Feser offers a tour de force… The ambitions of Feser’s book are great. He aims to explicate and defend a view of a human person as a unity of a material body and immaterial soul. He does so with clarity of prose, a wide reading of the relevant literature, and a systematic approach which grounds philosophical anthropology in metaphysics.
Some earlier
endorsements:
“Edward
Feser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore,
both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work for
consultation. Each of the human faculties discussed is treated comprehensively,
with a broad range of theories considered for and against, and, although Feser's
conclusions are firmly Thomistic, one can derive great benefit from his
discussions even if one is not a convinced hylomorphist. Every philosopher of mind would benefit from
having this book within easy reach.”
Howard Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central European
University
“Feser
defends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it into
dialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic
(Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus) philosophy. He deftly rebuts objections to Thomism,
both ancient and modern. Anyone working today on personal identity, the unity
of the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will need to
engage with the analysis and arguments presented here.” Robert C. Koons, Professor of Philosophy,
University of Texas at Austin
You can order from Amazon, Barnes and Noble, or directly from the publisher.
"Clarity of prose." Yes. No other academic philosopher writes as clearly and lucidly as Prof. Feser.
ReplyDeleteI enjoyed reading Immortal Souls. But I have one question about the definition of a person that is given in the book and its compatibility with the Trinity. Since a person would be an individual substance of a rational nature, wouldn't that make the three persons of the Trinity three individual substances and, hence, three separate entities? A precision would be greatly appreciated.
ReplyDeleteGod exists differently than we do. He is uncreated with one uncreated nature with 3 Persons. The Persons in God exist as relations in His nature. God knows everything immediately, so He doesn’t need a stepwise rational process to know as we have and need.
DeleteI have heard that Boethius's definition is better translated as "an individual subsistence of a rational nature. I don't know if that's sufficient to help solve the problem.
DeleteTony
DeletePersonally (pun not intended) I don't think it helps, since subsistence is just what is proper to a substance. A substance is that which subsists, it is the being "behind" the activity of subsisting (existing by itself, instead of in another or as a mode of something else, like accidents). A substance is that which subsists. God is a substance, since God subsists instead of existing-in something else like an accident.
As for the Trinity, my view isn't popular among traditionally-minded or orthodox people, I suppose, but I would say that "Person" in that case is just a weird translation of Hypostasis. They're something, but I don't know what they are, and I don't necessarily think of them as "persons". I don't know for sure if the Trinity is consistent, but I also don't know if it's inconsistent either, it's ust a perplexing concept for me and I find it hard to prove anything about it (which presumably is also the view of most Christians, given that the Trinity is supposed to be a mystery). But anyway, we could maintain Boethius's definition and just stop thinking of the Hypostases as "Persons". We don't know what they are (presumably they would be inner relationships God has with Himself, or something close to that, thomists would say).
Another alternative is to change Boethius's definition to "an individual something of a rational nature" - for creatures, like us humans, that something is a substance. But for the Persons of the Trinity, that something need not be a substance.
The council of Nicea declared in opposition to the Arian heresy that taught Christ was a creature lower than the Father in the order of being, that Christ and the Father are homouios or one in substance. That applies to the Holy Spirit as well. The distinction between God’s mode of being and existence compared to our’s is that God’s being is uncreated where God’s essence of who he is includes his existence. God is a Spirit who has no parts and is unchanging, but is pure Act in Himself. There is no potential in God to be perfected. God is perfect in Himself defining what love and being are for all creatures. Creatures depend on God for their essence which includes their potential for perfection for living creatures with intelligence. As they are perfected they more fully reflect the image of God in them. They exist as more perfect as they take on the perfection of their essence, nature and existence. Creature’ existence is dependent on God’s existence.
Delete@Anonymous, I agree that shifting from substance to subsistence is not at all helpful. You write:
DeleteI don't know for sure if the Trinity is consistent, but I also don't know if it's inconsistent either, it's ust a perplexing concept for me and I find it hard to prove anything about it (which presumably is also the view of most Christians, given that the Trinity is supposed to be a mystery).
Well, it doesn't appear to be consistent to me. If it is merely a description of releationships God has with Himself, then that is indistinct from Modalism. A relation entails relata (which entails a real distinction between the relata as well as a distinction in the relation). If that is the case, one is affirming composition. And if there's only one relatum, then we're back to Modalism.
Add to that Aquinas' claim that the relations are identical with the essence---there being no difference between the relations and the essence. Thus, if each “person” is identical with the essence, then each relation is as well. Via transitive identity, the “personal” distinctions would be logical at best, not real. Perplexing indeed.
Bill,
DeleteI agree that if each Hypostasis is identical to the essence, then each Hypostasis is identical to each other. I don't think one has to defend that in order to maintain the Trinity. The thing about the relations is tricky to me. One of the best defenses of the Trinity is, I think, Robert Koons's in his article "Divine Persons as Relational 'Qua' Objects". You can easily find it if you google it. I suggest you read it.
Personally, I don't think I can refute that article. I'd have to think a lot more.
Hello again, Anonymous. I'm familiar with Koons' argument and do not find it at all convincing. Have you heard Mullins' and Schmid's critique via their conversation with Koons? Koons raises Donald Trump's being a president, a hotel owner, etc., as examples of qua objects, but that's what a Modalist would say (e.g., God is Father in creation, Son in redemption, and Holy Spirit in regeneration). And this knower/known proposition is equally Modalist in that my knowing myself does not produce (however you define that term) a distinct consciousness.
DeleteKoons claims that the relata are the knower and the known. Well, if that's the case, then he can apply for membership in the United Pentecostal Church International because the one who is the knower is the one who is the known. And going back the Trump analogy, the person of the president is the person of the hotel owner. There is no extra mental difference between Trump as president and Trump as hotel owner, unless one pushes too far into composition.
Per Aquinas, the commonality of the persons is the divine essence (PC - Principle of Commonality), and the distinction of the persons is in the relations (PD - Principle of Distinction). Hence, PC ≠ PD. If PC = PD then we would be saying that the persons are different but alike in every way, which is absurd. In other words, that which makes them common is the very thing which makes them distinct, which appears directly contradictory, unless the PC is composite.
Koons admits that his paper is just a proposal subject to refinement. Well, by might lights, it needs a lot of refinement.
"Koons raises Donald Trump's being a president, a hotel owner, etc., as examples of qua objects, but that's what a Modalist would say (e.g., God is Father in creation, Son in redemption, and Holy Spirit in regeneration)."
DeleteI agree that in Trump's case it seems like we just have different abstract objects, or purely logical distinctions. But that's Trump, not God. Why must we understand it as modalism? It wouldn't be modalism if the different qua objects are truly real - the distinctions are really in God, not just how God presents Himself to us, not just how we think about God. The Trump analogy is just that: a very limited analogy.
"And this knower/known proposition is equally Modalist in that my knowing myself does not produce (however you define that term) a distinct consciousness."
It doesn't happen with OUR knowing. But why couldn't it be different with God? God is so extremely different from us. Why couldn't the knower/known distinction allow for distinct real entities in God? I don't think our human psychology is very relevant here.
Again, I do not know if the Trinity is consistent. But I also do not know if it is inconsistent, either. I find it very tricky and mysterious, and I think it's hard to show that it is in fact inconsistent with Simplicity.
"because the one who is the knower is the one who is the known." right, but Koons doesn't deny that God-as-knower only knows and isn't known, etc.
"In other words, that which makes them common is the very thing which makes them distinct, which appears directly contradictory,"
Sure, but I would not say that PC and PD are the same, and I don't think Koons's model involves that, either. Koons's model doesn't require relative identity. As I said, I agree that if the Father is identical with the Divine Essence, and the Son is identical with the Divine Essence, then the Father would be identical with the Son.
I reject the idea that there is identity between the Hypostases and the Divine Essence. I would say (e.g.) the Son is God because there is no distinction of substance between the Son and God, but the Son is not identical to God/the Divine Essence.
I think God is one substance, and the Hypostases are just internal distinctions. It is not clear to me why this would be incoherent, or inconsistent with Simplicity (I don't think the Hypostases are parts or compose the Substance). Vague, blurry and dark, yes - as I said, I find it very mysterious, but also in the sense that it isn't clear to me that it'd be absurd.
Hello again, Anonymous! You write:
DeleteWhy must we understand it as modalism? It wouldn't be modalism if the different qua objects are truly real - the distinctions are really in God, not just how God presents Himself to us, not just how we think about God.
Why wouldn’t it be Modalism? Objects are objects, not personalities. Fulfilling multiple ad intra tasks is something any finite human can do. Why couldn’t God? There just doesn’t seem to be anything here setting this theory apart from Modalism.
Why couldn't the knower/known distinction allow for distinct real entities in God? I don't think our human psychology is very relevant here.
Because Koons misstates Modalism in that he thinks that God’s modes are solely revelatory ad extra. Is not God, as a single personal “agent,” capable of performing multiple roles ad intra? The task for a trinitarian apologist is to show why his argument demonstrates the Trinity. But when he says something indistinct from a competing claim, he hasn’t gotten anywhere. If a Modalist says, “I have shown via the Scriptures that Jesus is God; therefore, Modalism is true,” a Trinitarian would rightly reply that since he also confesses Jesus’ deity, his Modalist opponent has only proved Christ’s deity, not the single personhood of God.
I think it's hard to show that it is in fact inconsistent with Simplicity.
Respectfully, I don’t think it’s hard at all. The assertion that real objects are really (extra mental realities in a subject) different from each other appears to affirm composition as a matter of definition.
I reject the idea that there is identity between the Hypostases and the Divine Essence.
Well, you’d have to take that up with Aquinas and a host of other theologians who affirm the strong version of divine simplicity (DS). Interestingly, under pressure from Mullins, and to a lesser degree, Schmid, Koons backed off somewhat from his claim that his version is a strong DS. Aquinas unequivocally stated that the relations were identical with the essence, and that the only difference was in our manner of thinking about it. In other words, the distinction exists only in our minds. On top of that, Aquinas stated that whatever is not of the essence is a creature. There really is no middle ground here.
"Why wouldn’t it be Modalism?"
DeleteBecause the distinctions would be real of God; they wouldn't just be logical distinctions. I take Modalism to be the idea that the distinctions are ultimately purely logical.
"Fulfilling multiple ad intra tasks is something any finite human can do. Why couldn’t God? There just doesn’t seem to be anything here setting this theory apart from Modalism."
Maybe God can, but why must that mean that God's relations of knowing-himself etc. (if that's what the Hypostases are) can't also be these real distinct entities? Again, it's not Modalism because the distinctions would be real, not merely logical.
"Because Koons misstates Modalism in that he thinks that God’s modes are solely revelatory ad extra. Is not God, as a single personal “agent,” capable of performing multiple roles ad intra?"
As I said, I think the idea is that in Modalism the distinctions are merely logical. Koons is affirming that there are real distinctions in God. I don't think I'm following you, in that I don't see how what you're saying is supposed to demonstrate that there CANNOT be really distinct relations or entities in God (such as "knowing himself", "being known" etc.)
"The task for a trinitarian apologist is to show why his argument demonstrates the Trinity"
No, the Trinitarian apologist merely has to defeat arguments that the Trinity is incoherent. I suggested Koons's model because I think it's hard to show that it's incoherent. I have no interest in "demonstrating" the Trinity. Again and again I have said that I don't know whether it is consistent or inconsistent; rationally speaking I am agnostic about it, and I just believe in it because it is the traditional Christian view, so as a Christian I presume it is true unless I can clearly show that it is false. I have yet to see any strong refutation of it.
"The assertion that real objects are really (extra mental realities in a subject) different from each other appears to affirm composition as a matter of definition."
For some reason it's just not clear to me when it comes to the Trinity. Composition is clear to me in cases such as proper parts; powers and attributes; etc. It is more hazy for me when it comes to stuff such as relations, or conscious states. I think these could be good candidates for the Hypostases. And then it isn't that God depends on them; more like God entails these (really distinct) relations or conscious states, somehow. I have to keep it vague, especially here.
"Well, you’d have to take that up with Aquinas a host of other theologians who affirm the strong version of divine simplicity (DS)"
I am not sure my problem is with strong DS. My problem is with the identity relation between the Hypostases and the Nature. I reject that identity, as I said.
"Aquinas unequivocally stated that the relations were identical with the essence, and that the only difference was in our manner of thinking about it."
I am not trying to defend Aquinas. I am just trying to undercut or rebut potential refutation of the Trinity. I think Koons's and Aquinas's models have much good, but might be imperfect.
I don't know what is your demonstration that there cannot be these 3 distinctions in God. I reject the idea that PC = PD, and I reject any identity between any Hypostasis and the Divine Nature.
"Interestingly, under pressure from Mullins, and to a lesser degree, Schmid, Koons backed off somewhat from his claim that his version is a strong DS"
DeleteI also wonder if this could be helpful and legitimate. People often mean different things by DS and "absolute simplicity", as they do with stuff like "immutability". I would have no problem adjusting my view of Divine Simplicity iff it were necessary to maintain the Trinity AND it isn't philosophically problematic.
Some thomists also affirm ideas of immutability that I would reject. I am an open theist, for example (and a believer in Divine Simplicity! The two are not opposed, as I've argued before). The immutability I affirm refers only to the denial of intrinsic, passive potentiality in God (which I think the First Way establishes).
The composition in God that I deny would be limited only to composition that entails dependence (making the Divine Nature dependent on anything) or passive potentiality. As I said in my previous post, I suspect that stuff such as relations and some conscious states might not entail the kind of problematic composition which I think theists should reject (by philosophical argument).
More modestly, all the Trinity requires is that there are 3 distinct whatevers in God. And these whatevers are NOT identical with the Divine Nature. This is all I affirm (as I said in my first post, I don't even like calling the Hypostases "persons"; I suspect it might be a confusing translation, and I would rather say that God is only one person since there is only one divine Will and Intellect). With that in mind, I was sincere when I said that I just don't see what would be incoherent about this idea. I don't know if it is consistent, but I don't know that it isn't, either.
Anonymous, you write:
DeleteBecause the distinctions would be real of God; they wouldn't just be logical distinctions. I take Modalism to be the idea that the distinctions are ultimately purely logical.
Then your take is wrong. The vast majority of Modalists are not classical theists. Indeed, the idea that composition might be a problem has probably never crossed their minds. They, like Social Trinitarians, take for granted that God is just like us, only greater. Classical theists among them are few and far between.
Maybe God can, but why must that mean that God's relations of knowing-himself etc. (if that's what the Hypostases are) can't also be these real distinct entities?
Because it introduces a real difference in the essence. If one relation isn’t the other relation, then there’s an aspect of the essence unique to the relation. A part is anything in a subject less than the whole, in the absence of which, even conceptually, the whole would be different from what it is. And if Trinitarians don’t mean self-thought, then perhaps they should use another term.
No, the Trinitarian apologist merely has to defeat arguments that the Trinity is incoherent. I suggested Koons's model because I think it's hard to show that it's incoherent.
I can’t force you to have another opinion, so have at it, but it means nothing to me. When a point of view is promulgated, especially in salvific terms, that a competing point of view can affirm, minus personalities, said claim is arbitrary. But considering the paper in question, I think Kroons’ model is clearly incoherent on DS.
It is more hazy for me when it comes to stuff such as relations, or conscious states. I think these could be good candidates for the Hypostases.
But on DS, God is identical with His thought. Differing ontological realities in His essence are either predicates or identical in toto. On the former, they are parts, and on the latter, you’ve acknowledged that they’d be one and the same.
I am not sure my problem is with strong DS. My problem is with the identity relation between the Hypostases and the Nature. I reject that identity, as I said.
Apologies, but this sounds confused to me. Anything not of the essence is a creature, according to Aquinas. You can reject it all you want, but if the relations aren’t one and the same as the essence, then they’re creatures.
I don't know what is your demonstration that there cannot be these 3 distinctions in God. I reject the idea that PC = PD, and I reject any identity between any Hypostasis and the Divine Nature.
There can be all kinds of logical, virtual or nominal distinctions in God. A real distinction is problematic as I’ve argued. If you reject PC = PD, then either the essence is composed or the relations are creaturely. There is no middle ground on DS.
Aquinas didn’t reply to this kind of objection like you did. He acknowledged the transitivity problem, but he answered it with an analogy showing a logical distinction (i.e., action and passion in motion). Very odd for somebody defending a real distinction, especially given that neither action or passion, as he defined it, are identical with motion.
Anonymous, you write:
DeleteMore modestly, all the Trinity requires is that there are 3 distinct whatevers in God. And these whatevers are NOT identical with the Divine Nature.
Well, there are three main branches of Trinitarian thought: Latin, Eastern and Social, with some 13 variations, collectively, under said branches. So, yours is one version among several. With some nuance, Modalists and Unitarians can agree with your statement, sans the word Trinity. As stated, Modalists are by and large theistic personalists, so they wouldn’t criticize the Trinity on compositional grounds. And based on what I’ve read from Unitarians, they’re in the same boat. They primarily consider the doctrine of the Trinity (DT) to be unscriptural and incoherent on grounds other than composition.
I’m in the group that affirms classical theism but am firmly convinced that the DT is incompatible with it. The classical arguments for God’s existence lead to Pure Act/Being Simpliciter. Unqualified existence is divine simplicity. Any qualified actuality defaults to an essence/existence composite. As Dolezal (a Trinitarian) has accurately observed, if all that is in God isn’t God, then God is explained, perfected and defined by something less than He is in order to be what He is. And that’s exactly what a composite being is.
"Then your take is wrong. The vast majority of Modalists are not classical theist"
DeleteSure, but what I'm saying is that for a Classical Theist + Trinitarian it would suffice for there to be these 3 REALLY DISTINCT whatevers (possibly, God-qua-knower, God-qua-known, etc.) in God. I am a classical theist and I think "personalism" isn't even viable, so what I'm saying is that under Classical Theism it would be sufficient for us to affirm the Trinity by saying that there are these 3 distinct whatevers in God (whereas if the distinctions were merely logical, it wouldn't be enough as it would just be a matter of how we conceive of God)
"Because it introduces a real difference in the essence. If one relation isn’t the other relation, then there’s an aspect of the essence unique to the relation. A part is anything in a subject less than the whole, in the absence of which, even conceptually, the whole would be different from what it is. And if Trinitarians don’t mean self-thought, then perhaps they should use another term."
I said that the composition I object to is the kind of composition that involves metaphysical dependence (constitutive parts, basically) or passive potentiality. This is because I don't think any other kind of Simplicity is established philosophically. What the traditional arguments establish is that the First Cause is entirely independent and lacking in passive potency - from this we can conclude that there can be no constitutive parts in God (no proper parts; no distinct powers and attributes, etc.)
I say this in order to make the following observation: if you wanna call the Hypostases "parts", I don't think that would immediately make them incompatible with the Divine Simplicity that I think can be philosophically demonstrated.
I'm not sure what you mean by there being "an aspect of the essence unique to their relation". If I take G to be the divine essence, then why would it be a problem for G being XYZ, XYZ corresponding to being related to F, S and H? To put it differently, I don't see why the difference couldn't be solely in F, S and H. Sorry if it's unclear to me.
Recall that I said I think relations (and some conscious states - I once came up with a model on the Trinity based on conscious states, but anyway) are good candidates for not entailing the problematic dependency-parts relation. If the idea is such that G entails some "parts" F, S, and H, then those "parts" aren't problematic to me because G isn't really metaphysically dependent on them. They wouldn't be constitutive parts, just entailment parts which I don't think are precluded by the First Cause's status as absolutely necessary and independent.
While we're at it: so far I have only talked about more "Latin"-inspired models. But I also think it'd be fine to have something like Monarchical Trinity. In that case, F (and only F) would be identical to G, and only F would be the first cause; S and H are ultimately effects of F. In that case, G could be entirely simple (yes, you could call S and H "creatures" if you want to, but I think that would ignore the relevant difference that S and H would be necessary effects of F, and could partake in G's nature to such an extent that they'd be divine; and somehow they might not have separate Wills and Intellects. The challenge in this case would be avoiding Tritheism, but I think the suggestions I mentioned could be helpful).
"I can’t force you to have another opinion, so have at it, but it means nothing to me."
Well, I thought I was clear from the start that my position is totally defensive. I just don't see why the Trinity would be absurd (incompatible with DS). I don't care about demonstrating it positively. You're the one making positive claims. From the start, I just said that I find it very hard to refute the Trinity. Thus I consider some hypothetical models.
"Apologies, but this sounds confused to me. Anything not of the essence is a creature, according to Aquinas"
DeleteI am not Aquinas. Here is one positive claim I make: the hypostases are NOT all identical to the Divine Essence. I said this again and again. I know what I am rejecting. I accept transitivity of identity and explicitly reject the idea of relative identity (as defended by e.g. Peter Geach, Van Inwagen, etc.). I think that if F = G and S = G then F = S, so no model of the Trinity that I consider feasible would say that the Hypostases are identical with the Divine Essence. I confess it's been a long time since I've read Koons's paper, but from what I recall it did not involve relative identity and he even rejected it in it.
"If you reject PC = PD, then either the essence is composed or the relations are creaturely."
To reaffirm: yes, I do reject "PC = PD". Yes, I do reject the idea that the hypostases are all identical to the Essence.
I would open to both horns, but I would simply qualify the "composition" and the "creaturely" concepts.
"The classical arguments for God’s existence lead to Pure Act/Being Simpliciter. Unqualified existence is divine simplicity. Any qualified actuality defaults to an essence/existence composite. As Dolezal (a Trinitarian) has accurately observed, if all that is in God isn’t God, then God is explained, perfected and defined by something less than He is in order to be what He is. And that’s exactly what a composite being is."
I make a big deal out of the (how shall we put it?) "arrow" of dependency. I think God must be absolutely simple because of his absolute independence; his status as Subsistent Necessary Existence, Pure Act, etc. God's existence is entirely unconditioned. But I don't see a problem with God entailing other things of necessity. I think the Trinity could be something like that - God's perfection necessarily entails these different Hypostases (the "Son" and the "Holy Spirit", and perhaps the "Father" too if the "Father" is not identical to God). To my mind, they could even be wholly internal to God - like aspects of His consciousness, or some internal relations - and thus be said to be "parts" of God, but not really constitutive parts, so God's independence (the ground for the Simplicity I accept) wouldn't be compromised. They would just be the necessary entailments of the Divine Essence's superabundant perfection. I don't know.
Anonymous, you write:
Delete…what I'm saying is that under Classical Theism it would be sufficient for us to affirm the Trinity by saying that there are these 3 distinct whatevers in God
But that’s true across all iterations of the DT. And that is unremarkable for Modalists and Unitarians.
I said that the composition I object to is the kind of composition that involves metaphysical dependence (constitutive parts, basically) or passive potentiality.
But the kind of being that can acquire different states of reality is metaphysically dependent because there would have to be a passive potency principle in its essence to acquire a different state.
If I take G to be the divine essence, then why would it be a problem for G being XYZ, XYZ corresponding to being related to F, S and H?
Look at it this way: What is the Trinity (T) in relation to G? Does T = G, or is there any “daylight” between T & G? If the former, does F = T, S = T or H = T? Presumably, you’d say no. If any person (P) is equivalent to T, then we have transitive identity. On the other hand, if F, S & H are part of T, then the conceptual absence of any of them eliminates T. Thus, if T = G, then G is logically posterior to F, S & H.
Moreover, if as you later (and earlier) attest that P ≠ E (divine essence), and if G = E (the essence is what makes God, God, if you will), then at best P is accidental to G. If that is the case, then P cannot be G in any meaningful sense. The relations have no bearing on G being G. However, if P is necessary to G, then G depends on P, which is the very metaphysical dependence that you abjure.
But I also think it'd be fine to have something like Monarchical Trinity. In that case, F (and only F) would be identical to G, and only F would be the first cause; S and H are ultimately effects of F. In that case, G could be entirely simple (yes, you could call S and H "creatures" if you want to, but I think that would ignore the relevant difference that S and H would be necessary effects of F, and could partake in G's nature to such an extent that they'd be divine…
Then only F would be a se and the “nature” that P partakes of would be definitionally distinct from the aseity principle in F. Since aseity, by definition, cannot be communicated, and since on this model S & H are not a se, and since F cannot communicate what F does not have, F would then be a composite of the aseity principle (AP) and the nature (N) principle He communicates to P. And since under this model N is not self-explanatory, it too would be a composite of act and potency. There are several logical contradictions here.
I said this again and again. I know what I am rejecting. I accept transitivity of identity and explicitly reject the idea of relative identity…
And, per above, I think this is clearly partialism. If P ≠ G, then P is not divine. If P somehow participates in G, then P is a composite of G and whatever else P is. Thus, P is dependent on something ~P for its explanation, actuation and conservation.
God's existence is entirely unconditioned. But I don't see a problem with God entailing other things of necessity.
But surely you can see how this is incoherent from a strong DS perspective. These “other things of necessity” are states of reality—existence! That reduces to existence entails other existence. Nothing can be added to existence because, in itself, it is unqualified. What you are saying is that unqualified existence entails qualified existence. You cannot add “other existence” to something that exists in an unqualified way.
"But the kind of being that can acquire different states of reality is metaphysically dependent because there would have to be a passive potency principle in its essence to acquire a different state."
DeleteNot so fast. As I alluded to before, it isn't clear to me that a distinction of relations (or of some conscious states) necessarily involves a change in passive potency. For example, if "being a knower" and "being known" are really distinct relations, nevertheless it isn't clear to me that God's necessarily being a knower would involve the actualization of some passive potency in God. God just is, purely actually, a Knower. And God's necessarily being known also doesn't mean that there is some "passive potency" in God for being known - even ordinary things don't change by being known. So, again, I think relations (and some conscious states) are good candidates for entailments in God (distinct from the essence, entailed by it) which nevertheless do not involve actualization of passive potentiality. This category itself would be very weird, but it is what it is.
Alternatively, in a more monarchical model I could say there is (actualized) passive potency in S and H, as they are caused by F (which has no potentiality whatsoever) as distinct from it.
"Look at it this way: What is the Trinity (T) in relation to G? Does T = G, or is there any “daylight” between T & G?"
I could say T is NOT identical to G. T could be G + the hypostases (or relations). T would be a composition or a plurality, but G wouldn't (at least not a dependent/posterior plurality). In that sense, G would have *posterior parts* (the hypostases which are entailed by G) which do not threaten its independence. As such, G would be a trinitarian in the sense that G entails these posterior parts/hypostases which ultimately make up what we call the Trinity. In the first model, the hypostases could be internal relations of God (thus, posterior parts of God); in the second, monarchy-inspired model they could just be S and H as distinct, actualized potentials.
"Moreover, if as you later (and earlier) attest that P ≠ E (divine essence), and if G = E (the essence is what makes God, God, if you will), then at best P is accidental to G. If that is the case, then P cannot be G in any meaningful sense"
Correct, P ≠ E. Except perhaps in the case of the Father (in the second model I alluded to, F, and only F, would be numerically identical to E). Let's assume P refers to S (the Son).
S is not identical to E. But from that, I don't think it follows that S could not be G in any meaningful sense. S might not be God in the nominal sense, but it might be God *in a predicative sense*. So we might say S is still omnipotent, all-knowing, etc.
In the first model, maybe God could be so extraordinarily weird that a relation (or conscious state?) like "God-as-known" turns out to be omnipotent, omniscient etc. like God is, even though it is numerically distinct from it.
In the second model, the actualized Son receives the fullness of God (the Father) power, knowledge, etc. He is just lacking the aseity. This is the next topic you touched on, so let me continue -
"F would then be a composite of the aseity principle (AP) and the nature (N) principle He communicates to P. And since under this model N is not self-explanatory, it too would be a composite of act and potency. There are several logical contradictions here."
DeleteI would not accept this framing of the idea in my second model. F would be entirely simple, there isn't a real distinction between the "aseity principle" and the Divine Nature. The idea is rather that F would communicate all the perfection of E to S, with the sole exception that, since it's a communication/causing, S would not end up having aseity. But S would still have the entirety of E's perfection, lacking *only* in aseity because of S's passive potency.
Humans, as contingent creatures, still receive some form of the Divine Nature - we have some being, power, life, intelligence, etc. The begotten Son receives *all* of the Divine Nature, and necessarily and eternally so, with the sole exception of aseity, since aseity is an uncommunicable form of the Divine Nature which would be proper only to the Father, who alone is the "arche anarchon", the one who begets without being begotten.
In other words: the Son would be the fullness of the Divine Nature under a caused/begotten mode.
So it's not as if F has PA and N; it just is N, but in F it is simply N in its original, a se mode. In S it is N under a communicated mode. So S is still as perfect as F is, except when it comes to aseity. It still has all of the divine power, wisdom, love, etc., and as such it is God in a predicative sense. It's just not a se; it is begotten, caused.
"And, per above, I think this is clearly partialism. If P ≠ G, then P is not divine."
P could still be divine in a predicative sense; whether P is wholly internal to God, or external.
"If P somehow participates in G, then P is a composite of G and whatever else P is. Thus, P is dependent on something ~P for its explanation, actuation and conservation."
The Persons (at least S and H) are supposed to come from God in some sense, so I fail to see a problem here. Whether they come about as internal relations ("God qua knower", "God qua known"...) which might not involve actualization of passive potentialities, or as something that might directly involve actualization of potentiality (such as my second model), I don't think either would be absurd or incompatible with the Trinity or the Creed (although it could of course be incompatible with certain models of the Trinity).
"But surely you can see how this is incoherent from a strong DS perspective. These “other things of necessity” are states of reality—existence! That reduces to existence entails other existence. Nothing can be added to existence because, in itself, it is unqualified."
Again, what I think is philosophically established by Divine Simplicity is that God doesn't have constitutive parts (God is entirely independent, a se, as such God cannot be posterior to any parts, hence not composed of essence and existence, power and other distinct attributes, etc.) or intrinsic, passive potentiality. That doesn't preclude God from entailing some distinctions within itself that neither constitute Him (in such a way that G would be posterior to such parts, instead of being that which entails them) nor actualize some passive potentiality in Him.
I think relations are weird. If there could be really distinct "God qua knower" and "God qua known" in the purely actually wise God, I don't see "being a knower" or "being known" as actualization of passive potentiality, even if they still somehow are brought about by God and the fact that the Divine Nature is knowledgeable/conscious/wise.
In the second model, things are simpler. I see no problem whatsoever with DS in the idea of God causing the same effect in every possible world. The Father wouldn't be qualifying itself; it would simply be necessarily bringing about the Son and the Holy Spirit as full, eternal, (ab alio) necessary communicated modes of the Divine Nature.
As I alluded to before, it isn't clear to me that a distinction of relations (or of some conscious states) necessarily involves a change in passive potency.
DeleteOf course it does. If thoughts are real, and if thoughts change, then a potential is actualized. A subject has the potency to think, and when he thinks, he actualizes that potency. A strong DS advocate would say that G is identical with His mind (M). Thus, G = M, which precludes potency because God’s act of self-contemplation is identical with His essence. But since you reject that, these thoughts become accidents and/or properties which logically entail the potency of E to acquire P (P not being necessary to E).
Alternatively, in a more monarchical model I could say there is (actualized) passive potency in S and H, as they are caused by F (which has no potentiality whatsoever) as distinct from it.
Then S and H are not G, plain and simple. If you confess passive potency in P, then P is a creature. And your continuing to call them G on the basis of what you later say is God’s nature in all of us is incoherent, as I’ve argued above and will expand upon below.
I could say T is NOT identical to G. T could be G + the hypostases (or relations). T would be a composition or a plurality, but G wouldn't (at least not a dependent/posterior plurality).
So, if T = Relations (R), then we would have a composite of G + T (R), thus, making T accidental. G is not tripersonal as an ontological reality; He is rather unipersonal with the capacity (potency) to acquire an additional identity in T (your second model, clearly not the first). But this clearly shows potency in G, for there is nothing ontologically in G that is S or H, but there is the potency in G to generate them which precludes His essence being identical with His existence. He could not be Existence Itself because states of reality may accrue to Him. If His essence isn’t existence itself, then existence must be added to give it actuality. Consequently, if any state of existence can accrue to G, then His essence is a potency principle in need of actualization. Thus, to state that further realities may accrue to G, however infinitesimal they may be, is to acknowledge a distinction in G’s essence and His existence. He would have to be an act/potency composite and, thus, a creature.
Continued in next post...
A simpler explanation may be found in Feser’s Five Proofs (Chapter 6). Against the objection that a substance can be purely actual as to existence but potential as to activity, he writes, “There are several problems with this suggestion, however, one of which might be obvious…agere sequitur esse (action follows being), according to which what a thing does reflects what it is. If the first cause of things exists in a purely actual way, how could it act in a less than purely actual way? How could its acting involve potentiality any more than its existence does? A thing’s existence is, after all, what is metaphysically most fundamental about it; everything else follows from that. In this case we are talking about something whose very existence is purely actual and devoid of potentiality. So, from where in its nature are the (metaphysically less fundamental) potentialities for activity that the critic suggests it is supposed to derive?”
DeleteSo, it appears to me that your position is manifestly at odds with itself.
F would be entirely simple, there isn't a real distinction between the "aseity principle" and the Divine Nature. The idea is rather that F would communicate all the perfection of E to S, with the sole exception that, since it's a communication/causing, S would not end up having aseity.
Apologies, but this is incoherent. You acknowledge that AP cannot be communicated to S, but everything else can. But if that is the case then the divine nature (N) is divisible. N cannot be self-explanatory since you deny AP in S. Having N sans AP ineluctably affirms composition in N because there is a part of N retained by F that S & H, having N, cannot have.
Humans, as contingent creatures, still receive some form of the Divine Nature - we have some being, power, life, intelligence, etc. The begotten Son receives *all* of the Divine Nature, and necessarily and eternally so, with the sole exception of aseity, since aseity is an uncommunicable form of the Divine Nature…
Thus, S & H are creatures in a higher stratification. Humans have N in a limited manner, angels in a perhaps higher manner, with S & H in the highest. As noted above, S & H are, on this model composites of N and whatever individuates them.
Moreover, since N can be expressed in or exemplified by S & H, and since N can be communicated minus AP, there is a real distinction between AP and N, your insistence otherwise notwithstanding. On your terms, there is a real difference between the two. Thus, F is a composite of AP and N, which is about as incoherent as it gets.
Anonymous, you write:
DeleteAgain, what I think is philosophically established by Divine Simplicity is that God doesn't have constitutive parts…
But that doesn’t address my objection. If you affirm additional realities in God that are not E, then that is contradicted by your claim that He is Pure or unqualified Act. That is a qualified existence by definition, so your affirmations are at odds with themselves.
That doesn't preclude God from entailing some distinctions within itself that neither constitute Him (in such a way that G would be posterior to such parts, instead of being that which entails them) nor actualize some passive potentiality in Him.
This is a claim, not an argument, and it certainly doesn’t, again, address my objection. You are alleging that God is Pure Act while simultaneously alleging that G + P doesn’t accrue an additional reality to G. But of course it does, else your claim is entirely incoherent. God cannot be unqualified existence if something ~G can be added to Him.
I think relations are weird. If there could be really distinct "God qua knower" and "God qua known" in the purely actually wise God, I don't see "being a knower" or "being known" as actualization of passive potentiality, even if they still somehow are brought about by God and the fact that the Divine Nature is knowledgeable/conscious/wise.
Either this claim asserts a univocal correspondence between our mind and the divine Mind (M), or it is our manner of making sense of M. The latter imposes no ontological reality upon G, for G is simply G. I’d have no issue with your statements if you’re alleging virtual distinctions in G. But when you allege a real distinction, then you’re courting causal dependence.
For a reliable discussion on the Trinity read Trinity in Aquinas by Giles Emory OP. He is a Dominican from Fribourg in Switzerland.
DeleteIf you want an excellent source on the Trinity read Trinity in Aquinas by Giles Emory.
DeleteWill this be released as an ebook for Kindle/Amazon (and if so, wehn)? Thanks!
ReplyDeleteDavid defeated Goliath armed with a slingshot.
ReplyDeleteProf Feser defeated Materialism armed with nothing but the concept of a triangle.
I also would like to know if this will be released as an ebook. Many thanks!
ReplyDeleteOff topic, I know, but I have to acknowledge your X about Aristotle and biology and your reference to the painter Raphael. You are indeed a Renaissance man!
ReplyDeleteAristotle's biology is relevant to the topic of the book, so not off topic!
DeletePre-ordered! Glad to see it is doing well on Amazon!
ReplyDeleteHave you ever commented that not doing good for the least of Jesus' brethren results in damnation just as surely as sexual sins?
ReplyDelete"They also will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or needing clothes or sick or in prison, and did not help you?’ “He will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me.’ “Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life.”
I have been thoroughly enjoying Immortal Souls. I hope it increases the popularity of hylemorphic dualism and the position gains more defendants and adherents. I credit my own intellectual formation on matters of the soul and mind, solely to Dr Feser and I hope others also come to see the truth of hylemorphic dualism.
ReplyDeleteIf I were to offer a suggestion, I think Prof perhaps could have included a bit about Cartesian Dualists who invoke God to deal with the interaction problem. I know that it might just be beyond the scope. But I guess it could be useful given that such discussions among theists are already taking center stage.
But God Bless Dr Feser for all what he has already done.
Ed kindly gave me a copy of this book recently and it clearly is of the same high quality as his other books. So far, I have only read the chapter 8, "Against materialism" and chapter 9, "Neither computers nor brains." These are the most relevant chapters to my forthcoming work on theological fads (which include the abandonment of objective truth and some sort of foundationalism; the abandonment of traditional ethics [natural law, virtue ethics, retribution as an important aspect of punishment etc]; denying divine simplicity, impassibility, immutability, foreknowledge etc.; and denying Christ's impeccability and even sinlessness). One chapter in this book concerns the fad of materialism/physicalism with respect to the mind/body problem. Ed's book contains a penetrating analysis of the insuperable problems of physicalism. He covers the most important arguments against physicalism, including recent arguments by Ross, Searle, Oderberg, and Rasmussen, discusses the main objections raised to these arguments and answers those objections. I shall expand upon this in a later post but I have a deadline to meet today.
ReplyDelete"and denying Christ's impeccability and even sinlessness)"
DeleteExcuse me, but what? who? how?
Hi Talmid. The traditional view is that Christ was impeccable, that his moral character, being divine, made it impossible for him to sin. Of course, there is also a sense in which Christ was capable of sin--he was physically capable of uttering a false sentence or of killing someone, etc. The impeccability of Christ was standard doctrine in Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism but most people have not heard of it nowadays and if they do, they think it conflicts with Jesus genuinely being tempted/tested. I can discuss that issue later. I defend the doctrine of Christ's impeccability but my major concern is not with those who accept that Christ never sinned in any fashion but are skeptical of impeccability. My major concern is with those biblical scholars who deny that Jesus was sinless. Let me cite a couple of examples regarding Jesus's actions with the Canaanite woman in Matthew 15:21-28. Gerd Theissen asks if we can still believe in "a Jesus who is put to shame by a foreign woman toward whom he has behaved inhumanly" and answers his question thus: "We can only trust a Jesus who allows a woman to draw him out of his prejudices."
DeleteSharon Ringe describes it "as an incident in Jesus's life when even he was caught with his compassion down" cited approvingly by Frances Taylor Gench in "Back to the Well."
Talmid,
DeleteThe doctrine of Jesus being sinless is also denied implicitly by numerous proponents of critical theory. These theorists hold that any man, simply by being male, is guilty of being part of the patriarchal system which exploits women. This would apply to Jesus even if he never sinned personally, he would still be part of the problem. Likewise, according to these theorists, Jesus by being part of an ethnic group (Jews) who despised a marginal ethnic group (Samaritans) was thereby racially guilty, whatever his own teachings towards Samaritans were. When Christians advocate for these critical theories, they (usually unwittingly) deny the central Christian doctrine that Jesus was sinless. If Jesus was part of the problem, he cannot redeem us!
@Anon
DeleteI see. Quite a strange view of the passage but i can see a completely casual reader thinking like that.
Would these author hold to orthodox views on matters like Christ divinity or atonement? I do see a non-perfect Christ as being a dificult on these matters.
@Timothy D. Finlay
We are talking about Christians, man. But the fans of Jesus with these views tend to just defend that He thinked like they do, so He is okay.
Talmid,
DeleteI was the Anon discussing impeccability and the views of Gerd Theissen and Sharon Ringe. I forgot to change the comment as function (working on a library computer). Theissen, Ringe and others likely do not view themselves as that orthodox on several matters. The problem is when books like "Back to the Well" are used at Evangelical schools without the professor criticizing these sorts of comments as heretical. I know students that have complained bitterly about this sort of thing as the institutions drift out of orthodoxy (it happens in Catholic schools also, of course).
@Timothy
Deletei supposed it was you, but i was not sure, so i did separate you from you XD
And yea, i supposed that these folks would not identify as orthodox, this view of they wous probably be disrespectiful even to muslins, let alone to any average christian. It just do not fit.
And it is sad that this material is used normally on evangelical schools, which truly seems to be a thing on catholic schools as well. That is a strange education.
Part of my book on theological fads is devoted to refuting what Christian physicalists say on the topic. They largely write on how biblical passages which have traditionally been interpreted as affirming a nonmaterial soul/spirit could be understood differently or addressing theological difficulties with physicalism. Most of them ignore the philosophical arguments against physicalism. The crucial argument by James Ross in "Immaterial Aspects of Thought" is over 30 years old but I have yet to see it mentioned in the literature of Christian physicalists. [If Ed or any reader of this blog knows where Joel Green, Nancey Murphy, or any other prominent Christian physicalist does address Ross's argument or other important philosophical arguments against physicalism, please let me know because I want to treat the topic fairly.] Ed does a superb job of simplifying and explaining the core of Ross's argument, and examining the major objections. He does this with other philosophical arguments also. Christian physicalists concede that from at least the third century A.D., Christians have explicitly argued for a dualism of body/soul. They need an explanation for why this doctrine developed given that, so they argue, Jesus and the Apostles were physicalists. They usually employ a version of Adolf von Harnack's "Hellenistic Thesis" or as Paul Gavriluk aptly labels it, "The Theory of Theology's Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy." In my next post, I shall explain why this does not work. In a further post, I shall discuss the value of the chapter "Neither computers nor brains" in combatting the fad of Christian physicalism.
ReplyDeleteFor the Hellenization Thesis to work regarding how doctrine X came to be erroneously held by Christians, the following conditions would need to be met: doctrine X must be false [else it would not be held erroneously by Christians]; Greek philosophy would need to teach X; doctrine X must not have been widely held in the ancient world prior to Hellenism (c. 300 B.C.); doctrine X must be different than what is implicitly held in the Scriptures; and X must be problematic from a biblical viewpoint. When doctrine X is physicalism, the Hellenization thesis runs into several problems. It must be able to refute philosophical arguments against physicalism, such as those so ably discussed in Immortal Souls, and I have seen little evidence of Christian physicalists even attempting this. It must show that physicalism is compatible with the doctrine of the resurrection (the more astute Christian physicalists abandon the doctrine of the intermediate state as being hopelessly incompatible with physicalism, but this leaves them the difficulty of explaining passages which support the intermediate state). And even if they solve those problems and somehow prove that physicalism was true, the Hellenization thesis would still fail. This is because, as numerous atheist physicalists acknowledge, some form of dualism is the folk default and would be held by ancient Chinese and ancient Hebrews alike. Dualism, even if it were erroneous [it is not], was not the result of Greek philosophy but of a common folk understanding of the body/soul [plus further revealed teachings].
ReplyDeleteAnother thing in regards to the soul, I'd like to add is about this notion of a "physical essence" that David Oderberg repeatedly makes use of. I haven't come across any reputed thomist who makes use of this notion. There's a small section dedicated to it in new advent but at most the claim can be made that it is scholastic.
ReplyDeleteProf Feser has a very good treatment of substantial form in Immortal Souls.
I think Prof's treatment of Metaphysics in Scholastic Metaphysics and Aristotle's revenge are very Thomistic.
These concepts are very crucial to understanding the human soul. I understand that Prof Feser has always said that he intends to follow the truth wherever it leads but I think this issue bears serious consideration.
Profs own work is very true to Thomistic principles so I'd primarily recommend profs work. But when Prof himself blurbs David Oderberg's book as he did today and his works as only complementary to it. It gets confusing.
Is "physical essence" the same as substantial form ? Indeed Prof himself never makes use of this notion. I submit that "Physical Essence" is not Thomistic and cannot be made sense of.
And I would genuinely urge Prof to consult other Thomists on this.
This is not a hit on DS Oderberg who I respect. It is just important for the sake of clarity to resolve such conflicting notions especially when you recommend your work alongside another's work otherwise it might confuse the overall concept of soul, essence etc.
Here is a basic summary of Ed's book (which is superb) from someone with more of a background in Biblical Studies.
ReplyDeleteThe book divides into four parts. Chapters 1 through 4 deals with “What is Mind?” with the chapters on The Intellect and The Will being particularly important theologically because the traditional view on what constitutes humans being made in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27) emphasizes intellect and will.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss “What is Body?” Chapter 5, “Matter” gets at what humans have in common with all material substances in the cosmos. As I write, today is Rosh Hashanah, the day that Judaism holds to be when God created the heavens and the earth, a merism for the material universe. Chapter 6, “Animality,” gets at what humans and the lower animals (created on days 5 and 6 in Genesis 1) have in common.
Chapters 7 through 9 answer “What is a Human Being?” Chapter 7 argues against Cartesianism, which is only version of substance dualism. A book which covered what Augustine, Eastern Orthodoxy, and the Oriental Apostolic churches say about the soul would need to include more about Plato and substance dualist theories other than that of Descartes. What Ed does cover in chapter 7 is explained very well, however. Regarding chapters 8 and 9, I have discussed them and will further discuss them in other posts. The refutation of physicalism in these chapters is worth the price of the book alone.
Chapters 10 through 11 discuss “What is the Soul?” with chapter 10 focusing on Immortality, and chapter 11 emphasizing hylomporphic dualism where the soul is the form of the body. Ed does not discuss the Bible in these chapters or anywhere else in the book. As more of a biblical studies specialist, I want to make the point that there is no simple correspondence between certain Greek and Hebrew words and what philosophers refer to as “soul” and “person.” The issue is more complicated than that.