Thursday, April 11, 2024

Two problems with Dignitas Infinita

This week the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith (DDF) published the Declaration Dignitas Infinita, on the topic of human dignity.  I am as weary as anyone of the circumstance that it has now become common for new documents issued by the Vatican to be met with fault-finding.  But if the faults really are there, then we oughtn’t to blame the messenger.  And this latest document exhibits two serious problems: one with its basic premise, and the other with some of the conclusions it draws from it.

Capital punishment

To begin with the latter, I hasten to add that most of the conclusions are unobjectionable.  They are simply reiterations of longstanding Catholic teaching on abortion, euthanasia, our obligations to the poor and to migrants, and so on.  The document is especially helpful and courageous in strongly condemning surrogacy and gender theory, which will win it no praise from the progressives the pope is often accused of being too ready to placate. 

There are other passages that are more problematic but perhaps best interpreted as imprecise rather than novel.  For example, it is stated that “it is very difficult nowadays to invoke the rational criteria elaborated in earlier centuries to speak of the possibility of a ‘just war.’”  That might seem to mark the beginnings of a reversal of traditional teaching that has been reiterated as recently as the current Catechism.  However, Dignitas Infinita also “reaffirm[s] the inalienable right to self-defense and the responsibility to protect those whose lives are threatened,” which are themes that recent statements of just war doctrine have already emphasized.

The one undeniably gravely problematic conclusion Dignitas Infinita draws from its key premise concerns the death penalty.  Pope Francis already came extremely close to declaring capital punishment intrinsically immoral when he changed the Catechism in 2018, so that it now says that “the death penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person.”  But that left open the possibility that what was meant is that it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person unless certain circumstances hold, such as the practical impossibility of protecting others from the offender without executing him (even if this reading is a bit strained).  The new DDF document goes further and flatly declares that “the death penalty… violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances” (emphasis added). 

This simply cannot be reconciled with scripture and the consistent teaching of all popes who have spoken on the matter prior to Pope Francis.  That includes Pope St. John Paul II, despite his well-known opposition to capital punishment.  In Evangelium Vitae, even John Paul taught only:

Punishment… ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.  Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.

And the original version of the Catechism promulgated by John Paul II stated:

The traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of the legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty. (2266)

In short, John Paul II (like scripture and like every previous pope who spoke on the matter) held that some circumstances can justify capital punishment, whereas Pope Francis now teaches that no circumstances can ever justify capital punishment.  That is a direct contradiction.  Now, Joseph Bessette and I, in our book By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment, have shown that the legitimacy in principle of the death penalty has in fact been taught infallibly by scripture and the tradition of the Church.  I’ve also made the case for this claim on other occasions, such as in this article.  Hence, if Pope Francis is indeed teaching that capital punishment is intrinsically wrong, it is clear that it is he who is in the wrong, rather than scripture and previous popes. 

If defenders of Pope Francis deny this, then they are logically committed to holding that those previous popes erred.  Either way, some pope or other has erred, so that it will make no sense for defenders of Pope Francis to pretend that they are simply upholding papal magisterial authority.  To defend Pope Francis is to reject the teaching of the previous popes; to defend those previous popes is to reject the teaching of Pope Francis.  There is no way to defend all of them at once. 

This is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of papal infallibility, because that doctrine concerns ex cathedra definitions, and nothing Pope Francis has said amounts to such a definition (as Cardinal Fernández, Prefect of the DDF, has explicitly acknowledged).  But it refutes those who claim that all papal teaching on faith and morals is infallible, and those who hold that, even if not all such teaching is infallible, no pope has actually taught error.  For that reason alone, Dignitas Infinita is a document of historic significance, albeit not for the reasons Pope Francis or Cardinal Fernández would have intended.

Dignity and the death penalty

The other problem with the document, I have said, concerns the premise with which it begins.  That premise is referred to in its title, and it is stated in its opening lines as follows:

Every human person possesses an infinite dignity, inalienably grounded in his or her very being, which prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter.  This principle, which is fully recognizable even by reason alone, underlies the primacy of the human person and the protection of human rights[Thus] the Church… always insist[s] on “the primacy of the human person and the defense of his or her dignity beyond every circumstance.”

The most striking part of this passage – indeed, I would say the most shocking part of it – is the assertion that human dignity is infinite.  I will come back to that.  But first note the other aspects of its teaching.  The Declaration implies that this dignity follows from human nature itself, rather than from grace.  That is implied by its being fully knowable by reason alone (as opposed to special divine revelation).  It is ontological rather than acquired in nature, reflecting what a human being is rather than what he or she does.  For this reason, it cannot be lost no matter what one does, in “every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter.”  And again, the dignity human beings are said in this way to possess is also claimed to be infinite in nature.

It is no surprise, then, that the Declaration should later go on to say what it does about the death penalty.  According to Pope Francis’s revision of the Catechism, the death penalty is “an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person.”  But Dignitas Infinita says this dignity exists in “every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter.”  That implies that it is retained no matter what evil the person has committed, and no matter how dangerous he is to others.  Thus, if we must “always insist on… the primacy of the human person and the defense of his or her dignity beyond every circumstance,” it would follow that the death penalty would be impermissible in every circumstance.

This alone entails that there is something wrong with the Declaration’s premises.  For it is, again, the infallible teaching of scripture and all previous popes that the death penalty can under some circumstances be justifiable.  Hence, if the Declaration’s teaching on human dignity implies otherwise, it is that teaching that is flawed, not scripture and not two millennia of consistent papal teaching.

There is also the problem that, in defense of its conception of human dignity, the Declaration appeals to scriptural passages from, among other places, Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Romans.  But all four of these books contain explicit endorsements of capital punishment!  (See By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed for detailed discussion.)  Hence, their conception of human dignity is clearly not the same as that of the Declaration.  Perhaps the defender of the Declaration will suggest that these scriptural texts erred on the specific topic of capital punishment.  One problem with that is that the Church holds that scripture cannot teach error on a matter of faith or morals.  So, this attempt to get around the difficulty would be heterodox.  But another problem is that this move would undermine the Declaration’s own use of these scriptural texts.  For if Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Romans are wrong about something as serious the death penalty, why should we believe they are right about anything else, such as human dignity?

At this point the defender of the Declaration might suggest that we are misunderstanding these scriptural passages if we think they support capital punishment.  One problem with this suggestion is that it is asinine on its face.  Jewish and Christian theologians alike have for millennia consistently understood the Old Testament to sanction capital punishment, and the Church has always understood both the Old Testament passages and Romans to sanction it.  To pretend that it is only now that we finally understand them accurately defies common sense (and rests on utterly implausible arguments, as Bessette and I show in our book).  But it also contradicts what the Church has said about its own understanding of scripture.  The Church claims that on matters of scriptural interpretation, no one is free to contradict the unanimous opinion of the Fathers or the consistent understanding of the Church over millennia.  And the Fathers and consistent tradition of the Church hold that scripture teaches that the death penalty can under some circumstances be licit.  (See the book for more about this subject too.)

Infinite dignity?

But even putting all of that aside, attributing “infinite dignity” to human beings is highly problematic.  If we are speaking strictly, it is obvious that only God can be said to have infinite dignity.  Dignitas conveys “worth,” “worthiness,” “merit,” “excellence,” “honor.”  Try replacing “dignity” with these words in the phrase “infinite dignity,” and ask whether the result can be applied to human beings.  Do human beings have “infinite merit,” “infinite excellence,” “infinite worthiness”?  The very idea seems blasphemous.  Only God can have any of these things.

Or consider the attributes that impart special dignity to people, such as authority, goodness, or wisdom, where the more perfectly they manifest these attributes, the greater is their dignity.  Can human beings be said to possess “infinite authority,” “infinite goodness,” or “infinite wisdom”?  Obviously not, and obviously it is only God to whom these things can be attributed.  So, how could human beings have infinite dignity?

Aquinas makes several relevant remarks.  He tells us that “the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity” (Summa Theologiae II-II.63.1).  Naturally, that implies that some people have more dignity than others.  So, how could all human beings have infinite dignity (which would imply that none has more than any other)?  He also says that “by sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood” (Summa Theologiae II-II.64.2).  But if a person can lose his dignity, how can all people have infinite dignity?

Some will say that what Aquinas is talking about in such passages is only acquired dignity rather than ontological dignity – that is to say, dignity that reflects what we do or some special status we contingently come to have (which can change), rather than dignity that reflects what we are by nature.  But that will not work as an interpretation of other things Aquinas says.  For instance, he notes that “the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity” (Summa Theologiae I.29.3).  Obviously, he is talking about God’s ontological dignity here.  And naturally, God has infinite dignity if anything does.  So if his ontological dignity excels ours, how could we possibly have infinite ontological dignity? 

Aquinas also writes:

Now it is more dignified for a thing to exist in something more dignified than itself than to exist in its own right.  And so by this very fact the human nature is more dignified in Christ than in us, since in us it has its own personhood in the sense that it exists in its own right, whereas in Christ it exists in the person of the Word.  (Summa Theologiae III.2.2, Freddoso translation)

Now, if the dignity of human nature is increased by virtue of its being united to Christ in the Incarnation, how could it already be infinite by nature?  Then there is the fact that Aquinas explicitly denies that human dignity is infinite:

But no mere man has the infinite dignity required to satisfy justly an offence against God. Therefore there had to be a man of infinite dignity who would undergo the penalty for all so as to satisfy fully for the sins of the whole world.  Therefore the only-begotten Word of God, true God and Son of God, assumed a human nature and willed to suffer death in it so as to purify the whole human race indebted by sin.  (De Rationibis Fidei, Chapter 7)

To be sure, Aquinas also allows that there is a sense in which some things other than God can have infinite dignity, when he writes:

From the fact that (a) Christ’s human nature is united to God, and that (b) created happiness is the enjoyment of God, and that (c) the Blessed Virgin is the mother of God, it follows that they have a certain infinite dignity that stems from the infinite goodness which is God. (Summa Theologiae I.25.6, Freddoso translation)

But note that the infinite dignity in question derives from a certain special relation to God’s infinite dignity – involving the Incarnation, the beatific vision, and Mary’s divine motherhood respectively – and not from human nature as such.

Relevant too are Aquinas’s remarks on the topic of infinity.  He says that “besides God nothing can be infinite,” for “it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite” so that “He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite” (Summa Theologiae I.7.2).  How, then, could human beings by nature have infinite dignity?

Some might respond by saying that Aquinas is not infallible, but that would miss the point.  For it is not just that Aquinas’s theology has tremendous authority within Catholicism (though it does have that, and that is hardly unimportant here).  It is that he is making points from Catholic teaching itself about the nature of dignity, the nature of human beings, and the nature of God that make it highly problematic to speak of human beings as having “infinite dignity.”  It is no good just to say that he is wrong.  The defender of the Declaration owes us an argument showing that he is wrong, or showing that talk of “infinite dignity” can be reconciled with what he says.

Possible defenses?

One suggestion some have made on Twitter is that further remarks Aquinas makes about infinity can resolve the conflict.  For in the passage just quoted, he also writes:

Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite.  For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form.  But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes.  But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite.  If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter.  But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.  Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite. (Summa Theologiae I.7.2)

What Aquinas is saying here is that there is a sense in which matter is relatively infinite, and a sense in which an angel is relatively infinite.  The sense in which matter is relatively infinite is that it can at least in principle take on, successively, one form after another ad infinitum.  The sense in which an angel is relatively infinite is that it is not limited by matter. 

But there are several problems with the suggestion that this passage can help us to make sense of the notion that human beings have “infinite dignity.”  First, Aquinas explicitly says that things “the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite.”  For example, while the matter that makes up a particular tree is relatively infinite insofar as it can take on different forms ad infinitum (the form of a desk, the form of a chair, and so on) the tree itself qua having the form of a tree is in no way infinite.  Now, a human being is, like a tree, a composite of form and matter.  Hence, Aquinas’s remarks here would imply that, even if the matter that makes up the body is relatively infinite insofar as it can successively take on different forms ad infinitum, the human being himself is not in any way infinite.  Obviously, then, this would tell against taking human nature to be even relatively infinite in its dignity.

Furthermore, it’s not clear how the specific examples Aquinas gives are supposed to be relevant to the question at hand in the first place.  The sense in which he says matter is relatively infinite is, again, that it can take on different forms successively ad infinitum – first one form, then a second, then a third, and so on.  But of course, at any particular point in time, matter does not have an infinite number of forms.  So, how would this provide a model for human beings having “infinite dignity”?  Is the idea that they have only finite dignity at any particular point in time, but will keep having it at later points in time without end?  Surely that is not what is meant by “infinite dignity.”  It would entail that even something with the least dignity possible at any particular point in time would have “infinite dignity” as long as it simply persisted with that minimal dignity forever!

Nor does the angel example help.  Again, the sense in which angels are relatively infinite, Aquinas says, is that they are not limited by matter.  But human beings are limited by matter.  So, this is no help in explaining how we could be even relatively infinite in dignity.

Another, sillier suggestion some have made on Twitter is that we can make sense of human beings having “infinite dignity” in light of set theory, which tells us that some infinities can be larger than others.  The idea seems to be that while God has infinite dignity, we too can intelligibly be said to have it, so long as God’s dignity has to do with a larger infinity than ours.

The problem with this is that the “infinity” that is attributed to God and to his dignity (and to human dignity, for that matter) has nothing to do with the infinities studied by set theory.  Set theory is about collections of objects (such as numbers), which might be infinite in size.  But when we say that God is infinite, we’re not talking about a collection any kind.  We’re not saying, for example, that God’s infinite power has something to do with him possessing an infinite collection of powers.  What is meant is merely that he has causal power to do or to make whatever is intrinsically possible.  And his infinite dignity too has nothing to do with any sort of collection (such as an infinitely large collection of units of dignity, whatever that would mean).  Set theory is simply irrelevant.

Another defense that has been suggested is to appeal to Pope St. John Paul II’s having once used the phrase “infinite dignity” in an Angelus address in 1980.  Indeed, the Declaration itself makes note of this.  But there are several problems here.  First, John Paul II’s remark was merely a passing comment made in the course a little-known informal address of little magisterial weight that was devoted to another topic.  It was not a carefully worded formal theological treatment of the nature of human dignity, specifically.  Nor did John Paul put any special emphasis on the phrase or draw momentous conclusions from it, the way the new Declaration does.  For example, he never concluded that, since human dignity is “infinite,” the death penalty must be ruled out under every circumstance.  On the contrary, despite his strong personal opposition to the death penalty, he always acknowledged that there could be circumstances where it was permissible, and that that was the Church’s traditional teaching.  There is no reason whatsoever to take the Angelus address reference to be anything more than a loosely worded off-the-cuff remark.  Moreover, even if it were more than that, that would not make the problems I’ve been setting out here magically disappear.

Some have suggested that the Declaration’s remark about the death penalty does not in fact amount to saying that capital punishment is intrinsically wrong.  What it entails, they claim, is only that it is always intrinsically contrary to human dignity.  But that, they say, leaves it open that it may sometimes be permissible to do what is contrary to human dignity.

But there are two reasons why this cannot be right.  First, Dignitas Infinita does not say that what violates our dignity is unacceptable except when such-and-such conditions hold.  On the contrary, it says that the Church “always insist[s] on… the defense of [the human person’s] dignity beyond every circumstance.”  It says that man’s “infinite dignity” is “inviolable,” that it “prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter,” and that our respect for it must be “unconditional.”  It repeatedly emphasizes that “circumstances” are irrelevant to what a respect for dignity requires of us, and it does so precisely because it claims that our dignity is “infinite.”  Asserting that human dignity has such radical “no exceptions” implications is the whole point of the Declaration, the whole point of its making a big deal of the phrase “infinite dignity.”

Second, the Declaration makes a special point of lumping in the death penalty with evils such as “murder, genocide, abortion, [and] euthanasia.”  It says: “Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances.”  Obviously, if the death penalty really does violate human dignity under every circumstance in just the way murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, etc. do, then it is no less absolutely ruled out than they are.  And obviously, the Declaration would not allow us to say that there are cases where murder, genocide, abortion, and euthanasia might be allowable despite their being affronts to human dignity.

Hyperbole?

The best defense that some have made of the Declaration is that the phrase “infinite dignity” is mere hyperbole.  But though this is the best defense, that does not make it a good defense.  First of all, magisterial documents should use terms with precision.  This is especially true of a document coming from the DDF, whose job is precisely to clarify matters of doctrine.  It is simply scandalous for a document intended to clarify a doctrinal matter – especially one that we are told has been in preparation for years – to deploy a key theological term in a loose and potentially highly misleading way (and, indeed, to put special emphasis on this loose meaning, even in the very title of the document!)

But second, the idea that the phrase is meant as mere hyperbole is simply not a natural reading of the Declaration.  For it is not just that special emphasis is put on the phrase itself.  It is also that special emphasis is put on the radical implications of the phrase.  We are told that it is precisely because human dignity is “infinite” that the moral conclusions asserted by the Declaration hold “beyond all circumstances,” “beyond every circumstance,” “in all circumstances,” “regardless of the circumstances,” and so on.  If you don’t take the “infinite” part seriously, then you lose the grounds for taking the “beyond all circumstances” parts seriously.  They go hand in hand.  Hence, the “hyperbole” reading simply undermines the whole point of the document.

That this extreme language of man’s “infinite dignity” has now led the pope to condemn the death penalty in an absolute way – and thereby to contradict scripture and all previous papal teaching on the subject – shows just how grave are the consequences of using theological language imprecisely.  And this may not be the end of it.  Asked at a press conference on the Declaration about the implications of man’s “infinite dignity” for the doctrine of Hell, Cardinal Fernández did not deny the doctrine.  But he also said: “’With all the limits that our freedom truly has, might it not be that Hell is empty?’ This is the question that Pope Francis sometimes asks.”  Asked about the Catechism’s teaching that homosexual desire is “intrinsically disordered,” the cardinal said: “It’s a very strong expression, and it needs to be explained a great deal.  Perhaps we could find an expression that is even clearer, to understand what we mean… But it is true that the expression could find other more suitable words.”  When churchmen put special emphasis on the idea that human dignity is infinite, then there is a wide range of traditional Catholic teaching that they are bound to be tempted to soften or find some way to work around.

High-flown rhetoric about human dignity has, in any event, always been especially prone to abuse.  As Allan Bloom once wrote, “the very expression dignity of man, even when Pico della Mirandola coined it in the fifteenth century, had a blasphemous ring to it” (The Closing of the American Mind, p. 180).  Similarly, Jacques Barzun pointed out that “[Pico’s] word dignity can of course be interpreted as flouting the gospel’s call to humility and denying the reality of sin.  Humanism is accordingly charged with inverting the relation between man and God” (From Dawn to Decadence, p. 60).

Some historians would judge this unfair to Pico himself, but my point is not about him.  Rather, it is about how modern people in general, from the Renaissance onward, have gotten progressively more drunk on the idea of their own dignity – and, correspondingly, less and less cognizant of the fact that what is most grave about sin is not that it dishonors us, but that it dishonors God.  This, and not their own dignity, is what modern people most need reminding of.  Hence, while it is not wrong to speak of human dignity, one must be cautious and always put the accent on the divine dignity rather than on our dignity.  I submit that sticking a word like “infinite” in front of the latter accomplishes the reverse of this. 

And I submit that a sure sign that the rhetoric of human dignity has now gone too far is that it has led the highest authorities in the Church to contradict the teaching of the word of God itself (on the topic of the death penalty).  Such an error is possible when popes do not speak ex cathedra.  But it is extremely rare, and always gravely scandalous.

156 comments:

  1. To claim a person has infinite dignity ignores the teaching of the Catholic Church on Baptism.

    Here are a few words from The Roman Catechism;

    Effects of Baptism

    The effects of Baptism should be frequently explained, in order that the faithful may be rendered more sensible of the high dignity to which they have been raised, and may never suffer themselves to be cast down there from by the snares or assaults of Satan.


    The Prelates responsible for the false claim (lie) that people have infinite dignity makes one wonder if those prelates possess the Faith once delivered.

    Frankly, I do not think they do if they can begin the document with such a fetid falsehood.

    Bergoglio has been an embarrassment for over a decade.

    Sure, he is our Pope and our Cross and I predict even worse is to come as there has been a sustained modern effort to undermine Doctrine on Sodomy.

    Pope John 23rd, in barring homosexuals from seminaries said; "Advancement to religious vows and ordination should be barred to those who are afflicted with the evil tendencies to homosexuality or pederasty..

    Pope Benedict XVI in his document about admitting homosexuals to seminaries said, "those who practice homosexuality are profoundly respected."

    It later was revealed that men who worked as Homosexual prostitutes, men who had homosexual sex in prison, and those who engaged in homosexual sex to help their career could be admitted to seminaries under certain circumstances.

    And then we had FS in which homosexual couples are blessed.

    Were he alive, Ray Charles could see the direction the hierarchy in Rome is leading us.

    ReplyDelete
  2. If the Pope through the DDF can teach error on the death penalty in this way and we are able to reject this erroneous teaching, doesn't this remove any ability to credibly rebuke Catholics that reject Humanae Vitae as error?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That is where Sacred Doctrine comes in, namely Doctrines from Sacred Tradition.
      One of these documents is in accord with Tradition, and one is direct opposition.
      "Therefore brethren, stand fast in the Traditions you have received from us, whether by our word (Tradition Proper, esp. oral ), or by our Epistle (Scripture)." - St. Paul.

      Delete
    2. That's literally what defenders of the new document say lol. Saying "well HV is tradition and this new one isn't" will convince no one besides those already convinced lol

      Delete
    3. This is kind of what I'm getting at though. Who is to decide what tradition is if the Pope errs in this way?

      To my understanding, the Pope has historically been the arbiter of what's in and what's out. There have been limited exceptions of dubious judgements like Pope Honorius and Pope Liberius'. But these previous examples remained in vague implication territory instead of an outright contradiction.

      For a crude example of what I mean, take Catholics that are pro-abortion. Given that even past Popes and Thomas Aquinas believed in ensoulment happening at quickening, who is to say that this is the church's tradition and more recent teaching is in error? In the past, we can rely on the Pope to authoritatively shut that down. But now anyone can just say, well that's just another area where the modern teaching is in error and we need to return to "tradition".

      Now, I'm pro-life (from conception) on a purely rational basis. But, this is the kind of cherry picking, endless arguments that I think we can look forward to if we cant rely on orthodox teaching from the magisterium.

      Delete
    4. WCB

      Matthew 19
      20 The young man saith unto him, All these things have I kept from my youth up: what lack I yet?
      21 Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.


      Hmmmm. Nothing here about being baptized.
      So how many here have achieved perfection according to the way to perfection as explained by Jesus?

      WCB

      Delete
    5. I am a Catholic and I want to live my life following Jesus Christ, but I can't help but feel all of this discourse is a little ridiculous.

      Centuries ago we had large numbers of prominent clergymen and theologians supporting positions like capital punishment for heresy ("that heretics be burned is against the will of the spirit") and that marital congress was always venially sinful.

      Obviously all of these constitute changes in the dominant current of thought among the hierarchy of the church and there are a lot of pedantic distinctions being made about whether these are genuine changes in the magisterium.

      Can't we just say the obvious and admit that many things Catholic hierarchs, clergy, and religious have said in every age have reflected the presumptions and prejudices of their age?

      Delete
    6. Anon, The problem is that a) the Church has always claimed that such a position is NOT what she and her theologians are doing and b) that doing so opens the door for a lot of debate about any "settled" topic. Homosexual relations, as an example, being bad could just reflect the "presumptions and prejudices of their age." But as we've seen, that's what the Church has been doing/ saying for decades so who knows lol. It's a clown show

      Delete
    7. One difference I would note is that Humanae Vitae simply reaffirmed an ancient consensus of the Church, which had been ringingly reaffirmed in 1930 by Pope Pius XI. It applied that ancient consensus to the Pill, but used the same thought process: an attempt to make sure sex in marriage cannot lead to pregnancy is illicit. Another difference is that HV was signed by the Pope whereas DI is only endorsed by him.

      Delete
    8. @Thunderjerky

      The thing is people who use such an admission to attack the opinions of the past read the implications of my suggestion precisely backwards.

      It is very convenient for all of us arguing with the past that our interlocutors can't defend themselves against our objections.

      Rather, the admission that a large portion of the opinions of past Catholics was colored by the conditions of their time is a call for modesty in the present- because we aren't uniquely free from prejudice and influence from our own society and its worldview.

      The idea that past theologians reflected the presumption and prejudices of their age should be a reflection to generate humility and caution among modern thinkers.

      Delete
    9. I'm not against your position just to clarify. I think it has a lot going for it but I think it opens the door for other problems that aren't easily answerable - priamirly that it consolidates even more power into that of the Roman Pontiff rendering the Catholic Faith, even more than it is now, the plaything of the current incumbent.

      Delete
    10. @ WCB "Follow me" indeed... And thus be baptized as he was

      Delete
  3. Thank you for your analysis, Dr. Feser. A couple things:

    Would you agree that the document is potentially internally incoherent in that it both puts forward the inviolability of human dignity, while at the same time potentially defending a defensive just war and self-defense more generally. In these scenarios, human beings are killed (supposedly) justly, even against their dignity. So, it seems that the document may be committed to the idea that human beings can be killed justly, even though it violates inherent dignity. In which case, the language around the DP falls away as strongly worded, but essentially the same if read in the most coherent way possible.

    Lastly, when I was reading the document initially, I wasn't as struck by the "infinite" term as profoundly because I took it to mean that humans possess a dignity that is categorically higher than other visible created things. More or less, the inherent dignity of humans is so different from other created beings that there is an "infinite" gap between them - basically the difference between the animal and rational soul. Is that a defensible reading of the document and if so does that smooth some of its rougher edges?

    Thank you! Always look forward to your analysis

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Second point doesn't work,
      Humans are infinitely lower than God and Angels by that reading.

      Delete
    2. Granted - but in the analogy of being that’s sort of true right? Angels are categorically higher than humans. Perhaps the “dignity” cutoff is based on having an intellect and will in likeness to God. In that way, the gap between animal and human on the spectrum of the analogy of being would be the most relevant because everything above the animal level has an intellect and will analogous to God’s. I think there is a reading of the idea of “infinite dignity” that attributes that categorical difference as an insurmountable gap between the dignity of animals and anything higher.

      Delete
    3. I honestly think that the route to take on understanding the infiniteness of man's dignity in DI need not be explored beyond the texts themselves. in paragraph 1, he states:

      "In the light of Revelation, the Church resolutely reiterates and confirms the ontological dignity of the human person, created in the image and likeness of God and redeemed in Jesus Christ. From this truth, the Church draws the reasons for her commitment to the weak and those less endowed with power, always insisting on “the primacy of the human person and the defense of his or her dignity beyond every circumstance.”

      IOW, if PF is going to justify his position, it's most likely that he's going to appeal to us being made in God's image and likeness as well as Christ's redemption to do it.... which he does in paragraph 11:

      "“God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’ […] So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:26-27). With this, humanity has a specific quality that means it is not reducible to purely material elements. Moreover, the “image” does not define the soul or its intellectual abilities but the dignity of man and woman. In their relationship of equality and mutual love, both the man and the woman represent God in the world and are also called to cherish and nurture the world. Because of this, to be created in the image of God means to possess a sacred value that transcends every distinction of a sexual, social, political, cultural, and religious nature. Our dignity is bestowed upon us by God; it is neither claimed nor deserved. Every human being is loved and willed by God and, thus, has an inviolable dignity. "

      It also seems to me that the infinitude of man's ontological dignity is more in terms of its imeasurability. Can you put a price on a human that is just? no, and it doesn't matter how wretched the human is (which is why PF points out how Jesus himself would not ignore the most marginalized in his ministry). And that seems to be what he has in mind when he talks about how Christ's redemption elevates human dignity and confirms it in paragraph 19:

      "The second conviction follows from the fact that the dignity of the human person was revealed in its fullness when the Father sent his Son, who assumed human existence to the full: “In the mystery of the Incarnation, the Son of God confirmed the dignity of the body and soul which constitute the human being.”[30] By uniting himself with every human being through his Incarnation, Jesus Christ confirmed that each person possesses an *immeasurable dignity simply by belonging to the human community*; moreover, he affirmed that this dignity can never be lost"

      There is indeed an elevation that occurs through redemption, but he also points out how the incarnation itself already says something immeasurable about what he became.

      Delete
    4. "Every human being is loved and willed by God and, thus, has an inviolable dignity."

      Quite so. To be is to be willed, and thus loved, by God. Thus the holocaust, for example (like every other thing that in any way has, does, or will exist, including w/o exception, n.b., every unspeakable outrage against human dignity, not just arcane abstracta like 'the diversity of religions'), is willed and thus loved by God and thus has immeasurable dignity.

      Otoh, "equally hated by God are the sinner and his sin" (Wisdom 14:9).

      Delete
  4. Dear prof. Feser, Michael Lofton offered a response by making a following distinction: "whether something violates one's dignity in all circumstances versus whether there are
    circumstances where one is permitted to violate one's dignity". Those this hold?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That is just a way of describing dignity's relation to either justice or sin rather that treating of dignity itself.

      Delete
    2. But how would you address Lofton's distinction?

      Delete
    3. Just taking it as you have reported it, I'd say the distinction is nonsense. The dignity in question is supposed to be inherent ontological dignity of the human person as such. It is metaphysically necessary and inalienable. There is no such thing as 'violating' it. It's like trying to kill God: good luck, give it a try, but just entirely not possible.

      Delete
  5. Accusing the teaching authority of Jesus Christ of contradicting the Word of God is quite an accusation. How long until you formally leave the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church? This is very sad to see. We all must pray for Dr. Feser.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. How much longer will God allow these bad shepherds to usurp the teaching authority of His Church and scatter His flock before the Antichrist himself appears to finish the job they have begun.

      Delete
    2. Yes, indeed. We must all pray for Dr. Feser

      Delete
    3. I appreciate the prayers, including those motivated by unjust and uncharitable interpretations of my motives. Pray even more, though, for the pope and the Church.

      Delete
    4. I gather "infinite dignity" to mean that the dignity of a human being cannot be violated by another human being (or, if you like, another creature).
      So, no man has the right to take another man's life, or even his or her own life.
      Maybe some people are have less dignity than others, but we are not to judge this.

      As for prayers, just pray for people.

      Delete
    5. It never ceases to astonish at how willing people are to say "How dare you!" without explaining their objection.

      Delete
    6. No actual argument, as usual, just insult.

      Feser’s arguments are strong, but it was his opponents’ constant resort to personal attacks that convinced me that they had nothing of substance to say, and that he probably has the better of the argument.

      Delete
    7. I gather "infinite dignity" to mean that the dignity of a human being cannot be violated by another human being (or, if you like, another creature).

      To Walter:
      When you say "the dignity of a human being cannot be violated by another human" I think that you probably mean that the dignity of man ought not be violated by another human.
      Because, manifestly, when a man unjustly murders another out of malice and hatred, that is, exactly, violating his human right to life. So the "cannot be violated" must mean something like "cannot justly be violated".

      However, I think that if we look carefully, one doesn't need INFINITE dignity in order to have a condition of "cannot justly be violated." Even if man's dignity is finite, that too cannot JUSTLY be violated. Indeed, if we grant that animals have finite dignity, the animal rights activists (even the ones who would accept that "finitude") would claim that we ought not UNJUSTLY violate that finite dignity. We might disagree on what constitutes just or unjust violation of their dignity, but that's merely a matter of locating the right place for the boundary, not disagreeing about whether THERE IS a boundary. (I might argue that the justice here isn't a matter of what is owed to the animal but owed to our own natures and to God, but it's still a claim of "ought".)

      The point is, that an act is "in violation of dignity" doesn't depend on an infinity of dignity. Further, whether an act upon someone is a "violation" of their dignity depends critically on details, e.g. putting someone in prison for saying "I don't really like you very much" is a violation of their human dignity, but putting them in prison for raping a woman isn't a violation of their human dignity. This applies whether or not humans' dignity is "infinite". Thus whether an act stands as a "violation" of human dignity itself first demands knowing the factors that constitute the nature of the act, because "due punishment for a crime" is a different kind of act than "malicious injury" and different again from "a kick delivered in karate training".

      This means that saying that humans have dignity (even infinite) doesn't get us out of asking WHAT constitutes an offense against it, and why.

      Delete
    8. Nick DApril 12, 2024 at 6:46 AM
      It never ceases to astonish at how willing people are to say "How dare you!" without explaining their objection.


      AnonymousApril 12, 2024 at 8:14 AM
      No actual argument, as usual, just insult.

      Feser’s arguments are strong, but it was his opponents’ constant resort to personal attacks that convinced me that they had nothing of substance to say, and that he probably has the better of the argument.


      The theatrical sanctimony of the concern troll, be it delivered by a professional chin stroking click bait YouTuber, or a small time amateur poseur, should come as no surprise. Yet, in its brazen transparency, it still does continue to do so.

      Delete
    9. Tony

      I think it is clear what I mean by "cannot".
      So, no man has the right to take another man's life, or even his or her own life.
      If saying that humans have dignity (even infinite) doesn't get us out of asking what constitutes an offense against it, and why, then dignity (even infinite) is no basis to claim that abortion, suicide, euthanasia ... are always wrong, because there are arguments that euthanasia, e.g. is not a violation of a person's dignity but an affirmation of that dignity.
      My point is that Dignitas Infinita is at least consistent in its appeal to dignity. It is, to put it differently, absolutely pro life, while advocates of the death penalty are not.

      Delete
    10. If saying that humans have dignity (even infinite) doesn't get us out of asking what constitutes an offense against it, and why, then dignity (even infinite) is no basis to claim that abortion, suicide, euthanasia ... are always wrong, because there are arguments that euthanasia, e.g. is not a violation of a person's dignity but an affirmation of that dignity.

      It's not "dignity" simply as such that explains why abortion is wrong - as I explained above. It's both "dignity in the relevant, specific sense of X" and factors that relate the conditions involved to the dignity of the person.

      Without those (as I illustrated) you get "dignity: therefore prison is wrong" and "dignity, therefore sending men in to battle (or fires) at the risk of their lives is wrong" and so on. Those who insist that it is possible that distinctions can (and must) be made that justify prison cannot then rest on "dignity" alone and refuse to consider distinctions for all the other stuff. I have no problem with someone who proposes that euthanasia is an affirmation of human dignity - as long as he is willing to engage the arguments and consider alternatives for the distinctions that must be applied.

      If DI is "consistent" in appealing to dignity for life, it is inconsistent in appealing to dignity for prison, accepting some and not others. So, it too accepts that distinctions must be made.

      Delete
    11. Dignity in this case has to do with human life. Sending someone to prison has nothing to do with the dignity of his life.
      Prison can be justified, as long as in prison, the dignity of the person's life is not violated.
      Torturing or treating the prisoner badly are violations of that dignity and cannot be allowed for that reason.
      And maybe DI is indeed inconsistent in appealing to dignity for prison, I am not arguing that DI is completely consistent. It isn't. It's simply consistent in appealing to dignity for life.

      Delete
    12. Dignity in this case has to do with human life. Sending someone to prison has nothing to do with the dignity of his life.

      One aspect has to do with life. Others don't.

      Torturing or treating the prisoner badly are violations of that dignity and cannot be allowed for that reason.
      And maybe DI is indeed inconsistent in appealing to dignity for prison, I am not arguing that DI is completely consistent.


      Or, just as likely, the document's consistency is present where it validly points to discriminating between different kinds of treatment for different situations (for prison), and is simply defective where it fails to consider the same issue for death as a punishment.

      Delete
    13. The dignity of human life is the basis for the radical prohibition of abortion, euthanasia and suicide. DI does not (validly or not) point to discriminating between different kinds of treatment for different situations when human life is concerned, because for DI, the dignity of human life is absolute. I prefer "absolute" over "infinite".
      In short, the catholic moral highground on these matters cannot survive unless this dignity is absolute and not subject to different kinds of treatment.
      I agree that a more pragmatic approach is in place in which all kinds of treatments and circumstances are considered, but the Catholic view has always been black or white, and cannot allow for shades of grey. Hence, on the Death penalty (and on many other things), Catholic tradition has been wrong from the start.

      Delete
    14. The dignity of human life is the basis for the radical prohibition of abortion, euthanasia and suicide.

      The dignity of the human person is the basis, which flows into rights to life. The life isn't the subject of the dignity, the person is.

      Otherwise you would end up with the idiotic view that when God allows a human person to die, even though God could prevent the death, God does something contrary to the person's dignity. Even the not-very-careful prelates at the DDF would balk at declaring God himself must protect every human life for as long as metaphysically possible. (Or declaring that God has violated the dignity of every human life (of those who have died so far) since the beginning of humanity.)

      Delete
    15. Tony

      The basis of those prohibitions is a radical pro-life stance. Pro-life as in "no human being has the right to end another human life", "only God has this right".
      I agree that it's an idiotic view, but it is not my fault that Catholic morality is not absolute.











      Delete
  6. But wait, there’s more. First and most obvious, the translation problem: we are NOT made IN (in) the image and likeness of God but TO (ab) the image and likeness of God. Big difference. The first might be ontological but the second is definitely teleological. We are made to image God; the closer we approximate that image, the greater our dignity.
    So what is this really all about. As mentioned in Dignitas Intifada, If the Incarnation has united Christ to every human being and that union can never be separated, as asserted by Vatican II, JPII, B16 and Francis I, then:
    each person is united to Christ at conception. Therefore we are essentially immaculately conceived (not just the BVM) – we’re born without the stain of original sin – and we possesses sanctifying grace without baptism. Hence baptism is not necessary for Jews, Muslims or pagans, regardless of religion. All religions are fine because all men possess the Indwelling of the Holy Trinity in virtue of being human. The passion and death of Christ were unnecessary; the Incarnation suffices since Christ assumed OUR/EVERYBODY’S human nature, not just A human nature. Everyone goes to heaven. Hell is empty. Hence, the twisting of Be Not Afraidtm. It’s all there in Vatican II Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes and has been for 60 years.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The only "translation problem" is rendering בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ as "to our image" instead of "in our image." No modern translation renders that verse the way Douay–Rheims does, because the Old Testament was not written in Latin.

      Delete
    2. Our Lady warned us about this at Fatima, and St. Pius X warned us in Pascendi over a hundred years ago.

      Delete
  7. All persons have equal, infinite dignity. But some have MORE equal infinite dignity than others. I am sure that Fernandez meant this.

    I was going to offer, first, that a fix could be that even though we have "infinite" dignity, the death penalty is OK because it's not against dignity at all (in the right conditions): to give someone what is their due is to observe and vindicate dignity, not to violate it.

    But then DI and Fernandez comes along and says

    Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances.

    Now, I seem to recall more than one authority in the Church, e.g. Cardinals Ratzinger and Dulles (and probably JPII), explicitly saying that about Vatican II's condemnation of "offenses against life itself", that this did NOT reach to the death penalty, because of lots of reasons - e.g. the same reasons why God saying "thou shalt not murder" doesn't contradict God saying "take him from my very altar and put him to death" about certain sinners. So, here Fernandez is setting himself in direct conflict with his betters - at least, with the prior DDF head, who most certainly was better.

    Interesting point: I noticed the last line of the declaration:

    The Supreme Pontiff, Francis, at the Audience granted to the undersigned Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, with the Secretary for the Doctrinal Section of the Dicastery, on 25 March 2024, approved this Declaration, which was decided at the Ordinary Session of this Dicastery on 28 February 2024, and he ordered its publication.

    It is my understanding that when the pope wants to say that he approves something personally, specifically, and as pope, in Latin the text adds the expression "in forma specifica. And if he does not do that, he means for the document to be, generically, a document of the DDF with only the pope's indirect nod. If, for example, the pope told DDF to prepare a document on human dignity, with a few vague indicators of direction, and when prepared, the pope basically was not inclined to wield an editorial pen and says, "yes, I asked for this, more or less, please publish." The pope is NOT making his own each and every statement in the document. I don't see any phrasing (in the English) that would correspond to "in forma specifica".

    If I am wrong about this, someone please correct me.

    But if I have that right, this declaration doesn't count as a papal magisterial teaching properly, it counts as a teaching by the bishops on DDF who approved it, with their magisterial weight slightly enhanced by the pope's nod of acceptance. Wouldn't it be fun to find out which bishops voted in favor of the specific language about infinite dignity, and about the death penalty - for the future heresy trials, of course.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Tony, this is indeed a papal document published in forma specifica. It is not the latter words that make it such, and those words are not actually printed in a doc itself and I at least don't recall ever seeing a doc that had them. A phrase which indicates such is that of being approved in an audience with the pope, who ordered its publication. This is an unquestionably accepted indicator of in forma specifica by canonists and theologians. (I am a canonist myself.) Compare this with other statements that have no such wording. Those latter are only statements of the roman curia. There is obviously no need to have every document presented to the pope and explictly say that he ordered its publication. The very act of taking the trouble to do so thus indicates the significance and intention to make it a papal doc.

      Delete
  8. There are several kinds of infinity. The infinite set of integers is much smaller than the infinite set of real numbers. God can be infinitely more valuable than us, while we can still possess infinite worth. We are worth quite a lot because look at the price paid for us!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Without infinite Grace, our worth is only in potential.

      Delete
    2. This analogy with sets is ignorant and ridiculous. It immediately implies that God could have even more dignity. So it is also heretical.

      Delete
    3. God can be infinitely more valuable than us, while we can still possess infinite worth.

      I think that this pretty much exactly fits with "relatively infinite" in distinction from "absolutely infinite".

      While I have little problem with this applied to humans, (and I can go along with the idea noted above that humans possess a dignity that is categorically higher than other visible created things), I would note that if you interpret "infinite dignity" in this sense, that completely undermines the (implicit) argument that the death penalty violates the dignity of man. For, if man's dignity is relatively infinite, i.e. it is infinite in respect of some relation, then (by definition) it is ALSO constrained in respect of the CONVERSE RELATIONS that circumscribe the relation involved. E.G. that man is good by conforming to that of which he is the image, God. Hence, in principle, because the infinitude is a relative one and excludes aspects or parts of dignity, then those excluded aspects can present reasons for which a man might justly be put to death, i.e. where the death penalty is not a violation of his proper dignity.

      The validity of this "might" can be brought home to a concrete application quite easily: Just like the right to life itself is part of man's dignity, so also is his right to self-determination, i.e. his freedom of will to decide his life for himself. But in the latter aspect of dignity, all parties (including the pope and the Church in general) agree that a man who commits a crime and remains a danger to society may be locked up in prison. But this is, per se, a constraint upon his right to freedom. We must allow that the kind of dignity involved permits imprisonment without that being an offense against his dignity. If his inherent "infinite" dignity comes from his very nature, and his nature is oriented toward "freedom" just as much as it is toward "life", then it follows that the kind of dignity that man has "infinitely" is a relative one that DOES NOT exclude prison because prison is not a per se offense against freedom. But it follows, equally, that another just punishment necessary for the safety of society, the death penalty, is not necessarily a per se offense against the right to life. At least, it is not merely on account of the infinitude itself (of man's dignity) that the death penalty must be considered a per se offense against the right to life.

      And indeed this might be the "solution" we need to raise: the document's sense of infinitude is valid in some sense, but that fails as a premise of demonstration against the death penalty because it is not the relevant kind of infinitude.

      Delete
  9. Where do they get these titles?
    Splendiferous this, Finocchio that. Dignatatum ad Nauseam, the other. Bet they've got a drawer full of them.

    However I have it on good authority - my own - that the prissy sly looking bald headed guy was considering yet another offering soon. To be titled
    'Senza Fine', it was, as part of a ground breaking proposal, to be presented as a song by its author; while accompanied by tuxedoed young males twirling in the background. A hitch in the form of a threatened lawsuit by one Ornella somebody seens to have temporarily paused that plan.

    A stop-gap declaration to be more traditionally published, and modestly titled either 'Osculum infinita me', or 'Osculum infinitatum meo' whatever any of that might almost mean, is currently being mooted instead.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hey, don't forget Tutti Frutti. Even if it is highly forgettable.

      Come to think of it, I wonder if everyone will forget it because of being exercised by so much worse that came out later?

      Not to speak of worse coming out in the end, I wonder whether without end might be considered in a physical sense, in reference to a person's parts?

      Delete
    2. TonyApril 12, 2024 at 6:55 AM
      Hey, don't forget Tutti Frutti. Even if it is highly forgettable.


      You got me there. One I overlooked.

      It is probable that most of what he has issued will turn out to be intrinsically highly forgettable.

      Whether it is ever successfully memory-holed, is I suppose another matter.

      Delete
    3. Serious answer to your rhetorical question: the titles of Church Documents are almost always taken from the first two or so words of the document.

      Since Latin as a language is one such that the precise order of the words is not as important as English, presumably the author gets a bit of wiggle room in deciding a "cool" name for their document in the way they construct the first sentence.

      Delete
    4. On "tutti frutti":

      "Tutti" just means "everyone" in italian. Italians use this word all the time. Any plural masculine noun/verb combination is going to be two words ending in "i". Maybe the church should do everything in English to make Americans who never studied a foreign language happy.

      Delete
    5. Yes, indeed, you silly uneducated Americanos: 'tutti' is just a fruity Italian word. And similarly, 'finocchio' is a veggie Italian word (thanks for that one, DNW -- made me LOL).

      Delete
  10. Superb analysis, Dr. Feser. As for "Pope Lofton the Egomaniac," I've had enough of his ongoing dishonest strawman attacks on you and others that I just make note of "here he goes again," and simply pray that he be granted much needed wisdom and humility.

    ReplyDelete
  11. The doctrine of the infinite dignity of a human person, if taken seriously and adopted as the new social norm, will make everything harder than hard.

    If everyone has infinite human dignity, then every word a man utters to another man can now be interpreted as blasphemy. Criticizing an animator, to give a facetious example, no longer counts as simply providing feedback or sharing your perspective, it has now become blasphemy against the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (the latter of which has no mercy, forgiveness, or clemency). Every interaction with a coworker or in-law becomes a kabuki theater of not offending his holiness, with a precision demanded from you greater than that of an archbishop performing the Tridentine mass in reverent worship. Instead of thinking about the future, men now have to devote all of their brainpower to the present moment, giving due obeisance to their cocreators and codeities. Why study science when even the smallest faux pas with a paper or tweet has the potential to become a sacrilege on the order of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus Christ or Ananias and Sapphira's lying to the Holy Spirit?

    The only way this farce can become more absurd is if we all collectively lose our noggins and start venerating each other like the Greek gods on Mount Olympus. Your coworker is no longer a talented but humble Joe Sixpack, but rather Apollo of the Temple of Delphi, whose auspices of infinite dignity demand the sacrifice of a rooster before Twitter can publish your alloted 240 characters or less of an antiphon of praise.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "If everyone has infinite human dignity, then every word a man utters to another man can now be interpreted as blasphemy."

      Can it? Or can it be interpreted as an expression of infinite human dignity? Indeed, surely it must be interpreted as the latter, since it ontologically must BE the latter, even if it is also the former.

      Delete
    2. @David McPike

      If everyone is a god, then there's no such thing as a faux pas anymore. That's the condensed summary of my comment.

      Delete
  12. Bellomy here.

    The words translated in the document as "regardless of the circumstances" are used elsewhere to mean "beyond every circumstance".

    Translated to mean that, the death penalty section becomes "Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, beyond every circumstance".

    The thing being modified is not the death penalty, but the dignity.

    I don't know if this solves the problem, though, because the passage is still equating the death penalty with evils such as abortion and genocide, which is still a huge problem.

    ReplyDelete
  13. I just want to point out a correction in one of the paragraphs. Regarding same-sex/homosexual desire (as I interpret it attraction), the Catechism teaches that it’s objectively disordered, not intrinsically disordered:

    2358 The number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies is not negligible. This inclination, which is objectively disordered, constitutes for most of them a trial.

    It’s homosexual acts that are called as intrinsically disordered by the Catechism. Even the article you linked the quote from Cardinal Fernandez, he is responding to the wording of homosexual acts as intrinsically disordered.

    I’m basing my correction by the letter, not by concept. Because unlike Cardinal Fernandez, I know there is a degree difference between what is objectively and intrinsically disordered.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Death Penalty discourse has really revealed that most people are essentially post modernists - power determines truth and truth is nothing except the expression of power. Contradictions are unimportant because power is never contradictory.

    Or we can just hold that the protections afforded to the Church are much less robust than we once believed them to be. It's hard to escape that people are simply going to believe the Catholic Church is true because they believe it to be true.

    Noble but those who do so should stop hiding behind "rationality" or "intellect" and just admit that they choose to believe and everything else is secondary. I get that nothing is wrong with that but that's what every single other person who believes anything else believes. The problem is that every other faith tradition/ believer would be dragged through the mud for the clown show the CC has been putting herself through for the past century or so.

    ReplyDelete
  15. CCC 2250 second paragraph in the Latin edition makes the following teaching regarding the death penalty: The Church teaches that the death penalty is (the phrase "cannot be" does not exist except in the translations) allowed in as much as inadmissible to the extent (moreover the phrase "not because" is not in the Latin either) that it could be (nor is the phrase "it is" found in the Latin) an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person,” (Notice: this leaves the door open for an exception.) “and she works with determination for its abolition worldwide.”

    ReplyDelete
  16. Another defense that has been suggested is to appeal to Pope St. John Paul II’s having once used the phrase “infinite dignity” in an Angelus address in 1980. Indeed, the Declaration itself makes note of this. But there are several problems here. "

    An interesting observation.

    In trying to make some sense of the current use of "dignity" in this context, and its purported meaning, I resorted to Etymonline. Although it would not help me tease out the specific meaning intended by the author of the document, it did reassure me that I had not been dreaming or mistaken when I thought that the term dignity referred to an elevated state of composure and nobility, or the posession of a certain social status or the aura of respectable character and behavior.

    However, further searching reveals that the term has become an ideological tool since approximately that time, though its occasional deployment had begun earlier.

    "... the opening sentence of its preamble, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UN 1948). This claim would surprise our modern ancestors. Until about 1830–1850, neither the English term “dignity,” nor its Latin root dignitas, nor the French counterpart dignité, had any stable currency as meaning “the unearned status or worth of all persons”, let alone the grounds of universal rights or equality ..."

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dignity/

    Checking ordinary dictionary definitions will make clear that the historical sense of the term is stll prominent and I would reckon constitutes the meaning taken by most ordinary people who have not been exposed to the motivated redefinition exercises of social theorists and would-be engineers.

    In short, the idea of dignity as some unearned or unexpressed quality imputed to all regardless of character, morals, innocence, behavior or social standing seems not only false but ridiculous, to those who are not, not only specially initiated but also somewhat naturally malleable personally.

    Those familiar with the Church may recall the creation of an organization of homosexuals sometime back in the late 1960's or early 70's, depending on the source, and called "Dignity". That comically oxymoronic name for an organization of flamboyant (or even sedate) buggerers was obviously chosen in an attempt to paper over revolting behaviors that are inherently anything but expressions of dignity. And which, even on a rational secularist take, come off as absurd and contemptible.

    The general strategy then, seems to be to continue to apply this social engineering technique. To hopefully name, to hopefully impute, then to hopefully assume as settled. The magical power of stretched out words to transform reality at work. Or so they would like to believe.

    In fact, the use of this term which had seen a steady decline in use during the modern age and reached its approximate nadir in 1980 [according to the Etymonline graph] has seen what appears to be a 50 percent increase since then.

    My guess is that as the historically attested uses of the term to refer to the dignity of an expressed personal nobility of character and/or earned respectability have continued to diminish, the ideological chaff has accounted for the increase in the use of the term that is recorded.

    Yet, as they say: You can put lipstick on a pig, but it's still a ...

    Not to mention a waste of even so frivolous an item as lipstick.

    ReplyDelete
  17. May I ask about a topic only mentioned in passing above? The document quotes Gaudiium et Spes to express disapproval of "deportations", and I wonder what that refers to. I'd be surprised if the bishops, in the early 60s, thought it wàs consistently wrong to deport unlawful border-crossers. The expression makes more sense if it referred to the unjust exile and expulsion of dissenters living under dictatorships. Am I mistaken about this?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I think that if you look at other documents of the Church from the 20th century, the primary sense of "deportations" is the mass deportations that were imposed by oppressors as being a subtle form of almost-genocide without outright killing them directly ("you got a choice: stay and die, or leave and only probably die"). The kinds of things like what the Turks imposed on the Armenians, the Russian pogroms against the Jews by the Tsars, (and, earlier, their eviction by the Spanish monarchs), and the treatment of Kurds by the Iraqis. And closer to home, perhaps some of the forced displacement of Native American tribes.

      It should be noted that MANY of the categories "condemned" by Gaudium et Spes were implicated really as approximations, not in precise and formal terms and senses. For example, the category of forced "deportations" might sort of be applied to some other events, but...not really all that well. To give cases: the decision in India in 1947 to divide the country between Hindus and Muslims required the forced movements of millions, but it was forced in both directions (i.e. imposed both on Hindus and on Muslims), and it was effectively internal to the larger entity that was the "India before division". The forced displacement of Germans out of "Poland" at the end of WWII related, in part, to the redefinitions of lots of country borders, not solely directed to Germans as "we hate you, so get out". (Though there was plenty of hatred, I am sure.) I suppose that the net effect of the English impositions in Ireland that ended up in millions leaving to go to America (to avoid starvation) might be considered "deportation" in some weird sense, but it's funny because the English probably would just as soon they did stay home and starve to death, and didn't intentionally grant them an option out: "failed genocide" might be more accurate. The point is that there are ragged edges to a lot of the categories mentioned, it was a broad brush-stroke kind of passage rather than a careful, definitional one.

      Delete
  18. The death penalty is immoral if you live in a modern developed country. Most developed countries already ban the practice, and the few that have not, like the US, execute a very small number of people. If industrial civilization collapses due to peak oil or climate change or nuclear war or zombies, and in the resulting neo-medieval society imprisoning murderers and rapists for life is not logistically feasible, then the death penalty is back on the menu. IDK why this is such a huge deal. I doubt the Catholic bishop is going to condemn the lord of the mad max zombie survivor fiefdom if he executes a murderer after a trial, because Pope Francis I said so and so.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Valuable discussions. In my book The Worth of Persons: The Foundation of Ethics I defended an absolute conception of human worth/dignity following from human nature ("ontological" rather than "acquired" in the language of Ed's discussion). So to that extent I'm in favour of Dignitas infinita. But I think the word "infinite" is not ideal, for the reasons Ed gives: its meaning is tangled; comparability of different infinities is obscure, etc; it would be better to keep to traditional alternatives like "absolute" or "irreducible". The implications for capital punishment are doubtful: capital punishment in the circumstances of a normal society is a violation of human worth, but (as with killing and abortion) emergency situations where one person's worth/survival conflicts with another's are not so clear.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I think any view of capital punishment that emphasizes urgency or safety is misguided and going to lead to consequentialism (which the recent magisterium seems to be barreling towards without yet having explicitly endorsed it).

      The only thing that justifies capital punishment is proportionate retribution. That means capital punishment is justified if someone commits a crime that is grave enough to justify loss of life (such as murder, but probably other crimes as well).

      If you start saying you can execute criminals only because there is a chance they might kill again, what’s to stop you from saying the same of the mentally ill?

      Delete
    2. Here in Sydney we've just had a schizophrenic shot dead by police after he'd knifed six people dead and was heading for more. It's just that kind of urgency that can justify killing - the same as in self-defence. It's cold-blooded state executions when there is the alternative of indefinite incarceration that can't be justified.

      Delete
  20. I hope Fernandez becomes the next pope. But even if he doesn't, the next pope will be even more liberal than Francis. It's going to be great.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This art is good. That art is bad. I like steak. I don't like onions. My dog is the best dog. Her dog is good sometimes.

      Delete
  21. Yes, the infinite dignity of the person is a bizarre expression. It is necessary, though, to insist on the absolute nature of the individual human person; it does not depend on social recognition or convention for existence, rights and duties. These are based on the ontology of individual nature.

    ReplyDelete
  22. The infinite dignity discussion may be helped by the potency-act distinction. As MacIntyre argued, our human dignity is rooted in our final end, which is to know and love God. As we come to know and love God more, our dignity is actually deepened. When we harm our love and knowledge of God (through thoughts, words, actions, inactions), then our dignity is actually harmed/'lost'. But the infinite dignity of our final end with God always remains in potency.

    A further qualification needs to be made, however. Since attainment of our final end has been harmed by the fall - our nature has been damaged by sin. So, how can our final end be fulfilled? Well, God redeems this fall by sending Christ, His only begotten Son, to fall into our nature. Christ thus perfectly actualised His human and divine natures on earth. His salvific work allows us to fulfill our human nature by participating in His divinity, through His body which He gave to His Church on the cross.

    A couple of smaller points... 1. The discussion of the death penalty is in section 'addressing some of the many grave violations of human dignity TODAY', therefore the text is saying (implicitly) that the death penalty 'violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances' TODAY - this can be read in JPII fashion that the rise of modern incarceration means that it is not necessarily applicable to circumstances TODAY following a Grisez double effect model. 2. You might want to check the original terms used by JPII with reference to infinite dignity. T&A Eggleston translated the relevant passage thus: 'God showed us just how much he loves each and every person in an unsurpassable way through Jesus Christ, and how immense a dignity is conferred on each person through him'. 3. DI is formally authentic Magisterium as it has been formally approved publicly by the Pope, so it is binding upon the consciences of the faithful. Publicly objecting to its contents is spiritually dangerous. Questions may be asked and clarifications requested, but I would strongly warn against emphatic and uncharitable rejection of its contents (especially the undignified and flippant dissent commonly exhibited by 'Catholics' on social media today).

    ReplyDelete
  23. The infinite dignity discussion may be helped by the potency-act distinction. As MacIntyre argued, our human dignity is rooted in our final end, which is to know and love God. As we come to know and love God more, our dignity is actually deepened. When we harm our love and knowledge of God (through thoughts, words, actions, inactions), then our dignity is actually harmed/'lost'. But the infinite dignity of our final end with God always remains in potency.

    A further qualification needs to be made, however. Since attainment of our final end has been harmed by the fall - our nature has been damaged by sin. So, how can our final end be fulfilled? Well, God redeems this fall by sending Christ, His only begotten Son, to fall into our nature. Christ thus perfectly actualised His human and divine natures on earth. His salvific work allows us to fulfill our human nature by participating in His divinity, through His body which He gave to His Church on the cross.

    A couple of smaller points... 1. The discussion of the death penalty is in section 'addressing some of the many grave violations of human dignity TODAY', therefore the text is saying (implicitly) that the death penalty 'violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances' TODAY - this can be read in JPII fashion that the rise of modern incarceration means that it is not necessarily applicable to circumstances TODAY following a Grisez double effect model. 2. You might want to check the original terms used by JPII with reference to infinite dignity. T&A Eggleston translated the relevant passage thus: 'God showed us just how much he loves each and every person in an unsurpassable way through Jesus Christ, and how immense a dignity is conferred on each person through him'. 3. DI is formally authentic Magisterium as it has been formally approved publicly by the Pope, so it is binding upon the consciences of the faithful. Publicly objecting to its contents is spiritually dangerous. Questions may be asked and clarifications requested, but I would strongly warn against emphatic and uncharitable rejection of its contents (especially the undignified and flippant dissent commonly exhibited by 'Catholics' on social media today).

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "The discussion of the death penalty is in section 'addressing some of the many grave violations of human dignity TODAY', therefore the text is saying (implicitly) that the death penalty 'violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances' TODAY"

      This is exactly how I understood the statement.

      As for the question on *infinite* ontological dignity, it seems like Hernandez is rooting it on the Imago Dei (see paragraphs 1 and 11), but also on the incarnation. He seems to understand infinitude of dignity in the sense that there is no price on it and that it cannot be measured (see paragraph 19)... I'm surprised that Feser didn't address the actual argumentation for the initial claim in the document itself!

      Delete
  24. Everything I've seen from Cdl. Fernández points me towards the conclusion that he is a person who desperately wants to be remembered for having made an important contribution to the philosophical/theological thought of the Church while unfortunately having nothing meaningful to say.

    ReplyDelete
  25. I'm curious if people would have as much a problem with "infinite dignity" if instead it were formulated apophatically as something like "unending dignity."

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I say go ahead and use whatever phrase you like. I just ask that you explain it, and don't go on to pretend to derive a pile of arbitrary conclusions from your pet phrase (whatever it might be) which clearly don't follow from it.

      Delete
  26. Here are links to what James Dominic Rooney O.P. has posted on this topic on FB. I greatly respect Father Rooney as a philosopher, friar and priest.


    https://www.facebook.com/stmichael71/posts/pfbid02TnXNNmnTEF5iLm8KX3AzZCLWZy8tvVhZUKAXBeTip36QfoGEg8kD8uGtJE8UPWFel

    https://www.facebook.com/stmichael71/posts/pfbid02qLyoVKVw4YVtemcViSCv3Jx2aY9j5Qea1VjCepHgm9QCgWLuMGXRxrG2Dq3aQemol

    https://www.facebook.com/stmichael71/posts/pfbid02bJi8jTqQyd8o5iwxoPS1wKvgzNPsQkaj2jGphRA1JrFLwxGn9R3XzjxrjXJPw8Q4l


    ReplyDelete
  27. One topic which I would like to see covered is the reasoning process of the Church's cadres of professional social justice and migrant refugee pimps with regard to a particular angle.

    As they are unlikely to answer directly, someone who has some understanding of how their so-called minds work, might serve as a devil's advocate and proxy for Frankie the Peronist and company.

    The primary question concerns how exactly it is that these weak, petulant, simpering, and ineffectual pseudo-males who could not defend their own kid sisters against an 11 year old neighborhood bully, presume to assign responsibility to others to do so.

    Particularly with regard to:

    - How and on what basis is it that they expect stronger men than they, to perform work which they cannot themselves do, but to do so according to their sensibilities and self-serving interpretations?

    - How they expect those successful rule of law polities/assumed refuges, to which the disruptive migrants flee, to remain rule of law polities once the laws are habitually violated and ignored?

    - And why don't they as paragons of virtue and spiritual courage and authority, just go directly to the gangster states and straighten them out there, and make migration unnecessary in the first place?

    They could pimp their brotherhood of mankind and infinite dignity program there in the cockpit of the problem, and nip the problem in the bud so to speak.

    - So "gurls", boys, "they-them" or whatever it is you privately call yourselves, why not hike your brocaded skirts, and hie your welcoming eyes and spreading fannies there, and see how your routine sells where it would do the most radical good?

    Go directly there, to Syria, to Sudan, to Boko, to China even, and tell them how it is. And refuse to shut up or leave until they meekly comply with an ascent of both intellect and will.


    Now a comment,
    My bet is you drop to all fours and start whimpering gratefully at the first sign of resistance; kissing feet, asses, and demonic or nonsense scriptures, rather than speaking truth to a power with no inhibitions, to its face. No, it is safer for you to pick on old nuns and middle class parents.

    You, so unlike the Christian working and laboring class martyrs who've had their throats slit, their churches burned down, their children abducted and their faith subverted, all while you diddled each other in the Vatican precincts and set up pagan idols in the garden.

    ReplyDelete
  28. Oops ... assent, not ascent. Cannot say whether tgat was a angled misstrike or a lapse. Sorry

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. No DNW, it was illiteracy.

      Delete
    2. It was his mental illness.

      Delete
    3. Are there two Anonymi who are upset DNW won't share his religious beliefs whenever they ask?

      Delete
    4. Anonymous at 11.36PM

      Which one???

      Delete
    5. DNW, I have noted this moral and mental incoherence that resides in high circles of the Catholic hierarchy, and I have dubbed it the VDT - Vatican Diplomatique Trope. Here is an example: After Pope Francis says

      In these cases where there is an unjust aggression, I can only say that it is licit to stop the unjust aggressor,

      Cardinal Parolin (Pope Francis's sec. of state) "clarifies":

      I underscore the verb 'stop.' I don't say 'to bomb' or 'make war,' (but) 'stop it,'

      But this idiotic trope goes back long before Francis. JPII had the same illness. He was IN FAVOR of Western countries getting involved in stopping the internecine war of Yugoslavia:

      European countries and the United Nations have the duty and the right to intervene, to disarm those who want to kill…

      when all the options offered by diplomatic negotiations… have been carried out and, despite this, entire populations are on the point of succumbing to the blows of an unjust aggressor, states have no right to indifference any longer. It appears to be their duty to disarm this aggressor

      But when it came time to discuss that disarmament:

      The following year, in January 1994, John Paul II explained to the diplomats that “the Holy See does not cease to recall the principle of humanitarian intervention, that is not necessarily a military intervention, but every other kind of action aimed at “disarming” the aggressor”.

      And the empty-headed:

      Recourse to the use of force is always a defeat for humanity. One cannot help but think of the eventual victims and the feelings of hatred that will inevitably arise. It makes one think of Pius XII's words on August 24, 1939: 'Nothing is lost with peace. All can be lost with war'."

      I wish that every one of these prelates would go to a confessor who would command them to make the following choice: to either SHUT THE HECK UP about "stopping" aggression but "without force", or take the same personal action toward making it so that the Mercedarians did in the late Medieval period: personally offer themselves in place of a victim Christian captured and enslaved by Muslims. One or the other. Their trope is, otherwise, utter psychotic idiocy.

      Who says that the Catholic Church discriminates against women? There are a bunch of old wymin in cardinal's hats.

      Delete
    6. "Who says that the Catholic Church discriminates against women? There are a bunch of old wymin in cardinal's hats "

      They like playing 'dress up', gliding around, and taking turns saying the magic words.
      It's all a game for them. Till they end up in Hell.

      Eventually the pixie haircut Wiccans find out that they can shoulder the soy boys and aging Peter Pans aside and start running the show themselves.

      https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=GUCx6JszsRc

      Delete
    7. Kevin
      I don't care about his religious beliefs, but his bizarre comments about people are those of someone who has serious personal issues.

      Delete
  29. Geez and another one seen on the pressing of "publish".

    How about a 5 minute edit function? Possible?

    ReplyDelete
  30. Respectfully, it seems like Thomists are doing themselves a great disservice on this issue by playing “Hot Potato” instead of doing proper source Exegesis. Briefly:

    -Origen acknowledges the existence of capital punishment in a (pagan- he lived before constantine) state as a matter of brute fact, but not one of “justice”. Remember, he held to neither the thomist conception of state or natural law. He further argues that Christians could not in any way participate in the matter. This was an absolute mandate of which I am aware of not even a single exception from him after some years of study, Nor is this changed by his (Eschatological) comments on all men warranting death. And yes, this is the overwhelming majority view adopted by the Patristics.

    -Thomas was rather concerned even in the context of his various commentaries on the common good to show he could square Capital Punishment with what he regarded to be the concept of Intrinsic Evil he explicitly cites from both Aristotle and Augustine. He was, in short, anticipating the argument “Wherefore could even the state do evil that good may come of it?”

    His response is instructive, most explicitly inII-II, q64, a2, obj. 3. And indeed he makes it even clearer in a7 of the same by using the rhetorical effect of the double nisi clause construction. It is- as it were- an exception of even an exception. For he had already accepted the presumption against self defense and then proceeded to furnish the requirements by which one might be said to overcome it such that the act would be moral.

    So if you read his texts as they are written in the Latin, it is actually very clear that the view Thomas is not actually being represented by Thomists at present.

    His view on the matter is this:
    -He accepts the high order Aristotelian-Augustinian principle that one can never do evil that good may come of it.
    -He shows that this is not a threat to a proper act of self defense.
    -He grants that it would indeed be a threat to Capital Punishment itself. Otherwise the double nisi construction makes utterly 0 sense.
    -He falls back on “fall from dignity” claim in a2, obj. 3 to bypass what would otherwise be an insurmountable argument from that higher order principle.

    Why does this matter? Well, the entire thrust of recent magisterial statements on it the question has pertained directly to the question of dignity. And indeed, that is the question that even Thomas could not escape in the end. For if man does not fall from dignity in the decisive way of which Thomas speaks that renders the criminal no better than a brute, then indeed it would remain true that even the state could not do evil that good might come of it.

    ReplyDelete
  31. I assume everyone here knows of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Period.

    Its worth pointing that- at first glance- Arius looked a heck of a lot more traditional and faithful than Athanasius. He had WAY more prooftexts from both scripture and authorities and some prima facie credibility in the east for emphasizing the primacy of the father. It was only after the council itself that Athanasius was vindicated in his actual conclusions and rationality, which really did represent something of a “development”. And then, of course, Arianism still spread exponentially for some 60 years until certain Roman sovereigns rose to power at exactly the right and exterminated them by every single military force at their disposal.

    Now I mention that because all of the most vile heretics in the early Church were utterly steeped in tradition and made pretense to speak for it over and against the Magisterium as such.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. But did "the Church" decide against these vile heretics by mouthing "the Holy Spirit is telling us you're wrong" or by arguments that reason from the sources of Scripture and tradition?

      Delete
  32. Feser,
    Can you comment on the Condemnations of 1277? The pope delegated Tempier authority to both identify heretical doctrinal error and also to excommunicate as appropriate. Most of the 200+ anathematized propositions are fine, but theres a few that certainly seem to strike directly at Thomas. Traditionally, a lot of people have argued “Well, you have to consider how this was received immediately thereafter.” But that sorta thing always struck me as a copout. Because apply that principle to Nicaea, and boom- suddenly we’re all Arians.

    ReplyDelete
  33. "So if his ontological dignity excels ours, how could we possibly have infinite ontological dignity?"

    Presumably because we are created in his image (and redeemed and all that). (Neoplatonically speaking: participation.)

    "On the contrary, it says that the Church “always insist[s] on… the defense of [the human person’s] dignity beyond every circumstance.” It says that man’s “infinite dignity” is “inviolable,” that it “prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter,” and that our respect for it must be “unconditional.”"

    Well, sure, why not? That's why annihilation theory is wrong. Even God respects our personal dignity unconditionally (our natural being, created in the image God), in the case of the damned by punishing such reprobate persons eternally, in the case of the blessed by blessing them eternally. And moreover, his mercy extends over all: the graced, the blessed, the suffering souls, the damned, the murdered innocents, the capitally punished, etc. So infinite dignity? Sure. But implications from the ontological 'infinite dignity' of rational beings to the liceity of this or that (sex changes, capital punishment, poverty, war, etc.)? Clearly none.

    ReplyDelete
  34. If it wasn't for the death penalty, a man of infinity dignity - since he was also God - would not have, by his death and by grace, saved all of us through faith. And the throngs ASKED for that death penalty! Beside this man, another death row inmate, of much lesser dignity standing, repented and was granted eternal life. So, I wonder, "do the current DDF folks even read scripture"?" Of course, these are not philosophical arguments, but there is enough there to make one.

    Anyway: Christ is risen. He's truly risen.

    ReplyDelete
  35. I broadly agree with Feser’s points. The one way I could say humans have infinite dignity is relative to animals and purely material objects in virtue of having a soul with immaterial (and thus relatively infinite) operations. One human is worth more than an infinite amount of cows, I believe. But that does not mean that human dignity is infinite in the sense that it cannot be diminished (so that capital punishment and Hell could not be justified).

    If human dignity is infinite in such a way that it cannot ever be diminished, then ironically all of the talk about the infinite dignity of humans will lead precisely to an endorsement of genital mutilation, abortion, suicide, and euthanasia. If human dignity cannot be diminished, how do these things affect human dignity? They cannot really hurt a human dignity that is infinite in such a way.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. If human dignity cannot be diminished, how do these things affect human dignity? They cannot really hurt a human dignity that is infinite in such a way.

      I have noticed this point as well. If a person can't lose their dignity by committing murder, then they can't lose it by being murdered, either.

      To be fair, I think that DDF would respond that the death penalty, torture, and so on don't diminish a person's dignity (nor "harm" that dignity), these are offenses against their dignity.

      But all this really does is force us to point out that there are MANY kinds of dignity that we have, and that SOME of them can be lost (the dignity that we acquire by a life of virtue can be lost by sins), and OTHERS of them are, precisely, the foundation for human moral responsibility and thus for just punishment in redress of sins. To be punished for sin doesn't offend against our human dignity, it vindicates that dignity because we are (at the same time) made to the image of God and responsible for acting in accordance with that image. We cannot lose our being ordered to action coordinate with godliness, but we can lose our INNOCENCE by inordinate action, and in doing so, just punishment vindicates our being made responsible for our free acts.

      Until the part of the Church trying to re-write the Church's teaching on this wishes to actually engage the actual core issues with arguments, it seems implausible that anything they put out can actually count as development of doctrine.

      Delete
    2. That argument is a bit complicated. Are the parties in question smart enough to effectively rationally engage with issues that are a bit complicated? Their theory seems to be: We have faith that the HS speaks through us so we don't need arguments. After all, we're people of faith, not cold-blooded rationalists. Some day someone smarter will possibly/presumably come along and provide the actual arguments, but in the meantime people of faith must just listen to us (i.e., to the presently reigning mouthpieces of the HS). And for you smartasses who have arguments against that last claim too, once again: We don't need to listen to your 'rationalist' arguments, we speak for the HS and you must listen to us...

      Delete
    3. I got a chuckle out of that, David. Thanks!

      Delete
  36. The Blessed Virgin, by becoming the Mother of God, received a kind of infinite dignity because God is infinite; this dignity therefore is such a reality that a better one is not possible, just as nothing can be better than God.
    St Thomas Aquinas

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. In my view, this follows directly from the best reading of the DDF. The Church has overwhelmingly spoken of human dignity by way of human nature’s unity to the divine and the potential thereof. Christ, in the Incarnation, united human nature to the Godhead truly and fully. Yet even so, he was dignified as a human precisely to the extent he united human nature to the divine nature in the hypostastic union itself. Mary did not possess that hypostatic union in precisely the same way, yet she undeniably shared in it and fully so by God’s grace. Hence, the relation between the human nature and the divine nature as participated remains real and true in precisely the manner the Church has traditionally defined dignity. What Mary had in even her own life due to the Immaculate Conception we hope to attain by God’s grace beyond the present trial and tribulations. And indeed I’d argue further on this point that if you follow Athanasius quite seriously that you see that even man’s “potential” to share in the divine life established by the Incarnation is unto itself a type of dignity.

      Delete
  37. God commanded the Israelites to apply capital punishment, so while it is perhaps not utterly inconceivable that the Fathers, Doctors, and popes failed to recognize that the death penalty was contrary to man's dignity, where is the argument that God messed up as well?

    ReplyDelete
  38. Interestingly, where thesis now being presented is that the death penalty is always a sin as being a violation of a person's dignity, Pope Francis EARLIER said (less than a year ago) that “You cannot employ it, but it was not so before”. Assuming he isn't being a complete dunderhead, one could attempt to reconcile these by proposing that he means that the death penalty today IS a violation of a person's dignity BECAUSE of today's conditions - we have other means available to protect society.

    That might not sit so well with the exact statement in DI, which is:

    Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances.

    We should note that the text footnotes to the (recently modified) text in the Catechism. But of course the Catechism doesn't have the phrase "regardless of the circumstances". One might then read this as DDF proposing a further addition, flying a trial balloon for extending the earlier treatment.

    It remains the case that when you qualify "infinite" for human dignity, as it must be qualified to be true at all, nothing in the document clearly gives a rationale as to why the death penalty IS a violation of the dignity of a person who in malice has killed others. It needs an argument, and (like all other efforts in this milieu), no argument has been offered.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The argument is the appeal to power - submit pls (/s)

      Delete
    2. "Regardless of the circumstances" is the same Italian phrase used earlier in the document to mean "Beyond any circumstance", and properly understood modifies the phrase about dignity, not death penalty.

      In other words, a person is dignified "beyond any circumstance" but the death penalty is not justified "regardless of the circumstances".

      Delete
    3. (I throw out that comment less as a response and more as a potential response after conversing with Brandon Watson about it on his blog. He seems to think that's the clear answer to the problem - I'm not convinced. Then why hasn't anybody else proposed that translation? Not even Michael Lofton, the mother of all popesplainers, is taking that tack. Why?)

      Delete
    4. If I understand what you are offering, Bellomy, the passage that now reads as

      Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances.

      could be re-stated as

      Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person that persists beyond any circumstance.

      That would be a viable statement, and also would clearly align perfectly with saying that even those who commit serious crimes do not lose their human dignity because that dignity persists regardless of their crimes. Which the same prelates say repeatedly. And in so saying, they would not be offering any kind of extension of the prior teaching in the CCC, just re-affirming it.

      It's an interesting approach. If one reads it that way, the natural conclusion would be that because (according to the best interpretations) the new language in 2267 of the CCC is a prudential judgment of conditions today in the world, this passage in DI carries exactly the same force because it intends the same meaning.

      I would want to (a) see what the "official" text says, if there ever is an official version, and (b) hear what Italian experts say about it, and especially if there is never any official version beyond the Italian. Because the Francine vatican is dilatory in regards to Latin being the language of the Church, I doubt whether there ever will be an official Latin version. (I get the sense that Francis would just as soon everyone forget that there is such a thing as the Latin Church, as distinct from the Churches of the Ukrainian Rite, the Coptic Rite, the Armenian Rite, etc.)

      Delete
    5. Bellomy here.

      I want to point out that I'm not sure this saves the passage. It still lumps in the death penalty with abortion and genocide as if it is essentially the same type of thing. This is still a huge error.

      Delete
    6. I agree with the alternative translation... The Spanish does the same thing:

      "Será necesario también mencionar aquí el tema de la pena de muerte:[56] también esta última viola la dignidad inalienable de toda persona humana más allá de cualquier circunstancia."

      the English includes a pesky comma that is not present in other texts and affects our way of inferring what the clause qualifies.

      Delete
    7. "a pesky comma that is not present in other texts and affects our way of inferring what the clause qualifies."

      Reeally? So "this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances" vs. "this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person regardless of the circumstances" seem to mean different things to you?

      The German has it pretty unambiguously (and wrong): "Auch die letztere verletzt unter allen Umständen die unveräußerliche Würde eines jeden Menschen."

      The French has the opposite unambiguous (and correct, I dare say) construal: "la peine de mort, elle aussi, viole la dignité de tout être humain, inaliénable en toutes circonstances."

      The Portuguese, Italian, and Polish match the Spanish.

      Delete
    8. Well, yes, I would say that in English, with the comma, it is a somewhat more natural to take the phrasing as having "under all circumstances" modify "violates", whereas in the French it seems to make it "inalienable in all circumstances" which clearly modifies the dignity. That's a pretty big difference.

      Delete
    9. "Bellomy here.

      I want to point out that I'm not sure this saves the passage. It still lumps in the death penalty with abortion and genocide as if it is essentially the same type of thing. This is still a huge error."

      I'm not sure we can infer moral equivalence simply on the grounds of these things being deemed as examples of violations of human dignity today. The very last item in the list is literally cyber-bullying (titled "digital violence"). Even if we can argue that "digital violence" can violate human dignity, it doesn't necessarily seem to be at the same level of violence as some of the other stuff mentioned here, nor is he arguing otherwise.

      I'd also add that his treatment of the death penalty isn't actually like that of other cases in that it doesn't even have its own section, but is rather mentioned in passing, unlike the statements on abortion, gender theory, etc.

      Delete
    10. I think this is worth a lot more discussion. If this alternative translation is in fact the correct one, then Dr. Feser's objection to this point is weakened considerably, and all of the claims from folks like Ybarra and Feser that this represents a new and final break in doctrine are, if not refuted, definitely challenged.

      In the discussion I had Brandon indicated that properly translated he simply didn't see a problem. Again, on that point I am REALLY not sure at all. The passage still makes stunning claims that at least APPEAR to put the death penalty on the same level as abortion and genocide.

      And I also ask again - why are more people not bringing this up? It's weird.

      Delete
    11. I think the Italian, Spanish, Portugese, and Polish are awkwardly phrased and ambiguous, as is the English, and the comma makes no difference to that ambiguity. The French and German are non-ambiguous, and the context of the document as a whole makes it almost certain that the French construal is correct and the German (and Feserian) wrong.

      Delete
    12. Which would make an official version (preferably in Latin) all the more important, no?

      Of course, resolving confusion has never been a preference for Francis and his pontificate, given he likes to "make a mess". I wonder whether the embedded confusion in publishing various versions that don't have the same meaning will ultimately relegate such documents to a trash-bin of well-neglected has-beens.

      Delete
  39. There’s a great deal that can be said on this matter. For the present, I want to suggest that people are largely misunderstanding “circumstances” as such. The fact of the matter is that the death penalty can refer to two entirely sorts of acts:

    A) A punishment of a criminal with a view to the common good.
    B) Preventing a (hallucinating) man from slaughtering townspeople.

    The fact of the matter is that those acts have two entirely different species at the level defines the term.

    The second example can be justified wholly in reference to Thomas’s treatment of Self-defense. In this case, the man might not even be a criminal in the sense that requires culpability. Nevertheless, he remains a real and immediate threat of the sort by which Thomas argues his death is accidental to intention.

    But the first example is the sort that does- for Thomas- require the man in question be a criminal. Because he acknowledges that- in such a case- the death is intended in the relevant sense of the world. Thus he has to contend with this objection directly under II-IIb Q64, A2 obj 3. And indeed what we find in his response in that he must grant that a criminal falls from dignity in the way that would make him relevant as a moral subject in the first place. Thus its necessary for the man to be a criminal not merely for the act of punishment per se, but actually because he would- otherwise- be the sort of thing that even the state could not (intentionally) kill that good might come of it.

    So in the end, the Magisterium is simply arguing - contra Thomas- that even a criminal does not forfeit his dignity in the morally relevant sense. Granting this, it would follow quite logically that the death penalty as a punishment would be intrinsically evil. Indeed, I think that is the best (and only) explanation for the double “nisi” construction and Thomas’s rhetorical choices in article 7 of the same, wherein he carves out capital punishment as an “exception of even an exception”. Were it not for his prior claims re: forfeiture of dignity, it would indeed be unlawful for the state to do evil that good might come of it, even that good is the common good itself.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thus its necessary for the man to be a criminal not merely for the act of punishment per se, but actually because he would- otherwise- be the sort of thing that even the state could not (intentionally) kill that good might come of it.

      I don't follow your point. If the man were not a rational being in nature (i.e. were like a beast ravaging and endangering humans) it would be lawful to kill that "man" so ravaging others, and nothing about his nature would create any problems. If a man were true man with a rational nature but is STILL ravaging like a beast because he is out of his mind, it is good for the authorities to kill him to protect others - that good might come of it. Such an act is not "punishment". But if the man is in his right mind but a murderer, that makes him the proper subject of punishment as such, which is the just treatment of one who is morally capable of free acts, abuses that freedom, and is morally responsible for grave sin. Punishment thus takes seriously his moral responsibility and treats it as worthy of due reward. That "good might come of it" is normally used to regard other results than the act itself. Punishment is good as an act of justice precisely as the due reward, not principally because it leads to other good results besides. To speak of goods that might come of it is to mistake its category.

      the Magisterium is simply arguing - contra Thomas- that even a criminal does not forfeit his dignity in the morally relevant sense.

      I would be happy to find this to be the case. However, what I find is that the Pope and various bishops assert, without argument, that "dignity" is sufficient to conclude that using the death penalty is inappropriate, i.e. a mere reference to "dignity" alone, and I have never once seen a prelate after Pius XII explicitly reference relevant senses of dignity, and offer distinctions about such dignity, to make such an argument. Maybe I missed the passages that make those careful distinctions?

      Delete
    2. Read the passages cited. In his response to objection 3 of II-IIb, Q. 64, A2, Thomas clarifies that both the Aristotelian and Augustinian formulations of intrinsic evil would apply even to capital punishment, but for the dignity forfeited by the criminal himself. You can also see that his treatment of self defense requires nothing of culpability whatsoever in the other article cited.

      Delete
    3. Anonymous:
      Here's your 'double "nisi" construction' (I presume):

      "Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones."

      I dare say -- si erro, corriga me, amabo te! -- that anyone who reads Latin can see that there is nothing here remotely resembling some kind of fancy, tricky, exegetically baroque 'exception to an exception.' But please go ahead and construe the passage in English for us. I'd be interested to know what you have in mind.

      Delete
    4. "the Magisterium is simply arguing - contra Thomas- that even a criminal does not forfeit his dignity in the morally relevant sense."

      As Tony pointed out, it seems you mean 'asserting' here, not properly speaking 'arguing.' If you actually meant 'arguing,' then what's the argument? If it were not true as Thomas says that "homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit, et ideo decidit a dignitate humana, prout scilicet homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens," then it would follow that not only capital punishment, but no punishment of any kind curtailing man's natural freedom would be licit (including mandatory 'rehabilitation'). So again, where's the argument for that?

      Delete
    5. On this matter- I’ll additionally say Thomists have primarily failed the Church on this issue because they have been done poor exegesis of the matter. They have played “hot potato” with Thomas to interpret one passage by another passage, one work by another work, indeed one doctor by another doctor before they have even treated of the text as text, before they have engaged a passage as a passage. Far from reading him in and with tradition, it actually just makes them poor exegetes simpliciter. So when you look at article 7 as referenced in Thomas’s latin, this is what is undeniable. And indeed I am currently writing a book on just this singular passage, the sequence of thought, the rhetorical choices therein, etc etc.

      -Thomas accepts a presumption against self defense that he intends to overcome by means of identifying a morally licit subset of such of those acts. Thomas proceeds by way of drawing a distinction of moral “species”. But far from leaning on anything of metaphysical conundrums at this point, he tells you explicitly the way these species are relevant to what follows: acts of one sort of species do not intend the evil brought about in the same way as acts of the other sort. Such evils are “accidental” in one case.

      -Thomas then moves to address the sort of species that is possibly good. He offers additional constraints to show how such acts would be good in the final analysis as opposed to the mere preliminary (but necessary) analysis of species. And he does all of this without even referencing the state or common good.

      -Thomas then circles back to the obvious concern he has already anticipated:
      “Let us grant this distinction of moral species and whatever of proportionality thereafter. Even so, what are we to make of the other moral species. Is it not even possibly good? And wouldnt this undermine your treatment of capital punishment as already explicated earlier in the question?”

      -Indeed, that is the context in which it makes any sense for him to speak here on capital punishment at all after having already addressed it at length in earlier articles. The matter is not even obviously pertinent to self defense in the way he continues here. After all, an individual can defend themselves licitly without having represented the state as such.

      Delete
    6. The issue is merely that even the most basic distinction at level of moral species- the distinction that allows him to elsewhere preserve anything of truth in the Aristotelian and Augustinian formulation of intrinsic evil- that distinction on which he has leaned for self defense proper- that indeed appears to threaten a prior conclusion he has already drawn on capital punishment.

      -Thus, Thomas moves to articulate capital punishment here as the most decisive of exceptions. Indeed, he even calls attention to this fact by the very structure, length, complexity, repetition, and order of that sentence itself. That additionally he chooses to use the strongest forms of nisi clauses is no small matter. In short, he points out capital punishment is a real exception of the most significant sort. In point of fact, he is eminently consistent in saying so.

      -When you return to the other passage cited, you see that Thomas responds directly to the question of intrinsic evil that motivated him to draw this exception. He responds in this manner:

      “A criminal has- in his sin- rendered himself less dignified in a certain way. He no longer exists for himself as such. He may be treated of (merely) in the manner that is most convenient to others.” Indeed, he illustrates this by his analogy to the way animals are treated.

      -In doing this, Thomas -quite brilliantly in my view- preserves one of the highest order principles in the tradition while squaring it with both self defense and capital punishment. His treatment of capital punishment with respect to the common good remains as sound as it ever was. It merely presupposed a metaphysical fact about the dignity of the criminal as such.

      -THAT presupposition is the one that ultimately matters in the present debate that is so frequently ignored in Thomistic hot potato. Whether Thomas is right or wrong on that singular point, I make no pretense to argue. But it is crucial to the present debate and to understanding the relevance of recent magisterial statements running back through JPII. It is pointless to bicker about whether dignity is infinite or slightly less so. What is clear and consistent in the last few pontiffs is a magisterial claim that dignity is not- contra Thomas- lost in the way Thomas believed to be decisive for the principle of intrinsic evil to have any bearing upon a criminal.

      Delete
    7. I see that our Anonymous is arguing in almost identical style and content as the author here:

      https://ralspaugh.wordpress.com/2019/06/12/aquinas-against-the-death-penalty/

      And I would say to both commenters: you might begin to have a point...if only you would delve more deeply into the entire metaphysics that Thomas explicates. He doesn't START in on the death penalty as the first thing to tackle: he earlier discusses good and evil, and then discusses specific goods, and that there is a hierarchy of such goods - noting that "the order of justice is the order of the universe", and then discusses particular evils, and gets to punishment which in its very nature is a REDRESS of the disorder that persists after the sinful act is over, and then discusses "satisfaction" which is punishment under a particular aspect. See I Q 23 and 48-49, then I II Q 87 and 108; and II II Q 57 then 64, and Supplement Q 12. St. Thomas talks about punishment (not just capital) having a medicinal aspect, but the primary medicinal aspect is precisely that it redresses the inherent disorder of the will rejecting its due order in obedience. To speak as if this applies only if the person has "lost his dignity" is to miss the whole point: it applies ON ACCOUNT of the dignity of his proper ordination to God not being matched by the dignity that ought to obtain in his freely willed choices, an ordination inherently joined to the order of the universe. The entire architecture of the moral order, undergirded by the metaphysical order, attests to God working out justice, in a realm with free agents who sin, by His addressing the disorder with re-ordering, and (necessarily) a re-ordering that entails moral significance - hence dignity. The root principles there are the root principles of the very dignity he cites in 64. The punishment (and satisfaction) that God requires isn't because the man hasn't any dignity anymore, it's because he HAS (he retains) the dignity of that high ordination to adhere to God - and is required to sustain the consequences of bearing that dignity.

      As I said, and David restated: if there is absolutely NO sense of any kind of a loss to him when man commits an offense, then there is no sense in which he can come under punishment as such, of any kind whatsoever: for it is on account of offense that we are punished. Other kinds of force used are like the force we use on animals, and doesn't carry moral weight. Punishment is used on humans because they have the dignity of a spiritual nature, ordered to a higher end.

      Delete
    8. I’ll additionally say Thomists have primarily failed the Church on this issue because they have been done poor exegesis of the matter. They have played “hot potato” with Thomas to interpret one passage by another passage, one work by another work, indeed one doctor by another doctor before they have even treated of the text as text,

      Pure and total BS. For one thing, Thomas is not the core deposit of Catholic teaching on punishment or the death penalty. We can roam through all of the Bible and the Fathers before ever getting to Thomas, if we want to. For example, Genesis 9:6 doesn't merely justify the death penalty, it does so by reference to the very foundation of man's dignity. Earlier, (Genesis 4), the story of Cain doesn't say that the death penalty is intrinsically wrong - it doesn't actually state any rule at all - but it implies that the death penalty is the standard and normative handling of a murderer, and so when God wants a different result, he intervenes with an EXCEPTION. But Gen. 9:6 states a general rule and a principle for that rule that reaches right back to Gen. 1, the very first words in the Bible about man.

      And of course, your supposed "hot potato" is blarney: Thomas addressed 10,000 topics, but he also worked systematically on principles: it is not dodging to insist on pulling out the principles that apply to punishment where he treats of them, even though they are not right next to II II Q 64 - which is about murder, not primarily about punishment. You really ought to understand punishment in its own right before descending to particular forms like the death penalty.

      Delete
    9. Respectfully, I studied hylomorphic metaphysics for almost a decade and even identify as something of a “strict observance” thomist, as you like. Much of what you have said here is true, yet it is utterly misapplied and a thoroughgoing example of the Thomistic hot potato of which I spoke. Thomas’s central arguments on the death penalty im Q.64 are not- in point of fact- as a “medicine” to the executed themselves, howsoever you believe statements elsewhere to imply this. That is why Thomas takes such pains to distinguish between the treatment of the criminal considered in se, and the treatment of the criminal considered insofsar as it is fitting to others. That is why he so comfortably in the text speaks of the analogy of parts to the whole, of limbs cut from the body, and so forth. The point of such analogies is not to “heal” the limb in the final analysis; it is to heal the body. This is- dare I say- undeniable in Q.64. But you’re not actually treating of the text in Q.64, are you? You are reading it for what you wish it to say.

      Delete
    10. Also, I looked at the linked argument in toto. It’s neither the objection of which I spoke nor even has bearing on what I argued, except as an illustration thereof. Thomas quite rightly shows there how whatever of “evil” consists in the uprooting of the cockle does not, in the final analysis, compromise the rest of wheat. Indeed, Thomas’s very preoccupation here demonstrates how misleading it is to say that Q.64 concerns itself with the healing of the cockle itself. That there is a way in which even the cockle can be healed in its uprooting is true, of course. But it is entirely tangential to his considerations here. It is the cockle in relation to the wheat, not the cockle in relation to itself, that grounds thomas’s word choices, imagery, analogies, and even arguments themselves throughout. This is undeniably clear when you read the passage as a passage and not merely as determined or derivative from what he said elsewhere.

      Delete
    11. To compare an argument couched in this kind of pretentious, incoherent bloviation (wadr to Anon -- I'm still interested to hear how he wd construe the passage in question):

      "Thus, Thomas moves to articulate capital punishment here as the most decisive of exceptions. Indeed, he even calls attention to this fact by the very structure, length, complexity, repetition, and order of that sentence itself. That additionally he chooses to use the strongest forms of nisi clauses is no small matter. In short, he points out capital punishment is a real exception of the most significant sort. In point of fact, he is eminently consistent in saying so."

      ...to Mr. Alspaugh's perfectly coherently argued position is not, methinks, fair.

      Alspaugh's view reminds me of Artie Ziff from the Simpsons, when he asks Marge not to tell anybody about his 'busy hands' -- not so much for himself, but because, he being so respected, it would damage the town to hear it.

      Delete
    12. How I construe the passage in question? II-IIb, Q.64, A.7?

      “non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens…
      Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest…
      illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi..”

      He can justify self defense through a distinction at the level of moral species appropriately bounded. He cannot do the same for capital punishment. Hence, he grants the latter is an illicit moral species and justifies it by way of exception: “nisi…nisi”.

      He states this as an exception without even elaborating thereupon because he has already treated of the issue at length and more directly earlier in the same question (A.2, obj. 3):

      The objection to capital punishment he accepts as relevant:
      “Praeterea, illud quod est secundum se malum nullo bono fine fieri licet, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro contra mendacium, et per philosophum, in II Ethic…”

      The manner in which the otherwise accepted principle does not apply to the criminal:

      “Ad tertium dicendum quod homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit, et ideo decidit a dignitate humana…
      Et ideo quamvis hominem in sua dignitate manentem occidere sit secundum se malum, tamen hominem peccatorem occidere potest esse bonum”

      In summary:
      “In sinning, man falls away from his own dignity…Although it is indeed not lawful in itself to kill a man who remains in such dignity, yet it can be lawful to kill a sinner in the manner in which we might kill a beast.”

      Principle of Intrinsic Evil: granted
      Qualification: Has no application to those without their dignity intact

      —> Hence his statements in A7: the lawfulness of an intrinsically unlawful moral species is granted only by way of exception.

      Delete
    13. Thomas’s very preoccupation here demonstrates how misleading it is to say that Q.64 concerns itself with the healing of the cockle itself. That there is a way in which even the cockle can be healed in its uprooting is true, of course. But it is entirely tangential to his considerations here.

      Good gravy! No wonder you are all topsy turvy!

      My reference to Thomas's point that punishment is medicinal had nothing at all to do with "healing the cockle". That's totally bass ackwards. If you had bothered to understand punishment in its proper role, you might have grasped that the medicinal point is to repair the order that sits deformed by the offense. The offender is not "the order". The order is that of the moral universe, and the repair is to re-align the offender with respect to the violated order so that justice is restored in the moral sphere. That re-alignment by nature consists in his suffering something contrary to the will. Doing so may or may not produce a reformation in the offender to be obedient to God, but that's not the intrinsic restorative action of punishment.

      JPII re-confirmed Thomas's point that the primary end of punishment is the redress of the disorder. You have to understand that before you understand particular modes of punishment and their proper place.

      Delete
    14. Tony,
      Why is Thomas taking pains in Q. 64 to show sinners can be killed in the same manner as- quite literally- “dumb animals”? Why are his analogies to limbs one of excision? Why is his consideration of part to whole made with a view of concluding whatever of “infection”?

      The answer its very simple: the argument Thomas is making here is not appealing to the principles you claim it is appealing to at all. Now, perhaps you’ll conclude that his treatment of killing and capital punishment in Q. 64 is inconsistent with what has he has stated elsewhere. Perhaps you won’t. Well and good. But you cant simply duck the actual text as so many Thomists are in the habit of doing.

      Delete
    15. Here, I’ll be very specific: what words in Q. 64 are you translating as “medicine” or “redress”? And where in Q.64 does Thomas justify his view with anything of saying that the sinner must suffer something contrary to his will for the restoration of the moral order?

      All these things can well be accurate interpretations of Thomas elsewhere. But they are absolutely not what Thomas is saying here. Those are not even premises of his arguments in these passages. His arguments would follow logically even without presupposing such things. His analogies here are entirely intelligible in the absence of them. In short, you’re not even bothering to do basic textual analysis.

      Delete
    16. Anon:
      I meant 'construe' in the old sense of give a word for word translation. I should have just said 'translate' (the following -- your allegedly crucial double-nisi passage, correct?):

      "Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones."

      Delete
    17. So “Nisi” clauses in English dont quite have a one to one translation. There is a very simple “Nisi” use that indicates a conditional of the sort “except for,” “but for”, etc.

      But a nisi clause proper - as opposed to a “simple” nisi or any other type of conditional clause- embodied the full sovereign force of a Nisi decree from ancient Rome.

      Some dreaded or hoped for event would come to pass on an already-defined date in virtue of the emperor’s authority [except and unless] a very specific (and usually difficult) action was undertaken before said date.

      In English, we really only two options in anything of brevity:
      X “except and unless” Y
      (Not X) “if and only if” Y

      And beyond that, it frequently functions as an internal intensifier of the sort:
      better —> best
      not —> never
      etc.

      Now a double nisi in a single sentence doesnt change the aforementioned semantics. It’s a rhetorical device alongside the fact Thomas broke (at least) 4 different conventions in this sentence alone for rhetorical effect.

      I’ll do my best to approximate both the semantics and rhetoric in the next comment.

      Delete
    18. (Sentence Structure Rhetorical Effect: “Pay attention. This is important.”)

      It is never lawful to kill except and unless [the conditions] considered above [hold true].
      Further, even as a man might [lawfully] kill another in his own defense, still he can never intend [to kill] as such.
      But in the accounting of the common good by way of public authority, herein lies an exception of even that exception:
      If and only if a man holds public authority and devotes himself over to the common good,
      he may intend to kill in his own defense, as in the cases of
      a soldier fighting against his enemies or a judge fighting off thieves.

      Delete
    19. Now, perhaps you’ll conclude that his treatment of killing and capital punishment in Q. 64 is inconsistent with what has he has stated elsewhere. Perhaps you won’t...

      All these things can well be accurate interpretations of Thomas elsewhere. But they are absolutely not what Thomas is saying here.


      So, instead of trying to interpret Thomas in Q64 by what he says elsewhere, you prefer to insist that what Thomas says here be interpreted without a larger perspective. I don't believe he - or anyone - should be interpreted that way.

      But standing completely on its own: your point is that Thomas is saying that the murderer has lost the dignity that protects him from being put to death. You suggest that the Fernandez in Dignitas Infinita is saying the opposite, but neither you nor DDF has offered an argument against his position, just claimed an opposed thesis.

      There are places where I think Thomas got something wrong: approximately 2 (besides his famous errors with biology - like conception). But I do it with reasoning that considers his arguments and his premises. Who knows, maybe you could convince us he is also wrong in Q64. But remember, that could go either way: wrong about the loss of dignity, OR wrong about the issue of whether the loss of dignity is what permits the death penalty.

      Delete
  40. Some of those interested in these matters might find the comments of Gavin Ashenden thought provoking.

    An ostensible aspect of Fernandy's paper which went largely unnoticed was, he says, the deliberate deemphasis of free will in the document. Man implied therefore, as a kind of, maybe, sort of, imposed upon, sentience-burdened fleshbot victim of existence; apparently having nonetheless, an infinite dignity.

    Was it Bergoglio's intent to meet the progressive secular and even anti-theist world halfway with a revised anthropology?

    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=jClelL3Dkig&pp=ygUOYXNoZW5kZW4gZ2F2aW4%3D

    ReplyDelete
  41. One point that seems to be completely overlooked in terms of considering the human person as per their dignity, and human life: how to compare them?

    Presuppose that the human person has an infinite value.
    How much value does a human life have?

    No, it's not infinite. It is finite. This can be seen by any number of quotes from the New Testament:

    "For whoever wants to save their lives will lose them"

    "And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul."

    "I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us."

    St. Paul lays it out clearly enough: the future life is to the present life as the infinite is to the finite - i.e. there is no ratio.

    A man's temporal life is not of infinite length, nor of infinite joy: it has finite value in and of itself insofar as natural life. During this life, we can participate in something of infinite value - by participating in God's own life. But this is supernatural life, and is it is not temporal.

    But of course, the death penalty does not take away God's life - nor take away your participation in God's life. Your supernatural life is not the object of death penalty, the execution doesn't address your supernatural life. The examples of the martyrs shows that clearly: they went to their deaths singing praises, counting what they LOST as if nothing compared to life in Christ.

    So: infinite value of human dignity - finite value of temporal life = infinite value of human dignity.

    That is to say: the loss imposed by the death penalty does not detract from the infinite dignity of the human person.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I understand the point you are making, but- even here- it is not Thomas’s view in the way you are making it. Thomas took real pains to show that that the criminal killed in the act of capital punishment had *already* lost his dignity in a very, very significant way. It was on that basis- and no other- that Thomas could intelligibly say that the objection “we may never intend evil that good may come of it” didnt apply.

      Thomas saw immediately that even a proportional punishment would be subject to that norm. When it pertains to life and death, you cannot dismiss that principle it without rendering its (explicitly cited) authority entirely unintelligible. In my view, that is the *only* explanation for why he hedges against it so thoroughly and explicitly through his treatment of killing as such. Even to the point of bringing it up in a matter he had already framed to be entirely independent from considerations of the common good and public authority as such. Even to the point of treating his dispensation in a7 as the most exceptional of exceptions in the nested conditional of a double nisi clause. That is not something a philosopher does unless he knows he simply must. That failing to do so would betray an undeniable element of the tradition. In short, this is simply the best and only explanation for the text considered as a text.


      My point here is not to prove whether Thomas is correct or not on that very specific point. I do suspect it proves too much, but that is not at all my concern. My hope is merely that Thomists will understand that is where the relevant argument is, that is the place where the Magisterium “intersects” Thomas, that is the singular position that must be demonstrated to be tradition with a capital “T”. Accepting or rejecting that supposition does not in the least entail some rejection of the common good or proportional punishment as such. Saying that makes a strawman of everything Thomas is actually arguing.

      Delete
    2. I understand the point you are making, but- even here- it is not Thomas’s view in the way you are making it. Thomas took real pains to show that that the criminal killed in the act of capital punishment had *already* lost his dignity in a very, very significant way.

      You say you understand, but if you do, then I don't understand how what you are saying is in response. What I suggested was offered on the premise that the offender does not lose his dignity. Thus the hypothesis sets my comment outside of what Thomas was considering in Q64. I wasn't offering a comment on Thomas's position, or on the basis of Thomas's position, quite the reverse: assuming that human's have infinite dignity, and assuming that such dignity is not lost by freely willing a grave crime, it still doesn't necessarily follow that the death penalty is contrary to that dignity: you still have to parse out distinctions and make an argument, not just hand-wave at "infinite". This point is outside of Thomas's considerations in 64.

      Delete
    3. Ahhh. I’m quite sorry for having misread you. For sure, Thomas, Q64, etc aside for now. I like philosophy as much as anyone else lol

      I think the obvious question to ask on the principles as you articulate them is:

      why not just a kill an infant immediately after baptism? Spare them any temptation to or possibility of sin, let them enjoy the Beatific Vision immediately. You’d be doing them the highest of favors as no merely “finite” value of a longer life could overcome the risk of losing an infinite good.

      Delete
  42. Feser invokes a fallacy when he says that something´s being known to unaided reason implies that the truth in question has a purely natural rather than a supernatural foundation. DI affirms that the infinite dignity of man is knowable by unaided reason. This does not mean, however, that it has no superantural foundation and that it is not an effect of Grace. In fact DI insists that manj´s infinite dignity derives from the loving gaze of God upon his creature, man. As a Thomist Feser is of course aware of the teaching that God´s existence is held to be accessible to reason and that there are thus rational demonstrations of God´s existence. But likewise this state of affairs does not imply that God´s being open to man´s reason does not have a supernatural origin. That is is not an effect of God´s grace. Feser needs to study theology. He might start with that Great Doctor of the Church Saint Therese who tells us that "everything is grace." Thomas Aquinas would have been in agreement with her. Augustine, the Doctor of Grace, would have been delighted by the Coup de grace realized by the Little Flower.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This is exceptionally and thoroughly true, and I applaud you for the clarity with which you have stated these facts. I actually made a comment on the Nature/Grace Debate on the doctrinal development page before I had seen this.

      There is nothing of a “threat” to grace in the recognition that even our most basic existence is a gift. Even our essence as such, and the extent to which that essence is intellectual, they are truly and thoroughly gifts that might have been otherwise. But the specific point Thomists so rarely- if ever- acknowledge is that they must demonstrate that an intellectual nature- even that of an angel- could exist without desiring God as he is in himself and how such an intellect could be considered an intellect at all.

      Here- on dignity as almost everywhere in theology- the important disagreements turn on the nature/grace debate itself. Everything depends on being able to see, like Aristotle, that even a properly human potency actualized by way of a friend remains as much a gift as it remains properly human.

      Delete
  43. Using former versions of the CCC against the present version (i.e. the one with the Church´s authority behind it) is uncool. There is only one Catechism. Why not do it the other way around: try to UNDERSTAND the former version in the light of the Catechism, which is only one. One should protect the integrality of the faith. This does not involve disrespecting old things, but understanding them better or trying to understand them better. This is the way the Development of Doctrine works. Sometimes difficulties and bottlenecks appear. (For instance as one tries to reconcile certain things that Pope´s of the nineteenth century said about issues lile tolerance and religious freedom with the expressions of Vatican II. But one needs patience. One should not precipitate because not every apparent contradiction is a real contradiction. When the Ordinary Magisterium tells us that it is going to explain something that needs explaining (and that is exactly what is going on here in the matter of the intinite dignity of man as it is in the matter of the Death Penalty) one should listen with openneess and give that religious assent that Lumen Gentium asks us to give to teaching of the Ordinary Magisterium. (One can´t say "Oh well I prefer assenting to something that according to me the Popes were saying in some other century, according to my personal investigations." To have that attitude is to put one´s personal theologizing above the Magisterium.

    ReplyDelete
  44. When the former version of the Catechism speaks of "legitimate public authority" that is not directly and in absolute terms translatable as "the State." From the fact that the Church regarded legitimate public authority to be endowed with a prerogative of punishing up to and including the Death Penalty that does not mean that the State, without further ado, enjoys that prerogative. The Church now teaches that the State does not enjoy that prerogative. Saint Thomas does not endorse the Death Penalty. The Death Penalty is a Modern Thing and a function of the Absolutism of the State, which is a Modern Thing. Saint Thomas would not have been on board with it.

    ReplyDelete
  45. To understand the new situation in which the Catechism addresses the problem of Capital Punishment it is necessary to understand two things which are in correlation: First: the emergence of the secular state. Here I mean the legitmately secular state as opposed to the absolutist secularism of the Totalitarian State. Second: the emergence of the consciousness of the intinite dignity of the human person. The position that the Catechism of the Catholic Church takes with regard to the Death Penalty makes sense as one takes into account this new situation. It makes sense as Catholic Doctrine, Teaching of the Magisterium, the clear teaching of the Church. And not merely as somebody´s prudential judgement about a merely passing set of circumstances. To treat it as a mere opinion regarding merely transitory circumstances is frankly absurd. But it is also absurd to call what the Church has now taught regarding the Death Penalty as a departure from its perrenial teaching. With doctrinal development the Church does not reject what it has always taught, but rather takes up some truth that has unfortunately been obscured, buried, neglected. The Church will no more retreat from what it is teaching on the Death Penalty than it will retreat from what it teaches on abortion or contraception. The Magisterium does not act with superficiality.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. There is only one Catechism. Why not do it the other way around: try to UNDERSTAND the former version in the light of the Catechism, which is only one.

      Because the Church herself has said that you must interpret new ways of teaching a truth as being consistent with the teachings of old. That's included in St. Vincent of Lerins description of development: that the development keeps the old meanings of doctrine while teaching them anew.

      with openneess and give that religious assent that Lumen Gentium asks us to give to teaching of the Ordinary Magisterium.

      That openness includes within it the rightful perspective on teachings that call for religious assent, which by definition allow for reservations in the assent. If the reservation arises from "the old teaching said X, and the new teaching appears to say ~X, but it is unclear because the new teaching doesn't actually engage the old teaching itself and clarify the issue", then the teaching authority itself that recently proposed ~X in that manner meant to leave room for that reservation. We are expected to give assent "according to the mind of the teacher", and if the teacher intends to express the teaching in a manner that avoids clarification of difficulties, that expressed teaching creates room for reservation.

      "legitimate public authority" that is not directly and in absolute terms translatable as "the State."

      Of course, because some "states" are not legitimate authorities.

      The Death Penalty is a Modern Thing and a function of the Absolutism of the State, which is a Modern Thing.

      Hahahaha. I can't tell, are you going for satire here? If you aren't: have you picked up a history book? The Bible? Romans 13:4? The Catechism of 1992? "The traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty."

      Second: the emergence of the consciousness of the intinite dignity of the human person.

      Absolutely right: the emergence of the awareness of human dignity. Exactly. That's why we now have Genesis 9:6, because of that new awareness: it tells us about the root of that dignity, by pointing to Genesis 1 which explains the source of our dignity.

      To treat it as a mere opinion regarding merely transitory circumstances is frankly absurd.

      Except that's what JPII, Cardinal Ratzinger, and Cardinal Dulles said about the earlier language in the Catechism, and Francis said he wasn't changing the underlying teaching. And JPII expressly hinged it on the ability of the state to keep us safe from a convict, a current condition not always present in the past. Well, they didn't use "mere" for the opinion, but did say it was a prudential judgment, about which Catholics could, in good faith, disagree.

      Delete
    2. The following claim is true for Catholics, but not in the way you have applied it:
      “…the Church herself has said that you must interpret new ways of teaching a truth as being consistent with the teachings of old.”

      The fact of the matter if you cannot avoid the (exceedingly difficult) requirement of identifying and interpreting tradition as such. And this is very easy to illustrate. Take, for example, the case of the 7th ecumenical council articulating the conditions by which it identifies a robber council as a robber council:

      “If [the council of Hiera] did not enjoy the cooperation of the then Pope of Rome…nor win the assent of the patriarchs of the east, of Antioch, of Alexandria…”

      Now, if you take that at face value without deferring to anything of magisterial interpretation, then you would obviously have to conclude that both Second Constantinople and the Council of Florence were de facto robber councils.

      -Second Constantinople is the council where Pope Vigilius is explicitly censured and imprisoned for his lack of cooperation. The council completed without him. It is only today viewed as an ecumenical council in light of the fact it is believed to have been ratified after the fact. And even on that point its not clear whether the Church believes Vigilius’s ratification-under-duress is legitimate, so many posit an “implicit” ratification in future pontiffs.

      -The Council of Florence is where the delegates for the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem all “tore their garments” in outrage upon the return of their delegates. Not only is there evidence said delegates were coerced and/or bribed, but the plain fact of the matter is the interests of the Patriarchs were never represented at all. They did not “assent” in any sense. And indeed that is an essential part of why that Schism resumed in full thereafter and remains to this very day.

      In short, the fact of the matter is that you can never pretend to identify and interpret tradition without the aid of the magisterium as such. If the Catholic Church is anything of what it believes itself to be, the living Magisterium’s role in the identification and interpretation of tradition as such is an utterly essential part of it. And epistemically, this is obvious, right? You are always and inevitably in the position of one “looking back” to see what is and is not a source of tradition proper.

      Delete
    3. Quick clarification here: that quote is drawn from the Second Council of Nicaea, not the 7th.

      Delete
    4. ANON, if you have depicted the historical conditions accurately, (which I am not at present free to delve into, beyond noting that there are layers of complications about Constantinople II and Florence), it would be unclear how that affects the use of Vincent's description of doctrinal development: a model of how to discern a rogue council is not a basic delineation of doctrine, it's more like a juridical prescription. And from the fact that the Church has not always well followed that prescription on rogue councils one cannot easily derive what it looks like to follow Vincent's prescription, and that certainly would not mean that prescription is invalid, or that I have misapplied it. The Church often has followed Vincent's prescription well.

      Delete
    5. Thats fair. I didnt mean to suggest Vincent of Lerins was incorrect. More just that the principle itself doesnt do much in the way of practical guidance on the harder questions. Everyone can prooftext from tradition on either side of (almost) any debate just as Arius did. And then establishing the respective levels of authority for a given source is quite often just as difficult and turns on precisely those sorts of extra-textual considerations discussed.

      And what happens is that you really just end up having to argue about juridical prescriptions themselves lol. But anyway, I just wanted to suggest that the question of (legitimate) doctrinal development is (usually) continuous with the hella hard question of “what counts as tradition with a capital T?”. But not every time. Nbd.

      Delete
  46. Everyone seems to take it for granted that the "image and likeness of God" statements in Genesis are necessarily about human dignity. The question that comes to mind is "Are they really?"

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I dont think its ever been an explicit doctrine, but its somewhat difficult to avoid a concept of dignity in practice, both exegetically and philosophically. What characterizes us as humans over and above any other animal? And in what sense might we be considered to bear God’s likeness in a manner that doesn’t devolve into a type of physicalism? And how would any such ideas be consistent with the Beatific Vision as our ultimate end?

      You can take a De Koninck turn toward collective prerequisites for any application , perhaps. But its hard to avoid in its entirety.

      Delete
    2. I don't have to think that God inspired the author of Genesis 1 to think "this is the passage where I am going to explain human dignity" in order for him to write "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness". It can be implicit.

      Various Fathers addressed this passage. Irenaeus distinguished "image" and "likeness" : The “perfect” human being is according to both the image and the likeness of God, whereas the "imperfect" human being has only the image but not the likeness. St. Maximos the Confessor: Every intelligent nature is in the image of God, but only the good and the wise are in His likeness.

      If the passage doesn't directly speak to our dignity, it's certainly deals with its sources. There might be other passages that also say something applicable, but this starts the ball rolling. And Dignitas Infinita mentions the passage as significant. So, is there a reason to think it isn't?

      Delete
  47. It seems to me that those who are attempting to defend "infinite dignity" as a valid reason for precluding the death penalty are missing the point, which is that it is precisely _because_ of man's dignity that the death penalty is commanded by God. Specifically, Genesis 9:6 says "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man his blood will be shed; for in His own image God has made mankind."

    Another problem is that people seem overly naive or optimistic about jailing violent criminals. Prisons can be very violent places where men are regularly brutally raped. Yes, the world outside the prison may be protected. But those inside the prison are not, and it is an assault on the dignity of those men just as well to be routinely subjected to gang rape, violence, and so on.

    ReplyDelete
  48. Thanks for a well reasoned and thorough response to rather glaring weaknesses in this document. If an undergrad used the phrase "infinite human dignity" in a paper, a good prof would point out that, while perhaps rhetorically effective, such verbal flourishes make for poor philosophy. But this is what we have come to expect from Rome. It's frightening to the sober mind.

    ReplyDelete
  49. No doubt, like so many post Vatican II documents, Dignitas infinita suffers from several kinds of defects. Some critics of this document err in other directions, however.

    Nicholas Rao has penned a Philosophical Analysis of Dignitas which criticises it for making a strong distinction between ontological and moral dignity. Rao criticises Pope Francis for holding ontological dignity to be the basis for respect for all men in all times. Rao says it's Kantian, "Kantian persons are worthy of respect because, and only because, they possess reason"; "Surely it is precisely in a Christian age and a Christian culture that human dignity is fostered!"

    But Pope Francis is right, and supremely Thomstic, on this one. Grace, and Christian ages and culture, are all wonders that may or may not exist for every man at every time, but he still possesses a universal dignity that is indeed identified with his rationality, his soul (and of course his body, not sure why Rao worries about that). Aristotle understood this in a basic manner without revelation and without Kantianism. The Christian Revelation has transcended, but not altered this universal dignity.

    To bring matters down to earth, and to our own time - I think Nicholas Rao may be confusing his Thomistic philosophy with his readings from Conservatism, for this is a spot where that ideology departs radically from Thomism, and Christianity itself. Conservative authors like Burke, Scruton and Kirk, do indeed discuss human dignity from the point of view of contingent, cultural circumstances. They viscerally hate the idea of universal, ontological equality. Finding the Thomistic truth of the matter in Dignitas infinita may be a bitter pill for conservative Catholics to swallow, but this is providential. Hearing the truth in such a place will concentrate their minds! Obviously liberal and Kantians have their own perverse logic for talking about human dignity, but on this point, Papa Francesco has got it right. Deo Gratias.

    ReplyDelete
  50. I agree substantially. I think people have largely gotten caught up with speculative issues of philosophy and theology that the encyclical may or may not make. I’m hardly interested in defending it *in toto*. But it seems obvious to me that it’s quite consistent with the previous two pontiffs in saying (minimally) this:

    “All humans possess dignity in virtue of what they are, and not merely what they have or haven’t done. Thus, they remain proper subjects of moral consideration in their own right, regardless of any defects or failures on their part.”

    This alone is enough to challenge Thomas’s position on the death penalty. Thomas saw very clearly that he had to deny criminals possessed the type of dignity that warranted moral considerations appropriate to intrinsic evil proper. It is- as you like- too firm and universal a matter of tradition to dispute. Hence he engaged intrinsic evil in II-IIb Q. 64 A. 2 obj. 3, affirmed it as a principle, and denied its application only after arguing dignity proper is the sort of thing that is lost in sin.

    ReplyDelete
  51. I took the statement that the "death penalty...violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances" to mean something along the lines of, "the death penalty, in all *contemporary* circumstances, violates the dignity of the person." Understood this way, the statement is hardly different from anything JPII said. Of course, the death penalty could be and was in fact rightly used in older times. I do realize this is a slightly creative reading of the text, but I don't think it's an outlandish reading. The term Dignitas Infinita uses, "violates," is in the present tense: to say that the death penalty violates (in the present) human dignity in all contemporary circumstances doesn't imply that the death penalty violated human dignity when it was used in the past, in circumstances that no longer exist.

    ReplyDelete