But this
sort of argument badly misunderstands the “just cause” condition, and the misunderstanding
is a frustratingly common one. The implicit
assumption is that the just cause condition requires merely that a war be
fought for some aim that is morally good in
the abstract. But that is not the
case. As I have emphasized in previous
writing on this subject, what the tradition requires is that the aim be a morally
good one all things considered, and given
the actual concrete circumstances
under which the war would be fought.
This should
be clear when we realize that almost any war would meet the “just cause”
condition if we conceive of its aims in an abstract enough way. For example, during World War II, the
Japanese empire could claim that its aim was to achieve the “co-prosperity” of the
countries of East Asia, and the Germans could claim that their aim was to acquire
Lebensraum or “living space” for
their people. And who could object to
co-prosperity or living space? But
obviously, it would be absurd to pretend that either country had actually met
the just cause condition of just war doctrine.
For when we get into the details of exactly how co-prosperity and living space were to be realized (namely, via
conquest) we see that the causes were not
morally good.
The reality
is that many of the conditions that too many people commenting on the Iran war
assume are distinct from the “just
cause” condition are in fact treated by the just war tradition as part of that condition. For example, consider the eminent
twentieth-century Catholic natural law theorist Heinrich Rommen (pictured
above). In his 1945 book The State in Catholic Thought he
addresses just war doctrine, and devotes a section to the just cause condition
(at pp. 660-65). Naturally, he addresses
the issue of whether the aims being pursued are morally legitimate. But he also says that for a cause to be just,
going to war must be a “last resort” to realizing those aims; that the proposed
war really is in fact “capable of attaining its purpose”; and that “the damages
caused by intervention are not greater than the damage to the common good,
national and international” caused by the disorder the war aims to remedy (p.
662). He also adds that “right intention
is a necessary part of the just cause” (p. 665).
In short,
whereas some commenters suppose that having
a right intention, being a last resort, having serious prospects of success, and not causing greater evils than those being remedied are additional conditions
of just war doctrine, over and above the just cause condition, Rommen treats
them as components of the just cause condition. Hence, when he says that “the justice of the
cause must be certain” and not have “only a probability” in its favor in order
for a war to be legitimate (pp. 664-65), he means that it needs to be morally
certain that all of these criteria
are met.
By no means
is this position unique to Rommen. One
finds it in standard Catholic manuals of ethics and moral theology in the
pre-Vatican II period. For example, the
discussion of the just cause criterion in Austin Fagothey’s Right and Reason (at pp. 563-65) includes
“sufficient proportion between the good to be accomplished and the accompanying
evil,” “last resort,” and “fair hope of success,” as parts of the just cause condition.
Hence when Fagothey goes on to say that the cause must not only be just
but must be “known to be just” and that we “must be sure of a just cause before
fighting” (pp. 564-65), he means that we must be sure that all of these criteria are met.
We find
something similar in the treatment of the just cause condition in volume I of
Fr. John McHugh and Fr. Charles Callan’s Moral
Theology: A Complete Course (at pp. 560-66). They argue that for a cause to be just, war
must be a “last resort”; the disorder war is intended to remedy must be “so
grave that it outweighs the risks and
losses of war”; that when determining these potential risks and losses, a
nation must factor in “the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses that
will be suffered by others” as well as harm to “the world in general or
posterity”; and that in light of such considerations, “it could happen that a
nation with justice on its side… would nevertheless not be justified in waging
war.” Hence when McHugh and Callan go on
to say that “the government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain
that right is on its side” and that “one should refrain from hostilities as
long as one’s moral right is uncertain,” they mean that it must be morally
certain that a proposed war meets all
of these criteria.
Now, in an earlier article at my blog and a follow-up article at Public Discourse, I have argued that the war with Iran clearly does not meet all of the criteria cited above. Accordingly, it does not meet the just cause condition of just war (let alone other conditions such as the “lawful authority” condition, which I have argued it also does not meet). As I noted in the First Things article, even some Catholic defenders of the war admit that the war only arguably meets the criteria cited above, rather than meeting them with moral certainty. But as I argue in that article, the absence of moral certainty is enough to show that the war is unjust, at least if we are looking at it through the lens of the Catholic just war tradition.
Dr. Feser,
ReplyDeleteThank you for bringing a rigorous defense of just war theory to our current situation. I was taught just war theory in its basics in high school about 15 years ago (we were going through some Aquinas and apologetics, I believe), but had largely forgotten the details to the point where I had stopped thinking about warfare with the light of this traditional Catholic view. Instead, I was caught up in the realpolitik paradigm many were taking with Iran until I read your commentary. I deeply appreciate your work!
Thank you!
DeleteI made two interrelated criticisms. This partially answers one, and is a partially useful clarification, but I really meant the two "prongs" to join into a single problem, and this does not address that problem at all.
ReplyDeleteBasically, you showed that in at least two instances "just cause" was used to refer to a set of criteria rather than a single criterion. But I already granted that it *could* do so.
But *can* isn't enough to show that the quotes you had in the First Things actually were all being used in that expansive way.
One could respond, well isn't one quote that does so enough to establish the point...
Well, yes, but... the the second prong of the problem is that each of the criterion involved here don't admit moral judgement that is even of the same kind, and so you really need to know which criterion or criteria each quote is talking about to understand what it is trying to convey.
To form a moral judgement about whether the war is defensive or aggressive (for example) is different in kind than weighing its probability of success, or attempting to balancing the harm of not acting vs acting and in what way and to what degree. If I act very aggressively, perhaps my odds of success go up, but so also the secondary evils So which should I do? If opt to minimize civilian harm, my odds of success may go down... but should I try that anyway? What if it appears that if I achieve victory quickly, the actual humanitarian impact is actually lower that if the war is protracted by fighting less aggressively?
The judgement about object could be mistaken, but is not probabilistic. The judgments about success, weighing of harms, etc are obviously and necessarily speculative and probabilistic.
The former type is not prudential per se, the latter is.
And since prudence requires knowledge of the circumstances, knowledge which those in positions of leadership have (or at least should have) and I definitely don't, I may not be able to form a judgement at all on that portion.
That doesn't mean *they* cannot. They may have sufficient information to form both a moral judgement about the object and a prudential judgement about success (and so forth for other criteria).
But that means all, as an outside observer, may be able to say is, "Well, the object appears just, but I can't really offer a judgement about whether this was really the last resort (not knowing all of was attempted or communicated before, often in private), whether the likely harm of this particular level of military intervention (more than nothing, and less than total war) is the right one to achieve the war aims, or whether with the combination of this particular strategy with this level of harm is likely to achieve the goal or not.
I don't see that it certainly unjust in its aims, because the case related to Iran's aggressive actions in the region, risks of its nuclear ambitions given past actions, etc. seem enough to justify a military to response, but I also don't know for certain that all the other necessary conditions are met, not because I am not paying attention, but because many of the details I would need to know to say that are not knowable by me, or you, or anyone outside a small group we are not a part of.
Where we appear to differ, is that you seem to be saying that if I do not know that all the conditions are met, I ought to condemn it as unjust.
That seems rash to me. All I can say is, "It does not appear to be obviously unjust as to its aim, but as to these other conditions, I don't have the information I need to form a judgement."
(I will call out, that someone might say, "You know all you need to know from the tweet about ending a civilization..." But my reply to that is that was so patently obviously hyperbole, both at the time and proven by subsequent events, that to take it as a literal threat is absurd, and so it doesn't really tell me anything other than Trump likes to speak hyperbolically.)
Another out-of-the ballpark homer
DeleteThis comment is really interesting. I am going to restate what I understand to be your objections. First, pivoting to new quotes that view the "just cause" condition as having components that include "probability of success" and other criteria does not show that the old quotes also understood just cause in this way. Along with this, it is not clear why we should understand "probability of success" as integrated into "just cause". Could I not have a just cause without having probability of success? Perhaps just cause is being used equivocally to refer to: (a.) the entirety of the case for a war, and/or (b.) the principal aim(s) or goal(s) to be achieved in the war. Well the former would clearly have components and the latter may or may not and if one is going to appeal to authorities to support claims about just cause, one needs to determine first in which sense a particular author that is being quoted is using the terms. Your criticism seems to maintain that some of the authors being quoted were using sense/definition b and that Feser is using *other* authors to support definition/sense a. If the first authors quoted meant definition/sense b, then they don't support what Feser claims that they supported.
DeleteSecond, moral judgement pertains to ends, cause, and intention. For that reason, it is distinct from the judgement of probability of success. It makes no more sense to say that I am "morally certain" I will succeed in some goal than I am "morally certain" that 2 + 2 = 4 or that I am "morally certain" that tariffs will cause inflation. Moral certainty would be a type of certainty precisely because it pertains to principles that we can know through natural law. One can be certain about the principles through natural law, but one cannot be certain about other matters that are involved in the application of those principles (e.g. probability of success).
Third, you are stating something that has been a concern of mine when folks confidently criticize what they don't understand. You wrote:
"And since prudence requires knowledge of the circumstances, knowledge which those in positions of leadership have (or at least should have) and I definitely don't, I may not be able to form a judgement at all on that portion.
That doesn't mean *they* cannot. They may have sufficient information to form both a moral judgement about the object and a prudential judgement about success (and so forth for other criteria)."
As you stated, anyone here thinking that they are in a position to intelligently assess the extent and immanence of the threat from Iran or the probability of achieving certain limited goals in mitigating those threats has a hyperbolic overconfidence in their own judgement.
You continue,
Delete"But that means all, as an outside observer, may be able to say is, "Well, the object appears just, but I can't really offer a judgement about whether this was really the last resort (not knowing all of was attempted or communicated before, often in private), whether the likely harm of this particular level of military intervention (more than nothing, and less than total war) is the right one to achieve the war aims, or whether with the combination of this particular strategy with this level of harm is likely to achieve the goal or not.
I don't see that it certainly unjust in its aims, because the case related to Iran's aggressive actions in the region, risks of its nuclear ambitions given past actions, etc. seem enough to justify a military to response, but I also don't know for certain that all the other necessary conditions are met, not because I am not paying attention, but because many of the details I would need to know to say that are not knowable by me, or you, or anyone outside a small group we are not a part of."
This is really well stated.
Although I did not have doubts about the just cause criteria (which I am using in the sense of "principle aim(s)") with the actions in Venezuela and the bombing of the nuclear facility last July, it is really the extent of this war that does give me a great deal more pause about this military action, particularly in relation to the just cause criteria.
If I were to make what I think that the strongest case for proportionality in relation to the cause in this military action, I would state the aim(s) of the war in this way. The principle aim is to prevent the nuclear ambitions of Iran not only in the short term, but also in the foreseeable future. This requires debilitating their military to such a degree that the case for success made by the radical jihadists and their claims to be "winning" seem outlandish to the general public and to the more reasonable leaders in the government of Iran. These more reasonable figures would then be in a stronger position to make an agreement with the United States weaking the role of leadership for the jihadists and allowing for the removal of highly enriched nuclear material. This seems to be the aims of the more comprehensive military action and the principle or aim of preventing them from having nuclear weapons is a just cause.
You concluded:
Delete"Where we appear to differ, is that you seem to be saying that if I do not know that all the conditions are met, I ought to condemn it as unjust.
That seems rash to me. All I can say is, "It does not appear to be obviously unjust as to its aim, but as to these other conditions, I don't have the information I need to form a judgement."
This also seems to me the correct approach to the question. It reflects an understanding of the nature of what needs to be assessed and a modesty that recognizes our lack of access to some of the relevant information.
Thank you, and yes, you restated my argument accurately, and probably better than I did.
DeleteI guess I might add a caveat… Prudence is a moral virtue, so it is okay in some sense to speak about moral certainty regarding prudential judgements. But you still need to account for the kind of judgement it is.
DeleteIt is not deductive, like 2+2=4. It is me saying, “Given all I know about the circumstances, and what I foresee is likely to happen as a consequence of taking this course vs any other, including not acting at all, this seems to be the best course to achieve this righteous aim.”
It’s the kind of judgement you use to decide whether to undergo a risky surgery. If it’s to cure a minor condition, maybe it is foolhardy (even a sin against prudence) to do. To cure a mortal one, maybe foolhardy (and a sin against prudence) not to.
But unlike 2+2, you can make absolutely the best decision given the knowledge available to you, and still fail. It doesn’t mean you were imprudent, just limited. (This is the heart of the story of Oedipus, incidentally. It is a story trying to capture how horribly things can go wrong not because of deliberately choosing evil, but simply because, as a mere man, we often can not know what we would have needed to know to avoid the calamity.)
@Anonymous: "All I can say is, "It does not appear to be obviously unjust as to its aim, but as to these other conditions, I don't have the information I need to form a judgement.""
DeleteSo I think that is a mistake, as rightly noted in the caveat offered in your subsequent comment. But your general gist is quite right. The critical point to bear in mind is that any (human!) moral judgment is essentially (NOT entirely, but essentially) subjective, based on always limited information, (access to/ knowledge of) which obviously varies from person to person. Thus anyone can form a moral judgment about anything, based on what he believes (what he thinks he knows), but it's nonsensically confused to presume, on the basis of my own subjective moral certainty, that my moral judgment must be shared by/binding on some other person who is very differently informed (epistemically situated) than I am -- differently informed/situated, moreover, both as regards facts and as regards principles.
I would add that the necessity of a chaste and just 'moral certainty' in one's judgments should apply as much to judgments about the justice/prudence of one's temporal rulers as to judgments about the justness of a given war.
Delete“So I think that is a mistake, as rightly noted in the caveat offered in your subsequent comment.”
DeleteIn my surgery example, the exigency may force my hand to make decision no matter how scanty my evidence.
Something similar might apply to the ruler of a country. He may have to act with a great deal of uncertainty, but time presses.
But, what I meant, is that not being in a position where I am forced by circumstances to come to a conclusion right now, it is fair to say, “I don’t have enough info to come to a good judgment, and since I am not in a position of responsibility that forces to me to decide this moment, I will refrain making a judgment until I have more evidence.”
It still seems to read to me like Dr Feser is saying I should presume it is unjust until I am convinced on all points, while it seems to be the presumption should favor not condemning your rulers as acting unjustly unless you are certain of it.
Anonymous April 26, 2026 at 12:34 PM,
DeleteI think you expressed very well the distinction between the ruler making the decision and the analyst examining that decision with limited information.
You also brought up the important question regarding the morality of condemning the moral actions of the legitimate ruler with incomplete information. This seems different that just claiming the wrong decision has been made. It is an accusation that the ruler intended evil and derivatively all his advisors who didn't resign.
This is a an insightful post, Prof!
ReplyDeleteOK, so, I look at the same "Complete Course" (maybe a different edition - this one was published in 1929 and is free in the "Internet Archive"), and I see things like "There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation;" (in 1384). That is clearly sufficient for ruling out wars for "co-prosperity" in abstract. Also, it shows that at least some theologians do not merge "right intention" into "just cause".
ReplyDeleteAnd then, in 1395 (after the "the government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side" cited in this post) they write "It should, however, be observed that ruler who has only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.".
Given this context, I think it is clear that what they say is that the government must be certain "beyond reasonable doubt" that the injury is real. In our case, it is certain that, for example, Iran has unjustly killed the protesters.
I see no indication that they claim that the government must be certain "beyond reasonable doubt" that, let's say, the chances of success are high. Was anything like that possible for Bl. Urban II in case of the First Crusade? (They do offer Crusades as examples of just wars; perhaps this implicitly includes only some of them, but the First Crusade is clearly included.)
And it is very clear that they do not claim that random citizens must have such level of certainty about the cause (or about the moral certainty of the government about the cause) for the war to be just. Even the conscripts do not require moral certainty to actively fight in the war ("for the presumption is on the side of the government.").
Also, while one is likely to sin in starting a war without the moral certainty that the injury is real, it might also happen that even in such case the injury is actually real. I guess further participation in such a war would not be sinful even for the government.
Now, further clarifications of just war theory are certainly needed, but this post does not seem to be a step towards such a clarification.
Also, a piece of advice: the discussion is likely to become a bit less heated (and be a bit less of an occasion of sin for everyone) if there was a clear affirmation that, whatever the justice of the war from the American side, the war is clearly unjust from Iran's side.
Without intending to argue with any of the rest of the post, I don't think Rommen is a good source for your argument, and I don't think you have understood him correctly. (As noted below, I think this is primarily Rommen's fault.) Rommen does not treat last resort as part of just cause; the mention of last resort comes up in passing in a discussion of the fact that opposition to idolatry or paganism doesn't provide an excuse, to address the question of whether saving Christians from persecution would serve as a just cause, and Suarez's claim that it could only be done as a last resort is used as part of Rommen's argument that the only kinds of causes available as just causes to a state, even a Christian one, are those concerned with grave violation of the rights of human societies or grave offense against the innocents. Likewise, the comments about the intervention's attaining its purposes and about damages are within the scope of an "Even then" clause about the justifiability of the intervention, not as components of the just cause itself. This is a pattern that recurs in Rommen's discussion; for instance, he goes on to say that even if the cause is just, insufficient material means does not give either a right or duty to intervene. His claim, of course, is not that sufficient material means is part of just cause, but that just cause cannot generate a right or duty to intervene where such means are lacking. This is the standard view that just cause generates just intervention only when all other criteria are met. Likewise, despite the fact that he initially looks like he is claiming it, Rommen doesn't actually hold that the just cause has to be morally certain; he goes on in the same paragraph explicitly to allow cases in which just cause is only probable but the other side refuses fair arbitration.
ReplyDeleteRommen does say that right intention is part of just cause, but this a point in which he is merely confused, as he also is when he makes the mistake of distinguishing the purpose of the war and its cause; right intention is part of the just conduct of war, which Rommen is distinguishing from the just cause. The confusion is highlighted indirectly in a footnote (p. 666n18) when he criticizes the Thomistic account of just war theory because St. Thomas doesn't have a debitus modus condition for just conduct, apparently not grasping that in the Thomistic theory this belongs to right intention. This is not, as far as I can tell, something he is getting from Suarez or any other of his Baroque scholastic sources; Rommen is just confused about what right intention is.
In short, Rommen is not very precise on this topic, and has a tendency to go back and forth in a way that sometimes obscures his point even when he's trying to be precise.
Hi Brandon,
DeleteYes, the actual phrase “last resort” is used in the passage on p. 662 where he brings up Suarez’s view about intervention in the specific sort of case you refer to. But, first, it does not follow that he does not regard last resort as part of “just cause” at least in that specific sort of case. On the contrary, he appears to agree with what Suarez says. More importantly, though, the concept of last resort is also operative elsewhere in the section on just cause, even if the phrase is not used. At p. 665, Rommen says that in a dispute between nations, there should first be an attempt at “arbitration by an impartial authority” and “only if this is not accepted by the opponent, then may the claimant proceed to war.” That’s another way of saying that war should be a last resort.
You say, of the later part of that same paragraph on p. 662:
the comments about the intervention's attaining its purposes and about damages are within the scope of an "Even then" clause about the justifiability of the intervention, not as components of the just cause itself.
I’m not certain what your argument is here. Given the context – namely, that Rommen is giving an extended treatment of the question of what a just cause amounts to – “the justifiability of the intervention” and the intervention’s having a “just cause” are just different ways of talking about the same thing. It’s not that there’s first, a question of whether there’s a just cause for the intervention, and then, second, a further question of whether the intervention is justifiable all things considered. (I mean: In that specific section, he’s not treating two different questions of that sort.) Indeed, here is the full sentence from which the phrases I quoted are taken:
“Thus the injury of innocents is the typical case of a grave violation of the international order and represents a just cause for war, always supposing that the intervention is capable of attaining its purpose and that the damages caused by intervention are not greater than the damage to the common good, national and international, caused by the violation.”
Notice that he uses the exact phrase, “just cause,” and says that such a cause is present “supposing” that the intervention can attain its purpose and avoid greater damages. In other words, he connects these to just cause rather than treating them as separate criteria.
(Continued)
(Continued)
DeleteFurthermore, at the beginning of the section on just cause, at p. 660, he says that “war is itself such a calamity, it brings forth so much unhappiness, destruction, and sorrow, that the rule of proportion must be applied,” connecting this with the just cause condition. In other words, here too he treats as part of the just cause condition – rather than as some separate condition of a just war – that a war not bring about evils that are out of proportion to those the war is supposed to be remedying.
You also write:
Likewise, despite the fact that he initially looks like he is claiming it, Rommen doesn't actually hold that the just cause has to be morally certain; he goes on in the same paragraph explicitly to allow cases in which just cause is only probable but the other side refuses fair arbitration.
I don’t know how you can read it that way. First, it doesn’t just “look like” he is claiming that. He couldn’t be more unambiguous: “We must now add a last criterion: the justice of the cause must be certain. The authority that declares war must be certain of its right and of the objective justice of its cause” (p. 664). He then goes on to discuss the difficulty the authority will have in in being impartial about the justice of a war, and that this difficulty is increased if the authority need have only probability rather than certainty. The whole point is to add emphasis to the point that probability is not enough, not to backtrack from it. Rommen then goes on to say that while this is the sort of case where, in litigation, the principle that would favor the party with the higher probability in its favor is “applicable,” nevertheless “the better course is arbitration by an impartial authority” and “only if this is not accepted by the opponent, then may the claimant proceed to war.” In other words, he’s not saying that there are after all cases where probability is enough for war; rather, he’s saying that whereas in ordinary litigation probability can be enough, in the case of war it is not.
As to right intention, it is interesting that though Rommen includes it as part of the just cause condition, other writers (like Fagothey and McHugh and Callan) do not. But whether it belongs there or not is secondary to the main point I was making, which is that all these writers have a much broader conception of just cause than people often suppose.
This seems to assume that the prudential criteria are to be considered equally weighty to the criterion of the just cause. I have absolutely no problem in saying, as do modern JW theorists such as James Turner Johnson, that the early twentieth century is in error in suggesting this, and that the classical tradition does not regard such criteria as being of equal weight.
ReplyDeleteHey! Random question concerning just war theory which (hopefully) is a complete nonissue as regards the present circumstances: how realistic do the chances of success have to be for pursuit of war to be just, and does it change based on one's certainty about the enemy's abilities and intentions? For example, if a small nation is extorted into giving minor economic to a larger one by the threat of war and its leaders realistically assess that the nation has no chance of winning the threatened war, then it would be unjust for the leaders of that country to spend blood and treasure to win the war, even if their cause was in the abstract "just."
ReplyDeleteContrast that to the experience of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto, who had reasonable grounds to believe that their enemy had their complete and unconditional extermination as their end. Given that, in this case there was practically no chance of victory and hence survival, but perhaps the uprising (or if one wants to quibble with the historical facts of the case an equivalent situation where the conditions that I establish do prevail) gives at least a marginal chance of survival or an extension of the life of the people, could war be just in such a case? Just a curious and please disregard if it distracts from consideration of the concrete circumstances here.
Ed, Thanks for tweeting about Fr Ryan and just war doctrine. Perhaps later you can write about how he was a confidant of FDR and helped shaped the New Deal. He wrote many books.
ReplyDeletehttps://networklobby.org/blog/msgr-ryan-social-security/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_A._Ryan
Actually, there was more than one Fr. John Ryan who wrote on moral theology in those days! You're referring to Fr. John A. Ryan. But the book on just war theory that I cited is by Fr. John K. Ryan.
DeleteWell, Ed, it seems that John A. Ryan did write about war and peace and believed in the just war doctrine.
Deletehttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3169147?seq=1 pg. 536
" A firm believer in just war theory, Ryan wanted to see the Italian states defeated and nazism and fascism destroyed."
It's an interesting to see that different moral theologians haven't settled on common definitions of terms and perhaps bringing this up will lead Just War theologians to resolve these differences in terms. But I don't think I've seen anyone explicitly say that it is just to go to war if even one of the components of Just War doctrine is not satisfied.
ReplyDeleteAt most, as Anonymous April 24, 2026 at 8:08 PM pointed out, people have said from the information they have, they see no indication that the Iran war is unjust. The assessment of an outsider pertaining to a insider's decision is not the same as the actual insider's decision. It is hard to see why an assessment of a nation's decision to go to war should meet the same standard as that nation's decision. People will not die if the assessment if is right or wrong as opposed to those who are making the actual decisions. Maybe I'm wrong, but I would be interested in seeing the reasons why.
I think there are some remaining questions that it would be important to address ( beyond simply the Iran war which fails the just war test in multiple different ways.. Obviously not being declared by the competent authority, Congress ( Article I Section 8) in the US context.
ReplyDeleteMore broadly I am struggling with what moral certainty means in terms of the prospects of success.. and it would seem that the degree of probability of success one would need depends on the evil one opposes..
So consider the situation in WW II and opposition to the Nazi's. Given the evil of the Nazi regime, their genocidal behavior and their desire for totalitarian expansion it seems obvious it was a just war to oppose them, even if the probability of success was much less ( it was possible but in the context of the time much less certain the allies would win.. Certainly it was less certain before the US entered the war) In fact it was quite uncertain but it seems like it would be absolutely moral to oppose the Nazi's given that the evil threat the embodied was so obvious and moreover they were the aggressors. In Contrast a lot of discussion if Iran is being driven by the fact that as bad as the Iranian regime is.. its threat to its neighbors is not the same order of magnitude as the Nazi threat was ( although arguably in terms of at least Israels response it too would be an aggressor by its continued sponsorship of terrorist attacks via proxies like Hamas.
So the specific question I would have for Professor Feser or anyone else is
How do you see the interaction of Just cause in terms of the reason for taking up arms versus the probability of success. I would say it appear that the need for a just cause for armed force needs to be more certain than the probability of success and that the probability of success needs to be less if the evil was in threatened with is very great.. In fact if the evil is great enough one seems to be justified in resisting with arms even if the probability of success is relatively low. Suppose a Nazi like regime was going to almost certainly destroy religion for a generation for example.. Given this situation the different conditions would seem to require a different level of certainty to be moral.. Perhaps this is just semantics about what moral certainty means in a given situation but I think this ambiguity is causing some of the confusion.
At the end of the day if we consider moral certainty as the level of certainty one would need depends on the level of evil one is trying to prevent.
In the case of Iran for example, given that it is a theocratic regime that has actively attacked Israel via proxies ( Hamas, Hezbollah), acquisition of nuclear weapons might be an existential threat and the concern that given the Islamic radicalism and the regimes behavior simply deterrence would be unreliable. It seems in that case then the probability of success one would need to act would be less given the potential existential nature of the problem.
It is not my point to argue that the Iran was meets the criteria of a just war as this depends on the specifics of how close they really were to a nuclear weapon, if other measures as have been done for decades were sufficient and in the US case the need to go to Congress and all the rest of it..
I am mainly interested in the interaction of whether or not it is correct that the probability of success one would need to have moral certainty is proportional to the gravity of the evil; It would seem the answer is yes. ( as it is explicitly proportional in terms of what level of attendant evil one will tolerate. )
I have followed these articles of Dr. Feser on Just War Doctrine for a time now and also read some of the comments. Obviously I may have missed something or perhaps not grasped the subject sufficiently. But it seems to me that in order to define what a just war is, one first has to define what war is, since just war is a subcategory of war. Now, what is the definition of war according to Dr. Feser?
ReplyDeleteThis question in my mind has a connection with the Iran war and the (lack of) justification for it. For as I naively try to understand it, I think this war really started in 1979 by Iran, not by Pr. Trump a couple of months ago. Iran declared the US and I
After having read these articles on Just War Doctrine and some of the comments, I am left with a basic question: What is the definition of war according to Dr. Feser. He has tried to define what a just war is, but this definition presupposes a definition of war and I have not found this definition in his expositions.
ReplyDeleteThis question to my mind is linked with a question about the Iran war, which was the starting point of this series of articles. To my mind the Iran war began in 1979, when Iran designated the US and Israel as big satan and little satan respectively. This language equals a declaration of war and the actions of Iran, by itself or by its proxies, confirmed this. From this I tend to think that Pr. Trump didn't start this war at all but merely intensified an already long time existing war. Does this change anything with respect to this Just War Doctrine?
Good question: It's a wide-spread problem, defining "war" clearly enough to say "when did X war start".
DeletePart of the problem is that there are all sorts of activities before war (or, depending on your view, "maybe" or "probably" before the war) that lead up to it and are contributory causes of the war: embargoes, tariffs, boycotts, psy-ops, propaganda campaigns, sailing your naval fleet nearby (and similar with air force). And there are all sorts of "use of force" activities that could be war if they are wide-spread enough, but (typically) are not called "war" when sufficiently localized: police actions, sabotage, cyber attacks, training insurgents, closing a harbor with mines, cross-border skirmishes. And then there's the even more difficult arena of (a) general buildup of military power, vs (b) specific, localized army preparations targeted toward designated goals against the opposing state.
It seems generally true that the definitions of "war" include the massed use of force as a necessary element. Because, broadly speaking, there can be a relative continuum of amounts / degrees / kinds of force used, it is naturally hard to state a principle that separates out "war" from lower-level conflicts that happen to have some use of force. Furthermore, while it is piously wished that "whoever started using force first" is the one who "started the war", that is often an unhelpful standard, given both the pre-war minor acts of force, and the possibility of a targeted, specific buildup of forces meant for an invasion after a series of smaller incursions: if after such a series of minor skirmishes, country A being is targeted by built-up forces of Country B who intends to use them in a major attack, often A is said to have a right of pre-emptive strike - on the basis of both factors being present: "we have been attacked over and over again in minor actions, and now they have prepared their army intending to invade us". In such a situation, A might get the first MAJOR strike in, but B is the aggressor and (at least arguably) "started the war".
But when you have violence going on for decades (or centuries), with lulls in between, where the lulls do not represent peace but simply biding your time, stalemates, etc, it is darn near impossible to state when "the war" began in any definitive sense. The "Hundred Years War" had major periods of not-fighting, but it's ow referred to a one war: it is arguably 3 or 4 different wars in succession - depending on how you define things. But in the case of a years-long cessation of active, hot warfare, there is (usually) some new cause that kicks off the renewed hot war, not just the nations catching enough breath to return to the ring. Which suggests that the new cause of war means it's a new war.
Pope Leo said God does not bless war. But in 1588 Pope Sixtus V blessed the Spanish Armada and hoped that Catholicism could be restored in England. Has Pope Leo forgot his history?
ReplyDelete@Anonymous re Armada: "war" is not identical with "Spanish Armada." If the Pope blessed the Spanish Armada, it does not follow that by that blessing Sixtus was blessing "war."
Delete"war" is not identical with "Spanish Armada."
DeleteTrue. But he didn't bless the Armada in a vacuum, he specifically endorsed Philip's Enterprise of England, to overthrow Elizabeth and return England to Catholic practice, referring to it as a crusade.
This doesn't mean that Sixtus was right (prudent) in doing so. But it shows that popes have thought war could be just, and that rulers like Philip could wage war with God's blessing. There's also the examples of popes who, as the prince of the Papal States, went to war.
Yes. Pope Julius led troops into battle.
DeleteOf course Sixtus was blessing war. The Spanish Armada went to battle and lost.
DeleteEver heard of "Deus Cult"?
DeleteI mean, ever heard of "Deus Vult"?
DeleteAlternative hypothesis: The Church has changed its opinion on war, in light of modern technology and the fact that the Papacy blessing war in the past has manifestly led to some pretty horrific results.
DeleteEven more alternative hypothesis: Any religion that changes it's doctrines it's either false or a new, different religion.
DeleteReally now? So the Church believes the same things now that she always did about slavery? About religious freedom? About democracy? About usury? None of that has ever changed at all in 2000 years?
DeleteI have a question, and I'm completely ignorant on this topic so I am happy to be set straight:
ReplyDeleteIs this certainty debate in just war theory related to the proportionalism debate in Catholic moral theology around the same time?
How did different thinkers in the proportionalism debate weigh in on the just war theory topic?
This is probably the topic for a dissertation not a blog comment, I realize
It seems fine to say that we (or rather, the person in authority) must have “moral certainty” of having just cause to decide on war with rectitude. It is plausible also that some theologians might also argue that the “moral certainty” required applies not only to the criterion of just cause, but to the whole apparatus of the decision, to be made with rectitude (as Prof Feser argues here about Rommel). It is a step further to argue that most theologians have taught the same point, that it is indeed the “common” teaching. Prof. Feser argues that the position is widely held, though it is not clear that he represents it as “the common teaching” of theologians, which is a step above. I presume that he thinks it true or at least that there’s plausible evidence that it is the common teaching. Fine, for this let’s assume he’s right.
ReplyDeleteWhat is less clear is that this would have any bearing at all on the problem I have (and suggested earlier): it does not appear that “moral certainty” could mean the same thing in regards to (a) having a just cause for war; (b) right intention; (c) having reasonable hope of success for it; (d) having suitability of proportionality of goods anticipated and evils resulting; and also (e) the whole aggregate complex of all requirements taken together. It seems to me that since they bear on a rectified choice in different ways, their being “right” would be so also in different ways, like the 4 causes denote different modes of causality, not just 4 separate causes.
Being perplexed by a meaning of “moral certainty” that would make sense of the claim, I looked up how theologians describe the term. Not for the first time. It left me just as confused, also not for the first time. For example, I came across this:
Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it. Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such. (It is from the same McHugh & Callan book.)
Perhaps you are not as moved to confusion as I, so let me note: using “impossible” and then clarifying it by “so unlikely” is worrisome. Using “that it would be imprudent to be moved by it” seems circular: if I already knew where prudence lay, I wouldn’t be ASKING if there was sufficient certainty. The first sentence of the Examples sets a bar that sounds a LOT LOWER than what most people who argue “you have to be morally certain” seem to be arguing. The next, though plausible as rough, inexact phrasing (“has overlooked no means”), if taken literally, would be actually impossible as there is no limit of additional means, and it is clear the authors must have meant “has overlooked no reasonable means”) and thus again reduces the criterion to “reasonable” or, in effect, prudence. The last sentence excuses the lacks in fallible evidence by claiming necessity, as that is what practical life requires, which again sets the bar quite low, AND may set the stage for sloppy, lazy, or confused people to judge based on very limited evidence, claiming “practical” necessity.
Here is their further breakdown of it:
From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based, certitude is of two kinds.
(a) Demonstrative certitude is the assent that rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true premises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Mass on Sunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law applies to him. (b) Probable certitude, which is the assent that rests on a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true, and against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot be readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is seriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the possibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the fact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he may hold himself excused from attendance at Mass…
ReplyDelete650. Probable certitude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral matters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a demonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a decision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious probability. What is called “probable certitude” here is very different from probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662 sqq.) .
Probable certitude…whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true…Caius is pretty sure that he is seriously ill.
677(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at times with less.
682(c) Probabilism [the theory the authors prefer, on the authority of St. Alphonsus], whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is certainly and solidly probable”;…
705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions are present:
(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure writer, it is only slightly probable.
(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St. Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses (e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.
(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly, if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side, the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth. Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions.
706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.
The authors seem to argue that a person could claim moral certainty (through probable certitude) of each of the criteria for just war, each standing in its own sphere and subject to its own proper mode of probable reasoning, if he can “satisfactorily answer” all the arguments on the other side. “Satisfactorily”…is a tough nut to crack, for us armchair viewers, to say that we know he cannot meet this standard. Not without access to the information and experts he has access to.
The authors above insist that moral certainty is required for every moral action: "it is necessary to act with a certain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience.". Thus the general, principled meaning of "moral certainty" is a level of assurance that they apply generically to ALL moral action, not just a narrow band of the most crucial choices.
DeleteWhen they apply it to more crucial choices (including war, but it would apply to many other things as well), they propose a firmer application of certainty, whose increased firmness comes entirely from the gravity of the subject matter and its dangers, is entirely a matter of degree just as choice and risk in general arrive before us, and are entirely answered by the ordinary meaning of prudence applied to its natural considerations of risk, gain, harm, need, information available, time available, and obligation: in general you take more care over actions that have graver impacts. In effect the authors demonstrate that the kinds of confidence required for different elements of the moral analysis vary as the circumstances vary. At the auto shop you sign a standard work order agreeing to pay for work to be done without reading anything but the bottom line, but in signing a college loan agreement you take more care and read much of it, in buying a house you take even more care, and in signing a treaty with another country you run that treaty's terms through the analysis of a whole department of specialists. These actions all require moral certainty in order to be morally good action, but this doesn't mean we have certainty of each element of the prudential analysis in the very same way, or to the very same degree.
"The reality is that many of the conditions that too many people commenting on the Iran war assume are distinct from the “just cause” condition are in fact treated by the just war tradition as part of that condition."
ReplyDeleteWouldn't it be more accurate to say that those conditions are indeed "distinct from," but not separate from, the just cause condition?
Not being pedantic here, btw.
Tony you put some effort into that. Unfortunately it won't make any difference.
DeleteSome people are arguing that the certainty of just cause (and/or of satisfying the full set of criteria) must meet or exceed the standard used in criminal trials: beyond a reasonable doubt.
ReplyDeleteI have a general question about this: is that standard one that is a direct part of the natural law, or is it properly one of human positive law?
As I understand it, the latter: this standard is instituted by human positive law, not the natural law. No doubt, it is a pretty good law, it protects many people from false convictions.
At the same time, it also protects criminals from valid convictions where the evidence is nearly, but not quite, beyond reasonable doubt. More importantly, though, it also protects criminals from convictions where some jurors misunderstand the meaning of "reasonable doubt" and instead require "beyond all doubt".
There is, most assuredly, some social damage that results from convictions not made when the defendant really was guilty and the evidence was right for conviction. There is also a lesser kind of social damage from criminals (actually) guilty who go free because the evidence was only close to sufficient "beyond reasonable doubt", but not quite. We have made a general judgment that all things considered, there is less social harm to many guilty people going free than for one innocent to suffer punishment. But: there is no way to prove definitively that this judgment is actually right. Moreover, however good the "reasonable doubt" standard is, it still lets through some false convictions, where an innocent person is punished anyway. There is no standard that is 100% proof against false positives, which means that society is prepared to tolerate some erroneous convictions.
Other countries use other standards, without clearly violating natural law precepts.
I'd be in the (small) camp of saying that is the wrong analogy.
DeleteA trial is an almost completely controlled environment, in which we can take as much time as needed (often years) to come to a conclusion about a single event. Then we often continue to litigate it for years more with appeals.
For many decisions of state, war included, a choice has to be made as to whether and how to act on the best available information at that time.
To continue the legal analogy, in some ways it is like a judge on a bench, but in others it is more like the policeman on the ground. The latter sometimes has to make split-second morally consequential decisions without the evidence and time for deliberation that would allow for "beyond a reasonable doubt" certainty. In some cases yes, but not in every case. But he still has to act.
When we evaluate these decisions later, we intentionally do so not by how they turned out, but by what an "objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality
of the circumstances know[n] to the officer at the time and without benefit of hindsight."
But we quite like casting stones from our comfy armchairs without knowing the "totality of circumstances" and with the "benefit of hindsight" and feeling quite sure we'd have made the right call. It's a hard habit to break.
I agree that the lengthy, drawn out process of a trial makes the analogy not ideal. In addition, the court's ability to subpoena witnesses and documents is unlike the war / no war decision-making. And the ability to "appeal to a higher authority" (at least until you hit the top court) is another way they are not alike.
DeleteOn the other hand, except in the dire straight where your country is now being directly attacked by major forces, governments do tend to have weeks and months to decide, which is unlike the policeman. If - as with Trump's February options - you can decide "we'll move 2 carrier groups, and attack in 2 weeks", you're not exactly in the situation of the cop on a beat, either. Something in between.
I mean, there's also the fact that "co-prosperity" was a euphemism for "Japanese imperial domination" and "living space" was a euphemism for "wipe out the Slavs and turn their lands into farms to feed Germany". It's not as if the means were the ONLY thing wrong with those countries' war aims. Similarly, none of the stated aims of the Iran war are anywhere near the real aims (as is typically the case in wars). It's pretty transparent that the impetus for this war was Israel's interests (a nation that I note Feser has studiously avoided mentioning at all, is if they weren't a major part of this whole thing. Oh well, I guess you can't take the Neocon out of the man).
ReplyDeleteI have been wondering about the recent state of affairs. Leaving aside whether the was started justly, is it now being executed justly.
ReplyDeleteOne of the criteria for entering into a war considers that things such as sanctions must be tried first. It seems that this is what is the current state of affairs. The US is not allowing Iran to ship any oil out of the Strait. The goal is to starve the Iranian economy with the threat of damaging their ability to continue to pump oil once there is no way to store any more. Won't this also affect the civilian population?
There is also another consideration: do pirates have the right to wage just wars?
ReplyDelete