To
oversimplify, intellectualism in the sense in question is the view that the
intellect is prior to the will, whereas voluntarism holds that he will is prior
to the intellect. That is to say, for
the intellectualist, the will only ever wills what the intellect first judges
to be in some way good; whereas for the voluntarist, the will wills what it does
independently of the intellect, and the intellect follows along for the ride. The dispute is thus over whether it is ultimately
the intellect or the will that is “in the driver’s seat” of human action. Naturally, things are more complicated than
that, but this characterization will do for present purposes.
Applied to
the issues of free will and moral responsibility, the dispute between
voluntarism and intellectualism cashes out in the difference between what theologian
Servais Pinckaers calls the “freedom of indifference” and “freedom for
excellence.” On the former conception of
free will, associated with Ockham, the will is of its nature indifferent toward
the various ends it might pursue, and thus is freer to the extent that it is at
any moment equally capable of choosing anything. The implication is that a will that is
strongly inclined to choose what is good rather than what is evil is less free
than a will that is not inclined in either direction. By contrast, on the conception of free will
as “freedom for excellence,” which is associated with Aquinas, the will is
inherently directed toward the good in the sense that pursuit of the good is
its final cause. The implication is that
the will is more free to the extent that it finds it easy to choose what is
good and less free to the extent that it does not.
How is this
relevant to The Vanishing? Let’s start with a brief summary of the
plot. (I’ll leave out the most crucial
spoilers, for any readers who haven’t seen it.)
The movie begins with Barney elaborately planning a kidnapping, for
reasons that are only revealed later and made especially hard to fathom given
that he otherwise seems like an ordinary, middle class loving father and
husband. Meanwhile, we’re introduced to writer
Jeff Harriman and his girlfriend Diane (played by Kiefer Sutherland and Sandra
Bullock, respectively) who are on vacation and stop at a large and busy gas
station, where Diane goes into the snack shop to pick up supplies. After waiting in the car for an unusually
long time, Jeff goes to look for Diane but can find her nowhere. The employees, customers, and police all prove
to be of no help in finding her, and she has vanished without a trace.
The movie
then flashes forward three years, and we find that Jeff has during that whole
time been looking for Diane without success.
He has posted fliers with Diane’s picture all over the vicinity of the
gas station, appeared on television to discuss the case, followed any lead he
can find, and repeatedly badgered the police, all to no avail. The search has become an obsession, and has
exhausted him. When he starts a new
relationship with a waitress named Rita (played by Nancy Travis) it seems he
may finally abandon the search. But then
Barney, who has been following the case during this time, decides to contact
Jeff and reveal that he is the one who abducted Diane. He promises Jeff that he can at long last
find out exactly what happened to her, but only if he agrees to experience what
she did – beginning with allowing Barney to drug Jeff with chloroform to knock
him out, just as he had drugged Diane.
I’ll leave
it to the interested reader to watch the movie and find out what happens. The relevance to voluntarism is this. When explaining to Jeff why he did what he
did, Barney begins by describing actions he had performed through the course of
his life despite their being dangerous.
One of them involved saving a drowning girl, which had made Barney a
hero in the eyes of his daughter. But
rather than gratifying Barney, his daughter’s admiration troubled him. He worried that he could not be worthy of
being thought by her to be a good man unless he was just as capable of doing
great evil as he was of doing good. And so he decided that he would prove to
himself that he was capable of such evil by doing the worst thing he could
think of to another person – which turned out to be Diane (and where we find
out exactly what he did to her by the end of the movie).
Barney’s
tale reveals, first, a fixation on the power of the will. He recounts jumping off a roof as a boy even
though he knew it was dangerous, and indeed resulted in him breaking his arm. Throughout the movie he is almost always
unflappable even in moments of distress, as when he suffers a serious beating
with equanimity. But the truly voluntarist
element is his apparent belief that a praiseworthy action could only flow from something
like what Pinckaers calls the “freedom of indifference” – that is to say, from a
will that was not in any way aimed at the good more than at anything else, but
opted for it anyway. This, it seems to
me, is the best way to make sense of Barney’s claim that he could only be
worthy of praise for his good action of saving the girl if he was no less
capable of an evil action like what he does to Diane. The kidnapping was, in effect, his way of
proving to himself that he did indeed possess the “freedom of indifference.”
Had he not been able to bring himself to do
such an evil thing, and had he saved the little girl because of an inclination toward
benevolence, this would have been perfectly consistent with what Pinckaers
calls the “freedom for excellence,” and would have been morally praiseworthy on
that conception of freedom. Barney’s
dissatisfaction with himself evinces an implicit rejection of this conception and
of its implications concerning what makes a person praiseworthy. But neither do his actions flow from any positive
inclination towards sadism, nor from a rejection of moral norms. He is portrayed as, in general, a pleasant
enough person. And he acknowledges that
it is just for Jeff to want Barney harmed for what he has done. He never evinces the slightest enjoyment of
causing others pain. All his actions are
performed in the bloodless manner of a scientific experiment (and indeed, it is
revealed that Barney is a chemistry professor).
He simply wants to make of his will something capable of anything.
Only a good
action that flows from this kind of
will is, he thinks, praiseworthy, and the reason seems to be that he thinks
only this kind of action would flow from the sheer arbitrary freedom of the will alone rather than from any
natural sentiment of benevolence or from a respect for rational criteria. This is, to be sure, a curious conception of
freedom and moral praiseworthiness, and quite perverse (indeed, depraved) from
the point of view of an intellectualist like Aquinas. But reading Barney as implicitly committed to
a conception of freedom as the “freedom of indifference” makes intelligible
what might otherwise seem a simply bizarre and incoherent character motivation.
If Barney
takes the voluntarist emphasis on the will to an extreme, there is also a sense
in which the other main character, Jeff, can be said to take the
intellectualist emphasis on the intellect to an extreme. His new girlfriend Rita grows increasingly
frustrated with his inability to overcome his obsession with finding
Diane. She is, more than anything,
jealous of this lost former girlfriend she has to compete with. Jeff explains that Rita is the one he loves,
and that romantic longing no longer has anything to do with his obsession with
finding Diane. It is not knowing that bothers him. He admits that if he had a choice between two
scenarios, one in which Diane is alive somewhere and happy but he never finds
out what happened, and one in which he does find out but she is dead, he would
prefer the latter. Whereas Barney has
made himself into a blind will divorced from intellect and its standards of
truth and goodness, Jeff has made himself into an intellect obsessed with
attaining a certain piece of knowledge to the exclusion of willing what is in
fact good.
Related posts:
Pop
culture roundup [where you’ll find other pretentious philosophical analyses
of movies, music, comics, and the like]
Extremist positions have the dual benefits of being both simple and logically consistent.
ReplyDeleteThat's why it so very important to be right about your position, and understandable that those so convinced become extreme.
Delete@TimTheWhite
DeleteIt's worth pointing out that when St. Thomas Aquinas flourished, the axiomatic method was not studied. There was no notion that all logic begins with an arbitrary choice of a finite number of postulates and from these all propositions follow. He believed that the five axioms of Euclidean geometry were in some way knowable by pure thought, in an ineffable sense.
Seeing that all logic begins with arbitrary starting axioms, it truly is the case that the will is the first mover and not the intellect. But you must have the wisdom to choose the best axioms.
ll logic begins with an arbitrary choice of a finite number of postulates and from these all propositions follow. He believed that the five axioms of Euclidean geometry were in some way knowable by pure thought, in an ineffable sense.
DeleteWell, no, that's not what he thought. He thought that there are true axioms that are per se true, AND that they can be known without proofs, but not by "pure thought" in the way of Kant's a priori stuff. Aquinas definitely required - for human knowing of these axioms - the prior input of sensations, and the development of concepts and universals, and the apprehension of natures, and the capacity for propositions, all of this taking place only because we first have sense input on which to work.
Seeing that all logic begins with arbitrary starting axioms,
If they are truly arbitrary, then there is no particular objection to picking axiom sets that harbor inherent inconsistencies (even if they are not immediately obvious). For, a preference for consistency would be, itself, merely an arbitrary choice. But since that is both incoherent AND patently not what we actually choose to do, it's implausible that all axioms are arbitrary choices.
@Tony
DeleteIf they are truly arbitrary, then there is no particular objection to picking axiom sets that harbor inherent inconsistencies (even if they are not immediately obvious).
The axioms of an axiomatic logical system are arbitrary, but they're not that arbitrary. They need to be consistent enough to be conceivable.
A axiomatic logical system with blatantly contradictory axioms is like visualizing a square circle. An axiomatic logical system with inherent contradictions that are not immediately obvious are like visualizing a Penrose triangle or an impossible trident.
The axioms of an axiomatic logical system are arbitrary,...
DeleteYou have again asserted a claim. The Thomistic claim is against this, that some principles are self-evidently true. Simply asserting your claim over again without support is not moving the ball forward.
but they're not that arbitrary. They need to be consistent enough to be conceivable.
Says who? Arbitrary is arbitrary. You want axioms that don't run into inconsistencies. Someone else might want axioms that do. There is no judging between them if they are truly arbitrary. If you want to judge between them, you have to claim a principle by which to judge them, and then a principle by which to assert THAT principle, etc.
A axiomatic logical system with blatantly contradictory axioms is like visualizing a square circle. An axiomatic logical system with inherent contradictions that are not immediately obvious are like visualizing a Penrose triangle or an impossible trident.
Because people are knuckleheads, sometimes they imagine X and Y are true, even though X and Y are contradictory. Sometimes they just don't care that they are contradictory, like supposing a square circle. They say: so what? Sometimes they can't see the contradiction, and in that case they aren't aware of any problem...just like others aren't aware of any problem in their axiomatic system. If you have a complex set of axioms, say in excess of 30, is there a way to be absolutely certain there are no contradictions, short of generating every possible logical sequence and checking for contradictions?
@Anonymous:
Delete"You have again asserted a claim. The Thomistic claim is against this, that some principles are self-evidently true. Simply asserting your claim over again without support is not moving the ball forward."
The claim is also complete and utter rubbish, so there is really nothing to respond to -- whether you are a Thomist or not.
@Anonymous
DeleteSays who? Arbitrary is arbitrary. You want axioms that don't run into inconsistencies. Someone else might want axioms that do. There is no judging between them if they are truly arbitrary. If you want to judge between them, you have to claim a principle by which to judge them, and then a principle by which to assert THAT principle, etc.
If someone chooses an axiomatic system that has inconsistencies... that's kind of like introducing the time-turner from Harry Potter: inconsistent axioms prove everything, which in turn kills all the dramatic tension in the logical deduction. The final end of a logical system is to have the power to discern what is provable and what is not provable, which inconsistent axioms frustrate.
If you have a complex set of axioms, say in excess of 30, is there a way to be absolutely certain there are no contradictions, short of generating every possible logical sequence and checking for contradictions?
Yes! If you can create an object that models all those axioms (e.g. the way a Rubik's cube models the axioms of group theory) then you have successfully proven that those axioms are 100% consistent.
If you have enough brute computational power, there's also a combinatorial way to check if a set of axioms are consistent, but I think the fastest known algorithm grows phenomenally fast as a function of the number of axioms. Like faster than e^(e^n).
Barney also makes a good example of what it might look like if someone actually lives out the implications of some philosophical worldviews. There are many that would result in monsters. Fortunately, most people with such beliefs don't act them out.
ReplyDeleteI believe that we have free will, and I remember years ago having the thought that I could make a philosophical point by freely choosing to do something completely evil and out of character, like killing my children. Obviously I would never want to do that, but it’s a creepy thought. Glad someone made a movie out of it.
ReplyDeleteHave you ever wonderen why you would never want to do that?
DeleteBecause obviously some people do want to do that.
WCB
ReplyDeleteFalse dilemma? Neither either or? Perhaps intellectualism and voluntarism are entertwined in complex manners.
WCB
Counting off the minutes until someone asserts that inasmuch as free will and good and evil do not exist, determinism renders the whole issue moot.
ReplyDeleteRegardless of what your view is of the actual operation of the human will, the last century and more has given us a pretty good indication of the human freak show that ensues both globally and locally from adopting a voluntarist anthropology and with the reduction of reason to a purely instrumental "faculty"; and the human being itself to a bag of welling self-justifying and unarbitratible* appetites.
ReplyDelete*Not sure, but I might have made that word up. Not going to bother searching.
You made it up.
Delete"You made it up."
DeleteWell then, if so, you probably read it here first.
"Incommensurable" or "unrankable" don"t cover the case. "Non[ ]comparable" is not even close.
Adjusting the spelling to an "a" instead of an 'i" would however have followed traditional construction forms which had not mutated over time.
"Nonarbitratable", presented as a compound still sounds like legalese and would convey such a particular sense.
Henceforth then, let it be "unarbitratable".
This, when refering to the relative qualities of those chaotic, welling, imagined to be intrinsically non justicible and not-to-be-evaluated or ranked urges, which are so celebrated by those appetite expressing entities once categorized [before categories were themselves disposed of as arbitrary conventions] as persons recognized as like one's self in some significant way. Persons, that is, who partake in a common and objectively shared moral humanity. A common humanity, that is, which putatively demands recognition as implying at least some intrinsic mutual obligations regarding conduct and consideration.
Thank you for the contribution.
WCB
ReplyDeleteEzekiel 36:27 And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them.
If we take this and other similar verses in the Bible seriously, God does not have to grant us free will to do evil. With the Great Commission God could do this for all mankind. And that means ones' will would trump our intellect. So if God can do this as promised, volunteerism would be the answer.
Now the question is, if God could do this, why doesn't God do this. And free will is not an answer. Romans 11 claims God hardened the hearts of the Jews not to believe Jesus was the Messiah. Why not harden the hearts of all mankind to believe?
WCB
"The reputation of 1993’s The Vanishing has suffered because critics judge it inferior to the 1988 Dutch movie ..."
ReplyDeleteSpent time yesterday sampling the original Dutch film based on, The Golden Egg. The movie is not conventionally linear and for reasons of effective exposition probably couldn't be. Watched only the initial scenes until the vanishing event itself, and the end without jumping about. The rest I sampled.
Did notice that in the Dutch film, there is the potential of another theme to account for the protagonist's obsession: guilt. It is not a direct responsibility. But it's a guilt over his initially cowardly - though that could be argued - petulant, and abandoning road trip behavior just prior to the incident where Saskia vanishes.
Briefly, there is a tension between the couple as they travel through France; during which Saskia recounts to Rex a recurrent dream she has had about floating alone and lonely in a golden egg.
Rex is driving and his stubbornness in not refueling opportunely and his snide remarks about the French scenery, reveals a subtle battle of the wills.
When this willfullness, and a desire to keep her a little off balance and in her place results in their running out of fuel in a dark mountain tunnel, exposing them to the danger of being struck by oncoming vehicles, he refuses to stay with her as she desperately seeks a flashlight. This, because as he says it will be a fruitless search as a result of their earlier disorganized packing. To be safe they must instead leave the car pronto.
The result is he abandons her in the car while she is frantically searching for the light. He walks back the way they came, while she cries out to him from the car not to leave her. Out of the tunnel and into the sunlight he can still hear her pleading. Rather than pause and urge her to join him, he smiles slightly and just keeps walking.
The upshot of this preliminary and presaging incident is that he eventually returns carrying a small plastic can of gasoline and on reentering the dark tunnel finds the car lights on, doors open, minus Saskia. Driving forward and exiting the tunnel, he rolls up to Saskia, standing forlorn and emotionally devastated, on the roadside, clutching the large flashlight.
He's emotionally chastened, she is deflated and disillusioned in him. They gradually rebond in a series of exchanges in the car and on the lawn of the next rest stop, as he explicitly pledges himself to her.
It is immediately after this heartfelt reconciliation and recomittment, that she, glowing with love and coltish reassurance, is inspired to go and get them both some refreshments - her treat. She takes her fateful trip into the service station mini mart and commisary, and meets her kidnapper.
Now I am uncertain as to whether Rex ever discovers the fact, but one scene makes it clear to us that she is lured to the kidnapper's car by the promise of being able to purchase a celebratory gift chain for Rex out of the kidnapper's pretended vehicle stored inventory: A chain with an 'R" engraved on it.
Rex then, has through a series of self-indulgent and passive aggressive behaviors, set in motion a series of events that leads to the death of Saskia.
His stubborness is step one. His passive aggressive cruelty and abandonment during the fallout is step two. The (ideally unnecessary) rebonding of the couple and his remorseful and heartfelt recomittment to her after his devastating abandonment, then puts the final emotional element in place which leads her in a celebratory desire to please him and confirm the restoration of their bond, to her death.
Is Rex then, inside that other drifting golden egg she has dreamed of meeting up with in her own cosmic loneliness; the egg which when encountered will lead to the destruction of both? As Ed points out, Dutch film is different.
Garden of Eden and Fall isn't it? While in Hinduism ' the golden egg' in the cosmic loneliness had the creator of the Manifest universe, Brahma. The universe is thus called Brahm'annda' 'annda' means egg.
DeleteGnosis is desire for 'knowledge' to create world that I will.
Once it is conceded that "Only a good action that flows from this kind of will [i.e. an indifferent one] is, he thinks, praiseworthy . . ." the cat is already out of the bag for if the will is truly indifferent, there is no "good action".
ReplyDeleteThat's pretty much my response to this, as well. For the voluntarist, it is difficult to see what even constitutes the principle of "good" at all, so that one can identify good choice from bad choice.
DeleteSo far as I can see in modern voluntarism, say post-Nietzschke, the trend has been to say that "to will something" is what is good, as such, and ultimately praise and blame are pointless categories with respect to that - they are category mistakes. The man who "freely" wills is living, and the man who only ever reacts is a dead end, might as well be dead anyway. This might be only an extremist position, but I am not sure how a voluntarist avoids landing there.
"So far as I can see in modern voluntarism, say post-Nietzschke, the trend has been to say that "to will something" is what is good, as such, and ultimately praise and blame are pointless categories with respect to that - they are category mistakes. The man who "freely" wills is living, and the man who only ever reacts ..."
DeleteYou must have read some Heidegger; or at least Heideggerian philosophy.
At least the stuff before the so-called "turn" ( assuming that that is real). That, or productions based on what early interpreters imagined was being stated: speaking here of that walleyed piece of shite French philosopher.
In any event, this question of the freedom of the will bears an obvious structural parallel in terms of analyzing that particular question to the related questions of the good and of objectivity, as you imply.
Eschewing any mysterianism and assuming that "the will" is understood as intention in the phenomenological senses, it becomes puzzling what could possibly be meant by freedom of the will beyond the relatively unconstrained ability to deliberatively form intentions and make choices and selections from among perceived options and objects.
And that is reasonable enough.
Now however, what the supposed freedom of a will to be free to not only make unforced choices, but to also sit somehow above itself and all contexts and inputs, and then to arbitrarily will what it will will as in some sovereign superexecutive understanding of "the will", is perfectly opaque in meaning.
It makes no more sense than to insist that what ordinary science calls objective is not objective because it does not meet the anti-metaphysical metaphysical conceptual imaginings of the critic. In other words, one must nonsensically concede the insistence that in order to grant validity to the concept(s), there must be a will beyond the will, [and in parallel], a nature beyond any supernature, or an objectivity beyond all possible origins, and yet all be nonetheless weighed in the same scale and by the same protocol as used locally.
And if not, so the routine goes, then our concepts - and that which they cover, are supposedly meaningless, and by supposed implication, any referent, necessarily nonexistent.
It represents a curious frame of mind evincing a remarkable stolidity.
Ed, what are your views on Fr Servais Pinckaers more generally? To my mind, he makes a very strong case that the 'manuals' of the Tridentine/Vatican I era should be seen as a break with the Patristic/Thomistic tradition, not a continuation of it. He shows how strongly they're influenced by nominalism and voluntarism, by a view of ethics that takes obligation as the fundamental principle, by a view of law that sees it as essentially the domination of one will (God's) over another (man's), etc. He argues that, unlike the Summa, the manuals rarely talk about man's final end, which is happiness; that they underestimate the idea of virtue as a habit; and that in general they're heavily influenced by what Pinckaers calls 'freedom of indifference'.
ReplyDeleteLiturgically I'm a thoroughgoing traditionalist, but I think he makes a very strong case, and I think it's one reason that the post Vatican II-revolution happened, and also why traditionalism isn't stronger today. Most traditionalists are unaware of the massive break caused by nominalism in 14th century, and how it's influenced so much that's come after it.
But I'd be most interested to hear your views.
John Lamont has written quite a bit around the same topic: https://acu-au.academia.edu/JohnLamont
English Catholc
DeleteRead about the manuals in this book that you can read free online at the Internet Archive.
The making of moral theology : a study of the Roman ...
Internet Archive
https://archive.org › details › makingofmoralthe0000...
Mar 19, 2021 — The making of moral theology : a study of the Roman Catholic tradition ; Publication date: 1987 ; Topics ...
I have only ever dabbled in bits and pieces of manuals, and not much at that, so I can't say I know what they are about. But I can say that they always struck me as not intending to lay out the totality of the good life in Christ, but to speak primarily of guardrails, going beyond which certainly bad. That is to say, if they are not designed to point to perfection, but to point out mortal sin, it is of little significance to note that they "rarely talk about man's final end."
DeleteThe trouble is that the manuals (argues Fr Pinckaers) were greatly influenced by nominalism/voluntarism. If he's right, then the manuals must therefore give a misleading understanding of why the guardrails are there. Further, we can't understand the means if our idea of the end is wrong. If we don't know what happiness is -- and we can't know what happiness is if we're nominalists/voluntarists or heavily influenced by those ideas -- then it is very likely that our understanding of the means will have significant errors of omissions.
DeleteOn the same note, if we don't understand that virtue is a habit, viz. a kind of relation between the parts of oneself; that the passions are per se good; that the will is intrinsically and always inclined towards the perceived good; that the person in a state of grace is intrinsically pleasing to God; that every singular action is either good or bad, therefore every non-sinful action performed in a state of grace is per se meritorious (at least that's my understanding of St Thomas); etc etc -- in other words, if we don't understand and appreciate the main differences between the traditional and the nominalist views of ethics -- then even our understanding of the means will be out of line.
To be clear, I'm not out to attack the manuals, and they're clearly better than most of the stuff printed since Vatican II. And as I said, I'm a thoroughgoing liturgical traditionalist and can see that the Church of 1960 was far ahead of the Church of today, on any number of measures. But I see more and more that there were big problems with pre-V2 Catholicism, and with what is called traditionalism today. And I think the nominalist and voluntarist influences explain a huge amount of the problem, since these ideas are so ingrained in Catholics' worldview that they're affected by them even if they formally reject them. So my interest isn't the manuals, but with trying to get to the bottom of the current crisis and its causes.
@Anonymous
DeleteThe Jesuits have been a big part of the problem from their very inception, so anything written by an SJ is going to be viewed with great suspicion by me at this stage :)
https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2018/10/tyranny-and-sexual-abuse-in-catholic.html
Certainly the Jesuits have been a big part of the problem in the past 100+ years. Since their inception? Suarez and Bellarmine were Jesuits, and Bellarmine is a Doctor of the Church.
DeleteI believe that there may be a strain of voluntarism in some of the early-ish Jesuits; likewise there seems to have been a strain of Jesuits who believed in a kind of absolute obedience to a superior, even to the point of not even questioning orders to commit what is intrinsically disordered. I wonder if these are related? Either way, I don't think that all of the Jesuits were infected by these strains. I had an old Jesuit professor (educated in the old, old ways) who was certainly free from such nonsense.
I don't doubt that there were strong influences of nominalism in the manuals, but there was no necessity that this be the case, it seems to be mainly an historical accident. There were nominalist influences outside of the manuals, as well, so tracking what led to this crisis doesn't seem to hang so much on the manuals as such, as on the nominalists. And, later, the modernists. (But of course the nominalists paved the way for modernism in the Church, as well.)
Thanks for your response. To deal with your last paragraph first: I agree that there is nothing formally nominalist about the manuals. And I agree that the big problem is nominalism, not the manuals as such. I guess I saw Ed's mention of Fr Pinckaers, remembered that he'd compared St Thomas and the Fathers to the manuals, and was curious what he thought of it -- which is why I framed my question in terms of the manuals. I later answered my own question by reading http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/03/scholastics-bookshelf-part-iii.html -- there's quite a bit in the comments there about Pinckaers and the manuals.
DeleteOn the Jesuits, the Rorate Caeli article I linked to argues that the problems with their novel concept of obedience go back to St Ignatius himself, although later Jesuits greatly amplified them. This concept absolutely derives from nominalism/voluntarism. I saw an intriguing note on Google books that argues that St Ignatius was studying at Paris at a time when nominalism was the dominant school of thought; it would be an interesting thing to study more. Of course, I'm talking about a tendency within the order, not every individual Jesuit. Also, it seems that Suarez is not in agreement with St Thomas on some major points. Ott's Fundamentals lists quite a few of them. IIRC, Suarez claims that the fact that an action is ordered towards beatitude does not, of itself, make it good; God must explicitly command it for it to be truly good. This seems a very long way from St Thomas. I'm going on memory here though.
IIRC, Suarez claims that the fact that an action is ordered towards beatitude does not, of itself, make it good; God must explicitly command it for it to be truly good.
DeleteHuh, yeah, that's very voluntarist and very non-Thomistic. I had not heard such things of Suarez, but I have only read snippets quoted from him, none of his actual works or commentary.
I did mis-remember, apologies. It's not quite as bad as I stated, but still very strange to Thomist ears.
DeleteThe following is from https://www.academia.edu/2232272/St_Thomas_Aquinas_vs_moralities_of_conscience:
"For Suarez – a characteristic representative of Counter-Reformation theology, as the
official theologian of the Society of Jesus – the content of what is good is given by the nature of
things, and this goodness can provide a motivation for action. It cannot, however, make an action obligatory, and thus cannot furnish a basis for morality and for law. The command of God adds the extra ingredient needed to achieve this. Law, in the mind of the legislator, consists in a just and right act of will by which a superior wills to oblige an inferior to do this or that thing."
(The reference to Suarez is in the text I linked to.)
So Suarez agrees with St Thomas that being ordered towards finality/beatitude makes a thing good, but disagrees that it makes it obligatory. Law is divorced from the Good and from our last end.
It's an interesting "distinction", and yes that is clearly a departure from Thomas. For my part, I would ask of Suarez "what if the Lawgiver commanded something in contradiction to the person's nature" to test his claimed distinction.
DeleteThe true answer is of course that God could not command something contrary to his own will, and his will is determinate when he creates a creature with a given nature. And from there, it is of course no difficulty at all to proceed to the point that of course God wills that the created being follow its nature. To my recollection, St. Thomas explicitly draws out the parallel between non-free beasts (and lower creatures) that follow God's law as a matter of course, and man who is free to choose to follow God's law (or to not choose), but in either case God's law is God's will for the created beings. "Law" isn't a superadded action on God's part separate from his will in creating free creatures. In saying that there is a "natural law" he is saying that law is in rational creatures from the mere fact of their rational natures:
Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.
Even the generally excellent Right and Reason by Fr Austin Fagothey SJ seems to be affected by this voluntarist-leaning tendency. From p.200 of the TAN Books edition:
DeleteWhen we say that all moral obligation comes from our last end, do we mean the subjective or objective last end, [viz.] do we mean the happiness we are to experience in possessing God or God Himself as the Supreme Excellence and Highest Good? The two are inseparable, but the second is logically prior. God deserves our obedience because He is good in Himself, and only secondarily because He is good to us. His command is not, "If you do this, you will be eternally happy," but simply, "Do this." This command, being absolute, unconditional, categorical, imposes moral obligation. The obligation, once established, is then enforced by a suitable sanction, the gain or loss of eternal happiness...
"[Only God] determines the necessary connection between the observances of the moral law and man's last end, and makes the attainment of the last end absolutely mandatory..."
Again, this is very strange to someone who's been reading St Thomas. There is no 'imposition' of 'moral obligation', two concepts that I believe are foreign to St Thomas (though I haven't read widely enough to say this with certainty). There is no 'enforcement' by giving or withdrawing eternal happiness. Rather, man by his very nature desires happiness, and only the 'posession' of God can give happiness, and therefore 'moral obligation', if we must call it that, flows from man's nature. If man pursues God as his last end, the result is that he will be happy; if he pursues something else, the result is that he will be eternally unhappy. Of course, 'moral obligation' does also flow from God, but through man's nature, not 'imposed' on it from outside.
Again, God doesn't 'make the attainment of the last end absolutely mandatory' (again a concept I think is foreign to St Thomas) apart from man's nature. Yes, there are also 'external' commands given us by God. But what makes them laws rather than mere desires -- and what makes rewards/punishment right and good, rather than mere expressions of power -- is their conformity to our nature.
This passage strikes me as similar to Suarez's that we just discussed.
@Feser:
ReplyDeleteYou miss a point.
I think, its not just vuluntarism but the notation of a kind of nietzschen perfectibilism. "You cannot be truelly good if you're just unable to do evil".
So, the perfect individual must be both: Able to do good and evil.
Fathers McHugh and Callan wrote a 2Vol Moral Theology Manual in the 1930s
ReplyDeletehttps://archive.org/stream/moraltheologyaco35354gut/35354.txt
Rev. Jone also wrote one in the 1960s that was translated into English
file:///C:/Users/jslpublic/Downloads/Moral%20Theology%20-%20Jone,%20Heribert,%20O.F.M.%20Cap.,%20J_7255.pdf
This is a very important and provocative post!
ReplyDeleteBy considering the motivation of Barney and its relation to a voluntarist personality, we can see that a voluntarist will is capable of instrumentalizing another human being just for the sake of its will (in that case, like it was a scientific experiment).
By contrast, an intellectualist will acknowledge that doing something that is bad in nature or even evil to another human being will refrain from doing that.
I may be a little bit biased because I too think that a will is freer when it can choose good things, but the contrast between the 'freedom of indifference' and 'freedom for excellence' is a good way that we can see that a voluntarist will can (at least sometimes) be more prone to immoral actions.
Great post, Ed!
I will look for this flick here in Brazil, it seems an intriguing history btw.
Hello, everyone. Mr. Feser, I have never been able to understand how someone could take the voluntarianist view of the will, and I will try to explain my problem with it. If you could, perhaps, explain to me what I am missing.
ReplyDeleteThe main issue I have with the voluntarianist position is that, as far as I can see, free will can only be understood in the context of intentionality. We choose this or that action for a reason. The only alternative to that would be to have our actions be completely random.
But if our free will is necessarily guided by intention, then it must be guided by intellect, for it is through the intellect that we can understand and judge intentions. The form of a truly voluntarianist intellect, as far as I can see, would look something like the Azathoth deity from the stories by H. P. Lovecraft. A creature with power but incapable of acting with any constancy, being even given the title of blind idiot god.
"If you could, perhaps, explain to me what I am missing."
DeleteI meant to write after that that "I would be thankful". Sorry if my comment came out as rude, it really wasn't my intention.