Immortal Souls provides as ambitious and complete a defense of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology as is currently in print. Among the many topics covered are the reality and unity of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, the critique of artificial intelligence, and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptions of human nature. Along the way, the main rival positions in contemporary philosophy and science are thoroughly engaged with and rebutted.
“Edward
Feser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore,
both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work for
consultation. Each of the human
faculties discussed is treated comprehensively, with a broad range of theories
considered for and against, and, although Feser's conclusions are firmly
Thomistic, one can derive great benefit from his discussions even if one is not
a convinced hylomorphist. Every
philosopher of mind would benefit from having this book within easy reach.” Howard
Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central European University
“Feser
defends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it into
dialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic
(Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Dreyfus) philosophy. He deftly rebuts
objections to Thomism, both ancient and modern. Anyone working today on personal identity, the
unity of the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will need
to engage with the analysis and arguments presented here.” Robert C. Koons,
Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
CONTENTS
Preface
Part I: What
is Mind?
1. The Short Answer
2. The Self
3. The Intellect
4. The Will
Part II:
What is Body?
5. Matter
6. Animality
Part III:
What is a Human Being?
7. Against Cartesianism
8. Against Materialism
9. Neither Computers nor Brains
Part IV:
What is the Soul?
10. Immortality
11. The Form of the Body
Index
Well, I ordered the book on Amazon on June 23rd, 2024. After delays, finally at some point in August they set the delivery date for October 8th, today. Instead of the book, I got an email notice from Amazon asking me if I still wanted the product: "There is a delay in shipping your order because of a supply chain issue. We’ll make every effort to get the delayed item to you as soon as possible. If you still want this item, please confirm below. We apologize for the delay." So frustrating!
ReplyDeleteI've been having the same experience. Looks like November 7th is the new date.
DeleteI'm glad Ed's book is this popular.
Same here, it is very frustrating indeed.
DeleteYep. Currently set to arrive Monday, but it hasn't shipped yet. I wait with baited breath.
DeleteYep. Mine says it's arriving Monday, but hasn't shipped yet. I'm excited for the call with Amazon support on Monday - LOL
DeleteNot terribly surprising, but I ended up in the same situation as Paolo and bmiller. Now slated for mid-November.
DeleteSo whatever supply chain/distribution issues have been holding it up still seem to be in effect unfortunately.
I canceled my Amazon order after it got pushed to November and ordered it from ThriftBooks.com
DeleteAmazon cancelled my order; I ended up getting the Nook app and downloading it from Barnes and Noble.
DeleteI as well.
DeleteI also order the book in June, but was recently told it would not arrive until at least November. I’m beginning to doubt I will receive it before Christmas.
DeleteI saw that Ed posted on X that Amazon had the book in stock again. It says the book normally ships in 2-3 days.
DeleteAmazon said they would send an email when they were shipping way back in June. Since I didn't get the email I canceled that original order and ordered again. It says the new order should arrive November 3rd or 4th. I'll post again if I get it.
All, I gave up on Amazon, and ordered it at Barnes & Nobles on 10/17 (was not available at any store within a 100 mile radius) and was delivered to me on 10/24. Had to pay for shipping, but happy it is here and I started reading immediately. Classic Feser: "Am I saying that Locke's theory and the entire centuries long debate it has spawned is based on a similar mistake? Yes, that is exactly what I am saying." :)
DeleteHey Prof, Very Quickly, Would it be fine to recommend the book to a popular audience and for that matter the entire series Aristotle's revenge etc ? Or is some level of learning required?
ReplyDeleteProf Feser writes scholarly books, but his books are clearly written and can be understood by the average reader with effort and attention. He doesn't write for academic specialists. He writes for everyone.
DeleteHi Anon
DeleteThanks, just wanted to confirm
Generally I know that Prof writes in a very clear way.
DeleteBut everytime I see these two endorsements, both of them made a point of recommending it to professionals. Of course it could be for both scholars and the general audience a because as you said Prof writes scholarly books but in a very clear way.
So that's why I was wondering.
I 100% agree with Anthony Kenny's complement of Prof which I come across everyday while visiting the blog.
Prof does have that rare and enviable gift :)
Cheers
I would also add that Prof. Feser is an all-around good guy, even if I disagree with him on a number of issues. I don't see how he finds the time to do all his outside writing in addition to being a full-time college professor and a husband and father with six children.
DeleteHis book Aquinas is more suitable for beginners. Also The Last Superstition if people don’t mind a more polemical tone.
DeleteAnon
DeleteI remember Prof mentioning somewhere that even his Aquinas book wasn't actually for "beginners". The beginners guide was actual the name of the series and Prof said his book was more challenging than that.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/05/dominicans-interactive-reviews-aquinas.html
So actually for beginners in Aquinas, I would actually recommend they start with "The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch" by Fr Stephen Brock.
It's recommended by Fr Thomas Joseph White on the Thomistic institute website. And I think it's quite useful because Fr Brock explains the basics very well because he spends more time on them.
After reading that, then I would recommend Prof's Aquinas which is also excellent.
Anyways just to settle it,
Would it be fair to say Immortal Souls is a work that is primarily aimed at scholars in the field but can be accessible to the general public if they willing to put in the time and effort.
Prof ?
It would definitely be more challenging for the non-expert, although some parts will be more so than others
DeleteYou can read quite a number pages of the book here free online:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.google.com/books/edition/Immortal_Souls/X-ceEQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA3&printsec=frontcover
An Avicennian critique of Thomistic psychology (in last of ch. of Feser's book):
ReplyDeletehttps://mashshai.wordpress.com/2024/10/11/a-problem-in-thomistic-psychology/#more-1898
Are you going to review Hunt's "Something for Nothing", or have you published a review already? I haven't read Hunt's book (yet), but wondering about your take.
ReplyDelete"Would it be fair to say Immortal Souls is a work that is primarily aimed at scholars in the field but can be accessible to the general public if they willing to put in the time and effort?"
ReplyDeleteYes, Norm, that is essentially what I said, "effort and attention."
I would be remiss if I didn't mention two intros to Aquinas by Fr. Brian Davies: Both are accessible for the average reader, but the first probably more so:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Outstanding-Christian-Thinkers-Davies/dp/0826470955/?_en
https://www.amazon.com/Thought-Thomas-Aquinas-Clarendon-Paperbacks/dp/0198267533
Hi Ed, I'd be interested to hear your take on the following Youtube video: "Proof Of AN AFTERLIFE: the Shared Near-Death Experience" featuring Raymond Moody and Paul Perry, in an interview hosted by Sergei Davidoff on the About Freedom show. Here's the link:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sc7mhQr5G7g&t=4s
Raymond Moody, who coined the term "near-death experience," has both a PhD in philosophy and an MD. As you'll see in the interview, he's a big fan of Plato, but he candidly acknowledges the problems facing the study of the near-death experience. His latest book, "Proof of Life after Life: 7 Reasons to Believe There Is an Afterlife," which he co-authored with Paul Perry, is available here:
https://www.amazon.com/Proof-Life-after-Reasons-Afterlife-ebook/dp/B0BTZ7FLXZ
Thoughts?
Read the criticism of Moody's writings
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond_Moody
Yes, that would be interesting, especially as the afterlife Moody believes he has evidence or even proof for is not the Christian one.
DeleteI haven’t read the book and I probably won’t be able to order it for a while, but for those that read the book or for even Feser himself, I’d like to know what view he takes on free will
ReplyDeleteHi Ed, do you address the topic of Near-Death Experiences in your book? Or if you don't, could you explain whether you think this type of argument is a good line of reasoning for the existence of the soul?
ReplyDeleteBarnes & Noble near me won't carry it in the store; it can only be ordered online. Amazon just let my account get hacked, and won't talk to me. Since Amazon allowed my account to be hacked, I had to cancel my credit card, and the new credit card isn't here yet. The book was supposed to have been delivered from Amazon on Monday 14 Oct, but it still isn't here. Because Amazon let me account get hacked, I can't even track it.
ReplyDeleteRe spiritual soul: why should we believe that the intellect is impressed by the form of the object? What pieces of information shall we think are conveyed by what we say is the form? When Aristotle talked about bees, did he know all that is known now about what is true of the bee as bee? Given all the myriad facts that are true of the bee as bee, it seems unlikely that people who in popular parlance know what a bee is know all that in science constitutes the bee as a bee. I am contesting the AT claim that the intellect takes in the form of the object. I think we get a sense of things as bearers of the names we give those universals in language, but we do not in our language grasp all that is true of the thing in nature. Maybe only scientists grasp that, if indeed even they. Who knows what the bee is in all the properties that constitute it in nature?
ReplyDelete"Who knows what the bee is in all the properties that constitute it in nature?"
DeleteWhat makes you think that possessing the form in the intellect means (or entails) knowing everything that could be known about the object? It does not and no one ever maintained it does. Here is Oderberg, from Real Essentialism, pgs 55-56:
"But, as has already been stressed, it is no part of essentialism that a person who knows the essence of something must know all of its
essence or know its essence in precise detail. If I identify a human as an animal and a scarecrow as inanimate, I have identified part of the essence of each. It is at least arguable that in most cases of material object identification, just as in mathematical, we identify objects by parts of their essence, even if in the material case we also rely heavily on accidental characteristics."
@grodrigues: thanks for the reference. I'll check out what Oderberg wrote. Does Feser go into this problem in his new book?
Delete@ficino4ml:
Delete"Does Feser go into this problem in his new book?"
What problem specifically? I presume you mean something like this: given that knowledge of essence is possessing the form in the intellect, how is error in knowledge or incompleteness of knowledge explained? I do not have any standard reference to give you or know if Prof. Feser goes into the problem in the latest book -- I have not read it yet.
As St. Thomas says:
Delete"[O]ur manner of knowing is so weak that no philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. "
http://iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2017/02/aquinas-no-philosopher-can-perfectly.html
On the other hand, it does not follow from our lack of perfect knowledge that our knowledge is unreal or uncertain.
It is a mistake to confuse completeness with correctness. The intellect takes the form of the object, just not perfectly.
Bees make honey. That's all that matters.
Delete"But, as has already been stressed, it is no part of essentialism that a person who knows the essence of something must know all of its
Deleteessence or know its essence in precise detail."
Thinking it over, and having read the Oderberg pages +, I think the question arises, how then do we know the essence with certitude? How do we identify it if it is not in fact the integral intelligible species that is impressed on our intellect but instead, some manquee distillation or abridgement of the intelligible species? It is sounding as though we do not have knowledge of the essential form but only opinion, if our manner of knowing is as weak as English Catholic quotes St. Thomas as saying it is.
The quotes included in the link that English Catholic indicate that St. Thomas is saying that we often don't get the essential differences of things, not saying that we never get it.
Deletesometimes, as is said in the Metaphysics, we use accidents or effects in their place,
For sometimes necessity compels us to use accidental differences
and in most cases we are not able to
substantial differences are frequently taken from accidents
In the context, the quote that he gives about not knowing the essence even of a fly is probably hyperbole, or if not hyperbole absolutely speaking, it is probably indicative of the weakness of the human intellect insofar as its ability to grasp essences is more imperfect as to creatures more unlike us, and lower creatures which simply have less act to know, which stymies us because of our mode of coming to know.
The extracts of Aquinas from English Catholic discuss the essences of God, created immaterial substances and material substances and how we can understand them. It seems the author of that article wants to emphasize that we don't or can't have perfect, direct knowledge of everything. But I don't think he would say we therefore have no knowledge of anything.
DeleteInterestingly, since ficino4ml mentions the bee, the final section is the Exposition on the Apostle's Creed where an example is given of a philosopher who spent 30 years studying the nature of the bee. Certainly at the end of his study, he knew more than when he started but less than there is to know. But also certainly when he started the study he knew the difference between a bee and a bird. Seems like an over reaction if we were to reach the conclusion that since we can't know everything about a subject then we actually know nothing about it.
What does the saint mean when he says, "For when the intellect understands in act, the intelligible species are in it according to/in line with a perfected actuality/act (secundum actum perfectum)" (In III DA l. 8, C703)? My off the top of head thought is that Aquinas means that the whole intelligible species is in the active intellect, not obscured pieces of the intelligible species.
DeleteSo when Aristotle and Aquinas confidently tell us about the brain and its properties and essential functions, IF we are going to say from a 21st century perspective that they don't get all of the brain's properties and functions right, then what shall we say about A's and A's certitude? It was false, right?
But who today knows all of the brain's properties and functions?
It remains mysterious what degree of grasp of F's properties is entailed by a claim that someone's intellect is identical with the essential form of some F. How was Aquinas' grasp of the intelligible species of the brain "according to a perfected act" when he thought that the function of the brain is to cool the blood so that certain operations of soul and body could occur? That just isn't enough to capture the essential functions of the brain even as we today in our admittedly not yet complete grasp grasp them.
Since we can't know that our intellect has become identical with the form of F, we can't say both that we know F and that knowledge of F entails the intellect's becoming one with the form of F. We are thrown back on the linguistic route that I suggested earlier: we know what we point to in language when we pick out some F, and other speakers through using language know that, too, and that's as far as we get. We have the Kripke style "water is H2O in every possible world" but not the AT "we know that water is H2O in every possible world because we know the essential form of water," since that last is not secure.
ficino4ml,
DeleteHere is that section in context:
702. What is said here disproves the un-aristotelian position of Avicenna touching intelligible ideas. Avicenna maintained that ideas are not retained by the potential intellect, but exist in it only so long as it is actually understanding. Whence it follows that, for this intellect to come to the act of understanding anything, it must have recourse to a separated active intellect, the source of intelligible ideas in the intellectual potency.
703. But against this Aristotle is clearly saying that the manner in which the mind becomes actually possessed of ideas is that of one who, possessing a science habitually, is stiff in potency to a given act of understanding. Thus the mind actually understanding possesses its ideas in fullest actuality; and so long as it has the habit of a science, it possesses them in a manner half-way between mere potency and complete actuality.
704. And having asserted that, once the mind has become partly actual with respect to certain ideas hitherto potentially apprehended, it is capable of understanding, whereas simply regarded in itself it lacks the capacity, because this might lead one to suppose that even as in act the mind never thinks of itself, Aristotle adds that, once in act, the mind is able to think not only of other things, but also of itself.
It looks like Aquinas is pointing out that Avicenna got Aristotle wrong regarding a separated active intellect. Before one can understand the concept of "force" in physics, one must have a background in physics. But once one has been taught enough of physics, one has a different potential to understand that concept than before. Looks like common sense to me.
A and A were not materialists, so I don't get why you would want to turn a discussion of the intellect into brain functions etc. Of course materialists would not agree with them.
I got it last week from Blackwells in Oxford, UK.
ReplyDeleteMichael Gray
Berrima Australia
Blackwells will sell and ship Immortal Souls to the USA
Deletehttps://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/search/?keyword=immortal+souls
Same. I ordered on Oct. 20th and it just arrived today from Blackwell's. That after waiting a month for Amazon to ship with no result. Thanks for cluing me in.
DeleteMine arrived. Worst thing about it is the green cover and yellow font. Whoever designed that should be fired. I look forward to the content, however, which is more important.
ReplyDeleteAgreed, I like the green but combined with that dark yellow font it's a bit hard to read.
DeleteWhat? A yellow font? Never heard of that. Is that true, Dr. Feser
ReplyDeleteHe's referring just to the cover copy, not the text of the book itself
DeleteThe preface of the book is just fantastic. The nod to Plato and the slap on Hume was enough to entice me to read the entire work.
ReplyDeleteDoes anybody know the LOC card catalog number for this book?
ReplyDelete“@bmiller: "A and A were not materialists, so I don't get why you would want to turn a discussion of the intellect into brain functions etc."
ReplyDeleteWhere did I say that the intellect is reducible to brain functions or the like? I did not say that, nor did I defend materialism. I used the brain as an example of something, the quiddity of which it is doubtful that A and A understood. I doubt anyone would say that modern brain scientists do not know more about the nature of the brain than A and A did. But A and A made confident statements about the brain and what they thought are its functions, as though they thought they had understanding of the brain. On their theory, having understanding = the intellect's being made identical with the quiddity of the understood thing.
Assuming that A and A thought they understood the brain, I posit that A and A were deceived about knowing the nature/essence of the brain. It’s a case where they thought their intellects were made identical with the form of the brain, but it was not so. (It does not follow that modern scientists DO understand the essence of the brain, but they know enough facts about the brain to falsify the account that A and A thought true about it.)
My suggested takeaway is twofold: 1) Thomists should exercise epistemic restraint toward claims to know the essence of something, all the more to the extent that the "something" is not a constituent of what one might call a tautologous system (e.g. a mathematical).
2) it's not clear to me that the notion of substantial/essential form does the explanatory work for us that A-T claims, since it is contentious in many cases in nature whether we understand the essence. But we have ordinary knowledge about many things in nature. So perhaps the approach taken by Parfitt and others, whom Oderberg criticizes in the book cited by grodrigues, may be the best we can do.
ficino4ml,
ReplyDeleteOK I get where you're coming from now. But surely you don't mean that since A and A got something wrong or incomplete in their writings, their philosophical approach is useless. Aristotle writes quite a bit about the various levels of certitude. Inference is less certain than demonstration for instance.
1) Thomists should exercise epistemic restraint toward claims to know the essence of something, all the more to the extent that the "something" is not a constituent of what one might call a tautologous system (e.g. a mathematical).
Right. Something of metaphysical certitude is more certain that something of practical certitude.
Did you find somewhere where A and A claimed epistemic certitude about Aristotle's theory of the brain?
Any updates on the shipping from Amazon for this one? I pre-ordered mine, but there's no estimated delivery date.
ReplyDeleteI made a comment on October 24, 2024 at 3:59 PM regarding my strategy. Check if it helps you out.
DeleteAmazon shows it has left the shipper, so looks like its on the way. Also the dropped the price about $2.
DeleteI don't know of a passage where Aristotle says explicitly, "I have certitude about my theory of the brain." He expresses himself about it as he does about many things when he speaks of properties that it has "by nature" or speaks of "the nature of the brain." By his own theory he is entitled to such direct assertions only if he thinks he knows the nature and the essence. Cf. Sens 444a10, GA 747a17-18, 783b28. At PA 652-658 is his main discussion of the brain, where he speaks of its "nature". He expressly says that it's false that we perceive with the brain. At 686a5 ff he talks about how it's "necessary" that animals with blood have a brain. To claim F is a necessary property of x is to commit oneself to claiming to know the quiddity of x, I should think.
ReplyDeleteficino4ml,
DeleteBy his own theory he is entitled to such direct assertions only if he thinks he knows the nature and the essence.
Where did you find this theory that prohibits one from making inferences?
This is from Wikipedia:
In the Prior Analytics, syllogistic logic is considered in its formal aspect; in the Posterior it is considered in respect of its matter. The "form" of a syllogism lies in the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion. Even where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter, i.e. the propositions of which it is composed, which may be true or false, probable or improbable.
When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing. Such syllogisms are called apodeictical, and are dealt with in the two books of the Posterior Analytics. When the premises are not certain, such a syllogism is called dialectical, and these are dealt with in the eight books of the Topics.
I doubt that he considered his exposition on the nature of the brain a demonstration and I'm sure he would have changed his position if he had the information we have now at hand.
It still looks like you are trying to argue that since Aristotle got one thing wrong, then he must have got something else, unrelated, wrong. I don't think that's a good argument. It would be like saying since Newton was an alchemist his theory of force must be wrong. Non-sequitor.
Something else I notice is that you seem to implicitly accept essentialism. You haven't argued that the brain doesn't have an essence that we can intellectually know. You've only argued that A got it wrong while present day scientists got it right, more or less.
BTW, I looked at the Oderberg work where he addresses the topic of knowledge and certainty. Chapter 3 I think. But you mentioned he criticized Parfitt. Where did he do that?
@bmiller: where did I say that Aristotle has a theory that prohibits one from making inferences?
ReplyDeleteficino4ml,
DeleteIt was the statement of yours that I quoted.
If you concede that Aristotle is entitled to expound dialectically, then what is your complaint?
Again, I ask you where I said that Aristotle has a theory that prohibits one from making inferences. You quoted words that I wrote but read into them propositions that I did not express.
ReplyDeleteficino4ml,
DeleteIf I got something wrong, then please tell me what you really meant. I'm not a good guesser.
You wrote that Aristotle had violated one of his own theories. Which one was that?
@bmiller: I did not say that Aristotle violated one of his own theories. Once again, you seem unable to take in what is written.
DeleteI must make good on what I said some time ago, that continued discussion will not be beneficial to me (I can't speak for you).
Suit yourself.
DeleteI think our interaction has been beneficially to those following along.
Now that ficino4ml is done with this topic, there are a few quibbles that would have distracted from the main point I think he was trying to make.
DeleteThe first is that Galen's account of the nature of the brain would have been the accepted view while Aquinas was alive and since he never commented on Aristotle's view there is no reason to think he didn't accept Galen's view and no reason to attribute Aristotle's view on this to Aquinas.
Next, Aristotle was correct that the brain is not an organ of sensation. Eyes, ears, nose etc, are. Aristotle held that the brain dissipated heat from the blood and surmised this since animals without a brain were also without blood. I didn't see him claim metaphysical necessity for this, but rather reaching a tentative conclusion from observations like biologists of today do while studying parts of the body. He missed what Galen found to be a more important function of the brain but I don't know if he was wrong about the brain simply dissipating heat more than other parts. The brain generates a larger amount of heat through activity than most other parts and so must have a means of dissipating it. So a legitimate complaint would be that A missed important functions of the brain, but no so much that he got wrong the function(s) he addressed. Since he was not attempting a demonstration and he acknowledged his premises were not certain, his conclusions would necessarily be less than certain.
Prof. Feser,
ReplyDeleteHave you read Brain, Mind and Computers by Fr. Stanley Jaki? It's excellent!
I paid for my ebook version on the Rakuten Kobo website. Although you have to read it through their Rakuten Kobo app. It's a decent reading experience. (The app)
ReplyDeleteThe book is amazing!
My copy arrived today in Lisbon, ordered from Amazon Spain.
ReplyDeleteMy copy has shipped and Amazon says it will arrive Tuesday.
ReplyDeleteGood news. I received my copy from Amazon today!
ReplyDeleteHow's the book, bmiller? I'm considering it
DeleteHi SteveK,
DeleteI've been busy, so I only got through the introduction. It starts with an argument about one's knowledge of self from Augustine against sceptics similar to the one Decartes used. I hadn't heard that before, so I look forward more like that.
The book is 500 or so pages, with normal to small font so there's lots to read.
That's about all I can say for now.
No Kindle version in 2024?
ReplyDeleteThere's an EPUB version, e-ISBN 978-3-86838-606-6, which can be purchased from Editiones Scholasticæ.
Delete