Sunday, October 27, 2024

Progressive Catholics and capital punishment

The debate over capital punishment between conservative and progressive Catholics typically exhibits the following dialectic.  The conservative will set out a case from natural law, scripture and tradition, and social science for the thesis that capital punishment is at least in principle licit and in practice still needed in some circumstances – as Joseph Bessette and I do at length in our book By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed.  The progressive will reply with an impassioned but vague appeal to human dignity, a cherry-picked statement from the recent magisterium, and a tendentious empirical claim (for example, that capital punishment does not deter, or is implemented in a racist manner), and top things off with in an ad hominem attack (such as accusing the conservative of being bloodthirsty or having a political motive).  The conservative will then complain that the progressive has attacked a straw man and simply ignored rather than answered his key points.  The progressive will at this point either ignore the conservative or simply repeat his original, question-begging reply at higher volume.

The latest iteration of the progressive’s routine is Jack Hanson’s article on Catholicism and capital punishment in The New York Review of Books.  A recent execution provides the occasion for the article, but there is otherwise nothing new in it.  And though it cites me as the Exhibit A “hard-liner” among Catholic academics who defend capital punishment, it offers no response to the key arguments Bessette and I develop in our book.

The conservative’s case

Because so many of our critics ignore rather than respond to those arguments, we’ve had to reiterate them many times in the seven years since our book appeared.  It is tiresome to have to do so yet again, but at least a brief summary is necessary for context.  There are three relevant sets of considerations, deriving from natural law, scripture and tradition, and social science.

The traditional natural law rationale for the death penalty is straightforward.  Wrongdoers deserve punishment, and what they deserve, specifically, is a punishment that is proportional to the offense.  And governmental authorities have the right to inflict such punishments.  Now, some offenses are so extremely grave that nothing less than execution would be a proportional punishment.  So, such offenders deserve the death penalty, and the state has a right to inflict it on them.

This is not to say that the state must inflict the death penalty whenever it is deserved, only that it may do so, at least in principle.  And there may in some cases be good reasons why it should not do so.  As Aquinas teaches, perfect justice is not attainable in this life, and when inflicting punishments, governments need to focus primarily on what is essential to preserving public order.  But though considerations of retributive justice are not sufficient to determine what punishments should be inflicted, they are necessary.  An offender can deserve death as a matter of retributive justice, so that if the state inflicts death on him, it does no injustice – even in cases where there are considerations other than justice that should lead it to refrain from inflicting this penalty.

The point is that the death penalty cannot be regarded as intrinsically wrong.  It does not amount to murder, any more than arresting and imprisoning a bank robber amounts to kidnapping, or any more than fining someone caught speeding amounts to stealing.  A murderer has forfeited his right to life, just as a robber has forfeited his freedom and someone who violates traffic laws has forfeited the money that goes to paying the fine.  If the death penalty is ever wrong, it can only be wrong because of the circumstances under which it is inflicted, and in particular because there is insufficient reason under the circumstances to give the offender what he deserves.

What, then, of the circumstances that prevail in a country like the United States?  Is there sufficient reason to inflict on some offenders the penalty of death?  Bessette and I argue in our book that there is.  We argue that some offenders remain so dangerous even when locked up for life that governing authorities ought to retain the option of execution.  For example, without the prospect of capital punishment, some offenders facing life imprisonment have no incentive not to murder fellow prisoners or prison guards.  Or, if they escape, they will have no incentive not to murder innocent people in the course of trying to evade police, if the worst they face is a return to life imprisonment.  In general, we argue, capital punishment does have significant deterrent effect.  It is necessary for governments to keep it on the books and utilize it at least in the case of the very worst offenders, in order to protect society from them.

This is just a summary in a few paragraphs of a natural law line of reasoning that Bessette and I develop and defend in detail in the book.  As we argue, in order to deny that the death penalty can be licit at least in principle, one would have to give up the principle that offenders deserve punishments proportional to the offense.  One problem with doing so is that divorcing punishment from desert has implications that by anyone’s lights would be unjust.  Another problem is that there is no way to give up the principles of desert and proportionality consistently with Catholic orthodoxy.  For these principles are deeply embedded in scripture and tradition, informing both the Church’s understanding of punishment and her teaching on salvation and damnation. 

This brings us to the second set of considerations in favor of capital punishment, which have to do with the teaching of scripture, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, the popes prior to Francis, and tradition in general.  As Bessette and I show in detail, there are many passages in scripture, in both the Old and New Testaments, that sanction the death penalty, and that have always been understood by the Church (and indeed by everyone else, such as Jewish interpreters) to sanction the death penalty.  This includes the Fathers of the Church, some of whom pleaded for clemency and thought it better for the state not to exercise its right to inflict the death penalty, but none of whom denied that scripture did indeed give the state that right.  The Church teaches that neither the Fathers nor the tradition of the Church can be mistaken when they agree on some matter of scriptural interpretation.  Since the Fathers and the Church have always agreed that scripture allows for capital punishment at least in principle, there is no way to interpret scripture any other way consistent with orthodoxy.  A Catholic is free to hold (as some of the Fathers did) that it is better in practice not to utilize capital punishment.  But a Catholic is not free to deny that scripture teaches that the death penalty can at least in principle be just.

This has for 2,000 years been the consistent teaching of the Church and of the popes who have addressed the issue.  Popes such as St. Innocent I, Innocent III, Leo X, St. Pius V, St. Pius X, and Pius XII not only upheld the legitimacy of the death penalty, but in some cases (such as Innocent I, Innocent III, and Leo X) condemned as heterodox the view that capital punishment is always wrong.  St. John Paul II too explicitly taught that the death penalty can in some cases be justifiable, and held only that it is the taking of innocent life that is inherently wrong.  Here too, Bessette and I back up our claims with a detailed presentation and analysis of the relevant texts.

The main reason Pope Francis’s change to the Catechism and his other many remarks on the death penalty have been so controversial is not because of his opposition to it, but because of the way he has expressed his opposition to it – namely, in a manner that seems to imply that capital punishment is intrinsically or of its very nature wrong.  The language of the change to the Catechism, which states flatly that the death penalty “is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person,” implies this, certainly on a natural reading.  The recent CDF document Dignitas Infinita condemns capital punishment in even stronger terms, claiming that it “violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances” (emphasis added).  This clearly implies that it something about the act of execution in itself, and not just its circumstances, that makes it immoral. 

This position flatly contradicts the consistent teaching of scripture and tradition.  If Pope Francis is right, every previous pope who has spoken on the matter is wrong – wrong about capital punishment, wrong about scriptural interpretation, wrong about the nature and implications of human dignity.  On the other hand, if all those previous popes were right, then it is Pope Francis who is wrong.  Either way, we are in a situation where some pope or other has erred.  Catholic theology leaves open the possibility that this can happen when a pope is not speaking ex cathedra.  And since, as the Church teaches, the main job of a pope is faithfully to hand on traditional teaching, the most obvious way this might happen is if he were to contradict traditional teaching.

Now, the very idea that scripture could be mistaken about a matter of faith or morals, or that the Church could for two millennia have consistently been misinterpreting scripture and teaching a grave moral error, is flatly incompatible with the Church’s claims about her own indefectibility.  But a single pope teaching error in some of his non-ex cathedra pronouncements it is not contrary to those claims – indeed, it has happened before, albeit only very rarely (as in the cases of Pope Honorius and Pope John XXII).  The logically unavoidable implication of this is that IF Pope Francis really does mean to teach that the death penalty is intrinsically wrong, then he is in error.  There is simply no other possible conclusion, consistent with the Catholic Church’s claims about her own indefectibility.

The third set of considerations relevant to the debate about Catholicism and capital punishment derives from social science.  Catholic opponents of the death penalty routinely make a series of empirical claims, to the effect that modern prison systems suffice to protect society without ever having to resort to execution, that the death penalty has no deterrence value, that it is applied in a racially discriminatory way, that there is a significant risk of innocent people being executed, and so on.  Usually these claims are just asserted, without supporting argument.  And usually, the counterarguments are simply ignored rather than rebutted.

But in our book, Joseph Bessette and I address these arguments too, systematically and in depth.  We show that there is in fact strong evidence that the death penalty has deterrence value, that there are cases where life imprisonment is not sufficient to protect others from the offender, that the death penalty is not in fact implemented in a racially discriminatory way in the U.S., that there is not in fact a significant risk of innocent people being executed, and so on.  (As it happens, the claim that there is such a risk of executing the innocent is one that Bessette has rebutted also in a recent Public Discourse article.)

The key questions in the debate over Catholicism and capital punishment, then, are these: Can the view that capital punishment is always and intrinsically immoral be reconciled with a sound philosophical theory of punishment?  Can it be reconciled with scripture, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and two thousand years of consistent magisterial teaching?  Are there strong social scientific arguments for the judgment that capital punishment is never necessary today in order to protect society?  In our book, Bessette and I present a detailed case that the correct answer to each of these questions is No.

Hanson’s case

Now, Hanson, as I have said, cites me as representative of Catholic academics who defend capital punishment.  So, what does he have to say in response to the arguments Bessette and I develop in our book?  Nothing.  He tells his readers only that those arguments have been “refuted by more capable theologians like David Bentley Hart and Paul J. Griffiths.”  Hanson does not tell us what makes Hart and Griffiths more capable.  (One suspects that “agreeing with Jack Hanson” has something to do with it.)  He also does not tell his readers that I have replied to Hart’s and Griffith’s objections, and demonstrated that in fact those objections are intellectually dishonest and notable more for their vituperative excess than for scholarly rigor.

Hanson does have some arguments of his own.  First, he suggests that there is a significant risk of executing innocent people.  In fact there is not, as Bessette, who is a social scientist with special expertise in these matters, shows in the Public Discourse article referred to above (which addresses, among other cases, the specific one Hanson puts special emphasis on).

Second, Hanson suggests that given “the notion of the ‘sanctity of life,’ which guides [the Church’s] hard-line stance against abortion,” it is “hypocrisy” for a Catholic to oppose abortion but support capital punishment.  Though this sort of objection is common, the problem with it is so obvious that I am continually amazed that death penalty opponents need it pointed out to them.  The problem is that there is (as everyone acknowledges in every other context) a crucial difference between the innocent and the guilty.  Is it hypocrisy or an assault on human freedom to condemn kidnapping while supporting the imprisonment of kidnappers?  Is it hypocrisy or an assault on private property to condemn theft while supporting the imposition of fines for certain offenses?  Of course not.  The reason is that the kidnapper takes away the freedom of an innocent person, whereas imprisonment is about taking away the freedom of a guilty person.  Similarly, the thief takes the property of an innocent person, whereas an offender who is forced to pay a fine is a guilty person.  Punishments like imprisonment and fines uphold rather than undermine freedom and private property, because they protect the freedom and private property rights of innocent people from those who would violate those rights.

For exactly the same reason, there is no hypocrisy whatsoever in opposing abortion while supporting capital punishment, because abortion involves taking the lives of the innocent while capital punishment involves taking the lives of the guilty.  And insofar as the death penalty protects society from those who have murdered before, and deters others from committing murders, it upholds the sanctity of life.  This is a point the Church herself has emphasized in the past.  The Roman Catechism promulgated by Pope St. Pius V teaches that for the state to implement the death penalty is precisely for it to obey the commandment against murder:

Another kind of lawful slaying belongs to the civil authorities, to whom is entrusted power of life and death, by the legal and judicious exercise of which they punish the guilty and protect the innocent. The just use of this power, far from involving the crime of murder, is an act of paramount obedience to this Commandment which prohibits murder. The end of the Commandment is the preservation and security of human life. Now the punishments inflicted by the civil authority, which is the legitimate avenger of crime, naturally tend to this end, since they give security to life by repressing outrage and violence.

Third, Hanson argues that “by sanctioning the taking of a life, we prevent any possibility that the condemned might someday reconcile with the world and with God.”  As Bessette and I discuss in our book, this is an objection Aquinas considers in Summa Contra Gentiles III.146, and he dismisses it as “frivolous,” for two reasons.  For one thing, says Aquinas, we have to balance the potential repentance of the offender against the very real harm the innocent may suffer if we do not protect them from evildoers by means of capital punishment.  For another thing, the prospect of execution in fact often prompts evildoers to repent and get themselves right with God while there is still time.  If an offender is so hardened in evil that even knowledge of his imminent death will not lead him to repent, then, Aquinas argues, it is likely that he would never repent anyway.

In a fourth line of argument, commenting on Genesis 9:6 (which famously states that “whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed”), Hanson writes:

For one thing, the Genesis passage stands in some tension with the Gospel’s teachings on sin and casting stones. For another, Roman Catholicism typically emphasizes allegorical, rational, and, above all, ecclesial interpretations of the Bible; direct appeals to the literal inerrancy of Biblical texts are rather a hallmark of Protestant theology in general and Reformation polemics against the Roman Magisterium in particular.

There are many problems with this, starting with the fact that Hanson does not explain exactly how Genesis is in “tension” with what the Gospel says about sin and casting stones.  Is he saying that we should never punish criminals, since none of us is without sin?  Presumably not.  But in that case, if we can punish them with fines or imprisonment, why not with execution, if that is necessary to protect society?  There is also the fact that Genesis 9:6 is by no means the only scriptural passage that sanctions capital punishment.  Many other such texts can be found, not only in Old Testament books such as Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, and Psalms, but also in New Testament passages such as Romans 13:4, which tells us that the governing authority “does not bear the sword in vain; he is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer.”  Obviously, then, the New Testament writers, who were in the best position to know, did not regard capital punishment as at odds with the Gospel.

Theologian E. Christian Brugger, author of the most systematic Catholic critique of capital punishment, concedes that Genesis 9:6 is a “problem” for his side, and that there was a “consensus” among the Fathers of the Church that scriptural passages like Romans 13:4 teach that civil authorities have the right to inflict capital punishment for sufficiently grave crimes.  Now, the Council of Trent and the First Vatican Council teach that where the Fathers are united on some matter of scriptural interpretation, no Catholic is at liberty to disagree with them.  Even if there were no other problems with attempts to reinterpret the relevant scriptural passages (and as Bessette and I show in our book, there are in fact many such problems), the consensus of the Fathers would suffice to show that these reinterpretations cannot be accepted.

Nor is Hanson correct to dismiss scriptural inerrancy as somehow a Protestant rather than Catholic notion.  On the contrary, popes such as Leo XIII and Pius XII emphasized that it is central to Catholic orthodoxy to hold that scripture is divinely inspired and thus free of error.  The First Vatican Council teaches that the scriptures “contain revelation without error…being written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit,” and pronounces an anathema on anyone who would deny that they are divinely inspired.  The Second Vatican Council teaches that since they are divinely inspired, “the books of Scripture must be acknowledged as teaching solidly, faithfully and without error,” and the Catechism of the Catholic Church incorporates this passage into its own teaching on scriptural authority (107).

Hanson’s position on scripture is also self-defeating.  In order to get around scriptural teaching on capital punishment, he suggests that such teaching is not free of error, or is incompatible with other scriptural teaching, or has been misinterpreted.  Yet he also appeals to scripture when it suits him, as when he refers to Christ’s remark about not casting the first stone.  But if we are free to reject scriptural teaching and its traditional interpretation in the one case, then why not also in the other?  How can Hanson’s appeal to scripture carry any more weight than the appeals made by more conservative Catholics?  Here we see a problem that, as Peter Geach pointed out, inevitably undermines modernist theologies.  They claim to preserve the core of divinely revealed teaching while jettisoning only what is inessential, but by means of arguments which if followed out consistently would make the whole of the purported revelation suspect.

In what seems intended as a separate, fifth line of argument, Hanson appeals to the standard progressive Catholic narrative about how a purportedly arid and abstract Neo-Scholastic theology gave way, after Vatican II and under the influence of ressourcement thinkers like Congar and de Lubac, to a more enlightened and humane modern theology.  Neo-Scholasticism, he suggests, is in some vague way linked to capitalism, Vichy France, fundamentalism, and other things sure to generate a Pavlovian response among the bien-pensant.  Exactly what all this has to do with whether capital punishment is intrinsically wrong or still needed today is never made clear.  The point, though, is obviously to insinuate that Catholic defenders of capital punishment derive their arguments from suspect sources and are motivated by a suspect political agenda. 

Rhetorically, this will no doubt be effective with some readers, at least those who already agree with Hanson.  Logically, of course, it is completely worthless, being a crude deployment of fallacies such as Appeal to Motive and the Genetic Fallacy.  If someone is going to show that the arguments from natural law, scripture and tradition, and social science that I summarized above are wrong, then he needs to demonstrate either that they rest on false premises, or that the conclusions don’t follow from the premises.  The sources of and motivations behind the arguments are completely irrelevant, even if they were as Hanson claims they are (which they are not, since there are, after all, lots of people who support capital punishment but have no sympathy with or even knowledge of Neo-Scholasticism).

A sixth and final objection raised by Hanson is also of a fallaciously ad hominem nature.  Those who have criticized Pope Francis’s statements on capital punishment, Hanson alleges, show “evident bad faith” and are really guided by “political preferences” rather than theological concerns.  The first thing to say about this is that once again, Hanson is simply diverting attention from what matters, which is whether the arguments given by Catholic defenders of capital punishment are cogent.  The motives they may have for giving these arguments are irrelevant, even if they were the motives Hanson attributes to them (which they are not).

The second thing to say is that here again, Hanson’s position is self-defeating.  For the weapon he deploys against conservatives can be turned against him.  That is to say, conservatives could with no less justice (indeed, with greater justice, I would argue) suggest that it is politics rather than theology that fundamentally motivates the thinking of progressive Catholics like Hanson.  In particular, they allow their progressive political preferences to trump what scripture, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and two thousand years of consistent magisterial teaching say about the topic of capital punishment.  They praise Pope Francis’s change to the Catechism, not out of any sincere respect for papal authority, but precisely because they think it finally undoes the teaching of earlier popes whom they disliked and had no qualms about criticizing.

To be sure, I am not presenting this as an argument against the progressive Catholic position on capital punishment.  That position is easily refutable on other grounds, namely the arguments I summarized above.  And an Appeal to Motive would be a fallacy whoever deploys it, conservative or progressive.  The point is rather that if Hanson wants to raise this sort of objection, then it could with equal justice be flung back at him.  And if he would object to having it flung at him, then to be consistent he ought not to fling it at conservatives.

The final thing to say is that the pope’s critics have in fact been very clear and consistent about their motives, and they have nothing to do with politics.  They have to do instead with the worry that in appearing directly to contradict the teaching of scripture, tradition, and all of his predecessors, Pope Francis is doing grave harm to the credibility of the Church’s magisterial authority.  The critics are concerned that the pope is giving aid and comfort to Protestant, atheist, and other critics of the Church, who allege that her claim to preserve intact the deposit of faith has been falsified.  They are concerned that he gives similar aid and comfort to heretics within the Church who would like to use the change in teaching on the death penalty as a stalking horse for other and even more radical doctrinal changes.

Hanson is free to argue that these concerns are overblown, and to rebut the arguments of the pope’s critics.  But he has no right to pretend that those concerns and arguments do not exist.  Catholic critics of capital punishment say that they are moved by respect for human dignity.  But it does not respect the dignity of those one disagrees with to ignore what they actually say, or unjustly and uncharitably to attribute bad motives to them.

59 comments:

  1. https://www.solidarity-party.org/blog/m5c6ehmv3eus74pah03qfvt8n2t4us

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  2. Great Post Prof

    I agree completely with this analysis!

    On twitter, however you have constantly mentioned that if any Pope were to ex cathedra declare Capital Punishment as intrinsically evil, it would in effect falsify Catholicism.
    I would like you to perhaps elaborate on that more as in what's your threshold for disagreement.

    Also, If that's the case, I think you ought to be more concerned with NNLT proponents then progressives.

    The progressives for all their despicable flaws seem less intent on making permanent doctrinal declarations.

    If however, a generally orthodox cardinal heavily influenced by Grisez and his ilk were to assume the Petrine Office, it seems like that might spell doom for the veracity of Catholicism.

    I'd be more concerned to reduce Grisez influence then debate progressives of the kind you just mentioned.

    Ofcourse there's already a lot of good work done in this sphere

    For those interested in some detailed but advanced works that refute New Natural Law Theory, I would recommend

    Action and Conduct by Fr Stephen L Brock and his more recent book The Light That Binds.

    I would also recommend Good and Evil Action by Dr Steven J Jensen and also Knowing The Natural Law by Dr Steven Jensen.

    For an analysis of the Death Penalty, I would obviously recommend By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed by Dr Edward Feser and Joseph Besette.

    For a more advanced analysis I would suggest the book on the Philosophy of Punishment by Peter Koritansky.

    Lastly Prof I was wondering if you have any guidelines for what constitutes dispute which doesn't affect your assent to the Church.

    I was always baffled by why Pope St John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI never went after Grisez and Finnis given how dangerous their ideas were.

    Another person I always wondered about in this connection was Fr Martin Rhonheinmer who apparently close to Pope Benedict XVI. Two Popes who were intellectual giants, no doubt understood and well familiar with the issues at stake never raised as much as a finger against them

    Let's say , if tomorrow the Church were to declare that Craniotomy was licit on the consultation of someone like Dr Finnis, do you think that it would falsify Catholicism ? (For the record, I think Craniotomy is Murder, following the analysis of other Classical Natural Law Theorists like Fr Kevin Flannery)

    So out of genuine curiosity, What degree of dispute rises to the level of being able to falsify Catholicism for you ?

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    1. I was always baffled by why Pope St John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI never went after Grisez and Finnis given how dangerous their ideas were.

      Like Paul VI, both of these popes ideas about HOW to rule entailed giving people massively too much rope before considering pull them up short and declaring "that's too far". They were soft on restraint of speech to the point of almost eviscerating the idea of canons against heresy (much less of lesser crimes that are still offenses against truth, such as teaching as "debatable" things that are not, or teaching as "doubtful" things that should not be doubted). There is always room judgment call on the use of "force" to put a stop to nonsense, but that also means that very possibly, those popes judged wrong.

      Let's say , if tomorrow the Church were to declare that Craniotomy was licit on the consultation of someone like Dr Finnis, do you think that it would falsify Catholicism ? (For the record, I think Craniotomy is Murder, following the analysis of other Classical Natural Law Theorists like Fr Kevin Flannery)

      When I looked up definitions, craniotomy in general is the removal of a portion of the skull: this might be done so you can get access to the brain behind it, e.g. to remove a tumor. A craniotomy in reference to a fetus CAN refer to doing this to kill a living fetus, but it can also refer to reducing the size of the skull of an already dead fetus so the womb can expel the fetus. The Church saying that craniotomy as an intended method of killing of the fetus is licit would be an obvious reversal of Evangelium Vitae.

      Also, If that's the case, I think you ought to be more concerned with NNLT proponents then progressives.

      NNLT theorists are wrong, but not as gravely wrong as those who deny the moral principles JPII reiterated in Veritatis Splendor (which is what many progressives do). In any case, Feser has taken aim at NNLT repeatedly on this front.

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    2. Hi Tony

      As to the Popes, The question doesn't seem to be only a matter of leniency.

      These NNLT figures seemed to be very close to these Popes themselves. The question that needs to be answered first is if there is any case for their theory being a valid matter of dispute in the first place. I don't think it is, I think that their positions are heretic but then why did these good Popes permit them.

      In the future , these questions will have to be formally hashed out.

      The Craniotomy case is usually taken up as a paradigmatic case of the disagreements between classical natural law theorists and new natural law theorists on action and intention.

      Basically the case which is usually discussed is a situation where it is discovered that a living baby's skull is really enlarged mid delivery to the point where proceeding further with the delivery will certainly kill the mother.

      Now using the principle of double effect and concept of intention in a distorted way,
      NNL Theorists posit that, given the fact that the baby will die upon delivery and not performing a Craniotomy will result in the mother's death as well, if the doctor performs a Craniotomy with the ultimate goal of saving the mother's life, this would be licit according to New Natural Law Theory. They might indeed say it's just "reshaping the head".

      The classical natural law theorist would respond that the means employed of doing so, namely the Craniotomy necessarily involves the deliberate act of killing the child (i.e Murder).

      The concrete physical act of craniotomy in itself consists of directly acting to kill the child and as such it cannot be claimed that there is no intention to kill the child. It is murder.

      I agree completely with Classical Natural Law Theorists that the act is murder.Obviously spelling it out in detail involves more argumentation and intricate analysis. The books I mentioned above do so.

      This should suffice to make the case of how radical and wrong NNLT is.

      Nevertheless given the seemingly disputed nature of it (personally I think it's clear enough to officially declare the NNLT position false), I was interested to know if the Church officially declaring such a procedure open to dispute would rise to the level of falsifying Catholicism for Prof Feser.

      Similarly suppose even in the case of death penalty, suppose the Church refrains from making any definitive pronouncements and declares it an open question with both positions being able to be held in good conscience.

      And ultimately let's say if it becomes akin to something like the disputes on grace where the Church didn't definitively resolve it.

      Would even that Falsify Catholicism for Prof ?
      Personally I was a bit frightened when Prof mentioned it was a matter of the Truth or Falsity of Catholicism. I would like some more clear articulation about that.

      I suppose in the case of Capital Punishment, the weight of scripture, prior councils, the fathers etc would make the Church declaring it an open question extremely problematic.

      My comment about Progressives was not that we shouldn't oppose them, we should strongly and harshly rebuke them. But their being opposed to objectivity by nature makes them less likely to effect or aim to make significant doctrinal declarations. Fernandez himself said, and I think Prof noted this, that they were not interested in making permanent declarations.

      It's a wrong attitude overall ofcourse because objectivity should be enforced and respected but only with respect to traditionalist motives, not the other way around.

      NNLT proponents however are very desperate to enforce their new theory and declare the death penalty intrinsically evil. Their motives pose a more dangerous threat, they beleive in objectively and sincerely beleive their positions. The fact that they tend to have a reputation for orthodoxy increases their threat.






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    3. The question that needs to be answered first is if there is any case for their theory being a valid matter of dispute in the first place. I don't think it is, I think that their positions are heretic but then why did these good Popes permit them.

      I think that JPII's encyclical Veritatis Splendor was meant to put some of the horrific moral theories being used beyond the pale by calling them out explicitly and showing that they are definitely contrary to Catholic theology and sound philosophy about the moral act, (namely, that the moral act takes its species from the object of the act, which is the teaching of St. Thomas in the Summa). However, the particular false theories he is repudiating are relativism, consequentialism, and utilitarianism. He did not call out NNLT, because it was still, at that time, being worked out and still upholding the immorality of abortion and contraception, the biggest tickets for dissident nonsense. Even the encyclical doesn't define the opposed theories to be formally heretical, (he doesn't set up his teaching as de fide), though to continue to hold them would certainly be a sin against the obligation to hold what the Church teaches under the standard of religious submission of mind and will, as taught very strongly, for many centuries, by Doctors, Catechisms, and popes. Still less was he aiming for defining NNLT heretical.

      The problem is that while the pope takes a stab at explaining "the object of the act," with some degree of success, the notion is extraordinarily difficult to pin down clearly, both in theoretical terms and in practical terms. And setting it out clearly in today's world is so much more difficult with 400 years of modern rejection of Aristotelian / Thomistic models of the form / matter and act / potency distinctions.

      The NNLT people ARE wrong, and the example of their arguments in favor of craniotomy ought to be taken to be reductios of their underlying theory. That they reject such a conclusion shows how warped they are in holding onto such a novel theory. But they aren't more warped than the consequentialists who also argue in favor of the same craniotomy.

      In my opinion, one way to at least shed light on their mistake in identifying "the act" is by analogy to the moral analysis of formal and material cooperation with evil: Formal cooperation would (by analogy) be actually intending the baby's death, and material cooperation would be like what they say: we don't WANT the baby to die, it's just a result of the act that we do intend, to act on the skull. But their problem is that immediate material cooperation is taken to be effectively the same as formal cooperation with the evil act, and is forbidden on the same lines as the prohibition of formal cooperation. And THE ACT is certainly analogous to immediate cooperation with evil, the act is of such a nature as to immediately AND DIRECTLY destroy the body's natural integrity which is necessary for life. That's what it MEANS to kill someone. So, even if (unlike the abortionist) they would celebrate a miracle by which God repaired the child's head (after delivery) and brought the child back to life, that cannot save their act from being defined as killing the baby.

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  3. I think the anti-death penalty position benefits from not having to confront just how violent some prisons (and prisoners) are, from stabbings to rape to beatings to continuing to run criminal enterprises. There is a subset of criminals for whom even imprisonment will not stop them from harming others and continuing to commit crimes. It seems to me an act of mercy for the other prisoners that at least these most violent criminals should be executed quickly.

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    1. This is an important point. Abolitionism is a luxury belief. Most abolitionists live in safe neighborhoods and are never likely to see the inside of a prison cell.

      It is another example of the powerful lording it over the weak in order to feel good about themselves.

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  4. How about just the Catholic case? That's what we should give our submission of intellect and will to. Not "conservative", not "progressive" just good, faithful, not dissenting and obedient Catholics.

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    1. No one's ever thought of that before, great insight! What would that case be and why are the other cases wrong?

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    2. One of Ed's central points is that if you pay attention to the Catholic tradition taken as a whole (rather than just the flavor of the day), then being a good, faithful Catholic requires adherence to the in-principle permissibility of the death penalty.

      After that, it's a matter of prudential application, which, pretty much by definition, the Church is not going to definitively prescribe a particular way of doing beyond the recognition of certain fundamental principles.

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  5. The death penalty by lethal injection is too easy a way to die.

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  6. You claim that your defense of death penalty is not motivated by bloodthirstyness.

    Well, aren't you the one who considers that corporeal punishment in the penal system is worth "reconsidering"?

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    1. UltimaThul, if you were convicted of a minor assault, and had a choice of a year in prison or corporal punishment, what would you prefer? What do you think most people would prefer?

      Exercise your imagination a little before insisting that only bloodlust could motivate a position.

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    2. Bellomy here, phone won't let me log in.

      Come on, this isn't even a response and I think you know that. Wanting to reconsider corporal punishment can be motivated by a variety of things.

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    3. I prefer to spend 1 year in prison, that's clear.

      In my country (France), it would be so unthinkable that I am not even sure any polling institute has ever asked the population for it.

      It can be reconsidered for a variety of reasons, fine.

      But Dr Feser says one benefit of this penalty is that it is "humiliating", that it is a case of public shaming.
      Speaking for myself, I find this pretty shocking.

      I suppose we can just agree to disagree.

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    4. How is corporal punishment “bloodthirsty”? It is merely a different form of punishment. Sometimes corporal punishment is more merciful than imprisonment as it does not take years of someone’s life away. And surely rapists who batter women are deserving of corporal punishment, wouldn’t you say? I think it could be an effective and proportionate punishment.

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    5. this penalty is that it is "humiliating", that it is a case of public shaming. Speaking for myself, I find this pretty shocking.


      Separating out the part that is "public", shame in and of itself is merely the proper and rightful response of a person with an active conscience who has sinned deliberately and realizes that he has done so: he ought to be ashamed before God that he misused his God-given faculties for an inherently shameful thing, a deliberate sin. One ought to feel shame at doing a shameful thing.

      Shame before the public is merely an extension of this: one ought to be ashamed in respect of the public order when one has deliberately violated a law that promotes the common good. Being convicted of that crime, and being sentenced to ANY penalty, ought to be felt as shameful by the offender, precisely on account of his knowing - through his own conscience AND through the publicly educed evidence - that he has done a shameful thing, and that this shameful thing has been made public. Trying to devolve the justice system of inducing shame is to eradicate moral reality as applied to the common good.

      It is neither necessary, nor always best, that the punishment be carried out privately, away from public view. It may be preferable, for various prudential reasons, that it sometimes or even usually be so. There is no principle that it being out of public view must necessarily serve the good in the best way. If in some cases the shameful fact of the offense, along with the naturally shameful necessity of bearing a punishment, best serves both the offender and society itself by being public, then by all means a public shaming of a due and just punishment borne publicly is appropriate.

      When can it be helpful to the offender himself? Some offenses bear on good reputation as such - e.g. if you slander someone. In order to make full recompense, one ought to be willing not only to suffer, but to repair the evil of the offense. And while publicly recanting the slander would go some way to doing that, willingly bearing publicly something shameful - bearing in your person the cost to reputation - in addition would demonstrate more fully your remorse and repudiation of the evil of the slander - thus completing more perfectly due contrition and its natural consequence.

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    6. I bet there are lots of prisoners wasting away in prison, unable to start their rehabilitation, who would much prefer to receive a public shaming and flogging and then be released. Rather that than get out of prison 10 years later with a conviction, no job experience, no resume, having to readjust to living on the outside, possibly even missing being able to provide for their children, etc.

      Not to mention that the money spent to hold them in prison for years could be spent helping their rehabilitation instead.

      People consider flogging cruel, but having 10 years of your life you won't get back is no less cruel.

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    7. People against corporeal punishment: "You guys are just bloodthirsty!"

      Also people against corporeal punishment: "I hope you rot in prison for the rest of your natural life!"

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  7. I feel like my previous comment was a bit over the top. Please excuse me.

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  8. As is typical of those who push novel ideas in the Church and insist that their new ways are the "real" meaning of the Gospels, they give scant attention to the DETAILS. E.G. (as applied to Hansen):

    Francis himself explicitly said that his change to the Catechism is to be understood as consistent with prior teaching. (This is required of papal magisterial teaching anyway, but he made it explicit.) So, where any conflict exists, prior teaching must be upheld - which means that his teaching as "inadmissible" is only a prudential judgment of current conditions - which Catholics are free to dispute.

    Second: A passage in the Catechism has its authority based on the authority of the original text from which it is taken, it has no more authority in the Catechism than the original. Francis's new text is taken from a statement in a public address to participants of a meeting organized by the Pontifical Council for Promotion of the New Evangelization: i.e. neither was the meeting itself that of a magisterial authority (merely organized by a Vatican council), nor was that council's brief one that covered the doctrinal issue at stake. As magisterial authority goes, that's slightly stronger than off-the-cuff comments to journalists in flight at 30,000 feet.

    Third: in the Gospel of John ("let he who has not sinned cast the first stone"), (1) Jesus was pointing out that THOSE pharisees had already sinned because they did not bring the adulterous man with the woman, and they were supposed to bring the sinners to judges, not to Jesus (He told them "I have not come to judge...:" at this time - it is at the second coming that he will come as judge.) (2) Jesus could not be one to throw the 1st stone, nor could he condemn her, as under the law the ones who had witnessed the act were required to do that, and Jesus had not witnessed the adultery. So when he said "neither do I condemn you" he was just following the law. The whole passage doesn't have anything to say about the licitness of DP for some categories of crimes.

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  9. There have been 20 executions so far in 2024 in the USA out of 340 million people, and none in leftist states like Calif. The Left really just uses this issue to attack pro-lifers for opposing 1 million yearly abortions, aw we defend executing mass murderers according to natural law. It's a variation of Bernardin's old "seamless garment" heresy, which won't go away until it's condemned in a new Syllabus of Errors.

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  10. In 2017 there was a riot in the James T. Vaughan correctional facility in Delaware, and a correctional officer (Steven Floyd) was tortured and murdered.

    The leader of the riot was sentenced to two life terms, but since he was already serving a life sentence it's not clear that adding two more was much of a punishment. Nor was the additional 150 years added on for assault and kidnapping.

    It is church teaching that the State has a positive obligation to inflict punishments commensurate with the gravity of the crime (CCC 2266). Inasmuch as essentially no punishment whatever was inflicted on this individual (nor the others already serving life terms) it seems that the state of Delaware failed its moral obligation in this case.

    This situation cannot be all that unusual and it certainly ought to be a consideration in discussions on the death penalty. Without that penalty a society cannot help but react unjustly in certain cases.

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    1. This case is extremely helpful in clarifying the necessity of capital punishment in particular cases where justice would be undermined without it.

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    2. @JMC

      i personally have no problem with capital punishment in principle, but allow me to play devil advocate:

      Suppose that the leader of the riot was in fact sentenced to death before the riots happened. Now them, should the State give him a worse execution or some other means of making his sentence stronger or there would be no need to enhance his punishment?

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    3. The Doctors say that punishments in this life (by humans) fall short of perfection, because of multiple factors. One factor is that we cannot crawl into the criminal's soul and directly measure the degree of his guilt, we can only estimate it based on external evidence. For another, we cannot punish after his death. For a third, we run up against constraints that would undermine the rational mind of the offender (e.g. long-extended severe pain - torture - making him react as an animal rather than as a human). And other limits. Therefore, the goal for human institutions is to model a penal system that within reason assigns punishments that are proportionate to the offenses, where "within reason" includes the constraints we must work under. Knowing, (a) that in the long run, God will make up for what is lacking in our penal system, and (b) God expressly intends that we participate in the process of punishment in our human institutions, modeling in our community the overall principles of justice that God will complete in the end.

      The idea that the death penalty must be as painless as we can make it is remarkably silly. Assuming that death is the rightful punishment in a given case, there is nothing wrong with using a method that causes the kind of pain coordinate to causing death. However, there can also be, legitimately, different lawful means of execution, with different levels of pain and suffering, without offense to the principles of punishment. So, at least in principle, we could designate one method of execution for "ordinary" cases, and a more harsh method for special cases like this one.

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    4. @Tony

      Excelent analysis. You laided the principles very well and with they anticipated the objection that one would need to enhance the criminal suffering if he caused damage again before execution, with could lead to a infinite regress, this is not necessary, as shown in your first paragraph.

      I see them that JMC point is very well done them. Your first paragraph does diminish the force of his argument, for we do accept already that the State can no be perfectly just on the matter, but he did bring up a consideration that lawmakers in a more sane society need to consider.

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    5. There is a limit beyond which punishment cannot legitimately go, which is why no one suggests murderers should be tortured to death. Once that limit is reached then regardless of the crime it cannot be exceeded.

      The argument here is whether death represents that limit or is in fact a bridge too far. Given that Scripture, virtually all the Fathers and Doctors, and 2000 years of catechisms, councils, and popes have acknowledged its moral legitimacy it is hard to imagine a valid argument claiming it is in fact immoral.

      There may be any number of reasonable prudential arguments against its use in particular circumstances. There are none that it is intrinsically evil.

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  11. As an avid reader of your books I thought I should check out your blog and what do you know? You're writing about something that, unfortunately, still exists in my state.
    You know, I've really wrestled with this issue as a Catholic, and I just can't support capital punishment anymore. When we talk about what Jesus taught us about mercy, I keep coming back to that one powerful moment in John 8:7 when He stopped an execution, saying "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone." That's not just a nice story - it's a direct challenge to how we should think about justice and mercy,imo.
    I also believe that there are logical trajectories along which doctrine can evolve.Pope Francis, building on St. John Paul II's teachings, is right when he says that the death penalty is "inadmissible" because it violates the dignity of the person (CCC 2267). What did St. Augustine say, "Do not kill him. Let him live and repent." I think this truly reflects Christ's core message of redemption - the same message that made St. Catherine of Siena visit condemned prisoners, preaching God's mercy until their final moments.How come some really think she would not have advocated for life sentences with the penal system we have in stock now?
    Yeah, sure, I understand the traditional arguments. But as Cardinal Bernardin pointed out in his "Consistent Ethic of Life," we can't just defend life in some cases - we need to uphold its sanctity consistently. St. Ambrose captured this beautifully: "God preferred the correction rather than the death of a sinner." Heck, we can do that. And in the near future, not even the miniscule possibility of a convicted murderer murdering s.o behind bars will exist, for the most dangerous people there will be android guards.
    These days, with modern prison systems, we can keep society safe without killing offenders. As Pope Francis explains in "Fratelli Tutti" (263-269), this means taking a life isn't necessary for public protection anymore. When St. Thomas Aquinas argued for capital punishment in the 13th century, he couldn't have imagined our current alternatives. There were no „life-sentences“ because jail meant being thrown into a dungeon and dying of neglect. Today, we can keep murderers in what could be regarded as closed monasteries (I would keep certain things like single cells for lifers)
    Quoting Aquinas without his historical context feels like Muslims quoting some medieval imans on why women are not allowed to travel further than XX miles.
    Plus, our justice system isn't perfect, see the case of Mr. Roberson in my state. Absolutely insane...
    The Catechism teaches that human life is sacred because "from its beginning it involves the creative action of God" (CCC 2258). That sanctity doesn't disappear because someone committed a crime.
    I find myslef inspired by Sister Helen Prejean's words (as a conservative…): "The profound moral question is not, 'Do they deserve to die?' but 'Do we deserve to kill them?'" Looking at my own state, I can adamantly say-no, we do not deserve that. Neither to our representatives. I have come to the conclusion that,as Catholics, our call to defend the sanctity of life needs to extend to everyone - even those who have committed terrible crimes.

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    1. Why is “worthiness” to punish in this case so different from worthiness to punish in any other?

      Further, in lawful execution, it is not an individual who performs it, as such, but the State, which does not experience “worthiness” in the same way.

      Finally, this is what Pius XII said about the nature of execution:

      “Even when there is question of the execution of a condemned man, the State does not dispose of the individual’s right to life. In this case it is reserved to the public power to deprive the condemned person of the enjoyment of life in expiation of his crime when, by his crime, he has already dispossessed himself of his right to life.“

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    2. Texas Ranger

      You seem to be conflating prudential arguments with arguments based on principle.

      The traditional position has always maintained that a catholic is free to think that the death penalty shouldn't be applied on prudential (given certain contingent circumstances) grounds but they have to hold that atleast in principle the death penalty is licit.

      The consistent life ethic retort doesn't make sense because the criminal has committed a crime such that logically as a matter of justice he doesn't have the right to live just as someone who has stolen has forfeited the right to not have something taken from him (The punishment might be applied as a fine by the state etc, note that this is different from restitution which involves giving what was stolen back, regardless of whether you can or can't give it back, you have to pay the fine)
      and as such a govt can licitly apply the death penalty for a murder.

      This doesn't mean the govt should do it everytime, they can include other considerations as well.

      But you have to admit that in principle the death penalty is licit.

      You supplied some prudential reasons like for example "Are we worthy enough to impose the death penalty".

      But note they are "prudential ".
      Even Cardinal Avery Dulles says something similar, he says that it seems like in the present day , given the depravity of govts, we might not have the moral authority to impose it, but he does mention that govts of the past did have the moral authority.

      This also implies that it is possible for us to apply the death penalty licitly.

      Would you concur with that ?


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    3. If the story in John 8:7 meant what you think it does it would ban all punishment; after all, the woman received no penalty at all. It is also worth noting that (apparently) none of the Fathers or Doctors referenced that passage when discussing capital punishment.

      As for Augustine, while he often opposed the application of capital punishment, he also recognized it as a morally valid penalty:
      "...it is in no way contrary to the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' ... for the representatives of the State’s authority to put criminals to death." (City of God, Bk 1)

      That was also the position Ambrose took. In a reply to a Christian magistrate who asked specifically about this, he replied: "...you will be excused if you do it, and praised if you do it not." (Letter XXV to Studius)

      As for Aquinas, his position was based on Scripture and had nothing whatever to do with the time that he lived. This point was reinforced by Pius XII who said: "...the essential foundation itself of penal power and of its immanent finality... is as little determined by the conditions of time and culture as the nature of man and the human society decreed by nature itself".

      What is missing from your comment is the concept of justice. Criminals are not punished primarily to protect ourselves, but because justice demands it. And sometimes the only punishment commensurate with certain crimes is death.

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    4. Even Cardinal Avery Dulles says something similar, he says that it seems like in the present day , given the depravity of govts, we might not have the moral authority to impose it,

      I don't recall Dulles making that argument himself, but certainly many opposed to the DP do. I find that nearly always, those asserting this are really doing so as a subterfuge for what they really think, which is that DP is always immoral.

      One problem is that when they admit modern governments have the right and necessity of using lethal force for defending from unjust aggressors, they are already admitting that these governments rightly can judge when to use lethal force and kill people. Add in that at least in some cases, even convicted felons cannot be kept from killing others, such governments sometimes must judge that killing a murderer is the only way of keeping other safe from him. (Those few who repudiate just defense through lethal force have other, more serious problems.)

      More importantly, it may well be the case that it is governments that have repudiated justice as a foundational framework for the penal system that have devolved too much to use the DP rightly, and in that case it might be the case that restoring the DP to the arsenal of licit punishments is a necessary part of those governments returning to wholesome, just and worthy governments. Certainly I have NEVER ONCE heard one of the people claiming "we're too degenerate to use DP" accept the thesis that OK, once we have turned around and ceased to be a degenerate people, THEN we can and should return to using the DP. They don't really think that we are degenerate and that's why we should reject using DP, they think a desire to use DP as punishment is per se degenerate and our returning to its use more widely would mean being even more degenerate than we are now.

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    5. @anonymous: Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I know this topic can stir up some deep feelings, especially when it comes to justice and what’s right. You’re absolutely right that the state doesn’t experience "worthiness" like a person would—it’s more about the community’s values and what we believe in. And these days, more Catholics, myself included, feel called to let mercy and respect for life guide us, even with folks who’ve done terrible things.

      Now, Pius XII’s stance did support the death penalty in certain situations, and I can respect that perspective for his time. But over the years, the Church has grown in its understanding of human dignity. With Pope Francis and others, there's been this shift to seeing the death penalty as "inadmissible" now, because it goes against the God-given worth of each person. Our prisons today can keep people behind bars for life, so they’re no longer a threat. And if we can protect society without ending a life, then we’re sticking closer to our beliefs in mercy and redemption.

      It’s not that justice doesn’t matter—of course, it does. But like Sister Helen Prejean says, the question isn’t so much whether some folks "deserve" to die but whether we "deserve" to take that life ourselves. For me, that lines up with what we’re taught about respecting life at every turn, no matter the situation.

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    6. @Norm Thanks for putting it out there so clearly! I see what you mean about the difference between “prudential” reasons and sticking to the principle itself. You’re right—traditionally, the Church didn’t rule out the death penalty and saw it as just in some cases where justice demanded it. And yeah, in theory, I get that it’s still considered a licit option.

      But here’s where I feel the message has evolved—and why it really hits home for me. What recent popes and even some cardinals are getting at is a call to dive deeper into that "consistent ethic of life." They’re not outright saying the principle is wrong; they’re asking us to consider whether we need to choose it anymore, especially when we have other ways to protect society and let justice take its course. Pope Francis and even Cardinal Dulles seem to be saying, in different ways, that in today’s world, we might do better to lean toward mercy over retribution.

      So, for me, it’s not so much about denying that the death penalty could be legitimate in principle. It’s about the choice we’re making as a society. If we can keep folks secure behind bars and allow a chance for redemption, why not do that instead? It just feels closer to what Jesus was all about—offering mercy even-or rather, especially- when it’s hard.

      And I’ll tell you, in a justice system that’s not perfect, I’d rather let someone live and err on the side of mercy than risk taking a life without needing to. That’s just where my heart and faith lead me these days.That's why I have joint other abolitionist in my state. A lot of them Catholics, btw.

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    7. @JMCabaniss Thank you for taking the time and laying it all out—I appreciate it! You’re right, John 8:7 isn’t about wiping out all punishment. But to me, it shows Jesus reminding us that mercy has a place in justice, especially when it comes to something as final as taking a life. His message makes me stop and think: if we have a choice, shouldn’t we lean toward mercy?

      I know Augustine, Ambrose, and Aquinas saw the death penalty as morally allowed, and I’m not trying to ignore that. But I feel like the Church’s teaching today builds on their wisdom, aiming to find justice without needing to end a life. Augustine often preferred sparing life, and that speaks to me.

      And you’re right, justice is about more than just protection—it’s about accountability and the seriousness of certain crimes. But these days, we can punish and protect without needing to go so far as an execution. With the flaws we know exist in the justice system, I’d rather see us lean on mercy whenever we can. That way, we’re still taking justice seriously but with an approach that respects every person’s dignity, no matter what.

      Pope Francis has even pointed out that doctrine can evolve when it comes to the dignity of life and the way we think about punishment. He says that as our understanding grows and as society changes, we’re called to revisit and deepen our sense of justice. In his view, the death penalty just doesn’t align with our understanding of human dignity anymore, and for me, that’s a powerful statement about where we can take the teachings of the Church going forward.

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    8. I wonder about one thing-the danger of a convicted murderer murdering again in prison comes up/is being brought up again and again.

      Fair enough,but: Why then do capital punishment aficionados not suggest to keep the death penalty for exactly these rare cases? It would allow for those redeemable to stay alive and contribute from within prison walls and would only target the few truly degenerates. Why do I never hear anything like that from pro-dp folk? Food for thought indeed.

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    9. TexasRanger,

      Do you think spending an eternity in Hell diminishes one's human dignity?

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    10. But over the years, the Church has grown in its understanding of human dignity. With Pope Francis and others, there's been this shift to seeing the death penalty as "inadmissible" now, because it goes against the God-given worth of each person.

      I am not in the least confident that we can say that the Church has "grown" in its understanding of human dignity. There are many indicators that suggest otherwise.

      The first and largest is that the "dignity of life" mantra was started primarily on the left by the same people who push for abortion. Manifestly, they don't have the Church's view of the dignity of life.

      The second is that the Church has always pushed a view of the dignity of human life that is immense, on account of our being called to be (adopted) children of God, partakers of divinity. The other aspects of human dignity are always less than this aspect, and are important primarily as the foundational base for that high dignity of being a child of God, i.e. being made with a rational nature, upon which grace can elevate us to life with God. The Church has ALWAYS held this, and nothing about today's understanding "grows" this understanding.

      In point of fact, 999 times out of 10, when abolitionists talk about a "new understanding" of human dignity, they are unable to actually articulate any such understanding that is different from what the Church held in the past, that constitutes a reason for abolishing DP. The rare times when I have seen them try, the easy and simple (and correct) reply has been "yes, but the Church always held that, and the Church always taught THAT is not a valid reason to abolish the DP". For example, the idea that a person does not "lose" their human dignity even with a grave crime like murder: Pius XII reiterated the distinction made for centuries: he has not lost the human dignity of having a rational nature, from which nature God calls him to become a child of God. But he has given up the dignity of protection from death by his crime, and justice calls for that death. That is, by correctly distinguishing between the different kinds and aspects of dignity, one can rightly identify the dignity that he retains and the fact that retaining such dignity doesn't deny being subject to the DP.

      But like Sister Helen Prejean says, the question isn’t so much whether some folks "deserve" to die but whether we "deserve" to take that life ourselves.

      The answer God gives to this very question is "yes", in Genesis 9:6: "by man shall his blood be shed". In effect, when God gave this rule by basing it on the origin of man's creation, God is himself testifying that the dignity of innocent human life demands this kind of being held accountable. God says the DP is a testimony to that dignity.

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    11. Tony

      For The View I attributed to Cardinal Dulles see,

      https://www.firstthings.com/article/2001/04/catholicism-capital-punishment

      The specific quote:

      "For the symbolism to be authentic, the society must believe in the existence of a transcendent order of justice, which the State has an obligation to protect. This has been true in the past, but in our day the State is generally viewed simply as an instrument of the will of the governed. In this modern perspective, the death penalty expresses not the divine judgment on objective evil but rather the collective anger of the group. The retributive goal of punishment is misconstrued as a self-assertive act of vengeance."

      It falls within the context of his discussion of retribution in this article.

      For the record, I don't agree with Dulles here.

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    12. Hello Texas Ranger

      Well then I would invite you to regularly uphold that distinction between principle and prudence.

      It's very important and if you do so, I think you'll find lots of common ground between catholics who hold to a traditional view on this issue.

      Pope St John Paul II did move the prudential application more towards the prudential side but he also upheld the principle that it is licit in principle. So did Pope Benedict.

      I would also prefer that you avoid using terms like "Evolving Doctrine" as you did in the next post,because you see, that's where you deviate from sound principle.

      You can argue for abolitionism without compromising principle. Pope St John Paul II did just that.

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    13. Texas Ranger,

      Is a "single cell" for life really a mercy?

      Why is 40 years in a single cell more merciful? And if he is out in the prison population, that is slightly more merciful to him but likely less merciful to others.

      If someone has done the unthinkable, give him a chance to repent and be made right with God, and then send him to the Lord's judgement seat. How is that not merciful?

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  12. What is New Natural Law except for Natural Law \ {death penalty}?

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    1. Well that's a very technical question.

      I think this blog post by esteemed Classical Natural Law Theorist, Dr J Budziszewski
      is quite comprehensive but simple

      https://www.undergroundthomist.org/what-is-this-nnl-whereof-you-speak

      Fully answering your question will require more sophistication
      but the above link is a good introduction

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  13. The top three states with the highest murder rates per 100,000 people are the ruby red states of Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi.
    https://usafacts.org/articles/which-states-have-the-highest-murder-rates/

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    1. The top cities with the highest murder rates per 100,000 people are indigo blue:

      New Orleans 58.4 rate, 83% for Biden
      St. Louis 57.2, 61% Biden
      Baltimore 44.7, 62% Biden
      Philadelphia 34.1, 81% Biden
      Memphis 32.6, 64% Biden
      Birmingham 28.9, 56% Biden
      Kansas City 27.5, 60% Biden
      District of Columbia 25.2, 92%

      All of these have higher rates than the state of Louisiana, which has the highest as a state.

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    2. did st louis mo vote for biden

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    3. Yes, it did. Most large cities are have Democratic mayors, all of which shows that crime is a local issue. There is nothing that Biden or Trump can do about crime in cities.
      That said, this article gives a different perspective on the fact the crime is higher in red states
      https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2024/1/22/2218809/-Revealing-the-truth-about-the-rate-of-Red-State-Crime

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    4. that is a horribly biased article. citing a 2023 decline of 12% in the murder rate as the greatest decline "ever" without citing the even steeper 2020 increase is just crazy. There's more: citing "2% increase" in funding when 2% fails to merely cover inflation, so it reflects a drop in funding.

      Delete
  14. "Texas Ranger"? You gotta mean the team, cause all self- respecting law enforcement Texas Rangers support the DP.

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    1. Imagine that not all Texans think alike. The dp will be repealed one day, as a practicing Catholic, I just want to speed it up a little.

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    2. Texas is a state like no other. It's the Republic of Texas. Someday it will change.

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  15. Would capital punishment ever be justified if the criminal was not culpable for his actions (perhaps due to being under the influence of a mind control device or simply being severely mentally ill), even if the criminal’s actions were very violent? Does one only forfeit the right to life if they freely did so in doing the crime?

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    1. How can one be responsible for a crime if he is not on his right mind?

      Unless we take punishment as 100% utilitarian, i don't think anyone would agree with executing someone who can't be guilty.

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    2. Would capital punishment ever be justified if the criminal was not culpable for his actions

      The entire principle of punishment is that it be due to the offender on account of the offender's choice to violate the law. If the person simply wasn't acting freely, it wasn't his choice. It isn't "punishment" at all if there was no choice in the matter, it's something else.

      There are many shades of gray in choice under which a person can be acting partially by his consent and partially pushed. One of the roles of the judge is to tailor the punishment by those shades of gray to reflect the actual degree of freedom in the offender's choice, which means reducing the sentence more where there was more impediment to free choice. But there is no need to apply this estimative judgment where there was no possibility of free consent, where the act was wholly without the offender's choice.

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  16. I feel Mark Sheas pain this morning.

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    1. Phew, after reading your comment, I popped over to peak at his blog. That fella is barely Catholic and he's definitely not enjoying it.

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  17. OT, but I just came across this, which I haven't been thinking about for a while: "... the ordinarily accessible substances are not good by being what they are, but only by having accidents which are good. (n. The scholastic doctrine, that all beings are good insofar as they are beings, derives from the neo-Platonists (via Augustine and Boethius), and is incorrect as an interpretation of Aristotle." ~ Stephen Menn, RevMeta 1992.

    It's often been remarked that Aquinas and others inherited a tradition that mixed things from Aristotle and from (other? so Lloyd Gerson) Platonists. Menn makes the two-pronged aspect of that tradition salient in his remarks.

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