Immortal Souls provides as ambitious and complete a defense of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology as is currently in print. Among the many topics covered are the reality and unity of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, the critique of artificial intelligence, and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptions of human nature. Along the way, the main rival positions in contemporary philosophy and science are thoroughly engaged with and rebutted.
"Edward
Feser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore,
both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work for
consultation. Each of the human faculties discussed is treated comprehensively,
with a broad range of theories considered for and against, and, although
Feser's conclusions are firmly Thomistic, one can derive great benefit from his
discussions even if one is not a convinced hylomorphist. Every philosopher of
mind would benefit from having this book within easy reach."
Howard
Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central European University
“Feser
defends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it into
dialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic
(Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus) philosophy. He deftly rebuts objections to Thomism,
both ancient and modern. Anyone working today on personal identity, the unity of
the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will need to engage
with the analysis and arguments presented here.”
Robert C.
Koons, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
CONTENTS
Preface
Part I: What
is Mind?
1. The Short Answer
2.The Self
3. The Intellect
4.The Will
Part II:
What is Body?
5.Matter
6. Animality
Part III:
What is a Human Being?
7. Against Cartesianism
8. Against Materialism
9. Neither Computers nor Brains
Part IV: What
is the Soul?
10. Immortality
11. The Form of the Body
Index
Going right on my Christmas list
ReplyDeleteI've always thought these book announcements were akin to hearing your favorite band is going to drop a new album. Congratulations on bringing it to the finish line (well, almost at least)!
ReplyDeleteNot to be ungracious, but the cover is a little hard on the eyes - kinda how TLS was now that I think about it. Are we committed on the color? :)
That is a topic in great need of re-exposition, as we confront the essential nothingness of the current conception of the human person, and the subsequent evaporation of the idea of objective human value.
ReplyDeleteNot, that most humans on the face of the planet ever affirmed it anyway. But "we" used to, before emotion and inchoate urges became the sole measure of man's meaning and fulfilment.
Re-limning the lines of demarcation between the prevalent meat machine, no there, there, version of the human organism in all its nihilistic conceit, and a perspective which potentially gives us a deep reason not to smash the face of an annoying and unneeded other if one may do so conveniently, is a profoundly worthwhile effort.
The western world is choking to death on its own deconstructed version of man. The supposed thought leading vanguard of taxonomic-humanity is frantically scrambling to escape its own humanness - on the basis of an impulse it cannot itself justify as anything other than as a brute, cosmically pointless, fact.
Their anthropology, reduces to man as a collocation of meaningless appetites encased in a skin sack: no real self, neither conscious nor self-directed in any meaningful sense, yet proudly claiming agency and a social right to one's consideration. With pretentions of eventual godhood. Thus, a thing that does not understand itself, and which is in principle and on the basis of its own metaphysics incapable of doing so in any ultimate sense, nonetheless imagines itself as god.
Perhaps this book can do some good before the race of man evporates completely. Or is forevermore conceived of as a deoxyribo automaton worm in a flesh sheath.
Be sure and send a copy to the current pope. Kinda help him firm up his stupid fideist brotherhood of humanity business on a rational basis.
Maybe.
Looking forward to adding this to my bookshelf.
ReplyDeleteBeen waiting for this book for years now!
ReplyDeleteSee's Heidegger, is interested
ReplyDeleteDr. Feser, do you would send this book like a gift to David Bentley Hart (just a jokey). I buy the book of him on mind- and I waiting arrived. And, of course, I going to buy your book on soul. I really thing that you and him could talking more about mind and soul; and I would appreciate if you talking more about the vision of Dr. Hart with respect monism - especially now that him will release a book about this theme.
ReplyDeleteI compelling with this vision - especially the vision of my compatriot, Bernardo Kastrup, on analitycal idealism - inasmuch I think that is more cogent and simple. In the question of analitycal idealism, despite of good thesis about that the more fundamental is mind, Kastrup continue with one of the greatest dogma of naturalism: mecanicism - how intentionality could evolve if the subvenient basis is mechanical? Doesn't make sense at all.
Anyway, from the land of Vera Cruz, God bless you Dr. Feser.
Very excited to see and read this! Thanks for all your hard work, Dr. Feser!
ReplyDeleteYoooooooooo
ReplyDeleteDr. Feser, congrats on the upcoming release of the your new book. Am very much looking forward to reading it.
ReplyDeleteSince my philosphical anthropology is Wittgensteinian based I'm glad to have the opportunity to do a detailed comparison of the two.
I hope he interacts with P. M. S. Hacker’s recent treatise on Human Nature.
DeleteTo Anonymous,
DeleteOne would hope so, bu I am very doubtful. He seems to be focused on addressing the claims made by analytic philosophers who are more in the mainstream of analytic philosophy. That would include folks like Searle, Dennet , Kripke and the Churchlands. Which makes sense, because most materialists or naturalists rely on their work when critiquing those in the supernatural camp.
Also, Hacker's tetralogy on human nature is more than 1,500 pages long. Impossible to address it adequately while still presenting one's own views.
Looking forward to your analysis of Heidegger. Despite never having studied his work as a stand alone subject [ pre or post "turn"] in an academic setting, I have a shelf full of his works; some well worn, others briefly engaged. And naturally, having done course work in Phenomenology and Existentialism, as well as philosophical anthropology, one would encounter him. But oddly enough, almost tangentially.
ReplyDeleteThe standard bibliographical note that he started out studying scholastic philosophy is kind of interesting, and we shall see if it bears on the trajectory of his thinking [ viewed positively or negatively] in your coverage.
Thank you for the work you put into this.
ReplyDeleteI CAN'T WAIT TO PUT MY HANDS ON IT!!!
ReplyDelete
ReplyDeleteAs big as it is, I could use the book to keep my door propped open
pretty good comments, professor. some wry, some cute, others, well this is not my point. If, and only if, the immortal soul notion is right, then I will change my stance on the life/death question. More later---when I can figure it out.
ReplyDeletePaul, this side of the grave, no one will ever be able to really "figure it out." But many people, many very learned people, will think they have.
DeleteLooks awesome! Excited to read and study it.
ReplyDeleteWhen is it hitting the shelves?
ReplyDeleteYes, please.
ReplyDeleteThe most important announcement of the year!
ReplyDeleteYes, it is always therepeutic to have a good laugh in these glum times.
Delete"Souls on board"
ReplyDeleteThe terminology we habitually use to describe ourselves, i.e., our lives, in the most critical moments may tell us quite a bit about our largely ingrained and unconscious assumptions about existence.
I was surprised to hear airline pilots and traffic controllers use terminology that most of us encounter only in novels about 19th Century seafaring disasters.
I would have expected "seat occupants", or "live cargo units".
See instead, 5:58 of the mayday call exchange.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=u88OZrltEFs
In this case, captains hanging on to tradition must have some other explanation than the pathetic and contemptible one deployed when the soulless flesh-robot meat computers of the religion of scientism claim that they continue to use the language of intentionality, free will, and purpose, merely out of convenience. (And not because these acolytes of scientism - so brave! as they are - fear the practical and corrosive blow back effects of being themselves socially reduced to, and then treated by others as, quasi zombies on a predetermined trajectory, and therefore liable to ordinately be treated [ or rather, ' dealt with' ] like any other material thing: which of course, their own ideology implies that they are.) Right Daniel? Can you hear me down there??
Don't worry folks. There is no harm in talking like that, really. It lived, more or less morphed into a giant lump of gasping flesh, then it died, and it is and feels no more. And now apart from whatever advantage or utility can be derived from its residuum, it can be forgotten about. Unless you happen to be an emotionally sensitive type.
Anyway, the audio reminds us it was not always presumptively seen as so regarding the human person: and not too long ago, at that.
Still obsessed with Daniel? I think his family, friends, colleagues and former students are celebrating his life., while you just vent into the blogosphere.
DeletePlease ask them to include headers on the pages so that one can know what part one is in while flipping through. Aristotle’s revenge is harder to navigate without headers.
ReplyDeleteTalk with Sam Harris about will.If you want...I left a remark today on *the problem with hell*, @ another blog. Shortly put, it seems to me there is no problem. I commented there, roughly, the problem would come without a 'problem' of hell. That would render axiology and deontology pointless. Although, as a practical matter, they already ARE pointless. Nihilism? No, realistic pragmatism. Carry on...Professor.
ReplyDeleteWCB
ReplyDeleteA quick look at Amazon seems to have a number of books on the subject of the soul available. Not all seemingly worth reading. Are there any books on the soul worth reading?
WCB
Thomistic Psychology by River Brennan
DeleteJ.P. Moreland, Ph.D is an evangelical Christian philosopher who written a number of books.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.amazon.com/Soul-How-Know-Real-Matters/dp/0802411002/ref=asc_df_0802411002/?tag=hyprod-20&linkCode=df0&hvadid=693373621819&hvpos=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=5725642790750795543&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9012821&hvtargid=pla-492050638239&psc=1&mcid=148bcf201f2e3bf7b9251d40ece4a052&gad_source=1
I am interested in whether Prof. Feser's new book will talk about the relation between soul as principle of motion in the animal and the First Unmoved Mover. Aquinas says in his commentary on the De Anima that "soul itself is the source (fons) and first principle (principium) of all motion in ensouled things" (In I DA l. 1.7).
ReplyDeleteI don't know about the belief basis for questions and answers on such matters. Gerald Edelman hypothesized there were primary and higher order levels of consciousness in living things. Like it or not, this supports notions of evolution---like it, or not. Insofar as I am not bound to belief, doctrine or dogma, this labels me athiest. Or, at best, agnostic. OK. I look to science for guidance. Nothing more to say.
ReplyDeleteCongratulations Ed, looking forward to read it!
ReplyDeleteOh hurrah, can't wait to buy it!
ReplyDeleteCan't wait to read it, thank you!!
ReplyDeleteHi Ed. I hope that in your book, you'll be addressing the scientific evidence that we store concepts in our brains, and that "by linking up different clusters in the brain that are responsible for storing groups of concepts, our species gained the capacity to think and communicate using metaphor." That's a quote from an article titled "How Neanderthal Language Differed From Modern Human," by Steven Mithen, Professor of Early Prehistory at the University of Reading.
ReplyDeleteHere's the link:
https://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2024/05/21/how_neanderthal_language_differed_from_modern_human_1032870.html
See also this article on how concepts are encoded in the brain (you can read the PDF online):
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811916301021
Additionally, Steve Mithen has found archaeological evidence that human language (which enabled our ancestors to engage in forward planning, which helped them during hunting) appeared in a rudimentary from about 1.6 million years ago, about 300,000 years after the appearance of Homo erectus. Language gradually became more sophisticated over the course of time, and did not become fully modern until about 100,000 years ago, when our ancestors acquired the ability to use metaphors. See here:
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/archaeology/human-evolution-language-origin-archaeology-b2517744.html
In short: the scientific evidence that the brain thinks is very strong, and there appears to be no clear dividing line between humans and non-humans. All we can say is that before 1.6 million years ago, our ancestors weren't human, and that over the next 1.5 million years, they became increasingly more human. This doesn't square well with the Thomistic claim that it is our rational soul (not our brain) that forms concepts, that a vast infinite gulf separates animals with rational souls from those lacking them, and that there was a definite moment in history when the first animal with a rational soul appeared. Comments, anyone?
None of it squares well with Genesis or indeed the rest of the Scriptures. God of course labels Adam a 'living soul' in 2:7 but this of course is the Hebrew word nephesh which is the exact same word he also uses of the animals throughout ch 1! Indeed the scripture repeatedly states 'man is like the beasts that perish' and 'there is no advantage for man over beast for all is vanity' and ' do not trust in mortal man...his spirit departs he returns to the earth in that very day his thoughts perish' and 'they sought the young childs soul to destroy it' and 'the soul is IN the blood' (!!!) etc etc.
DeleteSo either we're purely material beings in our fallen state or we're the combination of a spirit and a material body ie spirit + matter = living nephesh. When the spirit departs we then become dead nephesh or dead souls. If there was no resurrection of the dead there'd be no hope as Paul EXPLICITLY affirms in 1 Corinthians 15.
(The scientific evidence is not helpful to the secular mind. It would appear from your references that humans appeared much earlier in a sophisticated state which leaves much less time for evolution and therefore makes Divine Intervention even CREATION even more necessary)
There are more possible concepts than there are possible brain states. Hence there cannot be a one to one mapping of brain states to concepts.
DeleteI don’t see why any of that should be taken as evidence against the Thomistic claim. Concepts are immaterial, phantasms are material. The immateriality of the soul is the bright line between humans and non-human animals.
DeleteAs the other anon said, I didn't see anything in that second link that would surprise or even really challenge the Thomistic claim. The experiment conducted seems to be merely correlating activity in certain brain regions with the usage of language...which is what one would expect, A-T philosopher or otherwise. It's not like they conceive of the brain as a useless hunk of grey meat that plays no role in human cognition.
DeleteVincent, in your estimation, do the scientific discoveries you cite hold any more evidential value against the Thomistic idea of the soul than the existence of intoxicating substances? Why or why not?
DeleteHi everyone. The discoveries I've cited do much more than merely establishing a connection between mind and brain, as the existence of intoxicating substances does. What they do is to demonstrate an unexpected physical connection between different parts of the brain, each of which corresponds to different concepts held in the mind. THAT is what's so surprising about the new research - especially the research cited in my second link. Thomism does not predict this singular pattern of connections in the brain, and it can "explain" it only in retrospect, which amounts to Monday morning quarterbacking.
Delete"Thomism does not predict this singular pattern of connections in the brain"
DeleteExcept it does? Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but the Thomistic philosophy of mind is based on the assumption that universal concepts are abstracted from singular PHYSICAL particulars. That conceptual reasoning or language use are deeply connected with physical stimuli is not unexpected at all, and in fact that this particular philosophy of mind generates no concept with such evidence is one of the reasons it's so convincing. I think you do not understand the A-T thesis on the nature of the mind if you think otherwise.
Furthermore, I don't think you understand what is meant by a "concept" in the A-T sense, because that paper does not provide any real explanation of how such a thing could exist in physical form at all. The ideas of "concept formation" it discusses and compares to the experimental results are far, far, far more modest then what would be needed to defeat the A-T argument for the immateriality of conceptual reasoning.
Vincent,
DeleteAccording to Thomism, the intellect uses a variety of mental images (visual images, auditory images, tactile images, gustatory images, and olefactory images) to aid its comprehension of concepts. The mental images are physical/material; the concepts are not material. The brain is also involved in manipulating these images (rotating them, translating them, reflecting them, changing their speed or pitch or key or resonance or luminosity or intensity, duplicating the images etc.), which are physical processes that aid deductive reasoning. I am sure that there are numerous other ways in which how humans think involve different parts of the brain. It is entirely unsurprising to Thomism that a damage to a specific part of the brain results in a specific difficulty in abstract reasoning. Of course, Thomism does not make specific predictions about which part of a brain being damaged results in which defect in reasoning; that involves biology.
I have another question about something Aquinas says in his commentary on the De Anima. He says that the "Platonici" used to posit that understanding (intelligere) is either by "phantasia" or not without phantasia. Where did Aquinas get this about Platonists? It seems wrong.
ReplyDeleteAlthough Plato represents people as coming to know intelligibles by recollection from many cases of working with sensibles, and as using sensible things as images from which to reason, Plato also represents the highest stage of reasoning as operating by means of the intellect upon Forms; cf. e.g. Phaedo 79a: "you could not grasp the things that are without change by any other instrument than the reasoning of thought, but they are eternally in this way [i.e. unchanging] and not visible."
Not all acts of intellect use phantasia in the sense of mental picturing. Is Aquinas attributing "phantasia" to Platonists under some other signification, or is he using a superficial, secondary source?
Great news! Congratulations.
DeleteIf i'am not mistaken, St. Thomas had from Plato only a part of the Timaeus, the rest of his sources on the man were secundary. I don't believe he had much more from the other "pure" platinists.
DeleteFirst, where exactly is this located in the commentary? And secondly, isn't it a commentary on Aristotle's work? So is it not Aristotle and rather than Aquinas who is telling us what the Platonists were thinking?
Delete@bmiller: it's at "In I DA" l. 2.18.
ReplyDelete@bmiller #2: R.J. Henle SJ in 1956 wrote a book on the Plato and Platonici texts in Aquinas. I got it by googling some of the Latin words in the De Anima commentary. About the statement at paragraph 18, Henle says: "Source: I have been unable to find a proper source for this doctrine. Themistius says {De An. Par., V [CG V, 90.29]) that Plato described phantasia as a combination of sense and opinion."
ReplyDeleteAs far as my word searches go, Aristotle mentions Plato only once in his De Anima, and there only to refer to Plato's saying in the Timaeus that "Plato makes the soul out of the elements" (404b17).
Henle provides other passages where Aquinas quotes a Latin translation of Themistius. So he seems to have access to Themistius via a translation. Maybe Henle's answer to my question is the best I'm going to find, at least for now.
I have not found a place in Plato where phantasia is described as a combination of sense and opinion (doxa). Without searching further, I am guessing that Themistius made an inference from Plato's Theaetetus or Sophist.
ficino4ml,
DeleteHave you read this?
https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/DeAnima.htm#14
Aristotle lists 3 sources from Plato in De Anima referring to: Timaeus, ‘In the lectures “On Philosophy” and when referring to a quote about mind being the Monad.
It seems De Anima has quite a bit of discussion and criticism about Plato's views on the soul.
But he discusses
Sorry about leaving those extra words.
DeleteThe only reason I even commented was because of the presumption that Aquinas was somehow responsible for misanalyzing a Platonic doctrine when his goal was to comment on Aristotle's work, not criticize Plato's. Therefore it doesn't make sense to me why the first question would be "How did Aquinas misunderstand Plato?" rather than whether Aquinas understood Aristotle.
Looks to me that Aristotle had a lot to say about all early philosophers, what they agreed on and how they differed, what they got right and what they got wrong. It seems he took issue with Plato's theory of compound soul and how it ended up making imagination (and so sense) a part of the intellect.
@bmiller: I did not say that Aquinas misunderstood Plato OR Aristotle. I asked where "did he get this", i.e. whether Aquinas could have been using a source that got Plato wrong, or whether Aquinas was using "phantasia" in some non-standard sense.
DeleteThanks for the reference. I only started reading Aquinas' commentary on the De Anima, so I had not reached that passage yet.
The commentaries I have on the De Anima say the "lectures on philosophy" is probably Aristotle's own work, in which he had discussed views of Plato.
Deleteficino4ml,
I asked where "did he get this", i.e. whether Aquinas could have been using a source that got Plato wrong, or whether Aquinas was using "phantasia" in some non-standard sense.
Since the commentary is on Aristotle's work, I still wonder why you would not first think that Aristotle was using some source you were not familiar with rather than Aquinas. De Anima only lists the 3 sources, so the Platonic critique it is presumably based on those and Aquinas appears to use only those in his commentary.
The commentaries I have on the De Anima say the "lectures on philosophy" is probably Aristotle's own work, in which he had discussed views of Plato.
This doesn't seem to make much sense. Why would Aristotle claim Plato gave a lecture when it was really his own work. It would be a preposterous lie easily known to be so by people in his own lifetime.
@bmiller: 1) Aquinas says that "the Platonists" were positing that "intelligere" - to understand or use the intellect or however you want to translate this infinite - is phantasia. In the passage you linked from Ari's De Anima 404b, nowhere does Aristotle say that the Platonists said that understanding is phantasia. Aquinas' statement about the Platonists' doctrine of phantasia therefore must rely on some source other than De Anima 404.
Delete2) a. Aristotle wrote a work, apparently in the form of a dialogue, entitled On Philosophy. He refers to it in his Physics (194a36), using passive voice: "it has been said" [i.e. "by me"]] Fragments from On Philosophy are collected by Rose and by Ross, although scholars have contested the provenance of individual fragments. We have no evidence that Plato wrote a work of that title. There are two spurious Platonic dialogues that bear "On Philosophy" as their second title, sc. Theages and The Rivals (Anterastae), but neither of those goes into detail about the composition of soul, and Aristotle's way of quoting a Platonic dialogue is either "Plato says in the X" or "the Socrates says".
b. The reference in De Anima 404b is not worded as "Plato says." It is in passive voice: "it was determined/defined in a similar way in the things said about philosophy..." Aristotle is not claiming that Plato gave a lecture. You're reading more precision into the text of DA 404b than that passage contains. The problem arises from that passage's vagueness (not an uncommon problem for readers of Aristotle).
Aristotle's vagueness has led to controversy about that second notice re Plato's views about soul. Aristotle might be referring to: lecture/s given orally by Plato about philosophy; a written work of Plato's about philosophy; his own (Ari's) written work about philosophy. As I said, there is controversy among scholars who take one of these positions. Christopher Shields in his recent commentary on the De Anima thinks Ari may be referring to a lost work of Plato's, but he gives no argument for this and allows that Ari may be referring to his own On Philosophy. In the latter case, Ari in DA 404b will mean, "as was defined/determined [by me] in [my] things said About Philosophy [in the part where I discussed Plato's views about soul]."
It's challenging to control material like this.
I confess I am no closer to an answer about where Aquinas got the notice that the Platonists posited that understanding is phantasia. Not even Henle's passage from Themistius gives that information. Note that I am not laying responsibility for this false piece of doxography upon Aquinas.
The question matters for our understanding of Aquinas' sources, but it may not be answerable.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeletenowhere does Aristotle say that the Platonists said that understanding is phantasia. Aquinas' statement about the Platonists' doctrine of phantasia therefore must rely on some source other than De Anima 404.
Why does that necessarily follow? Aristotle identifies Timeaus as a source which implies that the soul is a compound of the immaterial and the material. The soul understands the material by directly sensing it. Aristotle holds that the senses produce images that are then understood by the intellect. The Timeaus version collapses the intellect and imagination. Thomas is explaining what Aristotle's theory is and how and why it differs from previous philosophers. Maybe you think that Thomas shouldn't have cut to the chase, but all of this is implied in De Anima.
You're reading more precision into the text of DA 404b than that passage contains.
I'm only reporting what Aquinas wrote in his commentary of De Anima. This is in Book 1, Chapter 2:
The first is from the Timaeus, where Plato says that there are two elements or first principles, Identity and Difference.
48. The second passage, showing that this was Plato’s theory, Aristotle refers to when he says ‘In the lectures “On Philosophy”.’
51. Then at ‘Again, rather differently,’ Aristotle alludes to the third text adduced to show that for Plato the soul was made up of elements or principles.
Regardless of what other commentators think, Aquinas thinks Aristotle is referring to these 3 works of Plato as a background to begin his critique. Are you actually reading the commentary on De Anima? Or are you just reading commentators on the commentary?
Aristotle's vagueness has led to controversy ...
It seems more probable that the "On Philosophy" reference was to a real work by Plato that is not currently known. It seems a real stretch to think Aristotle would be quoting himself.
@bmiller: please cite the passage/s where:
ReplyDelete1. Aristotle states that Plato or Platonists identified understanding and phantasia;
2. Aristotle says that it's his own view that understanding is the same thing as phantasia.
3. Aquinas states that "the things said about philosophy" is a reference to lectures given orally or written by Plato.
In various places in his treatises, Aristotle quotes his own earlier works and uses passive voice to mark things he wrote in those works about views of other philosophers. I gave you one such reference from the Physics.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteRegarding 1. Sorry, I never claimed to have such passages. Are you claiming you have passages where Aristotle states that Plato or Platonists did not identify understanding with phantasia? Or are you claiming that Plato and Platonists always claimed understanding and phantasia are different? Google search shows there are different opinions. At least the paltry searches I did.
Regarding 2. Aristotle claims that understanding is specifically not the same thing as phantasia. What an odd thing to ask for.
Regarding 3. I've already directed you to where Aquinas made the claim. It preceded the first quote I posted last exchange. Here it is:
46. Next, when he says ‘In the same way Plato’ Aristotle states the opinion of Plato who also, he says, made the soul consist of elements, i.e. be constituted by the, principles of things. And as evidence for this statement he takes three passages from Plato. The first is from the Timaeus,...
Why would Aquinas lump Timeaus and 2 things Aristotle wrote himself and claim all 3 were passages from Plato?
@bmiller: you are offering no new evidence, and the constructions you put on the texts are contentious.
Delete@bmiller #2: I asked three questions. None of those three was a claim. I made claims in the paragraph below the questions.
ReplyDeletere 1: AFAIK, we have no extant passage in which Aristotle says that Platonists identified understanding and phantasia. Since you have no such passage either, let's agree that Aristotle does not say this in any extant passage.
I fail to understand why you resist the conclusion that Aquinas used some other source than Aristotle when he said towards the beginning of his commentary on De Anima that the "platonici" used to posit that "intelligere" was phantasia. Would you not think that Aquinas used some other source or perhaps arrived at this statement by his own inferences? But if the latter is true, then we have to confront the question, whether Aquinas misinterpreted something. The thought that Aquinas misinterpreted something seems uncongenial to you. Note: I am not claiming that Aquinas did misinterpret; only that it looks as though some source he used may have misinterpreted.
There is no way that anyone can argue from the texts of Plato that understanding is IDENTIFIED with phantasia. I take this information as read so don't elaborate.
A problem is that the Latin "intelligere" can render more than one Greek verb of cognition, either "noein" or "epistasthai" or "suneidenai" or "epaiein" or even others. It cannot render any Greek equivalents of "perceive" or "opine". Since Plato in the Sophist said that phantasia is a mixture of perception and opining, Plato cannot be supposed to have identified phantasia and understanding. Maybe some other Platonist did so (Xenocrates? Ari talks about how dumb Xenocrates was). But we have no such fragment of Xenocrates that I've seen.
2. Your "what an odd thing to ask for" is gratuitous.
3. You are relying on English translation. Aquinas did not use the words "passages from". He wrote "quod Plato dicat animam compositam ex principiis rerum, probat per triplex dictum Platonis." This means "that Plato says that the soul is composed out of principles of things, he proves through three sayings [lit: through a triple saying or dictum] of Plato."
It does not follow that each "dictum" discussed by Aquinas came from a written work of Plato's. We only know that Aristotle's first Platonic source was the Timaeus, a written work. Aristotle for the second Platonic dictum cites "the things said about philosophy." You think it's probable that such was a written work of Plato's, but you have no evidence outside the passage, and against you is the fact that Aristotle 1) wrote a work called "On Philosophy," in which he discussed theories of others, and 2) Aristotle has the habit of citing his own work for discussions of other philosophers' opinions and using a passive voice construction to do so, just as he uses passive voice "it was determined" here in DA 404b.
So Aristotle is not claiming anything about "passages." He is claiming to give three pieces of info about what Plato said. We have a lot of info in Ari about Plato's "esoteric" discussions/teachings, i.e. those that were not written in dialogues but discussed in the Academy or in at least one public lecture, the notorious lecture "On the Good."
2.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteI think I understand why you reach the conclusion you do, and I've tried to explain why I think there are other possible conclusions. It seems to me that you are not actually reading the commentary but are relying only on secondary sources.
Regarding 1:
I fail to understand why you resist the conclusion that Aquinas used some other source than Aristotle when he said towards the beginning of his commentary on De Anima that the "platonici" used to posit that "intelligere" was phantasia.
I resist that conclusion because Aquinas is trying to explain why Aristotle says what he says in De Anima. If he didn't think Aristotle attributed that position to the Platonists it would make no sense for he, Aquinas, to bring it up while describing Aristotle's thought process. I thank you for insisting that Aquinas was attempting to insert his own personal opinion about what Plato thought instead of what he thought was Aristotle's opinion. I doubt I would have even looked at Timeaus and the commentaries on it otherwise. I think the gist of it is that some early philosophers thought that "intelligere"(understanding) did not differ from senses and Plato is listed among those. If so, then the phantasms produced by sense are understanding.
Not sure, but I'll keep reading and let you know what I find.
Regarding 2:
I sincerely don't understand why the question was asked. Aquinas has Aristotle disagreeing with Plato's purported position. Why ask me to provide passages saying the opposite?
Regarding 3:
This means "that Plato says that the soul is composed out of principles of things, he proves through three sayings [lit: through a triple saying or dictum] of Plato."
Yes I am relying on an English translation. Did I misunderstand what the Dominicans expressed in English? Or did the Dominicans misunderstand what Thomas wrote in Latin or mistranslate? As I read your translation to English "he proves through three sayings of Plato." I see that "passages" have changed to "sayings" but I don't see how that changes the meaning. There are 3 "sayings" attributed to Plato either way.
It is beside the point I'm trying to make if Aristotle "really" intended to cite himself partially or entirely for the 3 passages. The question is what Thomas thought Aristotle was saying. It seems you trying to make the case that Aristotle was referring to his own works rather than that Thomas thought that's what he was doing.
Well. boils down to an infinity thing, right? This is not complicated. Until we made it so.
ReplyDelete@bmiller, you don't control the sources, and you don't have expertise in either Plato or Aristotle. I am learning nothing from you so I will bow out now.
ReplyDeleteficino4ml,
DeleteThat's rather harsh. How are non-experts like me to learn anything if the experts dismiss their questions?
Here's my summary:
as implying that phantasms themselves were the forms of the things rather than transmitting the forms of the things to the intellect. So this was a logical implication rather than a direct quote.
He, Aquinas, took Aristotle at his word that he, Aristotle, was faithfully conveying Plato's teachings. It is true that Timaeus was a written text, but there historical evidence that Plato and the Platonists conducted lectures that were not written but only transmitted orally as described here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato%27s_unwritten_doctrines. So it seems that some scholars would attribute the "3 passages" to Timeaus and 2 propositions from the "unwritten doctrines"
I noticed I hadn't captured all the text when I pasted it.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure it's necessary that I fill in the missing parts.
ficino4ml,
Let me know if you want me to clarify.
@bmiller: I don't know whether it's "harsh" of you to have said twice that I seemed not to be reading Aquinas' commentary on the DA but rather, secondary sources about that commentary. Whether or not it's harsh, it's insulting. I said that I was reading Aquinas' commentary; you implicitly at least insinuated that I was lying. But never mind.
ReplyDeleteRe your last paragraph: yes, I've been suggesting that Aristotle for his second and third reference to Plato's soul doctrine may well have been using material delivered orally by Plato. I repeat, however, that there is no Greek word in Aristotle or Latin word in Aquinas that corresponds to the English "passages." Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas spoke of "three passages" in Plato. That's important for the history of philosophy, though not for modern debates about spiritual soul, because "passages" in English implies a written text. Neither Ari nor Aq claims that Plato's second and third "dicta" stand in a treatise or dialogue written by Plato - though it doesn't follow that they COULD NOT HAVE stood in a written work of Plato. That just isn't what A or A claim.
I can't make sense of your second paragraph. Nothing in Plato or in Aristotle's accounts of Plato implies that phantasms are forms.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteMaybe let's start from the beginning.
You asked what source Aquinas was using from Plato in his commentary on De Anima implying that a particular concept was foreign to Aristotle's assessment of Plato's doctrines. I may have misunderstood, so please correct me that is wrong.
I've written that I thought it would be more likely for Aquinas to rely on what Aristotle thought about Plato's doctrines than some other extraneous source unrelated to Aristotle's opinion in this type of work. If that is the case, then we should examine what Aquinas says he thinks Aristotle is using as the basis for his critique on Plato's thought. Those sources I take to be the 3 passages(or whatever) Aquinas listed in his commentary.
It seems there are no direct quotes from De Anima that explicitly quote Plato as saying "understanding is by phantasia" that we can find in De Anima and so we can agree. So why can't we see if Aquinas takes Aristotle as implying all of this from the sources Aristotle claims are frome Plato due to such things as Plato's divisions of the soul, movements related to the soul, how knowledge of sensibles comes about and so forth? That's what I'm examining.
If you don't want to examine De Anima to see if this is so that's fine. It seems that you've made up your mind. I still think it unlikely that that Aquinas used a secret source from Plato foreign to Aristotle's thought.
@bmiller: I did not ask "what source Aquinas was using from Plato." I asked what source Aquinas was using. Period. Using when Aquinas stated that "platonici" were positing that understanding is phantasia.
DeleteAquinas had access to various works about ancient Greek philosophy in Latin translation. He could have relied on some compendium or other source for this claim that platonists identified understanding with phantasia.
He could not have gotten that conclusion from any work of Aristotle available to us, because nowhere does Aristotle say that people who we could call "platonists" identified understanding and phantasia. In DA 3.3, Aristotle discusses phantasia. He does not say there that Plato or any other platonist identified understanding/intellect whatever with phantasia.
It does not matter what you think off the top of your head is likely or unlikely. You have to start with the texts we have, lacunose as they are, and build an argument upon them.
And you really need to stop the slurs upon other people's intellectual endeavors if you want to remain in dialogue. You just said, "If you don't want to examine De Anima..." I have published on the De Anima. What gives you the right to suggest I don't want to examine the DA? It's what we've been arguing about.
Really, I have other work that calls, of greater priority than posting on this blog. I will continue to dialogue if you want serious dialogue. I don't need to respond further to people who call my integrity into question.
ficino4ml,
DeleteHe could not have gotten that conclusion from any work of Aristotle available to us, because nowhere does Aristotle say that people who we could call "platonists" identified understanding and phantasia.
It is clear that you don't understand the point I'm trying to make since I have been agreeing with you for days that Aristotle did not explicitly write those words, but that it could be deduced from De Anima as Aquinas seems to state. If you wanted to refute my actual theory I would expect you to try to show me from the text of De Anima how this could not be so and why Aquinas was wrong.
These 2 quotes of yours so close together made me smile:
It does not matter what you think off the top of your head is likely or unlikely.
And you really need to stop the slurs upon other people's intellectual endeavors if you want to remain in dialogue.
I have been told I am not an expert, can't properly read English or need to learn Latin (that or the Dominicans need to), I am teaching you nothing, have been instructed (not asked) to answer 3 questions, told "don't elaborate" and so on. I admit your your version of not slurring other people's intellectual endeavors is a bit distracting, but oh well.
§ 47. Now this opinion rests on the principle already mentioned, that like is known by like. For it seemed to Plato that if the soul knew all things, and if Identity and Difference were fundamental principles, then the soul itself must be constituted of Identity and Difference; in so far as it participated in ‘Identity’ the soul, he thought, knew the ‘identical’, while so far as it participated in ‘Difference’ it knew the ‘different’, i.e. material things. Hence the actual process of the soul in knowing things. For when it gathers things together under genera and species, then, said Plato, it manifests Sameness or Identity, but when it attends to accidents and differentiations he finds in it Difference. That is how Plato in the Timaeus understood the soul as made up of principles.
Here Plato implies that the soul knows sensible/material things. Since sensible things are material, then part of the soul must be material due to the principle that like is known by like. How then does an external sensible object come to be known by the soul?
@bmiller: the short answer is that according to Plato, sensibles are not cognized by the soul by means of knowledge but by means of sensation and opinions formed from sensation. Phantasia comes in here as a mixture of sensation and opinion.
ReplyDeleteSee Aristotle's report of Plato's intellectual formation: "from youth he became first an associate/student of Cratylus and the Heraclitean beliefs (doxais), that all sensible things are always in flux and there is no knowledge (episteme) about them, and these [sc. positions] he took up in a similar way later on." Metaphysics 987a33-36.
Plato speaks haphazardly about knowledge of things in our embodied world, but when he is theorizing, he draws a sharp distinction between intelligibles, which are eternal, always the same, and are the objects of knowledge (episteme, noesis), and sensibles, which change and are the objects of sensation and doxa.
When Aristotle says that "Like is cognized by like" in DA, he is talking about both intelligibles and sensibles. For phantasia to be the SAME as understanding (the latter being a form of knowledge), phantasia has to do the work that understanding (intelligere) does. What is true of A must be true of B if A is identical with B. Not all that is true of intelligere is true of phantasia, since the latter is a faculty of forming mental pictures. We abstract form from phantasia, but phantasia is not the form; it presents "data" to our intellect, which abstracts the form.
So I am still not seeing a basis in P or Ari for the claim in Aquinas that the platonists held that understanding is phantasia. If you read the Timaeus you'll see the stark distinction that Plato makes there between cognizing intelligibles and cognizing sensibles.
A problem is the vagueness of 4th century vocabulary about cognition. Ari finally comes to use "krinein/kritikos" in ways that come close to our "cognize," which a term of wider extent than "know."
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteRegarding your 4th paragraph. Plato lists 4 types of cognition of the soul. Understanding, scientific knowledge, opinion and sense. Since "simple understanding" is something like intuition, then I would agree with you if Aquinas would not be using the terms regarding this type of understanding. (although Plato allows for divinely inspired phantasms)
When Aristotle says that "Like is cognized by like" in DA, he is talking about both intelligibles and sensibles.
I think the quote I posted says the same thing doesn't it (aside from the fact that it is referring to Plato at this point)? It says the soul "knows" the sensibles apart from the intelligibles. What is it that is known if it is not the intelligible?
We abstract form from phantasia, but phantasia is not the form; it presents "data" to our intellect, which abstracts the form.
This is Aristotle's theory. Is it Plato's theory too? Where can I find that?
@bmiller, adding: From what Aquinas says in ST 1a 84 a.6 c, it sounds as though the saint would only want to conclude that for Plato, understanding/intellect (intelligere) is like or analogous to phantasia, not that it IS phantasia.
ReplyDeleteST 1a 84.6 c: Aq states that Plato posited intellect is an immaterial power, virtutem, not using a corporeal organ in its act (cf. q. 75. a.3). Then Plato posited that sensation, sensus, itself is a spiritual power, vis, unchanged by sense objects, but the sensory organs are changed by sensible objects, and from the organs’ change, the soul is excited in a certain way so that it forms species [likenesses (?)] of sensibles in itself. Aq quotes Augustine as saying the body does not perceive, but the soul perceives through the body, using it as a messenger for forming in itself what is announced from outside. For Plato, Aq says, intellectual cognition does not proceed from sensible [cognition], nor does sensible cognition proceed totally from sensible objects, but sensible objects excite the sensible soul toward sensing, and similarly the sensus excite the intellective soul toward understanding, intelligendum. When he goes on to show how Ari’s theory of knowing differs, Aq says that Plato posited that intellectual operation is caused in us by the sole impression of certain higher things, i.e. Forms. Aq says that for Ari, the active intellect by a kind of abstraction makes intelligible in act those phantasmata received [by the possible intellect] from sensible objects.
In Plato's dialogues, it's not denied that we cognize sensible objects. Socrates talks about how it's not controversial that he's holding up three fingers (Republic), or about counting how many fingers there are (Hippias Major). What's controversial, Socrates says, are questions like, is one finger equal to another? Those kind of questions force us to reason in a way that leads to Forms -- the Form of Equality, for example -- so that perceiving sensible things can "summon" us to reason about intelligibles. But that's not an admission by Plato that perceiving three fingers is an instance of episteme in any proper sense.
The only reason I can imagine for the statement in In I DA that platonists were posting that understanding is phantasia is Plato's frequent use of visual imagery to refer to the act of knowing a Form. He'll talk about the F Itself being grasped by the eyes of the intellect, as blazing forth to us, etc. But that's metaphor. It's not use of phantasia as a technical term synonymous with the technical terms episteme, noesis, etc. of which "intelligere" is a Latin rendering.
So I remain in the dark about Aquinas' source in the intro to his DA commentary.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteI'm posting this before I can see that my last post was available but I thought this information is important to shed light on Thomas's reasoning.
ST First Part Question 84 article 4:
I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (Article [1]), held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called "per se" man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above (Article [1]), he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas.
If he is correct about Plato's theory, then for the soul, the act of participation is the act of understanding is the act of imagination. For sensible objects that is.