confession etc).

    Jesus's promises in Matthew 7:7-8 are sounding increasingly hollow, as are all those supposed promises in private revelations e.g. Divine Mercy etc.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. NoArtworkJuly 3, 2025 at 8:28 PM

      The spiritual world has consequences. Play that game with the utmost of care, and watch out for sleeping in.

      Delete
    2. The ShadowJuly 4, 2025 at 7:54 AM

      I can attest that I sought and eventually found. And I can attest that a person I interceded for for decades eventually came to a living faith. Jesus doesn't promise an instantaneous response, only a positive one. Notice the parables like that of the Unjust Judge, which command perseverance in prayer.

      Also, look a couple verses later: "Or what man of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone? Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a serpent?"

      If the son asks for a serpent, a good father will not give it to him. The promise is to give good things, not things that will harm us. But our Father is infinitely wiser than we, and knows whether what we ask for is genuinely for our good.

      A similar, but more difficult passage is Mark 11:23-24. I can only conclude that it is for apostles relying on God more than we can readily imagine. And I'm certain that the "belief" there is more than a mere psychological state ginned up by effort. Also note verse 25 - genuine forgiveness of one's enemies is part of the package.

      Delete
    3. TonyJuly 4, 2025 at 1:56 PM

      When we remember that often God responds to a petitionary prayer with some other good than the good we were asking for, and also that it is often the case that God uses trials and suffering to help us become better, it becomes effectively impossible to say "He didn't answer my prayer". St. Paul says (Rom. *:28) that God makes ALL things work for the good of those who love him. So, if you were to ask for a Ferrari, and God knows that your having a Ferrari would cause you to sin and end up in hell, he might answer your prayer by giving you something even better than getting that Ferrari, namely, to NOT get it, saving you from some grave sin.

      Hope and trust in God's good will for us is part and parcel with the life of grace, and those virtues mean a firm reliance on the truth of St. Paul's words, so that God either gives us what we ask for or something better, but that his measure for "better" is always by our future life in heaven with him. God himself repeatedly told us that he will make us better through trials and difficulties.

      And by the way, it appears his main method of increasing our virtue of patience is by making us wait for his eventual answer to prayers. Sneaky, I call that. St. Mother Teresa of Kolkata suffered through a trial of 50 years of dryness in prayer: I don't know if I even WANT that kind of patience. St. Teresa of Avila commented to God (I assume in the midst of some great trial) "if this is the way you treat your friends, it's no wonder you have so few."

      A similar, but more difficult passage is Mark 11:23-24. I can only conclude that it is for apostles relying on God more than we can readily imagine.

      I have though often of this passage, and I tentatively think (a) it's more obscure than even Shadow suggests: in the Revised Standard Version, it has 3 different tenses: you ask (present tense), believe you have received it (past tense), and "it will be yours" (future tense). And consequently (b) I think it's point is something more than merely "you need more faith". In another place God tells us "you ask but you do not receive because you ask wrongly." (James 4:2) It might be, at least sometimes, that we ask wrongly precisely because we are unwilling for God's response to be "not A, but B in its place", or "this suffering IS for your good".

      These are all unsatisfying and incomplete answers to the problem.

      Delete
    4. Geeky CatholicJuly 4, 2025 at 3:30 PM

      If I'm totally honest I'm starting to think of God as being worse than the pharisees. All of these promises he makes seem to have a fine print that would make an insurance salesman blush.

      Am I merely some plaything to dance for his amusement in a cosmic version of Crufts? I can imagine some smart alec angel commenting "Oh look at Johan, he managed to do the humble crawl but he failed the confidence high jump ---- no healing for him !!!"

      Delete
    5. bmillerJuly 4, 2025 at 6:06 PM

      Geeky Catholic,

      It sounds to me that it would be better if you sought out a trusted priest to have this discussion since it is to personal.

      Delete
    6. Geeky CatholicJuly 5, 2025 at 1:35 PM

      I have, and for the most part they're as useful as a catflap in an elephant house. I thought there might be some theologians here who could give me a straight answer.

      Delete
    7. bmillerJuly 5, 2025 at 4:34 PM

      Geeky Catholic,

      Maybe a good friend could help then.

      It looks to me that The Shadow and Tony offered you what most theologians would tell you except maybe in different words.

      I wish I could give you an answer that would help your spiritual healing. I'll say a prayer for you.

      Delete
    8. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 5, 2025 at 6:15 PM

      I’m not a theologian, but I doubt there’s an easy answer to the question. If you believe Jesus died for our sins and was resurrected, then it makes sense to dig deeper. (A Grief Observed might be a good place to start if you haven’t read it.)

      If you don’t believe Jesus died for our sins and was resurrected, then it’s a moot point. I assume you don’t feel that way, or at least you haven’t made up your mind.

      It’s worth looking into. Maybe other people can offer better article or book suggestions (or maybe even an easy answer).

      Delete
    9. bmillerJuly 6, 2025 at 6:57 AM

      Another thought came to mind. Maybe there has been a saint that faced similar difficulties and you could read about the saints life.

      For instance St Monika prayed a long time for St Augustine to straighten out. When he finally did, he felt obliged to make up for his past and I think he did a fairly good job.

      Delete
    10. ccmnxcJuly 6, 2025 at 2:03 PM

      One thing I think worth mentioning is that Jesus, in other contexts at least (see Pitre's recent work on Christology for example), says things that are deliberately puzzling and demanding of reflection. Indeed, if the impression I have from him is correct, we risk quite fundamentally misunderstanding Jesus if we read Him as if He's nothing more than a straight shooter.

      His disciples themselves would have known that simply praying to God in Jesus' name isn't going to get them everything they want (now or even later). So I think we need to read Him as a Jewish teacher whose sayings are meant to be reflected on and wrestled with rather than as someone simply concerned about teaching straightforward and true propositions.

      Contrast this with the motif of the necessity of coming to will what God wills. Presuming the inspiration of Scripture, I'm guessing there's an implicit invitation to find the right tension to hold these two propositions in. Frustrating if you simply want the answer. But perhaps to simply get the answer would be to miss the point of what Jesus is trying to do.

      Delete
    11. Geeky CatholicJuly 7, 2025 at 4:47 PM

      great, great cheers CCMNXC, that made me feel much better (not). I'm spiritually down and out as you Americans say.

      Delete
    12. ccmnxcJuly 8, 2025 at 5:22 AM

      No doubt the sufferings are genuine and worthy of a certain reverence. However, my hope is that, in light of the above considerations, we can avoid a scenario along the lines of "I'm genuinely suffering, and I've been lied to by God." Suffering is bad. Suffering + betrayal is worse.

      Delete
    13. Geeky CatholicJuly 8, 2025 at 2:10 PM

      CCMNX

      oh I felt like God lied to me already, he made me think that I had a vocation to religious life, then I couldn't find anyone who'd take me (that's NOT my current prayer intention btw). I already feel used and cast away by God.

      Delete
    14. WOLF BRONSKYJuly 8, 2025 at 5:45 PM

      I’ve been there, Geeky Catholic. I’m sure most of us have been. The last time I was struggling, I focused on God’s will, not mine. Knowing His will and doing His will. My #1 prayer these days is to want what God wants.

      Delete
  35. NormJuly 4, 2025 at 3:56 AM

    I have been really critical of Trump's economic policies on tariffs along the lines of Dr Feser's critiques.

    But I am still wondering if we missed something, jobs seems to be increasing, inflation has been controlled.

    All while the 10% baseline tariffs are still in place which seem to be generating a considerable revenue.

    The 10% baseline tariff is something that has been in the works for quite a while before this administration so I think there's a good chance that it's possible effects were foreseen and well accounted for.

    The reciprocal tariffs were ill thought out.

    But would anyone here with knowledge on these matters like to enlighten us on why the predictions of many economists didn't come to fruition with regards to inflation.

    Scott Bessent is quite well regarded as someone who is able to understand macroeconomics.

    Two reasons come to my mind as to why inflation didn't rise

    One is low demand, people fearing a recession switched to buying only necessities, thus the price of consumer goods largely remained the same. There was an up tick in some food prices though because of those necessities.

    Another reason could be that companies just stocked up well before the tariff dead line such that their existing stock was enough to last for a few monthsm

    Thirdly Trump's immigration policies may have caused a reduction in tourism this leading to lower demand and lesser fuel prices.

    Would like to hear different thoughts

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. bmillerJuly 4, 2025 at 11:33 AM

      I've read that prices didn't go up for consumers because:
      Manufacturers (like Japanese carmakers) don't want to raise their prices and lose market share to US manufacturers.
      Manufacturers raising production in existing US factories and slowing down domestically to avoid the tariffs.
      High end fashion businesses have large profit margins and so can tolerate 10%. For instance blue jeans selling for $100 cost $10 to make. 10% tariff raises cost to $11 so not much is lost.

      Delete
    2. TonyJuly 4, 2025 at 1:20 PM

      I admit that I don't understand the economics of tariffs well. Yet even I know that it is too soon to have expected to already be seeing much of the effects of tariffs, whether positive or negative. Also, many of the tariffs threatened were withdrawn or put on hold, and (as you say), we could still be drawing down reserves for some items, so consumers are pretty much entirely unable to tell which items they are buying now are priced the way it is because that item was directly affected by a tariff.

      Delete
    3. bmillerJuly 4, 2025 at 6:59 PM

      There were plenty of news outlets reporting on economists predicting immediate doom for tariffs and I suspect that is why Norm is asking the question.

      I suspect it's difficult to predict the effect of "tariffs" in a general sense period.

      First, tariffs are not the only factor driving inflation. Government spending and monetary policies have an enormous impact. Print more money and inflation goes up. Small changes in tariff policy may be insignificant related to monetary policy.

      Second, tariffs normally only affect a part of the economy, while inflation is a measure of costs to consumers across all of the economy. So the cost of shoes may go up while the cost of food goes lower and so no inflation.

      Third, it's not like people running companies never consider contingency plans, especially after the Trump first term tariffs against China and the problem with supply chains exposed with Covid. Economists, who make inflation predictions, get to keep their job no matter how wrong their predictions are. When a CEO makes a bad call he's gone.

      The worst thing CEOs lament is that tariff policy has not settled down so it's difficult to plan. They still plan, but cannot execute full throttle since they have to allow for all the uncertainty. Until then no one who relies on imports can make the most efficient decision for his company although he still has to decide how to price his products in the meantime.

      I also wonder how much news stories about how tariffs are bad are driven by politics rather than pure economics. If tariffs and protectionism is so bad, then how did China go from zero to Gorilla strength in a such a short period of time?

      Delete
  36. The DeuceJuly 4, 2025 at 5:30 PM

    Hi Ed, I know from following you on Twitter that you're familiar with the work of Denis Noble. I'm wondering if you've been following related developments in the cutting edge of biology.

    The Intelligent Design camp has moved in what I would consider a strongly Aristotelean direction in the last few years since you last addressed the topic. I see increasing sophistication from them and open recognition of the insufficiency of the Paleyian machine metaphor. See the recently released book "Plato's Revenge: The New Science Of The Immaterial Genome" on the work of Richard Sternberg for one very interesting recent example.

    At the same time, they've been finding increasing common ground with "3rd way evolution" guys like Denis Noble, Stuart Kauffman, James Shapiro, Michael Levin, etc who are converging on a similar conclusion and documenting biological phenomena that are clearly purposeful and non-random, yet also irreducible to mechanistic causes in principle. See the paper "The Reasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics in the Biological Sciences" by Stuart Kauffman etc al for an interesting recent example and summary.

    I'd be interested to see your thoughts on some of these developments, and I'd bet you could fruitfulness interact/advise/guide some of these guys given your own knowledge of the direction they are going.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 11:01 PM

      Hi Deuce! I've actually noticed this sort of trend too. I find Stuart Kauffman's viewpoints particularly fascinating, I have to say. (I think I encountered them through the physicist Lee Smolin's writing - Smolin thinks not just life, but the whole universe, may be fundamentally creative, and the laws of physics might change over time. Both Smolin and Kauffman are naturalists too.) Here's another site, by Steve Talbott, that shares some similar themes (against the idea of organisms as machines): https://bwo.life/

      I think the Intelligent Design theorists are wrong, because briefly, there's a lot of evidence evolution happened. However, I also accept that at least in principle, there may be some things about life (such as consciousness?) that evolution can't explain. And while I'm not religious, I have to admit that evolution does not, by itself, rule out the existence of God in principle (though I think it does things such as strengthen the problem of evil). So I don't agree with every metaphysical conclusion that some people have tried to draw from the fact of evolution. But I feel that criticizing the unwarranted metaphysical conclusions shouldn't get closely associated with the known fallacies of the ID movement - otherwise the baby might unfortunately get thrown out with the bathwater.

      Also, I think we need to distinguish between irreducibility in principle and a mere practical incapacity to perform a reduction due to complexity. The question is - if you had full knowledge of the initial state and the fundamental laws of physics, could you derive all the information about the system's behavior (such as through running a computer simulation), or would the system actually act differently than you would predict if you just knew the fundamental laws of physics? I have my doubts that anyone has proved that there exists a system that fundamentally isn't reducible in this sense. I remember a commenter called JesseM trying to explain this in the comments sections of other posts on this blog, and I don't think I saw anyone else who got this point, no matter how much JesseM tried to explain it, even with the simple example of Conway's Game of Life. What do you think?

      (As a side note, I'm the same Anonymous who was discussing intentionality and physicalism earlier.)

      Delete
    2. The DeuceJuly 6, 2025 at 4:28 AM

      I think the Intelligent Design theorists are wrong, because briefly, there's a lot of evidence evolution happened.

      Not all ID proponents deny evolution in the sense of common descent. Sternberg, Behe, and Denton don't, for instance.

      However, I also accept that at least in principle, there may be some things about life (such as consciousness?) that evolution can't explain.

      My own view is that while evolution happened, it doesn't actually *explain* much of anything in and of itself, except for why different species have incidental similarities.

      Rather, why evolution went the way it did is something that itself needs to be explained.

      Specifically, we need to explain biological function.

      It's not just that everything in biology looks purposeful, it's that for every single feature of biology that we seek to explain, its purpose or function is foundational to its very definition, such that to deny the objective existence of biological function is essentially to dismiss life itself and the entire field of biology as a subjective illusion (which collapses into outright incoherence when one considers that we are living creatures ourselves and our rational faculties are actually an example of biological function).

      Darwin was supposed to have given the "mechanism" that generates function, but I think he failed, first because natural selection isn't actually a mechanism but rather a mechanistic meta-narrative, and second because I think it's incoherent (I won't delve into my reasons for saying this here, but similar to attempts to naturalize intentionality, it's attempting to explain biological function while denying its objective existence).

      Also, I think we need to distinguish between irreducibility in principle and a mere practical incapacity to perform a reduction due to complexity.

      Both the Kauffman paper and the book on Sternberg's work I referenced explicitly address this distinction fwiw, and both argue that we're looking at behavior that is non-mechanistic and transcends computation in principle, not merely as a matter of being too complex for us to compute.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousJuly 6, 2025 at 1:19 PM

      Thanks for the reply! (I'm wondering whether I should make an account, but I'm worried about giving away my private information, so I'll stay anonymous for now). But anyway... good point that some ID theorists don't reject common descent. I keep forgetting that. I still have issues (for instance, Behe's claims about irreducible complexity have been debunked and he hasn't properly taken into account things such as exaptation, and Sternberg has done questionable stuff such as peer reviewing with a conflict of interest). I don't know much about Denton, though, and the Third Way of evolution certainly isn't committed to ID.

      I haven't been able to get Sternberg's book so far, unfortunately, but luckily Kauffman's papers are online and I've read the one you mentioned. The discussion about how living organisms (including cells) can sometimes adapt to novel situations that have never been in their evolutionary history are very interesting - I hadn't known that cells could be so flexible before. The mathematical proofs make me worry that there's a flaw, though, such as conflating our inability to predict everything with the idea that there are actually things not fully governed by the fundamental laws of physics. I have a tendency to worry whenever someone tries to use a mathematical proof in philosophy and science, because even if the math itself is correct, the starting assumptions may be flawed. I don't think I know enough about math to judge whether this particular case is flawed or not, though.

      Now, biological function and intentionality - those are the things I'm getting really excited about! I agree that denying rationality is incoherent, but I'm not sure whether denying the objective existence of functions that don't involve rationality (or consciousness) is incoherent in the same way (even if it is incorrect). You do say that you don't want to go further into your reasons, so I might not press you on this either.

      However, as I said earlier, I am very interested in intentionality and whether it can be naturalized. I've actually been considering whether, even if the "standard" strategies (such as conceptual role and causal theories) don't work on their own for all examples of intentionality, a combination of such strategies can allow for a full reduction after all. (Especially if someone does find a flaw in Richard Johns' argument, mentioned in an earlier comment chain). I wonder whether I should start a new comment chain for my thoughts on this, or whether I should continue in an existing one.

      Delete
    4. The DeuceJuly 7, 2025 at 2:55 PM

      for instance, Behe's claims about irreducible complexity have been debunked and he hasn't properly taken into account things such as exaptation

      He has addressed that and the way I would state it in brief is that exaptation, when it happens, isn't an explanation or counterexample for irreducible complexity, but just part of what needs to be explained. Under a wholly ateleological view of evolution, it cannot possibly be the case that some part was chosen for integration into some future system with a new function, after all. Keep in mind that Behe isn't denying evolution per se, he's denying purely accidental evolution.

      And bear in mind also that an explanation can't just be a matter of some part "wandering in" to some new system by a fluke. It has to happen in a consistently reproducible way. It has to be integrated into the development process of building that system in new organisms, and the new system must itself be integrated into the organism's overall control systems to have any benefit.

      And if Kauffman, Sternberg, etc are correct, a organism's development process is an inherently purposeful and non-mechanistic one.

      I haven't been able to get Sternberg's book so far

      I got the Kindle version (https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/B0F39C4B97/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0) which is pretty cheap. The book isn't actually by Sternberg, but about Sternberg and his work, so it has a layman's description of his research. The basic premise is something I had been thinking myself, and that meshes well with the work of Kauffman, Levin, etc: That the information needed to specify the process by which a single cell reliably develops into an organism consisting of trillions of cells of different types carrying out myriad functions of mind-boggling sophistication all integrated into a single organism is many orders of magnitude beyond anything that could possibly be stored inside a single cell or processed computationally inside a developing organism, so something goal-oriented and purposeful but not mechanistic or computational must be going on. Sternberg puts some number estimates to my intuition.

      I agree that denying rationality is incoherent, but I'm not sure whether denying the objective existence of functions that don't involve rationality (or consciousness) is incoherent in the same way

      Well, I would start by noting that while rationality is not material, it is fully integrated into our physical systems. It functions to take in and abstract information from our senses, to direct our actions, and so forth. Using our rational faculties depends on us taking in nutrients, getting sleep, etc. So if human rationality is inherently functional and its function is also inherently integrated into all the other functional systems of our body, they must be inherently functional too.

      That would strongly suggest that the same is true of analogous function in animals as well, and evolution actually makes that inference *more* solid. And while other animals may not be rational, many are surely conscious, so similar considerations apply.

      Beyond that, there's the simple issue that function is core to the definition of every feature in biology down to the simplest of microbes, such that denying the objective reality of that function is tantamount to denying the objective reality of the features and even of the organisms themselves.

      It may not be immediately incoherent to take a nominalistic view of single-celled organisms and their functions while holding the cells of our own bodies and their functions to be objectively real, but it's certainly deeply incongruous.

      Delete
  37. bmillerJuly 5, 2025 at 1:16 PM

    Here's a question.
    Given that prisons are morally acceptable, should there be prisons like the one in El Salvador?

    Should prisoners be treated like this?
    https://x.com/nayibbukele/status/1941206457598476321

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Michael CopasJuly 8, 2025 at 5:48 PM

      bmiller,

      Thanks for posting that link. The requirement of work or the opportunity to work to reduce a sentence seems to me both humane and redemptive. It would give more meaning to the lives of inmates and give a greater opportunity for moral reform. Inmates whose prison time consists of cable, working out, and leisure doesn't provide nearly the opportunity for reform nor the meaning of a life that contributes to the common good through labor. I think that they should reintroduce labor with the focus on its value for reform and dignity in giving someone an opportunity to pay the debt they owe more quickly and more meaningfully.

      Delete
  38. AnonymousJuly 5, 2025 at 3:20 PM


    "Pope Leo XIII: “The natural law enjoins us to love devotedly and to defend the country in which we had birth, and in which we were brought up, so that every good citizen hesitates not to face death for his native land” (Sapientiae Christianae"
    We now have a professional military force, so "every good citizen...need(s) not to face death for his native land."

    ReplyDelete
  39. AnonymousJuly 6, 2025 at 7:13 PM

    What is your stance on “conversion therapy “ for transgender and homosexual people?

    ReplyDelete
  40. AnonymousJuly 7, 2025 at 11:15 AM

    This touched me deeply:
    An inspiring reflection written by a non-Catholic judge in Kenya, on the election and significance of the elevation of Pope Leo:
    "There is a kind of wisdom that is not loud. It does not seek attention. It does not scream to be seen. It simply exists, quietly, deeply and eternally. This is the wisdom of the Catholic Church, a body that has outlived empires, survived schisms, endured scandals and yet remains standing, steady and sacred. The Catholic Church is not a trend. It is not a social wave. It is an institution that walks with time but listens to eternity.

    What the Vatican did was not just elect a new Pope. They made a statement to the world. They reminded humanity that God does not follow trends. That true leadership is not always found in the obvious. That sometimes, the one who carries the mantle is not the one the world expects, but the one heaven approves. This is the mystery of divine succession, wrapped in silence, clothed in prayer and sealed in sacred deliberation.

    What happened in the election of Pope Leo the Fourteenth is not just a political or ecclesiastical event. It is a mirror to the rest of the Christian world. It exposes by comparison the chaos that reigns in many modern church settings, particularly in the Pentecostal space. In some of these assemblies, power struggles have replaced prayer, and ambition has drowned anointing. The altar has become a showground, not a sanctuary.

    But the Catholic Church has reminded us of something we have forgotten. That the kingdom of God is not noise but order. Not display but discipline. Not popularity but purity. It has reminded us that when God is allowed to speak, He will often choose the one no one expected. He will raise the man who is hidden. He will lift the one who has been in the secret place.

    This is the wisdom of the eternal Church. This is the mystery of divine order. This is the power of the sacred. And in a world drowning in confusion, it shines like a light that cannot be hidden.”

    ReplyDelete
  41. AnonymousJuly 7, 2025 at 7:44 PM

    Re the X about Fr. Aidan Nichols. Back in 2020, at the height of Covid, I emailed him and asked him to pray for me and my mom . He emailed me back and said that he would. God bless the Dominicans.

    ReplyDelete
  42. AndyJuly 8, 2025 at 4:14 PM

    Here's a recent tweet by Robert Talisse:

    AT THE ATHENS AIRPORT

    Border Agent: What is your occupation?

    Me: I’m a philosopher

    BA (looking suspicious): Ok, then who’s the greatest Greek philosopher?

    Me (instantly): Aristotle

    BA (stamping my passport): Of course. Proceed

    ReplyDelete
  43. AnonymousJuly 8, 2025 at 10:54 PM

    "Last Christian town in West Bank attacked by Israelis, church leaders appeal to world for help

    A 5th century church and an ancient Christian cemetery were badly vandalised by Israeli 'settlers' in the last Christian town in the West Bank yesterday."

    https://www.indcatholicnews.com/news/52772

    ReplyDelete
  44. AnonymousJuly 10, 2025 at 11:44 AM

    https://www.npr.org/2025/07/09/nx-s1-5462837/diocese-of-san-bernardino-issues-dispensation-saying-catholics-who-fear-ice-dont-have-to-attend-mass

    ReplyDelete
  45. AnonymousJuly 10, 2025 at 12:03 PM

    Bihttps://www.google.com/books/edition/On_the_Demonic/7dcTEQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA2&printsec=frontcovershop Sheen wrote a book on the demonic
    He had a Ph.D in philosophy from the University of Louvain and a S.T.D. in theology from the Angelicum in Rome. His book, "God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy (1925) is still relevant.
    https://www.amazon.com/Intelligence-Modern-Philosophy-Fulton-Sheen/dp/1949899764

    ReplyDelete
  46. AnonymousJuly 11, 2025 at 3:31 PM

    "The Ruliad as an optimal framework for unifying mind, matter, and the infinite" by Damaris Kroeber

    At Wolfram:
    https://community.wolfram.com/groups/-/m/t/3497773?p_p_auth=L37Q207r

    ReplyDelete

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)