tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-89546086469040807962024-03-18T15:57:33.293-07:00Edward Feser"One of the best contemporary writers on philosophy" <em>National Review</em><br>
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"A terrific writer" Damian Thompson, <em>Daily Telegraph</em><br>
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"Feser... has the rare and enviable gift of making philosophical argument compulsively readable" Sir Anthony Kenny, <em>Times Literary Supplement</em><br>
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Selected for the <em>First Things</em> list of the 50 Best Blogs of 2010 (November 19, 2010)<br>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger1496125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38224259906148164752024-03-15T18:47:00.000-07:002024-03-15T18:53:05.592-07:00The metaphysics of individualism<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGkEH7n8sFz9IaCjZn8o0TO6gfcvaeMcWYnxupIFRfRQqJ3LIKzCv4o6E-KRuHFu4AK7o3-4WVMCa2kyFFsJ5r1UOmuXFanBD47waHrTv7d5gNsTzNXrN8D8WUwEbBWXSnh7n8IYHgcv_HpBMCpPNiFwAxHirpjsFf3HbogStws0kHppvO-7UONPpbFTA9/s599/0134.JPG" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="599" data-original-width="448" height="253" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGkEH7n8sFz9IaCjZn8o0TO6gfcvaeMcWYnxupIFRfRQqJ3LIKzCv4o6E-KRuHFu4AK7o3-4WVMCa2kyFFsJ5r1UOmuXFanBD47waHrTv7d5gNsTzNXrN8D8WUwEbBWXSnh7n8IYHgcv_HpBMCpPNiFwAxHirpjsFf3HbogStws0kHppvO-7UONPpbFTA9/w189-h253/0134.JPG" width="189" /></a></div>Modern moral
discourse often refers to “persons” and to “individuals” as if the notions were
more or less interchangeable. But that
is not the case. In his book <i>Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau</i>
(especially in chapter 1, section 3), Jacques Maritain notes several important
differences between the concepts, and draws out their moral and social
implications.<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Traditionally,
in Catholic philosophy, a person is understood to be a substance possessing intellect
and will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Intellect and will, in turn,
are understood to be immaterial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence,
to be a person is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ipso facto</i> to be
incorporeal – wholly so in the case of an angel, partially so in the case of a
human being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And qua partially
incorporeal, human beings are partially independent of the forces that govern
the rest of the material world.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Individuality,
meanwhile, is in the case of physical substances a consequence precisely of
their <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">corporeality</i> rather than their
incorporeality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For matter, as Aquinas
holds, is the principle of individuation with respect to the members of species
of corporeal things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence it is
precisely insofar as human beings are corporeal that they are subject to the
forces that govern the rest of the material world.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">With a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">wholly</i> corporeal living thing like a
plant or a non-human animal, its good is subordinate to that of the species to
which it belongs, as any part is subordinate to the whole of which it is a part.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such a living thing is fulfilled insofar as
it contributes to the good and continuance of that whole, the species kind of
which it is an instance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By contrast, a
person, qua incorporeal, is a complete whole in itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">its</i>
highest good, in which alone it can find its fulfilment, is God, the ultimate
object of the intellect’s knowledge and the will’s desire.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Insofar as
we think of human beings as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">persons</i>,
then, we will tend to conceive of what is good for them in terms of what
fulfills their intellects and wills, and thus (when the implications of that
are properly understood) in theological terms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But insofar as we think of them as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individuals</i>,
we will tend to conceive of what is good for them in terms of what is
essentially bodily – material goods, pleasure and the avoidance of pain,
emotional wellbeing, and the like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, we will also be more prone to see their good as something that
might be sacrificed for the whole of which they are parts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Maritain
puts special emphasis on the implications of all this for political
philosophy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The common good is more than
merely the aggregate of the goods enjoyed by individuals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But because human beings are persons, and not
merely individuals, the common good is also not to be conceived of merely as
the good of society as a whole and not of its parts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, “it is, so to speak, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a good common to the whole and the parts</i>”
(p. 23).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">On the one
hand, the political order is in one respect more perfect than the individual
human being, for it is complete in a way the individual is not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the other hand, in another respect the
individual human being is more perfect than the political order, because <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">qua person</i> he is a complete order in his
own right, and one that has a destiny beyond the temporal political realm.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, a just political order must reflect
both of these facts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In particular, it
must recognize that the common good to which the individual is ordered includes
facilitating, for each member of the community, the realization of his
ultimate, eternal end in the hereafter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus,
concludes Maritain, “the human city fails in justice and sins against itself
and its members if, when the truth is sufficiently proposed to it, it refuses
to recognize Him Who is the Way of beatitude” (p. 24).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This refusal
is, needless to say, characteristic of modern societies, both liberal and
collectivist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And unsurprisingly, they have
at the same time put greater emphasis on human individuality than on human personhood.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both do so insofar as they conceive of the
good primarily in economic and other material terms rather than in spiritual
terms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Liberal societies, in addition,
do so insofar as they conceive of these bodily goods along the lines of the
satisfaction of idiosyncratic individual preferences and emotional wellbeing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Collectivist societies, meanwhile, do so
insofar as they regard human beings, qua individuals, as apt to be sacrificed
to the good of the species of which they are mere instances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(It should be no surprise, then, that Burke
would famously condemn “the dust and powder of individuality” even as he
condemned at the same time the totalitarianism of the French Revolution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For individualism and collectivism are rooted
in precisely the same metaphysical error.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Maritain
cites a passage from Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange that summarizes the moral and
spiritual implications of the distinction between individuality and personhood:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To develop one’s </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">individuality<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> is to live the egoistical life of the passions, to make oneself the
centre of everything, and end finally by being the slave of a thousand passing
goods which bring us a wretched momentary joy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></i>Personality<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">, on the contrary,
increases as the soul rises above the sensible world and by intelligence and
will binds itself more closely to what makes the life of the spirit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The philosophers have caught sight of it, but
the saints especially have understood, that the full development of our poor
personality consists in losing it in some way in that of God. </i>(pp. 24-25,
quoted from Garrigou-Lagrange’s<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> Le Sens
Commun</i>)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Among the pagan
philosophers, perhaps none is as clear on this theme as Plotinus, who in the Fifth
Ennead contrasts individuality with orientation toward God: “How is it, then,
that souls forget the divinity that begot them?... This evil that has befallen
them has its source in self-will… in becoming different, in desiring to be
independent… They use their freedom to go in a direction that leads away from
their origin.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And among the saints,
none states this contrast more eloquently than Augustine, who distinguishes “two
cities [that] have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self,
even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the
contempt of self” (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">City of God</i>, Book
XIV, Chapter 28).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This earthly city, in
its modern guise, has been built above all by individualism.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related posts:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/11/tyranny-of-sovereign-individual.html">Tyranny of the sovereign individual</a></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2021/11/macintyre-on-human-dignity.html">MacIntrye on human dignity</a></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/10/liberty-equality-fraternity.html">Liberty, equality, fraternity?</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com33tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14482537725073393952024-03-05T18:40:00.000-08:002024-03-05T18:40:49.370-08:00When do popes speak ex cathedra?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhS_07rAsu9TDNlZF8kNlrqab-9OQ5jQbdL0YyEyEU3nqWZGI59j1BjnNp2N-EK1XcNsYIZNhxOTzUT89a0ME4vLZ3deLyAi5Zpm1xZSXQM0J8TJdbI16arHYLvdAg9kadz-Un4jhdRT1vnePwmxIbc5F9K-qseVHQ63deDQ6Ulub7HNkfohRIY43U3tTUu/s573/0022.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="573" data-original-width="309" height="350" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhS_07rAsu9TDNlZF8kNlrqab-9OQ5jQbdL0YyEyEU3nqWZGI59j1BjnNp2N-EK1XcNsYIZNhxOTzUT89a0ME4vLZ3deLyAi5Zpm1xZSXQM0J8TJdbI16arHYLvdAg9kadz-Un4jhdRT1vnePwmxIbc5F9K-qseVHQ63deDQ6Ulub7HNkfohRIY43U3tTUu/w189-h350/0022.JPG" width="189" /></a></div>Consider
four groups that, one might think, couldn’t be more different: Pope Francis’s most
zealous defenders; sedevacantists; Protestants; and Catholics who have recently
left the Church (for Eastern Orthodoxy, say).
Something at least many of them have in common is a serious
misunderstanding of the Catholic doctrine of papal infallibility – one which
has led them to draw fallacious conclusions from recent papal teaching that
seems to conflict with traditional Catholic doctrine (for example, on Holy
Communion for those in invalid marriages, the death penalty, and blessings for
same-sex couples). Some of Pope
Francis’s defenders insist that, since these teachings came from a pope, they <i>must </i>therefore be consistent with traditional
doctrine, appearances notwithstanding.
Sedevacantists argue instead that, given that these teachings are not
consistent with traditional doctrine, Francis must not be a true pope. Some Protestants, meanwhile, argue that since
Francis is a true pope but the teachings in question are (they judge) not
consistent with traditional Christian doctrine, Catholic claims about papal
infallibility have been falsified.
Finally, some Catholics have concluded the same thing, and left the
Church as a result.<span><a name='more'></a></span> <p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I’ve addressed
the doctrinal controversies in question at length elsewhere and will not
revisit them here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The point for present
purposes is that, whatever one thinks of them, none of these inferences is
sound, because they rest on the false assumption that Catholicism claims that a
pope could not err in the ways Francis is in these cases alleged to have
erred.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Church’s
teaching, as famously defined at the <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/first-vatican-council-1505">First
Vatican Council</a></span>, is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">When the Roman Pontiff speaks </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">ex cathedra<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher
of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a
doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, he
possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that
infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining
doctrine concerning faith or morals</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is fairly
widely understood that this does not mean that a pope is impeccable in his
personal moral behavior, or that he cannot err when he speaks on some topic
unconnected to faith or morals, or that he cannot err when he offers a personal
opinion on some theological matter rather than teaching in his capacity as pope.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, it is only when speaking as universal
pastor of the Church on a matter of faith or morals that he is infallible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">However, what
is somewhat less widely understood is that even this is not enough for an
infallible <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra </i>statement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As the passage from Vatican I says more than
once, the pope also needs to be speaking to the universal Church on a matter of
faith or morals <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in a manner that defines</i>
some point of doctrine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And to “define”
a doctrine is more than just putting it forward as binding on the
faithful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As the Second Vatican Council
teaches in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html">Lumen
Gentium</a></i></span>, even papal teaching that is not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> is normally binding (though as I’ve discussed <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/05/the-church-permits-criticism-of-popes_20.html">elsewhere</a></span>,
the Church acknowledges rare exceptions).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>To define a doctrine involves, in addition, putting it forward in an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">absolutely final, irrevocable</i>
manner.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When a pope defines some point
of doctrine, he is teaching it in a way that is intended <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">to settle the question for all time and can never be revisited</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It only when speaking with this <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">maximum</i> degree of solemnity that a pope
is claimed by Vatican I to be making an infallible <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Such
pronouncements are rare, and Pope Francis has never made one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In particular, none of the doctrinal controversies
referred to above involves any such pronouncement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Neither <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Amoris
Laetitia</i>’s teaching on Holy Communion for those in invalid marriages, nor
the 2018 revision to the Catechism on the topic of capital punishment, nor <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i>’s teaching on
blessings for same-sex couples, involves any <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> statement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>None
of these documents is intended to “define” or settle in an absolutely
irrevocable way any doctrinal matter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence,
if one or more of them really does contain doctrinal error, that would be –
though regrettable and indeed scandalous – nevertheless compatible with the
doctrine of papal infallibility, because none of them is the kind of
pronouncement that is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">covered by</i>
infallibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, none
of the inferences referred to above is sound.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The fact that these doctrinal pronouncements were issued under the
pope’s authority <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does not </i>(contrary
to some of Pope Francis’s defenders) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">by
itself guarantee</i> that they must be reconcilable with tradition, because
they are not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> definitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor, if they are erroneous, would that entail
that Francis is not a true pope, since (contrary to what some sedevacantists
seem to think) even true popes are not infallible when teaching <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in the specific manner </i>of the documents
in question.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For the same reason – and
contrary to what some Protestants and some Catholics who have lost their faith
suppose – if Francis has erred in these cases, that would not falsify Catholic
claims about papal infallibility, because the Church never claimed in the first
place that popes are infallible when making pronouncements <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">of the specific kind</i> in question, since none of them involves an
attempt at making an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>
definition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The teaching of the manuals <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is
important to emphasize that this is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in no
way</i> some novel interpretation of papal infallibility manufactured in order
to deal with the controversies that have arisen during the pontificate of Pope
Francis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is simply the way Catholic
theologians have always understood the matter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>To see this, consider what is said in several standard theology manuals
of the period between Vatican I and Vatican II.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This was, of course, the period when the popes were most keen to
emphasize their power to settle matters of doctrine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And yet the manuals say exactly what I just
said about the conditions on an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> statement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is worth
adding that these are manuals that received the Nihil Obstat and Imprimatur.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That does not entail that they are
infallible, but it does mean that what they say was regarded by ecclesiastical
authorities as perfectly orthodox and unremarkable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Let’s begin
with Scheeben’s 1874 <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Catholic-Dogmatics-Matthias-Scheeben/dp/1949013030/ref=sr_1_2?crid=SN1110DNE9PL&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.3parfc70A4GKoNPbQe1y31wHurkyJntXJMLzxNde3rDex3ita65ZSo7eNiooUVPAJy32rT9ayxqksvjGHwBQTk-I2ls1SF47uoao2deqs0B_nnvcJVGAs2MCfJZEuCAWb6P02ETKmmEHZfr4Ax51VDx1sXPFWNKeff-HrjOGT-9kMJKOn4u4oORtwvihR2gW8S80sBwedzxmUA7gpOOlNj9OC__zLGKx498JSh4HQfg.Vw7YuPKXuDkWroKChJieTw9MyWW8wrzkXD0oAJaLVcU&dib_tag=se&keywords=scheeben+Handbook+of+Catholic+Dogmatics&qid=1709607185&sprefix=scheeben+handbook+of+catholic+dogmatics%2Caps%2C609&sr=8-2">Handbook
of Catholic Dogmatics<span style="font-style: normal;">, Book One, Part One</span></a></i></span>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Commenting on papal authority infallibly to
judge matters of doctrine, it tells us that “only those propositions or
considerations which the judge evidently <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intended
to determine peremptorily</i> are to be regarded as judicially determined and
thus infallibly true” (p. 331, emphasis added).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is to say, unless the pope intends to settle a matter in a
peremptory or final way, his pronouncement is not of an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Accordingly, Scheeben says, “it is possible, notwithstanding the
continuing operation of his authority, that the pope <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">extra iudicum</i> [i.e. not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i>] should profess, teach, or attest something false or heretical” (p.
144, parenthetical remark in the original).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Brunsmann
and Preuss’s 1932 <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Handbook of Fundamental
Theology</i>, Volume IV, tells us the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">An </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">ex-cathedra<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> decision…
implies the unmistakable intention of the pope to utter a definitive and
binding doctrinal decision and to oblige the Universal Church to accept it with
absolute certainty.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence if the pope,
even in his capacity as supreme shepherd and teacher, were to recommend to all
the faithful a certain doctrine regarding faith or morals, even if he commanded
that doctrine to be taught in all the schools, this would be no </i>ex-cathedra<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> definition, because no definitive doctrinal
decision would be intended.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The case is
similar with regard to decrees issued by the Roman congregations, when they (as
happens with the S. Congregation of the Holy Office, over which the pope
himself presides) condemn a doctrine, and the decision is confirmed by the
supreme pontiff and published by his authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Such decrees are not per se infallible… If and so long as there is a
reasonable doubt whether the pope intends a definition to be </i>ex cathedra<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">, no one is in conscience bound to accept it
as such</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(pp. 49-50)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Notice that
Brunsmann and Preuss not only note that a papal pronouncement does not count as
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> if it is not intended as
“definitive” and as settling the matter with “absolute certainty,” but also
offer specific examples of teaching that would, accordingly, not count as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even a doctrine that a pope in his capacity
as universal teacher commends to all the faithful and commands to be taught, or
a doctrine taught with his approval by the Holy Office (now known as the
Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith), would not count as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> unless there were an “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unmistakable</i> intention” and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">no “reasonable doubt</i>” that he intended
it as an absolutely final and irrevocable doctrinal definition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ludwig Ott’s
1955 <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma</i>
says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Not all the assertions of the
Teaching Authority of the Church on questions of Faith and morals are
infallible and consequently irrevocable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Only those are infallible which emanate from General Councils
representing the whole episcopate and the Papal Decisions Ex Cathedra.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The ordinary and usual form of the Papal
teaching activity is not infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Further, the decisions of the Roman Congregations (Holy Office, Bible
Commission) are not infallible. (p. 10)<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The condition of the Infallibility is
that the Pope speaks ex cathedra.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
this is required… that he have the intention of deciding finally a teaching of
Faith or Morals, so that it is to be held by all the faithful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Without this intention, which must be made
clear in the formulation, or by the circumstances, a decision ex cathedra is
not complete.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Most of the doctrinal
expressions made by the Popes in their Encyclicals are not decisions ex
cathedra</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. (p. 287)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ott here
reiterates the points we’ve already seen in the other manuals, and adds that
“the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ordinary and usual</i> form” of
papal teaching, including “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">most of the
doctrinal expressions… [in] Encyclicals</i>,” are not infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Salaverri
and Nicolau’s 1955 <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Sacrae-Theologiae-Summa-IB-Scripture/dp/0991226879/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3MW9AIPNQTL1P&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.JrIcuj8PMXEZj9ustII22Ls_5IqBgJWH0N3hl32Ta1A4ssnrUPcW93dgMLLbFtgpupck3obJzH_tvzk6pxfxhznPN0PkUUnHJNTsZ-NMLuGU4PD5xBUE5OrHL_4uOmaS8L8TLNP5SUqg6vBi6AXJ1w.MGzC39SVjKt2TicySUrJo3Br2QZbezjBrEdBkRAuBsE&dib_tag=se&keywords=Salaverri+Nicolau+Sacrae+Theologiae+Summa&qid=1709608373&sprefix=salaverri+nicolau+ssacrae+theologiae+summa%2Caps%2C1687&sr=8-1">Sacrae
Theologiae Summa<span style="font-style: normal;">, Volume IB</span></a></i></span>
notes that “t<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">o speak ex cathedra</i>,
according to Vatican I, implies that the Roman Pontiff teaches something… <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">defining it as something that must be held</i>,
that is, obliging all to an absolute assent of the mind and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">deciding the matter with an ultimate and
irrevocable judgment</i>” (p. 216, emphasis in original).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They add that “the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">manifest intention</i> of defining something is required” (p. 219,
emphasis added).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other words, and as
the other manuals note, unless a pope explicitly tells us that he intends to
settle some doctrinal matter in an absolutely final and irrevocable way, we
don’t have an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> definition
and thus don’t have an infallible pronouncement.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Van Noort’s
1957 <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Dogmatic Theology, Volume II:
Christ’s Church</i> comments on the matter at length:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The pope, even acting as pope, can
teach the universal Church without making use of his supreme authority at its
maximum power.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now the Vatican Council
defined merely this point: the pope is infallible if he uses his doctrinal
authority at its maximum power, by handing down a binding and definitive
decision: such a decision, for example, by which he quite clearly intends to
bind all Catholics to an absolutely firm and irrevocable assent.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Consequently even if the pope, and
acting as pope, praises some doctrine, or recommends it to Christians, or even
orders that it alone should be taught in theological schools, this act should
not necessarily be considered an infallible decree since he may not intend to
hand down a definitive decision.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
same holds true if by his approval he orders some decree of a sacred
congregation to be promulgated; for example, a decree of the Holy Office…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For the same reason, namely a lack of
intention to hand down a final decision, not all the doctrinal decisions which
the pope proposes in encyclical letters should be considered definitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a word, there must always be present and
clearly present the intention of the pope to hand down a decision which is
final and definitive…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">[W]hen he is not speaking ex
cathedra… All theologians admit that the pope can make a mistake in matters of
faith and morals when so speaking: either by proposing a false opinion in a
matter not yet defined, or by innocently differing from some doctrine already
defined</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(pp. 293-94)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Van Noort
goes on to give an example of a case where a decree of a sacred congregation
was issued with papal approval but turned out to be doctrinally erroneous:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It should be candidly admitted, we
think, that the sacred congregation did condemn Galileo’s teaching by what was
actually a </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">doctrinal<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> decree.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The opinion of some theologians that the decree… was a purely </i>disciplinary<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> decree… is, in our opinion, difficult to
square with the facts of the case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Likewise it should be frankly admitted that the Congregations of the
Inquisition and of the Index committed a </i>faux pas<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> in this matter…<o:p></o:p></i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The pope was aware of the decree of
the congregation, and approved it </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">as a decree of the congregation. (pp. 308-9)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Van Noort’s
discussion repeats the points made in the other manuals, and adds the positive
explicit assertion that “the pope can make a mistake in matters of faith and
morals” when not speaking <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>,
along with an example in which a Vatican congregation acting with papal
approval did in fact issue a mistaken doctrinal decree.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Again, these
manuals were all written <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">after</i>
Vatican I proclaimed papal infallibility but <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">before</i> Vatican II and the doctrinal controversies that arose in its
wake.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence no one can claim that they
reflect some more limited, pre-Vatican I conception of papal authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor can anyone claim that they reflect the
polemical interests of post-Vatican II progressives or traditionalists who, for
very different reasons, would want to emphasize the limits of papal power.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are also exactly the sorts of manuals
sedevacantists like to appeal to in support of their position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But in fact they undermine that position,
because they show that the errors sedevacantists accuse the post-Vatican II
popes of would (even if these popes really were guilty of all the errors they
are accused of) be errors of precisely the kind the Church acknowledges can
occur, consistent with what Vatican I says about the conditions on
infallibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Again, I’m
not going to revisit here the details of the doctrinal controversies
surrounding Pope Francis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if</i> the pope’s exhortation <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Amoris Laetitia</i>, the 2018 revision to
the Catechism, or the DDF declaration <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans</i> contain doctrinal error, then these would be the kinds of errors
the Church acknowledges to be possible for a pope to make, because none of them
is an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence they would not falsify Catholicism, nor
would they show that Francis is not a true pope.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A heretical pope?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But what
about the thesis that a pope might lose his office due to heresy, which was
discussed by St. Robert Bellarmine, Francisco Suárez, and others among the
Church’s great theologians?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first
thing to say here is that what is in view in this thesis is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">formal </i>heresy, not mere <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">material </i>heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A material heresy is a claim that is in fact
heretical in its content, whether or not the person who asserts it realizes
that, or would persist in adhering to the claim after being warned that it is
heretical.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A person who holds some view
that is materially heretical would not for that reason alone suffer
excommunication and thus cease to be a Catholic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That would happen only as a result of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">formal</i> heresy, which is a material
heresy that a person persists in despite the attempts of ecclesiastical authority
to correct him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Moreover, we have to be
careful in determining what counts as “heresy,” which in canon law is not just
any old theological error, but specifically the denial of some teaching that
the Church has <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">officially defined</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A formal heretic, then, is someone who
obstinately denies some doctrine that the Church has formally defined, despite
the attempt of the Church to correct him.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The thesis
in question is that if a pope were a formal heretic in this sense, he would
cease to be a Catholic, and thus cease to be pope, since a non-Catholic cannot
be a pope.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But as <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/05/popes-heresy-and-papal-heresy.html">I
have argued elsewhere</a></span>, no one has succeeded in showing that Pope
Francis is a formal heretic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So the thesis
that he might have lost his office due to formal heresy is moot.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But even if he were a formal heretic, the
matter is still nowhere near as straightforward as sedevacantists suppose.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For one thing, the thesis that a pope could
lose his office for formal heresy is not a teaching of the Church, but a
theological opinion, nothing more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Whether a pope really could become a formal heretic, and, if so, whether
he would lose his office, are matters that have been debated but never settled,
either by theologians or by the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here is what
Van Noort says on the matter:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Thus far we have been discussing </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Catholic teaching<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It may be useful to add a few
points about purely </i>theological opinions<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">…
Theologians disagree… over the question of whether the pope can become a </i>formal
heretic<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> by stubbornly clinging to an
error on a matter already defined.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
more probable and respectful opinion, followed by Suárez, Bellarmine and many
others, holds that just as God has not till this day ever permitted such a
thing to happen, so too he never will permit a pope to become a formal and
public heretic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Still, some competent
theologians do concede that the pope when not speaking ex cathedra could fall
into formal heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They add that should
such a case of public papal heresy occur, the pope, either by the very deed
itself or at least by a subsequent decision of an ecumenical council, would by
divine law forfeit his jurisdiction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Obviously a man could not continue to be the head of the Church if he
ceased to be even a member of the Church</i>. (pp. 293-94)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Salaverri
and Nicolau write: “Theologians concede that a general Council can licitly
declare a Pope heretical, if this case is possible, but not to depose him
authoritatively since he is superior to the Council, unless it is clearly
certain that he is a doubtful Pope” (p. 217).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Note first
that both manuals are tentative about whether it really is even possible for a
pope to become a formal heretic, though some theologians do allow that this is
possible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There are two lessons to draw
from this that are relevant for present purposes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first is that the Church does permit
theologians to entertain and debate the possibility that a pope may not only
err, but <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">even fall into formal heresy</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is important for properly understanding
the doctrine of papal infallibility, because it shows that the Church is very
far from claiming that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">everything</i> a
pope might say on matters of faith or morals is infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Second, though, the common opinion is that
even if a formally heretical pope is possible in theory, it is highly unlikely
that divine Providence would allow this ever in fact to occur.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And this reinforces a point that should be
obvious in any event, which is that a Catholic ought to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">extremely</i> cautious about accusing a pope of formal heresy, as
opposed to some lesser degree of error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But it is,
in any event, not up to just any old Catholic with a stack of theology manuals
and a Twitter account to make this determination.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note that the manuals make reference to the
action of a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">council</i> against a pope
guilty of formal heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For to whom
does the task fall to warn a pope that he is in danger of such heresy?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And who has the authority to decide that,
after having been warned to no avail, his heresy is obstinate and thus has in
fact passed from being material to being formal?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If just any old Catholic could claim the
right to do this, the result would be precisely the sort of chaos that the
institution of an authoritative hierarchical Church is supposed to
prevent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence the common view is that, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if </i>a pope were to fall into formal
heresy and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if </i>he were to lose his
office as a result, the latter could only occur after some authoritative
ecclesiastical body had made the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">juridical
determination</i> that he had in fact fallen into formal heresy and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ipso facto</i> lost his office.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Yet even
this, as <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/05/popes-heresy-and-papal-heresy.html">I
have argued elsewhere</a></span>, would by no means solve all the problems that
arise in such a scenario.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And this
reinforces the point that we are dealing here not with any actual teaching of the
Church, but with highly controversial and problematic theological theories,
albeit ones the Church permits us to speculate about.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And it is merely on such <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">speculative theories</i>, rather than on official Catholic doctrine,
that the sedevacantist position is grounded.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ex cathedra heresy? <o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So far we
have been discussing papal teaching that is not presented in the first place as
if it were an irrevocable <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>
pronouncement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But what if a pope
attempted to teach some heresy in an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> way?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this possible even
in theory?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sometimes Catholics say
things to the effect that were a pope ever to try to do this, God would strike
him dead before he could carry it out.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Interestingly, though, Scheeben treats the matter as being more
complicated than that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He writes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Infallibility in itself does not
absolutely rule out</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">the possibility that the judge of
last resort may place… a formally invalid act of judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In this sense, therefore, many theologians in
the Scholastic period were able to deem the judicial infallibility of the pope
consistent with the possibility that he, out of wantonness or fear, might place
personal acts, even with the claim of his authority, which should not be
regarded at the same time as acts of his authority or of his See and hence,
without prejudice to the infallibility of the latter, could be erroneous.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Those theologians considered… the
sole [hypothetical] case of obvious and absolute temerity the one in which the
pope</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">would attempt to define a </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">notorious<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> heresy, or, what amounts to the same thing, to reject a notorious
dogma</i></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">that is held without
doubt by the entire Church and thus to require the whole Church to abandon her
faith; for in this case, they said, the pope would behave</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">not as a shepherd but as a wolf, not as a teacher but as a madman, while
on the other hand the Church or the episcopate could and would have to rise up
immediately as one against the pope, although</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">we could not say that
she was rising up over or even merely against papal authority; rather</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">she would rise up only against the arbitrariness of the person who
hitherto had possessed the papal authority, but plainly through the
questionable act renounced it and relieved himself of it</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. (p. 310)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What
Scheeben appears to have in mind by a “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">notorious
</i>heresy” or the “reject[ion of] a notorious dogma” is the explicit denial of
something <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">manifestly previously defined
as irreformable doctrine</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And by the
“attempt to define” such a heresy, Scheeben seems to have in mind a case where
a pope issued a decree like the following: “Using my full authority as
successor of Peter and universal teacher of all the faithful, I hereby declare
and define by a solemn and irrevocable decree that Jesus of Nazareth was not
the Son of God,” or something similarly manifestly heretical.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Scheeben
does not claim that Providence might ever in fact allow such a thing, but he
does discuss it as an abstract possibility that would not be strictly ruled out
by the doctrine of papal infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But how could it not be ruled out?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Scheeben’s view (or at least, the view of the Scholastic theologians he
has in mind) is that such an act would be “formally invalid” precisely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">because</i> it would manifestly conflict
with previously defined dogma.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The idea
seems to be that among the conditions on an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> definition is that it be logically consistent with previous
definitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After all, when proclaiming
papal infallibility and setting out the conditions on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncements, Vatican I explicitly says that:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Holy Spirit was promised to the
successors of Peter not so that they might, by his revelation, make known some
new doctrine, but that, by his assistance, they might religiously guard and
faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith transmitted by the
apostles</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The position
Scheeben is describing, then, would seem to be that an attempt to define a
manifest heresy <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> would be
a kind of misfire, a failure right from the get-go to fulfill a basic condition
on making an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> definition –
just as a failure explicitly to speak in one’s capacity as pope, or a failure
to manifest one’s intention actually to define a doctrine irrevocably, would be
a failure to fulfill the conditions on an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> pronouncement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(In this
respect, the position Scheeben is describing would be analogous to Fr. Thomas
Weinandy’s thesis about the conditions on magisterial teaching more generally,
which I discussed in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2024/02/what-counts-as-magisterial-teaching.html">a
recent post</a></span>.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some might
object to this position (as some have objected to Fr. Weinandy’s thesis) that
it amounts to an appeal to “private judgment,” the very thing Catholics
criticize Protestants for.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For if a
Catholic were to judge some papal definition heretical, wouldn’t this precisely
be to rely on his own judgment rather than that of the Church?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But this
objection rests on a crude misunderstanding of the notion of “private judgment.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Church has never claimed that we have <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">no understanding at all</i> of scripture,
tradition, or past papal teaching apart from what the current pope happens to
say about it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And such a claim would be
manifestly false.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You don’t need the
pope to tell you, for example, that scripture teaches that God created the
universe, that he made a covenant with Israel through Moses, that Jesus claimed
to be the Son of God, and so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Non-Catholics no less than Catholics can know <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i> much just from reading the Bible and noting how it has always
been understood for millennia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s not
as if the text is just a bunch of unintelligible squiggles that we can make
absolutely no sense of unless the current pope tells us: “This is what this
squiggle means, this is what that squiggle means, etc.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What the
Magisterium of the Church is needed for is to settle matters that go <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">beyond</i> what the text has always been
understood to say – finer points of interpretation, implications for doctrinal
controversies, applications to current problems, and so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, it is open to the Church to say:
“This is what divine creation of the universe amounts to,” or “Here is the
right way to reconcile this passage with that one.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
open to the Church to say: “Actually, God did not create the universe after
all,” or “It turns out that we’ve always been misunderstanding scripture when
we took it to be saying that God created the universe.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To deny this
would be to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">empty of all content</i> the
Church’s claim to her own infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It would be to say, out of one side of one’s mouth, that the Church
always teaches in accord with scripture and tradition – but then, out of the other
side, effectively to take this back by saying that if the Church ends up
contradicting some teaching that has always been regarded as part of scripture
and tradition, then it must not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">really</i>
have been part of scripture and tradition after all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That would be an instance of what is known in
logic as a “No true Scotsman” fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
would make the Church’s claim to infallibility unfalsifiable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Furthermore,
as <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/05/the-church-permits-criticism-of-popes_20.html">I
have shown at length elsewhere</a></span>, the Church has always acknowledged
that it can in some cases be legitimate respectfully to criticize popes, even
on doctrinal matters.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Church could
not have done so if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">every</i> criticism
of papal teaching necessarily amounted to “private judgment.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So, Scheeben
is correct to hold that, if a pope were to try to define <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> a claim like “Jesus of Nazareth was not the Son of
God,” that would be a manifest heresy, and it would not amount to “private
judgment” to say so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the contrary, it
would be precisely to adhere, not to one’s own private judgment, but to what
the Magisterium itself has in the past always insisted is irreformable
teaching.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But now
another objection to Scheeben’s thesis (or rather, the thesis he is
entertaining) might arise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For doesn’t
this thesis <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">itself also</i> make the
doctrine of papal infallibility unfalsifiable?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For doesn’t it amount to saying that popes always speak infallibly when
making an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncement –
but then going on to insist that if they do utter some error in what purports
to be an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncement,
it must not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">really</i> have been an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> pronouncement after all?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But that is
not in fact what Scheeben says.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What he
says is that if a pope attempts to define <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> some “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">notorious</i> heresy,”
then in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that </i>sort of case it would
not amount to a genuine <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>
act but rather only to a failed attempt at such an act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, he evidently has in mind cases where a
pope would deny some doctrine that has <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">manifestly</i>
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">been formally defined</i> by the Church
as irreformable doctrine (for example, the teaching that Jesus is the Son of
God).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But Scheeben does not address
cases where a pope might attempt to define <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i> some heresy that is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
notorious or blatant, but more subtle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And
here, one might argue, is where the doctrine of papal infallibility might open
itself to falsification even if one accepts the thesis discussed by Scheeben.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here would
be an example.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose a pope were to
attempt to make an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>
definition like one of the following: “Using my full authority as successor of
Peter and universal teacher of all the faithful, I hereby declare and define by
a solemn and irrevocable decree that the death penalty is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intrinsically </i>evil,” or “Using my full authority as successor of
Peter and universal teacher of all the faithful, I hereby declare and define by
a solemn and irrevocable decree that same-sex sexual activity can be morally
acceptable.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Such
pronouncements would not contradict any past <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">formal doctrinal definition</i> – a previous <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> papal pronouncement, a conciliar definition, or the
like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But they <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">would </i>manifestly contradict the clear and consistent teaching of
scripture and of the ordinary magisterium of the Church for two millennia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And the Church holds that scripture and the
consistent teaching of the ordinary magisterium cannot be in error on a matter
of faith or morals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, if a pope
attempted to make an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i>
pronouncement of one of the kinds just described, he would clearly be teaching
error.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, I
would say, if a pope were to make such a pronouncement, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that would falsify the doctrine of papal infallibility</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And I am myself not inclined to agree with
the thesis entertained by Scheeben either.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is to say, I am inclined to say that, if a pope tried to define <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex cathedra</i> a “notorious heresy” like
the claim that Jesus was not the Son of God, that too would falsify the
doctrine of papal infallibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Since I have
no doubt that that doctrine is true, I would predict that such a thing will never
in fact happen.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The doctrine is
falsifiable in the sense that it makes substantive empirical claims that can be
tested against experience.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it has
passed every such test for two millennia, and will continue to do so.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related
posts:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/12/when-do-popes-teach-infallibly.html">When
do popes teach infallibly?</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/05/popes-heresy-and-papal-heresy.html">Popes,
heresy, and papal heresy</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2024/02/what-counts-as-magisterial-teaching.html">What
counts as magisterial teaching?</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/05/the-church-permits-criticism-of-popes_20.html">The
Church permits criticism of popes under certain circumstances</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/08/aquinas-on-st-pauls-correction-of-st.html">Aquinas
on St. Paul’s correction of St. Peter</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/11/papal-fallibility.html">Papal
fallibility</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/the-error-and-condemnation-of-pope.html">The
error and condemnation of Pope Honorius</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/can-pope-honorius-be-defended.html">Can
Pope Honorius be defended?</a></span></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com51tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57738079064096110102024-02-25T14:29:00.000-08:002024-02-25T14:29:11.298-08:00What counts as magisterial teaching?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVCl5Jse407N_sU8gR5G9KRuMmV3XdOSBE3vt8TGKkISflAjD9iVj_RWCcXREuvQf7lELXxjLffzJIBqVzPpeFBglIQtMH9QuvY-3boK4xVz6ALBw2ozk3ZpCkO3qzljRGCNbu0ycsROzQYTlwrfzD6gk5ZjQFlX_zfepb2SYS3QyCR1bYCYcgwyDaE_uT/s503/0022.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="503" data-original-width="493" height="171" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVCl5Jse407N_sU8gR5G9KRuMmV3XdOSBE3vt8TGKkISflAjD9iVj_RWCcXREuvQf7lELXxjLffzJIBqVzPpeFBglIQtMH9QuvY-3boK4xVz6ALBw2ozk3ZpCkO3qzljRGCNbu0ycsROzQYTlwrfzD6gk5ZjQFlX_zfepb2SYS3QyCR1bYCYcgwyDaE_uT/w168-h171/0022.jpeg" width="168" /></a></div>Popes speak
infallibly when they either proclaim some doctrine <i>ex cathedra</i>, or reiterate some doctrine that has already been
taught infallibly by virtue of being a consistent teaching of the ordinary
magisterium of the Church for millennia.
Even when papal teaching is not infallible, it is normally owed
“religious assent.” However, the Church
recognizes exceptions. The instruction <i><a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html">Donum
Veritatis</a></i>, issued during the pontificate of St. John Paul II,
acknowledges that “it could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be
free from all deficiencies” so that “a theologian may, according to the case,
raise questions regarding the timeliness, the form, or even the contents of
magisterial interventions.” <i>Donum Veritatis</i> explicitly distinguishes
such respectful criticism from “dissent” from perennial Church teaching.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The clearest
sort of case where such criticism would be justifiable would be if a pope
himself says something that appears to conflict with the Church’s traditional
teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This has happened a handful of
times in Church history, the clearest examples involving <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/the-error-and-condemnation-of-pope.html">Pope
Honorius I</a> and Pope John XXII.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Church has always acknowledged that in these rare cases, it can be justifiable
for the faithful respectfully to reprove a pope.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I have written on this matter elsewhere (<span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/05/the-church-permits-criticism-of-popes_20.html">here</a></span>
and <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/08/aquinas-on-st-pauls-correction-of-st.html">here</a></span>)
and direct the interested reader to those articles.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Several
documents issued during the pontificate of Pope Francis have, according to his
critics, exhibited “deficiencies” of precisely the sort <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Donum Veritatis</i> says can be criticized in this way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is, for instance, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Amoris Laetitia</i>, which appears to allow, in some cases, absolution
and Holy Communion for those in invalid marriages who are sexually active and
lack firm purpose of amendment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is
the 2018 revision to the Catechism, which gives the impression that the death
penalty is intrinsically wrong when it characterizes it as “an attack on the
inviolability and dignity of the person.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Most recently, there is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans</i>, which allows for blessings for same-sex and adulterous
couples.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In these particular respects,
these documents appear to conflict with the traditional teaching of the Church.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I have
written on these controversial documents elsewhere, and what I want to address
here is a different issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose one
or more of these magisterial statements is indeed problematic in just the ways
the critics allege.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It seems that what
we would have in that case is magisterial teaching that is, to borrow the
language of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Donum Veritatis</i>,
“deficient.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.thecatholicthing.org/2023/12/19/gods-blessings-and-magisterial-teaching/">a
recent article at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Catholic Thing</i></a></span>,
Fr. Thomas Weinandy has proposed what appears to be an alternative
interpretation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Commenting on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i>, he suggests that
such deficient teaching is not truly magisterial after all, and for that reason
not binding on the faithful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is the
relevant passage:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">St. John Henry Newman provides
criteria for judging what is true and what is erroneous doctrinal development
(a “corruption”)… Newman presumed that all pontifical teaching or teaching from
bishops concerning doctrine and morals is magisterial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I propose that any pontifical teaching or
teaching from bishops that overtly and deliberately contradicts the perennial
teaching of previous councils and pontiffs is not magisterial teaching,
precisely because it does not accord with past magisterial doctrinal teaching.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The pope or a bishop may be, by
virtue of his office, a member of the magisterium, but his teaching, if it
contradicts the received previous magisterial teaching, is not
magisterial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such false teaching simply
fails to meet the necessary criteria.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
possesses no ecclesial authoritative credentials.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, it is simply an ambiguous or flawed
statement that attempts or pretends to be magisterial, when it’s not.</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This might at first glance seem
odd.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If teaching on faith or morals is
presented by the magisterium of the Church, isn’t it, by that very fact, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">magisterial</i> in nature?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it seems to me that what Fr. Weinandy is
getting at can be illuminated by way of an analogy with what St. Thomas Aquinas
says about the nature of law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aquinas
famously distinguishes several kinds of law, the two most relevant for present
purposes being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">natural law</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">human law</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The natural law, of course, has to do with morally
binding precepts grounded in human nature and discoverable by unaided reason.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Human law, by contrast, is man-made rather
than discovered or grounded in nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But human
law is necessary in order to give precision to the application of natural
law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, we can know by natural
law that it is wrong to steal or damage someone else’s property.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But how exactly to determine what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">counts</i> as another person’s property can
in some cases be difficult.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example,
if someone homesteads some piece of land, how deep under the ground do his
property rights extend?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How much of the
airspace above the land does he have a right to control?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does he have the right to drain stormwater
onto adjacent land, or to prevent it from draining onto his own?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Human law is needed in order to resolve such questions so that property
owners can know what they can reasonably expect of one another and how to
resolve disputes between them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To the
extent that human law applies and extends the natural law in such a way, it is
binding on us, just as natural law is.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">However,
such law is binding on us <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">only</i> to
that extent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, for Aquinas,
strictly speaking, it doesn’t even <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">count</i>
as law if it is not consistent with natural law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He writes: “Every humanly made law has the
character of law to the extent that it stems from the law of nature. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the other hand, if a humanly made law
conflicts with the natural law, then it is no longer a law, but a corruption of
law” (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Summa Theologiae</i> I-II.95.2, Freddoso
translation).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And since it is not law,
it lacks the binding force of law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Suppose, for example, that some purported law was passed by Congress that
permitted people to steal the property of those of some particular race or
ethnicity, or abolished private property altogether.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Because such a measure would positively
contradict the natural law, it would on Aquinas’s analysis not count as a
genuine law at all, and for that reason no one would be bound to obey it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Law, on this
understanding, cannot properly be understood except <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">teleologically</i>, by reference to the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">end or purpose</i> it serves.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Human law, to be true law, must facilitate the application of the natural
law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, when it deviates from this
end, it fails to be true law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is in
such a case mere <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">pseudo</i>-law, or at
best a failed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">attempt</i> at law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Attempting to make such laws is like
attempting to make tea but forgetting to put the teabag into the hot water, or
by running the water through coffee grounds.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Even if the person making it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intended
</i>it to be tea or even <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">thinks of it</i>
as tea, the result will not in fact be tea.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This
analysis, as I say, gives us an analogy by which we can understand Fr.
Weinandy’s thesis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Like human law,
magisterial acts have a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">teleology</i>, an
end or purpose for which they exist and apart from which they cannot properly
be understood.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That purpose is to convey
the deposit of faith, draw out its implications, and apply them to concrete
circumstances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When they facilitate that
purpose, we have genuine magisterial teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But should some act, even an act by a pope, be contrary to that end,
then the result cannot be a genuine magisterial act, any more than a human law
that contradicts the natural law can be a true law, or any more than hot water
run through coffee grounds can be true tea.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Suppose, for
example, that a pope were to teach that Christ had only one will, as Pope
Honorius appeared to do in the letter that led to his condemnation for aiding
and abetting the Monothelite heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On
Fr. Weinandy’s interpretation, the correct thing to say is not that this was a
genuinely magisterial act, albeit one that was in error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The correct thing to say is that this was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> a genuinely magisterial act, but
rather at best a failed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">attempt</i> at
carrying out a magisterial act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was a
kind of misfire, because a truly magisterial act always facilitates conveying the
deposit of faith, and Honorius’s act did the contrary of that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In Fr. Weinandy’s view, the novel teaching in
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> is another
misfire, an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">attempt</i> at a magisterial
act that fails insofar as it is contrary to the deposit of faith.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I would
suggest that yet another way to understand Fr. Weinandy’s position is that he
is, in effect, interpreting the word “magisterial” as what philosopher Gilbert
Ryle called a “success word.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A success
word is a word that describes an act or state that must be successful if it is
to be carried out or exist at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
example, if you can be said genuinely to have <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">proved</i> something or to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">know</i>
it, then it must in fact be true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You
can’t really have known something that turns out to be false, but at most only
have <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">thought</i> that you knew it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor can you prove something that is false,
but at most only <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">try</i> to prove
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By contrast, “believe” is not a
success word, because you can believe something even if it is in fact false.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">“Magisterial,”
on this interpretation, is also a success word.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If some thesis is in fact contrary to the deposit of faith, then it
cannot be genuinely magisterial, any more than a false statement can be known
or proved.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At most it can wrongly be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">thought to be</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intended as</i> magisterial, just as you can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">think</i> you know or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intend</i>
to prove something that is in fact false.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If it seems
bold to say that the Church can in some cases attempt a magisterial act and yet
fail, it is worth pointing out that there is a sense in which Fr. Weinandy’s
thesis is actually <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">less</i> bold than
what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Donum Veritatis</i> itself
says.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For again, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Donum Veritatis</i> says that it is possible for “magisterial documents”
and “magisterial interventions” to be “deficient” even with respect to their “contents,”
and not just their form or timeliness, and for that reason open to legitimate criticism
by theologians.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This seems to imply that
a thesis can be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">genuinely magisterial</i>
and yet nevertheless <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">mistaken</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">open to correction by the faithful</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Fr. Weinandy’s positon, by contrast, implies
that a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">genuinely</i> magisterial act <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">cannot</i> be mistaken or open to such
correction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whatever one thinks of his
position, it is hard to see how it is in any way less respectful of magisterial
authority than <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Donum Veritatis</i> is.</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com84tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1758712819455210312024-02-19T18:24:00.000-08:002024-02-19T18:25:55.840-08:00A comment on comments<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzDLVi1CG7aEnsdp_iNdjE36rPNJ38MG_j0EQmbU5PGUiyYAgXjFMkbZ3KIZE3XSW6oPJX1SpYdkDRxWKOWBjlheR2Ns0Kbwvu3hRNl0QBCvsTpTl65rjogPpBVdP4c-GLomyFMv_mZNK-jb66IDDrOzOd8F_L0EHSDEocD3Ouc4WIXVVxrk87MeAhF5rc/s534/0018.JPG" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="275" data-original-width="534" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhzDLVi1CG7aEnsdp_iNdjE36rPNJ38MG_j0EQmbU5PGUiyYAgXjFMkbZ3KIZE3XSW6oPJX1SpYdkDRxWKOWBjlheR2Ns0Kbwvu3hRNl0QBCvsTpTl65rjogPpBVdP4c-GLomyFMv_mZNK-jb66IDDrOzOd8F_L0EHSDEocD3Ouc4WIXVVxrk87MeAhF5rc/w349-h180/0018.JPG" width="349" /></a></div><br />Dear reader,
if it seems your comment has not been approved, sometimes it actually <i>has</i> been approved even if you don’t see it. The reason is that once a combox reaches 200
comments, the Blogger software will not show any new comments made after that
unless you click “Load more…” at the bottom of the comments page. The trouble is that this is in small print
and easily overlooked. In the screen cap
above, I’ve circled in red what you should look for.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Occasionally,
your comment does not appear because it has <i>not</i>
been approved. Sometimes this is because
the comment is too off-topic. Most of the
time, it is because the comment is nothing more than a drive-by insult or the
like, or is blasphemous or obscene.
Those are never let through if I notice them. Sometimes obnoxious comments are let through
if they are not too egregious and there is also a more substantive point made
in the comment. But I ask readers kindly
to refrain from sophomoric squabbles and the like.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Finally, sometimes
your comment has not appeared simply because it takes me a while to get to
approving comments. I’m trying to be
more speedy on that, sorry.</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50664320614084514552024-02-17T14:54:00.000-08:002024-02-17T14:54:31.780-08:00Avicenna, Aquinas, and Leibniz on the argument from contingency<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZoa2vEky6xze21oPU9FX9qGT4BXUuhNnQ5m8cM5Wvlctt0QrqSZB-vjorlZJL8GENlVGdTDui9GgSW0uOWfh0jhgpITQ7pP_rPiYVc3h-dwAy9X2PIHd4o16iTt3rS73XJh41fNJF0vKhwcCdoXzK5JNYjMWv7VKPCgglsNwhWS6IpjnwXl3DAu3DW9T0/s394/024.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="179" data-original-width="394" height="145" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZoa2vEky6xze21oPU9FX9qGT4BXUuhNnQ5m8cM5Wvlctt0QrqSZB-vjorlZJL8GENlVGdTDui9GgSW0uOWfh0jhgpITQ7pP_rPiYVc3h-dwAy9X2PIHd4o16iTt3rS73XJh41fNJF0vKhwcCdoXzK5JNYjMWv7VKPCgglsNwhWS6IpjnwXl3DAu3DW9T0/s320/024.gif" width="320" /></a></div>Avicenna,
Aquinas, and Leibniz all present versions of what would today be called the <i>argument from contingency</i> for the
existence of a divine necessary being.
Their versions are interestingly different, despite Aquinas’s having
been deeply influenced by Avicenna and Leibniz’s having been familiar with Aquinas. I think all three of them are good arguments,
though I won’t defend them here. I
discussed Avicenna’s argument in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/05/avicennas-argument-from-contingency.html">an
earlier post</a></span>. I defend
Aquinas’s in my book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Beginners-Guide-Edward-Feser/dp/1851686908/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3PBA25RSJAZ0M&keywords=feser+aquinas+oneworld&qid=1708138224&sprefix=feser+aquinas+on%2Caps%2C533&sr=8-1">Aquinas</a></i></span>,
at pp. 90-99. I defend Leibniz’s in
chapter 5 of my book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Five-Proofs-Existence-Edward-Feser/dp/1621641333/ref=sr_1_1?crid=ZXD0E7K2LU2L&keywords=feser+five+proofs&qid=1708138315&sprefix=feser+five+proofs%2Caps%2C490&sr=8-1">Five
Proofs of the Existence of God</a></i></span>.
Here I merely want to compare and contrast the arguments.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Because I
want to focus on what I take to be the main thrust of each of the arguments
rather get bogged down in exegetical details, I will offer my own paraphrases
of the arguments rather than quote directly from any of these thinkers’ texts. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here are the
three arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Avicenna’s is from the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Najāt</i>, and can be paraphrased as
follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">At least one thing exists.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has to be either necessary or
contingent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If it’s necessary, then
there’s a necessary being, and our conclusion is established.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But suppose it is contingent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Then it requires a cause.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose that cause is a further contingent
thing, and that that further contingent thing has yet another contingent thing
as its own cause, and so on to infinity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Then we have a collection of contingent things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That collection will itself be either
necessary or contingent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it can’t be
necessary, since its existence is contingent on the existence of its
members.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the collection must be
contingent, and in that case it too must have a cause.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That cause is either itself a part of the
collection, or it is outside it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it
can’t be part of the collection, because if it were, then as cause of the whole
collection, it would be the cause of itself. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And nothing can cause itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the cause of the collection of contingent
things must be outside the collection.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But if it is outside that collection, it must be necessary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, there is a necessary being</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Aquinas’s
version is the third of his famous Five Ways in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Summa Theologiae</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It can be
paraphrased as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some things are contingent in nature,
as is evident from the fact that they come into existence and go out of
existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such things can’t exist
forever, since whatever is contingent, and thus is capable of failing to exist,
will in fact at some point fail to exist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So, if everything was contingent, then at some point nothing would have
existed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But if there was ever a time
when nothing existed, then nothing would exist now, since there would in that
case be nothing around to cause new things to come into existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But things do exist now.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, not everything can be contingent, and there
must be a necessary being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, such a
thing might derive its necessity from another thing, or it might have its
necessity of its own nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But there
couldn’t be a regress of things deriving their necessity from something else
unless it terminates in something having its necessity of its own nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, there must be something which has its
necessity of its own nature</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Leibniz’s
version is in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Monadology</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It might be paraphrased as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For anything that exists, there must
be a sufficient reason for its existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In the case of the contingent things that make up the universe, this
cannot be found by appealing merely to other contingent things, even if the
series of contingent things being caused by other contingent things extended
backward into the past without beginning.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For in that case, we would still need a sufficient reason why the series
as a whole exists.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the series as a
whole is no less contingent than the things that make it up.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the explanation cannot lie in the series
itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A complete explanation or
sufficient reason can be found only if there is a necessary being that is the
source of the world of contingent things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So, there must be such a necessary being</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Each of these
thinkers goes on to argue that, on analysis, it can be shown that the necessary
being must have the key divine attributes, and therefore is God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I want to focus here just on the
reasoning each argument gives for the existence of a necessary being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And again, I won’t be defending the arguments
here, but just comparing them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So I
won’t say anything about how the arguments might be fleshed out or the
reasoning made tighter, how various objections would be answered, and so on.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What do the
arguments have in common?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First, they all
rest, of course, on the distinction between contingent beings and necessary
beings, and argue that it cannot be that everything falls into the former
class.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Second, they all reason <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">causally</i> to the necessary being as the
source of everything other than itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Third, for that reason, they all have at least a minimal <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">empirical</i> component insofar as they
appeal to the contingent things we know through experience and argue from their
existence to that of a necessary being.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A fourth
similarity is that all three thinkers cash out the nature of the necessary
being’s necessity in terms of the distinction between essence and existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Though, as my paraphrases indicate, this is a
distinct step that does not and need not be stated in the arguments
themselves.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Furthermore, our three
philosophers do not do this in quite the same way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Avicenna, and Aquinas following him, hold
that the cause of things in which essence and existence are distinct must be a
necessary being in which they are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
distinct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Leibniz, however, does not say
that God’s essence <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is </i>his existence,
but that his essence <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">includes</i>
existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(This way of putting things
has influenced much contemporary discussion – and not for the better, because it
obscures the implications for divine simplicity that Avicenna's and Aquinas’s way
of speaking makes clear.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A fifth
similarity is that none of the three arguments either presupposes or asserts
that the universe had a beginning.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All
of them hold that the existence of a necessary being can be established even if
we were to suppose that the world of contingent things has always been here.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A sixth
similarity is that each of the arguments moves from a claim about contingent
things considered individually to a claim about contingent things considered
collectively, albeit in different ways.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For Avicenna, just as an individual contingent thing requires a cause,
so too does the totality of contingent things require a cause.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For Aquinas, just as individual contingent
things must fail to exist at some point, so too must the collection of
contingent things fail to exist at some point, at least if there were no
necessary being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For Leibniz, just as
individual contingent things require an explanation outside them, so too does
the collection of contingent things require an explanation outside it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">How do the
arguments differ?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First some background.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Scholastic philosophers often distinguish <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">physical</i> from <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">metaphysical</i> arguments for God’s existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Physical arguments are those that proceed
from facts about the concrete physical world as interpreted in light of the
philosophy of nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, Aquinas’s
First Way is commonly interpreted as a physical argument because it begins with
the reality of motion, understood along Aristotelian lines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Metaphysical arguments are those that proceed
from more abstract considerations that are not tied to the physical world per
se.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, Aquinas’s proof for God’s
existence in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">De Ente et Essentia</i>
begins with the fact that there are things whose essence and existence are
distinct and argues that such things require a cause whose essence just is
subsistent existence itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since there
is an essence/existence distinction in angels no less than in material things,
the argument does not depend on facts about the physical <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">per se</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Of the three
arguments we’re considering here, Aquinas’s has a more physical cast than those
of Avicenna and Leibniz.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For the
observation that material things come into being and pass away, and the claim
that material things individually and collectively would go out of existence given
enough time, play a big role in the argument, and these are points about the
physical qua physical.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">By contrast,
Avicenna’s and Leibniz’s arguments have a more metaphysical cast.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if we take them at least to refer to
physical things, what they focus on is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">contingency</i>
of these things rather than anything specifically physical.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And angels, which are immaterial, are in a
sense contingent too, insofar as there is in them an essence/existence distinction
and thus the need for a cause which imparts existence to them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(To be sure, there is for Aquinas also a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sense</i> in which angels are necessary
beings, since once they exist, there is nothing in the created order that can
destroy them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Still, they have to be
created by God, who could also annihilate them if he wills to.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence angels have only a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">derivative</i> necessity rather than a strict necessity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For that reason, they also have a kind of
contingency.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, it
seems that one could remove any reference to the physical as such from Avicenna’s
and Leibniz’s arguments without altering their basic thrust.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, one could even remove any reference
to any actual specific contingent things and argue simply that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if</i> there are contingent things (whether
or not there really are any), they couldn’t be the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">only</i> things that exist, for the reasons Avicenna and Leibniz
give.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aquinas’s Third Way, by contrast,
would be a very different sort of argument if the physical claims it makes were
removed from it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A second
difference is that the notion of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">explanation</i>,
and with it the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), play an explicit role in
Leibniz’s argument but not in Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is not to deny that Avicenna and Aquinas
are at least implicitly committed to PSR, and that it lurks in the background
of their arguments, which are of course offering explanations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this is not thematized in their
arguments, the way it is in Leibniz.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This reflects Leibniz’s distinctively rationalist approach to metaphysics.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here’s one
way to understand the difference.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Scholastics distinguish several “transcendentals,” attributes that apply to all
things of whatever category – being, truth, goodness, <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2021/10/truth-as-transcendental.html">and
so on</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These are taken to be “convertible,”
the same thing looked at from different points of view.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, truth is being considered as
intelligible, and goodness is being considered as desirable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I say a lot more about the transcendentals
in <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/FESTAA">this article</a>.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Avicenna’s
and Aquinas’s arguments essentially consider reality under the guise of the transcendental
attribute of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">being</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The being of contingent things, they argue,
must derive causally from the being of something that exists in an absolutely necessary
way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Leibniz’s argument, by contrast,
essentially considers reality under the transcendental attribute of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">truth</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intelligibility</i> of contingent
things, he argues, presupposes a necessary being which is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intelligible in itself</i> rather than by reference to something else.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A third
difference is that the impossibility of an infinite regress of a certain kind
plays a role in Aquinas’s Third Way that finds no parallel in Avicenna’s and
Leibniz’s arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To be sure, and as
I have said, none of the three arguments rules out the possibility of an
infinite <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">temporal </i>regress – a regress
of what Aquinas would call “accidentally ordered” causes extending backward
into the past.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>None of them supposes or
tries to establish that the world had a beginning.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But Aquinas’s argument does include the
premise that a series of beings that derive their necessity from something else
would have to terminate in something that has its necessity of its own nature
or built into it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And here he is
appealing to the impossibly of an infinite series of causes of what he calls an
“essentially ordered” kind, also known as a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">hierarchical
</i>causal series.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I discuss the
difference between these two kinds of causal series in many places, including <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Aquinas</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Five Proofs</i>.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Any further
differences between the three arguments seem to me to reflect these three
fundamental differences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And the
differences are important, both because they capture different aspects of
reality, and because they entail that some objections that might seem to have
force against one version of the argument from contingency will not necessarily
apply to other versions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Though, as I
have indicated, I think each version can successfully be defended against
objections.)</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com96tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72050682828278714872024-02-07T11:40:00.000-08:002024-02-07T11:40:26.294-08:00The heresy with a thousand faces<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1Jq7axxBsj4Cs39OtFtpzBGrIdux2m_VTI2XrwJ-3WssUlejbTjJ2cQXsXTMiu304v0gvTkEAfxXi1z5lUTPQyXQNKUCWj8mFdr6dK4IM3L36XTIZIKEZ0BKPm5m7w8Vd8MMRlZw4MIa_TF0A-_Py_P2yET3GQCitJZ7gmaKlmjrkIGPj76PjyBe6VcsG/s569/011.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="357" data-original-width="569" height="201" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh1Jq7axxBsj4Cs39OtFtpzBGrIdux2m_VTI2XrwJ-3WssUlejbTjJ2cQXsXTMiu304v0gvTkEAfxXi1z5lUTPQyXQNKUCWj8mFdr6dK4IM3L36XTIZIKEZ0BKPm5m7w8Vd8MMRlZw4MIa_TF0A-_Py_P2yET3GQCitJZ7gmaKlmjrkIGPj76PjyBe6VcsG/s320/011.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>In <a href="https://www.postliberalorder.com/p/wokism-is-the-new-face-of-an-old">a
new article at <i>Postliberal Order</i></a>,
I discuss the disturbing parallels between the woke phenomenon and the medieval
Catharist or Albigensian heresy, a movement so fanatical and virulent that the
preaching of the Dominicans could not entirely eliminate it and Church and
state judged military action to be necessary.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com227tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23511936140751049552024-01-27T15:52:00.000-08:002024-01-27T15:52:13.184-08:00Immortal souls at West Point<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2qLe2BYdhYJJeRVL68eAB3QOyNEVMgSqiN75-zAJ9kvpHEvx7RB-yAjfqp21ZeXZOggktVBgwpIvbQUgmiMaYQj9outjCtBxJzGvYzii_dlCBYZZ6vqW9TxxipzChC8KptV1EHBluJZEKYggtBeEDePeeai2C4gwBh1zh4pAeEf0SjtcEdL82X6T5eKTD/s800/002.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="800" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2qLe2BYdhYJJeRVL68eAB3QOyNEVMgSqiN75-zAJ9kvpHEvx7RB-yAjfqp21ZeXZOggktVBgwpIvbQUgmiMaYQj9outjCtBxJzGvYzii_dlCBYZZ6vqW9TxxipzChC8KptV1EHBluJZEKYggtBeEDePeeai2C4gwBh1zh4pAeEf0SjtcEdL82X6T5eKTD/s320/002.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>Had a great
time visiting the United States Military Academy at West Point this week for a
Thomistic Institute talk on the theme “Do You Have an Immortal Soul?” Thank you
TI and cadets!<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16454812622800732102024-01-22T21:55:00.000-08:002024-01-22T21:55:19.216-08:00Voluntarism in The Vanishing<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVplvX9LBMLOC7e6cTvXy556xnjLs6a3DDzCitMZTnmvbQDgTOGEvsXFPRXGfXCFvgVJHcDtxnA52uUIGLLsTQY0YQraoK2MwgvbGHcwDF-TuFut0V9NqwfHGZB_uCXtvdBFbC3hx7_PSD4P_hatn0S6utrqjDRT1Zvmt8oLPMgjIE0OKDz9EsgH0bzCEv/s534/003.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="534" data-original-width="367" height="199" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVplvX9LBMLOC7e6cTvXy556xnjLs6a3DDzCitMZTnmvbQDgTOGEvsXFPRXGfXCFvgVJHcDtxnA52uUIGLLsTQY0YQraoK2MwgvbGHcwDF-TuFut0V9NqwfHGZB_uCXtvdBFbC3hx7_PSD4P_hatn0S6utrqjDRT1Zvmt8oLPMgjIE0OKDz9EsgH0bzCEv/w137-h199/003.jpg" width="137" /></a></div>The
reputation of 1993’s <i><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Vanishing_(1993_film)">The Vanishing</a></i>
has suffered because critics judge it inferior to the 1988 Dutch movie of which
it was a remake. But considered on its
own terms, it is a solid enough little thriller. Jeff Bridges is effectively creepy as the
oddball family-man-cum-kidnapper Barney Cousins. I had reason to re-watch the flick the other
day, and was struck by what I take to be an underlying theme of the contrast
between <i>voluntarist</i> and <i>intellectualist </i>conceptions of human
action.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To
oversimplify, intellectualism in the sense in question is the view that the
intellect is prior to the will, whereas voluntarism holds that he will is prior
to the intellect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is to say, for
the intellectualist, the will only ever wills what the intellect first judges
to be in some way good; whereas for the voluntarist, the will wills what it does
independently of the intellect, and the intellect follows along for the ride.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The dispute is thus over whether it is ultimately
the intellect or the will that is “in the driver’s seat” of human action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Naturally, things are more complicated than
that, but this characterization will do for present purposes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Applied to
the issues of free will and moral responsibility, the dispute between
voluntarism and intellectualism cashes out in the difference between what theologian
Servais Pinckaers calls the “freedom of indifference” and “freedom for
excellence.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the former conception of
free will, associated with Ockham, the will is of its nature indifferent toward
the various ends it might pursue, and thus is freer to the extent that it is at
any moment equally capable of choosing anything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The implication is that a will that is
strongly inclined to choose what is good rather than what is evil is less free
than a will that is not inclined in either direction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By contrast, on the conception of free will
as “freedom for excellence,” which is associated with Aquinas, the will is
inherently directed toward the good in the sense that pursuit of the good is
its final cause.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The implication is that
the will is more free to the extent that it finds it easy to choose what is
good and less free to the extent that it does not.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">How is this
relevant to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Vanishing</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s start with a brief summary of the
plot.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I’ll leave out the most crucial
spoilers, for any readers who haven’t seen it.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The movie begins with Barney elaborately planning a kidnapping, for
reasons that are only revealed later and made especially hard to fathom given
that he otherwise seems like an ordinary, middle class loving father and
husband.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Meanwhile, we’re introduced to writer
Jeff Harriman and his girlfriend Diane (played by Kiefer Sutherland and Sandra
Bullock, respectively) who are on vacation and stop at a large and busy gas
station, where Diane goes into the snack shop to pick up supplies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After waiting in the car for an unusually
long time, Jeff goes to look for Diane but can find her nowhere.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The employees, customers, and police all prove
to be of no help in finding her, and she has vanished without a trace.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The movie
then flashes forward three years, and we find that Jeff has during that whole
time been looking for Diane without success.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He has posted fliers with Diane’s picture all over the vicinity of the
gas station, appeared on television to discuss the case, followed any lead he
can find, and repeatedly badgered the police, all to no avail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The search has become an obsession, and has
exhausted him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When he starts a new
relationship with a waitress named Rita (played by Nancy Travis) it seems he
may finally abandon the search.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But then
Barney, who has been following the case during this time, decides to contact
Jeff and reveal that he is the one who abducted Diane.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He promises Jeff that he can at long last
find out exactly what happened to her, but only if he agrees to experience what
she did – beginning with allowing Barney to drug Jeff with chloroform to knock
him out, just as he had drugged Diane.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I’ll leave
it to the interested reader to watch the movie and find out what happens.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The relevance to voluntarism is this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When explaining to Jeff why he did what he
did, Barney begins by describing actions he had performed through the course of
his life despite their being dangerous.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>One of them involved saving a drowning girl, which had made Barney a
hero in the eyes of his daughter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
rather than gratifying Barney, his daughter’s admiration troubled him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He worried that he could not be worthy of
being thought by her to be a good man unless he was just as capable of doing
great <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">evil</i> as he was of doing good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so he decided that he would prove to
himself that he was capable of such evil by doing the worst thing he could
think of to another person – which turned out to be Diane (and where we find
out exactly what he did to her by the end of the movie).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Barney’s
tale reveals, first, a fixation on the power of the will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He recounts jumping off a roof as a boy even
though he knew it was dangerous, and indeed resulted in him breaking his arm. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Throughout the movie he is almost always
unflappable even in moments of distress, as when he suffers a serious beating
with equanimity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the truly voluntarist
element is his apparent belief that a praiseworthy action could only flow from something
like what Pinckaers calls the “freedom of indifference” – that is to say, from a
will that was not in any way aimed at the good more than at anything else, but
opted for it anyway.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This, it seems to
me, is the best way to make sense of Barney’s claim that he could only be
worthy of praise for his good action of saving the girl if he was no less
capable of an evil action like what he does to Diane.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The kidnapping was, in effect, his way of
proving to himself that he did indeed possess the “freedom of indifference.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Had he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> been able to bring himself to do
such an evil thing, and had he saved the little girl because of an inclination toward
benevolence, this would have been perfectly consistent with what Pinckaers
calls the “freedom for excellence,” and would have been morally praiseworthy on
that conception of freedom. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Barney’s
dissatisfaction with himself evinces an implicit rejection of this conception and
of its implications concerning what makes a person praiseworthy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But neither do his actions flow from any positive
inclination towards sadism, nor from a rejection of moral norms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is portrayed as, in general, a pleasant
enough person.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And he acknowledges that
it is just for Jeff to want Barney harmed for what he has done.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He never evinces the slightest enjoyment of
causing others pain.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All his actions are
performed in the bloodless manner of a scientific experiment (and indeed, it is
revealed that Barney is a chemistry professor).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He simply wants to make of his will something capable of anything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Only a good
action that flows from <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i> kind of
will is, he thinks, praiseworthy, and the reason seems to be that he thinks
only this kind of action would flow from the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sheer arbitrary freedom of the will alone</i> rather than from any
natural sentiment of benevolence or from a respect for rational criteria.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is, to be sure, a curious conception of
freedom and moral praiseworthiness, and quite perverse (indeed, depraved) from
the point of view of an intellectualist like Aquinas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But reading Barney as implicitly committed to
a conception of freedom as the “freedom of indifference” makes intelligible
what might otherwise seem a simply bizarre and incoherent character motivation.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If Barney
takes the voluntarist emphasis on the will to an extreme, there is also a sense
in which the other main character, Jeff, can be said to take the
intellectualist emphasis on the intellect to an extreme.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His new girlfriend Rita grows increasingly
frustrated with his inability to overcome his obsession with finding
Diane.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>She is, more than anything,
jealous of this lost former girlfriend she has to compete with.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Jeff explains that Rita is the one he loves,
and that romantic longing no longer has anything to do with his obsession with
finding Diane.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not knowing</i> that bothers him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He admits that if he had a choice between two
scenarios, one in which Diane is alive somewhere and happy but he never finds
out what happened, and one in which he does find out but she is dead, he would
prefer the latter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whereas Barney has
made himself into a blind will divorced from intellect and its standards of
truth and goodness, Jeff has made himself into an intellect obsessed with
attaining a certain piece of knowledge to the exclusion of willing what is in
fact good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related posts:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/09/pop-culture-roundup.html">Pop
culture roundup</a> [where you’ll find other pretentious philosophical analyses
of movies, music, comics, and the like]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html">Voluntarism
and PSR</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-voluntarist-personality.html">The
voluntarist personality</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com38tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21015879786988737962024-01-17T18:30:00.000-08:002024-01-17T18:30:00.320-08:00Avicenna’s flying man<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhM6zEoITRVtEGGUbpd59y5EuEbh6XtY2xzapq2_I-Qls9q6uJ_ohwR7EsT07A6ead0mR5bhAWptaJ2YXr2PDJoH085b1SGTU_HzZBxRPxDgFWrUSBcJgDmh32knyvanlXOLg7TWKCg71ajv5p2WdbQZ-TW1fz7nq37Ll_DP4m7Xp6OfBs4jOGmD35EVZL7/s346/003.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="346" data-original-width="259" height="227" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhM6zEoITRVtEGGUbpd59y5EuEbh6XtY2xzapq2_I-Qls9q6uJ_ohwR7EsT07A6ead0mR5bhAWptaJ2YXr2PDJoH085b1SGTU_HzZBxRPxDgFWrUSBcJgDmh32knyvanlXOLg7TWKCg71ajv5p2WdbQZ-TW1fz7nq37Ll_DP4m7Xp6OfBs4jOGmD35EVZL7/w170-h227/003.jpg" width="170" /></a></div>Peter
Adamson’s new book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Ibn-Sina-Short-Introduction-Introductions/dp/0192846981/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1F9GJIN34N8CQ&keywords=Ibn+S%C4%ABn%C4%81+%28Avicenna%29%3A+A+Very+Short+Introduction&qid=1705435867&sprefix=ibn+s%C4%ABn%C4%81+avicenna+a+very+short+introduction+%2Caps%2C495&sr=8-1">Ibn
Sīnā (Avicenna): A Very Short Introduction</a></i></span> is an excellent
primer on the great medieval Islamic philosopher. After a biographical chapter, it treats
Avicenna’s views on logic and epistemology, philosophical anthropology,
science, and natural theology, and closes with a discussion of his influence on
later philosophy and theology. Among the
things readers will find useful is the book’s discussion of Avicenna’s famous
“flying man” argument. Let’s take a
look.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The flying
man thought experiment is one of the means (not the only one) by which Avicenna
aims to establish the incorporeality of the human soul.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He presents it at the end of the first
chapter of his treatment of the topic of the soul in his work <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Cure</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One place you can find the relevant passage
is Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman’s anthology <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Classical-Arabic-Philosophy-Anthology-Sources/dp/0872208710/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3RGMDZPM8Y6N&keywords=classical+arabic+philosophy&qid=1705438670&sprefix=classical+arabic+p%2Caps%2C1576&sr=8-1">Classical
Arabic Philosophy</a></i></span>, which translates it as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For the purposes of establishing the
existence of the soul… [I]t has to be imagined as though one of us were created
whole in an instant but his sight is veiled from directly observing the things
of the external world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is created as
though floating in air or in a void but without the air supporting him in such
a way that he would have to feel it, and the limbs of his body are stretched
out and away from one another, so they do not come into contact or touch.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Then he considers whether he can assert the
existence of his self.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He has no doubts
about asserting his self as something that exists without also [having to]
assert the existence of any of his exterior or interior parts, his heart, his
brain, or anything external.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He will, in
fact, be asserting the existence of his self without asserting that it has
length, breadth, or depth, and, if it were even possible for him in such a state
to imagine a hand or some other extremity, he would not imagine it as a part of
his self or as a necessary condition of his self...<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the self whose existence he asserted is
his unique characteristic... <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, what
[the reader] has been alerted to is a way to be made alert to the existence of
the soul as something that is not the body – nor in fact </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">any<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> body</i>. (pp. 178-79)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The basic
idea of the thought experiment is as follows.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A man who comes into existence in the bizarre circumstances Avicenna
describes would have no sensory experiences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For one thing, he has from the start somehow been suspended in midair, in
a manner that does not involve even the air pushing against him – perhaps by
miraculous divine action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence he has
never experienced external physical objects exerting any pressure on his
skin.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Because his arms, legs, fingers,
etc. are all spread out away from one another, he also has not felt even his
own body parts pressing against him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Because he is veiled (presumably in a manner that does not involve a
veil making contact with his body) he has never seen anything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Presumably his ears, nose, and tongue are
similarly prevented from being affected by any stimuli.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence he has no awareness of any physical
object, not even his own body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As
Adamson notes, while some might object that such a man would still have proprioceptive
experiences of his limbs, it is not difficult to extend the thought experiment
in a way that would prevent that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
could imagine, for example, that the miraculous suspension of the normal operation
of the relevant nerves is a further part of the situation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, the man
would, Avicenna claims, nevertheless have awareness of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">himself</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He would know that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">he</i> exists, even though he would <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> know that his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">body</i> exists, and indeed would not know that any physical world at
all exists.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In that case, though, he
must be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">distinct from</i> his body and
from anything corporeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For if he were
corporeal, how could he know he exists without knowing that anything corporeal
exists?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Parallels to Avicenna?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I’ll come
back to some of the remarks Adamson makes about the argument, but first let me
make some observations of my own.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Avicenna’s
argument might seem similar to arguments later developed in the Cartesian
dualist tradition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, in his
Sixth Meditation, <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/04/descartes-clear-and-distinct-perception.html">Descartes
argues</a> that he could in principle exist without his body existing, if God
willed to create him that way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And in his
book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Engines of the Soul</i>, <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/conceiving-and-hallucinating.html">W.
D. Hart argues</a> that it is possible in principle for a person to have visual
experiences while lacking a body, in which case it is possible for a person to
exist without a body.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">However,
Avicenna’s argument is importantly different, in several respects.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First, Avicenna emphasizes that the man in
his thought experiment has had <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">no sensory
experiences</i> at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By contrast,
Hart’s argument involves a disembodied person who <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> have such experiences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And at least earlier in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Meditations</i>,
in Meditation One, Descartes suggests that it is possible for someone to have
sensory experiences even in the absence of the existence of his body or of any
material world at all, if a Cartesian demon caused a disembodied mind to hallucinate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Second, the key
premise of Avicenna’s argument is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">epistemic</i>,
whereas the key premises of the Cartesian arguments mentioned are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ontological</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Descartes and Hart start with the idea that
it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">possible</i> for the self to exist
without the body, and conclude from that that the self is distinct from the
body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Avicenna starts with the idea that
one can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">know</i> the self without <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knowing</i> the body, and concludes from
that that the self is distinct from the body.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Third, and
relatedly, the thought experiments Descartes and Hart appeal to presuppose that
the self could in fact exist apart from the body, whereas Avicenna’s thought
experiment does not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is not to say
that Avicenna doesn’t think the self could survive without the body, but only
that that would be a further <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">conclusion</i>
of the argument rather than a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">presupposition</i>
of the argument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The reason
these differences are important is that they make Avicenna’s argument immune to
certain objections that might be raised against Descartes and Hart.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First, one might question the assumption that
sensory experience really is possible without a body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If that assumption is wrong, then Hart’s
argument will fail (though whether Descartes’s argument would fail will depend
on how seriously Descartes wants us to take the Cartesian demon scenario).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But Avicenna’s argument makes no such
assumption.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Second, because
they presuppose that it is possible for the self to exist apart from the body,
Descartes and Hart might be accused of begging the question.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are trying to get from the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">possibility</i> of the self existing apart
from the body to the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">real distinction</i>
between self and body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But a critic can
object that the claim that it is possible for the self to exist apart from the
body <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">presupposes</i> that there is a
distinction between self and body, and thus can hardly cogently be appealed to
in order to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">establish</i> such a
distinction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Avicenna is not open to
such an objection.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If we are
looking for arguments from the tradition that are similar to Avicenna’s, it
seems to me that a more plausible parallel is to be found in some arguments <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">earlier</i> than his, which were developed
by St. Augustine in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">On the Trinity</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/augustine-on-immateriality-of-mind.html">Augustine
held</a> that the mind can know its own essence with certainty, but does not
know with certainty that corporeality is part of its essence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, he concludes, corporeality is not part
of the mind’s essence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He also held that
the mind can know itself without the mediation of any imagery, but cannot know
material things that way, and concluded that the mind must not be material.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Augustine’s
and Avicenna’s arguments are similar, then, in starting with what the mind <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knows</i> or doesn’t know about itself and
about material things, and from this epistemic premise drawing a conclusion
about the distinction between the mind and anything material.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The key difference is that Avicenna appeals
to a novel thought experiment in order to make his point about what the mind
knows.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some objections<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As Adamson
notes, one objection that can be raised against Avicenna’s argument would be to
deny that the flying man really would or could know of his own existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One could hold that it is only <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">after</i> the mind has had some perceptual
experiences that it comes to know itself, by way of reflecting on those
experiences.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note that one can hold this
on the basis of the moderate empiricism of Aristotle and Aquinas, without
committing oneself to the more extreme modern empiricism of Locke and his
successors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And as that indicates, one
could hold this without rejecting Avicenna’s conclusion that the mind is
incorporeal, but only the flying man argument’s particular way of arriving at
that conclusion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Adamson also
notes that Avicenna’s argument has to be understood in light of his broader
epistemological commitments, which include the thesis that the self is always
at least tacitly aware of itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I find
these broader commitments dubious, but for present purposes will simply note
that the need to defend them in order to get the flying man argument off the
ground at the very least makes it a considerably less punchy argument than it
might appear to be at first glance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Another
objection noted by Adamson is that to know one’s self without knowing one’s
body does not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">by itself</i> entail that
the self is different from the body, any more than the fact that Lois Lane
knows that Clark Kent is at the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Daily
Planet</i> without knowing that Superman is there entails that Clark Kent is
different from Superman.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Adamson
suggests that one way Avicenna could reply to this would be to argue that to
know a thing’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">essence</i>, specifically,
requires knowing its essential constituents.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If we say that the flying man knows his essence while not knowing
anything about his body, then the body cannot be among the self’s essential
constituents.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This
interpretation of the argument underlines its parallels with Augustine’s
arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I refer the reader to <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/11/augustine-on-immateriality-of-mind.html">my
discussion of those arguments</a>, which is not unsympathetic even though they
are not my own preferred way of establishing the mind’s immateriality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related reading:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/05/avicennas-argument-from-contingency.html">Avicenna’s
argument from contingency, Part I</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/07/avicennas-argument-from-contingency.html">Avicenna’s
argument from contingency, Part II</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/02/avicenna-on-non-contradiction.html">Avicenna
on non-contradiction</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84476573684611180102024-01-10T16:40:00.000-08:002024-01-10T16:40:06.452-08:00Progress report<p>My friends, it exists. More news later.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIJqTSkG0nIj3LpUZb6Ytkfw4Bco-eCD-_EVylmGyDSc4EYIhEpRtg5C1vWP7ntg2BKU7lUKWpnFCJUQllEKvcWSMknaEy4Gd9Si1APP6B84HKZudOSZGhQW7dPWbLXogD0cSQRCP2OBHBXnfRENJcNbcpaVkSMRjQ8pWtKflL1c50EcumgDVBF3y2ZQcU/s529/08.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="529" data-original-width="462" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIJqTSkG0nIj3LpUZb6Ytkfw4Bco-eCD-_EVylmGyDSc4EYIhEpRtg5C1vWP7ntg2BKU7lUKWpnFCJUQllEKvcWSMknaEy4Gd9Si1APP6B84HKZudOSZGhQW7dPWbLXogD0cSQRCP2OBHBXnfRENJcNbcpaVkSMRjQ8pWtKflL1c50EcumgDVBF3y2ZQcU/s320/08.jpg" width="279" /></a></div>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com149tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40404434227195975842024-01-10T00:08:00.000-08:002024-01-10T00:08:49.726-08:00Jesuit Britain?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFMVsnrpq2eiDDxVxpuC4SF_nC_g5s6Zi1H5KWjEl1rgiEiIPxVDazvhk43rOwqvrnYm-osT7tFyiKerrjJ0pHwej6LUAip5NHa8p5c5JhFNqv8Eu87bz6jDlsaE4E2yR-nKfMWOiGLjKE43jpMoSSInUkecZityKLndF6jLidtjAlr9i-DJ19iM1fM_on/s396/008.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="278" data-original-width="396" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFMVsnrpq2eiDDxVxpuC4SF_nC_g5s6Zi1H5KWjEl1rgiEiIPxVDazvhk43rOwqvrnYm-osT7tFyiKerrjJ0pHwej6LUAip5NHa8p5c5JhFNqv8Eu87bz6jDlsaE4E2yR-nKfMWOiGLjKE43jpMoSSInUkecZityKLndF6jLidtjAlr9i-DJ19iM1fM_on/w256-h180/008.jpg" width="256" /></a></div>My review of
the anthology <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Projections-Spanish-Scholasticism-British-Thought/dp/9004516077/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Projections+of+Spanish+Jesuit+Scholasticism+on+British+Thought&qid=1704872741&sr=8-1">Projections
of Spanish Jesuit Scholasticism on British Thought: New Horizons in Politics,
Law, and Rights</a></i>, edited by Leopoldo Prieto López and José Luis Cendejas
Bueno, appears in the <a href="https://www.acton.org/volume-34-number-1">Winter
2023 issue</a> of <i>Religion and Liberty</i>.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18778254496191337772024-01-02T16:08:00.000-08:002024-01-02T16:08:40.093-08:00New Year’s open thread<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7crr_i1DU_clgROPM7QKoXA7rSOt2TNX0a3DcWNzqNTLFe6KNy9SnAW9G_mqmGDe-OA6XvYzzfGrWOr00YboKIq0LXJ3K_z4IkE_a7ylAwzuiiUKU43B_oJ25rKruheYeVTYGFixDRjP2MIgZczF8nhENE2euZRDXQrq0mFZkAisUJygOjuR6uRkO4sv0/s327/004.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="225" data-original-width="327" height="147" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7crr_i1DU_clgROPM7QKoXA7rSOt2TNX0a3DcWNzqNTLFe6KNy9SnAW9G_mqmGDe-OA6XvYzzfGrWOr00YboKIq0LXJ3K_z4IkE_a7ylAwzuiiUKU43B_oJ25rKruheYeVTYGFixDRjP2MIgZczF8nhENE2euZRDXQrq0mFZkAisUJygOjuR6uRkO4sv0/w214-h147/004.jpg" width="214" /></a></div>Let’s open
the New Year with an open thread. Now’s
the time at last to bring up that otherwise off-topic comment that keeps
getting deleted, or anything else you like.
From Art Nouveau to Art Blakey, from presidents to presentism, from
sci-fi to Wi-Fi to hi-fis, everything is on topic. Just keep it civil and classy. Previous open threads collected <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/search?q=open+thread">here</a>.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com234tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88415589069425229332023-12-29T15:34:00.000-08:002023-12-29T15:34:11.143-08:00What is a “couple”?<p><span style="line-height: 107%;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqDsl-FAJXeZbzUSkeGQsSOw1QI_hPHbhMEqE1acWYillNdiZlqi_YD4e4so3hVrgzFhR4G9B4u4HXxWbO5BaZJs_qutGTMFcBPpAdvRaJ-82VGR_2gN8aio4iHZLsQKtCa4OwsDEQi92M5PMXRIsJ3U_Eyhtq87GC4tjSe4bmsQ6zGB7QbmhgmpNidBhG/s340/0033.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="340" data-original-width="248" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqDsl-FAJXeZbzUSkeGQsSOw1QI_hPHbhMEqE1acWYillNdiZlqi_YD4e4so3hVrgzFhR4G9B4u4HXxWbO5BaZJs_qutGTMFcBPpAdvRaJ-82VGR_2gN8aio4iHZLsQKtCa4OwsDEQi92M5PMXRIsJ3U_Eyhtq87GC4tjSe4bmsQ6zGB7QbmhgmpNidBhG/w182-h250/0033.jpg" width="182" /></a></div>In <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-scandal-of-fiducia-supplicans.html">my
recent article</a></span> on the controversy over <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ddf_doc_20231218_fiducia-supplicans_en.html">Fiducia
Supplicans</a></i></span>, I noted three problems with the document’s qualified
permission of blessings for “couples” of a same-sex or other “irregular”
kind. First, the document is not consistent
with <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20210222_responsum-dubium-unioni_en.html">the
Vatican’s 2021 statement</a></span> on the subject, which prohibited such
blessings, nor consistent even with itself.
Second, its incoherence makes abuses of its permission inevitable,
despite the qualifications. Third, the
implicature carried by the act of issuing this permission “sends the message”
that the Church in some way approves of such couples, even if this message was not
intended. In <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/cardinal-fernandez-same-sex-blessing">an
interview with <i>The Pillar</i></a></span>,
<span style="line-height: 107%;">Cardinal Fernández addresses
the controversy, but unfortunately, his remarks exacerbate rather than resolve
the problems.<span><a name='more'></a></span></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Cardinal Fernández’s answer<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some
defenders of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> have
suggested that the document intends “couple” to be understood merely as a pair
of individuals, without reference to any special relationship between
them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I explained in my earlier article
why that simply is not plausible, and the cardinal’s remarks in the interview
now decisively rule this interpretation out.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Consider these passages from the interview:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Sometimes they are <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">two very close friends who share good
things</b>, sometimes <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">they had sexual
relations in the past and now what remains is a strong sense of belonging and
mutual help</b>. As a parish priest, I have often met such couples</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">[In] a simple blessing, it is still
asked that <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">this friendship</b> be
purified, matured and lived in fidelity to the Gospel. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And even if there <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">was some kind of sexual relationship</b>, known or not, the blessing
made in this way does not validate or justify anything.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Actually the same thing
happens whenever individuals are blessed</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">, because that
individual who asks for a blessing… may be a great sinner, but we do not deny a
blessing to him…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">When it is a matter of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">a couple well-known in the place</b> or in
cases where there could be some scandal, the blessing should be given in private,
in a discreet place</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the “couples” that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>has in view include
“friendships” and “two very close friends,” who may have “had sexual relations
in the past” or “some kind of sexual relationship” in the past, who retain “a
strong sense of belonging and mutual help” and may be “well-known in [some]
place” to be a couple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And blessing such
couples is explicitly contrasted with blessing “individuals.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All of this makes it undeniable that what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>is referring to by
the word “couple” is not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">merely </i>two
individuals qua individuals, but two individuals <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">considered as having a close personal relationship of some sort</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other words, the Declaration is using the
term in just the way most people use it when discussing a romantic relationship,
not in some broader sense and not in some technical sense either.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, the
cardinal also goes on to say: “Couples are blessed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The union is not blessed.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This confirms that he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intends</i> to distinguish “couples” from “unions,” as many defenders
of the Declaration have tried to do.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, the cardinal says nothing to explain <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how</i> there can be such a distinction – that is to say, he does not
explain <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how this distinction is not
merely verbal, a distinction without a difference</i> like the distinction between
“bachelors” and “unmarried men.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There are
three problems here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First, and again, Cardinal
Fernández’s remarks confirm that by “couple,” what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>is referring to are two people considered as
having some close personal relationship, and indeed one that may have had a
sexual component of some sort at least in the past.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that is also just what the term “union”
is typically used to refer to!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, how
can one possibly bless a “couple” without blessing the “union”?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is not enough simply to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">assert</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">assume</i> that one can do so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We still need an explanation of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">exactly
what it means</i> to bless the one and not the other.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Second, the
cardinal says that in the blessings that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans</i> has in view, “it is… <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">asked
that</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this friendship be purified,
matured and lived in fidelity to the Gospel</i>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other words, the blessing is not merely on
the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individuals </i>who make up the
couple, but on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">their friendship itself</i>.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And how can that possibly fail to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a blessing on the “union”</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>True, it doesn’t follow that it is a blessing
on the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sexual aspect</i> of the union,
but that is irrelevant to the point at issue.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It still amounts to a blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">on
the union itself</i>, despite the cardinal’s claim that “the union is not
blessed.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Third, the
Vatican’s 2021 document on the matter says that while “individual persons” in
irregular relationships can be blessed, it “declares illicit <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any form of blessing that tends to
acknowledge their unions as such</i>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence,
the older statement says that irregular unions not only cannot be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">blessed</i>, they cannot so much as be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">acknowledged</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But as Cardinal Fernández’s remarks make
clear, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> permit acknowledgement of such
unions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For how can you bless “their
friendship” without <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">acknowledging</i>
it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How can you bless a “couple”
considered as “two very close friends” who may have had “some kind of sexual
relationship” in the past and retain “a strong sense of belonging and mutual
help,” without “acknowledging their union as such”?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, the
cardinal’s remarks in the interview <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do
not refute, but rather reinforce, the judgment that the 2023 Declaration
contradicts the 2021 statement</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There is yet
another problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, the interview
with Cardinal Fernández confirms that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans </i>uses the word “couple” in the ordinary sense that entails not
merely two individuals, but two individuals <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">considered
as having a personal relationship</i> of a romantic kind, or at least of a kind
that once had a romantic component.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now,
in the past, the Church has explicitly repudiated the contemporary tendency to
expand this ordinary notion of a “couple” so that it includes same-sex and
other irregular relationships.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
example, in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa.html">Ecclesia
in Europa</a></i></span>, Pope St. John Paul II criticized “attempts… to accept
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a definition of the couple</i> in which
difference of sex is not considered essential.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2008/may/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080510_hungarian-bishops.html">a
2008 address</a></span>, Pope Benedict XVI lamented that “so-called ‘de facto
couples’ are proliferating.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Insofar as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>uses “couples” to
refer to same-sex and other irregular relationships, then, it accommodates the
usage that these previous popes condemned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In this way too, the new Declaration conflicts with past teaching.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Mike Lewis’s answer<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://wherepeteris.com/criticism-of-fiducia-supplicans-confusion-or-spoiled-milk/">a
recent article</a></span> at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Where Peter
Is</i>, Mike Lewis complained that “countless papal critics are acting as if
they can’t understand the difference between a couple and a union” and mocks
their “sudden inability to grasp the difference” as “a case of mass lexical
amnesia.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Oddly, though, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">his article does not tell us what this
difference is</i>, which should have been easy enough if the distinction really
were, as he insists it is, obvious and long-standing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It seems
that even some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Where Peter Is</i> readers
were unimpressed, which has now led Lewis to try to explain the difference in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://wherepeteris.com/honestly-confused-over-couples-and-unions/">a
follow-up article</a></span>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Much of
what he writes essentially just reiterates, at length, that the new Declaration
clearly <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">says </i>that it authorizes only
blessings for couples and not for unions, and that “most reasonably intelligent
Catholics should be able to understand the difference if they read the document
with a spirit of receptivity and an open heart.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, this does not address the question
at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Everybody already knows what the
Declaration <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">says</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The question is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how any coherent sense can be made of</i> what it says.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In particular, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">exactly what is the difference</i> between a “couple” and a
“union”?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Naturally, to accuse those who
continue to ask this question of lacking “a spirit of receptivity and an open
heart” is not to answer the question.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Lewis does
take a stab at answering it, though.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
writes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I don’t understand why this is a
difficult concept, obviously a “couple” is two people who are paired
together.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A couple might be married,
engaged, or involved in another type of relationship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A union is a type of arrangement or agreement
between two people… The Church can bless two people who are a couple without
sanctioning everything that they do, nor recognizing every agreement they make</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I trust that most reasonably
intelligent Catholics who read Lewis with a spirit of receptivity and an open
heart will see that this utterly fails to solve the problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Start with the last sentence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes, one can certainly “bless two people who
are a couple without sanctioning everything that they do, nor recognizing every
agreement they make.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But one can also
bless a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">union</i> without sanctioning
everything the people in it do or recognizing every agreement they make.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, this does exactly nothing to explain the
difference between blessing a couple and blessing a union.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Consider
next Lewis’s claim that “a ‘couple’ is two people who are paired together.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What does being “paired together” amount
to?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is Lewis saying that just <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i> two individuals, even perfect
strangers, who happen to be standing next to one another counts as a “couple”
in the sense <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>has
in view?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ve already explained in my
previous article why that can’t be right, and we just saw above that the
interview with Cardinal Fernández confirms that it is not right.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Couple” in this context means more than
merely two individuals, and connotes a special relationship between them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And Lewis may well acknowledge this, since he
goes on to say that “a couple might be married, engaged, or involved in another
type of relationship.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But then, we
must ask yet again, how does this differ from a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">union</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lewis says, first,
that a union “is a type of arrangement.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I hardly need point out that that is so vague that it is obviously true
of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples </i>no less than of
unions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Couples, such as the married and
engaged couples Lewis gives as examples, are obviously in a kind of
“arrangement.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, this too does exactly
nothing to clarify the difference between a “couple” and a “union.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What, then,
of Lewis’s further suggestion that a union involves an “agreement” of some
kind?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is slightly less vague than
“arrangement,” but not enough to help.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Consider two people who decide to go steady, or to become engaged, or to
share bed and board.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Any of these
suffices to make them a “couple.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
these all involve <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">agreements </i>of some
type (as well as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">arrangements</i>).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, by Lewis’s criteria, this also suffices
to make them a “union.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once again,
then, Lewis has utterly failed to explain the difference between a “couple” and
a “union.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Later in the
article, Lewis suggests that the blessings the Declaration has in view “are
meant for each of the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">persons</i> in the
couple, not an attempt to legitimize a union” (emphasis in the original).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But what does this mean, exactly?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does it mean that what the Declaration has in
view are blessings on the persons considered only <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as individuals</i>, rather than <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as
a couple</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But we already saw above,
and at greater length in my previous article, why that is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> what the Declaration is saying.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Following a
suggestion from another defender of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans, </i>Lewis suggests:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Fiducia
Supplicans<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> studiously avoids explicitly
focusing on the dichotomy between individuals and relationships... “It does not
so much discuss who or what gets blessed, but what blessings are and for what
purpose.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This suggests that the
fixation of the document’s critics on the word “couple” is entirely misplaced,
and we should turn our attention to why we bless</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem with this is that it
is simply not true that the Declaration “does not so much discuss who or what
gets blessed.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the contrary, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the whole point</i> of the Declaration is to
go beyond what was already said in the 2021 document and assert that blessings
can now be given to “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples</i>” qua
couples (and not merely to the individuals in the couple, as the 2021 document
allowed).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence for critics to focus on
the word “couple” is not only <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not </i>misplaced,
it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">precisely to do what the new
Declaration itself does</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In a closing
section so absurd that the unwary reader might wonder whether his article is,
after all, meant merely as a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">parody</i>
of desperate defenders of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans</i>, Lewis tells us that he consulted ChatGPT to see how it might
explain the difference between “couples” and “unions”!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The part of the AI software’s response that
is actually relevant to this question reads as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Church may view the blessing of </span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">individuals</span></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> in a same-sex relationship as a recognition
of their inherent dignity and worth as persons…</span> </i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Therefore, the Church
might differentiate between blessing a couple (</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">as <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">individuals</b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">) and blessing
their union. </i>(Emphasis added)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the only way ChatGPT is able
to make sense of the difference between blessing a “couple” and blessing a “union”
is to suggest that the individuals in the couple are blessed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as individuals</i>, rather than as a
couple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem with this, of
course, is that the 2021 document already allowed for that, and that the whole
point of the new Declaration is to authorize the blessing of couples <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as couples</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once again, I explained at length in my
previous article how that is the case, and Cardinal Fernández has confirmed it
in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Pillar</i> interview.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Explaining
the difference between “couples” and “unions” thus eludes the best efforts of
man and machine alike.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com128tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-416093139681170832023-12-22T12:59:00.000-08:002023-12-22T12:59:54.471-08:00The scandal of Fiducia Supplicans<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbApCFkcmz03eYlut-58ElxxLo9zqocFcytz5YBt025BJt3gtApAaAXS1JKr0HGgeMW47clHZkbVBTxTqa8a7B9QNEBbEP08chAqRiFjN868PSE0UQURYtjilBRkY1Gcx66vb81IwV2mt64uAn9-bL_1KqVtm_9EPcPbQ9SxFjinIgPh80YK_OjBAY1jpw/s587/098.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="445" data-original-width="587" height="243" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbApCFkcmz03eYlut-58ElxxLo9zqocFcytz5YBt025BJt3gtApAaAXS1JKr0HGgeMW47clHZkbVBTxTqa8a7B9QNEBbEP08chAqRiFjN868PSE0UQURYtjilBRkY1Gcx66vb81IwV2mt64uAn9-bL_1KqVtm_9EPcPbQ9SxFjinIgPh80YK_OjBAY1jpw/s320/098.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>By now many
readers of this blog will likely have heard about <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ddf_doc_20231218_fiducia-supplicans_en.html">Fiducia
Supplicans</a></i></span> and the worldwide controversy it has generated, which
may end up being even more bitter and momentous than the many other
controversies sparked over the last decade by the words and actions of Pope
Francis. The Declaration, issued by the
Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith (DDF) under its new Prefect Cardinal
Víctor Manuel Fernández, for the first time allows for “the possibility of
blessings for couples in irregular situations and for couples of the same
sex.” This revises the <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20210222_responsum-dubium-unioni_en.html">statement
on the matter</a></span> issued in 2021 under Fernández’s predecessor Cardinal
Ladaria, which reaffirmed the Church’s traditional teaching that “it is not
licit to impart a blessing on relationships, or partnerships, even stable, that
involve sexual activity outside of marriage… as is the case of the unions
between persons of the same sex.”<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The good<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I have already
had a lot to say about the subject on Twitter, but an article summarizing the main
points might be useful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first thing
to note is that at the Declaration emphasizes that there is no change to the
relevant doctrinal principles, which it explicitly reaffirms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It also emphasizes that no blessing or
liturgical rite that might imply such a change can be approved.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here are the relevant passages:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This Declaration remains firm on the
traditional doctrine of the Church about marriage, not allowing any type of
liturgical rite or blessing similar to a liturgical rite that can create
confusion</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Therefore, rites and prayers that
could create confusion between what constitutes marriage – which is the
“exclusive, stable, and indissoluble union between a man and a woman, naturally
open to the generation of children” – and what contradicts it are
inadmissible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This conviction is
grounded in the perennial Catholic doctrine of marriage; it is only in this
context that sexual relations find their natural, proper, and fully human
meaning. The Church’s doctrine on this point remains firm.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This is also the understanding of
marriage that is offered by the Gospel. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
this reason, when it comes to blessings, the Church has the right and the duty
to avoid any rite that might contradict this conviction or lead to confusion…
[T]he Church does not have the power to impart blessings on unions of persons
of the same sex</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Church does not have the power to
confer its liturgical blessing when that would somehow offer a form of moral
legitimacy to a union that presumes to be a marriage or to an extra-marital
sexual practice</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So far so good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why the controversy, then?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And exactly what has changed?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To understand that, consider next that the
Declaration holds that what has been said so far cannot be the end of the
story, given the nature of the act of asking for a blessing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In order to help us understand the
value of a more pastoral approach to blessings, Pope Francis urges us to
contemplate, with an attitude of faith and fatherly mercy, the fact that “when
one asks for a blessing, one is expressing a petition for God’s assistance, a
plea to live better, and confidence in a Father who can help us live
better.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This request should, in every
way, be valued, accompanied, and received with gratitude. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>People who come spontaneously to ask for a
blessing show by this request their sincere openness to transcendence, the
confidence of their hearts that they do not trust in their own strength alone,
their need for God, and their desire to break out of the narrow confines of
this world, enclosed in its limitations…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">When people ask for a blessing, an
exhaustive moral analysis should not be placed as a precondition for conferring
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For, those seeking a blessing should not be
required to have prior moral perfection</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">God never turns away anyone who
approaches him! <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ultimately, a blessing
offers people a means to increase their trust in God. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The request for a blessing, thus, expresses
and nurtures openness to the transcendence, mercy, and closeness to God in a
thousand concrete circumstances of life, which is no small thing in the world
in which we live. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is a seed of the
Holy Spirit that must be nurtured, not hindered.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s leave aside the middle
paragraph, which attacks a straw man.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No
one holds that either moral perfection or exhaustive moral analysis ought to be
prerequisites to blessing someone.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The key
principle here is that the act of asking for a blessing evinces “a petition for
God’s assistance, a plea to live better, and confidence in a Father who can
help us live better” etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, so far,
so good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I don’t know of anyone who
denies that this is the case, at least in general.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The bad<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The problem
comes from the Declaration’s claim that this principle is such an “innovative
contribution to the pastoral meaning of blessings” that it calls for “a real
development from what has been said about blessings in the Magisterium and the
official texts of the Church.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In
particular, claims <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i>,
it entails “the possibility of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">blessing couples in irregular situations and
same-sex couples</i></b>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Later on the
Declaration repeats that what is in view is “the possibility of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">blessings
for couples in irregular situations and for couples of the same sex</i></b>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And again, the Declaration speaks of cases where
a “prayer of blessing is requested <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">by a couple in an irregular situation</i></b>”
or “the blessing is requested <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">by a same-sex couple</i></b>,” and where the
request can be granted given that certain conditions are met. (Emphasis added
in each case)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To be sure, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> makes clear
qualifications regarding the spirit and manner in which such blessings can be
given.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It says that a blessing for such
a couple can be permitted “without officially validating their status or
changing in any way the Church’s perennial teaching on marriage.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It acknowledges that such couples may be in “situations
that are morally unacceptable from an objective point of view.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It envisages cases where such couples, in
requesting a blessing, “do not claim a legitimation of their own status.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And in any event, says the Declaration, in
allowing such a blessing, “there is no intention to legitimize anything.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Moreover, there is no authorization of
anything more than an informal blessing, and it must not be construed as a
blessing on a civil union or a purported marriage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Declaration says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The form of [these blessings] should
not be fixed ritually by ecclesial authorities to avoid producing confusion
with the blessing proper to the Sacrament of Marriage…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Precisely to avoid any form of
confusion or scandal, when the prayer of blessing is requested by a couple in
an irregular situation, even though it is expressed outside the rites
prescribed by the liturgical books, this blessing should never be imparted in
concurrence with the ceremonies of a civil union, and not even in connection
with them. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor can it be performed with
any clothing, gestures, or words that are proper to a wedding. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The same applies when the blessing is
requested by a same-sex couple</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These qualifications reinforce
the Declaration’s insistence that there is no change at the level of doctrine
and thus no approval of any sexually immoral arrangements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What is in view is simply acknowledging that
to ask a blessing involves a recognition of the need for God’s assistance, as
well as a plea “that all that is true, good, and humanly valid in their lives
and their relationships be enriched, healed, and elevated by the presence of
the Holy Spirit,” on the part of those “whose guilt or responsibility may be
attenuated by various factors affecting subjective imputability.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And as far as I have seen, no one has any
quarrel with giving a blessing to any <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individual
</i>who asks for it in this spirit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed,
the 2021 Vatican statement issued under Cardinal Ladaria explicitly said that
to forbid the blessing of couples “does not preclude the blessings given to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individual persons</i> with homosexual
inclinations, who manifest the will to live in fidelity to the revealed plans
of God as proposed by Church teaching” (emphasis added).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What has generated
controversy are the words I have put in bold italics above.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, “controversy” is much too mild a
word.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the time I write this, the
bishops of <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.complicitclergy.com/2023/12/21/polish-bishops-people-in-same-sex-relationships-cannot-receive-a-blessing/">Poland</a></span>,
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/ukraine-bishops-conference-chooses.html">Ukraine</a></span>,
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/nigeria-largest-country-in-africa-its.html">Nigeria</a></span>,
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/african-bishops-v-fiducia-supplicans">Malawi
and Zambia</a></span> have indicated that they will not implement the
Declaration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Cardinal Ambongo,
Archbishop of Kinshasa, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/cardinal-ambongo-president-of-african.html">has
called for</a></span> a united African response to the problematic new
policy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Declaration has been
criticized by <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/muller-fiducia-supplicans-is-self">Cardinal
Müller</a></span>, <a href="https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2023/12/the-cost-of-making-a-mess">Archbishop
Chaput</a>, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/archdiocese-of-saint-mary-in-astana.html">Archbishop
Peta and Bishop Schneider</a></span>, and <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://catholicvote.org/theologically-pastorally-practically-inadmissable-british-priests-blessings/">the
British Confraternity of Catholic Clergy</a></span>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Among priests and theologians, criticisms
have been raised by <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.thecatholicthing.org/2023/12/19/gods-blessings-and-magisterial-teaching/">Fr.
Thomas Weinandy</a></span>, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://dwightlongenecker.com/the-coming-fiducia-fallout/">Fr. Dwight
Longenecker</a></span>, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2023/12/19/the-ddfs-innovative-declaration-on-blessings-is-a-disaster/">Prof.
Larry Chapp</a></span>, and others.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The problems
with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> can be summed
up in three words: <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">incoherence</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">abuse</i>, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">implicature</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s consider
each in turn.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The
incoherence stems from the fact that, as Dan Hitchens <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2023/12/the-pope-and-the-black-hole">has
pointed out at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">First Things</i></a></span>,
the Declaration contradicts the 2021 Vatican document.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The contradiction is clear when we compare
the following two statements:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">2021: “It is
not licit to impart a blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">on
relationships, or partnerships, even stable, that involve sexual activity
outside of marriage… as is the case of the unions between persons of the same
sex</i>”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">2023:
“Within the horizon outlined here appears the possibility of blessings <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">for couples in irregular situations and for
couples of the same sex</i>”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I trust that
the contradiction is obvious to anyone who reads the two statements
dispassionately, but in case it is not, here’s an explanation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A “couple” is just the same thing as two
people in a “relationship” or “partnership.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“Irregular situations” is a common euphemism in contemporary Catholic
discourse for relationships that involve fornication, an invalid marriage,
same-sex sexual activity, or the like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The 2021 document clearly peremptorily rules out any blessing for a
couple in this sort of situation, whereas the 2023 document clearly allows it
under certain circumstances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since
these are contradictory, the new Declaration entails a clear reversal of the
2021 document.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">On Twitter, I’ve
seen several odd, tortuous, and utterly unconvincing attempts to get around
this problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some say that the new
document authorizes blessing “couples” but not “unions.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem, of course, is that the
distinction is merely verbal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both the
2021 and 2023 documents are addressing romantic relationships.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And in that context, to be a “couple” entails
having a “union” of some kind (an emotional bond, going steady, sharing bed and
board, or whatever).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To say that one
might bless couples but not unions is like saying that one could bless
bachelors without blessing unmarried men.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What if
“unions” are understood as “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">civil</i>
unions,” in the legal sense?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This does
indeed have a different meaning than “couples,” since not all couples are in
civil unions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this does not solve
the problem, because the 2021 document rules out blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i> unions of a same-sex or otherwise irregular kind, not merely
civil unions in the legal sense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed,
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">doubly</i> incoherent, because it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">reiterates</i> the teaching of the 2021
document that “the Church does not have the power to impart blessings on unions
of persons of the same sex.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
statement contradicts the statement that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples</i>
can be blessed, because a “couple” and a “union” are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the same thing</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The new
Declaration thus not only contradicts the 2021 document, it contradicts itself.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some have
claimed that couples and unions are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
the same thing, on the grounds that “couple” can refer to simply a pair of
individual things, as when one speaks of drinking “a couple of beers” or having
slept for “a couple of hours.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the
problem is that the context concerns, again, couples in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">romantic</i> sense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And a couple in that sense is more than
merely a pair of individuals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is,
again, a pair who have some emotional bond or the like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would be absurd to pretend that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>is speaking of
“couples” in a thin sense that might include two complete strangers who simply
happen to be standing next to each other as each asks the same priest for a
blessing!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some have
claimed that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>merely
authorizes blessing the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individuals</i>
who make up the couple, not the couple <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">itself</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the document explicitly and repeatedly
speaks of blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples</i>, not
merely the individuals in the couple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Moreover, the 2021 document already explicitly said that individuals
could be blessed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So there would be no
need for the new document, and in particular nothing in it that counts as
“innovative” or as “a real development,” without the reference to “couples,”
specifically.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some have
claimed that there is crucial significance in the phrase “blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">for</i> couples,” as if the “for” somehow
entailed that the couple itself is not being blessed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One problem with this is that we need some
explanation of how a “blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">for couples</i>”
amounts to anything different from “blessing couples.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Another problem is that the Declaration also
does in fact speak of “blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples</i>,”
and not merely of “blessings <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">for </i>couples.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some have
claimed there is no contradiction between the 2021 and 2023 documents insofar
as one can, they say, bless a “couple” without blessing the “relationship”
between the individuals who make up the couple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But again, the document speaks of blessing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couples</i>, not merely the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individuals</i>
in the couple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The blessing is imparted
to a couple <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">qua couple</i>, not merely
qua individuals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is, as I have
said, why the document can claim to be “innovative” and “a real
development.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But how can one bless a
couple <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">qua couple</i> without blessing
the relationship that makes it the case that they are a couple?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The 2021
document also explicitly says that while <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">individuals</i>
in unions can be blessed, it “declares illicit any form of blessing that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">tends to acknowledge their unions as such</i>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But to bless couples qua couples and not
merely qua individuals is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">precisely</i> “to
acknowledge their unions as such.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So,
even if one could make sense of the idea of blessing a couple without blessing
the relationship, there would <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">still</i>
be a contradiction between the 2021 and 2023 documents.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">acknowledging</i>
the union while blessing it, no less than the blessing itself, is forbidden by
the 2021 document but allowed by the 2023 document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The bottom
line is that blessing “couples” in the 2023 document amounts to “blessing
people qua in a relationship.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And the
2021 document’s prohibition on blessing “relationships” is obviously just a way
of prohibiting “blessing people qua in a relationship.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The differences in phraseology between the
documents are merely verbal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps the
new document uses the words it does in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">hope
of</i> avoiding a contradiction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
point, though, is that it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does not in
fact </i>avoid a contradiction, given the way terms like “couple,”
“relationship,” and the like are actually used when describing romantic and
sexual situations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor are there any
special theological usages in play here, for the relevant terms have none.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So, it is,
in my judgement, sheer sophistry to deny that</span> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Fiducia Supplicans </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">permits the blessing of couples in
same-sex and other irregular relationships, and to deny that this contradicts
the 2021 document.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On Twitter, Fr. James
Martin <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://x.com/JamesMartinSJ/status/1736786693007511836?s=20">triumphantly
declared</a></span>:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Re: Vatican declaration on same-sex
blessings. Be wary of the "Nothing has changed" response to today's
news. It's a significant change. In short, yesterday, as a priest, I was forbidden
to bless same-sex couples at all. Today, with some limitations, I can</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">One can and
should <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">lament</i> that Fr. Martin is
right, but one cannot reasonably <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">deny</i>
it – <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>does indeed
mark a significant change, and precisely because it permits what was previously
forbidden.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The ugly<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, Fr.
Martin <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/catholic-gay-blessing-pope-francis.html">immediately
went on to bless a same-sex couple</a></span> in a manner that even some
defenders of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i> have
said is an abuse of the Declaration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This brings us to the second problem with the Declaration, which is that
such abuse was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inevitable</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For, again, the new document makes the
Church’s current policy incoherent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On
the one hand, the Document insists that there is no doctrinal change at all,
and that there is no change entails that the Church can no more acknowledge the
acceptability of same-sex and other irregular “couples” today than it has in
the past.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the other hand, to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bless</i> such couples <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as couples</i> (and not merely as individuals) implies that their being
a couple is in some way acceptable (and not merely that they are accepted as
individuals).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It “tends to acknowledge
their unions as such,” which the 2021 document forbade.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, many
are bound to judge that the Church now in some way accepts same-sex and other
irregular “couples” – again, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as couples</i>
and not merely as individuals – and will naturally draw the conclusion that she
no longer takes very seriously the immoral sexual behavior that defines such
relationships.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To be sure, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans </i>explicitly rejects
any approval of such behavior.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that
is bound to be lost on the average man in the pew.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If one has to have special theological
expertise even to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">try</i> to make
coherent sense of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia Supplicans</i>
– and is likely to fail even then – it can hardly be surprising if people draw
from it precisely the heterodox conclusions the document claims to
forestall.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This brings
me to the last problem with the Declaration, which is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">implicature</i> it involves.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An
implicature is a communicative act which, by virtue of its context or manner,
relays a meaning that goes beyond the literal meaning of the actual words that
may be used.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To take an example <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/10/nudge-nudge-wink-wink.html">I’ve
used before</a></span>, suppose you go out on a blind date and a friend asks
you how it went.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You pause and then
answer flatly, with a slight smirk: “Well, I liked the restaurant.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is nothing in the literal meaning of
this sentence, considered all by itself, that states or implies anything
negative about the person you went out with, or indeed anything at all about
the person.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Still, given the context,
you’ve said something insulting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You’ve
“sent the message” that you liked the restaurant but not the person.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or suppose someone shows you a painting he
has just completed, and when asked what you think, you respond: “I like the
frame.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The sentence by itself doesn’t
imply that the painting is bad, but the overall speech act certainly conveys
that message all the same.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In these
cases, the speaker intends the insult, but the implicature can exist even
without the intention.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose you said
“Well, I liked the restaurant” or “I like the frame” <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">without </i>wanting to insult anyone, and indeed with the intention of
avoiding the insult that would follow from saying directly what you really
think.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You still would have sent an
insulting message, however inadvertently, because these statements <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">would in fact be insulting, given the
context</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That you <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">meant</i> no insult is irrelevant.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And it would be disingenuous or at least
naïve of you to protest your innocence on the grounds that the literal meaning
of your words is in no way insulting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For the literal meaning is not all that is relevant to the message sent
by an utterance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if you were
innocent of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intending</i> to insult, you
are guilty of carelessness or at least naïveté.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Implicatures
have always been important to the Church when evaluating theological
propositions (even if churchmen and theologians don’t usually use the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">word</i> “implicature,” which is a technical
term from linguistics and philosophy).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even
statements that are not strictly heretical, or even erroneous, have
nevertheless been condemned as problematic in some other way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, they might be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">badly expressed</i>; or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ambiguous</i>; or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">prone to cause
scandal</i>; or “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">savor of heresy</i>”
even if not being strictly heretical; or “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">offensive
to pious ears</i>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These are among the <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03532a.htm">“theological
censures”</a></span> well-known to Catholic theologians of past generations,
even if they are not always familiar to contemporary writers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A moral or theological proposition whose
literal meaning is not necessarily heretical or even false might still be
“badly expressed” or “prone to cause scandal” or the like insofar as, given the
context in which it is asserted, it involves a heretical or false implicature.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, here is
the context relevant to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans</i>: The secular world hates the Church’s teaching on sexual
morality perhaps more than any other of her doctrines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It constantly urges her to abandon it, many
supposing that it is simply a matter of time until she does abandon it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Most churchmen rarely discuss it, and on the occasions
when they do, the tendency is to give a vague and perfunctory acknowledgement
following by an impassioned plea for acceptance of those who do not obey
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The current pope tends to favor and promote
churchmen who deemphasize traditional teaching on the subject, and strongly to
disfavor churchmen who happen to have a reputation for upholding it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is also widely perceived as being inclined
to soften Church teaching in other areas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Those who have most loudly favored the blessing of same-sex and other
“irregular” couples are precisely those who reject the Church’s traditional
teaching on sexual morality, whereas those who have most loudly opposed such
blessings are those most keen to uphold that teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Meanwhile, no one could fail to realize in
advance of issuing a document like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fiducia
Supplicans </i>that the qualifications it makes would be known to few who would
hear about it and understood by fewer – that, to most laymen who would learn of
these qualifications, they would sound confusing and legalistic and make far
less of an impression than the new policy itself.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It cannot
reasonably be denied that, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">given all of this
context</i>, the Declaration has the implicature that the Church is now at
least in part conceding the criticisms of those who reject her teaching, and
that she now in some way <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">approves</i> of certain
same-sex and other “irregular” arrangements (such as those involving
fornication and invalid marriages).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
cannot fail to send that message <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">whether
or not</i> it was the message intended.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And it does so <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">regardless of</i>
all the silly wrangling over the meaning of “couple,” and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">whether or not</i> one could somehow cobble together a strained reading
that reconciles the new document with the 2021 document.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if the Declaration is not strictly
heretical, it is manifestly “prone to cause scandal,” “badly expressed,” and “ambiguous.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is worth
adding that we are only seeing the beginning of the implications of this
development.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is nothing special
about “couples,” after all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence there
is no reason in principle why the logic of the Declaration should rule out
blessings for “throuples” or even larger polyamorous “unions,” or for
organizations like the pro-abortion Catholics for Choice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How could it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Members of such groups would also claim that there is much “that is
true, good, and humanly valid in their lives and their relationships,” and that
by the very act of asking for a blessing, they are “expressing a petition for
God’s assistance, a plea to live better, and confidence in a Father who can
help us live better.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why should they be
denied, if same-sex and other “irregular” “couples” are not to be denied?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Cardinal Müller
judges the new Declaration “self-contradictory.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Archbishop Chaput describes it as “doubleminded.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Fr. Weinandy says it “wreaks havoc.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Prof. Chapp pronounces it a “disaster.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Prof. Roberto de Mattei, though a reliably
measured commentator on the controversies surrounding Pope Francis, <a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/roberto-de-mattei-quo-usque-tandem-for.html">nevertheless
writes</a>: “It pains me to say, that a very grave sin was committed by those
who promulgated and signed this scandalous statement.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These conclusions all seem to me exactly
right.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">extremely</i> rare that such things could
justly be said of the highest doctrinal authorities in the Church, but it can
happen when a pope does not speak <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ex
cathedra</i>, and it is not unprecedented.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The most spectacular case is that of Pope Honorius, whose ambiguous teaching
gave aid and comfort to the Monothelite heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For this he was condemned by three Church councils and by his
successors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pope St. Leo II declared:
“We anathematize the inventors of the new error… and also Honorius, who did not
attempt to sanctify this Apostolic Church with the teaching of Apostolic
tradition, but by profane treachery permitted its purity to be polluted.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Historian Fr. John Chapman, in his book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Condemnation of Pope Honorius</i>, notes
that “the formula for the oath taken by every new Pope from the 8th century
till the 11th adds these words to the list of Monothelites condemned: ‘Together
with Honorius, who added fuel to their wicked assertions’” (pp. 115-16).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I have discussed the case in detail <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/the-error-and-condemnation-of-pope.html">here</a>
and <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/can-pope-honorius-be-defended.html">here</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The case of Pope
Honorius should be studied carefully by theologians and churchmen – and by Pope
Francis especially.</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com144tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71539402319227914832023-12-17T13:10:00.000-08:002023-12-17T13:10:06.264-08:00The Aristotelian proof on Within Reason<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhM3sCIrGIYm3MMePRIYNRWt52iCE3cXGHvGgOJmPYagMfQunFyLdwG6GTu7r78KyffKe5d_2e89F1nTGpyLQsa6xy0RMhaWAfaug_z52FBTV-GdkmpW3X_UbNDczC8TyfyuO1agGfYmzT7yh6aZdMty-FHaN9VmW9a98nSuLRUlOBsWV2rCcpKwmUIMlYO/s554/098.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="309" data-original-width="554" height="178" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhM3sCIrGIYm3MMePRIYNRWt52iCE3cXGHvGgOJmPYagMfQunFyLdwG6GTu7r78KyffKe5d_2e89F1nTGpyLQsa6xy0RMhaWAfaug_z52FBTV-GdkmpW3X_UbNDczC8TyfyuO1agGfYmzT7yh6aZdMty-FHaN9VmW9a98nSuLRUlOBsWV2rCcpKwmUIMlYO/s320/098.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>Some time back,
Alex O’Connor and I recorded a discussion of the Aristotelian argument from
motion for the existence of God, for his <i>Within
Reason</i> podcast. The episode <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfQldsGrMfk">is now available on YouTube</a>.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com208tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44253095113444184072023-12-12T16:09:00.000-08:002023-12-15T12:31:39.009-08:00On Vallier, Vermeule, and straw men (Updated)<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUw8ooal2-ryW4T-5h4xKcu5cWNICi2FWwDS6e4-iCrc7Y0RPaUEFmv5EWPfPX101wuM8qDkUkeaOb5sBehZ_SQhPzKPM_-dcno832vYb0vb_IfKEPvaOnKiEmVqJd9mJq3VJxpxgtu6ImqogLUwcYyqbcdsEoMXWsYhdhJVtAjoci8uQJDfMTeA5gtlWt/s468/0077.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="219" data-original-width="468" height="161" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUw8ooal2-ryW4T-5h4xKcu5cWNICi2FWwDS6e4-iCrc7Y0RPaUEFmv5EWPfPX101wuM8qDkUkeaOb5sBehZ_SQhPzKPM_-dcno832vYb0vb_IfKEPvaOnKiEmVqJd9mJq3VJxpxgtu6ImqogLUwcYyqbcdsEoMXWsYhdhJVtAjoci8uQJDfMTeA5gtlWt/w344-h161/0077.jpg" width="344" /></a></div>Over at his
Substack, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://liberaltortoise.kevinvallier.com/p/reading-adrian-vermeules-integralism">Kevin
Vallier responds</a></span> to <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://thejosias.com/2023/12/08/no-king-but-caesar/">my recent review</a></span>
at <i>The Josias</i> of his book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/All-Kingdoms-World-Alternatives-Liberalism/dp/0197611370/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=All+the+Kingdoms+of+the+World%3A+On+Radical+Religious+Alternatives+to+Liberalism&qid=1701987022&sr=8-1">All
the Kingdoms of the World</a></i></span>.
Vallier claims that I “mislead the reader” vis-à-vis his
characterization of the views of Adrian Vermeule. In particular, says Vallier, “Feser… makes
several claims that make it sound as if I think Vermeule endorses violence and
authoritarianism. Feser does note at one
point that I say Vermeule does not want coercion. But that leaves the impression that I only say
this in passing.” He then cites five
remarks from his book that he says show that he clearly acknowledges that
Vermeule does not endorse violence.<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So, have I
given a misleading impression of Vallier’s treatment of Vermeule?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not in the least.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note, first, that I explicitly said in my
review that Vallier acknowledges that Vermeule does not advocate violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Vallier tells us [that]… <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">whether they like it or not</b>, in order
to bring their desired regime about, integralists “must use violence in ways
that the Catholic Church rejects” (p. 137)…</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Vallier admits that in
fact “Vermeule wants to avoid coercion” and</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> “<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">says little about how hard integralists should fight for the ideal</b>”
(pp. 134-35).<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Most of what Vallier describes <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">is not anything Vermeule </b></span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">himself<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> actually says, but only
what </i>Vallier<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> claims would have to be
done in order to realize Vermeule’s vision</i></span></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem, as I show, is that Vallier <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">also</i> says things that give the
impression that Vermeule advocates a radically revolutionary political program
that manifestly could not be realized without violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And material of this latter sort greatly
outweighs the qualifying statements Vallier makes here and there, and which he
cites in his response to me.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, as I
noted in my review, we have page after harrowing page in Vallier’s book
describing how the political program he attributes to Vermeule “probably
requires abolishing democracy” (p. 136) and would entail “mass surveillance… [to]
suppress dissent” (p. 150), “Chinese-level tactics” (p. 148), “modern heresy
trials” (p. 149), “pressure to segregate religiously diverse populations” (p.
154), “ultra-loyal troops [to] subdue career military officials. (Hitler’s SS
springs to mind)” and “youth programs to increase loyalty to their leader.
(Hitler Youth springs to mind)” (p. 146), “human rights violations” and “secret
police” (pp. 151-52), and “leadership purges, replete with execution, torture,
and show trials. A one-party state” (p. 147).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Vallier warns that to uphold the regime Vermeule would set up,
“Protestants could face heresy charges” (p. 153); that “according to
integralism, Black Protestant churches have no right to exist” and “the state
must decide whether to declare Black Protestant churches criminal
organizations” (ibid.); and that “we should not assume that an integralist
regime will treat Jews well” (ibid.).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">And so
on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vallier concludes that “Vermeule’s
integration from within requires massive violence” (p. 239).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, the political program he attributes
to Vermeule is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">so</i> extreme and
unhinged that it is hard to see how anyone could fail to perceive that it would
require massive violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And again,
though Vallier makes a few disclaimers here and there, they are nowhere near as
numerous or prominent as the detailed descriptions he gives of the coercive
regime he says Vermeule’s views would entail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>When an author briefly notes here and there that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Vermeule doesn’t advocate violence</i>, but also goes on at great
length about how <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Vermeule’s extreme
political program would manifestly require massive violence</i>, it is hardly
unfair to judge that he has given his readers a misleading impression of
Vermeule’s views.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Then there
is the fact that Vallier’s qualifying statements are hardly full-throated.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, as Vallier notes in his reply to
me, he concedes that “Vermeule would not suppress liberalism with violence” (p.
134).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But here is the longer passage in
Vallier’s book from which that line is taken:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Vermeule wants to protect the Church
from malignant states.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His method: train
strong Christian leaders who will take power and defend the church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">When I
have spoken with Vermeule’s defenders, often young people, they characterize
his strategy as concerned chiefly with </b></span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">defense<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> rather than </i>offense<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I do not think Vermeule’s
theory of liberalism allows for any such distinction.</i></span></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vermeule would not suppress
liberalism with violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Liberalism
will destroy itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But liberals and
the liberal state can still do significant damage in the meanwhile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Further, once liberalism dies, it could
revive.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As Vermeule so evocatively
claims, we must “sear the liberal faith with hot irons.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It must not rise again.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Only a strong state combined with a strong
church can complete this urgent task.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Vermeulean protectors must become conquerors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They must then rule with an iron rod</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so, however much Vermeule
wants to avoid coercion, he is stuck with it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Integralists must exercise hard power</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. (p. 134)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The impression given here is that
while Vermeule does not endorse violence and even eschews it, he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> endorse a radical political program
that would clearly <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">require</i>
violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But as I showed in my review,
the problem is not just that Vermeule does not endorse violence itself.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem is that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Vermeule does not in the first place actually endorse the extreme
political program Vallier attributes to him</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hence, in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/">“Integration
from Within”</a></span> (from which the “hot irons” remark is quoted), Vermeule
is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> talking about Catholic
integralism, but “nonliberal” politics more generally.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, he explicitly says that “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">there can be no return to the integrated
regime of the thirteenth century</i>, whatever its attractions.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor does he advocate any positive concrete
political program of any other kind for replacing liberalism, and indeed
explicitly says that the “postliberal future [is] of uncertain shape.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vermeule says that “for the foreseeable
future, the problem will be to mitigate the spasmodic, but compulsive and
repetitive, aggression of the decaying liberal state” rather than promote an
alternative.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, he says that
nonliberals who follow his advice will:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">mainly attempt to ensure the survival
of their faith communities in an interim age of exile and dispossession. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">They do
not evangelize or preach with a view to bringing about the birth of an entirely
new regime,</b> from within the old. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">They mitigate the long defeat</b> for those
who become targets of the regime in liberalism’s twilight era, and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">this will surely have to be the main aim
for some time to come</b></span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly, in <a href="https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy">“A
Christian Strategy,”</a> far from endorsing the “party capture” approach that
Vallier attributes to him, Vermeule says that “the Church… <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">must stand detached from all subsidiary political commitments, willing
to enter into flexible alliances of convenience with any of the parties</b>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather than calling for going on offense with
a revolutionary political program, he says that “the main proximate short-run
goal must be largely one of survival.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Rather than pushing some doctrinaire integralist vision, he emphasizes
flexibility: “Christians will always have many different options for political
engagement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In some or other
circumstances, one or another of them will prove best in the light of
prudential judgment; none has any logical or theological priority.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In short, Vallier
is saying, “I didn’t accuse Vermeule of advocating <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">B!</i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I accused him of
advocating <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A</i>, which will inevitably <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">lead</i> to B!”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And the problem is that Vermeule not only
does not advocate B, he doesn’t advocate A either.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Or consider Vallier’s
remark that “Vermeule has publicly declaimed all such [violent] tactics.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is the passage in Valler’s book in which
that remark appears:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Vermeule has publicly declaimed all
such tactics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, even in
“Integration from Within” he indicates hesitancy about coercion, though what he
says is curious: “It would be wrong to conclude that integration from within is
a matter of coercion, as opposed to persuasion and conversion, for the
distinction is so fragile as to be nearly useless.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the one hand, integration from within is
not “a matter of coercion.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the
distinction between coercion and noncoercion is “nearly useless” – which leaves
one to wonder which tactics Vermeule has in mind</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. (p. 147)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One problem here is that Vallier is misusing
the word “declaim,” which literally means “to speak in an eloquent or
impassioned way.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, the literal
meaning of what Vallier says in the first line here is “Vermeule has publicly spoken
in an eloquent way of all such [violent] tactics”!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Obviously, that is not what Vallier means,
which is why I didn’t bother quoting this particular line.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The more
important point here, though, is this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On
the one hand, Vallier here acknowledges that Vermeule shows “hesitancy about
coercion.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But on the other hand,
Vallier says that it is “curious” that Vermeule says that the distinction between
coercion and persuasion is “nearly useless,” so that one “wonder[s] which
tactics Vermeule has in mind.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since the
larger context is a discussion of the violent means Vermeule’s program would
allegedly require, some readers might get the impression that Vermeule might
not be entirely committed to eschewing violence after all.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But here is
the longer passage from Vermeule’s article “Integration from Within” where he
makes the remark in question:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It would be wrong to conclude that
integration from within is a matter of coercion, as opposed to persuasion and
conversion, for the distinction is so fragile as to be nearly useless. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As J. F. Stephen noted, there is a type of
intellectual and rhetorical “warfare” in which “the weaker opinion – the less
robust and deeply seated feeling – is rooted out to the last fiber, the place
where it grew being seared as with a hot iron.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In a more recent register, we have learned
from behavioral economics that agents with administrative control over default
rules may nudge whole populations in desirable directions, in an exercise of
“soft paternalism.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is a useless
exercise to debate whether or not this shaping from above is best understood as
coercive, or rather as an appeal to the “true” underlying preferences of the
governed</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End
quote.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Seen in this context, there is
nothing at all “curious” about Vermeule’s remark, or remotely suggestive of
violence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the contrary, as I noted in
my review of Vallier’s book, it is clear from this passage that when Vermeule speaks
of cases where the distinction between coercion and persuasion is unclear, what
he actually had in mind were soft incentives of the kind liberals like Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein describe in their book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nudge-Improving-Decisions-Health-Happiness/dp/014311526X/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Nudge%3A+Improving+Decisions+about+Health%2C+Wealth%2C+and+Happiness&qid=1701912329&sr=8-1">Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness</a></i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here is another
example where Vallier’s reading of Vermeule is careless to such an extent that
he ends up attributing to Vermeule the opposite of what he actually said. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As I noted my review, Vallier compares
Vermeule’s program to that of a Marxist revolutionary party. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, in his book, Vallier writes: “Vermeule
analogizes his view [of liberalism] with Karl Marx’s claims about capitalism: ‘Liberalism
is inherently unstable and is structurally disposed to generate the very forces
that destroy it’” (p. 127).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The remark
from Vermeule is quoted from “A Christian Strategy.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But here is the larger passage in that
article in which it appears:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There are two ways of understanding
[the liberal] dynamic. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One is that in
the long run, liberalism undermines itself by transforming tolerance into
increasingly radical intolerance of the “intolerant” – meaning those who hold
illiberal views. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On this view, militant
progressivism is distinct from liberalism, indeed a betrayal of it. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Such an
account would make liberalism analogous to Marx’s claim about capitalism:
Liberalism is inherently unstable and is structurally disposed to generate the
very forces that destroy it.<o:p></o:p></b></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A different view, and
my own, is that liberal intolerance represents not the self-undermining of
liberalism, but a fulfillment of its essential nature</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When a chrysalis shelters an
insect that later bursts forth from it and leaves it shattered, the chrysalis
has in fact fulfilled its true and predetermined end. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Liberalism of the purportedly tolerant sort is
to militant progressivism as the chrysalis is to the hideous insect</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">End quote. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As the reader can clearly see, in the line
Vallier quotes, Vermeule is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
stating his own view, but on the contrary, a view he explicitly says is “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">different [from</i> his] own.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">More could
be said, but that suffices to make the point.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Vallier is for the most part admirably fair-minded, and I don’t think
for a moment that he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intentionally</i>
misrepresents Vermeule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that he does
in fact give a misleading characterization of Vermeule’s views, however inadvertently,
there can be no doubt.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Vallier
addresses some other issues too, and says that he will address yet others in a future
post.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I may return to those in a future
reply.)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">UPDATE 12/15:
Vallier responds <a href="https://liberaltortoise.kevinvallier.com/p/does-vermeule-have-a-transition-plan">over
at Substack</a>. Here’s the reply I
posted <a href="https://x.com/FeserEdward/status/1735754013394772008?s=20">at
Twitter</a>:<o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Sorry, but the
case remains unmade. When @Vermeullarmine offers us specific models for a Christian
politics to look to, he gives biblical examples like Joseph in Egypt, Esther and
Mordecai, and St. Paul. Are these models of the integralist “state capture”
envisaged by @kvallier? No, they involve using state power defensively, to
protect a faithful minority (in the first two cases) and seeding the ground for
a centuries-long change in the culture (in the case of Paul). Any “state
capture” that such models could lead to are so <i>very far </i>down the line (perhaps centuries) that the relevant concrete
cultural circumstances are impossible to predict, giving Vallier’s imagined Catholic
integralist state capture scenarios no purchase. And as I keep saying, <i>Vermeule himself does not, in any event,
actually propose any such scenario</i>. In order to attribute it to him, Vallier’s
latest response has to rely in part on what <i>other
people</i> have said, and on<i> extrapolation
from a tweet</i> from Vermeule (despite conceding, at p. 123 of his book, that
tweets and other off-the-cuff social media ephemera are not a good basis on
which reconstruct someone’s considered views).</span></span></p><p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com68tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12594149057337973492023-12-08T10:24:00.000-08:002023-12-08T10:24:13.975-08:00Contra Vallier on integralism<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAmGgN4MgsyQ7QJdmC7-KJEQq9K1ySrvZlYEE3TniMxjhwNpe4wT8k0HJLLBWg210zdJWAH2FSU34TCV_gR9Ou4suV7jTMuhzmHMPHNe7rbb6SjBBw1IRYpqYiXwIG0ozXaYPqS_WH-b546bzELlOUng4dNZFxB6_i34kieTEdi_-l1xS7emavymbdahAI/s703/012.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="423" data-original-width="703" height="193" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAmGgN4MgsyQ7QJdmC7-KJEQq9K1ySrvZlYEE3TniMxjhwNpe4wT8k0HJLLBWg210zdJWAH2FSU34TCV_gR9Ou4suV7jTMuhzmHMPHNe7rbb6SjBBw1IRYpqYiXwIG0ozXaYPqS_WH-b546bzELlOUng4dNZFxB6_i34kieTEdi_-l1xS7emavymbdahAI/s320/012.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><a href="https://thejosias.com/2023/12/08/no-king-but-caesar/">Over at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Josias</i></a>, I critique Kevin Vallier’s
new book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/All-Kingdoms-World-Alternatives-Liberalism/dp/0197611370/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=All+the+Kingdoms+of+the+World%3A+On+Radical+Religious+Alternatives+to+Liberalism&qid=1701987022&sr=8-1">All
the Kingdoms of the World: On Radical Religious Alternatives to Liberalism</a></i>.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com83tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20536872771838155132023-11-26T16:11:00.000-08:002023-11-26T16:11:21.994-08:00Ryle on microphysics and the everyday world<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvEYlg6M6NBEAzw18AhC3cxu2oQypGyayIoEqJxAa_2gAQEOD7G79yhxumDIXBVaSiMGJU78fpSUYhIpr_rhbSGRC9YXvAKtkRPzWXR9IPez4lf-ySw3hXo6gCmBwrswDFsIy3QYNB9D0vB2zE1BPkbUloIkXbF23d-fjxu9QPsRLS4JC-_WL39qamTEcQ/s487/007.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="355" data-original-width="487" height="233" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvEYlg6M6NBEAzw18AhC3cxu2oQypGyayIoEqJxAa_2gAQEOD7G79yhxumDIXBVaSiMGJU78fpSUYhIpr_rhbSGRC9YXvAKtkRPzWXR9IPez4lf-ySw3hXo6gCmBwrswDFsIy3QYNB9D0vB2zE1BPkbUloIkXbF23d-fjxu9QPsRLS4JC-_WL39qamTEcQ/s320/007.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>Science,
we’re often told, gives us a description of the world radically at odds with
common sense. Physicist Arthur Eddington’s
famous “two tables” example illustrates the theme. There is, on the one hand, the table familiar
from everyday experience – the extended, colored, solid, stable thing you might
be sitting at as you read this. Then
there’s the scientific table – a vast aggregate of colorless particles in
fields of force, mostly empty space rather a single continuous object, and
revealed by theory rather than sensory perception. What is the relationship between them? Should we say, as is often done, that the
first table is an illusion and only the second real?<span><a name='more'></a></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As philosopher
Gilbert Ryle showed in chapter 5 of his classic book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Dilemmas-Lectures-Cambridge-Philosophy-Classics/dp/1107534194/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1WC1RSHAAIB1M&keywords=gilbert+ryle+dilemmas&qid=1700965630&sprefix=gilbert+ryle+dilemmas%2Caps%2C237&sr=8-1">Dilemmas</a></i></span>,
the real illusion is not the table of common sense, but rather the notion that
science gives us any reason to doubt it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, science is not even addressing the sorts of question common
sense might ask about the table, much less giving an answer that conflicts with
the one common sense would give.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And it
is only conceptual confusion that makes some suppose otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle’s reminders<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle
identifies two main sources of this confusion concerning what science tells us
about the world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first has to do
with the word “science” and the second with the word “world.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For one thing, there is not even a prima
facie conflict between our common sense conception of the world and the vast
bulk of what falls under the label “science.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>No one thinks philology casts the slightest doubt on the reality of
words, or that botany, geology, and meteorology cast any doubt on the reality
of plants, earth, or weather.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
findings of such areas of research are not taken to undermine our confidence in
the reality of everyday objects.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor are
telescopes and microscopes taken to give any reason for doubting it, despite
revealing objects vastly larger or vastly smaller than the ones we encounter in
everyday life.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor is what physics tells
us about middle-sized objects (pendulums, water pumps, etc.) regarded as
challenging our belief in tables and the like.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In fact,
Ryle suggests, it is only two special areas of scientific study that people
suppose somehow casts doubt on such belief: the microstructure of material
objects, and the physiology of perception.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But even here, it is not, strictly speaking, the findings of modern
science that are the source of the problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Similar claims about the unreality of ordinary objects were made
millennia ago on the basis of the speculations of the ancient atomists.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Why don’t
the scientific findings, any more than the speculations, cast doubt on the
world of common sense?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This brings us to
the word “world.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When we hear tell of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the world</i> as described by microphysics,
we are, says Ryle, too quick to suppose that “world” should in this context be
understood the way it is understood by theologians when they talk about the
world’s creation, or that it should interpreted as a synonym for “cosmos.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But we should think of it instead on the
model of phrases like “the world of poultry” as a farmer or butcher might mean
it, or “the entertainment world” as a newspaper reporting on what is going on
in the field of entertainment would use it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“World” in such contexts means something like “sphere of interest” or
“the collection of matters pertaining to a certain subject” (such as poultry or
entertainment).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, no one
thinks there is some conflict between “the world of poultry” or “the
entertainment world” on the one hand, and the world of everyday physical
objects on the other.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But neither is
there any conflict between the latter world and the world of facts which are
the sphere of interest of the scientist who studies the microstructure of
matter or the physiology of perception.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>As with poultry or entertainment, the “world” of the latter is really
just a relatively small subset of all the facts that make up reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is not a comprehensive description of
reality that competes with the description taken for granted by common sense.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle offers
a couple of analogies to illustrate the point.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>When economics characterizes human behavior by way of considerations of
profit and loss, supply and demand, and so on, it is not putting forward an
exhaustive characterization of the nature of human beings or of any particular
human being.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor is it mischaracterizing
them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is simply noting what people
will tend to do if they are in circumstances of a certain specific sort, and
are attentive to considerations of a certain specific sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Similarly, when microphysics characterizes matter in the way it does, it
is not to be understood as offering an exhaustive characterization of tables and
other everyday physical objects, but simply calling attention to certain features
that are manifest under certain circumstances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That’s all.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle speaks
as if the average reader at the time he was writing (the early 1950s) would readily
grant that it would be a crude mistake to think that the economist’s
description captured the entirety of human nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It may be doubted whether all readers today
would be immune to such economic reductionism, but in any case, Ryle also
offers another analogy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He asks us to
imagine an accountant who has put together an exhaustive description of the
financial operations of a certain college – tuition, salaries, rents, costs for
utilities and groundskeeping, expenditures on library books, food services,
sports, special events, and so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Suppose the description covers all the activities and assets of the
institution and is extremely precise and useful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The
objectivity, precision, comprehensiveness, and utility of this description
would hardly justify the accountant in claiming that he has captured <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">all there is</i> to the college.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even though there is no part of the college
that is not referred to in his ledger, the ledger obviously doesn’t capture all
there is to those parts or to the whole they make up.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, even if the price of every
library book can be found there, the sorts of things that, say, a book reviewer
would want to know about a book will not be captured.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But neither would it be correct to say that
the description of the college that the accountant gives is in competition with
the description that might be given by, say, a student.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor would it be correct to say that the
accountant’s description is mistaken.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
is correct <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as far as it goes</i>, but it
is simply not meant in the first place to capture everything.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Obviously, it
would be silly so speak of there being two colleges, the way that Eddington
speaks of there being two tables. There
is just the one college, and certain features of it are focused on by the
student for his purposes, whereas others are focused on by the accountant for
his own, different purposes. But the
same thing is true of tables and other physical objects as common sense
understands them and as the physicist approaches them. There is just the one table, and the ordinary
person in everyday life focuses on certain aspects of it, whereas physics focuses
on different aspects. That’s all. Physics, rightly understood, no more competes
with or refutes the ordinary person’s understanding of the table than the
accountant competes with or refutes the student’s understanding of the college.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle notes
that it is tempting to say that common sense and microphysics give different
but complementary “descriptions” or “pictures” of the same reality, but he
argues that even this is misleading, insofar as it implicitly attributes a far
greater commonality of purpose that actually exists between the two.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For there is no reason to think of
microphysics as attempting in the first place to “picture” the reality of a
table or any other ordinary physical object (as opposed to explaining certain
features of it, or predicting its behavior under such-and-such circumstances,
or figuring out how to manipulate it in certain ways – none of which entails or
requires a “picture” of its full reality).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ryle also
notes that nothing in what he says implies or is intended to imply any contribution
to, or criticism of, scientific practice or scientific results.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is merely a point about the fallaciousness
of certain kinds of claims made about the everyday world on the basis of
science.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Hossenfelder and Goff<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Regrettably,
even seventy years after Ryle wrote, too many philosophers and scientists alike
still need a reminder of these observations, simple and obvious though they
ought to be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Physicist Brian Greene
provided a good example <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-particle-collection-that-fancied.html">not
too long ago</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Another case in point
is <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://x.com/Philip_Goff/status/1723696812748325153?s=20">a recent
Twitter exchange</a></span> between philosopher Philip Goff and physicist
Sabine Hossenfelder, and the debate on Twitter that it engendered.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To be sure, neither Hossenfelder nor Goff
would say that physics provides an exhaustive description of physical
reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In that way their views align
with Ryle’s main point (albeit neither brings up Ryle).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, they miss some of its other
implications.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For example,
Hossenfelder not only takes an instrumentalist view of physics, but seems to
think it obvious that physics just <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i>,
of its nature, instrumentalist – that when it makes reference to electrons, for
example, there is no implication whatsoever that electrons actually exist, as
opposed to being merely a useful fiction for organizing observations and making
predictions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But while instrumentalism
is certainly defensible, it seems to me a mistake to think it the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">obviously</i> correct interpretation of
physics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is like saying that the
accountant’s description of the college, in Ryle’s example, is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">obviously</i> nothing more than a useful
fiction, and that its utility gives us no reason at all to believe that it
captures anything really there in the college.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, of course, the accountant’s description does capture real
features of the college, even if only very abstract economic relations and far
from all, or even the most important, features of the college.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly, the utility of physics gives us
reason to think it does capture real features of the world, even if they are highly
abstract structural features and very far from an exhaustive description of
nature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I defend this <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">epistemic structural realist</i>
interpretation of physics in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Aristotles-Revenge-Metaphysical-Foundations-Biological/dp/3868382003/">Aristotle’s
Revenge</a></i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Goff, meanwhile,
himself accepts this interpretation of physics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, he falls into another error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Physics captures only very abstract structural features of physical
reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But what about the other
features?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What fleshes out this
abstract structure?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Goff is among the
growing number of writers who argue for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">panpsychism</i>
by proposing that qualia, the characteristic features of conscious experience
(the way red looks, the way coffee smells, and the like) provide a model for
understanding the intrinsic nature of all physical reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He presents this as a bold solution to what
would otherwise be a great mystery.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To see what
is wrong with this, imagine someone who noted that Ryle’s accountant provides
only a very abstract description of the college’s economic structure, and then
argued: “Something must flesh out that abstract structure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whatever could it be? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What a mystery! <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I postulate that it is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">qualia</i> that flesh it out, and thus that, strange as it may seem,
the college is – from the lecture halls to the library to the cafeteria and
down to every floorboard of the gym – a panpsychist entity pulsating with consciousness!”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The main problem
with this argument is not that it leads to a ludicrous conclusion, though it
certainly does.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem is that it
is a “solution” to something that isn’t a mystery in the first place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Certainly, the abstractness of the accountant’s
description of the college doesn’t pose any mystery whatsoever.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We already know what the intrinsic properties
of the college are – they are simply those that every student, professor, administrator
and janitor already knows about, just by walking around and looking at it from
day to day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The accountant has simply
ignored all this detail that we already know about, and focused instead on
certain abstract economic features.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Similarly,
we already know what the intrinsic features are of tables and other ordinary physical
objects.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are precisely those we
come across in dealing with these objects every day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Physics simply ignores these features and
focuses on those of which it can give a precise mathematical treatment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no mystery that needs solving in
terms of some bizarre metaphysics like panpsychism, but merely a reminder of
what we already know from common sense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Ryle (like Aristotle, Aquinas, Wittgenstein, and other critics of
revisionist metaphysics) offers precisely such a reminder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I have criticized Goff’s views along these
lines but at greater length before, <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/07/problems-for-goffs-panpsychism.html">here</a>
and <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/07/goffs-gaffes.html">here</a>.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some
scientists who commented on the exchange between Hossenfelder and Goff on
Twitter opined that it illustrates why many scientists don’t find such discussions
fruitful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>According to one of them, the
reason they are unfruitful is that they don’t help us do physics better.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But why on earth should anyone suppose that
the only reason why a discussion between physicists and philosophers would be
worthwhile would be if it helps the former do physics better?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Putting the implicit narcissism to one side,
there is another problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As Ryle says,
the point of his own remarks is not to either criticize or add to science’s
methodology or results, but rather to reveal the fallaciousness of certain
inferences <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">drawn from</i> its methodology
or results. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A scientist who thinks such
a message not worthwhile is precisely the sort of person most in need of
hearing it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related
posts:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-particle-collection-that-fancied.html">The
particle collection that fancied itself a physicist</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/10/dupre-on-ideologizing-of-science.html">Dupré
on the ideologizing of science</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/01/cartwright-on-theory-and-experiment-in.html">Cartwright
on theory and experiment in science</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/10/cartwright-on-reductionism-in-science.html">Cartwright
on reductionism in science</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/07/fallacies-physicists-fall-for.html">Fallacies
physicists fall for</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com147tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72825347803729642652023-11-18T11:27:00.000-08:002023-11-18T11:27:13.140-08:00What is free speech for?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJkQMzcBFohSikRUFJ1OUIBi1D8jSC6MPcX7XqpFuYvtiyFlVxYg8GdMo3L5AWf29b2_sEvw1Bbd-WPi-FX0b1KQVcYIa9Qjz2DNozSz51M_dQtShm-X_VLlAK1aAt13yzn6h6DBhbiLbLNFZ6oVYFuD0AKTw9sTGPdU6jCSx-BR-3Y3NAGEPxo3N_R4B_/s887/012.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="563" data-original-width="887" height="203" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJkQMzcBFohSikRUFJ1OUIBi1D8jSC6MPcX7XqpFuYvtiyFlVxYg8GdMo3L5AWf29b2_sEvw1Bbd-WPi-FX0b1KQVcYIa9Qjz2DNozSz51M_dQtShm-X_VLlAK1aAt13yzn6h6DBhbiLbLNFZ6oVYFuD0AKTw9sTGPdU6jCSx-BR-3Y3NAGEPxo3N_R4B_/s320/012.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>In <a href="https://www.postliberalorder.com/p/what-is-free-speech-for">a new article
at <i>Postliberal Order</i></a>, I discuss
the teleological foundations of, and limitations on, the right to free speech,
as these are understood from the perspective of traditional natural law theory’s
approach to questions about natural rights.<p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com50tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12534532118703855242023-11-09T11:00:00.000-08:002023-11-09T11:00:33.355-08:00All One in Christ at Public Discourse<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7wI-qGGeXsSyBrg5jlutnJJAnyzfOfJYpoKTiUASC4Q-zjN-Sk70jBmEH9tIhvMyf3yyDlGMVNQZ924znLHvPFtil5RGL1VX6NLa22KlYAbULrjxiIoXJ8kQOTxskb6Dk2AvDdBpdQjHy7urbte1qskXes-qmuYUDnjArwzJD5e3fIDlpxBAIrFlncFX9/s296/035.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="199" data-original-width="296" height="130" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7wI-qGGeXsSyBrg5jlutnJJAnyzfOfJYpoKTiUASC4Q-zjN-Sk70jBmEH9tIhvMyf3yyDlGMVNQZ924znLHvPFtil5RGL1VX6NLa22KlYAbULrjxiIoXJ8kQOTxskb6Dk2AvDdBpdQjHy7urbte1qskXes-qmuYUDnjArwzJD5e3fIDlpxBAIrFlncFX9/w193-h130/035.JPG" width="193" /></a></div>At <i>Public Discourse</i>, John F. Doherty <a href="https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2023/11/91715/">kindly reviews</a> my
book <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/All-One-Christ-Catholic-Critique/dp/1621645800">All
One in Christ: A Catholic Critique of Racism and Critical Race Theory</a></i>. From the review:<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In Feser’s book, Catholics, other
Christians, and even non-Christians will find much to help them confront CRT
and the perennial challenges of living in a racially diverse society</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Critical race theorists routinely use
confusing, tough-to-pin-down logical fallacies. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Feser does us the service of laying these
fallacies out methodically and succinctly</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">…<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For anyone who knows nothing about
CRT, </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">All One in
Christ<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> is an excellent place to start. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has a decidedly negative perspective on the
movement, but Feser takes pains to be fair to his opponents</i>.</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com50tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68523036969734515672023-11-04T17:30:00.001-07:002023-11-04T17:30:50.081-07:00The Thomist's middle ground in natural theology<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWmd55vmU6RcIPIsUO0Z1Jy-PitT6JCx9mrAE64-MsK3MqcAWGqtwFhCQ8Yqgd6GP64fREm7sXVfFfxMckU-GRmsfCc_21YVbZp-0SJFBIjsegt26mnQO6iupA3QwlIRthNm124NhdZk_X_CF6O5JykNNebbhBZPOGr3-LahfN18RLQV85s-fHnpdKXzRz/s574/064.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="574" data-original-width="201" height="403" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWmd55vmU6RcIPIsUO0Z1Jy-PitT6JCx9mrAE64-MsK3MqcAWGqtwFhCQ8Yqgd6GP64fREm7sXVfFfxMckU-GRmsfCc_21YVbZp-0SJFBIjsegt26mnQO6iupA3QwlIRthNm124NhdZk_X_CF6O5JykNNebbhBZPOGr3-LahfN18RLQV85s-fHnpdKXzRz/w141-h403/064.jpg" width="141" /></a></div>The
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition holds that knowledge must begin with sensory
experience but that it can nevertheless go well beyond anything that experience
could directly reveal. Its empiricism is
of a moderate kind consistent with the high ambitions of traditional metaphysics. For example, beginning <i>a posteriori</i> with the fact that change occurs, it claims to be able
to demonstrate the existence of a divine Prime Unmoved Mover. Similarly demonstrable, it maintains, are the
immateriality and immortality of the soul.<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Two crucial
components of this picture of human knowledge are the theses that concepts are
irreducible to sensations and mental images, but can nevertheless be abstracted
from imagery by the intellect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As I have
discussed <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-rationalistempiricist-false-choice.html">before</a>,
a key difference between the Aristotelian-Thomistic position on the one hand
and early modern forms of rationalism and empiricism on the other is that each
of the latter kept one of these Aristotelian-Thomistic theses while rejecting
the other.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rationalism maintained the
thesis that concepts are irreducible to sensations and mental images, but
concluded that many or all concepts therefore could not in any way be derived
from them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, rationalists
concluded, many or all concepts must be innate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Modern empiricism held on to the thesis that concepts derive from mental
imagery, but concluded that they must not really be distinct from them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence the modern empiricist tendency toward “imagism,”
the view that a concept just is an image (or an image together with a general
term).<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">These
fateful moves are key to understanding the later trajectories of the
rationalist and empiricist traditions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
notion of innate ideas gave rationalism confidence that it had the conceptual and
epistemic wherewithal to ground an ambitious metaphysics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But rationalist metaphysical systems can be
so bizarre and revisionary that they are open to the objection that their lack
of an empirical foundation leads them to float free of objective reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Modern empiricism, by contrast, has usually
been much more metaphysically modest.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But it has also had a tendency to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">too</i>
modest, to the point of collapsing into skepticism even about the world of
common sense and ordinary experience.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Here the critic can charge that collapsing concepts into imagery has
prevented modern empiricism from being able to account for any knowledge beyond
the here and now.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, both
approaches can be and have been modified by various thinkers in ways that seek
to avoid problems like those mentioned – though from the Thomistic point of
view, only a return to the broadly Aristotelian conception of knowledge from
which they each in their own ways departed can afford a sure remedy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But general epistemology
is not my concern here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What I want to
do instead is note two general approaches to natural theology that might
loosely be labeled “rationalist” and “empiricist,” even if their practitioners
don’t necessarily all self-identify as such.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They are approaches that are, from the Thomist point of view, deficient
in something analogous to the ways in which rationalist and modern empiricist
epistemology and metaphysics in general are deficient.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And like those views, they represent opposite
vicious extremes between which, naturally, Thomism stands as the sober middle
ground.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">On the one
hand we have an approach that aims to establish admirably ambitious traditional
metaphysical conclusions – such as the existence of God and the immortality of
the soul – by way of an essentially rationalist methodology.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One example would be <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/12/plantingas-ontological-argument.html">Plantinga’s
ontological argument</a> for God’s existence, and another would be <a href="https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/02/soul-proprietor">Swinburne’s conceivability
argument</a> for dualism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Plantinga’s
argument proceeds by considering what might or must be the case in various
possible worlds, and on that basis aims to establish the existence of God in
the actual world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Swinburne’s argument
begins with what we can conceive about the mind, and draws the conclusion that
its essence or nature must be of an immaterial kind.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">From the
Aristotelian-Thomistic point of view, both these arguments get things precisely
backwards.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We don’t start with
possibilities and then reason from them to actualities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, we start with actual things,
determine their essences, and then from there deduce what is or is not possible
for them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We don’t start with what we
can conceive and then determine a thing’s essence from that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, we start with a knowledge of its
essence and then determine, from that, what is actually conceivable with
respect to it, and what merely falsely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">seems</i>
to be conceivable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">From the
Thomist point of view, while the metaphysical <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">conclusions</i> of such arguments are not too ambitious, the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">method </i>for arriving at them is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We cannot do so entirely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a priori</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To be sure, once
we do establish the existence of God (through arguments of the kind I’ve
defended at length <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Five-Proofs-Existence-Edward-Feser/dp/1621641333/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3F7H4ZSOA88NZ&keywords=feser+five+proofs&qid=1699139963&sprefix=feser+f%2Caps%2C434&sr=8-1">elsewhere</a>),
we discover that he is such that, were we fully to know his essence, we would
see that his existence follows from it of necessity, just as the ontological
argument claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But what we can’t do is
jump directly to such an argument as a standalone proof of his existence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly, when we first establish that the
intellect is by nature immaterial, we will see that it is indeed conceivable
for it to exist independently of the body (topics I’ve dealt with e.g. <a href="https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf">here</a>
and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119468004.ch6">here</a>).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But in that case the appeal to conceivability
is rendered otiose as grounds for establishing the intellect’s immateriality.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">On the other
hand, we have arguments that proceed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a
posteriori</i>, but are way too <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">un</i>ambitious
in their conclusions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This would
include, for example, arguments that treat God’s existence as at best the most
probable <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/12/is-gods-existence-hypothesis.html">“hypothesis”</a>
among others that might account for such-and-such empirical evidence, or even
fail to get to God, strictly speaking, as opposed to a “designer” of some
possibly finite sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And it would
include arguments for survival of death that put the primary emphasis on out-of-body
experiences and other phenomena that can at best render a probabilistic judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Thomists
tend to put little or no stock in such “god of the gaps” and “soul of the gaps”
arguments. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At best they are distractions
from the more powerful arguments of traditional metaphysics, and thus can make
the grounds for natural theology seem weaker than they really are.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At worst, they can promote serious
misunderstandings of the nature of the soul, of God, and of his relationship to
the world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(For example, they can give
the impression that it is at least possible in principle that the world might
exist without God, which entails deism at best rather than theism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And they can give the impression that the disembodied
soul is a kind of spatially located or even ghost-like thing.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For the Thomist,
the correct middle ground position is to hold that the soul’s immateriality and
immortality, and the existence and nature of God as understood within classical
theism, can all be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">demonstrated</i> via
compelling philosophical arguments, but that the epistemology underlying these
arguments is of the Aristotelian rather than rationalist sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Again, I defend such arguments for the
existence and nature of God in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Five-Proofs-Existence-Edward-Feser/dp/1621641333/ref=pd_sim_14_2?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=JBGA9F0R86NCQBXMT2ZJ">Five
Proofs of the Existence of God</a></i>, and have argued for the immateriality
and immortality of the soul <a href="https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf">here</a>
and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119468004.ch6">here</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Much</i>
more on the latter topics to come in the book on the soul that I am currently
working on.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related reading:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-rationalistempiricist-false-choice.html">The
rationalist/empiricist false choice</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/12/is-gods-existence-hypothesis.html">Is
God’s existence a “hypothesis”?</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/09/qed.html">Q.E.D.?</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/06/theology-and-analytic-posteriori.html">Theology
and the analytic <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a posteriori</i></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2021/02/can-thomist-reason-to-god-priori.html">Can
a Thomist reason to God <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a priori</i>?</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com108tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62849728246659104462023-10-24T17:47:00.000-07:002023-10-24T17:47:21.841-07:00Cartwright on reductionism in science<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg539i2B7jnNBmUl8ABWbAlb_fW3eF3Bt2L38FwMEZK7xB5cqski2Cbf7_Ae1ugUQRHJVGFu7PlRmUA4x_7pZofUGdPM8SvHRQdKHxhXdaaiXXc0OBQitJhRPR_7O21zfXFGlEijRSVdE5t4LyYBQLzzBX3fjtP41jTw8zgig8Fe3EUxoZDEwTRpzeEZSaj/s371/089.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="371" data-original-width="257" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg539i2B7jnNBmUl8ABWbAlb_fW3eF3Bt2L38FwMEZK7xB5cqski2Cbf7_Ae1ugUQRHJVGFu7PlRmUA4x_7pZofUGdPM8SvHRQdKHxhXdaaiXXc0OBQitJhRPR_7O21zfXFGlEijRSVdE5t4LyYBQLzzBX3fjtP41jTw8zgig8Fe3EUxoZDEwTRpzeEZSaj/w177-h256/089.JPG" width="177" /></a></div>In her
superb recent book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Philosopher-Looks-at-Science/dp/1009201883/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=A+Philosopher+Looks+at+Science&qid=1674183665&sr=8-1">A
Philosopher Looks at Science</a></i></span>, Nancy Cartwright revisits some of
the longstanding themes of her work in the philosophy of science. In <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/01/cartwright-on-theory-and-experiment-in.html">an
earlier post</a></span>, I discussed what she has to say in the first chapter
about theory and experiment. Let’s look
now at what she says in her second chapter about reductionism, of which she has
long been critical. <p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Reductionism
does not have quite the same hold in philosophy of science that it once did, having
been subjected to powerful attack not only from Cartwright, but from <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://americanmind.org/salvo/scientism-americas-state-religion/">Paul
Feyerabend</a></span>, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/10/dupre-on-ideologizing-of-science.html">John
Dupré</a></span>, and many others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I
discuss the anti-reductionist literature in detail in <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Aristotles-Revenge-Metaphysical-Foundations-Biological/dp/3868382003/ref=sr_1_1?crid=14V62PZ5DAQ0E&keywords=feser+aristotle%27s+revenge&qid=1698105924&sprefix=feser+aristotle%27s+revenge%2Caps%2C265&sr=8-1">Aristotle’s
Revenge</a></i></span>.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Still, the idea
that whatever is real is somehow ultimately nothing more than what can in
principle be described in the language of a completed physics exerts a powerful
hold on many.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Cartwright cites <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Every-Thing-Must-Metaphysics-Naturalized/dp/0199573093/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3CQEGCRV8NV0T&keywords=ladyman+ross&qid=1698105578&sprefix=ladyman+ros%2Caps%2C810&sr=8-1&ufe=app_do%3Aamzn1.fos.006c50ae-5d4c-4777-9bc0-4513d670b6bc">James
Ladyman and Don Ross</a></span> as adherents of this view, and <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/rosenberg-roundup.html">Alex
Rosenberg</a></span> is another prominent advocate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As Cartwright notes, in contemporary writing
about science, the lure of reductionism is especially evident in discussions of
the purported implications of neuroscience for topics like free will.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Cartwright
sets the stage for her discussion by quoting a famous passage from physicist
Sir Arthur Eddington’s book <span class="MsoHyperlink"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nature-Physical-World-Gifford-Lectures/dp/1107663857/ref=sr_1_6?crid=3ILUVYSORIKNO&keywords=Arthur+Eddington+the+Nature+of+the+Physical+World&qid=1698178480&sprefix=arthur+eddington+the+nature+of+the+physical+world%2Caps%2C565&sr=8-6&ufe=app_do%3Aamzn1.fos.006c50ae-5d4c-4777-9bc0-4513d670b6bc">The
Nature of the Physical World</a></i></span>:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I have settled down to the task of
writing these lectures and have drawn up my chairs to my two tables.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Two tables!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me – two tables, two
chairs, two pens…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">One of them has been familiar to me
from earliest years. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is a commonplace
object of that environment which I call the world. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How shall I describe it? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It has extension; it is comparatively
permanent; it is coloured; above all it is </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">substantial<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>[I]f you are a plain commonsense man, not too
much worried with scientific scruples, you will be confident that you
understand the nature of an ordinary table…<o:p></o:p></i></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Table No. 2 is my scientific table…
It does not belong to the world previously mentioned – that world which
spontaneously appears around me when I open my eyes... My scientific table is
mostly emptiness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sparsely scattered in
that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed;
but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the
table itself…<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There is nothing </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">substantial<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> about my second table. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is
nearly all empty space – space pervaded, it is true, by fields of force, but
these are assigned to the category of “influences”, not of “things”. </i>(pp.
xi-xiii)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Now, reductionism
holds that in some sense the first table is really “nothing but” the second
table – or even that the first table does not, strictly speaking, really exist
at all, and that only the second table does (though philosophers typically
characterize the latter sort of view as eliminativist rather than
reductionist).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Reduced reductionism<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The first
consideration Cartwright raises to illustrate how problematic reductionism is
concerns the way reductionists have, over the last few decades, repeatedly had
to qualify their claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The ambitions
of reductionism have, you might say, been greatly reduced.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bold <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">type-type
reductionism</i> gave way first to a weaker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">token-token
reductionism</i>, and then to yet weaker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">supervenience</i>
theories.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Type-type
reductionist theories hold that each <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">type</i>
of feature described at some higher-level science can be identified with some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">type</i> of feature described at a
lower-level science, and ultimately at the level of physics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps the best-known theory of this kind is
the original<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> mind-brain identity theory</i>,
which holds that every type of psychological state (the belief that it is
raining, the belief that it is sunny, the desire for a cheeseburger, the fear
that the stock market will crash, etc.) can be identified with some specific
type of brain process.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A stock example
from the physical sciences would be the claim that temperature is identical to
mean kinetic energy.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As
Cartwright notes, one problem with this sort of view is that it is difficult to
find plausible cases of successful type-type reductions beyond such stock
examples.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Another is that the stock
examples themselves are not in fact unproblematic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Reduction” claims seem really to be eliminativist
claims after all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, given the
so-called reduction of temperature, it’s not that what we’ve always understood
to be temperature is really just mean kinetic energy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s that what we’ve always understood to be
temperature is not real after all (or exists only as a quale of our experience
of the physical world, rather than something there in the physical world
itself) and all that really exists is mean kinetic energy instead.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A problem
with supposing otherwise is that the laws that govern the features of some
higher-level description and the laws that govern the features of some allegedly
corresponding lower-level description can yield conflicting predictions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One way to think about this – though not
Cartwright’s own example – is in terms of <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/05/davidsons-anomalous-monism.html">Donald
Davidson’s view</a></span> that descriptions at the psychological level are not
law-governed in the way that the materialist supposes that descriptions at the
neurological level are.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence, even if a
brain event of a certain type is strictly predictable, the corresponding mental
event will not be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given this sort of
mismatch, there is pressure on the type-type reductionist to treat the
higher-level description as not strictly true.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">An
especially influential consideration that led philosophers to abandon type-type
reductionism is the “multiple realizability” problem – the fact that
higher-level features can be “realized in” more than one type of lower-level
feature, so that there is no smooth mapping of higher-level types on to
lower-level types of the kind an ambitious reductionist project aims for.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the case of the mind-brain identity
theory, the problem is that the same mental state (believing that it is
raining, say) could plausibly be associated with different types of brain
process in different people, or even in the same person at different
times.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or consider how an economic
property like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">being one dollar</i> can be
realized in paper currency, in metal currency, or as an electronic record of
one’s bank account balance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This led
philosophers to embrace less ambitious <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">token-token</i>
reductionist theories.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The idea here is
that even if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">types </i>of feature at a
higher level cannot be smoothly correlated with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">types</i> of feature at a lower level, nevertheless every <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">token </i>or individual instance of a feature
at the higher level can be identified with some token or individual instance of
a lower-level feature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this particular</i> instance of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">believing that it’s raining</i> is identical
with <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that particular</i> instance of a
certain type of brain process.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As
Cartwright notes, however, token reductions in fact tend to yield, after all, type
reduction claims of a sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An example
would involve <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">disjunctive</i> types at
the lower level of description.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
instance, a token reductionist view of mind-brain relations may entail that a
type of mental state like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">believing that
it is raining</i> is identical to a “type” of neural property defined as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">being in brain state of type B1 OR being in
brain state of type B2 OR being in brain state of type B3 OR</i>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And this will, in turn, open up the
possibility of a conflict between what the laws that govern the higher-level
description entail and what the laws that govern the lower-level description
entail.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If it is
objected that disjunctive “types” of the kind just described seem artificial, that
is certainly plausible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the problem,
as Cartwright notes, is that this illustrates how identifying what counts as a
plausible type is going to require detailed metaphysical analysis, and cannot
be read off the science, as the reductionist supposes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In any
event, token-token reductionism gave way in turn to talk of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">supervenience</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The basic idea here is that phenomena at some
higher level of description <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A </i>supervene
on phenomena at some lower level of description <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">B</i> just in case there could not be any difference at what happens at
level <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A</i> without some corresponding
difference in what happens at level <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">B</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But exactly
what this amounts to is not obvious, and debating the meaning of supervenience
has, Cartwright complains, been a bigger concern of philosophers than
explaining exactly why anyone should believe in it in the first place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(More on this in a moment.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As its vagueness indicates, supervenience entails
an even weaker claim than token-token reduction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Though, in recent years, there has been a lot
of heavy going about “grounding,” which, Cartwright notes, is stronger than
supervenience.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The idea is that all
facts are “grounded” in the facts described at the level of physics, in the
sense that whatever happens at the higher levels is “due to” what happens at
the lower, physics level.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But here too, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i> suppose this is the case?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Groundless grounding<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Where the
claim that everything supervenes on the level described by physics is
concerned, Cartwright says, there are three basic reasons given for it, none of
them well worked out or convincing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>First, there is a leap from the fact that the lower-level features
described by physics <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">affect</i> what
happens at the higher levels, to the conclusion that those features by themselves
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">entirely fix</i> what happens at the
higher levels.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is simply a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">non sequitur</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Second,
there is a leap from the supposition that successful reductions have been
carried out in a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">handful</i> of cases, to
the conclusion that reductionism is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in
general</i> true. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this too is a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">non sequitur</i> (and on top of that, the
premise is questionable).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Third, there
is the claim that physicalistic reductionism is in fact the method applied
within science.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this, Cartwright
argues, is simply not true to the facts of actual scientific practice.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">“Grounding”
accounts of reduction suppose that the level described by physics is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sole</i> cause of what happens at the higher
levels, and also that it is in no way itself caused by what happens at the
higher levels.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These claims too, argues
Cartwright, are not supported by actual scientific practice.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here she
appeals in part to recent work in the philosophy of chemistry, in which two
general lines of anti-reductionist argument have been developed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first and more ambitious of them argues
that chemistry as a discipline rests on classificatory and methodological
assumptions that are simply <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sui generis</i>
and make the features of the world it uncovers irreducible to those uncovered
by physics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The second does not rule out
reductions <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a priori</i>, but argues on a
case by case basis that purported reductions have not in fact successfully been
carried out.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I discuss this work in
philosophy of chemistry at pp. 330-40 of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Aristotle’s
Revenge</i>.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But it is
not just that chemistry and other higher-level sciences are not in fact “all
physics” at the end of the day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As
Cartwright emphasizes, “even physics isn’t all physics.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For one thing, “physics” covers a range of
branches, theories, and practices, not all of which have been reduced to the most
fundamental theories.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For another, even
the fundamental theories themselves are not fully compatible with each other,
the notorious inconsistency between quantum mechanics and the general theory of
relativity being a longstanding and still unresolved problem.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>She adds:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The third and to me most important
point is that in real science about real systems in the real world, for
predictions and explanations of even the purest of physics results, physics
must work in cooperation with a motley assembly of other knowledge, from other
sciences, engineering, economics, and practical life</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">. (p. 110)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Cartwright
then goes on to describe in detail the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_Probe_B">Stanford Gravity Probe B
project</a> as an illustration of the vast quantity of theoretical knowledge and
practical know-how that are necessary in order to apply and test abstract physical
theory, yet cannot itself be reduced to such theory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This recapitulates a longtime theme in
Cartwright’s work over the decades, viz. that the mathematical models and laws
of physics are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">idealized and simplified abstractions
from </i>concrete physical reality, and do not themselves constitute or capture
concrete physical reality.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In short,
reductionism, Cartwright judges, is poorly defined and poorly argued for.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its lingering prestige is unearned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I’ve mainly
just summarized Cartwright’s arguments here, since I sympathize with them and
they supplement those that I develop in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Aristotle’s
Revenge</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They give us, though, only
her case <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">against</i> the views she
opposes, rather than the positive account she’d put in place of them, which is
described later in the book.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>More on
that in a later post.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Related
reading:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/10/dupre-on-ideologizing-of-science.html">Dupré
on the ideologizing of science</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://americanmind.org/salvo/scientism-americas-state-religion/">Scientism:
America’s State Religion</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-particle-collection-that-fancied.html">The
particle collection that fancied itself a physicist</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/07/fallacies-physicists-fall-for.html">Fallacies
physicists fall for</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/one-long-circular-argument/">One Long
Circular Argument</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/science-and-scientism/">Science and
Scientism</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/rosenberg-roundup.html">Rosenberg
roundup</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com119tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67973987238231519652023-10-12T13:54:00.000-07:002023-10-12T13:54:08.146-07:00Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie<p><span style="line-height: 107%;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyEPgGORFkXZhB3Q0VG83l-w3xC-bisPSOhr2UUATs3P9ujWZIh0QrcgbntWuEWTSIgfq5PK0-KomloLo5KGD-h4Id7ZEwdvnk-aITLlHPEMtpQ5txkp2x9LoArPWFsqIU26deRMRnRfgib7anu3CeK4ZpmS_RiE8rLuzJa3ZmTXgk7cV7UZKprqvwD-2f/s375/025.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="262" data-original-width="375" height="164" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyEPgGORFkXZhB3Q0VG83l-w3xC-bisPSOhr2UUATs3P9ujWZIh0QrcgbntWuEWTSIgfq5PK0-KomloLo5KGD-h4Id7ZEwdvnk-aITLlHPEMtpQ5txkp2x9LoArPWFsqIU26deRMRnRfgib7anu3CeK4ZpmS_RiE8rLuzJa3ZmTXgk7cV7UZKprqvwD-2f/w234-h164/025.jpg" width="234" /></a></div><a href="https://www.firstthings.com/article/2023/11/thomists-in-the-wilderness">My review</a> of Jon Kirwan and Matthew Minerd’s important new anthology <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Thomistic-Response-Nouvelle-Th%C3%A9ologie-Concerning/dp/0813236630/?tag=firstthings20-20">The
Thomistic Response to the Nouvelle Théologie</a></i> appears <span style="line-height: 107%;">in the November 2023 issue of <i>First Things</i>.</span><p></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com120tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38339706724549274722023-10-10T16:37:00.000-07:002023-10-10T16:37:59.673-07:00A little logic is a dangerous thing<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvlYnFnR3v9GEfHMIxRaMng2blUnrkujRlsF1tJdx2pXYPMemDOM3mVJx9-xYQ-kv-2aYtvVEZK3_1ObTJ0HLey84hXJwUvkMd7YmGwCGQXt1LNrJvEZCkIU0a-mQsIEXOqZG9rzQeMjSujxDrETuzCf38A5sSwCeXyCLCW0zZI3fAaVxxCC3JriyJIH2I/s365/009.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="305" data-original-width="365" height="165" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvlYnFnR3v9GEfHMIxRaMng2blUnrkujRlsF1tJdx2pXYPMemDOM3mVJx9-xYQ-kv-2aYtvVEZK3_1ObTJ0HLey84hXJwUvkMd7YmGwCGQXt1LNrJvEZCkIU0a-mQsIEXOqZG9rzQeMjSujxDrETuzCf38A5sSwCeXyCLCW0zZI3fAaVxxCC3JriyJIH2I/w198-h165/009.jpg" width="198" /></a></div>Some famous
and lovely lines from Alexander Pope’s “An Essay on Criticism” observe:<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A little learning is a dangerous thing;<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">And drinking largely sobers us again</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Think of the
person who has read one book on a subject and suddenly thinks he knows
everything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or the beginning student of
philosophy whose superficial encounter with skeptical arguments leads him to
deny that we can know anything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A deeper
inquiry, if only it were pursued, would in each case yield a more balanced
judgement.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Similar
delusions of competence often afflict those who have studied a little
logic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2021/07/the-metaphysical-presuppositions-of.html">Elsewhere</a></span>
I’ve discussed the phony rigor often associated with the application of formal
methods.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here, however, what I have in
mind is the abuse of a more elementary part of logic – the study of fallacies
(that is to say, of common errors in reasoning).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The principle of charity<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Beginning
students of logic, when they first learn the fallacies, often start thinking
they can see them everywhere – or more precisely, everywhere in the arguments
of people whose opinions on politics or religion they already disagree with,
though not so much in the arguments of people on their own side.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(What are the odds?)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A good teacher will inform them that
knowledge of the fallacies must be applied in conjunction with what is called
the “principle of charity.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
principle tells us that, when an argument that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">could</i> be read as committing a fallacy could also be plausibly
interpreted instead in a different way, we should presume that the latter interpretation
is the correct one.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The point of
this principle is not merely, or even primarily, to be nice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The point is rather that the study of logic
is ultimately about <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">pursuing truth</i>,
not about winning a debate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we
dismiss some argument too quickly because we haven’t considered a more charitable
interpretation, then we might miss out on learning some important truth –
perhaps a truth that we are reluctant to learn, precisely because it comes from
someone we dislike.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But it’s not
just a failure to apply the principle of charity that can lead someone wrongly
to accuse another of committing a fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Sometimes people just don’t correctly understand the nature of some
particular fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Ad hominem?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Let’s
consider some common examples, beginning with the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What
matters when evaluating an argument is whether its premises are true, and
whether the conclusion really follows from the premises, either with deductive
validity or at least with significant probability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And that’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">all </i>that matters, logically speaking.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The character of the person giving the
argument is entirely irrelevant to that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ad hominem</i> fallacies are
fallacies that neglect this fact – that pretend that by attacking a person in
some way, you’ve thereby cast doubt on the argument the person has given or the
truth of some claim he has made.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There are
different ways this might go.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
crudest way is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">abusive ad hominem</i>,
wherein, instead of addressing the merits of some argument the person has
given, you simply call him names – “racist,” “fascist,” “commie,” or whatever –
and pretend that sticking such a label on him casts doubt on what he said.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Another common variation on the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">circumstantial ad hominem</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">appeal to motive</i>, wherein one attributes
a suspect motive to the person and pretends that doing so casts doubt on what
the person says.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, it does
not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A good argument remains a good
argument, however bad the motives (or alleged motives) of the person giving it,
and a bad argument remains a bad argument however good the motives of the
person giving it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is
crucial to emphasize, though, that calling someone a name, attributing bad
motives to him, or in some other way attacking a person or his character is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not in itself</i> a fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It amounts to a fallacy only when <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">what is at issue, specifically, </i>is the
merits of some claim he made or some argument he gave, and instead of
addressing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i>, you <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">change the subject</i> and attack the
person.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But of
course, there are other contexts where the subject <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i> the person or his character, rather than some argument he gave.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, if a jury is trying to determine
whether a person’s eyewitness testimony is reliable, a lawyer is not committing
an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy if he notes
that the witness has been caught in lies in the past, or is known to harbor a
personal grudge against the person he’s testifying against.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Or, when you are deciding whether to believe
a used car salesman, you are not guilty of an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy when considering that his motive to sell you a
car might bias the advice he gives you.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Again, in cases like these, what is at issue is not some argument the
person gave, which might be considered entirely apart from him.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What is at issue is the credibility of the
person <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">himself</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Or suppose
you call someone a “jerk” precisely because he is acting like a jerk.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no fallacy in that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, there is no fallacy even if he is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> acting like a jerk, but you’re just
in a bad mood.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Name-calling may be
justified in the one case and unjustified in the other, but it is not a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">fallacy</i> if the context isn’t one where
the cogency of some argument he gave is what at issue, and you’re distracting
attention from that.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">People are
especially prone to make the mistake of confusing attacks on a person with the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy when the context is a
debate or public exchange of some other kind – where, of course, one or both
sides may be making arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose
Person A and Person B are engaged in some public dispute (on a blog, on
Twitter, or wherever).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose Person A
addresses the arguments of Person B, but Person B refuses to respond in kind,
resorting instead to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i>
attacks, or mockery, or changing the subject.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Suppose that Person A, appalled by this behavior, calls attention to
Person B’s personal failings – characterizing Person B as intellectually
dishonest, or as a sophist, or as a buffoon, or the like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And suppose that Person B then objects to
this and accuses <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Person A</i> of committing
an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Is Person A
guilty of such a fallacy?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course
not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He has not attacked Person B <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as a way of avoiding </i>addressing Person
B’s claims or arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the
contrary, he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">has</i> addressed those claims
and arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His negative estimation of
Person B’s character is a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">separate</i>
point, and a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">correct</i> one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Person B – whether out of clueless
befuddlement or cynical calculation – makes of the false accusation that Person
A is guilty of an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy
a smokescreen to hide the fact that it is really <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Person B himself</i> who is guilty of this.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In the case
I just described, a person is accused of committing an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy when he is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
in fact doing so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it can also happen
that a person pretends (or maybe even sincerely believes) that he is not
committing an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy when
he <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i> fact doing so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To change my example a bit, suppose Person A
and Person B are engaged in some public dispute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose Person B never addresses Person A’s
arguments, but simply and repeatedly flings terms of abuse, questions his
motives, and so on, with the aim of undermining Person A’s credibility with his
readers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suppose Person A accuses Person
B of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacies, and Person
B responds: “I’ve committed no such fallacy!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>After all, using such terms of abuse is not by itself fallacious.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s only a fallacy when addressing an
argument, and I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">haven’t</i> been
addressing your arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’m just
telling people what a horrible person you are.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Is Person B
thus innocent of an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i>
fallacy in this case?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He may not have committed this fallacy in a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">direct</i> way, but he has still done so <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">indirectly</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>True, he has avoided addressing any <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">specific</i> argument Person A has
given.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence he has not in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i> way committed an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the same time, though, he has, through <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> abuse, tried to poison his
readers’ minds against taking seriously <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i>
argument that Person A might happen to give.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Hence he has deployed a fallaciously <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad
hominem</i> tactic in a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">general </i>way.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The bottom
line is this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is a speaker resorting to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> abuse <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as a way of trying to avoid</i> having to address some claim or
argument another person has given?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If
so, he is guilty of an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i>
fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If not, then he is not guilty
of such a fallacy (whether or not his abusive language is unjustifiable for
some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">other</i> reason – that’s a separate
question).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Appeal to emotion?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">An <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">appeal to emotion</i> fallacy is committed
when, instead of trying to convince one’s listener of a certain conclusion by
offering reasons that provide actual logical support for that conclusion, one
plays on the listener’s emotions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The strength
of the emotional reaction makes the conclusion <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">seem</i> well-supported, when in fact the premises do not provide
strong grounds for believing it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But here it
is important to emphasize that the presence of an emotional reaction does not
by <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">itself</i> make an argument
fallacious, not even if the speaker foresees such a reaction and indeed even if
he intends it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To take an artificial example
in order to illustrate the point, suppose some follower of Socrates, having
just heard the fatal verdict, wants desperately to believe that his hero
Socrates will somehow never die.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You
hope to bring him back to reality, and present him with the following argument:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">All men are mortal<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Socrates is a man<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Therefore, Socrates is mortal</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">He contemplates this reasoning, sighs heavily and resigns
himself to the cold, hard truth.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
argument raises profound emotions in him, as you knew it would.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But have you committed a fallacy of appeal to
emotion?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Obviously not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The argument is no less sound than it would
be if someone with no emotional reaction at all had heard it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Still, you might think, the reason there is no fallacy here
is that the emotions in question are not such as to incline the person to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">want</i> to believe the conclusion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Quite the opposite.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But suppose the emotions in question <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">were</i> of that sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, suppose one of Socrates’ enemies
feared that the hemlock would not kill him, and worried that perhaps Socrates
was immortal and could never be gotten rid of.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Suppose you present <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">him</i> with
the same argument just given.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is
reassured.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But have you now, in this
case, committed a fallacy of appeal to emotion?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">No.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here too, the
argument remains just as sound as it would be if some unemotional person who couldn’t
care one way or the other about Socrates had heard it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But what if you not only know that the person
will be pleased by the conclusion, but <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intend
</i>for him to be pleased by it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What if
you hope that his positive emotional response to the argument will make him
more likely to accept it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Wouldn’t <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i> make it a fallacious appeal to
emotion?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">No, it would not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
the bottom line is that the premises are clearly true and the conclusion
clearly follows validly from them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
presence or absence of an emotional reaction, of whatever kind, does not change
that in the least.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hence there is no
fallacy of appeal to emotion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such a
fallacy is committed only when there is some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logical gap</i> in the support the premises supply the conclusion,
which the emotional reaction is meant to fill.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But there is no such gap – and thus no fallacy.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Indeed, an emotional reaction can in some cases get a person
to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">more</i> rational, not less.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the second example, the person’s fear that
Socrates might be immortal is unreasonable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He’s letting his fear of Socrates’ influence within Athens get the better
of him, and lead him to paranoid delusions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The argument you give him, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">precisely
because it is pleasing to him</i>, draws his attention away from these paranoid
feelings and back to reality. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Again, the example is admittedly artificial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But there are many topics that do
realistically carry heavy emotional baggage, yet where this does not entail
that arguments having to do with them must be guilty of the fallacy of appeal
to emotion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Matters of life and death –
war, abortion, capital punishment, and the like – are like that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No matter what conclusions you draw and what
premises you appeal to, they are bound to generate emotional reactions of some
kind in your listener.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that does not
entail that you are guilty of a fallacy of appeal to emotion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The bottom line is this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Are the premises of the argument true?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Do they in fact provide logical support for the conclusion (whether
deductive validity or inductive strength)?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Then the argument is not guilty of a fallacy of appeal to emotion,
whether or not it also happens to generate an emotional reaction in the
listener, and whatever that reaction happens to be.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Slippery slope?<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">A third fallacy that is widely misunderstood is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">slippery slope</i> fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Someone commits this fallacy when he claims
that a certain view or policy will lead to disastrous consequences, but without
offering adequate support for this judgement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It is an instance of the more general error of jumping to conclusions or
inferring well beyond what the evidence appealed to would support.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For example, suppose someone criticized a proposed small tax
hike by claiming that it would inevitably lead to a radically egalitarian redistribution
of wealth.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is hard to imagine how
this would fail to count as a slippery slope fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is there a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logical</i> connection between raising taxes slightly and radically
equalizing shares of wealth by way of redistribution?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No, and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/classical-natural-law-theory-property-rights-and-taxation/E5AF0E3F9E3B29FDFF940E4CAA728721">it
is not hard to formulate principles</a> that would both allow for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">some</i> taxation while at the same time ruling
out radically redistributive taxation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is
there nevertheless some strong <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">causal </i>connection
between raising taxes slightly and radically redistributing wealth?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Obviously not, since there have as a matter
of historical fact been many cases where taxes were raised, but were never
followed by a radically egalitarian redistribution of wealth.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Notice that the problem here, though, is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> that the argument claims that bad consequences would
follow.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The problem is that the argument
did not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">back up</i> this claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is often overlooked by people who accuse
others of the slippery slope fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They seem to think that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i>
claim that bad consequences will follow from a certain view or policy amounts
to a slippery slope fallacy.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In fact, there is no fallacy <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as long as someone explains exactly how</i> the bad consequences are
supposed to follow.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you can show that
A <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">logically entails</i> Z, or that it
does so when conjoined with some other clearly true assumptions, then you have
not committed a slippery slope fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Or if you can identify some <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">specific
causal mechanism</i> by which A will lead to Z, then you have not committed a
slippery slope fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You commit such a
fallacy only when you jump from A to Z <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">without
filling in the gap</i> between them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What if you are wrong about the claim that A logically
entails Z, or wrong about the causal mechanism you claim links them?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You are still not guilty of a slippery slope
fallacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>True, you are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">mistaken</i>, and perhaps guilty of some
other logical error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But you haven’t
committed a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">slippery slope fallacy</i>,
specifically, if you at least proposed some specific means by which A would
lead to Z.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 12.0pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">There are other fallacies too that are often misunderstood,
but that suffices to make the point.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Knowledge of the fallacies is essential to reasoning well, but it is of
limited value if it is merely <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">superficial</i>
knowledge, and may in that case even impede careful reasoning.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It can lead to seeing fallacies where they do
not exist, and thus lead away from truth rather than toward it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And if one’s knowledge of fallacies is
deployed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">merely</i> as a further rhetorical
means of trying to make an opponent look bad, it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">constitutes</i> sophistry rather than remedying sophistry.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Further
reading:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/04/what-is-ad-hominem-fallacy.html">What
is an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy?</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-ad-hominem-fallacy-is-sin.html">The
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad hominem</i> fallacy is a sin</a></span></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/05/self-defeating-claims-and-tu-quoque.html">Self-defeating
claims and the tu quoque fallacy</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/09/meta-sophistry.html">Meta-sophistry</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2023/06/the-associationist-mindset.html">The
associationist mindset</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/10/really-informal-fallacies.html">Very
informal fallacies</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2021/07/the-metaphysical-presuppositions-of.html">The
metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic</a></span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com40tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4229051519302152312023-10-02T16:45:00.000-07:002023-10-02T16:45:25.731-07:00Michael F. Flynn (1947-2023)<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnPYW6IqXDaG_SgEKq5vSv95wjPiw2NNHMBGHWBvzEEvK2DDaT49Gk3W_Su64ziimT3FymrlgUrtzvCgWu0V54romQvJFo089aJM1Ku1Tvj5ya68BLutwPP6siuzzBnT59VsnrCJqnaFXmaPl4XMbY2AaJUDqTDN2XmBRMvV3Xl6ijOoBSUSaAsSpTB-aP/s382/004.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="382" data-original-width="265" height="222" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhnPYW6IqXDaG_SgEKq5vSv95wjPiw2NNHMBGHWBvzEEvK2DDaT49Gk3W_Su64ziimT3FymrlgUrtzvCgWu0V54romQvJFo089aJM1Ku1Tvj5ya68BLutwPP6siuzzBnT59VsnrCJqnaFXmaPl4XMbY2AaJUDqTDN2XmBRMvV3Xl6ijOoBSUSaAsSpTB-aP/w154-h222/004.jpg" width="154" /></a></div>It is with
much sadness that I report that Michael F. Flynn, well-known science fiction
writer and longtime friend of this blog, has passed away. Mike’s daughter made the announcement <a href="http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2023/10/wonder-and-anticipation-likes-of-which.html">at
his blog yesterday</a>. <p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">That Mike
will be remembered for his work in science fiction goes without saying.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it is worth emphasizing too that he was
an irreplaceable presence in the blogosphere, who showed the potential of the
medium for work of substance and lasting value.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I doubt he ever posted anything that didn’t reward his readers’
attention, with writing that wore lightly Mike’s learning not only in the sciences
but also in philosophy, theology, and history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He was for many years a regular and welcome contributor to the comments
section of this blog, raising the tone simply by virtue of his presence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One of the things I most admired about him
was the calm and patient manner with which he would respond to even the most
obnoxious and ignorant interlocutors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
never had to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">say</i> that he knew what he
was talking about, while his opponent didn’t.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He simply showed it by typing up a few sentences.<span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I had the
honor and pleasure of meeting Mike in person only once, at a conference in New
York City at which the esteemed <a href="http://www.wmbriggs.com/">Matt Briggs</a>
was also present.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The three of us “bloggers
in arms” marked the event <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/11/bloggers-in-arms.html">with a
photo</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(It was also an honor, and a
thrill, when Mike had a character cite me as an authority in his philosophical
SF short story “Places Where the Roads Don’t Go,” in his collection <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Captive-Dreams-Michael-Flynn/dp/1612420591/ref=sr_1_1?crid=C44J5IZGRYZ9&keywords=flynn+captive+dreams&qid=1696288989&sprefix=flynn+captive+dream%2Caps%2C286&sr=8-1">Captive
Dreams</a></i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thanks, Mike!)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Matt has
posted his own reflections about Mike <a href="https://www.wmbriggs.com/post/48779/">at his blog</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Though I
knew Mike mainly from our online interactions, I have to say it felt like a gut
punch to learn of his death. Perhaps
that was for the usual selfish reason that all of us are sad at the death of a
person we like and admire – that we know <i>we</i>
will be worse off. Thank you for your
work, Mike, and may God bless and protect your soul. You and yours are in our prayers. RIP.</span></p>Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com32