Hylomorphism in brief
Longtime
readers of this blog or of my books will be familiar with the
Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of physical substances as composites of form
and matter, where (to a first approximation) matter is the stuff out of which such
a substance is made and form is what organizes that stuff in a way that allows
it to manifest its characteristic properties and powers. More precisely, it is substantial form that does so.
And the soul is a substantial form of the kind that gives a physical
substance the distinctive properties and powers of a living thing.
Matter, on
Aquinas’s account, is what makes it possible for there to be more than one instance
of any species of physical substance (using “species” here in the traditional
broad metaphysical sense, not the narrower biological sense). Different lumps of iron all have the same
basic nature, as do different oak trees and different poodles. But if they have the same nature, how can
they be different substances? The answer
is that there are different bits of matter which have all taken on the same
nature. Matter is in this way the “principle
of individuation” of physical substances.
When the
matter of a purely physical substance loses its substantial form, that
particular substance goes out of existence altogether. For example, when you chop down an oak tree
and burn it in the fireplace, that particular oak tree is gone. The matter out of which it is made persists,
but it has taken on an entirely different form, the form of ash. The substantial form of an oak tree is no
longer present in it (even though there are, of course, other oak trees, and they have such a substantial form).
Now, Aquinas
thinks of angels as substances that are purely intellectual in nature, and thus
(since he takes the intellect to be incorporeal) to be immaterial
substances. Because they are immaterial,
there is no way to individuate one member of an angelic species from
another. There can still be different
species of angel, but each will have exactly one member. Hence there are as many angelic species as
there are angels.
The human
intellect, like angelic intellects, is incorporeal. How, then, can there be more than one member
of the human species? The answer, for Aquinas,
is that while human beings are not purely corporeal substances (unlike iron,
oak trees, and poodles) neither are they purely
incorporeal substances (as angels are).
A human being is a unique sort of substance that has both corporeal
properties and powers (such as eating, walking, seeing, and hearing) and
incorporeal ones (thinking and willing).
Because
human beings are partly corporeal, they can be individuated from one another as
different members of the same species.
But because they are partly incorporeal, they do not go out of existence
altogether at death. They carry on as incomplete
substances after death, reduced to just their intellectual (and thus
incorporeal) operations. Because every
substance has a form, and human beings continue on as incomplete substances, a
human being’s form continues on after death.
And since the soul just is the substantial form of a human being, that means
that the soul carries on after death. It
no longer manifests the corporeal
powers that it would normally give human beings (since, absent the body, there’s
no matter for it to inform). But the incorporeal powers can still
manifest.
Vallicella’s objection
Bill begins
his criticism of this view by saying that Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism holds
that “substances of the same kind have the same substantial form.” In the case of human beings, he continues, “since
these substances of the human kind have the same form, it is not their form
that makes them numerically different… It is the matter of their respective bodies that makes
numerically different human beings numerically different.”
But in that
case, Bill argues, when the matter of some particular human being goes at
death, there is nothing left to individuate him. Hence there can be nothing of him, in particular, that carries
on. Bill writes:
After death a human person ceases to exist as the particular
person that he or she is. But that is to
say that the particular person, Socrates say, ceases to exist, full stop. What survives is at best a form which is
common to all persons. That form,
however, cannot be you or me. Thus the
particularity, individuality, haecceity, ipseity of persons, which is essential
to persons, is lost at death and does not survive post mortem.
Bill appears
to think that if the Aristotelian-Thomistic view were applied consistently, it
would have to say of human beings what it says of iron, oak trees, and
poodles. Just as the particular
individual oak tree that you burn in the fireplace is altogether gone (even
though there are other oak trees that carry on), so too, after death, is the
particular individual human being altogether gone (even though there are other
human beings who carry on).
But there
are two problems with Bill’s argument.
The first is that it rests on a mistaken conception of substantial
form. The second is that it neglects the
crucial difference the Thomist says exists between human beings and every other
corporeal substance, which is that human beings have incorporeal intellectual
powers.
Let’s
consider these points in order. When
Bill says that, for hylomorphism, “substances of the same kind have the same
substantial form,” he speaks ambiguously.
That could mean that, while each individual physical substance has its
own substantial form, with physical substances of the same species their
substantial forms are of the same kind.
That would be a correct characterization of the Aristotelian-Thomistic
position, but unfortunately it does not seem to be what Bill means. He seems to mean instead that there is one
substantial form shared by all human beings in common – not one kind of substantial form, but one substantial form.
But that is
not what Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism says, and it is not true. There are, it seems to me, two ways to read
Bill’s claim. On one reading, the
substantial form of human beings is a kind of Platonic Form, and different
human bodies are all human because they participate in that same one Form. The problem with this is that it isn’t an Aristotelian conception of form at all,
but a Platonic conception. A substantial
form, for the Aristotelian, isn’t an abstract Platonic object in which a thing
participates. Rather, it is a concrete
principle intrinsic to a substance that grounds its characteristic properties
and powers.
The other
way to read Bill’s characterization of hylomorphism is as holding that human
beings share one substantial form in the sense that they are all part of one
big substance – humanity considered as something like a single organism, with
different individual human beings as analogous to body parts that that organism
gains or loses as people are conceived or die.
But this is obviously not Aristotle’s or Aquinas’s view. They take human beings to be substances, not parts of a substance. And as
substances, each must have his own substantial form.
I think it’s
the first of these interpretations (what I’m characterizing as the Platonic
one), rather than the second, that Bill has in mind. But, again, it is a mistaken
interpretation. It just isn’t the case
that you, me, and Socrates all share the same one substantial form in the sense
Bill’s argument requires. Rather, you
have your own substantial form (and thus soul), I have mine, and Socrates has
his.
The same
thing is true of an oak tree. This oak
tree has its own individual substantial form, that oak tree has its own individual
substantial form, and so on. The reason
none of them continue after death is that everything an oak tree has or does –
and thus every property or power its substantial form gives it – depends on
matter. Hence when the matter goes,
there’s nothing left for the form to inform, nothing left for it to be the form
of.
This brings
us to the second crucial point, which is that a human being, unlike an oak
tree, has properties and powers that do not
depend on matter – namely, the intellectual properties and powers. Hence, a human being is not an entirely
corporeal substance, but a partly incorporeal one. This incorporeal part carries on after the
body dies, so that there is in this
case (unlike the case of the oak tree) something for the form to continue to be
the form of.
And that is
the sense in which the soul carries on beyond the death of the body. Yes, the soul is the form of the body,
because it is the form of a substance that it partially bodily in nature.
But unlike an oak or a poodle, a human being is not entirely bodily in nature, so that there is (as it were) still work
for the human soul to do even after the body is gone.
Why does
this not make the human soul after death like an angel, the unique member of
its own distinct species? The answer is
that the soul was once conjoined to its body and always retains its orientation
to that particular body. An angel
without a body is no less an angel for that.
It is complete in its incorporeal
mode of existence. By contrast, a human
being without a body (that is to say, a disembodied soul) is less of a human
being insofar as it is an incomplete
human being. Incorporeality is normal
for an angel, but not for a human being.
This orientation toward matter, which persists even in the absence of
matter, suffices to individuate human souls.
Of course, Bill
may raise further objections, to some or all of what I’ve said here. The point, though, is to indicate why I think
the particular objection he raises in his post fails. (Longtime readers might remember that this
issue is in fact a matter of longstanding dispute between Bill and me. I’ve linked to some earlier posts on the
subject below.)
I want to
add in closing that I have been reading Bill’s recent book Life’s Path with pleasure and profit, and advise you to do the
same. Bill is among the rare
contemporary philosophers who live up to the traditional ideal of producing both
solid technical academic philosophical work (as in his superb earlier book A Paradigm
Theory of Existence) and insightful moral, political, and other practical
reflections accessible to a more popular audience (as in the more recent
book). Read and learn.
Related
posts:
Vallicella
on hylemorphic dualism
I'm probably misunderstanding. But it seems to me that this passage....
ReplyDelete"The same thing is true of an oak tree. This oak tree has its own individual substantial form, that oak tree has its own individual substantial form, and so on. The reason none of them continue after death is that everything an oak tree has or does – and thus every property or power its substantial form gives it – depends on matter. Hence when the matter goes, there’s nothing left for the form to inform, nothing left for it to be the form of."
kind of obviates the need for matter as a principle of individuation. If each oak tree has its own (distinct) substantial form, then in fact, it did not need matter to individuate it. Each oak tree is its own species, like each angel.
No? What am I missing?
The Oak tree's individual, material form is what gets destroyed. It is a purely material construct that gets materially destroyed. Whether it is distinct does not change that. While it exists as a material thing, that matter is all that individuates it: but not as another species. It still has Oak DNA material, like any other oak. Humans and Angels cannot be materially destroyed. A human soul that was a black male when it had a body will still have the mind and identity of that particular black male forever. When he rises again at Judgement Day, he gets the same kind of black male body he had before because that's his unique physical form.
DeleteI could be wrong, but I think Prof. Feser means something like this: “Each oak tree instantiates the same substantial form, but that form exists in numerically distinct instances only because of matter.” That is, there’s the form as a kind (shared by all oak trees), and the form as it exists in *this* individual by informing *this* matter.
DeleteSo when he says “this oak tree has its own individual substantial form,” he’s referring to the form as instantiated in a particular parcel of matter—not a different kind of form, but a distinct occurrence of the same form. On this reading, matter is not bypassed but precisely what individuates.
Thank you, Wesley. But in that case, I don't see how he successfully rebuts Vallicella's argument.
DeleteSMack, how so?
Delete"Orientation toward matter” is an intentional or relational property, not an individuating property in the Thomistic sense (which depends on actual matter). Saying that a relation to potential matter individuates an immaterial form is to derive individuation from a non-existent correlate. This is analogous to saying:
ReplyDelete“All numbered tickets are individuated by the people who hold them.”
“Even when no one holds the ticket, its orientation toward holders individuates it.”
That doesn’t follow logically. It assumes what it needs to prove: that individuation can be preserved by a mere relational potential.
It's more like,
Delete"Everybody signs their ticket. Everyone has a name whether they hold a ticket or not. Tickets are only meant for people who can sign them. Animals need not apply. (sorry animals)."
Re: Thomas Kelly's comment,
DeleteProf. Feser can correct me if I’m wrong, but I take “orientation” here to be teleological—not a merely relational property, but an intrinsic directedness toward informing a particular body. That ordering persists even when the body is absent, because the soul remains the form of this human being, not just an instance of human nature.
If one allows Natural Kinds e.g. Oak, Humanity, as distinct from Properties I find it puzzling that Matter should be the individuating principle. The trope/instance of the natural kind “Man” in Plato and Aristotle is not the same—just as the redness of one rose is not the same as that of another—rather they are instances of the same universal “Man.” This if I recall correctly was close to E.J. Lowe’s view.
ReplyDeleteThis does not hinder the subsistence part of course since the kind instance “Man” is partly immaterial it will partly survive bodily destruction—but being the instance of a universal rather than the universal itself we will not end up with Averröes’ Monopsychism.
(Prime Matter relative to Form might still be needed for other good reasons e.g. explaining substantial change)
Ed I've raised a similar objection to the Thomistic account but with a different diagnoses of the underlying issue (see here: https://open.substack.com/pub/mashshai/p/a-problem-for-thomistic-psychology?r=4on5dv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false)
ReplyDeleteAlso, another, related objection here: https://open.substack.com/pub/mashshai/p/the-metaphysics-of-the-rational-soul?r=4on5dv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false
both from an Avicennian point of view.
@Sinawi,
DeleteYou raised interesting questions, but Ed is very, very busy to take on such large topics, especially when he already wrote two books on that matter (i.e. Scholastic Metaphysics, and, the new gem, albeit indirectly adressing those topics, Immortal Souls).
If its alright, I think I can give a glimpse of what he would say regarding "A problem for Thomistic Psychology" (https://mashshai.substack.com/p/a-problem-for-thomistic-psychology?triedRedirect=true), but take what I'm saying here as a grain of salt, since I'm not qualified or intelligent as Ed to make a robust defense of these matters.
So, in the post you said, "A body, the author agrees, is a composite of (substantial) form and prime matter. Now, consider the s. form itself. What sort of relation does it have to the prime matter? Specifically, does it inhere in the prime matter? If so, then s. form, by their criteria, is not a substance but rather an attribute i.e., of prime matter, where the prime matter serves as the ‘subject’ of said attribute."
I think that most of the problems you raised could be disarmed if we rectify what was said here. I mean, the problem is that this is not the Aristotelian-Thomistic (AT, for now on) view. Substantial Form does not inhere in Prime Matter, since Prime Matter is not a subject in this sense. We would be in trouble if Prime Matter was indeed the subject of Substantial Form, since, as you aptly said, Substantial Form would be an attribute (or quality) of Prime Matter.
Now, the correct view is that, even though we may say comonly that the Substance is a composite of Substantial Form and Prime Matter, the reality is that this analysis is holistic i.e. the Substance is not reducible to Substantial Form and Prime Matter, but it is a UNITY of these both principles (and these principles are only intelligible when we see the Substance as a whole). So, it is not correct to attribute to AT metaphysics the views you raised.
Prime Matter does not have any kind of actuallity on its own -- it only begins to exist IN ACT when it is united with Substantial Form. So, the analysis is not that Prime Matter is a subject of Substantial Form. Its a mistake to think that Prime Matter already exists in Act, as it is something 'just already there' to receive Substantial Form as a kind of accidentality.
Really hope that helps!
May God bless you!
@Vini, thanks for the response! You said:
Delete"Now, the correct view is that, even though we may say comonly that the Substance is a composite of Substantial Form and Prime Matter, the reality is that this analysis is holistic i.e. the Substance is not reducible to Substantial Form and Prime Matter, but it is a UNITY of these both principles (and these principles are only intelligible when we see the Substance as a whole)."
this doesn't address the question though, which was: what sort of relation does s. form have to the p. matter? is it one of inherence? if yes, there's a problem (as you see). if no, then, given that (as Ed says in the book) "Substances, in general, just are the sorts of things which exist in themselves rather than inhering in anything else", s. form would be a substance.
Sinawi,
DeleteThe substantial form has a couple different relations to prime matter:
(1) making prime matter determinate, and
(2) being (or having been) individuated and delimited by prime matter
The error here is in treating principles of a substance (form/matter) as if they themselves are either substances or accidents. But the form/matter distinction is more fundamental (and hence general) than the substance/accident distinction, meaning what is true of substances and accidents might not be true of form and matter.
So while we would say substances exist in themselves and accidents exist in another, we wouldn't say that substantial forms either exist in themselves or in another, precisely because substantial forms are neither proper substances nor accidents. They are more fundamental. Thus the dilemma you are setting up is a false one.
@Sinawi
DeleteHi again!
Oh, I see where you're getting at.
When Ed says, "Substances, in general, just are the sorts of things which exist in themselves rather than inhering in anything else," he is contrasting Substances with Accidents (qualities). He is not simply pointing out the general mode of existence of Substances; he is contrasting it strictly with Accidents (which inhere in a Substance, that's why he says in the end that they "exist in themselves rather than inhering in anything else").
And now, to the important part. Substantial Form cannot be a Substance in any sense, since a principle of Substances (heuristically, you can think that Substantial Form is "said of" a Substance, since it only exists "in" that Substance, instead of a third realm of Platonica). As I said in the earlier reply, Substantial Form unites with Prime Matter to constitute a Substance, but these metaphysical parts (Substantial Form and Prime Matter) are only intelligible and could only exist because they are "said of" Substances. It is through Substances that we know that they must be real components of reality, and it's also through Substances that we know they don't have any reality apart from that Substance (as opposed to what a Platonist would say).
And, we must be careful, because if we think by just analyzing crudely what Ed said in the quote "Substances, in general, just are the sorts of things which exist in themselves rather than inhering in anything else," isolated from the rest of the framework he's working with, the trouble arises -- this problem only arises if we misrepresents what he is actually saying. To put it differently -- and kinda rhetorically --, what guarantees us that Substantial Forms exist in themselves when they are, in fact, only knowable through actual Substances? Substantial Form is an inner organizing principle of a Substance, not something that could exist apart from it, so it could never fill the criteria of something that exists in itself.
I hope that this is clearer now.
ccmnxc, thanks for the response. you said:
Delete"The error here is in treating principles of a substance (form/matter) as if they themselves are either substances or accidents. But the form/matter distinction is more fundamental"
i don't think i'm treating s. form as if it were a substance. rather, i'm inferring that it is a substance based on a line of reasoning.
"...we wouldn't say that substantial forms either exist in themselves or in another, precisely because substantial forms are neither proper substances nor accidents. They are more fundamental."
but why should that distinction/question be inapplicable to/asked of s. forms themselves? to say "because substantial forms are neither proper substances nor accidents" is just question-begging, since that distinction is precisely the means to determine whether something is a substance or not in the first place (depending on how it is answered).
Perhaps we can get more clarity by recalling that substantial form and matter are different kinds of principles of "the thing". Accidental attributes can "inhere in" a substance, but NEITHER matter nor substantial form "inhere in" the substance: they ARE the thing, insofar as they are intrinsic principles of the substance, but in distinct ways. The substantial form isn't "in" the substance the way the matter is in it, and still less the way accident is. Analogically, it would be like objecting to the skin of the apple being "the apple" (as to an aspect of it) merely because it is not "inside" the apple. It is not on the inside precisely because it establishes the outermost spatial aspect of the apple. Substantial form isn't the sort of thing to "inhere in" matter, it's job is to inform matter, and it does so not by being spatially present to the matter but by being formative of the matter. (Sort of like (but not the SAME as) the distinction between extensive and intensive attributes: an action can be "more just" than some other, but does not do so by being larger.) The substantial form cannot be "in" the matter the way accidents can be, nor "of" the matter the way a portion of the matter is materially part of the whole matter. The whole point of form being a different kind of principle is that it operates in a different way as a principle.
DeleteBut it is obvious from that description that the substantial form of a natural being (i.e. one whose definition includes matter) cannot be the sort of thing that can be really existing without ever being the form of some matter. If the kind is "animal", the substantial form, is by definition, formative of some matter. It's not question begging to point to its defining concepts. It cannot begin to exist without beginning AS the form of some matter.
Feser's (and Aristotle's) point is that with a substantial form that includes a spiritual aspect, the fact that it cannot begin to be real as the ontological substantial form of a individual human person but by being the form of some individuating matter, does not lead to the conclusion that it cannot continue after death as the substantial form of that individual person: the matter was NECESSARY TO BEGIN the individuality of the person, but is not necessary for its continuation. The form, once ontologically real as the form of a person, is an ontologically real spiritual form that exceeds the bounds of matter by reason of its intellectual powers. Thus, once the whole being exists, the matter is necessary for the the being's completeness, but not for every aspect of it.
"the matter was NECESSARY TO BEGIN the individuality of the person"
DeleteI think this is Feser's doctrine (and of course not just his). But it's not clear to me what kind of necessity this is, or whether it is really defensible as a properly Christian doctrine, or what qualifications/amplifications would be necessary to make it a properly Christian doctrine.
Likewise: "the matter is necessary for the being's completeness": what does 'completeness' mean here? Completeness in what respect? It's just trivial and circular to say "it's incomplete w.r.t. matter, since it exists immaterially." You can say it's incomplete w.r.t. its operations that are materially dependent, but if those operations are themselves essentially 'incomplete' -- in the sense that everything material is 'incomplete' (contains a ('material') principle of potency (non-act) as potency), and in the (related, analogous) sense that ratiocination is incomplete in relation to intellection/comprehension -- then it is odd to say that a comprehensor is 'incomplete,' just because he is no longer (in need of) thinking things through, and just because his (actual) act is no longer characterized by (that particular, 'material') potency.
Matter cannot be a principle of individuation, because it's already matter, an individual thing. Or am I missing something?
ReplyDeleteYou are missing that matter, as Aristotelian-Thomists conceive of it, is definitely *not* an individual thing.
Delete@Richard,
DeleteYou said, "Matter cannot be a principle of individuation, because it's already matter, an individual thing. Or am I missing something?"
Thats not the Aristotelian-Thomistic (AT, for now on) view on the 'matter' (no pun inteded). Matter is not "an individual thing" that exists by itself or already exists by itself, its an internal principle of something -- and it only exists when united with Form.
Let's begin by the basics. For AT, a Substance (me, you, a tree), is composed by Substantial Form (the inner principle that make something be what it is) and Prime Matter (the pure pontecy to become something or take on Form). Prime Matter does not exist by itself, as if it is something 'already there' waiting for it to be united with another thing that is already there -- it only exists ACTUALLY because it is united with a Substantial Form that gives it the full reality, an ACTUAL reality, instead of the mere POTENTIAL reality that it exists.
So, Matter is a principle of individuation because it is Matter of this something rather than that other something. It is the Matter (which is informed by this Substantial Form) that gives it the actual reality I'm talking about. So, since this Matter is what is being informed by this Substantial Form, it is what is responsible for individuating such thing.
The key here is to understand the Act/Potency distinction in AT metaphysics. The error of thinking that Matter is something 'already there', is to treat it as a kind of Act or Actuallity, when it is, in fact, mere a Potentiallity to take on Form (which is a kind of Act).
Oh, and btw, I recommend you to read Ed's Scholastic Metaphysics. Its an incredible book, and it will explain everything I am talking about here, but 100x better. To be precise, Chapter 1, and, 3 is where Ed addresses these topics (i.e. Chapter 1 he explain the distinction of Act and Potency, and on Chapter 3 he explains how these principles apply to Form and Matter as a composite that makes the Substances that we see everyday).
Hope that helps!
(Off-topic: your profile picture is adorable! You have such a nice baby! I hope someday to make one little angel like that too!)
I would simply argue that AT metaphysics is inconsistent in regards to Prime Matter, then, I think. If Prime Matter is purely potential, then that is what Prime Matter actually IS. The pure potentially of Prime Matter isn't argued to actually be a quality assigned to some other thing besides Prime Matter. So Prime Matter has to actually be pure potential. But if Prime Matter is purely potential, then there must be something actual about Prime Matter to be designated as such. So Prime Matter is not purely potential.
DeleteI have two of those angels, now. That profile picture was my first daughter, Alessa. She's now sixteen. My second daughter is Liliana, and she is now eight. It's been a delight and a trial so far being a father, and I highly recommend it.
Richard: Your argument seems parallel to the old chestnut that if God is omnipotent, then he must be able to do anything; but he can't be impotent, so there's something he can't do and he must not be omnipotent.
DeleteAnyway, yes, prime matter is the (always actual) principle of (material) potency as such in a material thing, which as such is in (at least remote) potency to taking on/received/being actualized by all possible material forms. It is not a principle of wholly undifferentiated 'omni'-potency, as if it was in potency to being something other than just what it is.
Dear Dr.Feser, I’d like to know what you think regarding the phenomenon of terminal lucidity because I think that, but its nature, is a strong evidence against materialism and riductionism, and a strong evidence pointing at the existence of a soul, because in many of those cases the brain of these people was so heavily damaged that they could have not retrieved their personalities and their memories IF consciousness was a mere result of physical and material processes. I’d really like to know your position on this subject. Greetings from Italy
ReplyDeleteMassimiliano
Buongiormo,
DeleteThe professor doesn't reply as often as he used to. But since you are from Italy, he may make an exception. Ciao.
@10:59 AM
DeleteThe thing is that I believe that the cases of terminal lucidity are a very strong indicator, even for people who are currently non firmly believers but at the very least open to the supernatural and God, that our personality and consciousness is not a result of of matter, which means that there would be no reason to think that our consciousness dies with the body.
They are very overlooked in my opinion.
Massimiliano
I would pile this phenomenon in with the phenomena of Near Death Experiences (NDEs), in which a person has clearly functional thinking even though in a state of apparent physical limitation, like a coma. Many NDEs don't have provable aspects by which a scientist could verify that (a) the mental experiences were verifiably valid, and (b) that the physical norms for such conscious activity were definitively not available, but SOME of them do. E.G. sometimes the person learns facts that they could not have learned before the coma they are in (e.g. they hear a conversation outside the room, down the hall, between a doctor and a parent).
DeleteAssimilated with these would be the rare but real cases of clear ACTUAL death, where the person then comes back to life. I don't mean the cases of a person whose heart stops for a minute or two but they are doing CPR on them and then the patient recovers. I am referring to cases where the heart has stopped for 10 or 15 minutes, they stopped CPR, and THEN 15 minutes later the patient come back to life. (I have heard of one case where the person drowned and was lifeless and cold for 4 hours and then revived - without any mental deficit from the brain's lack of oxygen: they were dead).
It is my understanding that NDEs are termed that way because it is (generally) ambiguous whether real and true death has occurred, and even if the person's mental experience indicates they "went" somewhere like a visit to heaven, it remains impossible to verify that this experience definitively represents they were truly dead, with a full dissolution of the body / soul composite. The latter examples, (e.g. dead 4 hours) are not the same as typical NDEs because it is not ambiguous as to whether death had occurred, it's quite apparent.
Can anyone point me to William Vallicella's blog? I think the link on the right hand side of this page is old and no longer working.
ReplyDeleteHi Kyle, here's Bill's new blog address (which is different from the Substack referred to in the post above): https://maverickphilosopher.blog/
DeleteI have a question about matter being the principle of individuation: if form explains what a thing has in common with other things sharing the same nature, then for matter to distinguish a thing from other members of the same species, doesn’t there already have to be some distinguishing features in the underlying matter? But this seems to imply that there are forms already present in the underlying matter. What otherwise could account for these distinguishing features in the underlying matter?
ReplyDeleteHi Ian, if I am correct, in AT when you read "matter," you should think of "prime matter," meaning pure potentiality and therefore something absolutely indistinct. Therefore, matter itself does not exist, or rather, it is not in act unless there is a form that distinguishes it.
DeleteIan,
DeleteMight be better to say that matter as such has a distinguishing function rather than a distinguishing feature. This is to say, matter plays such-and-such a role with respect to form in a given substance.
Part of the issue at play here is that there really never is an instance of formless matter, and so to that extent your intuition is correct. It is what we call "designate matter," in particular, which does the individuating, and designate matter is always bound by location. To that extent, then, there is already some formal feature of the matter which does the individuating.
But this is where we get back to functions or roles. What individuates an accidental form? The substance in which it inheres. What individuates a substantial form? Prime matter, but prime matter which is specified according to some location (and hence 'designate matter'). The substance is in potency to the accidental forms, and the matter is in potency to the substantial form. In both cases, the role these things play is of individuator, even though substance and matter are not the same thing. Rather, they perform the same function or role with respect to different things.
Happy to elaborate further if that would be helpful.
@Ian, hi again!
DeleteYou said, "[...] if form explains what a thing has in common with other things sharing the same nature, then for matter to distinguish a thing from other members of the same species, doesn’t there already have to be some distinguishing features in the underlying matter? But this seems to imply that there are forms already present in the underlying matter [...]"
But that misses the point and also conflates the fundamental difference between those two (i.e., Form and Matter).
First, we need to be clear of a very important distinction: Matter (as opposed to Prime Matter) is the kind of stuff that is already informed by a Form -- it already has a kind of ACTUAL reality that is united with a Form.
Now, what underlies change, like when one individual Substance (e.g., a tree) goes out of existence (e.g., goes to the wood chipper and then to the fireplace), is Prime Matter -- which is the principle of reality that has the capacity and the potential reality to take any Form. In the case of the tree, the Form of that Substance is gone, and also the Matter of that said tree, but the Prime Matter has taken on various forms (e.g., burnt powder and ashes).
So, when you said, "But this seems to imply that there are forms already present in the underlying matter," you are not thinking of Prime Matter; you are thinking of Matter (which, as I said, already has a Form informing it). So, there is no incoherence right here, just a misunderstanding of what these principles mean. Again, Matter is something that already has a Form, which is why it can individuate this individual from that other one (that's why you think there is some Form already informing it, because it really has!).
Hope that makes it crystal-clear!
Hi, Theophilius,
DeleteBut if matter is something absolutely indistinct (and that's also my understanding of prime matter) and requires form to distinguish it, then how can it act as the principle of individuation?
Hi, ccmnxc,
DeleteYou write that prime matter specified according to some location individuates substantial form, but doesn't location (i.e., space) already presuppose the existence of material substances? In which case, how would location act as an independent determinant of individuation?
Vini Tadeo,
You write:
Again, Matter is something that already has a Form, which is why it can individuate this individual from that other one...
But then it sounds as though form is what is doing the individuating, since the form that this particular bit of matter is united to is what distinguishes it from that particular bit of matter.
Hi Ian,
DeleteMy understanding of prime matter is that, being pure potential, it cannot act. Therefore, it is a principle of individuation if, and only if, a form actualizes the potentiality of individuation of prime matter. In other words: individuation without form means potentiality, that is, something that can receive an act, a form. Like a valley without mountains :)
@Ian
DeleteYou said, "But then it sounds as though form is what is doing the individuating, since the form that this particular bit of matter is united to is what distinguishes it from that particular bit of matter."
But now you are conflating individuation with identity. You can identify this Matter as different from that one because the Form gives it identity, but now the question is: what differentiates this Form from that other? And the answer is that Matter does this job by means of individuating it.
You are basically conflating Form as a principle of identity with matter, which is the principle of individuation.
Ian,
DeleteYou're exactly correct. But prime matter in general already presupposes the existence of material substances, so I don't think this would be a new problem over and above what was already there.
There are two related questions here:
1. How do we account for the existence of substances?
2. How is it that these universal forms can be individuated?
Obviously, presupposing the existence of substances is unhelpful in answering the first question given the circularity. I don't think this is the case for the second question, though. These universal forms are individuated because already existing substances are acted upon such that they cease to be one thing, and the designate matter from that corrupting being then is enformed by some other substantial form, thus confining it to a particular place.
Recall the role of matter: It is that which persists through change. This is true of both prime matter and designate matter. Even in accidental change, the substance acts as the "matter" for the accidental form.
So in this case, it is matter-qua-located which is individuating. Location isn't an independent individuator but rather intimately tied in with the already extant designate matter (which was part of the previously corrupted substance).
Thank you for your responses, Vini Tadeo and ccmncx.
Deleteccmncx, your latest regarding the role of location vis-a-vis designate matter is helpful.
Another question:
ReplyDeleteIt just isn’t the case that you, me, and Socrates all share the same one substantial form in the sense Bill’s argument requires. Rather, you have your own substantial form (and thus soul), I have mine, and Socrates has his.
How do the different substantial forms that Socrates has, and that you have, and that I have relate to the form of human being that I form a concept of when I abstract from the particulars of any individual human being? Doesn't the form that is in the individual have to be the same that I form a concept of for it genuinely to count as knowledge? But in that case, how can my substantial form differ from yours and Socrates?
Hi @Ian,
DeleteI think you are conflating how we know these things (epistemology) with their nature or what they are in extramental reality.
1 - In the mind, there is no difference between my, your, or Socrates' Substantial Form when you abstract the rest of the attributes and all. The Substantial Form, as I said in earlier comments, is an inner organizing principle of a Substance, and when we think about it, it is just like a Universal (philosophically speaking), since our concept of Substantial Form (e.g., in the case of the human being, we have a Substantial Form of Rational Animality) covers every member from the especies that has that specific Substantial Form when we 'peel of' the rest of the Accidents (qualities).
2 - In reality, my Substantial Form is united with my Matter, and your Substantial Form is united with your Matter -- that's how we are individuated.
So, even though in the mind we have the same Substantial Form, as a concept, in reality, my Substantial Form is numerically distinct from yours, and it is united with my Matter, which is also distinct from yours.
Hope that helps.
God bless!
Introduction: I am a Platonist.
ReplyDeleteFrom my perspective, the uniqueness of the person is entirely identified with the soul, which participates in the idea of human being. It follows that my personality is entirely whole even if it is no longer conjoined with the body (for now, let's leave aside the "how" this conjugation is conceived by the various types of Platonism). Can I say the same thing for the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception? Can I say, according to the latter, that incomplete being is nevertheless what identifies me as a person? I'm inclined to say no, because from my perspective, the person is unique and therefore, as such, is not composite and therefore cannot be something incomplete. Question to Ed: would it be acceptable to consider the human soul incomplete in the sense that in the absence of matter it cannot realize its essential power?
If it takes over 500 pages to "prove" the immortal existence of the human soul, something is wrong.
ReplyDeleteAs they say on Twitter, tell me you haven’t actually read the book without telling me you haven’t actually read the book.
DeleteThe book does not devote 500 pages to proving the soul’s immortality. Only the second to last chapter is devoted to that topic. Some of the preceding material sets the stage for that, but much of it does not and is instead devoted to other aspects of human nature (since, as the subtitle indicates, the book is about human nature more generally, not just immortality).
Then again, why the length of an argument would somehow cast doubt on its cogency, I have no idea.
But I realize your comment was not a serious one anyway, but just a bit of sophomoric snark.
@Anon:
DeleteWhat stupid nonsense!
Long books = "wrong". Lol!
IMO, Vallicella's objection seems to assume, does it not, that the immaterial intellect is equivalent to the per se Form of the human, and upon death, we return to that form?
ReplyDeleteThat doesn't seem correct to me - the immaterial intellect as an aspect of the Form, but the complete form requires the conjunction of the body and the intellect with all its powers from vegetation to intellection (vegetative, sensate and intellectual souls).
Can the intellect also not undergo individuation without matter, too? i.e Angels are not differentiated through matter, but angels can be distinguished by what they know, what their intellects have acquired, learned. Do our intellects not differentiate in the same way, so even post mortem, my intellect is still differentiated from your intellect based on what it knows immaterially?
I would say 'complete form' means 'actual form' and is the necessary correlate of 'actual being.' Thus it is not possible to have an 'actual being' which has a metaphysically/substantially 'incomplete form.' Any 'incomplete form' must refer to the 'incompleteness in some respect' of an 'actually' ('completely') existing substance.
Delete@David
DeleteI believe "incomplete form" can not exist.
In my understanding, every form in itself and precisely because it is a form is "susbstantial". Whether or not it is the form of a being differentiated in matter. Otherwise I would have to assume that the substantial form of the apple ceases to exist when the apple is eaten and consequently there should exist as many substantial forms as there are uneaten apples. That said, what essentially differentiates the forms in my opinion is whether or not they are rational forms.
Theophilius: It's clearly false, certainly from the standpoint of any remotely Aristotelian account, to say that every form is a substantial form, or that every form is 'complete' in every respect. And the concretely existing substantial form of an apple does cease to exist when it is eaten, otherwise it would not cease to be an apple.
Delete@David
DeleteIn fact, I maintain my Platonic stance, while assuming some Thomistic "inclinations." Now, from the AT point of view, what happens to the form of an apple when it is eaten? The AT says it ceases to exist, but if it ceases to exist, this means the substantial form of the apple is material. It follows that if the substantial form of an apple is material, then something non-material must exist in order to actualizes it, along with matter, as the substantial form of the apple. Something doesn't add up for me, assuming I've fully understood what form means in AT.
Theoph.: You claim "it follows that..." Okay, but I don't see how it does.
Delete@David
DeleteIf a substantial form cease to exist how can matter be actualised by the same form? If I eat an apple, causing the non existence of its substantial form, what susbstantial form could instantiate new apples? If that said is true, it follows that some non-material substantial form is necessary.
Substantial forms would be what instantiates new apples if and only if new apples were substantial forms. They are not. New apples are matter-form composites, instantiated in virtue of the efficient cause of new apples, namely apple trees.
Delete@Theophilus
DeleteIn A-T metaphysics, AS I understand it, the form of the apple doesn't go anywhere. You don't eat the form of the apple, rather your digestion separates the form of the apple from its matter, and that matter is now taken up into your form once it is processed as proteins and carbohydrates to fuel your metabolism.
The only place for a form sans matter to go, is into your intellect, or another's intellect. The difference between Platonism and A-T metaphysics is the former believes in a realm of Forms that descend into matter, the latter, Forms inhere in things but can exist immaterially in the intellect.
"Why does this not make the human soul after death like an angel, the unique member of its own distinct species? The answer is that the soul was once conjoined to its body and always retains its orientation to that particular body."
ReplyDeleteI would suggest a different answer: The human soul after death is indeed like an angel: an incorporeal spiritual substance. How it got to be what it is (the particular incorporeal substance that it is) is different from an angel, and its destiny in relation to its erstwhile body is obviously different; but what it actually is essentially is not. (For Aquinas the eternal destiny for each of the elect, resurrected or not, is indeed to be 'assimilated' within one of the nine choirs of angels.) Angels also have (ministering) 'orientations to particular bodies' in accordance with the role assigned to them by divine providence. And the soul's relation to its body in the resurrection will decidedly not be simply resumed as it was before the resurrection, subject to the body and immersed in its carnality, but will be indeed 'like to that of the angels,' to whom matter is subject in virtue of their spiritual powers.
This may be somewhat off-topic, but I think it is related, and it's been really bothering me for some reason. So I found some research that shows that stimulating some very specific parts of the brain causes an increase in mathematical errors in one-digit addition and multiplication. To be clear, I know that A-T states that physical processes, such as those in the brain, are necessary for normal human intellectual function - just that a physical process all by itself isn't sufficient for an intellectual operation. So I'm certainly not claiming that this is some disproof of A-T. But the issue seems to be that the stimulation caused errors in which people said the wrong answer. I was wondering whether it would have been expected that if the intellect was unable to find the correct answer due to the circumstances, there would be no response at all instead of saying an incorrect answer. I'm worried that this would seem to lead to mathematical skepticism because we can never be sure that our seemingly rational thoughts aren't being affected by something that makes them actually incorrect. I feel I have to be making a mistake in reasoning myself, but I'm not sure exactly what it is.
ReplyDeleteThis reads remarkably like an exchange between Siger of Brabant and Aquinas. Compare Vallicella's claim that individiduals of the same species share the same substantial form with what Siger says in Ch. 7 of his Tractatus de anima intellectiva: "To differ in species, as man differs from ass, is to differ by reason of form. But to differ in number while belonging to the same species, as horse differs from horse, is to differ by reason of matter." (trs. Klima)
ReplyDeleteAre you suggesting Thomas would disagree Siger's claim here??
DeleteThomists: "it is a principle that 's. form is inseparable from matter' ... well, for the most part as the human soul being an exception"
ReplyDeleteAvicennians: know that p's holding for the most part is inconsistent with its being a principle
Sinawi: You have a mistaken view of the Thomist position. Just as Thomists do not believe that all substances are material substances, Thomists do not believe that all substantial forms are material forms. And only material substantial forms are inseparable from matter.
DeleteThen they shouldn't, as they often do (e.g., Feser and others) speak of the inseparability of form and matter as a general thesis.
DeleteWell it is a general thesis. But it's not wholly general. And to be clear: there is no possible way to forestall all misunderstandings, and perhaps esp. not those of sophomorically arrogant readers who assume that their every misunderstanding must be someone else's fault.
Delete'general, but not wholly general' - right. you don't seem to be aware of the issue here.
Delete's. form and matter are inseparable' - in what discipline is this claim established? answer: metaphysics. that means: natural philosophy takes it for granted i.e., as a principle. but, if, as you say, it's 'not wholly general' - then it can no longer serve as a principle of nat. phil. that's just how an Aristotelian science works. do you get it now?
I am no expert on the issue, but as someone who finds the Aristotelian (or Thomistic) solution viable, I wonder whether the principle can be tweaked to read: “Substantial form and matter are inseparable unless the substantial form is capable of performing at least one operation independently of the matter (body).” Perhaps the principle was always meant to be read this way, or perhaps I am just missing something.
DeleteTohtoh
Sinawi, you're right, I'm not aware of the issue here. Could you begin by clarifying what text you are referring to here? (Or is this something you just made up?)
Delete(btw, Sinawi, I would say that your claim that "s. form and matter are inseparable" is established neither as to its meaning nor as to its truth -- and your assumption to the contrary is mere question-begging.)
DeleteIs there any discussion in Aristotelian sources (old or new) of how a soul works?
ReplyDeleteI have not seen contemporary discussions of the Aristotelian soul which discuss this or advance hypotheses about it. It is discussed how the soul fits into the general Aristotelian metaphysical framework and I understand that this is often the main point of discussion. But how does it provide organization for living things?
I'm not sure what such a study would be called, psychology is already taken and animology (if we want to use Latin) sounds like the study of animals.
There is Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima if that is what you mean.
DeleteThanks for the suggestion, I haven't read it.
DeleteHere it is online. It's challenging but the commentary by St. Thomas helps quite a bit.
DeleteI'm wondering if anyone can clarify this for me. I read above EF saying "The human intellect, like angelic intellects, is incorporeal. ... human beings are not purely corporeal substances (unlike iron, oak trees, and poodles) ... A human being is a unique sort of substance that has both corporeal properties and powers (such as eating, walking, seeing, and hearing) and incorporeal ones (thinking and willing). ... Because human beings are... partly incorporeal, they do not go out of existence altogether at death." This doesn't yet make sense to me. I think I can see what it might mean to call thinking an "incorporeal" power. (I mean, I can at least see that thoughts and intelligence have no extension, mass, location, etc.) And if what it means to be partly an incorporeal being is to have some properties that are not corporeal, then I can see what it means to say that people are partly incorporeal beings. But I can't yet see how I can get from that to the notion that human beings are not fully extinguished at death. (A computer has certain incorporeal powers too - the information it processes is not, qua information, corporeally characterisable - but this doesn't help it, or part of it, continue to exist after it's been melted down.) I guess there must be something else meant by the idea of an intellect being incorporeal over and above the idea of it having incorporeal properties, at least of the sort I mentioned above. Does anyone know what this is?
ReplyDeleteRichard, let me take a first stab at answering, and hopefully others will correct and extend it.
DeleteFirst, the incorporeal activity of knowing an incorporeal concept implies an incorporeal power. To know the concept "justice" as an abstract concept - i.e. as a universal it is further abstraction from the already not-physical attribute of some specific just action (which could be manifested physically, but the justice IN the action would not have extension, weight, color, etc), requires a faculty capable of incorporeal action. And because things like the universal "justice" cannot be affected by physical conditions (like heat and cold, or by a knife) and cannot expire, the faculty that is capable of knowing it must be fitted to that kind of object, i.e. not affected by heat and cold, or by a knife, etc. This implies the faculty itself is incorporeal. But it is NOT abstract (i.e. like the universal, justice), it is concrete: it is an actual, working faculty of a specific individual in his individual being. Thus the soul which is the soul OF that individual human has a concrete faculty that is necessarily incorporeal. Therefore the soul itself must be incorporeal, that is, DIFFERENT from the kinds of souls of animals who don't have incorporeal faculties.
(A computer has certain incorporeal powers too - the information it processes is not, qua information, corporeally characterisable - but this doesn't help it, or part of it, continue to exist after it's been melted down.)
Properly speaking, a computer doesn't have ANY information powers at all: it's processes are wholly corporeal, using electricity and gates to store and change states that - TO HUMANS - represents information. The stored states aren't informational as such, any more than the ink blots on a printed page are informational to the paper. It is humans using the accidental arrangements to transfer and operate on information, the incorporeal operative power is wholly in the humans.
I think that the intellect is itself incorporeal insofar as it is capable of an operation, thinking, that does not require a physical organ. If you are interested, our host deals with this in his book “Immortal Souls,” especially Chapter 3 (on intellect) and Chapter 10 (on immortality), but also Chapter 9 (distinguishing thinking from computing).
DeleteObjection 1: Human thinking is incorporeal only insofar as it it capable of an operation that does not require a physical organ. But human thinking does require (rightly functioning!) physical organs, so human thinking cannot be incorporeal.
DeleteObjection 2: The human intellect, just like digital computers, depends on corporeal processes in order to process and represent information, including information regarding universals. Therefore the human intellect is no more incorporeal, or capable of surviving its corporeal disintegration, than is a computer.
Richard: "I can at least see that thoughts and intelligence have no extension, mass, location, etc."
DeleteObjection: But likewise the sensory/sentient experiences of animals have none of that. Or if they do, then so do thoughts and intelligence. Either way it would seem that human souls are no more (conceivable as) incorporeal than animal souls.
Hello @Richard,
DeleteYou said, "This doesn't yet make sense to me. I think I can see what it might mean to call thinking an "incorporeal" power. (I mean, I can at least see that thoughts and intelligence have no extension, mass, location, etc.) And if what it means to be partly an incorporeal being is to have some properties that are not corporeal, then I can see what it means to say that people are partly incorporeal beings. But I can't yet see how I can get from that to the notion that human beings are not fully extinguished at death. (A computer has certain incorporeal powers too - the information it processes is not, qua information, corporeally characterisable - but this doesn't help it, or part of it, continue to exist after it's been melted down.)"
I think I get what you were trying to say by thinking that computers have a kind of 'incorporeal power'. If by that you mean that the information it synthesizes has no apparent physical "place," but that doesn't help the case at all.
Firstly, computers are not natural things (to see more about this specificaly, cf. Scholastic Metaphysics, chapter III); they are programmed with symbols that are only user-relative, in the sense that they represent things, words, tokens, etc. that could only be interpreted by us, because it has a purpose for us only (so the misanalogy between computers on one hand, and us on the other is not a real one).
So, even though it seems that they have this kind of immateriality you talk about, it is not really an immateriality at all. On the computer case, the logic gates, inputs, and outputs are externally imposed by a programmer or idealizer of the thing (i.e., an IT guy). And, in that case, they are completely reducible to the physical parts put together to build the computer (e.g., power, electricity, silicon parts, microprocessors, etc.). These parts (silicon parts, microprocessors, etc.) have no inherent tendency to work together, but could only do so because someone organized them in that way.
In contrast, our intellect and mental capacities are inherently teleological through and through, and anyone who denies that cannot properly do so without contradicting themselves. Our mental powers in general have an inherent tendency to work together naturally (i.e., they are not independent things 'waiting' to be put together, they are 'born' this way, so to speak).
A lot more could be said, especially about the immaterial powers of the intellect and the so-called indeterminacy of meaning (which is also crucial to understand why computers cannot rationalize in the first place). I highly recommend that you read Ed's Opus Immortal Souls, especially the first three chapters of Part I. Be sure to grasp these chapters well, so that you can progress through the book more easily. Even though Ed is a phenomenal expositor and clarifier, some topics are highly abstract and a little bit technical, so if you missed earlier points, you will definitely not understand the rest (e.g., if you skip direclty to Part III, chapter 9, "neither computers nor brains," you will have difficulties grasping the power of the argument if you skipped the earlier points made in Part I).
Hope that helps!
God bless you!
"These parts (silicon parts, microprocessors, etc.) have no inherent tendency to work together, but could only do so because someone organized them in that way."
DeleteObjection: But similarly, our intellects and mental capacities have no inherent tendency to work together (hence sin and death, war, envy, strife, absurdity, meaningless, fantasy, psychosis, suicide, etc.) and only do so insofar as they happen to be more or less psycho-socially integrated in one way or another.
"In contrast, our intellect and mental capacities are inherently teleological through and through, and anyone who denies that cannot properly do so without contradicting themselves."
Objection: But anyone who claims that our intellect and mental capacities are inherently teleological through and through (while other things, in contrast, are not!*) is also inescapably contradicting himself; hence it seems that contradiction is as inherent to the human condition as teleology, and thus contradiction and teleology are not contraries or contradictory. Indeed, contradiction (along with all the other kinds of awkwardness and unpleasantness) appears to be part of the teleology of human existence.
(*I leave the proof of this claim, as you have left the proof of yours, as an exercise.)
To David McPike 10:55
DeleteEven in its disembodied state?
But similarly, our intellects and mental capacities have no inherent tendency to work together (hence sin and death, war, envy, strife, absurdity, meaningless, fantasy, psychosis, suicide, etc.) and only do so insofar as they happen to be more or less psycho-socially integrated in one way or another.
DeleteThis is absurd. It is clear that our faculties do have an innate tendency to work together, from the fact that they usually work together quite readily, given time and opportunity. Babies tend to (without being forced or strongly encouraged by physical incentives like food) to learn to integrate their individual sense events into coherent cross-sense functional wholes. Animals do this too, that's not special to humans. But soon after that, babies start to evidence intellectual activity in learning speech, and hence to grasp concepts. At first, mostly for physical things, but eventually expanding and abstracting as to universals and abstract concepts. And then they quite naturally and almost universally tend to formulate propositions and thence on to deductive reasoning. That they ALSO have unreasonable thinking sometimes, or sometimes uses reason toward unsavory goals doesn't prove that the activity of reasoning is somehow not a tendency in us.
But anyone who claims that our intellect and mental capacities are inherently teleological through and through (while other things, in contrast, are not!*) is also inescapably contradicting himself
You are just throwing out assertions that have no plausibility whatsoever. A man who SOMETIMES thinks through action steps from A to K to arrive at K because he wants K is obviously engaged in teleological behavior, and his intellect is core to that behavior. Even though he sometimes doesn't behave that way, (e.g. his heart beats without his conscious choice to direct the heart to beat) doesn't defeat the teleological behavior. A claim that man as such has no bent toward that teleological aspect of thinking is just to reject human nature altogether.
If you reject Aristotelianism to THAT extent, your problem isn't with the narrow position on the survival of the human soul after death of the body, your problem is with the whole form / matter, soul / body, natures of living beings theory to begin with.
Hey Tony, I think you haven't read my objections very carefully here. I think you are arguing here like a classical clueless modern philosopher, who completely misconstrues the scope and nature of Aristotelian teleology.
DeleteYou say: "It is clear that our faculties do have an innate tendency to work together." Right. But so do the parts of a computer, which also "usually work together quite readily, given time and opportunity."
You say: "A claim that man as such has no bent toward that teleological aspect of thinking is just to reject human nature altogether."
Sure, but that's not a claim I made. But likewise, a claim that computers as such have no teleological bent is to reject (fail to understand) the nature of computers altogether.
Anyway, to reiterate: there is no question of rejecting some kind of Aristotelian-'ism' here. The question is about the specifying the nature and scope of particular (broadly 'Aristotelian') concepts.
(Tony: I just re-read my objection, to a part of which you replied, and I must say I'm pretty nonplussed by the violence of your misconstrual of the gist of that objection.)
DeleteYeah, I agree with Tony about what A-T (at least as presented by Feser) implies, though this is not to say that I agree with A-T itself. I'll add that from my understanding of A-T, it's not claiming that other things don't have teleology, but that humans have a unique form of it, with both conceptual thought and a physical body. Silicon, in this view, does have intrinsic teleology in that it has certain natural properties, but that does not include intrinsically forming computers (it only does that when outside forces arrange it that way). I will say that even if I don't necessarily accept the full A-T picture, I think there is a strong case that the mind, at least, is teleological. Everyone who isn't an eliminativist agrees it is, and I think Feser (among others) has actually made good arguments that eliminativism is incoherent. For instance, some thoughts aim at the truth, and are false when they fail to reach that goal, but this involves intrinsic normativity. If there is no teleology, there is no truth or falsity, but this is self-defeating for obvious reasons.
DeleteI think, in fact, that this in itself is a fatal problem for mechanistic materialism, because such a position implies that there is no intrinsic teleology anywhere, including in the human mind (which would be nothing more than a physical system such as the brain, conceived of as a machine/computer.) But saying this on Feser's blog is pretty much preaching to the choir (though materialists do show up here sometimes), so I wonder how to introduce this argument to materialists. Some have heard about and criticized arguments of this sort (such as the argument from reason), but it's still not very common. One reason is probably that, as another blog post has pointed out, it is very easy to fall into the belief that the meaning of a computer's processes is intrinsic to it, and therefore that a computational view of the brain explains how thoughts have meaning. Again, there are some sophisticated views that attempt to explain how purely physical processes can have abstract meanings, even if we don't agree with them. But many people aren't very reflective and just assume it without realizing that there is something to think about - that's how I was in the past, incidentally.
Sometimes, though, I've seen materialists stumble upon the problem and begin to wonder how you're going to get determinate content from purely physical facts. I haven't actually counted things, so I might be biased, but I think many materialists either ignore the problem or go in an eliminativist direction instead of attempting to show how determinate content can be reduced to the physical. I found an interesting example just recently (though it was written many years ago), in which the author outright stated that it's difficult to explain how, say, a calculator could be "correct" or "incorrect" in naturalistic terms, given that it of course always operates according to the laws of physics. His solution was that a calculator's (in)correctness depends on whether it matches your mental model or not... but there wasn't an explanation of what a brain's (in)correctness involves, if it also always operates according to the laws of physics. I'm wondering whether I should link these articles here. It might be interesting to analyze them.
Tony, re. your remarks about babies and language acquisition:
DeleteMy understanding is that there is no question but that the (both general and specific) integration of language function in human beings is absolutely necessarily dependent on (socio-psychological) nurture, and not just on maturation of an innate natural capacity.
"a fatal problem for mechanistic materialism, because such a position implies that there is no intrinsic teleology anywhere, including in the human mind"
DeleteIs that indeed a true implication of 'mechanistic materialism'? Or just commonly assumed to be an implication thereof? Or is it a (constitutive) dogma thereof? Or is it not really an implication thereof at all, but rather a poorly defined, poorly understood problem in relation thereto?
"Even in its disembodied state?"
DeleteOur knowledge of the soul in its embodied state tends to be very confused. I think our knowledge of the soul in its disembodied state is possible (to the extent it is possible) only by analogy with (and in proportion to) our knowledge of it in its embodied state, and so the latter is, 'proportionately,' even more confused.
@David McPike
DeleteWith all due respect, but are you listening to yourself?
You said, "Objection: But similarly, our intellects and mental capacities have no inherent tendency to work together (hence sin and death, war, envy, strife, absurdity, meaningless, fantasy, psychosis, suicide, etc.) and only do so insofar as they happen to be more or less psycho-socially integrated in one way or another."
Let me ask you a question: when you were born, did your mother go out in search of "leg trees," "arm trees," "head trees," etc., picking out separated parts to "construct" you, or did your parts not preexist you?
Also, when you were making this argument of yours, did you use your imagination alone, or were you using all your mental devices to work through a chain of reasoning to get to this odd conclusion of yours? By the way, the very examples you are using (psychosis, suicide, envy, meaninglessness, and so on) are parasitic on the very concepts you are trying to deny. To say that someone is crazy, say, you can only understand that something is wrong with that person because there is a violent disruption of his or her faculties. The mere fact that we are somehow defective or vitiated with mental illnesses can't do the work you think they can do to lift your argument off the ground.
What is more astounding is your later statement, "Objection: But anyone who claims that our intellect and mental capacities are inherently teleological through and through (while other things, in contrast, are not!*) is also inescapably contradicting himself; hence it seems that contradiction is as inherent to the human condition as teleology, and thus contradiction and teleology are not contraries or contradictory. Indeed, contradiction (along with all the other kinds of awkwardness and unpleasantness) appears to be part of the teleology of human existence."
When you put out this argument, was your intention directed at refuting me, correcting me, or just playing around? The very act that you did is an undeniable example of intentionality, teleologically directed at some end. But let me ask you something more: were you aiming at TRUTH when you wrote that? If so, how could you also hold that teleology and contradiction "are not contraries" by any means? If contradiction and teleology are not contraries, the syllogism of "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal," has the same validity as "It's raining outside, I love Pepsi, therefore Donald Trump is a muslim!"
If by now you can't see what's wrong with what you are saying, I'm afraid you are in the grip of a delusional metaphysical idea, but you are not 'packing' any good argument for it at all.
Oh Vini, dear Vini. What to say, with all DUE respect to yourself? A difficult question. A few points for your consideration:
DeleteYou clearly have a very naive view of mental illness. I suggest you read Thomas Szasz's classic The Myth of Mental Illness. It seems to have effectively blown your mind, being exposed to the unsuspected reality that there is more than one (intelligent!) way to look at such things. But that's indeed how it is.
It appears (oddly) that you're wondering what an 'objection' is. I suggest you spend some time reading Aquinas's Summa theologiae. You should be able to figure it out, if you give it some close and sustained attention.
Your argument about "intentionality, teleologically directed at some end" is an absolute train wreck, which in no way is coherent, either in itself or as constituting a response to my objection. Please note: there's really no point in responding to an objection if you haven't bothered to first understand it.
I hope by now you can see what's wrong with what you're saying; if not you are clearly delusional, etc. (lol!)
@David McPike
DeleteOh, David, dear David... it seems my answer got so much under your skin that you didn't even care to clarify what you meant by all the ramblings you brought up so far. What makes me curious, though, is the fact that neither Tony nor I *could* interpret or understand your so-called objection. Still, you, definitely a higher intellectual being of prose capable of putting Plato to shame, couldn't even clarify to us, poor souls, what you meant by all that.
What's worse, you directed your time to pompous book references and fancifully cloaked ad hominem, as if they were definitive to the matter, or as if they elevate you, when these topics are really beside the point at best. If you really paid the attention you so much asked for, you would notice that what I said about a person "being crazy" was a mere example, and that is, again, not what really matters.
The main point was whether our psychological powers have or have not an inherent tendency to work together. You can't simply bring out abnormal cases as if these deviations are definitive to the discussion at hand, when, in fact, they are not and also are parasitic on the very normal cases which we should start the metaphysical investigation to begin with. It also doesn't matter what this or that psychiatrist has to say in his or her scientific field of operations, when the question is a metaphysical one (one can't simply bake his area of work into metaphysics and expect us to accept it); what's worse, his or her opinions still presuppose some metaphysical position behind it -- and in Szasz's case, specifically, a very bad and unreflected one, too. If you weren't so keen on demonstrating your superb verbiage, I guess you would have had the time to notice that.
But, in all of that, I must admit, you really blew my mind with your exposition about mental illnesses and their possible interpretations. I guess it is the first time I saw a case of Post-Intentionality Stress Disorder in the comment section. It's not every day that we see people using intentionality and presupposing the truth of one's statement in a dispute while also denying the very fact of doing so. So much for telos et veritas, I guess.
But again, it seems that you would reply to all of that that we misinterpreted you or something. So, lo and behold, majesty, pardon and deliver our crude intellects with yours enriched and ineffable inteligentsia!
I'm just an anon, but I will add that I can't really understand your most recent post either, David. For the discussion of "mechanistic materialism," though, I will clarify that I was using "mechanistic" specifically to mean "without inherent teleology." Now, someone can be a mechanist about the physical world and still believe minds have intrinsic teleology, but of course a materialist believes minds are part of the physical world, so that wouldn't be an option for them. So yes, it seems that the nonexistence of teleology in the human mind (if mind even exists in the first place) is a consequence of mechanistic materialism.
DeleteWhether materialism (or physicalism) has to be mechanistic is an interesting question. Given how much our understanding of physics has changed, it's unclear what "materialism" even means anymore, so some people have argued that only consistent part of materialism/physicalism now is a rejection of intrinsic teleology. At the very least, I think most materialists would not accept its existence. They would believe the idea of teleology is completely reducible to, or can be eliminated and replaced by, nonteleological processes - if they even consider the matter at all, that is.
I'm actually less certain that physicalism is false than many of the people here are, I think, and I'm not religious. However, as I've read more about this topic, my confidence that teleology and intentionality can be successfully reduced or eliminated has decreased quite a bit, to say the least... As I've said, while it's not the case for all materialists, I've noticed quite a few argue for implicitly or explicitly eliminativist positions when reductionism fails to give them determinate content. And there are reductionists doing some hard work, but I haven't found anything that really convinces me so far, and there are in-principle criticisms of such positions.
To David McPike, 11/4, 3:04 PM
DeleteMy initial comment was a reply to a precise question by Richad Gipps, namely: “I guess there must be something else meant by the idea of an intellect being incorporeal over and above the idea of it having incorporeal properties, at least of the sort I mentioned above. Does anyone know what this is?” My reply was: “I think that the intellect is itself incorporeal insofar as it is capable of an operation, thinking, that does not require a physical organ.” You objected to this (11/3, 10:55 AM), but your objections, in my view, were not immediately relevant to the question asked (hence my further question: “Even in its disembodied state?”), for my answer was not an explanation or a defense of how an intellect can subsist independently of the body, but simply a statement of what I understood to be the “official” reason provided for this view in Aristotelian-Thomism. Of course, I may be wrong about thinking that this is the “official” reason, in which case this is what you might want to address if you wish to help Richard Gipps.
Things have meaning in themselves.
DeleteWhen we grasp things, we grasp their meaning, and therefore we can impose said meaning onto the words we use to communicate.
But to grasp meaning, we need forms (which are immaterial.) Because meaning stems from the essences of things. And essences are forms.
But the materialist doesn't accept forms into his ontology (because they are not material.)
Therefore, the materialist is forced to live in a world with no intrinsic meaning.
Now the materialist says that we "impose" meaning onto the world via "convention".
But that convention happens to be nothing more than an agreement between "brains".
But brains are parts of larger material entities (the human bodies.) But if the larger material entities (the physical human bodies) don't have any intrinsic meaning in themselves (because they are purely material and matter is entirely devoid of any intrinsic meaning), then their parts (including the physical brains), are equally meaningless.
And what's intrinsically meaningless, can't impose meaning. Nor by convention, nor by any means. Therefore "conventionalism" is nothing but an appeal to magic. An unsuccessful attempt to salvage a dying philosophical system.
"Conventionalism" is no better than "fairies did it".
And as such, it deserves zero intellectual respect. Everything that exists is defined, everything points towards something! TELEOLOGY is an intrinsic feature of the world, or else we plunge into absurdity!
We can't "impose" what we don't have! Even toddlers know that!
I'm the anon who was discussing "mechanistic materialism" (I finally found out how to comment with a name...) So I was thinking, and there's another reason I feel that people might not accept the A-T arguments for immaterial souls. At least part of that argument is that concepts are immaterial - no material process can ever have determinate conceptual content, but of course human thought can. However, I believe a lot of people think of concepts as something else, such as the ability to sort things into groups. Of course, plenty of material things, such as artificial neural networks, can sort things into groups. "Abstraction" and "concepts" are regularly used to refer to neural networks, both biological and artificial, so again there is the argument that computers can explain the human mind.
DeleteI think that this might be part of the reason why A-T arguments are not very popular, because people think claims such as "material processes can't form concepts" have been scientifically refuted. So I feel A-T believers, when making those arguments, could be more clear on what their definition of "abstract concept" is and how it is different from the material processes commonly described as "abstracting." I think this has happened to some extent already.
I remember Gyula Klima, in an article on AI, saying that there is a difference between "perceptual abstraction," which is basically pattern-matching that nonhuman animals and AI can do, and "conceptual abstraction," which is immaterial. In a different comment section on this blog, Brandon stated that generalization is broader than abstraction, in that there are material ways of generalizing that aren't true abstraction. And David Oderberg in his article "Concepts, Dualism, and the Human Intellect," specifically rejected the thesis that concepts are reducible to something such as sorting capacities. He also discussed the neuroscientific research attempting to explain how concepts are stored in the brain, and said that the research at most shows correlations between concepts and brain activity, but not that concepts are reducible to brain activity.
For instance, he argued that the intellect can grasp a potential infinity of concepts, but the brain is finite. Interestingly enough, in classical physics, I believe a finite physical system can have an infinite number of possible states. But our current best quantum physical theories imply that a finite physical system indeed only has a finite number of possible states. Of course, that depends on the empirical evidence, so it's not (fully) metaphysical. Plus, I think many people, especially materialists, would deny that humans can understand an infinite number of concepts. Nevertheless, I spotted others who aren't even A-T believers, such as Douglas V. Porpora, using infinity to criticize physicalism, so perhaps it's worth paying attention to as well?
These comments are helpful; thank you; I will have to go look at Immortal Souls now :)
ReplyDeleteAnother Avicennian argument for why souls (be they plant, animal, or human) are substances:
ReplyDeletehttps://open.substack.com/pub/mashshai/p/contra-thomism-on-form-soul-and-substance?r=4on5dv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
The argument you provide seems valid to me. The question is whether it is also sound. What reason does Avicenna (or you) give for (1)? After all, you could replace "substance" with "substantial form" throughout the argument, and you would still have a valid argument. However, we will not know which version is sound (the Avicennian version or, for the sake of simplicity, the Thomistic version) until (1) is demonstrated in each case.
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