"As its title suggests, Immortal Souls by Edward Feser provides a robust philosophical defense of the immortality of the soul. The scope of the book reaches far beyond this one topic, however, as Feser methodically exposits and defends the entire Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics of the human person, addressing in depth such topics as personal identity, freedom of the will, perception and cognition, phenomenal consciousness, and artificial intelligence. The result is an extraordinarily comprehensive and detailed sweep through contemporary philosophy of mind, addressing nearly every major topic of interest. Feser makes a forceful case that Thomism remains a live option, able to resolve many seemingly intractable problems at the intersection of philosophy and the sciences of cognition…
Immortal Souls covers so much ground, and is so dense with argumentation, it would be impossible to survey every topic it addresses in a short review…
Those who work their way through its five hundred plus pages will come away with a solid grasp of the current state of play in contemporary philosophy of mind, which is a richly interdisciplinary field that incorporates findings from psychology and cognitive science in addition to the traditional categories of metaphysics and epistemology. Feser displays an impressive breadth of knowledge in this area, showing himself conversant not only with Thomism and the analytic tradition, but with recent discussions that draw upon phenomenology and empirical psychology as well."
A problem for Thomistic psychology (critique of Feser and Klima):
ReplyDeletehttps://open.substack.com/pub/mashshai/p/a-problem-for-thomistic-psychology?r=4on5dv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
The Thomist denies both alternatives in the article. Substantial form does not inhere in prime matter as attributes do in substances, because nothing can inhere in prime matter in that way - as pure potential, prime matter has no actuality and can't support any other existence. Nor does substantial form exist in itself; a form, in itself, is an abstract concept that a rational being can contemplate, but concepts don't exist in the way that substances do. Rather, the substantial form realizes and defines the prime matter into a proper substance. Neither depends on the other, ontologically - the substance depends on both.
DeleteThe refutation of the "action follows being" Thomist argument thus fails at the statement "And part of what it means for its being to be independent of matter in this context is that it does not inhere in matter i.e., in the way s. form does" - no substantial form inheres in matter, so not inhering in matter cannot be part of what that means. Rather, what calling a substance immaterial means is that it exists, as more than an abstraction, without defining any matter. Angels are such substances that don't normally define any matter; the peculiarity of the human soul is that it normally defines matter as its body, but can exist without doing so.
The Avicennian view, as far as I can tell, requires the human soul and human body to be two different substances - thus it's tantamount to the Cartesian view. It follows that Avicenna faces the same "interaction problem" that Descartes does: why are these substances conjoined at all, and how does either one operate on the other, when none of the soul's operations apply to material beings and none of the body's operations can affect the immaterial?
@ Michael Brazier: I recently read a paper in which the author argues that soul, as form of the living body, is a predicate. The author argues that the soul-to-living body relationship is predicative. So far I find this odd if the soul is a cause of the living body/living organism. Isn't a cause ontologically prior to its effect? I am not understanding how a predicate of a substance can be a cause of the substance unless the cause is "said of" the substance. But the substance is a living animal; the soul isn't a substance as it is in, say, Platonism.
DeleteSo is it wrong to say that the soul-living body relation is predicative, or am I just misunderstanding terminology?
A quote from the article, which displays the errors: A body, the author agrees, is a composite of (substantial) form and prime matter. Now, consider the s. form itself. What sort of relation does it have to the prime matter? Specifically, does it inhere in the prime matter? If so, then s. form, by their criteria, is not a substance but rather an attribute i.e., of prime matter, where the prime matter serves as the ‘subject’ of said attribute.
DeleteNo, substantial form and the matter both belong in the category "substance" and not in any of the other categories (which are all of being which inheres in substance). The substantial form informs the matter so as to make of it a substance, and the matter individuates the formal principle so as to make it a one being. Both are "the substance" as being principles of the substance, the (two) principles that make the substance to be that thing of a specific kind. Accidents inhere in a substance not as principles of it but as attributes. It is true that form and matter may be said to be "in" the substance as those kinds of cause are the "inherent" cause, whereas agent and final cause are causes that do not inhere in the thing. But this clearly uses "inhere" in two senses, for accidents inhere in substance as attributes, not as making is to be a thing as such.
(There are other things that are in the category of substance without being substances: The principles of genus and species also belong in the category of substance, not as designating individual substances as such, but as designating substances by their essential differentiating principles.)
fincino, if the paper is correct, I suspect that what it means is to make almost more of a grammatical comment, rather than a ontological one: the soul is said to be the form of an individual body on account of the matter being the principle of individuation: you could not say "THIS rational soul" (as opposed to "rational soul in general") but by it being the soul of THIS matter. Because it is true that the soul is a concrete, real "a THIS one" by being the form "of this matter", the "of" means there is a kind of relation there. But it's not an accidental relation which "inheres in" the being, rather it's the very make-up of the substantial being. One could - in some sense or other - "predicate" the soul as "of this body", but it's just as true to predicate the matter "of this soul", which clarifies that they are both root principles of the substance.
@Tony: thank you for your response. I mostly agree. I would hesitate, though, to predicate an individual living body's matter "of" that body's soul. To me that sounds as though the soul is the substance, but we want the substance to be the composite. And we wouldn't want to speak as though a soul has matter if we say that the soul is the form. But yes, I get it that there is an intentional relation of my matter to my soul, so perhaps there is a sense in which "predicate" can capture this intentional relation. I'm just having trouble with that notion because I don't see that "the matter" is said OF "the soul" as "man" is said of Socrates, and I don't see how the matter is said "in" the soul, as "pale" is "said in" Socrates. So I'm not seeing predication as the Categories conceives of predication to designate the relation between a living body's matter and its soul.
Deleteficino, would it help to suggest that properly, the "of" we are talking about should be used as "the matter of this substance, Socrates", and "the form of this substance, Socrates", and not "the matter of this form" nor "the form of this matter" except in a looser or more derivative sense?
Delete@Tony: what you write after "properly" sounds on target to me, on the whole. In the De Anima, Aristotle first defines soul as the "form of a natural body having life (sc. the body) potentially." Second, as "the first entelechy/actuality of a natural body having life potentially." The third definition of soul is "the first entelechy of a natural ὀργανικοῦ body," where there is dispute whether to translate ὀργανικοῦ as "endowed with organs" or the like or as "instrumental." He doesn't say the soul is the form of the "matter."
DeleteMichael Brazier,
Delete"The Thomist denies both alternatives in the article."
That’s not an option – unless you’re willing to violate the PNC. For the disjunction between ‘inhering in prime matter or not’ is exclusive and exhaustive.
Sinawi: exclusive, yes; but not exhaustive. Nothing can inhere in prime matter, because prime matter does not exist; and substantial form cannot exist of itself, because it's an abstraction, and only a strict Platonist believes in a Realm of Forms separate from both minds and concrete substances. If you're working with Aristotelian metaphysics, neither alternative is coherent; which is a good indication that you've imported assumptions from some other metaphysical system without noticing.
DeleteIn any case, the relation of form to matter in a substance is not of the same kind as the relation of an accident to its substance. The mistake comes well before any consideration of the human soul's specific nature and properties - it's a general misconception of what form and matter are to any Aristotelian.
Michael Brazier,
DeleteOf course prime matter exists. Yes, it doesn't exist by itself. But that's something else (and I didn't say or suggest otherwise). But if it exists in this compound, and s. form exists in it too, then what is their relation with respect to each other? Well, either s. form inheres in it or not. There's no third option.
Nothing in the above assumes that 'form exists of itself', or that there's a Platonic Realm and the like.
Well then, let's restate the supposed problem. According to the article, either the human soul is dependent on matter, or it is not. If dependent, it must inhere in the matter, and thus cannot exist apart from it; if not dependent, it can't be the substantial form of the matter, so it's a different substance. There's "no third option", therefore Thomism is inconsistent.
DeleteExcept that there is a third option. We are animals, and therefore have actions that depend on matter; and we are rational, and therefore have actions that don't depend on matter. Since action follows being, humans must have a nature that partly depends on matter and partly doesn't. And since the form of a living being is a soul, a human soul does not require matter to exist (but does need matter to be complete.)
The unexamined assumption in the article (and by you), that an entity is either wholly material or wholly immaterial, is basically Cartesian dualism. It wouldn't be surprising if Avicenna had held proto-Cartesian views of the human soul - his "flying man" prefigures Descartes' Meditations, after all. But the inability of Descartes and all his followers to explain how a material body and immaterial soul can interact is excellent reason to reject such views.
Michael Brazier,
DeleteYou’ve failed to apply the ‘action follows being’ principle properly. If the human soul has no activities independent of matter, then its being is also not independent of matter. But if it has at least one activity independent of matter, then its being too is independent of matter. There’s no third option; nothing can be partly dependent and partly independent of matter - if we’re keeping the relevant sense of ‘in/dependence on matter’ fixed here (which you are not doing).
Rationality is an activity independent of matter, and the human soul is rational. Do you continue, as the article does, and say that then the human soul cannot be the form of any matter? For that it can, and does, is the "third option" Aquinas took.
DeleteOr, how do you account for the fact that human beings are rational animals, given that rationality is by its nature independent of matter, while animality depends on matter?
Yes, I still say it cannot be the form – IF it has a being independent of matter. For form inheres in matter; as such, it has a being that’s dependent on matter. No third option. So, the Thomist view is fundamentally inconsistent.
DeleteFor me (the Avicennian view), the human soul is a self-subsisting substance that initially needs the body for some of its activities. Fundamentally, the relation between it and the body is not a form-matter relation but a user-of-an-instrument and the instrument relation.
The mathematician Saccheri tried to prove the parallel postulate of Euclidean geometry by contradiction. He produced a long list of theorems under the assumption that there is more than one line parallel to a given line through a point not on the line, but never found a clear contradiction. In the end he declared that one of his theorems was "repugnant to the nature of a straight line" and thus a contradiction, and published his work "Euclid Freed of Every Flaw". He never realized that he was developing hyperbolic geometry, a mathematical concept unknown to any Greek.
DeleteYou have done much the same here. All you have done is show that Aquinas' theory of the human soul is "repugnant to the nature of a self-subsistent being", and then declare this to be a contradiction. The inconsistency arises only because you foist onto Aquinas a definition of "substantial form" that he did not hold.
I can only suggest that you read Immortal Souls yourself - not just Chapter 11 where he discusses your exact argument in detail, but also Chapter 7 where he contrasts Aquinas with Descartes, explaining why an instrumental view of the soul-body relation does not agree with the empirical evidence. Further discussion would be pointless until you demonstrate knowledge of those or similar objections to your position.
Great to see the appreciation for your book , Prof.
ReplyDeleteWell deserved!
Avicenna's psychology of the soul
ReplyDeletehttps://arabicphilosophyjkh.wordpress.com/category/project-thesis-on-the-soul/
A review of "Immortal Souls" in a leading philosophy journal such as the Philosophical Review or the Journal of Philosophy would be of greater interest than the Catholic World Report......
ReplyDeleteReviews in academic journals generally take longer to appear. My books often get reviewed both in academic journals and popular outlets. Not sure why that's a minus.
DeleteIt is not minus, Dr. Feser, it is a very big plus, because you are one of few philosophers who can write for both specialized academic journals and popular outlets.
DeleteAlexander, I don't understand the tone of your comment. Why are you trying to diminish Ed's work?
DeleteReviews are a good thing in general, but you should not overstate them. How many pop philosophers or pop scientists have you seen in the last couple of years that got good reviews in respectable journals of philosophy when, in fact, their work was only average at best or a philosophical mess worse? Making this question is answering it.
You should not judge whether it got a review on this or that platform/journal, but you should judge the work by reading it yourself. Ed's Immortal Souls is a revigorating opus that translates the very hard (to say the least) jargon and ingenuity of analytic philosophy to the average guy (like myself and many others). And, most importantly, it addresses thoroughly the most important aspects of human life on this earth against the pop metaphysical ideologies of modernity.
The book has over 500 pages of extensive and well-developed argumentation for the immortality of the soul, the existence of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, free will, and much more. So, when you think about all of that, how come any journal/review the book appears in or not becomes more important than the vast, rich, and good content of the book itself? You should think about it.