Monday, September 28, 2015
This Friday, October 2, I will be giving a talk at Harvard University, sponsored by the Harvard Catholic Student Association and the John Adams Society. The topic will be “The Immortality of the Soul.” The event will be in Sever Hall, Room 113, at 8pm.
Sunday, September 27, 2015
Tuesday, September 22, 2015
Philosopher Harry Frankfurt is famous for his expertise in detecting bullshit. In a new book he sniffs out an especially noxious instance of the stuff: the idea that there is something immoral about economic inequality per se. He summarizes some key points in an excerpt at Bloomberg View and an op-ed at Forbes.
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
Just for laughs, one more brief post on the philosophy of humor. (Two recent previous posts on the subject can be found here and here.) Let’s talk about the relationship between rationality and our capacity to find things amusing.
First, an important technicality. (And not exactly a funny one, but what are you gonna do?) Recall the distinction within Scholastic metaphysics between the essence of a thing and its properties or “proper accidents” (where the terms “essence” and “property” are used by Scholastics in a way that is very different from the way contemporary analytic metaphysicians use them). A property or collection of properties of a thing is not to be confused with the thing’s essence or even any part of its essence. Rather, properties flow or follow from a thing’s essence. For example, being four-legged is not the essence of a cat or even part of its essence, but it does follow from that essence and is thus a property of cats; yellowness and malleability are not the essence or even part of the essence of gold, but they flow from that essence and are thus properties of gold; and so forth. A property is a kind of consequence or byproduct of a thing’s essence, which is why it can easily be confused with a thing’s essence or with part of that essence. But because it is not in fact the same as the essence, it can sometimes fail to manifest if the manifestation is somehow blocked, as injury or genetic defect might result in some particular cat’s having fewer than four legs. (See pp. 230-35 of Scholastic Metaphysics for more detailed discussion.)
Tuesday, September 8, 2015
I don’t write very often about relativism. Part of the reason is that few if any of the critics I find myself engaging with -- for example, fellow analytic philosophers of a secular or progressive bent, or scientifically inclined atheists -- take relativism any more seriously than I do. It just doesn’t come up. Part of the reason is that many other people have more or less already said what needs to be said about the subject. It’s been done to death.
It is also possible to overstate the prevalence of relativism outside the ranks of natural scientists, analytic philosophers, theists, and other self-consciously non-relativist thinkers.
Friday, September 4, 2015
In a recent article (to which I linked last week), philosopher Massimo Pigliucci wrote:
[W]hile some people may very well be “Islamophobes” (i.e., they may genuinely harbor an irrational prejudice against Islam), simply pointing out that Islamic ideas play a role in contemporary terrorism and repression does not make one [an] Islamophobe, and using the label blindly is simply an undemocratic, and unreflective, way of cutting off critical discourse.
Furthermore, to insist that “Islamophobia” is the only alternative to regarding Islam as inherently benign is, Pigliucci says, to promote a “false dichotomy [which] is a basic type of informal logical fallacy.”
Friday, August 28, 2015
Stop me if you’ve heard this one before, but while we’re on the subject of humor, here’s another mistake that is often made in discussions of it: failing to identify precisely which aspect of the phenomenon of humor a theory is (or is best interpreted as) trying to explain. For instance, this is sometimes manifest in lists of the various “theories of humor” put forward by philosophers over the centuries.
Tuesday, August 25, 2015
My recent Claremont Review of Books review of Scruton’s Soul of the World and Wilson’s The Meaning of Human Existence is now available for free online.
Should we expect a sound proof to convince everyone? Michael Augros investigates at Strange Notions (in an excerpt from his new book Who Designed the Designer? A Rediscovered Path to God's Existence).
Intrigue! Conspiracy! Comic books! First, where did the idea for Spider-Man really come from? The New York Post reports on a Brooklyn costume shop and an alleged “billion dollar cover up.”
Thursday, August 20, 2015
In a recent article in National Review, Ian Tuttle tells us that “standup comedy is colliding with progressivism.” He notes that comedians like Jerry Seinfeld and Gilbert Gottfried have complained of a new political correctness they perceive in college audiences and in comedy clubs, and he cites feminists and others who routinely protest against allegedly “sexist,” “racist,” and/or “homophobic” jokes told by prominent comedians like Louis C. K. In Tuttle’s view, the “pious aspirations” of left-wing “moral busybodies” have led them to “[object] to humor that does not bolster their ideology” and “to conflate what is funny with what is acceptable to laugh at.”
Check out the recently published Religion and the Social Sciences: Conversations with Robert Bellah and Christian Smith, edited by R. R. Reno and Barbara McClay. The volume is a collection of essays presented at two conferences hosted by First Things on the work of Bellah and Smith. (My essay “Natural Theology, Revealed Theology, Liberal Theology” is included.) The publisher’s website for the book can be found here.
Thursday, August 13, 2015
When everyone is somebody, then no one’s anybody.
W. S. Gilbert, The Gondoliers
Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average.
Garrison Keillor, A Prairie Home Companion
If you printed a lot of extra money and passed it around so as to make everyone wealthier, the end result would merely be dramatically to decrease the buying power of money. If you make it easier for college students to get an “A” grade in their courses, the end result will be that “A” grades will come to be regarded as a much less reliable indicator of a student’s true merit. If you give prizes to everyone who participates in a competition, winning a prize will cease to be a big deal. In general, where X is perceived to have greater value than Y and you try to raise the value of Y by assimilating it to X, the actual result will instead be simply to lower the value of X to that of Y.
Thursday, August 6, 2015
At Aeon, philosopher Elijah Millgram comments on metaphysics and the contemporary analytic philosopher’s penchant for appealing to intuitions. Give it a read -- it‘s very short. Millgram uses an anecdote to illustrate the point that what intuitively seems to be an objective fact can sometimes reflect merely contingent “policies we’ve adopted,” where “the sense of indelible rightness and wrongness comes from having gotten so very used to those policies.” And of course, such policies can be bad ones. Hence the dubiousness of grounding metaphysical arguments in intuition.
Wednesday, July 29, 2015
After my recent series of long posts on sola scriptura (here, here, and here), I fear that you, dear reader, may be starting to feel as burned out on the topic as I do. But one final post is in order, both because there are a couple of further points I think worth making, and because Andrew Fulford at The Calvinist International has now posted a rejoinder to my response to him. And as it happens, what I have to say about his latest article dovetails somewhat with what I was going to say anyway. (Be warned that the post to follow is pretty long. But it’s also the last post I hope to write on this topic for a long while.)
Following Feyerabend, I’ve been comparing sola scriptura to early modern empiricism. Let’s pursue the analogy a little further and consider two specific parallels between the doctrines. First, both face a fatal dilemma of being either self-defeating or vacuous. Second, each is committed to a reductionism which crudely distorts the very epistemic criterion it claims zealously to uphold. Let’s consider these issues in turn.
Thursday, July 23, 2015
Let’s return to Andrew Fulford’s reply at The Calvinist International to my recent post on Feyerabend, empiricism, and sola scriptura. Recall that the early Jesuit critique of sola scriptura cited by Feyerabend maintains that (a) scripture alone can never tell you what counts as scripture, (b) scripture alone cannot tell you how to interpret scripture, and (c) scripture alone cannot give us a procedure for deriving consequences from scripture, applying it to new circumstances, etc. In an earlier post I addressed Fulford’s reply to point (a). Let’s now consider his attempt to rebut the other two points.
Saturday, July 18, 2015
At The Calvinist International, Andrew Fulford replies to my recent post on Feyerabend, empiricism, and sola scriptura. You’ll recall that the early Jesuit critique of sola scriptura cited by Feyerabend maintains that (a) scripture alone can never tell you what counts as scripture, (b) scripture alone cannot tell you how to interpret scripture, and (c) scripture alone cannot give us a procedure for deriving consequences from scripture, applying it to new circumstances, etc. Fulford says that these objections “essentially rely on a caricature of the teaching,” and offers responses to each point. Let’s consider them in order.
Monday, July 13, 2015
In his essay “Classical Empiricism,” available in Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend compares the empiricism of the early moderns to the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura. He suggests that there are important parallels between them; in particular, he finds them both incoherent, and for the same reasons. (No, Feyerabend is not doing Catholic apologetics. He’s critiquing empiricism.)
Thursday, July 9, 2015
For the Platonist, the essences or natures of the things of our experience are not in the things themselves, but exist in the Platonic “third realm.” The essence or nature of a tree, for example, is not to be looked for in the tree itself, but in the Form of Tree; the essence of a man is not to be looked for in any human being but rather in the Form of Man; and so forth. Now, if the essence of being a tree (treeness, if you will) is not to be found in a tree, nor the essence of being a man (humanness) in a man, then it is hard to see how what we ordinarily call a tree really exists as a tree, or how what we call a man really exists as a man. Indeed, the trees and men we see are said by Plato merely imperfectly to “resemble” something else, namely the Forms. So, what we call a tree seems at the end of the day to be no more genuinely tree-like than a statue or mirror image of a tree is; what we call a man seems no more genuinely human than a statue or mirror image of a man is; and so forth.
Monday, July 6, 2015
Some of the regular readers and commenters at this blog have started up a Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion discussion forum. Check it out.
Philosopher Stephen Mumford brings his Arts Matters blog to an end with a post on why he is pro-science and anti-scientism. Then he inaugurates his new blog at Philosophers Magazine with a post on a new and improved Cogito argument for the reality of causation.
Speaking of which: At Aeon, Mathias Frisch discusses the debate over causation and physics.
The Guardian asks: Is Richard Dawkins destroying his reputation? And at Scientific American, John Horgan says that biologist Jerry Coyne’s new book “goes too far” in denouncing religion.
Monday, June 29, 2015
Suppose a bizarre skeptic seriously proposed -- not as a joke, not as dorm room bull session fodder, but seriously -- that you, he, and everyone else were part of a computer-generated virtual reality like the one featured in the science-fiction movie The Matrix. Suppose he easily shot down the arguments you initially thought sufficient to refute him. He might point out, for instance, that your appeals to what we know from common sense and science have no force, since they are (he insists) just part of the Matrix-generated illusion. Suppose many of your friends were so impressed by this skeptic’s ability to defend his strange views -- and so unimpressed by your increasingly flustered responses -- that they came around to his side. Suppose they got annoyed with you for not doing the same, and started to question your rationality and even your decency. Your adherence to commonsense realism in the face of the skeptic’s arguments is, they say, just irrational prejudice.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
In his brief and (mostly) tightly argued book God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga writes:
[S]ome theologians and theistic philosophers have tried to give successful arguments or proofs for the existence of God. This enterprise is called natural theology… Other philosophers, of course, have presented arguments for the falsehood of theistic beliefs; these philosophers conclude that belief in God is demonstrably irrational or unreasonable. We might call this enterprise natural atheology. (pp. 2-3)
Cute, huh? Actually (and with all due respect for Plantinga), I’ve always found the expression “natural atheology” pretty annoying, even when I was an atheist. The reason is that, given what natural theology as traditionally understood is supposed to be, the suggestion that there is a kind of bookend subject matter called “natural atheology” is somewhat inept. (As we will see, though, Plantinga evidently does not think of natural theology in a traditional way.)
Thursday, June 18, 2015
Current events in the Catholic Church and in U.S. politics being as they are, it seems worthwhile to put together a roundup of blog posts and other readings on sex, romantic love, and sexual morality as they are understood from a traditional natural law perspective.
First and foremost: My essay “In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument” appears in my new anthology Neo-Scholastic Essays. It is the lengthiest and most detailed and systematic treatment of sexual morality I have written to date. Other things I have written on sex, romantic love, and sexual morality are best read in light of what I have to say in this essay.
Monday, June 15, 2015
Duns Scotus has especially interesting and important things to say about the distinction between causal series ordered accidentally and those ordered essentially -- a distinction that plays a key role in Scholastic arguments for God’s existence. I discuss the distinction and Scotus’s defense of it in Scholastic Metaphysics, at pp. 148-54. Richard Cross, in his excellent book, Duns Scotus, puts forward some criticisms of Scotus’s position. I think Cross’s objections fail. Let’s take a look at them.
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Sunday, June 7, 2015
I am pleased to announce the publication of Neo-Scholastic Essays, a collection of previously published academic articles of mine from the last decade, along with some previously unpublished papers and other material. Here are the cover copy and table of contents:
In a series of publications over the course of a decade, Edward Feser has argued for the defensibility and abiding relevance to issues in contemporary philosophy of Scholastic ideas and arguments, and especially of Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas and arguments. This work has been in the vein of what has come to be known as “analytical Thomism,” though the spirit of the project goes back at least to the Neo-Scholasticism of the period from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth.
Tuesday, June 2, 2015
The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, has just been published. My essay “Religion and Superstition” is among the chapters. The book’s table of contents and other details can be found here. (The book is very expensive. But I believe you should be able to read all or most of my essay via the preview at Google Books.)