At YouTube, philosopher
Elmar Kremer provides a useful multi-part introduction to the dispute between
classical theism and theistic personalism, as part of the Wireless Philosophy video
series. Here are links to each of the installments:
You can also
find all seven videos collected together at the Wireless Philosophy
website.
Kremer is also the author
of the important book Analysis
of Existing: Barry Miller's Approach to God.
(Miller, in turn, was the author of several important works, including A Most Unlikely God, a must-read for
anyone who wants to understand classical theism and divine simplicity in depth. Unfortunately, it is out of print and hard to
get hold of. But you can find chapter
1 online and read reviews of the book by Bill
Vallicella and Bonald.)
Other than some spelling mistakes (equivacally, immutible), this series of videos is exceptionally good. More importantly, this can help students who have a hard time reading books.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the links. You should definitely join the Classical Theism vs Theistic Personalism discussion group on Facebook.
ReplyDeleteThat sounds very interesting and lively!
DeleteThe comment section under the videos is full of overconfident New atheist types. What a surprise.
ReplyDeleteFor real. Disagring with Dr Kremer is fine, but why be nasty about? It gives your position a bad taste and makes you seem arrogant which isn't going to convince goodwilled questioners.
DeleteThe way the current landscape is carved amongst theists womt last long, it's too simplified.
ReplyDeleteEastern orthodox with the Essence-Energies distinction cant plausibly be considered theological personalists, yet they differ with the major thomist strand like Brian Davies and Norman Giesler.
Take the video on God's knowledge. Practically most of the eastern orthodox would disagree with the account of knowledge as would a decent minority of broadly thomistic philosophers today.
What does count as classical theism will be broadened in my opinion or it will just come to be seen as the major thomistic understanding of God
Orthodox theology leads towards classical theism and away from personalism. DBH is good on this. The essence energy distinction is often cited but I don’t see it as irreconcilable against classical theism. The main thing is that orthodox theologians are more willing to accept mystery than catholic theologians are, which leaks into philosophy. Definitely orthodox are not theistic personalist.
DeleteDear Prof. Feser,
ReplyDeleteProf. Briggs published an interesting chapter from Aquinas: https://wmbriggs.com/post/29692/ basically what strikes me odd is that idea that it is possible for one person to govern, rule another person, and yet they are in a sense considered equals.
This is important, because moderns tend to fetishize egalitarianism, therefore I am tempted to reject the idea of equality outright. But maybe that would be an overreactiong.
What did human equality mean for Aquinas? Could you write about this, please?
I love Classical Theism and the God of Classical Theism with all my heart.
ReplyDeleteI also hate Theistic Personalism and false Idol it erroneously puts forth as "god" with the fire of ten thousands suns.
Oh there are simply not enough Romantic French words to express my love for the former and not enough Scottish word express my black hatred for the later.
Cheers.
I love the Sacred Heart.
DeleteSame thing! ;-)
DeletePer the OP, 7 philosophical videos cover a great deal of material, too much to adequately respond to, so I will just jump to the last.
ReplyDeleteThe video seems rather inaccurately titled, since it is not really so much a response to atheism as it is an attempt to express rationalizations for god's evil nature and evil actions, in response to the argument from evil against a good god.
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
― Epicurus
In the millennia since Epicurus many poorly reasoned attempts have been made to try to justify an evil god as good, as Kremer attempts, but they all fail, as Kremer has.
"god's goodness...a good world...is consistent with a world containing evil"
No, not on an omnipotent good god, that makes no sense, and fails to counter Epicurus in any meaningful way.
It doesn't matter what the definition of evil is for the contradiction to be apparent, we don't need to define what exactly evil is to see the contradiction because it is the theist who simultaneously asserts a good omnipotent god in a world with good's antithesis, evil. That combination of assertions is simply incoherent, irrespective of the precise meanings the theist might wish to assign to them, that assertion violates the principle of non-contradiction.
"God's actions are good and just because they are in agreement with his own goodness"
"Stalin's actions were good and just because they were in agreement with his own goodness"
This argument is clearly tautological, circular, self referential, and therefore meaningless. This is just another way of saying might makes right, that evil is good if the powerful defines evil as good.
The video ends rather abruptly with a citation of an epitaph, cited as as though it is somehow supposed to be obviously fallacious, when in fact the epitaph illustrates how very evil god is compared to an ordinary man.
Martin Ingleblod would be merciful to god despite god's many evil acts, yet god will condemn Martin Ingleblod to an eternity of torturous agony for comparatively minor transgressions.
Clearly, the Christian god is the most evil being in all fiction.
Go away.
DeleteWhen I see someone so hopelessly wrong, I can only look to the Lord for guidance who said "Forgive them Lord, for they know not what they do". Besides, how often do these words apply to ourselves. I also think it does some good to those of us who love to discover the philosophical traces of God's glory and presence, that if this were the primary way for humanity to approach God, we would not need grace, revelation, or Christ. As it stands, sp is living proof of how deeply in need of grace we all are. Aquinas and Aristotle are not sufficient. Not that anyone on this blog has ever claimed this, least of all Saint Thomas.
DeleteDaniel,
Delete"I can only look to the Lord for guidance who said "Forgive them Lord, for they know not what they do""
Your best wishes for my eternal salvation are kind indeed. However, it seems you are directing your efforts at an immutable being, on the true existence of the god of classical theism, so what do you hope to gain with intercessory prayer? Do you suppose god will possibly change upon hearing your sincere urgings? If god intends to condemn me to an eternity of unbearably tortuous suffering for failing to ask for his grace, do you suppose god might change his mind upon hearing your requests such that he would grant me grace despite my not having asked for it?
It would seem that your efforts would be infinitely more likely to be successful if you turned to attempting to change people, since we know it is at least possible that people can change.
"As it stands, sp is living proof of how deeply in need of grace we all are."
Perhaps, but it seems the only possible way I might receive grace, on classical Christian theism, is if I were to become convinced that I was in error above, and thus realize my errors more generally, ask for and thus receive grace.
You say I am "so hopelessly wrong", but I don't think you mean that you literally have no hope, since you were kind enough to ask for grace on my behalf, so I think you mean I am very wrong, or fundamentally wrong, or just plain wrong.
In what way am I wrong? Is there some specific statement I made that is demonstrably irrational on the merits of the arguments?
"...it is the theist who simultaneously asserts a good omnipotent god in a world with good's antithesis, evil. That combination of assertions is simply incoherent."
DeleteI think it goes without saying that most Christians disagree that these assertions are "simply incoherent." The incoherence turns on your imagination of what you think the proper response to evil is if you were omnipotent and omnibenevolent. But this is why the comparison of God's goodness to Stalin's "goodness" fails: there is no man who is either intellectually capable of understanding what would be most fully and perfectly good for the entire world nor is there a man who has the power to carry out that understanding. The evils men like Stalin visited on our world came from their own hubris, believing that they were both wise and powerful enough to rule the world the "right way," that they were personally capable of fixing all injustices in the world and ushering in a new order of eternal peace and prosperity. That such men routinely cause immense misery and human destruction is a testament to man's stupidity and impotency to fully irradicate evil, which then implies that he is not in a position to judge God for doing a bad job of it.
Now if a being such as God exists, and if he is greater than us in the way classical theism suggests, then the statement that the combination of evil in the world with God's goodness and power is incoherent implies that you believe that you are fit to adjudicate claims of final and ultimate justice for the entire world. Put differently, your dispute is that God speaking to the world through his prophets, through the Bible, through his Son, and through the Church to call people into a higher way of life, to cease committing evil acts and to love what is good, is not the best possible response a fully good and fully poweful being of ultimate love could take in response to the presence of evil in the lives of those he loves.
If this is the case, then an atheist making an effort to undermine people's faith in God, which at the very least means undermining those people's pyschological attachment to a notion of ultimate good that he is obligated to pursue, is not a relatively minor infraction; it is seditious against God's own way that he is solving the problem of evil in the world (which atheists claim to be very concerned about solving), namely, by sending his son as an example for us to follow, to give us the opportunity to voluntarily lay down our sin and choose what is good instead, all of which will finally be followed by the involuntary judgment which will completely irradicate evil permanently.
It strikes me as being more incoherent to say that you care very very much about the presence of evil in the world while simultaneously doing everything you can to undermine God's attempt at solving it. If you don't like the way he has chosen to fix it (through example of loving self-sacrifice and a call to voluntary peace and repentance), then you are claiming to be in a position to better adjudicate the nature of the dispute between man and God which gives rise to evil. "Stop being evil, love each other, love me, and I will save you" seems like a pretty reasonable solution to a problem we created and perpetuate.
this guy is a known troll... it's pointless to even try to discuss with him....no person here except for a fee other trolls has ever done so constructively...
DeleteJMM
Delete"there is no man who is either intellectually capable of understanding what would be most fully and perfectly good for the entire world"
You seem like a very thoughtful and reasonable person, so I assert you are capable of improving on the Christian bible and the manner it asserts god has structured his creation, vastly, and clearly. I think it would take you about 10 minutes to make a good start at it which would be an immediate improvement of vast proportions.
"The evils men like Stalin visited on our world came from their own hubris"
Indeed, with the hubris of god as described in the bible overshadowing and exceeding the likes of Stalin on an immense scale of inflicted suffering and evil.
"that they were personally capable of fixing all injustices in the world and ushering in a new order of eternal peace and prosperity"
I don't think such considerations motivated the likes of Stalin, rather, psychopathic narcissism. How else does one describe a being that inflicts not only Earthy suffering on an enormous scale but, in god's case, eternal suffering as well?
"you believe that you are fit to adjudicate claims of final and ultimate justice for the entire world."
Clearly, Martin Ingleblod, you, and I all possesses such fitness as opposed to a being so wicked as to create other beings knowing they will suffer for all eternity for doing the very things god knew they would do before he created those suffering beings, and god, as omnipotent, had the power to create them otherwise. What explanation other than a diabolical narcissistic evil could account for such a god?
" it is seditious against God's own way that he is solving the problem of evil in the world” God is solving the problem of evil? Sorry, where is the evidence for that?
There can be no greater evil than condemning most of humanity to eternal torturous suffering. Loss of a job, murder, rape, mass extermination, war...all pale in comparison.
Clearly, the Christian god is evil based only on the evil in this world that god is said to have created, knew in advance all about, and could have created otherwise. That asserted fact set alone would render the Christian god the most evil being of all.
But god is not content, on the truth of the bible, to merely create a world of suffering, rather, he has created an eternity of far greater suffering for most of humanity, a far greater evil perpetrated by god than the relatively brief evils he has visited upon humanity for their short stay here on Earth.
"judgment which will completely irradicate evil permanently."
Perhaps such a thing might eradicate future evil on Earth but god would continue to perpetrate vastly more evil upon the suffering billions for all eternity.
"you care very very much about the presence of evil in the world while simultaneously doing everything you can to undermine God's attempt at solving it."
How does an omnipotent being "attempt" to do things? How would a mere man be able to undermine the works of god?
" "Stop being evil, love each other, love me, and I will save you" seems like a pretty reasonable solution to a problem we created and perpetuate."
You seem to be suffering from some version of a battered spouse syndrome, blaming yourself for the beatings visited upon you.
I abide by the ethics of responsibility to those who create with foreknowledge and could have created otherwise.
God knew, it is said, what natures he had created in us, even what each individual being would do in every detail for thousands of years, and, it is said, god is omnipotent and thus could have created our natures differently.
Yet, god blames you and I and all human beings for behaving according to the natures he created. Further, god will torture most of humanity for eternity for doing the things he knew they would do according to the natures he created when he could have created otherwise. Such a god is clearly the most evil being of all.
Stardusty is a troll. His stream of consciousnesses are only possible if you smoke a lot of crak.
DeleteHow about the objection that, prior to God's first act of creation, he had the potential to create and was therefore not pure act. Therefore he is not divinely simple, and so classical theism fails.
ReplyDeleteThere was never a "prior" in the temporal sense required (which isn't to be confused with the notion that God wills creation for an infinite duration back into the past).
DeleteThere is no prior before* creation.
DeleteThe objection assumes that one must create by actualizing intrinsic potentials, but classical theists deny that assumption. It's true that all creatures do that when they act, but on the classical theistic model, it's not true of God.
DeleteRather, God creates by bringing things into being outside of him, so that all of the creation and actualization of potential takes place on the side of creation as opposed to on the side of God.
Unknown
DeleteIt would be better to leave out any hint of temporal priority.
So, in a possible world in which God does not create, does he have the "potential" to create?
Or, to put it another way, avoiding the ambiguity of the term "potential", is there an intrinsic difference between God who creates and God who doesn't create?
I don't see how the will to create can be identical to the will not to create. Yet, for on radical simplicity, God is identical to his will.
No, you cannot say "God has the potential to create". You could say "God has the POWER to create".
DeleteSo, in a possible world in which God does not create,
The formulation of "a possible world" is fraught with a vast array of philosophical trapdoors, black holes, and absurdities. Better to formulate it without such constructs. You might go with "let's hypothetically postulate that God did not create..." Would God be different from the God we have given that he did create? And the answer is, no. St. Thomas answers the question of whether God's creative act presents a difference in God due to the result being different from his own existence. Q 19, A2:
Objection 4. Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 4. As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
Tony
DeleteThere is nothing wrong with the formulation "a possible world in which God does not create". Possible world semantics are a handy tool in analyzing different positions.
But, "let's hypothetically postulate that god did not create" will do, as long as it's made clear that it is metaphysically possible that God does not create.
Anyway, my objection is not the same as objection 4, hence Aquinas's reply is not relevant here.
Walter,
DeleteThere are different approaches to this problem. If you are interested, check out this paper for an interesting survey of views. https://philpapers.org/rec/GRAAIA-4.
My own view is that since God is not really related to creation (as Aquinas argues notably in the SCG and DP), creation does not involve an actualization of any potential within God. Therefore, in the possible world in which God does not create, he is intrinsically the same as he is in the actual world in which he does create. The difference exists within the world and that is all. I know this view sounds strange however I think it is quite defensible and a number of philosophers have done so for a variety of different reasons.
Tom
DeleteI can't get access to the paper you mentioned, but I have read quite a few approaches to this problem, and I must say, none of them sound every convincing to me.
I have come across your view before and I understand that, on a specific definition of potentiality, creation does not involve an actualization of any potential within God.
But that is not my objection. My objection is that if God is identical to His Will, then He is identical to his will to create X, but he is also identical to his will not to create x. And that is a contradiction.
Walter,
DeleteA few years back when I was still doing research in this area I was able to get access to the paper for free via Academia.edu. Not sure if this is still a viable option. It is a good read.
In any case, I deny that God is identical to his will to create X. I think we can say that God voluntarily creates X but there is no such thing as God's "act of will" to create X (apart from the actual created thing). In other words, there is no such thing as God's intention to create, that exists in addition to the actual created world.
I would affirm that God is identical to his will in the restricted sense that he is identical to his willing the good as such. Therefore, God is intrinsically the same across all possible worlds.
Tom
DeleteIf there is no such things as God's act of will to create X, then if X exists, X is an accidental consequence of God's willing the good as such. But that contradicts your claim that God voluntary creates X. In order to voluntary create X, X must be an object of God's will. In order to create Y instead of X, Y must be an object of God's will.
Hence God's will differs between possible worlds, which per divine simplicity entails that God differs between worlds.
Walter,
Delete(1) You say "If there is no such things as God's act of will to create X, then if X exists, X is an accidental consequence of God's willing the good as such." I am not sure what you mean by this. By "accidental consequence" if you mean, the creation of X does not follow necessarily from God willing the good, then we agree but this is not an objection to my account.
On the other hand, if by "accidental" you mean "not intentional" you are simply stating what I take to be your conclusion, viz. that in order for God to voluntarily create X, there must exist some intention in the mind of God prior to X. But since this is the issue at hand, asserting it without argument is to beg the question.
(2) You say "In order to voluntarily create X, X must be an object of God's will." But this statement itself is not sufficient to prove that God is different across possible worlds. You would need additional premises to form a valid argument.
(3) To be clear, divine simplicity entails that God is identical to everything intrinsic to God. I am denying that God's intention to create the world is intrinsic to him. Therefore, in other worlds, God is intrinsically the same as he is in this world.
Walter,
DeleteI feel like your objection against simplicity is committing a de re/de dicto fallacy. Consider what Pruss says about a similar objection (should be easy for you to adapt the response):
"Consider the argument written out:
(45) C1 is God’s causal activity and is a necessary being. (Premise)
(46) C1 is God’s causing E. (Premise)
(47) Therefore, God’s causing E is a necessary being.
(48) Therefore, God necessarily causes E.
The fallacy is in the last step, which has essentially the following logical form:
(49) The F is a necessary being.
(50) Therefore, necessarily, the F exists.
But this is fallacious if “the F” in (50) is read de dicto, as it must be in the case where F is “God’s causing E.”. The number of eyes of the tallest person is, let us suppose, the number two and, let us also suppose, that the number two is a necessary Platonic being. But it is incorrect to conclude that, necessarily, the number of eyes of the tallest person exists, since that would entail the falsehood that necessarily there is a tallest person (it could be that no person has a height or that there is a tie).
The inference from (49) to (50) requires that Fness be an essential property of the F. It is not an essential property of the number two that it be the number of eyes of the tallest person, and hence the inference fails in that case. Similarly, in the God case, the argument is only going to work if it is an essential property of God’s activity that it be the same as God’s causing E. But this proponents of divine simplicity should deny. They should instead insist that the same activity would count as God’s causing E in those worlds where God causes E and as God’s causing F in those worlds where God causes F. A very imperfect analogy for this is that the same act of writing down a sequence of numbers is, in some worlds, the filling out of a winning lottery ticket and in others the filling out of a losing lottery ticket. The reason for the imperfection in the example is that in the lottery case, it does not depend on the act which lottery tickets are picked, but everything in some way depends on God’s act. But it should be no surprise if there is no close analogue to doctrines coming from divine simplicity."
In other words, there is no such thing as God's intention to create, that exists in addition to the actual created world.
DeleteI would affirm that God is identical to his will in the restricted sense that he is identical to his willing the good as such:
Pantheism?
Tom
Delete"I am denying that God's intention to create the world is intrinsic to him."
Let's analyse this.
1 God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality
2 Logically prior to created reality, only God exists
3 Logically prior to creation, everything is intrinsic to God.
4 Conclusion (from 3 and 1) God's intention to create is intrinsic to God
This is a valid argument, so if you want to challenge it, you must reject one of the premises.
Atno
This also answers your objection.
Walter,
DeleteI deny (1). As I say above, I do not think there is a such thing as God's intention to create this world in addition to the actual created world.
Therefore, my view is compatible with denying there is such an intention at all or reducing it to the created thing itself. I happen to prefer the latter.
Tom
DeleteIf you deny intention altogether, you cannot maintain that God voluntarily creates X. So, your view is not compatible with denying there is such an intention at all.
You cannot reduce God's intention to the created thing itself either because that would imply that the created thing is logically prior to the will to create. It is absurd to claim that God created X because X exists.
@Walter Van den Acker:
Delete"If you deny intention altogether, you cannot maintain that God voluntarily creates X. So, your view is not compatible with denying there is such an intention at all."
Read more carefully please. Tony did not "deny intention altogether" but denied that there is an intensional act separate from the creative act. The distinction is merely logical and not a real one, so your argument cannot go through. There is nothing absurd in this denial and it is the exact right response, as it follows from Divine simplicity.
Walter,
DeleteYou say "If you deny intention altogether..."
As I said, I do not deny intention altogether, I said that the denial of (1) in your argument is consistent with either denying the intention altogether or reducing it to the created world itself and I said that I prefer the latter view.
Second, you say "if you deny intention altogether, you cannot maintain that God voluntarily creates X." While I do hold that the best way to account for divine intentions is to reduce them to the created things themselves, I do not think this is necessary in order to hold that God voluntarily creates. You seem to imply the following is true:
(5) In order for an agent to voluntarily do X, he must first* formulate an intention to do X.
But (5) is false. If (5) is true, then no agent could voluntarily form an intention without first forming an intention to form an intention. But this problem could be repeated to infinity. Therefore, (5) entails that no one voluntarily forms intentions. Since this is obviously not the case, we ought to reject (5). So I affirm that an agent can voluntarily do X without a prior intention to do X. But in that case, God can voluntarily create the world without a prior intention to create the world. Again this leaves open whether or not the world created should be identified with the divine intention. I would argue that they should be considered the same thing under a different description.
What I say above applies to the second half of your response too. I will say though nothing in your argument commits me to the view that "God created X because X exists." Agents do not bring about their intentions because their intentions exist. Rather, agents bring about their intentions for whatever goods happen to motivate them. If we identify the universe with a divine intention (the view that I endorse), then we ought to say the universe exists for whatever goods motivated God to create it.
*logically not temporally
Grodrigues
DeleteTom, not 'Tony' (read more carefully, please) "said my view is compatible with denying there is such an intention at all", and I said that his view is not compatible with denying there is no such intention at all. I did not say that Tom denies intention altogether. So, please, read more carefully before you reply.
Moreover Tom said he prefers reducing it to the created thing itself, not to the creative act. If there s no real distinction between the creative act and the intention, that actually strengthens my argument.
Tom
DeleteNo, I do not imply that in order for an agent to voluntarily do X, he must first* formulate an intention to do X.
This is not about formulating anything. The intention may very well reduce to the creative act itself, as grodrigues seems to believe, but that strengthens my objection. You cannot identify the universe with a divine intention, because a divine intention is necessary whereas the universe is contingent. And an necessary entity cannot be identical with a contingent one.
Walter,
DeleteFirst, let me clarify a terminologic point. No theist should make a real distinction between "intention to create" and "act of creation." In order for God to create the world, he simply has to intend it to exist.
Second, you say that you do not imply (5) is true. But you do say "If you deny intention altogether, you cannot maintain that God voluntarily creates X" This is logically equivalent to
(6) If God voluntarily creates X, there exists a divine intention to create X.
But affirming (6) does not commit me to (1), as I say "the denial of (1) in your argument is consistent with...reducing [the divine intention] to the created world itself." So in order to affirm (1), you need something like (5).
Third, you say "You cannot identify the universe with a divine intention, because a divine intention is necessary whereas the universe is contingent." But this assumes the very fact that I am denying, viz. that divine intentions are necessary. And you cannot respond by saying "they are necessary because they are identical with God." Because again, I am denying that divine intentions pertaining to the created world are identical with God. They either (i) do not exist at all, or (ii) they are identical to the created world itself. I prefer (ii) however either option is compatible with divine simplicity.
@Walter van der Acker:
Delete"Tom, not 'Tony' (read more carefully, please) "said my view is compatible with denying there is such an intention at all", and I said that his view is not compatible with denying there is no such intention at all. I did not say that Tom denies intention altogether. So, please, read more carefully before you reply. Moreover Tom said he prefers reducing it to the created thing itself, not to the creative act. If there s no real distinction between the creative act and the intention, that actually strengthens my argument."
My apologies for mispelling Tom's name and also misreading his and your argument, so I will try to read more carefully next time before jumping on the middle of a conversation.
Your last statement is of course false, since in God willing and creating are one single, unique act. You think this strengthens your argument because, you say "You cannot identify the universe with a divine intention, because a divine intention is necessary whereas the universe is contingent." but this is either a misconstrual of Divine Simplicity (there is no distinction between God's act simpliciter and God's act of willing the created order) or nothing but question begging: the essential, necessary act of God can have contingent effects, which is what defenders of Divine Simplicity have always held. There is no identification going between God's act and its effects -- if that is what Tom is implying then I suppose you do have a beef against him, but him alone.
@grodrigues
DeleteI want to clarify how I see the conceptual landscape of this problem in response to your comment to Walter.
There are three things under discussion [I am numbering things distinct from my discussion with Walter]:
1) God
2) God's act of creation (i.e. his intention to create)
3) The created world.
Proponents of divine simplicity cannot hold that (2) is a part of God distinct from him. Therefore, they have to affirm one of the following:
a. (2) is identical with (1)
b. (2) is identical with (3)
c. There is no such thing as (2)
Walter has suggested that if we take option (a), i.e. God is identical with his act of creation, then it follows that the act of creation is a necessary being and therefore our world exists necessarily. Implicit in his argument is an acceptance of object essentialism. He must accept that acts of will have their objects necessarily, and moreover, he has to accept a strong version in which they have even their secondary objects as necessary (since if they only have their primary objects necessarily, a Thomist could say that God wills himself necessarily and in all possible worlds but this one act of will can have different secondary objects in different worlds while remaining identical across these worlds).
I happen to agree with this implicit assumption of strong object essentialism which is why I deny (a), and reject his premise that
"God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality." This is consistent with holding either (b) or (c), and I happen to prefer (b). The proponent of option (a) on the other hand would not necessarily have a problem with Walter's argument (his comment on April 26 at 12:27 am) but would instead reject that its conclusion leads to the denial of divine simplicity.
When you say "which is what defenders of Divine Simplicity have always held," I am not sure which position between (a), (b), and (c) you are referring to. However, proponents of the doctrine of divine simplicity have held different views on this matter and the paper I link to in my first comment on this thread discusses a variety of these in historical and philosophical detail. It is perhaps the case that the differences between these views are largely verbal, but I am unsure.
Finally, I noted this above (comment April 24 5:14 pm), but I will say it again for clarity. I affirm that God is identical with his act of will. However, I restrict this to mean that he is identical with his act of willing the good as such, i.e. his self love. Because of this, I can affirm with you that "the essential, necessary act of God can have contingent effects." However I deny that this entails option (a).
Even if my disagreement with (a) is merely verbal (which I am not confident that it is), I like to articulate my defense of divine simplicity using (b), i.e. in identifying the divine intent to create with creation itself. One reason for this is that it allows me to more easily explain how God can voluntarily create this world without first forming an intention to create it.
@Tom:
Delete"He must accept that acts of will have their objects necessarily, and moreover, he has to accept a strong version in which they have even their secondary objects as necessary (since if they only have their primary objects necessarily, a Thomist could say that God wills himself necessarily and in all possible worlds but this one act of will can have different secondary objects in different worlds while remaining identical across these worlds)."
This is my understanding of the standard Thomistic position.
"The proponent of option (a) on the other hand would not necessarily have a problem with Walter's argument (his comment on April 26 at 12:27 am) but would instead reject that its conclusion leads to the denial of divine simplicity."
But I do have problems with Walter's argument. I quote it:
"1 God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality
2 Logically prior to created reality, only God exists
3 Logically prior to creation, everything is intrinsic to God.
4 Conclusion (from 3 and 1) God's intention to create is intrinsic to God"
This argument must be rejected on several grounds. God's act of will is intrinsic to God, that is not something that any proponent of divine simplicity can deny, so the putative conclusion is not even problematic. But then I am not even sure the argument is valid; at any rate, premise (1), if it means that there is a real distinction between the act of the will and the act of creation, as methinks it must if the argument can even barely stand, then of course it must be rejected.
"I affirm that God is identical with his act of will. However, I restrict this to mean that he is identical with his act of willing the good as such, i.e. his self love. Because of this, I can affirm with you that "the essential, necessary act of God can have contingent effects." However I deny that this entails option (a)."
Then I think you and I have different understandings of what option (a) means and entails, since if God is identical with His act of willing, and his act of willing is identical to the act of creation, then by transitivity God is identical with his act of creation. The distinction to be made is that the created order, properly speraking, refers to the secondary effects of the single, unique, undivided act of God, so contingency and division pertain to the effect but not to the act.
"I like to articulate my defense of divine simplicity using (b), i.e. in identifying the divine intent to create with creation itself. One reason for this is that it allows me to more easily explain how God can voluntarily create this world without first forming an intention to create it."
But this denies the distinction of God and the created order and therefore his absolute transcendence, in other words, it will collapse in some form of pantheism. I also fail to see how this evades Walter's aporia, maybe not in the exact form he spelled it out, but it is easy to patch it up to an inconsistent set of statements. Note that I agree with you that there is no such thing as "first forming an intention to create" and then creating, but the way to go about it, is to deny that the act of willing the creation is distinct from the act of creation is distinct from God's necessary act of willing himself.
@godrigues,
DeleteYou say that "This is my understanding of the standard Thomistic position." I doubt that there is no standard Thomist position. The paper I link to in my first comment of this thread articulates a variety of positions each of which has prominent Thomists in its defense, but I don’t know. In any case…
Second, you say "so the putative conclusion is not even problematic." I agree, if you accept (a). Which is why I say "The proponent of option (a) on the other hand would not necessarily have a problem with Walter's argument." That said, of course a proponent of option (a) could have other problems with Walter's argument, as you do. But my point is only that in rejecting option (a), I have to reject his conclusion and therefore one of his premises (assuming the argument can be written in a formally valid way). I reject (1) but I did not understand (1) to imply a real distinction between God's act of creation and his act of intending the universe (a distinction which I too reject).
Third, you say "since if God is identical with His act of willing, and his act of willing is identical to the act of creation, then by transitivity God is identical with his act of creation." We both agree that God's act of creation is really identical with his act of willing to create this world (which I have been calling for ease of conversation "God's intention.") We also agree that God is identical with his act of willing the good (i.e. himself).
Verbally we each distinguish between God's act of willing creation (God's intention to create) and God's act of willing the good. Since you endorse option (a) and affirm that this distinction is merely verbal, you are committed to the view, as you admit, that God is identical with his act of creation.
I on the other hand think that the distinction between God's act of willing the good and his act of willing this universe are not only verbally distinct but really distinct. That leaves me with option (b) or (c) if I want to preserve divine simplicity, which I do.
The reason I disagree with you is that you have to deny the strong form of object essentialism which I prefer to maintain. That said, I am not sure whether or not object essentialism (in this particular case at least) amounts to a substantive metaphysical view or merely a verbal preference. If its the latter, then our disagreement is merely verbal.
Fourth, you say "But this denies the distinction of God and the created order and therefore his absolute transcendence." Even if I conceded this point, this would not commit me to (a) but only a denial of (b). So it does not follow that I have to deny that "God's act of willing the creation is distinct from God's necessary act of willing himself" since option (c) affirms this distinction while also not allegedly threatening transcendence.
Be that as it may, I do not think (b) threatens transcendence either. (B) says that the created world is identical with the divine intention. But it does not say that the created world is identical with God. In order to identify God and creation, you would need to identify God with his intending the universe. But this is what the proponent of (b) is denying.
Fifth, you say "I also fail to see how this evades Walter's aporia." It evades his argument because it allows me to escape (1) which states "God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality." But if God's intention is really identical with created reality (option (b)), then it follows that it is not prior to the universe. On the other hand, if there simply is no such thing that counts as "God's intention to create" (option (c)), then it is not logically prior to created reality. Therefore, accepting either (b) or (c) allows me to deny (1) and evade his argument.
TLDR
DeleteI think we are mostly in agreement. We both agree that all that exists is God and the created world. We disagree as to which of these the term "God's intention to create" refers to. I am not sure whether or not there is a truth of the matter or it is just a verbal preference.
So just to clarify, Tom
DeleteI think your position on Divine Simplicity is not one that Walter is arguing against. You are explicitly allowing God to have actions that are not identical to each other, and not identical to God.
That does not mean your kind of DS is to be preferred, since it can be objected to in other ways.
Tom
Delete"First, let me clarify a terminologic point. No theist should make a real distinction between "intention to create" and "act of creation." In order for God to create the world, he simply has to intend it to exist."
Actually, this is all that is needed for my argument to work. God's intention, whatever it entails is intrinsic to God.
"Second, you say that you do not imply (5) is true. But you do say "If you deny intention altogether, you cannot maintain that God voluntarily creates X" This is logically equivalent to
(6) If God voluntarily creates X, there exists a divine intention to create X."
Yes, that's what I am saying.
"But affirming (6) does not commit me to (1), as I say "the denial of (1) in your argument is consistent with...reducing [the divine intention] to the created world itself." "
That is included in "God's intention, whatever it entails, is intrinsic to God."
1 God's intention is identical to the created world
2 God's intention is intrinsic to god
3 therefore: the created world is intrinsic to God.
"So in order to affirm (1), you need something like (5)." No, I don't.
"Third, you say "You cannot identify the universe with a divine intention, because a divine intention is necessary whereas the universe is contingent." But this assumes the very fact that I am denying, viz. that divine intentions are necessary."
I don't assume this, I am arguing for it by arguing from the simple fact that divine intentions are intentions of God and are , by definition, intrinsic.
"And you cannot respond by saying "they are necessary because they are identical with God." Because again, I am denying that divine intentions pertaining to the created world are identical with God. They either (i) do not exist at all, or (ii) they are identical to the created world itself."
But they do exist, as you said earlier that no theist should make a real distinction between "intention to create" and "act of creation." In order for God to create the world, he simply has to intend it to exist." So, no theist should deny that they exist.
I have already answered why the the second option makes no sense. You simply cannot deny that God's intentions are God's. It doesn't matter what they 'reduce to', they are still God's intentions, and therefore intrinsic to God. They do not depend on the existence of the created world, but the created world depends on their existence. If they had been different, the created world would have been different, not the other way round, because that would make God contingent.
Now, I really don't see us making any progress here, so unless you have something brand new to add, I am going to bow out.
Michael
DeleteI am arguing about the position on DS that states that God is identical to all his "properties", including His will.
I think Tom does endorse that position.
I am not arguing about any other definition of
I'm not really sure what this means:
Delete"they are still God's intentions, and therefore intrinsic to God.
Nor this:
I am arguing about the position on DS that states that God is identical to all his "properties", including His will.
Granted, in the latter you put "properties" in quotes. But surely that is a key point; whether we can treat them as we do properties ordinarily.
According to Thomistic DS, his "properties" surely come down to his essence, which is his existence. I'm not sure we can go much further than that. I don't say we cannot, either, but it does sound a bit like a de re / de dicto conflict.
@Tom:
Delete"The reason I disagree with you is that you have to deny the strong form of object essentialism which I prefer to maintain. That said, I am not sure whether or not object essentialism (in this particular case at least) amounts to a substantive metaphysical view or merely a verbal preference. If its the latter, then our disagreement is merely verbal."
I have seen a couple of propositions named strong essentialism, so would you please tell me what you understand strong essentialism to be? If it entails that God has real (non-Cambridge) accidental properties then it is to be rejected. I should probably warn that even though, somewhat paradoxically, my background is in mathematics, I am something of an old fashioned Thomist and I tend to view with suspicion Frege-Russell intrusions and assumptions.
"Fourth, you say "But this denies the distinction of God and the created order and therefore his absolute transcendence." Even if I conceded this point, this would not commit me to (a) but only a denial of (b). So it does not follow that I have to deny that "God's act of willing the creation is distinct from God's necessary act of willing himself" since option (c) affirms this distinction while also not allegedly threatening transcendence."
Then once again you will have to spell out for me what do you understand by identifying God's intention with God's creation. I took it in the most straightforward sense of identity. Tentatively, there is a sense in which we can understand this identification since there is no middle layer as it were between God's will and the actualization of His (active) will. But then I would aver that reduction is a much better term. I would have to think harder on what exactly this buys and if it manages to evade the objections.
George
Delete"According to Thomistic DS, his "properties" surely come down to his essence, which is his existence."
Exactly.
Walter,
DeleteThis will be my last comment, thank you for the discussion. I am going to divide it into three posts.
Part 1:
Your original argument against divine simplicity (April 26 12:27 am) is used to show that God’s intentions pertaining to the universe are intrinsic to God, a conclusion which is meant to show a problem with divine simplicity (and I agree, it does pose a problem for simplicity, c.f. my above discussion with godrigues). Your argument starts with the premise (1) “God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality.” And as I have said, I deny that this is the case, thereby resisting the conclusion. This is the crux of our disagreement and the basis for our entire discussion so far.
I argued in my previous comment that you need (5), or at least something relevantly similar, in order to make your argument work and you say “No, I don't.” I will explain why you in fact do need (5). And since you do need (5), my argument against it in my comment on April 26 9:07 am stands as an argument against your conclusion (1).
Let me rephrase (5) to state (I do not think this rephrasing changes the substance of the original proposition, I just think it is easier to fit into the overall context of our discussion).
(5’) If an agent voluntarily brings about some state of affairs S, he forms the intention to bring about S prior to S obtaining.
Consider now the following claim
(7) If God voluntarily creates, he forms the intention to create prior to creation.
It turns out that (7) is a special case of (5’). So while (5’) entails (7), (7) does not logically entail (5’). That said, to accept (7) but to deny (5’) seems like a case of special pleading. And there doesn’t seem any metaphysical reason why (7) would be true if (5’) is not. The upshot of this is that while the denial of (5’) does not strictly entail (7) is false, it strongly suggests it. I would add that my argument against (5) (c.f. my comment April 26 9:07 am), can easily be applied to (7) as well, giving more reason to think that
(8) If (5’) is false, (7) is false.
Now, (7) is in fact crucial to your argument for (1) “God's intention to create is logically prior to created reality.” For consider three propositions each of which are logically sufficient for the denial of (1):
(9) “God’s intention to create” does not refer to anything that exists
(10 ) God’s intention to create exists and is itself a created thing
(11 ) God’s intention to create exists and is logically posterior to creation.
Notice that (9) and (10) roughly correspond to (i) and (ii) from my previous comments.* The point is that in order to defend (1), which is the crux of your argument, you need to find a way to reject (9)-(11). And while I agree that (11) is self-evidently implausible, I think that (9) and (10) are both reasonable options and I happen to prefer (10) as I say, because I think that we ought to identify God’s intention to create with the created world itself
Continued…
DeleteIn any case, you need an argument against (9) and (10). You provide an argument against (9) by affirming:
(6) If God voluntarily creates X, there exists a divine intention to create X
Obviously, I am committed to saying
(12) God voluntarily creates
Which (6) and (12) entail together the denial of (9). I nowhere concede (6), so I do not accept your argument against (9). That said, I did not provide an objection to (6) and instead simply pointed out that it was insufficient as an argument against (1), which again, is the heart of our dispute. In order to defend (1), you need to reject (10) and (11) too. In other words, you need the following premise
(13) If there exists a divine intention to create X, it is neither a created thing nor logically posterior to creation.
But (13) is equivalent to
(14) If there exists a divine intention to create X, it is prior to creation
But (6) and (14) entail
(15) If God voluntarily creates X, there exists an intention to create X prior to creation
And I take it as self-evident that
(16) If there exists an intention to create X prior to creation, God forms the intention to create X prior to creation
But (15) and (16) entail (7). Meaning you need (7) to be true in order for your argument to be convincing. If you deny (7), you have to either deny (15) or (16). But as I said, denying (16) strikes me as incoherent and denying (15) entails the denial of (6) or (14). Now since (14) is just a rewording of (13), the denial of (15) entails the denial of (6) or (13). But denying (13) entails the truth of either (10) or (11). On the other hand, if you deny (6), you lose your major argument against (9). But if (9), (10), or (11) is true, then (1) is false. Consequently, if you accept (1), you ought to accept (7). I am not arguing that (1) logically entails (7), since it is logically possible to affirm (1), but deny (6) and (7). That said, since (6) is the only good reason to reject (9), denying (6) seriously undermines the argument in defense of (1). So at the very least, rejecting (7) undermines our reason for thinking (1) is true even if it doesn’t strictly entail (1) is false.
So you ought to affirm (7), in which case, you need to affirm (5’) because (7) and (8) entail (5’) via modus tollens. Therefore, you need to accept (5’) in order to make your argument for (1) at all plausible.
So the bottom line is that my argument against (5) seriously undermines (1).
*I should point out that (10) is compatible with saying that the intention to create X is identical to X itself or is compatible with saying that the intention is some other creature that in turn causes X. Since the latter is not an option I have ever encountered in the literature and I think is problematic, I am not going to consider it as a serious option but mention it here for completeness sake. I also mention it to preempt an objection, viz. that (10) does not logically entail the denial of (1) because it is possible that God’s intention to create is a created thing but it is prior to the rest of created reality. I would respond by noting that even if God’s intention to create is a created thing which in turn causes the rest of creation to exist, (1) is false since God’s intention to create would not be prior to all of created reality (which is what (1) affirms) since it is a part of created reality (as (10) stipulates).
Part 2
DeleteIn part 1, I argue that your defense of (1), which is the core of our disagreement, requires accepting (5). But I provide in an earlier comment what I take to be a conclusive argument against (5) (comment April 26 9:07 am) and in so doing I provide an objection to (1).
In any case, let's recall (9), (10), and (11) from above.
You argue against (9) with (6) and now you attempt to counter (10) too with the following:
“You cannot identify the universe with a divine intention, because a divine intention is necessary whereas the universe is contingent” and “I don't assume [that divine intentions are necessary], I am arguing for it by arguing from the simple fact that divine intentions are intentions of God and are, by definition, intrinsic.”
I take it that you are arguing as follows (I am replacing “universe” with “creation” to avoid implications that the physical universe exhausts all of creation):
(4) Divine intentions are intrinsic to God
(17) If something is intrinsic to God, it is necessary
(18) Therefore, divine intentions are necessary (from 4,18)
(19) If X is necessary and all parts of Y are contingent, X is not part of Y
(20) All parts of creation are contingent
(21) Therefore divine intentions are not part of creation (from 18-20)
I accept (19) with certain qualifications, but for all intents and purposes these do not affect the argument so I will concede (19). I agree with (20). So this means I can either challenge (4) or (17).
First, let me say that I in fact accept (17). So I will ultimately end up denying (4). That said, there is something odd about using (17) in this context. The strongest reason to accept (17) is the doctrine of divine simplicity. This means that a defense of (21), i.e. a denial of (10), rests on the truth of divine simplicity(according to this argument). But for one strongly committed to divine simplicity, and impressed by this argument, the right move is not rejecting divine simplicity but instead affirming (9) in order to preserve the doctrine.
As it turns out though, I do reject (4) for two reasons. First of all, I do not think there are any good arguments for (4). You provide the following: “the simple fact that divine intentions are intentions of God and are, by definition, intrinsic.” But certainly this is false. Intentions are not by definition intrinsic. Even if you are right in thinking that they are necessarily intrinsic, we have to settle the matter in some other way besides appeal to the meaning of the word. And to simply affirm that intentions are intrinsic to the agent, by necessity, is just to beg the question in favor of (4). You could try to argue that divine intentions are intrinsic to God because human intentions are intrinsic to humans. But this inductive argument is weak since there are important differences between divine and human cognition.
Second, I reject (4) since I think it too ultimately leads to (5). These comments have already gotten to be too long so I will not pursue that argument here, I just want to point out that this is why I happen to reject it.
The final point I would make is this: if you are trying to show that accepting (4) is incompatible with the doctrine of divine simplicity, I agree because I think this would mean that God could not act differently across possible worlds. I say this multiple times in my responses, which is why I have been trying to argue against (1). One way in which I have argued against (1) is by proposing that perhaps divine intentions are identical with created things. And it is this point precisely you are rejecting with (21). But notice, your argument for (21) depends on (4). But your initial reason for concluding (4) in the first place was because of an argument which included (1) as a premise, in fact, it is the premise which we disagree over. Therefore, in using (4) as a premise in an argument against (1), you are begging the question unless you provide an independent reason for accepting (4) apart from (1).
I would put the problem more simply like this. The following is an aporia:
Delete1) Divine Simplicity;
2) Modal collapse is false;
3) There exists a contrastive explanation in God for any created thing.
Divine Simplicity entails that God has no intrinsic property different from His existence. When we talk about His Justice, His Mercy, His Will, etc., we are just referencing His existence under a different name.
So, if God necessarily is His will to create this world, and His will to create this world entails this world, then this world is necessary.
If God is His will to create this world only in this world (in another possible world, it would be His will to create that one) then God's essence differs across possible worlds (since God is His essence) which is impossible (He would in fact be a contingent, and not a necessary, being).
Therefore "God's will to create this world", if it entails this world, cannot be a real thing - to maintain it does either results in modal collapse or Divine contingency. Therefore it must be either in reality nothing at all, a mere Cambridge property of God, or in fact (despite appearances) it doesn't entail the actual world.
If it is nothing at all, or doesn't entail the actual world, then there nothing whatsoever to point to in God which entails the actual world. In other words, there simply is no contrastive explanation for the actual world (or anything in it) in God.
Nor does positing "God's will to create the world" as a Cambridge property really help. Cambridge properties of things are, by definition, properties which are not in them (intrinsic), but determine by something outside of it, such as a man being a widower. Thus, why this world exists instead of any other is simply an unexplainable brute fact. It is the truthmaker of the Cambridge property and not the other way around.
@LonelyProfessor
DeleteThis objection applies to libertarian choices and not to the doctrine of divine simplicity per se. Positing some act of will or intention to create in the mind of God which produces creation does not solve the problem you are positing, it only pushes it back a stage. What is the contrastive explanation for the choice itself?
Hello
ReplyDeleteSorry to insist on it, but my point was not answered satisfactorily last time.
Why should we love and worship a God who lets immense suffering unfold and who furthermore threatens us to eternal conscious torment?
What's the point?
1. Because God is the reason anything exists at all. Any good you experience in this like is because of God, so you should appreciate that. And even though the world has suffering, God offers eternal peace and happiness that greatly outweighs the bad experienced on this earth.
DeleteThe best book on the problem of evil is Brian Davies "The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil." It is not an easy read, but it is worth reading.
2. Feser has a series of posts on hell that you can check out. It's worth noting that, while not Feser's position, many theists do not believe that hell is eternal (David Bentley Hart among the most noteworthy who believe this).
The latter part depends on your religious views, which e.g. I reject (I tend toward universalism). The former is due to the popular misconception of God as a father figure, but human morality is not convertible to Gods goodness. All-goodness/omnibenevolence is the most misunderstood attribute, but that is no wonder when one listens to most masses nowadays.
DeleteStill though we only exist because of God and we have an ultimate end because of him, as he alone is able to fullfil our desire for something eternal. This is a religious drive though and mustn't be confised with our desire for material benefits, a condition which sadly precludes a number of people. I think a beautiful way that desire is pictured is in Dantes “Divine Comedy“ (there is an audiobook on YouTube).
This world isn't perfect, it couldn't be due to its comtingent and therefor non-necessary nature. But to paraphrase John Leslie it is worth being thought about. Being is good, life is good. Realizing that gives the quickest answer as to why the being that makes this possible is required to be worshipped. The old testament, particularly Psalms and Proverbs capture such urges like no other work I know.
The point is that you already do worship just this kind of "god", in the sense that you (and all humans) have something in mind when they think of "greatest possible good thing", deviation from which constitutes some kind of "evil", and permanent separation from which constitutes a state of existence that we would call "hell". There is no "god" that you can possibly worship that won't cause you some kind of pain.
DeleteThe better question is, of all possible things that we could worship as God, which is the best? Is it money? Fame? Sex? Knowledge? The God of religion A, B, C...? Absence of suffering? Etc etc. For example, you are saying that the God of classical theism is not worthy of worship because there is at least one thing that is greater than him, namely, existence free of evil and suffering, and that such a being as the Christian God therefore represents a kind of evil thing since it deviates from the highest possible good.
The hidden assumption here is that absence of suffering is unquestionably a higher good than a God who allows us to experience suffering within the limits of his love and provision in the way a father allows his children to suffer in certain controlled ways for their good.
@godrigues,
DeleteYou say “I have seen a couple of propositions named strong essentialism, so would you please tell me what you understand strong essentialism to be? If it entails that God has real (non-Cambridge) accidental properties then it is to be rejected.”
I am calling object essentialism the view that an act of will is essentially an act of willing X. Therefore, willing X and willing Y are distinct acts if X and Y are distinct things. I am using “strong” to clarify that X and Y need not be the primary objects of the will but any objects.
If strong object essentialism is true, then there is a problem for divine simiplicity. In the actual world, God’s act of will is the act of willing this universe. In another possible world, his act of will is willing some other universe. Since the universes in each world are distinct, then God’s acts in each of these possible worlds would be distinct (even though these objects are only secondary objects of the will). This is problematic if God is identical to his act of will since it would entail that God does not exist across possible worlds, he is radically contingent.
One way around this is to adopt a weaker version of object essentialism in which an act of will is essentially an act of willing X where X is understood to be only the primary object of the will.
I think that strong object essentialism implies God has a real (non-cambridge) relation to creation if you identify God with his act of willing the universe (which I label option (a) in our discussion). Since I think strong object essentialism is plausible, I reject the idea that God is identical with his act of willing this universe. This does not mean I reject divine simplicity since this leaves open options (b) and (c).
You say “Then once again you will have to spell out for me what do you understand by identifying God's intention with God's creation. I took it in the most straightforward sense of identity. Tentatively, there is a sense in which we can understand this identification since there is no middle layer as it were between God's will and the actualization of His (active) will. But then I would aver that reduction is a much better term. I would have to think harder on what exactly this buys and if it manages to evade the objections.”
I may agree that “reduction” is a better term but I don’t think that is substantively different than the proposal in (b). And again, as I say, I am not convinced that the differences between (a), (b) and (c) are beyond verbal differences. That said, the reason I think (b) is plausible is that I think it makes sense to think God creates the universe in a similar way to how humans formulate intentions (with of course the important qualifications about the difference between God and creatures etc.). It is often assumed that God first (logically not temporally) intends that the universe exists and then somehow the universe comes into being. But I think we ought to cut the middle man and simply say God just creates the universe without first formulating an intention.
If strong object essentialism is true, then there is a problem for divine simiplicity. In the actual world, God’s act of will is the act of willing this universe. In another possible world, his act of will is willing some other universe. Since the universes in each world are distinct, then God’s acts in each of these possible worlds would be distinct
DeleteIs it correct to say that God's acts are "in" the world, or any world? The effects are, sure. But unless you define the acts as their effects (very dubious), surely that is not what classical theism holds?
Or am I missing something?
"In the actual world, God’s act of will is the act of willing this universe."
DeleteThe actual world is the only world in which any real being can exist. To assert a being exists in other than the actual world is incoherent.
"In another possible world, his act of will is willing some other universe"
There is no other possible world for a being to actually exist except the actual world.
"Is it correct to say that God's acts are "in" the world, or any world?"
Everything that real being X is exists in the only real world, the actual world. Everything that real being X does transpires in the only real world, the actual world.
Where is being X?
Somewhere? Then being X exists and acts in the actual world, along with all other real beings, all of which must necessarily exist in that same world, the only place any real being can exist, the actual world.
Nowhere? Then it is incoherent to assert being X is real.
Threatens us with*
ReplyDeleteWhat do you think of The Realist Guide, by Fr. Paul Robinson? He's dismissive of Craig and co.
ReplyDeleteI like his very Aquinian approach. According to Robinson, St. Thomas (from his obvious vantage point) was able to correct what was wrong in Aristotle's First Mover, who he says exercises no efficient causality on the universe (doesn't create), has no knowledge of the universe, and, while being immaterial, is still within the universe, not separate from it.
Her says that the three points make Aristotle's God different from the Christian God and that the error was due to his failure to distinguish between essence and existence. He argues that these flaws severely affected scientific progress for many centuries.
The book makes a very good case for modern science's expansion, once Aristotle's views had been developed and corrected in the Middle Ages.