Monday, June 29, 2015
Suppose a bizarre skeptic seriously proposed -- not as a joke, not as dorm room bull session fodder, but seriously -- that you, he, and everyone else were part of a computer-generated virtual reality like the one featured in the science-fiction movie The Matrix. Suppose he easily shot down the arguments you initially thought sufficient to refute him. He might point out, for instance, that your appeals to what we know from common sense and science have no force, since they are (he insists) just part of the Matrix-generated illusion. Suppose many of your friends were so impressed by this skeptic’s ability to defend his strange views -- and so unimpressed by your increasingly flustered responses -- that they came around to his side. Suppose they got annoyed with you for not doing the same, and started to question your rationality and even your decency. Your adherence to commonsense realism in the face of the skeptic’s arguments is, they say, just irrational prejudice.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
In his brief and (mostly) tightly argued book God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga writes:
[S]ome theologians and theistic philosophers have tried to give successful arguments or proofs for the existence of God. This enterprise is called natural theology… Other philosophers, of course, have presented arguments for the falsehood of theistic beliefs; these philosophers conclude that belief in God is demonstrably irrational or unreasonable. We might call this enterprise natural atheology. (pp. 2-3)
Cute, huh? Actually (and with all due respect for Plantinga), I’ve always found the expression “natural atheology” pretty annoying, even when I was an atheist. The reason is that, given what natural theology as traditionally understood is supposed to be, the suggestion that there is a kind of bookend subject matter called “natural atheology” is somewhat inept. (As we will see, though, Plantinga evidently does not think of natural theology in a traditional way.)
Thursday, June 18, 2015
Here is a roundup of blog posts and other readings on sex, romantic love, and sexual morality as they are understood from a traditional natural law perspective. [It is updated periodically to include more recent relevant posts and articles.]
Monday, June 15, 2015
Duns Scotus has especially interesting and important things to say about the distinction between causal series ordered accidentally and those ordered essentially -- a distinction that plays a key role in Scholastic arguments for God’s existence. I discuss the distinction and Scotus’s defense of it in Scholastic Metaphysics, at pp. 148-54. Richard Cross, in his excellent book, Duns Scotus, puts forward some criticisms of Scotus’s position. I think Cross’s objections fail. Let’s take a look at them.
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Sunday, June 7, 2015
I am pleased to announce the publication of Neo-Scholastic Essays, a collection of previously published academic articles of mine from the last decade, along with some previously unpublished papers and other material. Here are the cover copy and table of contents:
In a series of publications over the course of a decade, Edward Feser has argued for the defensibility and abiding relevance to issues in contemporary philosophy of Scholastic ideas and arguments, and especially of Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas and arguments. This work has been in the vein of what has come to be known as “analytical Thomism,” though the spirit of the project goes back at least to the Neo-Scholasticism of the period from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth.
Tuesday, June 2, 2015
The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, has just been published. My essay “Religion and Superstition” is among the chapters. The book’s table of contents and other details can be found here. (The book is very expensive. But I believe you should be able to read all or most of my essay via the preview at Google Books.)