Monday, March 4, 2019

ORDER NOW: Aristotle’s Revenge (Updated)


UPDATE 3/9: A reader points out that another option, for readers anywhere in the world, is to order through Book Depository.  You can now also order through Barnes and Noble.  The other options, to remind you, are Amazon.com and Casemate Academic (for U.S. orders) and Eurospan, Amazon.co.uk, and Amazon's other European sites (for European orders).
  
UPDATE 3/7: At the moment, Amazon is accepting pre-orders again.  These things tend to fluctuate, so check back periodically if the pre-order option temporarily disappears again.  As noted below, you can also pre-order through the U.S. distributor.  European readers can also order through Eurospan.

UPDATE 3/5: Looks like Amazon's pre-order stock sold out right away.  If you don't want to wait for Amazon to re-stock, it looks like you can also pre-order via the U.S. distributor.

Amazon has the U.S. release of my new book Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science scheduled for March 22.  You can pre-order now.  The book has already been available for a few weeks at Amazon.co.uk and other European outlets.   

Some pre-publication reactions to the book:

“With characteristic clarity and panache, Feser argues that the principles of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, especially metaphysics and the philosophy of nature, are not challenged by developments in modern and contemporary science.  Indeed, Feser thinks that a proper understanding of the natural sciences discloses the enduring value of these very principles.  The book offers an excellent analysis of many of the key philosophical questions that lie at the heart of discourse about the implications of the physical and biological sciences. It is a very important resource for philosophers and scientists.”  Dr. William E. Carroll, Aquinas Institute, Blackfriars, University of Oxford

“Scientists seek explanations for why nature is the way it is.  In this engaging and thought-provoking book, Ed Feser provides explanations both for why contemporary science is the way that it is and for why modern scientists think in the way that we do. It would be a pity if scientists did not read this book. It would help them realize that their often unacknowledged philosophical assumptions and idiosyncrasies actually reveal that they are closet Aristotelians at heart.” Rev. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., Ph.D., S.T.D., Professor of Biology and of Theology, Providence College, and Director, ThomisticEvolution.org

“A welcome sequel to Feser's Scholastic Metaphysics, this book argues convincingly that modern science has not overcome Aristotle's philosophy but rather presupposes it.  Feser shows that, far from being vanquished, Aristotle provides ‘the true metaphysical foundations for the very possibility of that science.’” Fr. Michael Dodds, O.P., Professor of Philosophy and Theology, Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, Berkeley, California

Here are the cover copy and table of contents:

Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature.  Aristotle’s Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science.  Among the many topics covered are the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of evolution; and neuroscientific reductionism.  The book interacts heavily with the literature on these issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, so as to bring contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0. Preface

1. Two philosophies of nature

1.1 What is the philosophy of nature?
1.2 Aristotelian philosophy of nature in outline
1.2.1 Actuality and potentiality
1.2.2 Hylemorphism
1.2.3 Limitation and change
1.2.4 Efficient and final causality
1.2.5 Living substances
1.3 The mechanical world picture
1.3.1 Key elements of the mechanical philosophy
1.3.2 Main arguments for the mechanical philosophy

2. The scientist and scientific method

2.1 The arch of knowledge and its “empiriometric” core
2.2 The intelligibility of nature
2.3 Subjects of experience
2.4 Being in the world
2.4.1 Embodied cognition
2.4.2 Embodied perception
2.4.3 The scientist as social animal
2.5 Intentionality
2.6 Connections to the world
2.7 Aristotelianism begins at home

3. Science and reality

3.1 Verificationism and falsificationism
3.2 Epistemic structural realism
3.2.1 Scientific realism
3.2.2 Structure
3.2.3 Epistemic not ontic
3.3 How the laws of nature lie (or at least engage in mental reservation)
3.4 The hollow universe 

4. Space, time, and motion

4.1 Space
4.1.1 Does physics capture all there is to space?
4.1.2 Abstract not absolute
4.1.3 The continuum
4.2 Motion
4.2.1 How many kinds of motion are there?
4.2.2 Absolute and relative motion
4.2.3 Inertia
4.2.3.1 Aristotle versus Newton?
4.2.3.2 Why the conflict is illusory
4.2.3.3 Is inertia real?
4.2.3.4 Change and inertia
4.3 Time
4.3.1 What is time?
4.3.2 The ineliminability of tense
4.3.2.1 Time and language
4.3.2.2 Time and experience
4.3.3 Aristotle versus Einstein?
4.3.3.1 Making a metaphysics of method
4.3.3.2 Relativity and the A-theory
4.3.4 Against the spatialization of time
4.3.5 The metaphysical impossibility of time travel
4.3.6 In defense of presentism
4.3.7 Physics and the funhouse mirror of nature

5. The philosophy of matter

5.1 Does physics capture all there is to matter?
5.2 Aristotle and quantum mechanics
5.2.1 Quantum hylemorphism
5.2.2 Quantum mechanics and causality
5.3 Chemistry and reductionism
5.4 Primary and secondary qualities
5.5 Is computation intrinsic to physics?
5.5.1 The computational paradigm
5.5.2 Searle’s critique
5.5.3 Aristotle and computationalism

6. Animate nature

6.1 Against biological reductionism
6.1.1 What is life?
6.1.2 Genetic reductionism
6.1.3 Function and teleology
6.1.4 The hierarchy of life forms
6.2 Aristotle and evolution
6.2.1 Species essentialism
6.2.2 Natural selection is teleological
6.2.3 Transformism
6.2.4 Problems with some versions of “Intelligent Design” theory
6.3 Against neurobabble

72 comments:

  1. Congratulations, Dr Feser.

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  2. Exciting looking book. In the chapter "Primary and secondary qualities," will the topic of putting colour back into objects be covered? I hear it said a lot on this blog that colour is part of matter (or something of the like, sorry if I'm misstating) but it seems so true that colour is just light waves interpreted by conscious experience.

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    1. will the topic of putting colour back into objects be covered

      Yes indeed.

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    2. Not available for pre-order anymore. Shame.

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    3. Hi everyone,

      FYI, Professor Michael Egnor and I had an exchange on this subject (and on the location of perceptions) a few years ago:

      Egnor:
      Do Perceptions Happen in Your Brain?
      https://evolutionnews.org/2015/12/do_perceptions/

      My reply:
      Professor Michael Egnor’s incredible claim about perception
      https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/professor-michael-egnors-incredible-claim-about-perception/

      Egnor:
      Perception and the Cartesian Theater
      https://evolutionnews.org/2015/12/perception_and/

      My reply:
      The Squid And The Supernova: A Reply To Professor Egnor
      https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/the-squid-and-the-supernova-a-reply-to-professor-egnor/

      Egnor:
      Can You Perceive a Star That’s No Longer There?
      https://evolutionnews.org/2015/12/can_you_perceiv/

      My reply:
      Comment
      https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/the-squid-and-the-supernova-a-reply-to-professor-egnor/#comment-592070

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    4. Egnor's claim about perceiving the moon occurring on the moon (or whatever he's trying to say) is wild indeed. I wouldn't call him an "articulate exponent" of Aristotelian philosophy, though it seems beyond dispute that he's an accomplished neurosurgeon. Pretty sure the location of the sensation occurs at the sense organ and with the recruitment of the central nervous system for the powers of perception.

      Ugh. I'd be more worried about the bad Thomist PR if Egnor didn't write exclusively for an anti-evolution website that no one outside of the ID community reads.

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  3. If time-travel is impossible, then why is it possible to conceive of it?

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    1. Conceivability provides defeasible evidence of possibility, at best. If we have strong arguments against the possibility of time travel, we can defeat the support that conceivability might give to time travel.

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    2. 1. It's not clear that it is conceivable.
      2. Conceivability, so called, doesn't actually dictate possibility in the relevant sense.

      See Ed in Scholastic Metaphysics pp 121-3 for discussion of this sort of argument in general.

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    3. Is it really conceivable? I wonder if it depends on whether or not you accept an A or B theory of time? If the former then it's not conceivable because it would require you to make sense of visiting a truly non-existent past. Given an A theory of time, the idea that one could "visit the past" would be a logical contradiction because that which does not exist cannot be visited. If the latter then such a past would technically still exist and perhaps it's conceivable that one could visit it.

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    4. @RomanJoe,


      Even under B-theory, it's still not certain how time travel could be conceivable.

      Because the order of causality is still necessary, time paradoxes are still a problem. So time traveling to an existent past would still be impossible due to causal contradictions.

      Unless, perhaps, one qualifies time travel with a type of Novikov self-consistency principle or the like. But that wouldn't be time travel as most people think of it.

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    5. @iwpoe "It's not clear that it is conceivable." What are the thousands and thousands of plots that describe time travel then? The authors of those plots had no trouble conceiving of them.

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    6. Being able to picture certain aspects of time travel is not the same thing as strict conceivablility, which is going to be the grasping of the concepts involved in the scenario. Very often, indeed always in my experience with them, when one attempts to conceptually treat of such fictional plots- which is exactly what would be necessary to have actually conceived if such a scenario -conceptual paradoxes and causal issues show up right away. Again, on this sort of argument in general see the reference I gave, and on this particular case see the above people replying to you.

      To conceive of a thing is not the same as to imagine it. just because I can form select mental images of what I think would be involved in a particular scenario does not mean I have actually conceived it.

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    7. Going off of iwpoe's thoughts, one can perfectly imagine a square circle. Perhaps it's a circle with four corners jutting out of its circumference. But to call this image a square circle is not the same as literally squaring a circle. A square circle is still a contradiction, an impossibility, despite imagining a shape and labeling it as such. Maybe time travel is the same way. We can imagine visiting the past but this doesn't necessarily prove that one could travel to the past.

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    8. If the existence of a fictional plot talking about something means that it’s conceivable, then just watch:

      John, the married bachelor, went to the beach. Seeing a heap of sand, he took out exactly as many grains of sand as it was required for the heap to cease being a heap. Taking this sand, he arranged it in the shape of a square circle. Feeling a happy sadness because of this, he walked home – but without moving his legs, since he was tired – and put some ice cubes on his stove in order to cook dinner. He made scrambled eggs and bacon, but seeing as he was not very hungry, he simply unscrambled and uncooked the eggs and put them back into the shells, closing the shells and then storing the eggs again, good as new. Finally, he went to bed early – despite being unemployed, he had to go to work early at his job tomorrow.

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    9. Time travel is not a contradiction in terms, just a physical and possibly metaphysical impossibility.

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    10. @RomanJoe: The definition of "circle" is "set of all points on a plane within a certain distance from a center point". The definition of "square" is "equilateral rectangle". Since all the points within a certain distance from a center point do not make a rectangular shape, equilateral or otherwise, a square circle is a contradiction in terms, therefore not imaginable.

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    11. Sophia’s Favorite,

      One could argue that the implications of time travel involve contradictory terms. For example, it implies existing before you existed (e.g. 1000 years ago). Or both sitting at midnight on a particular day and not sitting at midnight on that same day.

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    12. @Cogniblog

      Just because something is conceivable it doesn't mean it is possible.

      I can conceive that I can do magic like in Dungeons & Dragons, doesn't mean that it is possible that I become a lv.20 Wizard :D

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    13. I do not think that what we conceive is actually time travel; it is only certain sensations associated with it. I can imagine myself stepping into a time machine and emerging in the royal court of Louis the 14th, but this is not really thinking about all the complexities of time travel.

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  4. Really impressed by breadth of material covered.But is there any discussion here of how modal knowledge is attained?

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  5. How long is the book in terms of page number?

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  6. What is the Thomistic interpretation of black hole information loss?

    Calculations suggest that physical information could in fact permanently disappear in black holes. Now there are several proposed ways to solve this problem, since physics doesn't allow information to be destroyed for thermodynamic reasons. But if information really IS erased forever in black holes, how would a Thomist interpret this?

    Do we have to appeal to God literally annihilating this information by seperating essence and existence? Or can creatures potentially have the power to forever erase something - maybe seperate the form from matter, or give the matter an unrecognisable form that for all intents and purposes is like forever disappearing?

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    1. Joe, I think you are possibly mixing categories. "Information" is not a primary being, it is a derivative sort of being - a "being of the mind" in that the mind knows some (primary) reality. (Rational relations are in the same category of "being of the mind".)

      Secondly, God does not depend on historical facts to know the facts: as the First Cause, and being independent of time, he knows all that is without "what is" causing his knowledge. Thus information can cease to be accessible to any created being without it ceasing to be known by God. There is no need to speak of God "annihilating" information.

      Or can creatures potentially have the power to forever erase something

      Creatures do this all the time, when they kill an animal or a plant: that individual being will never be again. They cannot erase it from having been, though, that's metaphysically impossible. And thus they cannot eradicate God's knowledge of it, even if they can reduce it to no longer knowable to men.

      maybe seperate the form from matter,

      Truth is not made of form and matter, it is a correlation, conformity of the MIND with some reality (including non-material reality). Creatures can change a real state of affairs to some other state of affairs, but they cannot thereby change existing knowledge of what had been true as still being correctly of what HAD BEEN, even if they can render it impossible to ascertain (in a certain location) what is now. All a black hole "information loss" does is render what had been true but was unknown to us before the loss no longer a truth which we can discover through natural causes. This is not any problem for Thomism. Nothing in Thomism implies that we can discover all truths of nature through natural causes.

      What is the Thomistic interpretation of black hole information loss?

      What is the interpretation of quantum mechanics' information loss from the random destruction of a proton? They are of the same sort of "problem", but they are not really problems at all because loss of that sort of information is not a difficulty for A-T theory.

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    2. @Tony,


      Thanks for your answer!


      "Information" is not a primary being, it is a derivative sort of being - a "being of the mind" in that the mind knows some (primary) reality.


      The information being lost is intrinsically related to the matter (if my understanding is right, information is synonymous for matter in that case), and what this means is that what's being permanently lost is the matter, not just an abstract set of data.


      Thus information can cease to be accessible to any created being without it ceasing to be known by God. There is no need to speak of God "annihilating" information.

      Well, if the matter literally ceases to exist completely in the black hole, then that information is no longer "known" by God, because it no longer exists. At least at a certain point in time.

      It's arbitrarily true that God still knows the information, but only as to what it was in a prior state in time. If it stops existing, it's no longer known by God in any time after that, because to be known by God is the same as to exist.


      Creatures do this all the time, when they kill an animal or a plant: that individual being will never be again.

      But what occurs in those instances is substantial change where the prime matter is not destroyed.

      In black hole information loss, the matter is supposed to disappear completely, not to merely change form.


      What is the interpretation of quantum mechanics' information loss from the random destruction of a proton?

      Good thing you brought that up! I have another physics related question that I wanted to ask, relating to the nature of small particles.

      Namely, the fact that two seperate particles of light can occupy the same location in space.

      Aquinas deems it metaphysically impossible for two material objects to occupy the same location, but we now know that this only applies to matter that's made up of fermions. Matter that's made up of bosons (such as light) is different and multiple particles actually can occupy the same location in space. In lasers, for example, this often happens as multiple photons may share the same quantum state, and thus share the exact same location.

      What are the consequences for Thomism, if any, especially since the A-T view of matter is that matter is that which distinguishes two things with the same form from each other, and one consequence of this is thought to be that location is essential to matter, thus it is impossible for two material things to have the same location?

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    3. In black hole information loss, the matter is supposed to disappear completely, not to merely change form.

      As I understand it, no, that's not the case: the matter may cease to be in its former state, but whatever it undergoes, its MASS remains mass of the black hole, and thus it is not annihilated. And there is a conservation of mass/energy, even if it is reformulated into (just to pick an option) as rotational energy. Hence there the underlying mass is not gone from the universe.

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    4. Matter that's made up of bosons (such as light) is different and multiple particles actually can occupy the same location in space. In lasers, for example, this often happens as multiple photons may share the same quantum state, and thus share the exact same location.

      Comment below where Michael Brazier responds.

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  7. It's a pity there is no "look inside" feature for the book on Amazon or preview in Google Books; I'd like to have a browse before buying. Does the book assume a lot of prior philosophical knowledge or is it accessible for the layman? Actually I have read a couple of introductory books on the philosophy of science, so maybe I'll just order it anyway (I can always return it if it's over my head).

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  8. Went to preorder and Amazon is just saying "Currently unavailable"?? I'm a Prime member in Northeast Ohio if that helps. I've signed up for it to email me when it's available again; is this a common problem with preorders?

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    1. My guess is that given the anticipation of the book, it is already out of stock. Same thing happened with Scholastic Metaphysics - Feser's just too darn popular. Might be awhile; could also try to order through Routledge and see if that's faster: https://www.routledge.com/Aristotles-Revenge-The-Metaphysical-Foundations-of-Physical-and-Biological/Feser/p/book/9783868382006?fbclid=IwAR1dc8wZyOdS9x4i2ati0xXczXLdjGsFFoY0dktYd9AcvhUBkdGt03_9ZgQ

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    2. That's frustrating; I thought the point of preorders was to gauge how big the print run should be. It's not like I'm expecting prompt delivery here, after all. Ah well.

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  9. congratulations! Dr. Feser, been looking forward to the book for a while. :)

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  10. Not having purchased the book yet but I assume Ed has a response to the truthmaker argument against Presentism?

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  11. I am a philosophy novice and have only read of Feser his "Aquinas". I know this book will be a challenge for me but the real question is: should I seek more philosophy experience elsewhere before attempting to tackle this one?

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    1. One of the headings is “actuality and potentiality”. Since it apparently explains these basic concepts, it is probably for a general audience. Reading some more can’t hurt, though.

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    2. You might want to read Feser's "Scholastic Metaphysics," which this book is essentially the sequel to, first. It's not necessary, though.

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  12. Ordered. Coming tomorrow!

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    1. How? It says not available until March 22nd.

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    2. Amazon.co.uk ;)

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  13. Hopefully a digital or audio version is in the works for those of us who are vision impaired. :)

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  14. Replies
    1. And... What are your thoughts? What did you find interesting? What was thought provoking or challenging?

      Give us the goods!

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  15. I really want it, but like hell am I paying what they’re changing for the imported paperback. I sure hope there will be a digital edition.

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  16. I should have preordered yesterday when I had the chance. Now its unavailable. My luck. Hopefully a new printing will happen.

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  17. Yeah I was able to find it on another website than Amazon.

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  18. Will there be a kindle version at some point?

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  19. eBook!

    Why are your "Editiones Scholasticae" books note available digitally?

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  20. Does neoaristotelianism forbid space or time having more than three and one spatial dimensions as some theories of physics indicate?

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  21. For those for whom Dr. Feser's oxbow link is also not working, and for whom the search bar is returning nothing, this one works for me: https://www.oxbowbooks.com/dbbc/catalog/product/view/id/77581/s/aristotle-s-revenge/

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  22. Ed, given that Casemate Academic is the American distributor, does that mean those of us who initially ordered through Routledge need to cancel our initial order and go through Casemate? I'm not familiar with how this whole book distributor thing works.

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  23. For anyone having trouble, you can find copies available here:

    https://www.bookfinder.com/search/?author=&title=&lang=en&isbn=3868382003&new_used=*&destination=us&currency=USD&mode=basic&st=sr&ac=qr

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  24. I've ordered it from Amazon.co.uk for delivery to the US. It's been dispatched, and Amazon says I should get it by March 25.

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  25. Now sold out at amazon uk too until 14th March.

    Ed, I think it's time to come clean; admit you went into philosophy for the money. ;-)

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  26. If anyone remembers me from the freak out in the "Materialism Subverts Itself" post, Hi! Anyway, ordered today from Amazon.co.uk (Im in the republic of Ireland) Was given a March 22nd delivery date, but now I've just received this:

    "Hello,

    We are pleased to report that the following item will dispatch sooner than expected:

    Edward Feser "Aristotles Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science"
    Previous estimated arrival date: March 19 2019
    New estimated arrival date: March 12 2019 - March 14 2019"

    So go check those inboxes!

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  27. Actually, it isn't possible to distinguish two bosons in the same state from each other - all you know is that there are two bosons present. And this has real physical consequences, such as the possibility of lasers.

    Bosons are an intermediate category between matter in Aristotle's sense (concrete, particular and located) and the forms (abstract, general and not locatable.) They are, in fact, very close to what Aquinas said angels are. The main difference is that bosons exist in large numbers, while each angel is unique.

    So if you take distinguishability as defining matter, only fermions count as material. If you take number as defining matter, both fermions and bosons are material. It's weird, but I think Thomists have the resources to handle it.

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    1. @Michael Brazier,


      1)Actually, it isn't possible to distinguish two bosons in the same state from each other - all you know is that there are two bosons present.


      Well, if it isn't possible to distinguish between two of them, then how do we know that there ARE two of them?

      If this isn't merely an epistemic point where we simply don't know how to distinguish them, but positively know we can't distinguish them, then how can we say there are two bosons present at all if there is literally no difference between the two at all?

      We know that bosons, when they aren't in the same state, are materially seperate, and are in fact unique individuated particles of matter. Which entails obviously that each boson has a different matter from other bosons, which means the difference between each boson in usual cases is their matter.


      2)They are, in fact, very close to what Aquinas said angels are. The main difference is that bosons exist in large numbers, while each angel is unique.


      The reason why each angel is unique is because each angel is pure form with no matter. And that is also why each angel is it's own species - because to have multiple beings of the same species requires something to distinguish them, and that is usually understood to be matter.

      Now, if bosons are such that there are multiple numbers of them, then that means they are of the same species. Which means they aren't pure form.

      Which means that either matter is what distinguishes one boson from the other, meaning that bosons aren't even close to forms but are completely material things, or something else than matter is the distinguishing element.


      But what could that possibly even mean? If matter doesn't distinguish two things, then what does? Angels are distinguished from each other by their forms, meaning that the difference between angels is simply that each angel is a unique composite of essence and existence. But to propose two material things being distinguished by a non-material difference just...doesn't make sense.

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    2. "Well, if it isn't possible to distinguish between two of them, then how do we know that there ARE two of them?"

      Divide the total energy carried by the bosons by their frequency; the result is proportional to the number of bosons present. You can't tell them apart, but that simple calculation lets you count them.

      I suppose bosons undermine Leibniz's Law, that if two objects can't be distinguished by any method whatsoever, they aren't two, but one. Leibniz wasn't a Thomist, though.

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    3. @Michael,


      Divide the total energy carried by the bosons by their frequency; the result is proportional to the number of bosons present. You can't tell them apart, but that simple calculation lets you count them.


      If that's the case, then we actually CAN distinguish the bosons, because we can know how many are present according to certain properties they have. Not being able to tell them apart would only be a result of us not knowing how to tell them apart, not a result of us knowing ontologically that they can't be distinguished.


      I suppose bosons undermine Leibniz's Law, that if two objects can't be distinguished by any method whatsoever, they aren't two, but one. Leibniz wasn't a Thomist, though.



      Well, first of all, we actually can distinguish the bosons because we can know how many are present due to certain qualities they have (i.e. energy, frequency) and the fact they are distinct in other cases (when not in the same location).

      Second, Leibniz's law is about ontological distinguishing where we know for certain two things literally have no differences between them, not merely that we can't find a difference using our known methods.


      Third, I would question the idea that physics can somehow undermine basic metaphysical premises (such as basic ones about identity) from the get-go, so the assumption that our discoveries about bosons can somehow undermine a metaphysical principle is questionable.

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  28. Matter that's made up of bosons (such as light) is different and multiple particles actually can occupy the same location in space. In lasers, for example, this often happens as multiple photons may share the same quantum state, and thus share the exact same location.

    Joe, I think the whole point of bosons (like photons) is that they DON'T "occupy space" in the same sense as fermions, and that is WHY they can "be in the same place at the same time". They are not "there" in the same sense to begin with.

    Another aspect of the same principle is that (as I understand it) the "location" of a particle (whether boson or fermium) is actually a complex consideration, because it "exists" under a range of probability functions, in that it is more probably "in" one location, and less probably in a more distant location. This shows how difficult it is to say that it "is in" a specific place simply speaking. If a particle has a 40% probability of being within a space of X radius, and another particle has a probability of 10% of being in the same sphere of space, do they "superimpose" on each other? Yes, in a sense they do. But in another sense, they don't "occupy the same space". Aristotle could remain saying "they are not in the same place "in the same sense".

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    1. Even without probabilities involved: one of the ways in which photons "exist" is as waves. And there is no problem with two waves superposing on each other. You can do the experiment in water where two waves at right angles intersect: they superpose as they pass through each other, and then they continue on their way as they had been after the superposition. Nobody thinks that WATER needs to be the sort of thing that can have two gallons of water in the same one-gallon space at the same time, for the waves of water to do so.

      Remember the old term "wavicles"? Maybe that's passe at this point, but the underlying difficulty of photons being "particles" in the very same sense as fermions remains valid.

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  29. https://infiniteskepticism.blogspot.com/2019/03/why-edward-fesers-up-to-date-version-of.html

    This dope thinks he debunked you. Please set him straight.

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    1. I haven´t read it until the end and skipped some parts but what I read and what the conclusion and his mentioning of theories of time indicate is a common misunderstanding of the five ways and especially the first cause (among other fallacies and non-sequitars, see his conclusions below). The author doesn´t present something new but objections which have been adressed several times, but maybe there will be a gracious commentator here with more knowledge in thomistic philosophy than I have, who will take his time and make a whole refutation. But for everyone to know how the author argues, here I copied his conclusions on the five ways:

      For the First way, it would presuppose a theory of time, which given God's activity, would deny the existence of irreducible causal powers since it entails a four-dimensionalist account of persistence. Which also would deny the reality of change (as scholastic would define it). Contradicting numerous premises, mainly premise 1 and 2.

      For the Second way, it would suffer the same problems but is easily salvageable unlike the other. But even then, if it is true, it entails eternalism. Given eternalism, four-dimensionalism, and continuous creation, it entails occasionalism. Given occasionalism, it entails pantheism. Given pantheism, God is the only substance, so there would be no essence/existence distinction nor anything essence that needs to be actualized.

      For the Third way, it would suffer the same problem as the Third, it entails pantheism. Given pantheism, God is the only substance and everything else is just a part of him. So, either God is a composite or everything else is a noncomposite. And the Third way requires the existence of composites in order to reach the existence of a non-composite, so it fails.

      For the Fourth way, it depends on the Second way since it relies on being itself being convertible with goodness, unity, truth, etc in order to say that which has unity or is good only in a limited way depends on something which is pure goodness and absolutely.

      For the Fifth way, it entails an eternalist theory of time, which given God's activity, would deny the existence of irreducible causal powers since it entails a four-dimensionalist account of persistence. Without irreducible causal powers, final causality does not exist. Atleast for anything within the universe.

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    2. Dominik

      You are correct.

      However, to put it succinctly, the solution to the Hilbert Hotel puzzle defeats Aristotelian Theism.

      However, that is the strength of Aristotle; his ideas can be proved wrong.

      Delete
    3. I have looked it up just now. A solution of the Hilbert´s Hotel Puzzle only gives problems for the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Aristotelian Theism would be unaffected, since we can accept an eternal universe. I have seen your name on so many old posts, you should know that!

      Delete
  30. Mr Feser, for that many pages book should be available in hardcover too. Also my opinion is that it's always good to have nice cover art even though it's not so much important, but it helps in more than few ways. Anyway I'm getting my copy.

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  31. I decided that I couldn’t wait, so I ordered a copy from Amazon UK. It arrived this afternoon!

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  32. I'm the publisher of that book. We are very sorry about this delay. There are several reasons for the delay. The main reason is the change of our US-Distributor. The books arrived in the USA last week. But our distributor informed us on Wednesday "Due to the recent weather in the New Jersey area this has caused vessel delays compounded by ports due to snow closing resulting congestion at the pier resulting in late collection of containers by the hauler." So books have been send yesterday to our distributor, that is Casemate Academic and can be pre-ordered at Casemate directly: https://www.oxbowbooks.com/dbbc/aristotle-s-revenge.html We are not sure when the books are ready for Amazon.com but we think that may be at the end of March. At Amazon.com the book will be available on April, 2.
    Please sorry for the delay. In Germany and Central Europe the book is available since the end of January.

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  33. Sweet, buying this as soon as I can get my hands on it. I have been wanting to do more reading on this particular topic, I am sure that the sources you list in the book might give me some good authors to explore as far as philosophy of science is concerned. Like always it is awesome, learning more about why it is what you believe. Most of all the importance and relevance of this in so far as the modern conversation that we have atm regarding the relationship that faith and reason, play in the context of modern ideas such as quantum mechanics and how these ideas have metaphysical presuppositions. Problem with abstract thinking, is that unless you go deep enough we just kind of never explore it that much. Problem is if you are not aware of your presuppositions, it can lead you down a huge waste of time, as can be seen by many physicist's who waste their post doc, and PhD's pursuing silly ideas. Wasted brain power, imagine what we could do with these theoretical physicist's pursuing ideas that are consistent with good metaphysics!

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  34. Thank you for your work. Your easy to understand, yet thorough, work has led me to a deep, solid foundation for my faith, during a time I (like many others) questioned it. Not only that, but your writings on metaphysics have completely changed the way I see reality, and are raising my children. Seeing how these underlying principles essentially mean every facet of art and life reflect one another, it has tremendously increased my understanding of how all forms of art reflect one another (in turn reflecting life, and God's fundamental qualities) and has made it far easier to cross-apply principles from film, photography, painting, novels, etc into my musical composition journey.

    Speaking of which: I'm in Canada, and Canada kind of sucks for product availability at times. Anyone know of where to get Scholastic Metaphysics? It seems to be out of print, which concerns me.

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  35. Goodness, that was a trainwreck of a post. Forgot I can't edit. Will proofread next time.

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  36. Mr. Feser: ¿Is there a possibility to get Aristotle's Revenge or any of your books translated to Spanish?

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