Here is a summary of her position. The pacifist holds that all killing is immoral, even when necessary to protect citizens against criminal evildoers within a nation, or foreign adversaries without. This position is contrary to the basic precondition of any social order, which is the right to protect itself against attempts to destroy it. It also has no warrant in the orthodox Christian tradition. A less extreme but related error is the thesis that violence can never justly be initiated, but at most can only ever be justified in response to those who have initiated it. In fact, Anscombe argues, what matters is not who strikes the first blow, but who is in the right. For example, it was in her judgment right for the British to initiate violence in order to suppress chattel slavery.
That is one
set of errors. But another and opposite
extreme error is to abuse the principle that war can sometimes be justifiable,
in order to try to rationalize violence that is in fact unjust. Indeed, this opposite extreme is, in
Anscombe’s view, the more common error. And
it is more common in war than in police activity, because war affords more occasions
for the evil of killing the innocent, and civilians in particular. The principle of double effect is too often
misapplied in attempts to rationalize such killing.
Having given
a general description of these two sorts of error, Anscombe then goes on to
examine each in more detail. She
suggests that in the early twentieth century, some were drawn to pacifism in
part as an overreaction to universal conscription (which she regards as an
evil). But her main focus is on the
theme that pacifism derives from a distortion of Christianity. In part this has to do with a hostility to
the ethos of the Old Testament, which she argues is widely misunderstood and
widely and wrongly thought to be at odds with the New Testament. But the New Testament too has been badly
misunderstood. For example, counsels to
which only some are called (such as
giving away one’s worldly goods) are sometimes misrepresented as precepts
binding on all.
“The truth
about Christianity,” Anscombe says, “is that it is a severe and practicable
religion, not a beautifully ideal but impracticable one” (p. 48). But the distortions she describes have made
Christianity seem to be an ideal but
impracticable one. And the attraction
some Christians have for pacifism is an example. Many Christians and non-Christians alike
believe the falsehood that Christ calls us all to pacifism. And because no society could survive if it
practiced pacifism, many thus conclude that Christian morality is simply not
practical.
Here, as
Anscombe argues, is where pacifism inadvertently paves the way for those who
rationalize the murder of the innocent. Falsely
supposing that all violence is evil
and also noting that violence is necessary to preserve a society against
evildoers, they take the short step to the conclusion that “committed to
‘compromise with evil,’ one must go the whole hog and wage war à outrance” (p. 48). In other words, once we are convinced that
we’re going to have to do evil anyway in order to protect society, there’s no
limit to the evil we will rationalize as necessary to achieve this good
end. Unrealistic moralizing has as its
sequel an amoral realpolitik, falsely
presenting itself as the only alternative.
With
Catholics, Anscombe says, this amorality masquerades as an application of the
principle of double effect. True, this
principle can indeed in some cases justify actions that foreseeably risk harm
to civilians, when that harm is not intended and when it is not out of
proportion to the good to be achieved.
(For example, it can be justifiable to bomb an enemy military base even
if one foresees, while not intending, that some civilians nearby could be
killed as a result.)
The trouble,
Anscombe says, is that people often play fast and loose with the notion of
“intention” in order to abuse the principle of double effect. For example, it would be sheer sophistry for
an employee to say that when he helped his boss embezzle from the company, his
“intention” was not really to assist
in embezzlement, but only to avoid getting fired, so that the action could be
justified by double effect. Similarly,
Anscombe argues, it is sophistry to pretend that the obliteration bombing of
cities does not involve any intentional killing of civilians, but only the
intention to end a war earlier. Another
sophistry involves interpreting what counts as a “combatant” very broadly, so
as to try to justify attacks on the civilian population in general. Anscombe also responds to various other attempts
to rationalize violations of just war criteria.
That, again,
is the argument in outline. Here are
some ways it is relevant today. We have,
on the one hand, some Catholics who appear at least to flirt with pacifism. Pope Francis said things that implied that
war could never be just and that traditional teaching on this matter needed to
be rethought, though he
also said things that pointed in the other direction. As with other topics, his teaching on this
matter was simply muddled rather than a clear departure from tradition. But it was muddled in a way that gives aid
and comfort to the first, pacifistic erroneous extreme identified by Anscombe.
On the other
hand, we also have many who go to the opposite extreme criticized by Anscombe,
of trying to rationalize unjust harm to civilian populations by abuse of the
principle of double effect and related sophistries. For example, this is the case with much of
the commentary on Israel’s war in Gaza. Israel
certainly had the right and indeed the duty to retaliate for the diabolical
Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, which killed almost 1,200 people. But many seem to think that this gives Israel
a blank check to do whatever it likes in Gaza, or at least whatever it likes
short of deliberately targeting civilians.
That is not
the case. Yes, traditional just war doctrine
holds that it is always immoral deliberately to kill civilians. But that is by no means all that it says on
the matter. It also holds that it is
immoral deliberately to destroy civilian property and infrastructure, and
thereby to make normal civilian life impossible. To be sure, it holds too that it can, by the
principle of double effect, sometimes be permissible to carry out military
actions that put civilian lives and property at risk, where such risk is not intended but simply foreseen. But it also holds that this harm must not be out of proportion to the
good that one hopes to secure by way of such military action.
Throughout
Gaza, however, civilian property and infrastructure have been largely destroyed,
and ordinary life made impossible. The resulting
humanitarian crisis has been steadily worsening. Casualty numbers in Gaza are hotly disputed,
but they are undeniably high. According to
a recent report:
Almost 84,000 people died in Gaza between October 2023 and
early January 2025 as a result of the Hamas-Israel war, estimates the first
independent survey of deaths. More than
half of the people killed were women aged 18-64, children or people over 65,
reports the study.
Suppose for the
sake of argument that the true number is half of that, or even just one third
of that. That would still be extremely
high. Such loss of life, destruction of
basic infrastructure, and making of ordinary civilian life impossible are out
of proportion to the evil Israel is retaliating against. And this is putting aside the awful
conditions under which Gazans have been living for years, and the allegations
of cases where civilians have been deliberately targeted during the current
war. These too are hotly disputed
matters, but the point is that even if we
don’t factor them in, Israeli action in Gaza seems clearly disproportionate
and thus not justifiable by the principle of double effect.
There is
also the sophistry some commit of pretending that if a civilian sympathizes
with Hamas, he is morally on a par with a combatant and may be treated as such. And then there is the proposal some
have made to dispossess the Gazans altogether, which would only add a further,
massive layer of injustice.
None of this can facilitate a long-term solution to the Israel-Palestine problem, but will inevitably greatly inflame further already high hostility against Israel. A commitment to preserving the basic preconditions of ordinary civilian life for Israelis and Palestinians alike is both morally required by just war criteria, and a precondition to any workable modus vivendi.
I hold great respect for Ed, but unfortunately, and despite a number of good points, he leans toward the same error here as Miss Anscombe did in her essay; namely, a definition of “evil” that’s a little pat. That’s hardly to say that either is “wrong,” but it’s to suggest that they don’t grapple with the realities of combat on the ground. Anscombe was certainly correct to say that the use of nuclear weapons was morally wrong, but her proposed solution (a negotiated peace with Japan) does not take adequate account of the strategic ramifications of such a move.
ReplyDeleteAt least Anscombe had the benefit of being right about the wrongness of using the Bomb. Ed here makes an, if he’ll allow me, elementary error about disproportion in casualties. As many actual just war ethicists (e.g., Lord Biggar in the UK) will note, “proportionality” is only a “prudential” criterion in the tradition, precisely because it is so difficult to accurately predict what will or won’t be proportionate.
For example, one could easily have predicted that the devastation necessary to obtain the surrender of Japan after Pearl Harbor would be “disproportionate” - hundreds of thousands, if not millions of civilians would need to die to vindicate the deaths of only a few thousand Americans. But that “disproportion” by no means vitiated the justice of the American cause, nor did it render the decision for war ultimately disproportionate.
In a similar way, Israel is responding to perhaps the worst terror attack in history, with the aim of preventing future acts of violence (an inevitability if Hamas remains in power) and with liberating the population of Gaza from terrorist rule. Anyone could have predicted that civilian casualties would be great. But that fact in itself (and apart from any particular acts which may be judged to have violated the laws of war) - especially in light of the relatively low civilian-to-combatant kill ratio - does not render the continuation of the Israeli campaign immoral, just as it did not render immoral the American decision to pursue unconditional surrender in WWII.
"Anscombe was certainly correct to say that the use of nuclear weapons was morally wrong, but her proposed solution (a negotiated peace with Japan) does not take adequate account of the strategic ramifications of such a move." - and what exactly are those "strategic ramifications"?
DeleteAnon, you are right that in spite of making many excellent points in the OP, Prof. Feser glitched when he identified the proportion (and, therefore, the lopsided DISproportion currently running). The proportion that properly enters in the initial ius ad bellum decision for (or against) war is a proportion of the anticipated evils to be suffered and goods enjoyed in having a war and being successful, versus the evils to be suffered and goods enjoyed by NOT accepting war - and therefore submitting to whatever evil condition currently obtains (or is going to exist) based on not going to war. The proportion (before you have decided on whether to go to war) is about FUTURE goods and evils, on the basis of some EXISTING state of affairs from which great evils exist and/or can be reasonably be expected if you do not resort to violence.
DeleteIn running this analysis, when you are considering "cases" that may occur, it is often the case that the case of "we chose not to resort to war" just is the case of "our government ceases to exist and the enemy takes over ruling our territory and our people, and our nation as a distinct people will eventually cease to exist at all." While that is a very severe condition, it is not by any means the absolute worst case. It would be worse if the enemy is (explicitly) bent on killing every man, woman and child of your people, and this is what would happen if you don't resist by force.
But even the loss of your government, territory, and national identity are clearly just cause to justify deciding on war, if you have prospects of success. In the proportion analysis that you must then consider, you must ALSO consider the evils that the opposing side will suffer because you visit violence upon them, (along with the evils your own side suffers from the fighting - including the destruction you visit within your own territory), and also the evils that the community of nations will suffer alongside of the belligerents. And against these evils, you weigh the goods to be won by such war, especially your national identity, most of your people, and some / much of your goods protected, but ALSO (a) justice to be done upon the criminal nation; (b) just peace to be upheld among the community of nations as a premier value; and (at least possibly) just reparations paid to your country by the unjust aggressor.
There are many aspects of the proportional analysis that are difficult, because there is no clear and certain unit of comparison for the different KINDS of goods: how many deaths balance against justice? But one portion of the analysis is as easy as pie: in totting up the totality of the evils that will come about if you decide on war, the "evils suffered by the enemy" DO NOT include the just reparations they may pay if you win. Just punishment is itself an element of good order.
When it comes to soldiers' deaths, proportion isn't really a big issue here: if your generals are much better, and your equipment is much better, you might be able to inflict a 20-1 ratio of deaths in battle. That's not a reason to say the proportion is off, so don't go to war: the enemy is more under the obligation to either not fight, or surrender, if they have no reasonable prospect of success, and if you must prove to them in detail that they have no such prospect, that disproportion is part of the ART of war, not a reason to decide against the war. (Assuming you have just cause to begin with.)
And it’s within THAT analysis that you have to weigh the merits of their sufferings with the merits of your sufferings if you continue to fight, and (differently) if you decide to stop. Do their sufferings count EQUALLY with yours? It might seem so, but no nation have ever done so in deciding. At least this much seems more probable: we don’t count equally with our sufferings the sufferings they endure where justice and reason told them they could have surrendered to avoid more. That’s where the weighings become most difficult of all: if you have to decide whether to continue in the face of highly imbalanced new sufferings from new fighting, with what mechanism do you weight their irrational intransigence in not surrendering when they should have?
DeleteOne of the shining examples of the conclusion of a war, wherein the belligerents ended up being co-partners in peace in the community of nations, is in WWII, after which Germany and Japan became wholesome allies with the US, Britain, etc, worthy partners in peace. That kind of outcome might not always be feasible, but it is the ideal of just war theory. An inconclusive series of battles that is merely prelude to the next round is not a just peace and ill represents a valid goal of a just war. But that outcome of WWII might not have come about if we had not continued the war in March and April 1945, even though at that point everyone but Hitler knew that Germany could not win, and during which the new dying (and destruction) was massively imbalanced. Germany's new suffering from the fighting in those 2 months was A LOT less than if an unjust "peace" was made that led to yet another WW.
@MP
DeleteWell, he's not even approaching this from the right way (Pearl Harbor alone provided precisely no basis for demanding unconditional surrender), but a conditional surrender would probably have involved all the Japanese leaders who committed or ordered war crimes getting off scot-free and Japan keeping its genodical empire in East Asia.
@Anonymous
Delete"perhaps the worst terror attack in history"
Maybe if you have the memory of a goldfish. Three times as many people died on September 11, 2001, and IS killed over a thousand Shia Muslims at Camp Speicher in 2014. And that's setting aside the numerous acts of state terrorism and mob violence that not everyone would accept as terrorism, even if they probably should.
To MP: any historian of the period can tell you that the fanatical elements of the Japanese government would have latched on to any attempts to negotiate as a sign of American weakness.
DeleteTo Great Thurible: the nature of the government that ordered Pearl Harbor, and its other depredations, was sufficient justification for unconditional surrender.
Before you start accusing people of deficient memories, Great Thurible, perhaps you should recall the relative sizes of Israel and the United States, as well as the different natures of 9/11 and 10/7. The hijackers didn’t rape people, nor did they slaughter the vast majority of their victims up close and personal. 10/7 is easily more devastating than 9/11 was.
Delete"To MP: any historian of the period can tell you that the fanatical elements of the Japanese government would have latched on to any attempts to negotiate as a sign of American weakness." - "any historian of the period"? I find that pretty hard to believe. By 1945 it was pretty clear that America is not weak. Given that, being willing to offer some specific terms (and to tinker with them) would not have indicated weakness. Just like Wilson's Fourteen Points (whatever flaws they had) were not seen as a sign of weakness.
DeleteFor that matter, concerning "a conditional surrender would probably have involved all the Japanese leaders who committed or ordered war crimes getting off scot-free and Japan keeping its genodical empire in East Asia." - Fourteen Points did show an example of terms that include dismantling an empire.
"To Great Thurible: the nature of the government that ordered Pearl Harbor, and its other depredations, was sufficient justification for unconditional surrender." - how? What exactly in its "nature" was relevant here? Presumably, "nature" is not merely "what the government did"?
1) Yes, any historian of the period. Start with Notre Dame’s Fr. Wilson Miscamble (who does not, despite consistent misrepresentation, believe it was moral to drop The Bomb).
Delete2) “Nature” refers precisely to the sort of government in power in Japan: a fanatical imperialist, militaristic cabal.
"Yes, any historian of the period. Start with Notre Dame’s Fr. Wilson Miscamble (who does not, despite consistent misrepresentation, believe it was moral to drop The Bomb)." - um, you do not prove that "any historian of the period" believes something by pointing to a single historian (unless, of course, you want to claim that he is the only "historian of the period").
DeleteActually, the claim is just ridiculous - the historians hardly agree about anything much less obvious than "Some people have died a violent death in the period between 1939 and 1945.". "Did Roosevelt try to provoke the Japanese into attacking?" "Did Stalin prepare to attack Hitler in the summer of 1941?" - you can get very different answers from different historians.
And when we look at the alternative history (what would have happened, had something else happened differently), there is even less agreement.
Furthermore, you did not qualify "historians". I can easily disprove you by simply claiming to be an amateur historian (it is not exactly hard to be one) and saying that I disagree.
So, if you think that there is a total consensus on this one question of alternative history, feel free to prove it. But know that this is an exceptionally hard task, and that it will inevitably require modifying (or clarifying) your position at least a little.
"'Nature' refers precisely to the sort of government in power in Japan: a fanatical imperialist, militaristic cabal." - as opposed to the one that ruled USSR at the same time? The one that, apparently, deserved not a war until unconditional surrender, but rather Lend-Lease?
Anyway, that does leave the question of "How?". How does that lead to unconditional surrender being the only acceptable option?
Why isn't that a matter that could be dealt with, let's say, a demand that Minister of Army and Minister of Navy would be civilians, and a demand to fire some specific people?
'Traditional just war doctrine holds that it is always immoral deliberately to kill civilians. But that is by no means all that it says on the matter. It also holds that it is immoral deliberately to destroy civilian property and infrastructure, and thereby to make normal civilian life impossible.' This is not the case. If it were, just war theory would be substantially equivalent to pacifism, because it is impossible to wage war without choosing to destroy civilian property and infrastructure. Anscombe's article was aimed at the use of nuclear weapons and the bombing attacks on civilians in the Second World War; that is, on military measures that took as their goal the killing of vast amounts of civilians. That is not relevant to Israeli military actions in Gaza, which have the goal of destroying a military and terrorist threat (Hamas) and rescuing Israeli hostages. You assert that 'Such loss of life, destruction of basic infrastructure, and making of ordinary civilian life impossible are out of proportion to the evil Israel is retaliating against. And this is putting aside the awful conditions under which Gazans have been living for years.' Since Hamas is in control of Gaza and has been for years, the awful conditions there are the responsibility of Hamas and provide a reason for Israeli attacks on that organisation. The claims that Gaza was besieged by the Israelis are false; the area had functioning ports and airports that operated freely with the rest of the world, and Gazans were able to work in Israel. It was an open-air prison only to the extent that it suffered from the tyrannical and criminal rule of Hamas. The Hamas organisation received large amounts of money - more than a billion dollars a year - which it spent on weapons and tunnel systems rather than the Gazans. The destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza is a result of Hamas's policy of deliberately using civilians and civilian institutions such as hospitals as military installations and human shields. This destruction is thus the fault of Hamas rather than the Israelis. You assert without any justification that the damage and loss of life in Gaza is 'out of proportion to the evil Israel is retaliating against'. The characterisation of Israeli actions as 'retaliation' is tendentious and false. These actions are aimed at destroying Hamas and rescuing hostages. Hamas is a jihadi terror organisation that has as its immediate goal the destruction of Israel and the killing of all Israeli Jews; its further goals are the destruction of Christianity and of Christians who will not convert to Islam. It indoctrinates all the inhabitants of Gaza in its satanic ideology and kills anyone who questions it. It is part of a broader jihadi movement that is a threat to all European, African and Middle Eastern Christians, and that is currently massacring Christians throughout Africa and the Middle East. Its destruction is a very important and just military objective, and Israeli actions in Gaza - which it should be noted promise to free the Gazans from the evils of Hamas rule - are entirely justified and proportionate.
ReplyDelete100%
DeleteJohn,
DeleteThis is a helpful comment and an important reminder. The destruction of infrastructure was not a malicious act in any way. It was an attempt to prevent further terror from Hamas and was entirely justified. I also think that there is a strong case for displacement based on the formal participation in evil by a population that elected Hamas and continues supports its charter which calls for the destruction of Israel. What is far more difficult to justify is the proportion of the response in terms of the loss of life. Let's assume that every lost life was: (a.) preceded by a warning that Israel would be bombing, or (b.) that Hamas was hiding in every case behind innocent civilians, or (c.) loss of life through lack of food and medical care. This no doubt accounts for nearly all the loss of life of civilians and (a.), (b.), or (c.) could be justified by the principle of double effect in many particular cases. But could the cumulative numbers be justified or do they reflect an obvious violation of the principle of proportionality in response? It seems to me that they do and that the war needs to be brought to an end to the extent that Israel can accomplish this with a completely irrational bargaining partner (I recognize that this is the fundamental problem as Hamas does not represent a reasonable, good willed bargaining partner).
Well, yes and no. I think Dr. Feser's criticisms of Israeli overreach ignore Hamas' pattern of deliberately embedding their military assets so as to maximize their own civilians' casualties when they are attacked. Knowing this, though, it's probably also the case that Israel could exercise more care, sometimes, than they do,
DeleteLike another commenter said, “seems” is not an acceptable term under these circumstances. One could just as easily say that the low ratio of civilian to combatant deaths proves that Israeli action is justified.
Delete"If it were, just war theory would be substantially equivalent to pacifism, because it is impossible to wage war without choosing to destroy civilian property and infrastructure." - of course it is possible. Why wouldn't it be possible?
DeleteSure, waging war without accidentally destroying civilian property and infrastructure might be much harder, but that is not what our host is attacking.
"The destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza is a result of Hamas's policy of deliberately using civilians and civilian institutions such as hospitals as military installations and human shields." - is it? It is certainly true that Hamas happily kept firing from positions deliberately close to civilian houses with the hope that Israeli fire will hit them. And yes, in such cases the damage to the civilian house is understandable and could be justified. That is, if there was a serious hope of causing damage to the combatants; such stories also seem to mention that the combatants do run away before the Israeli response, in which case the response seems to be a waste of both civilian property and perfectly good explosives... I'd say it would be better (both from moral and military point of view) to keep the response less predictable (let's say, to respond to about every tenth attack) to encourage the enemy combatants to stay (and get killed by an unpredictable strike), but I guess the Israelis do not want to be seen as doing nothing...
But the number of demolished buildings seems to be a bit too high for that to be a credible explanation for every single case... I do get the impression that someone in Israeli leadership has decided that it is easier to demolish the buildings and expel the inhabitants so that the enemy combatants would have nowhere to hide. And that does not seem to be compatible with just war theory. For that matter, has that actually helped to achieve any military or political aim worth achieving? Or is that merely so that IDF would be seen as doing "something"?
"The characterisation of Israeli actions as 'retaliation' is tendentious and false. These actions are aimed at destroying Hamas and rescuing hostages."
DeleteNumerous statements by Israeli leaders (military and civilian) have made it clear that the war in Gaza is retaliatory in nature. And the IDF has killed far more hostages in airstrikes than it has actually rescued in military operations. But even setting that aside, Netanyahu's government has been propping up Hamas for years in order to keep the PLA from creating a unified Palestinian state, so to suddenly claim that he's on a disinterested crusade to destroy a dangerous terrorist group is disingenous. Hamas was his ally up until October 6, because they had the same goal: drawing out the Israel-Palestine conflict as brutally and painfully as possible in order to stay in power. That's why neither side is interested in a ceasefire. Whether you're Hamas or Netanyahu, dead Palestinians are good for business.
Let me just say, I was fully on Israel's side back in 2023, as I always had been before. But I'm tired of the excuses. Every single time a hospital or refugee camp or school is hit by an Israeli airstrike or starving civilians are mowed down by IDF troops while trying to get food or medicine, it's the same round of tired old excuses about how Hamas doesn't follow the rules and so Israel doesn't have to either, and all that baloney about how Israel bears no animus towards Palestinians but just wants to destroy Hamas. I don't buy it. Really, hardly anyone buys it anymore apart from hardcore Trumplings and establishment Democrats. Even Dr. Feser, who's no liberal, doesn't buy it. Maybe there's a reason for that.
Support for Netanyahu is one thing (you’re right; he was propping up Hamas before) is one thing. Continuing a just war that necessarily entails large civilian casualties is another. It’s trite, but look at WWII).
Delete“Retaliatory” has two meanings: vengeance, and vindication. There’s a sense in which Israel could “retaliate” against Gaza in a tit-for-tat, and a sense in which they can retaliate to punish wrongdoers (which the tradition manifestly allows).
"[Hamas] indoctrinates all the inhabitants of Gaza in its satanic ideology and kills anyone who questions it."
DeleteWell, yes, that's plausible. But then as a matter of identity, who/what is Hamas? Is it correct to talk about 'Hamas' and 'the inhabitants of Gaza' as if they are (morally, ontologically) independent entities? Or is this a case of spot the difference, and the answer is, "It's the same picture!"
It seems that all the church fathers who wrote on this relevant topic during the first 300 years taught this version of pacifism: correct for kings and govt to use the sword (God ordained these worldly authorities to restraint evil) while wrong for any Christian to kill any fellow human being. Hence those church fathers wrote against Christians taking up any job that involved killing human beings.
ReplyDeleteSeparately, regarding selling possessions to give to the poor with the result that one would then have treasure in heaven: this commandment was given not only to some Christians but to all the disciples in Luke 12.33-34. And then in Luke 14.33 Jesus was declaring to the crowd: “any one of you who does not give up all his possessions cannot be my disciple.” (See the Greek text: the word “possessions” is there)
johannes
Just a slight amendment to what I said above: the words in the Greek text for Luke 14.33 are:
Delete“…pasin tois heautou hyparchousin…”
“…all that he himself possesses…”
So the statement is “…everyone among you who does not give up all that he possesses cannot be My disciple.”
(Jesus was speaking to the crowd)
Regards,
johannes
And of course, for the first three hundred years, no Christian wielded the secular sword. A society that is 90% Christians, governed by a Christian prince, could hardly rely solely on its non-Christian citizens to repel an unjust attack upon itself.
DeleteSeparately, regarding selling possessions to give to the poor with the result that one would then have treasure in heaven: this commandment was given not only to some Christians but to all the disciples in Luke 12.33-34. A
DeleteAnd yet, the apostles did not do this after Pentacost: instead of giving the money to the poor, they pooled the money and doled it out at need principally for their own community. And St. Paul's depiction of the communities in Asia Minor shows they didn't do it either.
And of course, for the first three hundred years, no Christian wielded the secular sword.
Delete"Then some soldiers asked him, “And what should we do?” He replied, “Don’t extort money and don’t accuse people falsely—be content with your pay.” (Luke 3:14)
The apostles in their own writings did not forbid military or police service. St. Paul explicitly declared that the prince wields the sword on God's behalf (Romans 13:1-4). In the next 150 years, a number bishops wrote against Christians bearing the sword, but at the time, being in a legion would have meant being exposed to occasions of potentially conflicting religious obligations as the legion did sacrifices etc. During this time, there was no universal consensus of the bishops against it. Even before Constantine allowed Christianity, though, there were plenty of Christians in the legions and in local peace officers, as documents and inscriptions testify: they were in the minority, but definitely there. Some of them were in the legions and then accepted martyrdom in refusing to participate in some idolatry, proving their commitment to Christ. Later on, plenty of bishops, Fathers and Doctors of the Church approved the principle of Christians being soldiers or peace officers, and clarified the teaching by which Christ expressed disapproval of the sword. After all Christ himself declared "Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I have not come to bring peace, but a sword."
Despite Ed's usual analytical rigor and knowledge of the JW theory, he lands on this feeble conclusion: "Israeli action in Gaza seems clearly disproportionate." Seems? What about "is" or "is not"? His conclusion is not based on a thorough analysis of Israeli actions and their alternatives but on either false or vague descriptions, lacking the precision and substantiation expected from serious moral evaluation. This type of reasoning is not worthy of a philosopher of Ed's caliber. All serious military analyses of Israel’s conduct have concluded that Israel is going far beyond all ethical and legal requirements in its concern for non-combatant Palestinians. The attacks on October 7 showed that Hamas could no longer be allowed to remain in power. Unfortunately, Hamas had spent 20 years and billions of dollars building tunnels and entrenching themselves in civilian areas. Given this, what were Israel's options? No one who is accusing Israel of conducting an unjust war ever bothers to answer that question.
ReplyDelete100%
Delete"The attacks on October 7 showed that Hamas could no longer be allowed to remain in power." - that seems to hint at another related sophistical justification of unjust wars. First, we say that the war is terrible and bad, and the pacifists are mostly right, next we say that we can only fight against total evil, then we discover that our enemy just so happens to be a total evil (that part is often true enough)... And then we conclude that we have a duty to achieve a total victory at any cost.
DeleteAnd that is both immoral and stupid. In words of Talleyrand, "It was worse than a crime, it was a mistake.". If we say that we have to win at any cost, we will easily ignore all the costs. And then we will discover that we lost far more than we had to.
That is not even just a matter of ethics or moral theology: it is also a matter of military strategy (or "grand strategy"). You do not have to cite Anscombe here, even Liddell Hart will do.
It happened in the WW2: the Americans and the British "had" to win at any cost, so they did not think how to make sure that Mao would not get power in China, or how to avoid Stalin getting so much of Europe.
At a lower scale, Allies bombed Monte Cassino, destroyed the building - and then discovered that its ruins are also suitable for defence.
And in this case, what did Israel manage to achieve? You say "The attacks on October 7 showed that Hamas could no longer be allowed to remain in power." - so, is Hamas no longer in power?
Thus, "Given this, what were Israel's options?" - given that they didn't achieve much, how about "doing nothing and hoping for the best"? It also leads to achieving nothing, but at a lower cost.
After considering such an option one might decide that there might be a still better (and more serious) option, like "Use drones, spies and the like to find the tunnels, then send an infantry team to clear each tunnel" or something. I'm pretty sure that's what they end up doing anyway. I do not see how demolishing all the buildings around helps them here in any significant way.
"All serious military analyses of Israel’s conduct have concluded that Israel is going far beyond all ethical and legal requirements."
DeleteThis statement leaves me astounded at the depths of moral blindness to which men can sink. How could anyone looking at the actions of Israel not see them for what they are: evil? It takes no great military analysis to see that dropping the equivalent of four or five nuclear bombs on civilian populations is evil. This statement is amazing.
Your statement is amazing for its moral blindness and, frankly, evil. Perhaps, Father, you should educate yourself in the ways of war before posting such antisemitic tripe.
Delete@Fr Peter M:"It takes no great military analysis to see that dropping the equivalent of four or five nuclear bombs on civilian populations is evil."
DeleteWell certainly. Likewise, as Oderberg argues in his book The Metaphysics of Good and Evil, Jill's not having the money she needs to buy the ice cream cone she wants is evil. But clearly you can't evaluate the justness of an action (any action) simply by noting that its result (a state of affairs) is evil.
@MP: " If we say that we have to win at any cost, we will easily ignore all the costs."
Sure. But who's saying that??
Re. 'neglecting' to deal with Mao and Stalin while fighting Hitler et al., surely there's a rather good case to be made that thinking of this as some kind of neglectful oversight presupposes a mistaken notion of what is, and is not, within 'our' power to control -- like, e.g., the course of history.
I wonder if the real answer to all this unfortunate nastiness is synodality... (nothing like a little simplistic moral clarity a' la PF, right?).
"But clearly you can't evaluate the justness of an action (any action) simply by noting that its result (a state of affairs) is evil." - sure, but I think his point was not this. Yes, in principle it is possible that all those bombs or shells, let's say, merely missed the target. Yes, that would be innocent, just incompetent, while having the same result. But that seems to be unlikely (so many bombs or shells missing the target?). Thus it is likely that destruction of civilian buildings was intended. And that is evil. Sure, maybe it is not as evil as the things Hamas did, but that's not very reassuring. The Church talks about the universal call to holiness, not the universal call to being less murderous than a notorious terrorist organisation.
Delete"@MP: ' If we say that we have to win at any cost, we will easily ignore all the costs.' Sure. But who's saying that?? " - seemingly, pretty much everyone who is fighting a war. No, usually not in those same words (in this formulation, it is a bit too obvious that this is stupid). For example, read Liddell Hart's "Strategy", and you will see him complaining about many similar instances throughout the history.
"Re. 'neglecting' to deal with Mao and Stalin while fighting Hitler et al., surely there's a rather good case to be made that thinking of this as some kind of neglectful oversight presupposes a mistaken notion of what is, and is not, within 'our' power to control -- like, e.g., the course of history." - it might have been hard to achieve all this. It was not hard to do a little better. For example, send a bit less by Lend-Lease to USSR in 1944 and 1945 (let them get weaker, so that in the end the final front line would be somewhere to the east of the historical one). Sending less does not require a heroic effort. Or accept the partial surrender of German forces fighting you, not insisting that the forces fighting the Soviets would surrender. In fact, the Soviets did expect such "betrayals". For example, one of the favourite movie series of Putin himself, "Seventeen Moments of Spring", has this as a major plot point. Or just accept that anti-communist forces that do not fight the Axis with all strength, conserving some strength for the future civil war are acting just as they should.
"I wonder if the real answer to all this unfortunate nastiness is synodality..." - where do you see this "unfortunate nastiness"?
@MP: You seem to have ignored the particular claim of Father Peter M that I critiqued. In any case, similarly: yes, the destruction of civilian buildings is prima facie evil (an evil state of affairs); but the act of destroying civilian buildings is not as such intrinsically evil. I'm pretty sure you do need to provide some contextual analysis to ascertain whether such an act is actually evil, vs. justifiable.
DeleteOn the second point, if in fact no one's saying that, I suggest that it's better not to suggest anyone is. (Jousting at windmills, straw men, that kind of thing-to-be-avoided.)
On the third, of course, it's not hard to 'do better' if all you're 'doing' is explaining ex post facto, with the dubious benefit of hindsight (which, let's be honest, is anything but 20/20), what could have been done better...
And by "unfortunate nastiness," I was just referring, most immediately, to the rather horrid situation in Gaza -- fantasies about all these evil IDF and Hamas badasses just sitting down at little round tables together and talking it out? -- but then by extension to all of it, wherever it is to be seen.
DeleteAlso, your association btw (the universal call to) holiness and not blowing stuff up seems to me not at all to the point. The issue here is just the universal call (commandment) not to do evil, and then the question of what constitutes evil in the present situation.
Delete"@MP: You seem to have ignored the particular claim of Father Peter M that I critiqued." - you seem to assume that you did not misunderstand that claim.
DeleteAnd I happen to think that there is a significant possibility that you did misunderstand it. Which is why I was presenting an alternative interpretation.
For that matter, I get an impression that you misunderstood much of what I wrote. I am starting to doubt there is much of a point in trying to correct those misunderstandings at the moment...
At least it looks like "I wonder if the real answer to all this unfortunate nastiness is synodality..." was a rather good joke with a rather good point. Yes, since "synodality" seems to concern the how the Catholic Church functions, it would follow that in such case the proposed solution is converting Jews and Palestinians. Not something likely to happen, but at least that could plausibly lead to lasting peace. I guess that makes it better than other proposed solutions (which tend to be both unlikely to happen and unlikely to lead to lasting peace)...
"you seem to assume that you did not misunderstand that claim."
DeleteUm, yes, that is my assumption... and naturally I happen to think that there is a significant possibility that my assumption in that regard is correct. For that matter, blah blah blah... (nuff said!).
This post is excellent. Just considering the loss of life in Gaza in relation to the principle of proportional response should prick every conscience. It has certainly pricked mine. Grateful for this post.
ReplyDeleteI wonder where the line is drawn between combatant and non-combatant:
ReplyDelete1. A farmer growing food to feed a civilian manufacturing bomber aircraft. Also the truck driver driving food to the city to feed that same civilian
2. The civilian manufacturing bomber aircraft
3. The civilian at the depot repairing severe combat damage to bomber aircraft
4. The enlisted Air Force mechanic repairing less severe battle damage to bomber aircraft at an air base
5. The civilian delivering bombs to the air base
6. The enlisted airman loading bombs on to the aircraft
7. The crew of the bomber aircraft
Classic just war theory was developed when war involved two warrior classes fighting battles, limited in time and scope, about which the vast majority of the peasant class had any interest in or even knowledge of. Warfare in the modern era has become "total war", the self-aware engagement of entire nations, where two economies attempt to crush each other. I don't know exactly what this means, but it at least means that the neat line between civilian and combatant isn't what it was in the 10th century.
we also have many who go to the opposite extreme criticized by Anscombe, of trying to rationalize unjust harm to civilian populations by abuse of the principle of double effect and related sophistries....
ReplyDeleteYes, traditional just war doctrine holds that it is always immoral deliberately to kill civilians.
Actually, I doubt that traditional just war theory, as originally taught at the beginning, said this. That's because the very concept of "civilian" is something that developed over time. It does not due to anachronistically apply the concept backwards to a period in history when the formulators of the doctrine would not have grasped the concept - or at least would have struggled with it.
It is only within the past 400 years that soldiers have typically been uniformed - before that, soldiers often came to war clothed in whatever they had. It even more recent that all soldiers take an oath that binds them to military service and obedience to officers in a structured way (though it was practiced earlier in isolated cases, like with Roman soldiers). In fact, both of these are related to the modern development of nation-states.
If you go back in history to times before there were large nation-states, and consider situations like a town with walls defending itself against a marauding nomadic tribe that wants to take its wealth and move on, the distinction between "civilian" and "soldier" would be somewhat loose. It would get looser still if the walls failed, and the invading tribesmen were abounding in the streets: every man and woman, and older children, would take up a weapon to defend their lives and property. But before the walls fell, early in the battle, the support of townsfolk to help support the guard units on the wall would put them in harm's way and muddy the waters on whether they were "combatants" or "non-combatants". Then you get situations where an invading army has "won" the battle, but has not successfully quelled the populace into full obedience, and the people put in layers of non-compliance, ranging from omitting to obey orders like "submit all your weapons, and give us half your grain", to underhanded mal-compliance, to getting word out to allies in the distance, to helping with planning of sabotage, to positive and active sabotage, including destruction of material that - before the lost battle - was their own stuff.
Plus, the location of "combatant" status and "holds moral guilt for the war" do not line up perfectly: In the US, the President is formally a civilian, but he is also the Commander in Chief, and commanders are normally legitimate targets of war. If a president is the principal person who decides unjustly to foment an unjust war, he is BOTH morally guilty of the fighting AND the commander of the combatants, though a civilian.
The fact of the matter is that there are a LOT of cases where the line between "morally directly involved in the violence" and "not morally involved in the violence" is wide and gray - notice the latter does not include "directly"?. Pretending that it is never wide or gray in the modern world is not merely naive, it is dangerously wrong.
This applies in places like Gaza, where some of the people Israel is intent on dealing with are out-and-out terrorists that have done acts of terror. But the near-continuum that ranges between those people and others who have "merely" assisted in acts of terror, or taught others to commit such acts, or have vocally supported the terror as a means of war and used to assist others in such acts but not recently, and those who have voluntarily done non-violent acts that materially support the terrorists in general, or those who willingly accepted terror being done on their behalf, or...cannot be sliced at a specific place where you KNOW you have rightly distinguished between those that merit direct attention of your forces, and those who do not merit that attention. It ain't easy to draw the line even in theory, and doing so on the ground is even harder because you don't get your hands on "the facts" with clarity and certainty.
ReplyDeleteI am not saying "therefore all the people of Gaza are responsible and thus legitimate targets of Israel's activity." No. I reject that conclusion. I am just saying that the principle of just war - as to who may be DIRECTLY targeted - is stated more carefully, and it is indeed rather difficult to state it properly. Legitimate targets of the violence of war may include official combatants (soldiers in uniform), saboteurs, spies, and those top-level non-combatants in whose decision authority rests the decisions to enter or cease the unjust war (i.e. who are not innocent by reason of carrying out the orders of others, because they GIVE the orders). It is (so far as my reading has found) an unsettled question whether civilians who are directly involved in the war effort as such but are not directly involved in combat (e.g. driving a truck-load of bombs to be loaded onto a ship) are legitimate targets of warfare, or under what conditions (if ever).
A commitment to preserving the basic preconditions of ordinary civilian life for Israelis and Palestinians alike is both morally required by just war criteria, and a precondition to any workable modus vivendi.
ReplyDeleteI concur with this goal almost completely, noting especially that the truly upright moral view is to include both "us" and "them" in ultimately sharing the goods of a just peace. Any pattern of thinking that only considers "us" and leaves "them" out of the picture is not upright.
However, I take issue with the word "preserve" in this context, as it carries implications that are at best problematic. This round of warfare kicked off with Hamas taking a bunch of hostages and killing others. Israel could have ignored this (the total numbers harmed directly in the incursion was not massive in warfare terms: if a building had fallen and killed like number, the country would automatically have revised building codes nationwide on that account). But if Israel had not responded with SOMETHING effective, Hamas would have continued with another attack, and then another... This state of affairs could not be called "preserving" the basic conditions of ordinary life.
When Israel responded militarily, they inflicted some damage to Gaza and killed some people. Hamas knew from the beginning that they would not submit to a peace settlement unless Israel made conditions in Gaza nearly unlivable - no effects of war short of that would have moved them to even discuss a settled, long-term cease-fire (I do not use the word "peace"). Given that factor, Israel was not faced with "how to PRESERVE" peaceful conditions, but "how to CREATE the preconditions of peaceful living". In this work, they determined - with some justification - that it is fundamentally impossible to bring about preconditions of peaceful living as long as Hamas is in control of Gaza. So, if that's true, then "how to create conditions of peace" entails removing Hamas as part of the war.
Suppose your enemy's army hunkers down in a city: While it is always morally worrisome to level a city by artillery in pursuing a just war, the criteria for whether to do so include things like "can we give the civilians enough time for them to get out before the shelling" and "will the damage to the city be warranted by the advance of the tactical and strategic needs of the war". If it is clear that the civilians will not be able to get out, then new questions must be asked: " how do we target the most militarily critical targets while killing the fewest civilians." They DO NOT include "will the inhabitants of this city be able to continue ordinary living while we do this." "Ordinary living" went out the window when your enemy army hunkered down in the city - it's on THEIR heads that their own people won't be able to live in ordinary conditions during the fighting. A return to ordinary living first presumes a return to a basic condition of just peace between the nations, and your job in the war is to fight to achieve the conditions in which a just peace the nations can be made.
"There is also the sophistry some commit of pretending that if a civilian sympathizes with Hamas, he is morally on a par with a combatant and may be treated as such."
ReplyDeleteWell, then there's the sophistry of pretending that civilians who are ready and willing and profoundly and intransigently committed in principle to participate in and accomplish genocide against your nation and people are rightly characterized merely as 'Hamas sympathizers.' I wonder if there are some viciously rationalistic presumptions at work in applying JWT here, where we assume that the respective actors (nation states?) are quasi-rational agents, acting with a commonly understood framework of values and ends and principles. Like, who doesn't fundamentally long for world peace?? (Answer: Maybe not those guys?) Maybe the genocidal God of the OT wasn't just some misbegotten projection of self-justifying genocidal stone-age miscreants? Maybe there's a real point to the contention that our enemies are not (just) flesh and blood, but the powers and principalities of the air, etc. Maybe there's some room here for sth like realpolitik after all?
"Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done beyond the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases [such as...??]. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to certain higher principles than the common rules, according to which synesis judges. And in accord with those higher principles is required a higher virtue of judgment, which is called gnome, and which denotes a certain clear-sightedness in judgment." (ST II-II.51.4)
O.T. Evangelical scholars believe God did order Israel to slay women and children.
DeleteHi Prof
ReplyDeleteI agree with everything you say, Prof.
If it has been determined that a particular civilian infrastructure like a mosque or a particular building is being used to carry out terrorist activities that have been the source of a lot of attacks on another country's soil, wouldn't that become a legitimate target, since in this case the nature of the infrastructure is decidedly terrorist even if it may be being used by civilians as cover. As such wouldn't it be ok to target this infrastructure. Does that make sense?
Would appreciate your thoughts.
Cheers
Norm
" For example, it would be sheer sophistry for an employee to say that when he helped his boss embezzle from the company, his “intention” was not *really* to assist in embezzlement, but only to avoid getting fired, so that the action could be justified by double effect."
ReplyDeleteExcept that, for example, if the boss makes a legitimate threat to kill the employee if they don't assist in the embezzlement, then the action can be justified by double effect.
"it can, by the principle of double effect, sometimes be permissible to carry out military actions that put civilian lives and property at risk, where such risk is not *intended* but simply foreseen."
Anscombe elsewhere (in her essay Mr. Truman's Degree) raises a related interesting case which, I think, has not been thought about enough subsequently. She says:
"It may be impossible to take the thing (or people) you want to destroy as your target; it may be possible to attack it only by taking as the object of your attack what includes large numbers of innocent people. Then you cannot very well say they died by accident. Here your action is murder."
(This principle is also expressed in Gaudium et Spes #80.)
One example of it occurred in the case of the USA-Iraq war: There was a bomb-shelter that was open to anyone in the vicinity of the shelter, whether civilian or military. (The enemy military could be there because their family's homes were in the vicinity of the shelter). It was known that some of the enemy military in one particular bomb shelter could be very high-ranking individuals, mixed with civilians, so they made it a target. To make sure that the enemy military were killed, wherever they happened to be in the shelter, they put enough explosive into the shelter to make absolutely sure that everyone in the shelter was killed.
Using Anscombe's principle, this destruction of the shelter was definitely murder of the civilians. (Double effect doesn't apply.)
Paul, if you can't point to some authoritative source for your idea that the PDE sometimes allows for embezzlement as the object of the act, I (and I think David and others here) must conclude that it is merely your (mis)-understanding of PDE, not the actual teaching of PDE itself. John Paul II expressed, in Veritatis Splendor, in pretty clear terms, that when the object of the act is as such evil, i.e. inherently evil, then external factors like your motive and the circumstances ("but otherwise he'll kill my wife") cannot save the act, it remains immoral and to be shunned. You seem to be saying the exact opposite.
DeleteAnscombe's example, where killing is in the act, is an example showing that the killing belongs not merely to the circumstances but the object of the act. But the point of the example does not hinge at all on the object's inherent evil be, specifically, the evil of killing innocent people, it could be ANYTHING that is inherently evil to be a similar example. Like embezzlement.
"Paul, if you can't point to some authoritative source for your idea that the PDE *sometimes* allows for embezzlement as the object of the act"
DeleteI haven't claimed that PDE allows for embezzlement as the object of an act. I have pointed that the same physical act can sometimes be explained by one of two different intentions, one permissible and one not -- just like the case of fatality-inducing self-defense, and just the like the case of taking someone else's loaf of bread (which has an object which can either be greed, or feeding someone on the point of starvation, depending on the circumstances).
As the Catechism says: "The seventh commandment forbids *theft*, that is, usurping another's property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one's disposal and use the property of others."
Some circumstances can actually change the species of an act. The Catechism here points out the condition "against the reasonable will of the owner". So, we look at the particular circumstances of a taking, and decide if the will of the owner was reasonable or not. If it wasn't reasonable, the whole species of the act changes -- the object changes.
@Paul: Okay! So deny it if you want, but apparently you want to say it's not embezzlement because of a remote intention, even though embezzlement is the immediate intention. So likewise, if I kill an innocent person to save two innocent people, or if I kill a million innocent people to save a million and one innocent people (for example!), then according to you I haven't committed murder, because the circumstances have changed the species of my act??
DeleteNo. Clearly, no.
Likewise, embezzlement is still embezzlement, regardless of why I participate in it, and there is no morally neutral 'physical' description of embezzlement as such. Appropriating goods that are naturally suited for providing for essential needs, otoh, may or may not be theft depending on the circumstances.
If you were to change your example, and say your boss wanted you to help him 'steal' (i.e., 'appropriate,' i.e., take) some bread to feed a desperately hungry child, then that wouldn't be 'stealing' anyway (assuming for some bizarre reason that you and your boss had no other reasonable means of getting hold of some food), and you would have no need to introduce double effect reasoning to justify it (as in "I did it b/c he threatened me!").
@Paul: Further, your view seems to face the following problem:
DeleteOn one hand: "Why'd you feed the starving orphan?" "I only did it b/c the boss threatened me!"
But then on the other hand: "Why'd you threaten him?" "I only did it b/c he was refusing to feed the starving orphan."
So which of these actions would really be the proper subject of analysis and/or justified, given your (mixed-up) version of PDE??
David McPike: "Appropriating goods that are naturally suited for providing for essential needs, otoh, may or may not be theft depending on the circumstances."
DeleteBut, money is something "suited for providing for essential needs".
If Catholic teaching allows me, under the right circumstances, to take a loaf of bread from its owner, in order to feed someone on the point of starvation, then I don't see a reason why I can't equally well take $5 to buy a loaf of bread for the same purpose.
I don't see a reason why we would disagree with that.
David McPike: "Likewise, embezzlement is still embezzlement, regardless of why I participate in it,"
Except that sometimes what we would, under normal circumstances, call embezzlement may actually not qualify as embezzlement, depending on the "reasonable will of the owner."
Paul, you say: money is something "suited for providing for essential needs".
DeleteBut there's obviously an equivocation there: you can't eat money, or shelter under it, or wear it. So no, money is not 'naturally' suited for these things, but only by convention, human institution, and given appropriate circumstances. If you have money but there is no food, you can't provide for your essential needs; if you have food but no money, you can.
By your reasoning I cd say murder isn't necessarily murder, b/c the same physical act cd in some circumstances provide for my essential needs (if we're starving, we cd kill and eat this person). So wd this change the species of act from being murder to feeding the hungry??
Re. embezzlement, 'reasonable will of the owner' may change the species of act from formal to merely material embezzlement (b/c taking against the will of the owner pertains to the essence of theft). The motive of the embezzler/thief is circumstantial to the act itself and does not change the species, but only changes/specifies the gravity of the offense.
DeleteRe. Anscombe's argument, the killing of innocent people (regardless of how many), provided it is not directly intended as an end or as a means, and is minimized and avoided so far as is reasonably possible, is not ipso facto impermissible, i.e., is not ipso facto murder. So it appears she is wrong.
DeleteHer poorly articulated argument suggests that 'large numbers' change the species of act. It seems she is wrong about that too.
David McPike: "So no, money is not 'naturally' suited for these things"
Delete"Naturally" was your chosen wording. I'm instead concentrating on exactly what the Catechism says:
"The seventh commandment forbids *theft*, that is, usurping another's property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one's disposal and use the property of others."
What's to be provided for is "immediate, essential needs".
What can be used to do this is "the property of others". Which includes both loaves of bread, and money.
David McPike: "By your reasoning I cd say murder isn't necessarily murder"
And sometimes that's the case: for example, self-defence. (But not in the case you suggest, which is not a use of my reasoning.)
David McPike: "Re. embezzlement, 'reasonable will of the owner' may change the species of act from formal to merely material embezzlement (b/c taking *against the will of the owner* pertains to the essence of theft). The motive of the embezzler/thief is circumstantial to the act itself and does not change the species, but only changes/specifies the gravity of the offense."
No. If it doesn't match the definition for theft that the Catechism provides, it's not theft at all, and thus it can't be either formal or material cooperation in theft, since there simply is no theft.
David McPike: "Re. Anscombe's argument, the killing of innocent people (regardless of how many), provided it is not directly intended as an end or as a means, and is minimised and avoided so far as is reasonably possible, is not ipso facto impermissible, i.e., is not ipso facto murder. So it appears she is wrong."
If someone chooses to kill a number of people that includes both civilians and military, so that the military are killed, that is murder of the civilians. That's Anscombe's point. And it's stated in Gaudium et Spes:
"Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."
There are acts of war (happened numerous times in WW2 and after) where the attacker, sometimes for the sake of simplicity, sets out to kill everyone in a particular area, so that the military in the area are killed. That's murder.
"What's to be provided for is "immediate, essential needs"."
DeleteI'm getting the sense here that you don't really care about understanding principles and that you're a superficial Catechism-fundamentalist proof-texter. But the obvious question here is, what makes a need 'immediate and essential'? Answer: The very same thing that makes it 'natural'; i.e., money is never an 'immediate, essential' need.
Now you can say, "That's not what the Catechism says." Right; but so what? It also doesn't say otherwise. The Catechism does give a list, and it lists what I referred to, and not money. So how do you figure that, man? You're going to assume that "..." in the Catechism means "money"? Why? Do you have any alternative principled account of how to distinguish between needs that are "immediate and essential" and those that are not? Or do you just not care, the Catechism is silent, so you'll just pretend it must mean what you want it to mean?
"And sometimes that's the case: for example, self-defence. (But not in the case you suggest, which is not a use of my reasoning.)"
Oh boy. This is getting just stupid. Self-defense is not murder; right, "sometimes." But WHEN?? What principles distinguish when it is and when it isn't?? That's the essential question here and you're just ignoring it (and mutatis mutandis the same goes for the question of theft). In any case, when self-defense is not murder, it does not become the case that murder is not murder. (Oy, man!) And I was using your reasoning, that is applying the principles apparently underlying your reasoning, but since you seem incapable of grasping or explaining underlying principles, it seems futile trying to explain this or argue about it with you.
"No. If it doesn't match the definition for theft that the Catechism provides, it's not theft at all, and thus it can't be either formal or material cooperation in theft, since there simply is no theft."
Um, what?? Seriously, my dude?? You've completely ignored the point I made, have you not?? What's the point of me explaining stuff to you if that's what you're going to do...?! Gah!
As for GS 80, you've indiscriminately ignored a number of salient issues, but most importantly the import of the word "indiscriminately" in that passage.
David McPike: "The Catechism does give a list, and it lists what I referred to, and not money. "
DeleteThe Catechism gives a list of things that can be provided to the needy: "food shelter, clothing ...". The Catechism also lists the things that I can put at my disposal and use for that purpose: "the property of others".
David McPike: "You're going to assume that "..." in the Catechism means 'money'? "
I'm reading "the property of others" as including money.
That part of the Catechism agrees with what Aquinas said, over 700 years ago,
David McPike: "Self-defense is not murder; right, "sometimes." But WHEN?? What principles distinguish when it is and when it isn't?? That's the essential question here and you're just ignoring it "
It's the Principle of Double Effect.
David McPike: "self-defense is not murder, it does not become the case that murder is not murder."
Depending on circumstances, sometimes the same act can be self-defense and sometimes it can be murder. It's an application of PDE, based on the circumstances of the act.
David McPike: "As for GS 80, you've indiscriminately ignored a number of salient issues, but most importantly the import of the word "indiscriminately" in that passage."
The word "indiscriminately" in GS 80 I see as the most significant word.
I find it difficult to understand why it should be wrong in war to kill civilians. I don't see a relevant difference between combattants and civilians. If you kill the women and children of your enemy, you break the enemy's morale. He has nothing left to fight for. And the war will end soon with his capitulation. The war will be short and cruel. But if you follow humanitarian principles, the war will drag on and on (as we see nowadays in many conflicts) and in the end far more will be killed then was necessary. The war will be long and cruel.
ReplyDelete"He has nothing left to fight for."
DeleteExcept for vengeance. Or, as history shows, fighting to steal your women and children. Your algorithm just makes everything much, much worse, and for much, much longer — if that were possible
Not if you just exterminate your enemy.
DeleteOh sure, might as well eat them too while you're at it. Why let all that good meat go to waste?
DeleteNo God fearing people deliberately seek the blood of the innocent.
"Except that, for example, if the boss makes a legitimate threat to kill the employee if they don't assist in the embezzlement, then the action can be justified by double effect."
ReplyDeleteSo your version of PDE says sth like, "don't directly intend to do evil, unless someone threatens your life; then just do what you gotta do, man!"? That's different from the version I learned.
"it may be possible to attack it only by taking as the object of your attack what includes large numbers of innocent people. Then you cannot very well say they died by accident. Here your action is murder."
But then if it was, say, only ONE innocent person, you COULD say that that person died by accident, and it would NOT be murder?? (That seems clearly a muddled account.)
"So your version of PDE says sth like, "don't directly intend to do evil, unless someone threatens your life; then just do what you gotta do, man!"? That's different from the version I learned."
DeleteAnd different from the version I learned. The point is that cooperating in embezzlement is not permitted in some double-effect cases, but is permitted in other cases, where the threat is severe enough.
"But then if it was, say, only ONE innocent person"
It would still be murder.
Double effect is complicated enough that it is a lot to take in. Sometimes the occasional sentence shouldn't be taken as being completely and totally precise.
I think neither Feser nor Anscombe were writing sentences that were intended to fully take into account all the details of double effect.
"The point is that cooperating in embezzlement is not permitted in some double-effect cases, but is permitted in other cases, where the threat is severe enough."
DeleteWell so you say. But by what specific principle (other than just, supposedly, 'PDE' in general)?
And yes, it wd still be murder. So what's the point of the example's specifying that large numbers of innocent people will be killed? To state, "well it's pretty complicated so whatever if like the example is misleading and confusing rather than clarifying," is not a real satisfying rejoinder here.
"But by what specific principle"
DeleteAs you suggest, it's just PDE in general. The central point that I think Anscombe was focusing on was that simply claiming the intention was to avoid some (relatively) minor negative effect, so as not to be guilty of the intention of embezzlement was not a valid argument. But if the intention is to avoid some much more severe negative effect, then PDE can (in suitable circumstances) be valid.
"So what's the point of the example's specifying that large numbers of innocent people will be killed?"
Anscombe was focusing on the example of Truman and the atomic bomb, and aimed her argument at that. But the type of argument has much wider application.
The central point that I think Anscombe was focusing on was that simply claiming the intention was to avoid some (relatively) minor negative effect, so as not to be guilty of the intention of embezzlement was not a valid argument. But if the intention is to avoid some much more severe negative effect, then PDE can (in suitable circumstances) be valid.
DeleteWow. OK, so it is clear that you completely disagree with Feser, Anscombe, John Paul II, along with me and (I am pretty sure) David on what "the point" is. To say it point blank: No, that's NOT what PDE says, and not what Anscombe was relying on. As taught in the traditional Catholic tradition, it would be the wrong moral choice, and wrong moral analysis, if you were presented with a situation where a super-powerful (but not lying) person said "commit this one small act whose object is a minor evil (but is intrinsically evil), or I will completely destroy all the Earth and everyone in it", and you said "well, that's a vast negative effect, so PDE says I can do that one small act of evil". According to the Catholic moral tradition, you could multiply the negative effects by as many times as possible, and minimize the size of the minor (intrinsic) evil by as many reductions as you like, and the answer would be the same: it's immoral, and PDE doesn't (can't) justify doing it.
Now as to why: the Principle of Double Effect is a principle that speaks to the moral character of an act insofar as its moral character is molded by EFFECTS. It does not speak to the moral character insofar as OTHER factors mold its moral character. Standard teaching is that the moral character of a human act is given by three aspects (fonts, or sources that contribute to its moral character): its object, its motive, and its circumstances (which include its effects insofar as known or considered). If an act's object is intrinsically evil, then the act is determined in its moral character as morally wrong no matter what is true of the motive and circumstances. No matter how high the motive, no matter how strenuously the good effects outweigh the bad effects. Pope JPII went to great pains to state this in Veritatis Splendor. An act vitiated by having an intrinsically wrong object of the act is wrong in such a way that the other two fonts of morality cannot "un-vitiate" it: it is immoral for ALL motives and under ALL circumstances.
It is only when an act is either good or neutral in its object can the other fonts of morality then determine the moral character of the act: a good motive and prudent circumstances will make the act a morally good act, whereas a bad motive OR imprudence regarding the circumstances can make the act immoral. In that situation - the object of the act is good or neutral - the principle of DOUBLE effect says of the effects overall: if you have some positive effects, and some negative effects, you can weigh them and, if in the balance the good effects outweigh the bad effects, (and you don't intend the bad effects) the act can be a good one. You can only BEGIN to apply PDE when you have already determined that the object of the act is good or neutral.
In that situation, you are considered to act in such a way that the bad effects are known but they are not willed, and because they are not willed, their badness doesn't capture the moral character of the act itself. But this cannot be said of an evil object, because the object of act is necessarily in the will, that's its very seat (or it could not be the object of the act). So it is nonsense to say of an evil that is specified in the object of the act "I knew of it as an anticipated effect but I did not will it", you necessarily will the object of the act or you don't DO the act to begin with - that's its very ...object.
"Wow. OK, so it is clear that you completely disagree with ..."
DeleteI don't disagree with JP2's Veritatis Splendor, nor with PDE, nor the condemnations of Pope Innocent XI, nor with the concept of intrinsic evil. Nor was I disagreeing with St. Alphonsus Liguori (Doctor of the Church) whose opinion on this issue I was relaying.
There's an important part of Veritatis Splendor, relevant to our discussion:
"By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person."
I call the "proximate end of a deliberate decision" the proximate intention. Proximate intentions are not permissible if they involve choosing an evil. They can be decided to be evil if either the proximate intention is an intrinsic evil, or if the proximate intention will cause evil that outweighs any good it also brings about.
It's best to call it the proximate intention because intentions often occur in chains. For example, suppose I'm in my house and I open a door, so that I can get in a car, so that I can drive to work, so that I can earn money, so that I can buy food, so that I can continue to live. When I'm in my house the next proximate intention is opening the door. With the door open, the next proximate intention is getting in the car. Once it the car, it's driving to work ... and so on. Loosely, I could have said that my intention in opening the door was to be able to continue to live. That would be correct, but it can too easily obscure the fact that there is a chain of intentions, and each proximate intention along the chain must be good/neutral, not just the last/main intention in the chain.
Sometimes, the exact same physical action can potentially be explained by more than one proximate intention. Exactly which proximate intention a particular actor had in mind can only be determined by looking at the circumstances, amongst which, the prior knowledge and thinking of the actor is very important. (This is especially important in issues of double effect)
Occasionally, some issues can be confusing. For example, taking $20 from someone may either be an act of greed or, if the money will be used to buy food for a person on the point of starvation and there is no alternative, a good act. Only circumstances can tell the difference.
It's never permissible for proximate intentions to be evil. But it's also very important to make sure the correct proximate intentions have been determined.
Paul, I find almost everything you said here matches my own understanding, thank you. The one point that I find problematic is the second half of:
DeleteThey can be decided to be evil if either the proximate intention is an intrinsic evil, or if the proximate intention will cause evil that outweighs any good it also brings about.
The ACT is immoral if the proximate intention is evil, or if the sum total of the circumstances are undue, and this includes (among other things) the net balance of goods and evils in the effects. The proximate intention is the intention that is immediately present at the end of the act, or it isn't "proximate". The "effects" that come later, caused BY the proximate end of the act, can't be proximate intentions of the act.
When you point to a "chain", I think it is understood (depending on the interior condition of thought of the agent) as a series of distinct actions, or as a single act with a series of means toward one object. Insofar as he regards the whole series as one "act" with many parts ordered to a single object, just to that extent, the whole series is characterized by that one object, if it be upright or not. So, going to church in order to meet your fellow swindlers for a con is a means to the object of advancing the con, and is wrong because the object of the act is evil. The intermediate step, neutral in its own right, is bad on account of being willed as a means to an evil object.
However, insofar as - in the intention of the agent - the elements of the string are understood rather to be each one their own act, each one will have a distinct object that must be good or neutral, or the individual element will be an immoral act. Then, these individual acts may be OK as to their object, but still vitiated by their remote end.
If memory serves, Aquinas explicitly talks about how the proximate end of an act can also be viewed as an intermediate step toward another good as the object, in which case it is (in the will) as a means rather than as an end. I think JPII was pointing out that the critical determinant lies in the thinking of the agent, in the matter of how he intends what he is about, so that a merely exterior description of the string of events cannot tell you where the agent's object was at any point of the series of steps. One agent could do the string as a series of distinct acts geared to a remote end, where another agent does the string as a series of means toward a single object.
Often enough, even the agent does not see clearly enough to be able to say exactly what he was about, at each element, as to what was his object and what was his (remote) motive. A thorough examination of his thinking throughout may reveal even to himself that his act(s) overall entailed that at one point he intended evil as the proximate end or as a remote end.
However, some acts have built within themselves so strong a resting point that it cannot but constitute something of a proximate end. For example, a man might decide to seduce a married woman for some ulterior advantage (maybe, national secrets), but the actual act of intercourse in that situation has its own proximate object that is specified by the elements "have sex" and "with a married woman", so that "the act" is adultery, and the intentions beyond that end are necessarily remote intentions. He cannot intend the remote good but as a result of the proximate object of the act of adultery. In such cases, WE can see this must be so without delving into his mental framework in detail, unlike in more complex cases where individual steps are themselves neutral and have less the character of an end as such.
"When you point to a "chain", I think it is understood (depending on the interior condition of thought of the agent) as a series of distinct actions, or as a single act with a series of *means toward* one object."
DeleteI'll say more in a different way, because I am not sure if, or where, we might differ.
We make decisions about actions we perform, so we are really talking about a chain of decisions. I'll call this chain a plan. Each plan takes place in our heads, prior to performing any component of the chain. (The last component in a chain corresponds to "the remote end".) Each decision has two parts: (A) what is the proximate goal of the action we are performing, and (B) what are all the things that will happen as a result of the action. Neither (A) nor (B) must be evil.
(A) can be wrong because it's an intrinsic evil. (B) can be wrong because the evil effects outweigh the good.
"So, going to church in order to meet your fellow swindlers for a con is a means to the object of advancing the con, and is wrong because the object of the act is evil. The intermediate step, neutral in its own right, is bad on account of being willed as a means to an evil object."
I don't find anything wrong with using that wording, but I don't find it as overall helpful as thinking of things in a chain. So I would think of a chain:
(1) going to church, then (2) advancing the con.
(1) is neutral. It's not an intrinsic evil, so it passes test (A). And its immediate effects are unlikely to be significantly good or bad, so it passes test (B).
(2) doesn't pass test (A) because it would be formal cooperation in a deception.
The plan (the chain) taken as a whole fails because it contains a component which is evil.
(The last component in a chain corresponds to "the remote end".) Each decision has two parts: (A) what is the proximate goal of the action we are performing, and (B) what are all the things that will happen as a result of the action. Neither (A) nor (B) must be evil.
DeleteI think that's sort of true but slightly mis-stated.
If all of the objects of the acts that are the intermediate steps in the chain are good objects, and the remote end is a good ultimate end, then the chain passes the first and second tests of moral acts. But if the known effects of the many steps taken together are more evil than good, then the chain as a whole fails the third of the 3 tests for the moral choice, and the choice to set in motion whole chain constitutes an immoral choice. If the whole chain is immoral, then the will that initiates the whole chain by setting in motion the first step, and the second, vitiates those earlier steps not by reason of their own proximate object, nor by reason of their (separate) effects alone, but by reason of willing them as parts of an evil overall plan.
Assume, as the overall picture, that the steps are understood in such a way that all of steps (i), (ii), through (n) are geared toward remote intention X, and that none of earlier the steps in themselves represent a good that would cause you to rest there if that's all the process involved. In this case, none of the steps represent a whole and independent "act" in its own right. If the effects of step (i) are overall negative, but the effects of step (ii) are good enough not only to overwhelm the evil effects of step (ii) but also those of step (i), etc, then the will that enjoins the overall command "do (i) and (ii) and ...(n) to get to X" is not guilty of willing a sum total of effects that are more evil than good. It is not needful to measure the net result of step (i) independently, and make it pass all 3 tests for the 3 fonts of morality, and then for step (ii), etc., because the person would not have willed ANY of the preliminary steps BUT for willing the final step that gets to X, so they all together properly constitute "the act" and the act's totality of effects are good.
Take the surgeon cutting through tissue to remove a cancerous tumor. The initial cut through tissue, step (i), considered alone, has far more evil effects than good. But he would never have undertaken to do THAT cut independently, on its own. So the proper aspect of (i) is that is an integral part of a larger act, removing the cancer. And it's moral character can only be grasped in connection with the whole act, not the parts alone.
The tricky part of the analysis of surgery, as a moral act, is to not find that the initial step like cutting healthy tissue is itself an intrinsically evil act, which is a tempting to conclude because cutting healthy tissue is always, considered on its own, damaging. It is because the tissue is not an independent being, and its health depends on the health of the whole organism, so that cutting the healthy tissue CAN be "for the health of the tissue cut" through being for the health of the organism.
If, however, there are steps in the chain that are of sufficient cast as "an end" that you could undertake that step for its own sake - you would do it for that proximate end even if it never led to remote end X - then that changes the moral picture somewhat. Clearly, if the proximate end of step (i) is intrinsically evil, then step (i) is evil in its own right as a step. Then, even under the analysis of the overall plan, doing the plan entails as a means something that is evil in its own right. The PDE doctrine provides that in order for "the act" to be moral, the remote end must be a good end, AND that the "means to" that end must be good or neutral: the GOOD intended must not flow from the EVIL elements. "Do not do evil that good should come of it." If one of the steps (that is, one of the means toward the remote end) is evil, then the plan fails that criterion of the doctrine.
DeleteI think your point is about a different situation, where first it is true that one of the steps sufficiently has a character that it has "an end" that you could will the step as an act for its own sake, AND also for that step the object of the act is good or neutral, but the net effects of that step are more evil than good. But in order for this to present any real quandary, we must also assume the situation where the sum total of all the effects of all the steps are more good than evil (for if not the whole chain would be evil anyway, regardless of step (i)). If that's the picture, I would suggest that there are 2 cases that are possible:
First Case, if the will is set on remote end X in such a way that it does not take rest in step (i) with its own distinct object, but merely passes through, then (i), then the fact that the nature of step (i) could in some cases make (i) an act for its own sake does not control THIS concrete act. And then the sum total of all the effects of all the steps is the controlling factor of "effects" on the chain as a whole, not the narrow effects of step (i), and in this concrete act, step (i) is only a part of a larger integral whole.
However, in Second Case, the will is intent on remote end X in such a way that it also intends rest or satisfaction in the object of (i) as a kind of intermediate resting point, and then the (net bad) effects of step (i) determine step (1) to be a bad act, and then constitutes a bad means to X. (Please note that I propose this, but I have never heard any authority spell out this case explicitly.)
But this result, I think, comes out because step (i) is both "a means" toward X, AND its own distinct act in its own right, and this depends on the manner in which the will adheres to the steps and the whole. It doesn't get that character (that step (i) is bad because of its net effects) without step (i) being considered sufficiently "an act" in its own right that willing the step is willing something whose SEPARATE effects determine its moral status. And when that is the case, the moral result is simply the normal moral analysis: the good moral act requires (1) good or neutral object; (2) good motive; and (3) fitting and due circumstances (including effects), added to the PDE rule that a good chain must not have a bad means to the overall end.
@Paul: So I guess you think that embezzlement is not intrinsically evil?? I think it is, and therefore can't be used as a means to an end, and can't be justified using PDE as you have claimed.
Delete"So I guess you think that embezzlement is not intrinsically evil?? I think it is, and therefore can't be used as a means to an end, and can't be justified using PDE as you have claimed.."
DeleteEmbezzlement is a type of theft. The Catechism defines theft as "the usurpation of another's goods against the reasonable will of the owner."
If someone holds a gun to your head and says "Embezzle $1 or I will kill you," it is unreasonable of an owner to refuse the $1. In essence, the unreasonable will turns the action from an act of theft to an act of life-saving.
"Take the surgeon cutting through tissue to remove a cancerous tumor. The initial cut through tissue, step (i), *considered alone*, has far more evil effects than good."
DeleteThe evil effect is the cutting of the tissue. The good effect is that the surgeon achieves a necessary step towards the goal of the surgery.
(The cut could be morally bad if it wasn't a necessary step.)
Each part of the chain is evaluated individually, but always taking into account that its purpose is to be part of a chain that links together towards the remote end.
@Paul: Are you being entirely serious here, or just saying whatever pops into your head to justify your view?
Delete"If someone holds a gun to your head and says "Embezzle $1 or I will kill you," it is unreasonable of an owner to refuse the $1."
Delete"Embezzling a dollar" just sounds silly. Let's say rob instead, since the owner is in a position to refuse. So it wd be unreasonable to refuse to hand over the dollar, but it would also be unreasonable to think that what was happening was just and unobjectionable. That is very different from what the Catechism and GS and the Fathers refer to when they talk about the universal destination of goods. There's certainly no question in your example about changing the species of act: it is still an objectionable and unjust act of robbery. The question is, who is guilty.
By contrast, in a case of immediate essential necessity, when I use someone else's property for emergency shelter, or food, or clothing, the act is neither unjust nor objectionable. No one is guilty.
The Catechism defines theft as "the usurpation of another's goods against the reasonable will of the owner."
DeleteIf someone holds a gun to your head and says "Embezzle $1 or I will kill you," it is unreasonable of an owner to refuse the $1. In essence, the unreasonable will turns the action from an act of theft to an act of life-saving.
This is truly appalling. It is unreasonable for someone to hold a gun to your head to coerce you into embezzlement. It is then unreasonable for you to cooperate with that by choosing to do something that is unjust in itself, and taking the $1 from some third party owner for the thief/would-be-murderer having extraordinary need for the $1 is certainly unjust. (If the thief-murderer had extreme need for it, he himself could have asked the third-party owner for the $1 himself, rather than going through you.) Also unreasonable for you to take the $1 from its owner without your specific knowledge of whether HE has need of it, or more properly, what his needs are and what intentions he had for it as to whether his intended destination of the $1 was more urgent than that of you or the thief-murderer. More unreasonable still would be taking the $1 from its owner rather than asking for it, as the taking would be against positive law and land you in legal troubles entirely unnecessarily, if he would have given it freely. And finally, you can't turn an unjust act into a reasonable act because someone is coercing you, or the martyr's who refused to sacrifice to idols would have been wrong to do so: if your theory is right, the coercion (real threat, fulfilled many times) "sacrifice or die" would make sacrificing to the idols then reasonable and upright, when it wasn't.
(As a completely side note: the it is my impression that this "definition" of theft - with the phrase "against the reasonable will of the owner" and with explicit incorporation of "universal destination of goods" is one of the handful of places where the Catechism is presenting a relatively soft, uncertain standard as if it were a tried and tested doctrine - there are other places this happened as well. St. Thomas proposed this approach to limit the scope of "theft", but he did not resolve a number of difficulties with it that make it problematic. That's my impression: I would not rely on this in advancing a theory of embezzlement or theft, at least not without expecting to do a LOT more work. In any case, under this approach, it isn't "theft" if the taking was for an immediate urgent need unable to be met otherwise, so cases like this can't establish that "theft" or "embezzlement" (a species of theft) isn't intrinsically evil. You either have to give up on the premise of the situation that the thief/murderer forced you to "embezzle", or give up on it not being intrinsically wrong.)
Tony: "It is unreasonable for someone to hold a gun to your head to coerce you into embezzlement."
DeleteYes.
Tony: "It is then unreasonable for you to cooperate with that by choosing to do something that is unjust in itself."
No. Any injustice is being done by the person holding the gun.
Tony: "under this approach, it isn't 'theft' if the taking was for an immediate urgent need unable to be met otherwise, so cases like this can't establish that 'theft' or 'embezzlement' (a species of theft) isn't intrinsically evil"
Care has to be taken when using the word 'theft': it can either refer to an action that we would, under normal, common circumstances, judge to be theft, or it can refer to something that matches the precise, exact Catechism definition of theft. Mixing up the two meanings in looking at circumstances that are unusual can lead to confusion.
Tony: "the Catechism is presenting a relatively soft, uncertain standard as if it were a tried and tested doctrine - there are other places this happened as well. St. Thomas proposed this approach to limit the scope of "theft", but he did not resolve a number of difficulties with it"
I think that the conclusions I'm presenting are quite consistent with the Catechism and Aquinas.
Tony: "you can't turn an unjust act into a reasonable act because someone is coercing you, or the martyr's who refused to sacrifice to idols would have been wrong to do so"
You can't always turn an unjust act into a reasonable one. But sometimes you can. It depends on the circumstances.
No. Any injustice is being done by the person holding the gun.
DeleteAnd here you have eviscerated the teaching of JPII on the act that is immoral because the object of the act is intrinsically evil.
Tony: "And here you have eviscerated the teaching of JPII on the act that is immoral because the object of the act is intrinsically evil."
DeleteNo.
Let me give two cases, to see if we are talking about the same things, or not.
Case 1: An impoverished cashier is working in a clothing shop by themselves, and has access to the till. A friend of theirs comes in. The cashier takes $10 out of the till and gives it to their friend so the friend can buy, say, a cinema ticket. We'll presume that this is not what the owner of the shop would agree to. So, it matches the definition of theft (specifically, embezzlement), and is an evil committed by the cashier.
Case 2: An impoverished cashier is working in a clothing shop by themselves, and has access to the till. Unexpectedly, someone on the point of starvation appears in the shop. The cashier takes $10 out of the till and uses it to buy bread from nearby to feed the starving person. That does not match the definition of theft, and is not an evil committed by the cashier. (It doesn't matter whether or not the owner of the shop agrees to the $10 being used because, in any but exceptional circumstances, it would be unreasonable to disagree.)
Do you agree/disagree with cases 1 or 2?
Paul, I agree with the conclusion stated about Case 1, though I note that the scenario relies on a premise that is wildly indeterminate in character for comparing the two cases: how does the cashier KNOW that the owner wouldn't agree to it?
DeleteAs to Case 2, I note that Aquinas made a somewhat similar framework for exceptions to LAW in his treatise on law. Roughly, a person has to obey the positive law made by the legislator...but he allows for an exception in certain difficult cases. In working out the details (and piecing them together), it appears that exceptions may arise either because (a) the rule written for some good result N, in the particulars of this situation, will defeat achieving N; or (b) the rule written for some good N will achieve good N in this situation, but doing so it will defeat some higher-order good that N normally serves. But Aquinas also constrains the use of an exception (so as to justly not obey the law) by an additional criterion: you don't have time or access to the legislator to ASK for an exception. In that case you act on the presumption that the legislator would himself make an exception to the rule for that new situation, and you act on that presumption.
So, your Case 2 is under-determined as to several aspects to fit within those parameters, but the simplest is: does the cashier have a phone to call the owner and ASK? If he does, he cannot just give the money away without trying to get permission. But there are many, many other elements of presumption the cashier is making: first, WHY is the person starving: is it for causes of his own making (he refuses to work); or he is an alcoholic in his last stages of liver failure, (and his stomach actually rejects food so he can't eat), or...etc. And similarly, other factors about the $10: has the owner received a bankruptcy notice that if he doesn't make a payment in full of a loan long in arrears, today at noon, of the entire $1,000 now due, the business will be taken and he will be thrown in jail - and he needs those $10 to make the payment. Or at least, the cashier doesn't know what purposes the owner has, and whether those purposes are similarly urgent. Moreover, the cashier doesn't realize that the owner has done acts like this before (handed over $10 to a poor person), but as a loan, not as a gift, and he (the cashier) cannot determine how the urgency here prevents a loan working just as well.
It is because of complications like the above - for which the qualifier listed in the Catechism is never quite fleshed out - that I continue to think that particular provision in the Catechism is more of a proposal than a historically well-established, tried-and-true, doctrine.
So I propose that you attempt to explain your use of the theory with some other element of good and evil than that of property and theft. Maybe: directly, intentionally killing an innocent baby? Or worshiping idols? Or blasphemy? Or adultery? If your theory of how PDE works is right, it should be readily possible to construct cases for any of these.
Tony: "your Case 2 is under-determined"
DeleteEvery case, on anything whatsoever, that I could make from now until eternity is under-determined against objections being made that some detail is missing, or needs more specification. (For the same reason, all your objections are under-determined.)
Tony: "It is because of complications like the above - for which the qualifier listed in the Catechism is never quite fleshed out "
Well, that and the fact that the edition of the Catechism with an infinite number of pages that flesh out every possible situation is (it seems) long overdue.
Fix your link.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure if another comment has touched on this, but what are the implications of terrorists using civilian infrastructure to hide themselves or to operate from? If they are launching rockets from the rooftop of a hospital, is retaliation morally justified?
ReplyDeleteYou must use the least violence possible to end the threat.
DeleteYou could drop tear gas on the roof to drive the shooters off, and them use ordinance if they fire again from a different building.
This is hardly reflective of the tradition. One is permitted to use - indeed, required to use - adequate force to defeat an enemy, and that adequacy is a matter of prudential judgement.
DeleteI am the original asker of the question, fyi.
DeleteI think that my original question cuts to the heart of the matter in Israel. When your enemy is willing to engage in these sorts of things, it becomes much harder to determine what is morally justified.
Although the project of estimation is always a troubling one when a matter is somewhere near the middle rather than at the extremes, there are ways to deal with it.
DeleteIf the location has a battalion of 600 soldiers but there are also 50 civilian workmen putting in additional electrical lines, that's an army base, not a civilian location. If the hospital has 150 civilian staff and 500 patients, along with a platoon of 22 infantry holed up in the basement, that's a civilian installation.
When the numbers are more even, here's a tool to use to help determine what you are about, what is your object and your motive: what if the hospital were YOUR OWN hospital with your staff and your patients, and the enemy army unit took up there. Would you just surround it and leave them alone? Would you attack? If you would attack, HOW? Just bomb the whole thing to hell and gone, or surgical tactical teams going in floor by floor? Whatever method you would use to minimize civilian suffering, probably that level of attack should also be OK to use if the enemy army holes up in their own civilian hospital...and possibly some more.
Terrific analysis, Ed!
ReplyDeleteI am so glad the U.S. military did ask Elizabeth Anscombe for advice during WW2.
ReplyDeleteThe most fascinating part of this article to me is not Anscombe's (and Feser's) view of war, but rather Anscombe's views on the practicality of Christianity. The admonition to "hateth your life", the threat of bringing "brother against brother" and above all the seeming admonition (Mathew 6 34) to not plan for the future all strike me as impractical and truly anti-life (on earth.) I guess I'll have to read Anscombe's essay to see what she had to say.
ReplyDelete