Saturday, February 15, 2020

The socialist state as an occasionalist god


Hobbes famously characterized his Leviathan state as a mortal god.  Here’s another theological analogy, or set of analogies, which might illuminate the differences between kinds of political and economic orders – and in particular, the differences between socialism, libertarianism, and the middle ground natural law understanding of the state.

Recall that there are three general accounts of divine causality vis-à-vis the created order: occasionalism, mere conservationism, and concurrentism (to borrow Fred Freddoso’s classification).
 
Occasionalism holds that God alone has causal efficacy, and the apparent causal power of created things is illusory.  It seems to us that the sun causes the ice in your lemonade to melt, but it is really God causing it to melt, on the occasion when the sun is out.  It seems that it is the cue ball that knocks the eight ball into the corner pocket, but it is really God who does so, on the occasion when the cue ball makes contact with it.  And so on.  Created things no more act than puppets do.  Just as it is really the puppeteer who moves the puppet around the stage by means of its strings, with the puppet doing nothing, so too it is God who brings about every effect in the world.  Indeed, created things are more like shadow puppets than the kind moved about by strings.  The latter sort of puppet might have at least an indirect causal efficacy by virtue of accidentally knocking into other things, but a shadow puppet cannot do even that much.  And neither can any created thing, according to occasionalism.

Mere conservationism, by contrast, holds that created things not only have causal power, but exercise it completely independently of God.  God merely conserves them in existence as they do so, while playing no role in their efficacy.  Though God keeps the sun in existence, it is the sun and the sun alone that causes your ice to melt.  Though God keeps the cue ball in existence, it is the cue ball and the cue ball alone that causes the eight ball to move.  And so on. 

Concurrentism is a middle ground position.  It holds, contra mere conservationism, that God not only conserves things in existence, but also must concur or cooperate with their activity if they are to have any efficacy.  But it also holds, contra occasionalism, that created things do have real efficacy, even if not on their own.  To borrow an example from Freddoso, when you use a piece of blue chalk to write on the chalkboard, the chalk would be unable to have this effect if you were not moving it.  Left to itself, it would simply lie there.  All the same, its nature makes a real contribution to the effect insofar as the letters would not be blue if the piece of chalk were not itself blue.  Or consider a battery-powered toy car.  The motor really does move the wheels of the car and thus the car itself, but would not be able to do so if not for the battery that powers it.  God is like you in Freddoso’s example or like the battery in mine.  He must concur or cooperate with the cause if it is to have its effect, but the cause nevertheless makes a real contribution of its own.

One reason to prefer concurrentism to these alternatives derives from the Scholastic principle agere sequitur esse or “action follows being.”  On this principle, what a thing does reflects what it is.  If created things don’t really do anything, as occasionalism holds, then it seems they have no reality at all.  God alone is real, and when we observe what we take to be created things in action, what we are really observing is God in action.  Occasionalism thus collapses into pantheism.  Hence if pantheism is false, so too occasionalism must be false. 

If, by contrast, created things can act entirely apart from God, then it seems (given that action follows being) that they can exist entirely apart from God.  Divine conservation would go out the window with divine concurrence.  Mere conservationism thus collapses into atheism, so that if atheism is false, so too mere conservationism must be false. 

Concurrentism would thus stand as the only way rightly to understand the relationship between God and the world given that agere sequitur esse.  The world has real causal efficacy of its own because its existence is really distinct from God’s, but it nevertheless requires God to concur in its causal activity just as it requires God to conserve it in existence. (For more on all of this, see Five Proofs of the Existence of God, especially pp. 232-46.)

Now, what does all this have to do with the varieties of political order?  Again, I would propose that there is an analogy here with the relationship between socialism, libertarianism, and the traditional natural law understanding of the state.  In a lecture on socialism and the family that I gave about a year ago, I noted that socialism involves centralized governmental ownership of the basic means of production and distribution, and that the ownership of a thing, in turn, entails having a bundle of rights over it.  Hence, the more rights a government claims over the basic economic means of a society, the more it claims de facto ownership over them, and the closer it approximates to a socialist system.  Socialism can come in degrees.  (Listen to the lecture for qualifications and details.) 

That is a point about the economic aspect of socialism, but as I noted in the same lecture, there is also an ethos or moral vision associated with it.  In particular, it is a collectivist ethos according to which the basic economic means are owned and utilized by government for the sake of society as a whole, rather than for the sake of any individual or group within society.  One could develop this ethos further in at least two ways.  One could take society to be a kind of organism of which individual citizens are like mere dispensable cells or organs, to be sacrificed for the good of the whole if necessary in the way that an organ or cells can be shed for the sake of the preservation of the body.  Totalitarian forms of socialism approximate this extreme form of collectivism.  Alternatively, one could take all individual citizens to have inherent and equal value, and therefore not to be sacrificed for the good of the whole even if they are expected to work for the good of the whole.  Egalitarian forms of socialism would correspond to this less extreme form of collectivism.

Now, when you use something that I own and you use it only in the ways that I direct you to use it, I can be said to be acting through you.  You function merely as my agent.  Your acts are really my acts insofar as you serve as a kind of extension of myself.  For example, a lawyer or employee might function this way.  Similarly, the more rights a socialist state would claim over both the resources that its citizens use and over decisions about the ways that they may use them, and the more such a state regards citizens as mere organs or cells of the social whole, the more fully it can be said to treat citizens merely as extensions of itself. 

Here, I would suggest, we have something analogous to occasionalism, with the socialist state serving as a rough analogue to the occasionalist understanding of God and individual citizens roughly analogous to created things as conceived of on occasionalism.  The more fully the citizens have to follow the directives of the state, the more akin they are to the inefficacious physical objects of occasionalism – mere puppets of which the state is the puppeteer.  It is really the state that acts through them, just as for the occasionalist it is really God rather than the sun making the ice melt.  And a totalitarian socialist state that treats society as a whole as if it were the only real substance, with individual citizens merely its cells, is analogous to an occasionalism that has collapsed into pantheism.  Only society really exists, with the citizens being its appendages, just as on pantheism only God really exists and the things and events of our experience are really nothing more than his manifestations. 

Now consider the opposite extreme from this point of view.  Suppose you take the libertarian position that the state has absolutely no rights over any resources, or any say over how they are to be used, other than the bare minimum necessary in order to carry out the “minimal state” or “night watchman state” functions of protecting individual rights to life, liberty, and property.  It is individual citizens who own almost all resources and have the right to decide how they are to be used, sold, given away, or otherwise exchanged in free market transactions.  Government serves only to keep the system humming by enforcing contracts and punishing rights violations. 

This, I submit, is roughly analogous to the mere conservationist model, on which God merely keeps things in existence from moment to moment while they operate completely independently of him.  And the more extreme anarcho-capitalist version of libertarianism, which privatizes everything and abolishes the state entirely, is, by extension, analogous to deleting God from even a conserving role vis-à-vis the world, resulting in atheism.

Now, in an earlier post I have expounded the traditional natural law conception of the state, which can be seen as a kind of middle ground position between socialism and libertarianism insofar as it is guided by the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity – principles which reflect our nature as rational social animals.  As social animals, we come into the world not as individualist atoms having no need for or obligations toward others, but rather as members of communities – the family first and foremost, but also the local community, the nation, and ultimately the human race as a whole.  As rational animals, we require a considerable range of freedom of thought and action in order to realize the ends toward which we are directed by our nature, including our social ends. 

Solidarity and subsidiarity balance these considerations.  As organic parts of larger social wholes, our flourishing as individuals goes hand in hand with that of those larger wholes, just as the flourishing of a part of the body goes hand in hand with that of the whole organism.  The eye or the foot can flourish only if the whole body does, and the whole body can flourish only insofar as parts like the eye and foot do.  Just as these parts must do their part relative to the whole body, so too must the individual do his part relative to the family, the nation, etc.  And just as the whole organism must guarantee the health of its parts, so too do larger social orders have an obligation to each individual member.  Solidarity thus rules out a libertarian or individualist model on which we have no obligations to others other than those we consent to.  That would be like the eye or foot having no natural ordering to the good of the body as a whole, or the body as a whole having no natural ordering to the good of these parts.

On the other hand, given our rationality, the organic analogy is not a perfect one.  Each of us has a capacity for individual thought and action that literal body parts do not have, and which entails that we are more than mere cells or organs of a larger social body.  Literal body parts cannot understand themselves and their relation to the whole body, or choose whether and how to fulfill their roles relative to the whole.  We can do so, and to flourish as rational agents we thus require as much freedom of thought and action as is consistent with our need for and obligations to larger social orders.  There is also the consideration that the organic analogy is stronger the more proximate is the social whole of which one is a part.  Our needs and obligations relative to the family are stronger than our needs and obligations relative to the nation, and our needs and obligations relative to the nation are stronger than our needs and obligations relative to humanity as a whole.  Hence the natural law model entails a special regard for family and nation over the “global community,” even if the latter deserves some regard as well.  Subsidiarity thus rules out any socialist absorption of the individual into a communal blob.  It also requires that larger level social orders (such as governments) interfere with the actions of lower level orders (such as families and individuals) only where strictly necessary.  The presumption is in favor of freedom of action, even if this presumption can in some cases be overridden.

Now, this natural law model of society is, I would suggest, roughly analogous to the concurrentist model of the created order’s relation to divine action.  As rational animals, we really do act on our own rather than as mere extensions of society, just as created things really do have causal efficacy of their own rather than being nothing more than manifestations of God’s action.  As social animals, we nevertheless really do depend on larger social wholes for our capacity to act as rational creatures, just as created things depend on God for their capacity to act at all.  The natural law model is a middle ground conception of the relation of individual and society falling between the socialist and libertarian extremes, just as the concurrentist model is a middle ground conception of the relation of created things to God falling between the occasionalist and mere conservationist extremes.  Or to extend the analogy in a slightly more fine-grained way, the sequence:

pantheism, occasionalism, concurrentism, mere conservationism, atheism

is roughly analogous to the sequence:

totalitarian socialism, egalitarian socialism, natural law, libertarianism, anarcho-capitalism

I suggest only that there is an interesting parallelism here, and not that the analogy could be pushed much further than what I have already said.  And it goes without saying that there are all sorts of ways that the analogy might break down.  Nor am I claiming that there are any interesting practical implications of this analogy.  It just struck me that there is an analogy here, that’s all.  It is also important not to misunderstand the point of the analogy.  I am not claiming that the state is divine, or that there is necessarily any special connection between anarcho-capitalism and atheism, or any special connection between socialism and pantheism!  None of those things is true, and none of them follow from the analogy. 

113 comments:

  1. If God is purely simple and omnipotent how does he possess all powers? Doesn’t that mean he needs a composing cause since some beings have some powers and others have others?

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    1. No ominsicence and omnipotence aren´t attributed to God, but derived from the simple nature. So his power to create everything is his knowledge of everything.

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  2. What exactly is the difference between mere conservationism and concurrentism, though?

    If created beings cannot exercise their causal powers without God keeping them in being, this entails logically that the causal powers created beings have are also kept in being by God, so causal power is also constantly actualised by God.

    But this is just a logical consequence of God keeping things in being at every moment - does mere conservationism state that God somehow keeps things in being but that the causal efficacy of things is somehow not kept in being by God?

    If so, this position doesn't make any sense.

    The analogy of the battery powered toy is also far better than the chalk analogy, since the movements of the toy aren't caused by the battery, only the power is given to the toy to move how it wants.

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    1. The mereconservationist is the one who fails to see this logical consequence.

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    2. Huh. In that case, mere conservationism isn't even on the table as s possible option since it isn't logical in the first place.

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    3. Well I assumed Feser meant something like Deism, where God exists to create everything & set it in motion at the beginning, but otherwise, doesn't interact with it.

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    4. What do you mean by "interact"? Do you mean having no relation?

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  3. The casual efficacy might exist apart from God, if he only sustains being. Or this "moving" power could be God, without falling into pantheism

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    1. Well causal efficacy follows from having being, and so God is the continuous existential cause of both the sheer being of things but also the causal efficacy of things since that also exists and is constantly dependent on God.

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    2. people try actually to construe airtight arguments against stuff you can't refute, like Occasionalism. Maybe God gets more glory by being the one pushing the ball. You guess are lacking in imagination or mysticism or both

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  4. Feser is denying that spontaneous randomness is a property of our universe, contra Bell's theorem and Teihard. I would like him to write a piece on predestination, because Thomism and Augustine's camp are not family friendly. If God acts so that ultimately all things ends as He wants it, then He doesn't truly desire to bring his family to home above all else. Too down philosophy fails

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    1. Thomism is exactly like Augustinian predestination. On most forms of Thomism (though I stress there are some thomists who try to avoid this) we choose what we do because of God's concurrence. Either based on causation, we cannot actualise our potential to will to accept or avoid performing a mortal sin, or, if the issue of causation isn't clear (that's where some thomists disagree) it's based on Gods knowledge. He has no potency and so is impassible. He cannot know something *because* you do it, you do it because he knows it. He knows it because he causes it to happen.

      Again, a fair few thomists try to avoid this conclusion. They typically start with the fundamental metaphysics and then see how much they can maintain whilst avoiding the Augustinian-Calvinist predestination view

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    2. The most recent Catholic mystics cry "mercies of God" but for Thomists God can cause all to convert but wills most to damnation. I would save everyone in my family. The Thomistic God is an idol you tried like a subtle diamond

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    3. If you desire to stare into your idol longer, tell me: does God's knowledge of choosing to create even put a mere accident in him? I know you don't want dust

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    4. I disagree with the Banezian development of Thomism.

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    5. You're contradicting yourself. How can you explain prophecy without Molinism or Banezianism?

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    6. If Moses is told "your people will rebel", Moses can use his free will to tell the people and they can use their free will not to rebel. Molinism explains things by situations that never existed, so is ruled out. The only obvious answer is Banez's thesis, according to which God can give the right graces to everyone and ultimately save all sinners. Aquinas explicitly states that God wants to show off mercy and justice by saving only the few

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    7. You could explain prophecy outside of Banez or Molina. Many Libertarians are primarily sourcehood Libertarians. PAP is typically present by not necessarily so. Though instances of free choice with only one possible outcome would trace back and to previous choices that did have PAP.

      Given this, you could have a variation on Aquinas' view. Where God determines a prophecy to come true but where it is logically posterior to someone fulfilling the sourcehood condition. Somewhat like the case with Pharaoh

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  5. This is an interesting analogy, but note that there is nothing here that indicates that state or government is required for the middle-ground position. All you have is a nice analogy showing that man, in order to live according to his nature, must be part of larger communities, from the family up to humanity as a whole.

    No libertarian (excluding some anon on an internet message board perhaps) ever disputed this. All libertarians deny is that the coercive agency of the state needs to be involved in order for society to function, and there is nothing in your analogy that addresses that question.

    The analogy is much better seen as a middle road between the ethos of extreme collectivism on one hand and atomistic individualism on the other. But note that atomistic individualism has no connection to libertarianism, in theory or practice. On the contrary, I'd argue that it's actually a pretty good description of the ethos of the modern welfare state.

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  6. The Church has never infallible defined that:

    1) socialism is wrong

    2) the the Pope has authority when teaching fallibly

    3) that the Church was given authority to speak on community organization

    So a Catholic can be a socialist

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    1. That the pope has authority when teaching fallibly is pretty basic. Only someone as stupid as a socialist would think Catholics can completely and utterly ignore what popes continuously teach.

      In any case, this type of discussion is useless. Catholics cannot be socialists, period. Have this as a bonus:

      "But what if Socialism has really been so tempered and modified as to the class struggle and private ownership that there is in it no longer anything to be censured on these points? Has it thereby renounced its contradictory nature to the Christian religion? This is the question that holds many minds in suspense. And numerous are the Catholics who, although they clearly understand that Christian principles can never be abandoned or diminished seem to turn their eyes to the Holy See and earnestly beseech Us to decide whether this form of Socialism has so far recovered from false doctrines that it can be accepted without the sacrifice of any Christian principle and in a certain sense be baptized.

      That We, in keeping with Our fatherly solicitude, may answer their petitions, We make this pronouncement: Whether considered as a doctrine, or an historical fact, or a movement, Socialism, if it remains truly Socialism, even after it has yielded to truth and justice on the points which we have mentioned, cannot be reconciled with the teachings of the Catholic Church because its concept of society itself is utterly foreign to Christian truth.” (Quadragesimo Anno)


      Socialism is pure cancer.

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    2. And just a reminder that socialism is not the same as social democracy, Christian democracy, or many alternative political and economic ideas which are sometimes (loosely and wrongly) associated with "socialism".

      Socialism, real socialism, is cancer. Social democracy, Christian democracy, etc. can be respectable positions.

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    3. Catholics are only bound by the infallible. Popes trying to force fallible teachings down peoples' throats is bs. And the Church has never confirmed it has any authority whatsoever in political system's validity

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    4. A "pronouncement" as Pius puts it, is not infallible. The Church has NEVER infallible taught that the Pope has fallible teaching authority or that a bunch of fallible pronouncements become infallible at some undetermined time

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    5. Catholics can't be true socialists, but can they be true liberals, in the classical sense? Doesn't classical liberalism itself fall under the a like condemnation (I don't mean an exact parallel to Pius' explicit declaration one can't be a Catholic and true socialist)?

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  7. Can anyone explain how the weak-PSR works to get to the existence of God? I've read the Gale-Pruss paper and I don't follow it.

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    1. If it's even *possible* for there to be an explanation for the existence of a totality of contingent things, it follows that it's possible for a necessary being to exist (since a necessary being would be the only possible explanation for a totality of contingent things).

      But if it's possible for there to be a necessary being, then a necessary being actually exists. This is a well-known fact, it is standard S5 modal logic which the vast majority of philosophers accept. (Some people don't accept S5, but the vast majority of people working with modal logic do).

      "But I don't see how possibly-necessary entails actually-necessary!" then you gotta work your way through the logical entailment and reflect to see how it really works.

      Put it differently, weak-PSR gives us a strong reason for accepting the possibility premise in ontological arguments. The ontological argument is basically that "if a necessary being possibly exists, then it actually exists". The vast majority of philosophers now accept that the argument works, the only issue is with the possibility premise - how to show that a necessary being is possible. The best versions of ontological arguments today are valid, it's really just the soundness that is disputed because of how to establish that possibility premise. But weak-PSR gives us a strong reason to accept the possibility premise: it's possible that there can be a cause for a totality of contingent things -> it's possible that a necessary being exists.

      I recommend you check out the online survey www.necessarybeing.com by Josh Rasmussen.

      Again, at this point most philosophers seem to be moving towards an acceptance of the existence of a Necessary Concrete Being. It's just way too difficult to avoid that. So discussions are now changing towards Stage 2 of cosmological arguments - establishing that the necessary being is God.

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    2. Great explanation Atno, thank you. Do you happen to know of a link where S5 is explained somewhere in simpler terms for us laypeople? Or if you want to take a stab at explaining it that would be wonderful too.

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    3. I’ve read up on S5 and modal logic and I am admittedly completely weak on this stuff. How do you contend an objection where someone says S5 suddenly makes everything possible real? Unicorns, etc?

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    4. Isn’t it true that s5 can disprove God in the same way it can prove God equally?

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    5. S5 says that whatever is possibly necessary is necessary (and hence, exists).
      The problem is that, because of S5, saying that something is possibly necessary invonves exwactly the same amount of certainty than saying that something is necessary simpliciter.

      Now, if it's *possible* for there to be an explanation for the existence of a totality of contingent things, then sure, it follows that a necssary being exists, but the claimt hat it is possible requires much more than simply not finding any apparent possibility in the concept of something explaining the totality of all contingent beings.
      The possibility of something explaining the totality of all contingent beings relies on the possibility of a necssary being existing, so claiming that it is possible that something explains the totality of all contingent beings actually begs the question.

      In short, the weak PSR doesn't help the case for a necssary being. Unless one isn't convinced that a necessary being is possible, the weak PSR doesn't add anything at all.

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    6. Johannes

      Your proof below doesn't work because "intrinsically illogical" is not the only thing to consider. There is also nothing intrinsically illogical about a brute fact. But if a brute fact can exist, there can be no necessary being.
      So, either your unconditioned entity is a brute fact, which means there is no argument for its uniqueness etc.

      In short, you need to argue for the impossibility of any brute act, as well as the impossibility of an empty world before you can get to a necessary being.

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    7. It doesn't really beg the question, unless you also consider that every valid argument begs the question.

      When one sees that P entails Q, one can then conclude that Q is true by means of P. Many people do not see that a necessary being is possible, but they do see that it is possible for there to be an explanation of the totality of contingent things, which therefore gives them strong reason to conclude a necessary being is possible (contrary to their first direct assessment).

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    8. S5 doesn't make everything possible real. S5 means that every possible *necessary* being would be real. Unicorns are not necessary beings, at least in our typical understanding of unicorns.

      "Isn’t it true that s5 can disprove God in the same way it can prove God equally?"

      It is. If it's possible that God does not exist, then God does not actually exist, because whatever is a necessary being (and God is supposed to be one) cannot possibly not-exist. That would be the atheistic variation of ontological arguments, so to speak.

      But it is difficult to establish that God "possibly" doesn't exist. Because the possibility here is not epistemic, but metaphysical. It's not a "well maybe God doesn't exist after all" but rather a strong metaphysical possibility as in "the laws of reality are such that God could fail to exist". In any case, I think the standard ontological arguments cancel each other out - God's possibility entails his existence; his possible non-existence entails his non-existence, so it reaches a stalemate (if you have any metaphysical intuitions here).

      With weak-PSR, things are different. Speaking for myself, I can say that I find weak-PSR to be self-evident and intuitive (I find the same for full-blown PSR, but even someone who rejects PSR could find weak-PSR actually true). And arguments for PSR (empirical and inductive generalizations, etc) can also be given for WPSR. Plus there are many other ways to get to WPSR (such as those included in the survey website I linked to), so it does establish that a necessary being exists.

      Can't say much about S5 right now but I recommend you to look at the entailment and try to understand why people accept such axioms and their consequences. For instance, whatever is possible, is necessarily possible. Maybe think of the result of mathematical calculations; if X + Y were *really* possibly Z, wouldn't it have to really be Z after all? 2 + 2 cannot possibly be 5 or 3. If a mathematical result is possible, it must actually be the case. It's exactly the same for necessary existence, except that it applies to existence instead of a number.

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    9. Atno

      Many people see that it is epistemically possible for for there to be an explanation of the totality of contingent things, but such an explanation is only metphysically possible iff a necessary entity is metaphysically possible, which is the very thing that the argument is supposed to show. That's why it begs the question.

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    10. For others who want to follow the conversation involving my version of the ontological proof using “an unconditioned entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition”, please see that proof I have already presented somewhere below in a new thread.

      Hi Walter,

      My version of the ontological proof cannot be used in a reversed way to prove that an empty world is possible or that it is possible for an unconditioned entity to be non-existent.

      For anyone attempting to use in a reversed way to prove that an unconditioned entity can possibly not exist, he/she would need to prove that it is a logical possibility that “an unconditioned entity, whose existence is not conditioned on anything and hence whose existence is impossible to be prevented by the presence or absence of any condition, is able to be prevented to exist by the presence or absence of the conditions in some world”. But that idea is an intrinsic contradiction or a logical impossibility and hence not a logical possibility.

      Therefore the non-existence of an unconditioned entity even in the world of logical possibilities is impossible.
      (because it is illogical)

      Hence it is impossible for an unconditioned entity not to exist, even in the world of logical possibilities.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

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    11. Thanks for the replies. Atno, I’ve always agreed that the ontological arguments cancel each other as well. could you expand on how the weak PSR changes that in terms of the modal cosmological argument? My immediate intuition is to say can’t an atheist or just someone who is a rascal take that argument and do exactly what they do with the ontological? It’s possible that there is not a necessary being, therefore there isn’t?

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    12. Walter,

      Don't get me wrong, in a way you are correct. The argument "begs the question", but it does so in the way that every valid argument begs the question, pretty much. As I said, someone might not think Q is true, but nevertheless think that P is true, and when presented with an entailment that P -> Q, that person will therefore have a reason to accept Q she wouldn't otherwise have. Of course, she might, on the contrary, become suspicious of P. But if she's very sure of P, or if she's more sure of P than she is doubtful of Q, then she will have good reason to accept Q.

      You are correct that many people see that it is epistemically possible for there to be an explanation for the existence of a totality of contingent things. But I claim that many people also see that it is *metaphysically* possible, either intuitively, or by means of arguments.

      I myself take this possibility to be metaphysical. As I said, I find WPSR to be self-evident. And there are other ways to affirming this metaphysical possibility: through an inductive generalization of explanations and contingency; or through considerations of modality, such as Rasmussen's principle of modal continuity (which I accept), and so on.

      So, really, someone might not have any idea on whether "God exists" is metaphysically possible all by itself. But she might nevertheless think that WPSR is true, and that will give her reason to accept the metaphysical possibility of God, say.

      I'm not saying everyone does see and/or infer these metaphysical possibilities, but a lot of people do, and it seems that more and more philosophers are starting to accept Stage One of cosmological arguments ("there is a necessary cause").

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    13. Anonymous,

      There is no parallel argument against the modal cosmological arguments. Let's call the fact of there being a totality of contingent things, the "Big Contingent Fact (BCF)". Let's say the WPSR is "BCF possibly has an cause".

      So it is possible that there is a necessary cause which explains the BCF. So, possibly there is a necessary being -> there actually is a necessary being, by S5.

      But if the BCF possibly doesn't have a cause, that doesn't mean there is no necessary being. It just means that the BCF could exist without being caused by the necessary being.

      And it would be quite pointless to say "but it is possible that there is no necessary being", since the whole idea is that WPSR gives us reason to believe that a necessary being is in fact possible. If someone is strongly convinced of WPSR, they will have reason to believe a necessary being exists.
      Of course, someone could always be more convinced of the metaphysical possibility of "there is no necessary being" than they are of WPSR (which I would find very weird). But that's an individual matter, it doesn't affect the argument. The same would go for any normal cosmological argument which invokes PSR instead of WPSR.

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    14. By the way, modal cosmological arguments are not completely "new". They trace back at least to Duns Scotus's proof for God. He also made the type of inference that, from the possibility of a First Efficient Cause, we could get the actual existence of a First Efficient Cause.

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    15. Johannes

      An unconditioned entity does not possibly exist if a brute fact possibly exists. It's a question of being "prevented to exist" but of being possible.
      So, I am afraid your argument doesn't work.

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    16. Atno

      I am not sure it's true that more and philosophers are starting to accept Stage One of cosmological arguments.
      I would have to see some figures to be able to tell whether you are right or wrong.
      I do think, however, that it is true that more and more philosophers are open to the epistemic possibility that something necessary exists.
      Although I wouldn't describe myself as a philosopher, I am certainly open to that epistemic possibility.
      But that's as far as it goes.

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    17. “There is nothing intrinsically illogical about brute facts“

      Sure there is, its the brute fact itself. It doesn't follow any rules and is the way it is brutely for no reason. If brute facts are possible the laws of logic aren't universal, because in which way but brutely could a brute fact be said to follow the Principle of Identity, Law of Excluded Middle or Law of Non-Contradiction?
      It is exactly this why accepting brute facts is irrational. Seems like an acceptance results in giving up doing pilosophy. How could they be accepted in a way that isn't completely ad hoc?

      Delete
    18. Walter,

      There is some evidence from Rasmussen's survey - I'm now quoting from his book with Pruss, "Necessary Existence"

      "The results are based upon
      the answers of 2,322 participants. These participants comprise all those
      participants who took the quiz for the first time between August 15, 2012
      and April 15, 2013. About half of them (49.9%) responded “it seems so”
      to the question “Is there a Necessary Being?” Call these ‘believers.’ 21.8%
      reported “it seems not” (disbelievers), and 28.3% reported “I can’t say”
      (agnostics).
      So what percentage of participants reported answers that comprise
      the premises of an argument for a necessary being? The overall answer
      (including believers and non-believers alike) is 94.8%. Among disbeliev-
      ers, the percentage is not much lower: 93.1%. Figure 1 is a breakdown
      of the percentages of believers, agnostics, and disbelievers who reached a proof."

      "We also tabulated results for the 446 participants each of whom
      reported to be a philosopher. Those results are shown in Figure 2.
      We see that philosophers were slightly more skeptical than the broader
      population, but not by much."

      There is also the fact that the literature of philosophy of religions seems to be paying a bit more attention to Stage Two now. And some atheist philosophers - especially Oppy, perhaps the greatest atheist philosopher of religion out there - more and more are trying to avoid cosmological arguments by focusing on Stage Two instead.

      Delete
    19. Atno, I'm following (I think). So what it breaks down to is that in the ontological consideration, the equivalence is in that one can deny that God is possible and affirm that God is possible and thus the argument reaches a stalemate.

      However, in the context of the modal cosmological, your contention is that it goes beyond having to deny that God is metaphysically possible, but rather would require a contention that a weak PSR is impossible to deny it in the same way (just for argument's sake?) - I understand what you're saying in that in that example of explaining the BCF it would not entail there not being a NB, just that the NB didn't explain it. But that being said, could the parameters be changed in such a way to say the WPSR is possibly not true, and that there is possibly no necessary being (in existence, not causing the BCF), and then you get the result that an NB is not real?

      Delete
    20. Dominik

      Nobody I know of believes that brute facts could give rise to square circles, so the only thing I see is that you personally think brure fcats cannot exist, which is OK, but not a good basis for a debate.

      Delete
    21. Hi Walter,

      For someone to argue that a brute fact is possible, he would need to set up an explicit or implicit premise that involves this idea:

      Premise: It is a logical possibility for there to exist a world where there exists no Unconditioned Entity.

      Such a premise is false/unsound because such a premise entails the contradiction that “an Unconditioned Entity, whose existence is unconditioned on any condition and hence would be an entity that exists regardless of whatever conditions are present or absent in any world, somehow failed to exist in a certain world under certain conditions”.

      Every premise that you set up involving the absence of an unconditioned entity would entail the above contradiction.

      Since every such premise entails the above contradiction, it is logically impossible for there to exist any situation or any world of any condition for an unconditioned entity not to exist.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    22. Hi Anonymous,

      You said “So what it breaks down to is that in the ontological consideration, the equivalence is in that one can deny that God is possible and affirm that God is possible and thus the argument reaches a stalemate.”

      See my reply to Walter. It is not a stalemate. It is logically impossible for God not to exist in any logical world. Any proposal that there is a world where The Unconditioned does not exist entails the contradiction I mentioned to Walter.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    23. How could we change the parameters in this way? If no WPSR is not true, this does not mean there is no necessary being, just that there is no BCF which can even possibly be explained or caused.

      The argument assumes that you accept WPSR. It is supposed to be a necessary truth also. If someone is doubtful about WPSR to the point where they do not accept it, then the argument does not work. The same goes for any standard cosmological argument as well. The only difference is that WPSR is much more modest than PSR. If someone thinks that maybe some contingent things can exist uncaused, nevertheless they might believe that these contingent things *can possibly* be caused to exist, for example.

      Basically, cosmological arguments can get us to a necessary being by

      1) invoking a principle such as PSR or the principle of causality;

      2) invoking a weaker, modal principle (such as WPSR) which gets us to the possibility of a Necessary Cause, which by S5 must then actually exist;

      3) appealing to Inference to the Best Explanation or inductive inferences (we should, in any case, use as a rule of thumb that we should look for explanations whenever we can, and not settle for brute facts if we can avoid them. Or, it is more likely for a contingent reality to exist if there is a God than if there is no God, etc).

      Delete
    24. In other words, a world that exists base on Brute Fact would ultimately entail a circular square, ie, a contradiction, because of the contradiction I mentioned above: an unconditioned entity that exists in any situation/condition failed to exist in a certain situation/condition.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    25. Ok, so you're saying that in order to change the parameters in that way, you'd have to just not be accepting the WPSR in the first place?

      So what is your refutation to someone saying "it is possible there is not a necessary being" to then saying there is no necessary being?

      Delete
    26. Hi Walter,

      An unconditioned entity (a logical possibility) is an entity that would exist under ALL kinds of logical conditions since its existence does not depend on any condition at all.

      An entity that exists in ALL kinds of logical conditions and yet does not exist under certain logical conditions is a contradiction.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    27. Johannes

      No, the existence of a brute fact would not entail the contradiction that “an Unconditioned Entity, whose existence is unconditioned on any condition and hence would be an entity that exists regardless of whatever conditions are present or absent in any world, somehow failed to exist in a certain world under certain conditions" . It would entail that an Unconditioned Entity, whose existence is unconditioned on any condition and hence would be an entity that exists regardless of whatever conditions are present or absent in any world is a contradiction.
      So, your argument fails if a brute fact is possible.

      Delete
    28. Hi Walter,

      Think of it this way:

      There is no INTRINSIC contradiction in the idea that “a brute fact is metaphysically impossible”.

      There is an INTRINSIC contradiction in the idea that “an unconditioned entity that exists regardless of all kinds of logically possible situations/conditions failed to exist under certain situations/conditions.”

      The word “INTRINSIC” is important. Whichever idea that has an INTRINSIC contradiction is false.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    29. In other words,

      The idea that “brute fact is the fundamental reality” entails the INTRINSIC contradiction of “an unconditioned entity that exists under all kinds of logical conditions failing to exists under certain kinds of logical conditions”.

      The idea that “The Unconditioned Entity is the fundamental reality” does not entail any INTRINSIC contradiction because the proposition “brute fact is not the fundamental reality” is not an intrinsic contradiction.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    30. Anonymous,

      I would just respond that "it does not seem particularly true to me that it's metaphysically possible that there is no necessary being. But it does seem to me that a Big Contingent Fact can have an explanation, and therefore that a Necessary Being exists, and therefore that it is not after all metaphysically possible that there is no necessary being."

      Delete
    31. Hi Walter,

      In other words,

      The idea that “brute fact is the fundamental reality” entails the INTRINSIC contradiction of “an unconditioned entity that exists under all kinds of logical conditions failing to exists under certain kinds of logical conditions”. So the idea “Brute Fact is fundamental reality is false”.
      (P1: If X, then Y.
      P2: Y is false because Y is an intrinsic contradiction. Conclusion: Therefore X is false.)


      In contrast, the idea that “The Unconditioned Entity is the fundamental reality” does not entail any INTRINSIC contradiction because the proposition “brute fact is not the fundamental reality” (which is entailed by “The Unconditioned Entity is fundamental reality”) is not an intrinsic contradiction.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    32. Check out page 89 of Necessary Existence by Pruss and Rasmussen for why it does not suffer the same duplicity of the ontological argument in that it equally proves non-existence of God. Cannot recommend that book enough if you are interested in S5 and necessary being proofs.

      I personally do not like to toy with such arguments and I find them wholly "unnecessary" (he-he) for my own edification because I accept a weak version of the strong PSR, but such logic is nonetheless sound.

      On page 89, Pruss/Rasmussen show that it is irrelevant in the same way Atno did above, because simply showing that it is possible the NB did not cause all contingent things does not do anything to showing the NB does not exist.

      They go on on page 91 to show the following:

      "So, if one is to favor one possibility over the other, one should have some independent reason to do so. We take it that MAB provides an independent reason to favor the second possibility—the possibility of necessary concreta."

      Pruss, Alexander R.. Necessary Existence (p. 91). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

      The point being here that given the initial foundation of the argument (possibly some things have a reason for their existence), it is irrational if not bordering on illogical to work with the premise that there is possibly no explanation to contingent things in something that is itself not-contingent.

      Ultimately, if one does not find Pruss/Rasmussen's responses adequate, you could just take the position Atno detailed above, wherein stating the arguments cancel each other out, and therefore it becomes not a check in Theism or Atheism column, but rather a "draw." I think this is silly for so many reasons, chief among them I think Pruss/Rasmussen more than adequately address the objection.

      Delete
    33. I don't think there is a stalemate with WPSR. I think that WPSR give us reasons that overpower skepticism about a necessary being.

      Ultimately it just depends on what a person will find more plausible; what price they are willing to pay.
      The idea that a necessary being could possibly fail to exist would entail the cost that it is strictly impossible for there to be an explanation for a Big Contingent Fact. I take that cost to be unacceptable, I am not willing to pay it. I think it's crazy.

      Basically, P entails Q and W. If someone is more convinced that P is true than they are that Q and W are false, then P gives them reason to accept Q and W. If, however, someone is more convinced that Q and/or W are false, this might give them reason for rejecting P. It is up to the individual to assess the propositions and their plausibility.

      Let P be WPSR, Q "there is necessary being" and W "it is not possible for a NB to not exist". I am very, very convinced that P is true, and I don't even find W particularly plausible. So...

      Delete
    34. Yes, I agree with you. What I was saying is that if someone truly wanted to throw the argument out and pay that price, at the end of the day the best they can do is show a stalemate to the argument the same way the modal ontological argument can be addressed.

      What you've said above is basically what Pruss/Rasmussen state on page 90/91, that accepting the WPSR of their argument gives independent reason to NOT look at the "reverse" version of the argument with any seriousness. In fact, even Pruss' WWPSR (google Pruss WWPSR, I've seen you on his site so I'm sure you're familiar with it) would address such an objection. My point was again simply that if someone did pay that price (i.e. positing that there is possibly no explanation to anything at all) all it would get them is the same stalemate that the modal ontological argument gets you.

      Delete
    35. Johannes

      You keep saying that "brute fact is the fundamental reality” entails the INTRINSIC contradiction of “an unconditioned entity that exists under all kinds of logical conditions failing to exists under certain kinds of logical conditions”, but that's not true. A brute fact entails that an unconditioned entity exists under no kinds of logical condition, IOW an unconditioned entity is impossible.

      Delete
    36. Hi Walter,

      As you said, claiming brute fact to be the fundamental reality entails claiming
      “an unconditioned entity exists under no kinds of logical condition.” This is equivalent to claiming “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds”.

      But to claim “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds” is false on both counts:

      •••••••

      Firstly, an unconditioned entity exists at least in the world of logical possibilities because there is no intrinsic logical contradiction in the concept of “an unconditioned entity whose existence is not affected by any logically possible conditions”. In contrast to intrinsic contradictions such as a circular square, any concept that has no intrinsic logical contradiction is a logical possibility. Any entity that is a logical possibility exists in at least one logically possible world. So an unconditioned entity exists in at least one logically possible world and hence the entailed claim “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds” is false.

      This means the idea “brute fact is the fundamental reality” entails the something which is false, because “brute fact” entails the false idea of “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds”.

      By Modus Tollens, “ “brute fact is the fundamental reality” is false. Brute fact is not the fundamental reality.

      Premise 1: If “brute fact is the fundamental reality” is true, then ““an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds”.
      Premise 2: But “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds” is false because it exists in at least one logically possible world.
      Conclusion: Therefore “brute fact is the fundamental reality” is false.
      (This is the logic form of Modus Tollens)

      •••••••

      Secondly, just as the concept of a circular square is an intrinsic contradiction, the concept of “an unconditioned entity, WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO EXIST under all kinds of logically possible conditions because its UNCONDITIONAL EXISTENCE cannot be affected by any logical condition/situation, FAILS TO EXIST under EVERY KIND of logically possible conditions” is also an intrinsic contradiction.

      This means the idea “brute fact is the fundamental reality” entails an intrinsic contradiction, because “brute fact” entails the intrinsic contradiction of “an unconditioned entity, WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO EXIST under all kinds of logically possible conditions because its UNCONDITIONAL EXISTENCE cannot be affected by any logically possible conditions, FAILS TO EXIST under EVERY KIND of logically possible conditions”.

      On this second count, “brute fact” entails an intrinsic contradiction and hence “brute fact is the fundamental reality” is false. Brute fact cannot be the fundamental reality.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    37. Hi Walter,

      Here is a third reason why brute fact is impossible to be the fundamental reality. Take any existing entity, say, the red paint on a red chair.

      3-premise deductive proof using the red paint:

      Premise 1: The red paint on the red chair exists now as a conditioned entity. Its physical existence depends CONTINUOUSLY on the fulfilment of many conditions. One example is this series of concurrent conditions:

      red paint > molecules > atoms > protons > .......
      Note:
      (a) If all molecules cease to exist, the red paint would cease to exist, but if the red paint ceases to exist, molecules can still continue to exist. If all atoms cease to exist, both the molecules, and red paint, would cease to exist, but whether red paint or all molecules cease to exist, atoms can still continue to exist. In this sense the dependency is one-directional.
      (b) The red paint would cease to exist not only if molecules cease to exist; the red paint ceases to exist if all atoms cease to exist, or if protons cease to exist, or if any type of entities in the series ceases to exist. So the existence of molecules is one condition for the red paint’s existence; the existence of molecules is another condition for the red paint’s existence and so on. Every condition needs to be continuously fulfilled in order for the red paint to continue to exist.
      (c) The red paint’s existence is CONTINUOUSLY dependent on the existence of every type of entities in the series, just as the existence of your image in the mirror is continuously dependent on your existence in front of the mirror. If at the next moment you are gone from the mirror, then your image in the mirror would also be gone.

      Premise 2: Such a series is either a never-ending series or a series with an ending. If such a series comprises a never-ending quantity of conditions, then the red paint would not be existing now because it is impossible to achieve fulfillment of an never-ending quantity of conditions (it is a never-ending task to fulfill a never-ending quantity of conditions). Since the red paint exist now on the red chair, that means all the conditions have already achieved fulfillment, and therefore that series of conditions is not never-ending but has an ending. This means a last entity exists now, at the end of the series:

      red paint > molecules > atoms > ... > last entity

      Premise 3: The last entity's existence is either conditional or not conditional on any condition. If the last entity’s existence is conditional on some other condition, then it is impossible for it to exist NOW, because there is nothing after the last entity for it to be conditioned on. Since the last entity exists now (see Premise 2), the last entity’s existence is not conditional on any condition at all. Thus it exists unconditionally now, as an Unconditioned Entity.

      Conclusion: An Unconditioned Entity whose existence is unconditional on anything exists in the real world now.

      Cheers!
      johannes

      Delete
    38. Johannes

      But you are begging the question here, which is whether an unconditioned entity exists in a possible world.
      And, contrary to your claim, an unconditioned entity is only possible if no alternative is possible. That question, however, is not answerable by simple pointing to (a lack of) intrinsic possibility.
      Necessary entities require both intrinsic and extrinsic possibility. So, as long as you haven't established extrinsic possibility, you cannot claim that it exists in one possible world.

      Delete

    39. Hi Walter,

      Your comment mentioned “necessary entities”. Please note that “necessity entities” is not relevant to me because what I have been talking about is unconditioned entity. The concept “unconditioned” is not the same as “necessary”

      Your premise: Brute fact is the fundamental reality in at least one logically possible hypothetical world of existence.
      (I would say that this premise is false/unsound See below for my reason.)

      “Brute fact being the fundamental reality” is impossible in ANY and EVERY logical world of existence,
      because it entails a logical world comprising only conditioned entities (ie without any unconditioned entity in it). A logical world comprising only conditioned entities is impossible to exist. Reason:

      This is because every conditioned entity, by virtue of being “conditioned”, can exist only when all the various conditions or series of conditions which its existence CONTINUOUSLY depends on are fulfilled.

      Say, in such a hypothetical “brute fact” world there is a conditioned entity X whose existence is CONTINUOUSLY conditional on three conditions A1, B1 and C1. The existence of A1, B1 and C1 are in turn conditional on A2, B2 and C2 respectively.

      Let us focus only on the series containing A1:

      conditioned entity X > condition/entity A1 > condition/entity A2 > condition/entity A3 > ... > condition/entity A(last)

      [Every such series cannot be an endless series because an endless series of conditions cannot be fulfilled which then results in conditioned entity X being unable to exist. Hence every such series has an ending with a last condition/entity at the end.]

      In such a world, every such series of conditions/entities would ultimately terminated in a last condition (ie a last entity) and every such last condition/entity in every series would itself be an conditional entity and hence would also have conditions for existence. But since every such last condition/entity is already the last in its respective series, there is nothing after it to fulfill the condition it needs for existence, and so the last condition/entity cannot exist. If the last condition cannot exist, then the last-but-one condition also cannot exist as the last-but-one condition’s existence is conditional on the presence of the last condition/entity. This state of affairs repeats itself for every condition/entity in the series. The result is: conditioned entity X cannot exist at all in such a hypothetical “brute fact” world.

      Every other conditioned entity in such a hypothetical “brute fact” world suffers the same result as conditioned entity X.

      In the end, such a world becomes a world of non-existence, or a non-existing world. In other words, there is no such world where one or more conditioned entities exist as brute fact. That means such a “brute fact” world is impossible.

      There is no such possible world where conditioned entities exist as a brute fact.

      So there is no logically possible world where one or more conditioned entities exist as brute fact (ie a world comprising only one or more conditioned entities without any unconditioned entity).

      In contrast, there is nothing impossible with my starting premise that it is possible for an unconditioned entity to exist in at least one logically possible hypothetical world out of zillions and zillions of logically possible hypothetical worlds.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    40. Because of the above reasons, every logically possible world of existence (ie any hypothetical logical world with something existing in it) ENTAILS the existence of an unconditioned entity (ie at least one unconditioned entity - ultimately it can be proven there is only one unconditioned entity which I like to label as The Unconditioned).


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    41. Johannes

      This will be my last reply on this subject.
      Firstly, I used "necessary entity" because that where you are heading. If the outcome of your argument is not a necessary being, then your unconditioned entity may exist in one possible world, or in a zillion ones, but not in all possible worlds, which makes it a brute fact.

      You seem assert that an unconditioned entity that exists under all kinds of logical conditions is possible. I am not sure that such an entity is possible and I don't see where you have somehow showed that it is possible. That' why I maintain that you basically beg the question.
      Of course iff such entity is possible, it is necessary.
      But I am not convinced it is possible for something to exist unconditioned under all sorts of logical conditions.
      For starters, for something that exists unconditioned, logical conditions are irrelevant. It's even worse: sinds an unconditioned entity needs no conditions to exist, it doesn't seem to need any contitions to not exist either. IOW, it is a brute fact.

      So, Johannes, your argument seems to prove that brute facts are possible and hence, that a necessary entity is impossible.

      Fortunately for you, I think you are begging the question, so maybe you haven't succeeded in destroying theism after all.

      Delete

    42. .


      Hi Walter,

      1. In every possible world where entities exist, each entity is either a conditioned entity or unconditioned entity, due to the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. Impossible to have a third kind of entity.

      2. If brute fact is the fundamental reality in a world, then in that world, a conditioned entity exists without its required condition(s) for existence being fulfilled. It exists as a brute fact. There is no explanation why a conditioned entity can exist despite the conditions that its existence requires is unfulfilled or absent. It is thus a world containing an intrinsic contradiction: a conditioned entity, which is an entity that does not exist if the conditions it needs in order to exit are absent/unfulfilled, is existing despite the absence of those required conditions. In such a “brute fact world”, an entity cannot exist and can exist at the same time which is an intrinsic contradiction. So a “brute fact world” is an illogical world. It is not a logically possible world. Hence “brute fact is the fundamental reality” cannot and therefore does not exist in any logically possible world.

      3. In any world where all conditioned entities’ have an explanation for why they are able to exist, there is only one logical possible explanation: every existing conditioned entity’s required conditions for existence are fulfilled/present. All these conditions are able to be fulfilled/present because the conditions which they in turn required for their fulfillment/presence/existence are also fulfilled/present. Every such series of CONTINUOUS dependency would terminate in an unconditioned entity because an unconditioned entity does not require any conditions for existence and hence once such a series that arrives at an unconditioned entity would ends there. Notice: every existing entity has an ultimate and logical explanation in such a world. Every existing conditioned entity exists because all the required conditions are fulfilled/present and every existing unconditioned entity exists because its existence does not require any condition in order to exist. There is no intrinsic contradiction in explaining why any entity is existing in such a world and hence such a world is a logical world, or a logically possible world.

      4. Even though an unconditioned entity does not need any condition to exist or not exist, it is logically impossible for an unconditioned entity not to be existing in any logical world where something exists. See point 2 on why it is logically impossible (ie an intrinsic contradiction).


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    43. So an unconditioned entity exists in at least one logically possible world and hence the entailed claim “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of logically possible conditions/worlds” is false.

      Guys, has it occurred to you that "possible worlds" and "logically possible worlds" are undefined expressions, and (probably) are undefinable expressions?

      Or, equally a death blow to such arguments, that it is epistemically impossible to know whether any statement with ACTUAL content, (rather than purely symbolic content, such as ~P=>Q) is true in all possible worlds or all logically possible worlds.

      Delete
  8. That's all psychology. "Why" is a psychological question

    ReplyDelete
  9. What's getting to be more impressive than the philosophical content of Dr. Feser's blog is the quality of Golden Age comic references...and that's saying something.

    ReplyDelete
  10. Anonymous asked “Can anyone explain how the weak-PSR works to get to the existence of God? I've read the Gale-Pruss paper and I don't follow it.” Among the replies given to Anonymous, S5 modal logic was invoked.

    Below is my version of ontological proof without the need to use S5 modal logic:

    Step 1. In contrast to a circular square, there is nothing intrinsically illogical about the existence of an entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition. So an entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition DEFINITELY exists in the world of logical possibilities. In other words, an entity, whose existence is impossible to be prevented by the presence or absence of any condition, exists in the world of logical possibilities.
    (Let us label such an entity as unconditioned entity.)

    Step 2. Such an unconditioned entity either exists or does not exist in the real world. If such an unconditioned entity does not exist in the real world, that means in the real world, the presence or absence of certain condition(s) has managed to prevent such an unconditioned entity from existing. This contradicts the fact that an unconditioned entity’s existence is impossible to be prevented by the presence or absence of any condition. (In other words, an intrinsic logical contradiction exists in the idea that “an entity whose existence is impossible to be prevented by the presence or absence of ANY condition has been prevented to exist because of the presence or absence of certain condition(s)”.)

    Conclusion:
    Therefore the only logical outcome is that such an entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition exists not only in the world of possibilities but also in the real world. An unconditioned entity thus exists in the real world now.

    From the above conclusion, we can then proceed to prove that there exists only one such unconditioned entity, and its various attributes. And then what emerges would be the God of Classical Theism.


    Cheers!
    johannes hui







    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. For anyone attempting to use my version in a reversed way to prove that an unconditioned entity can possibly not exist, he/she would need to prove that it is a logical possibility that “an unconditioned entity, whose existence is not conditioned on anything and hence whose existence is impossible to be prevented by the presence or absence of any condition, is able to be prevented to exist by the presence or absence of the conditions in some world”. But that idea is an intrinsic contradiction or a logical impossibility and hence not a logical possibility.

      Therefore the non-existence of an unconditioned entity even in the world of logical possibilities is impossible.
      (because it is illogical)

      Hence it is impossible for an unconditioned entity not to exist, even in the world of logical possibilities.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    2. To reduce misunderstandings due to the expression “prevented to exist”, I modify the argument as follows:

      Step 1. In contrast to a circular square, there is nothing intrinsically illogical about the existence of an unconditioned entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition. So an entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition DEFINITELY exists in the world of logical possibilities. In other words, an entity, whose existence is impossible to be affected by the presence or absence of any condition and hence would exist in ALL kinds of conditions, exists in the world of logical possibilities.

      Step 2. Such an unconditioned entity either exists or does not exist in the real world. If such an unconditioned entity does not exist in the real world, that means in the real world, the presence or absence of certain condition(s) has managed to affect the existence of an unconditioned entity. This contradicts the fact that an unconditioned entity’s existence is impossible to be affected by the presence or absence of any condition and hence would exist in ALL kinds of conditions. (In other words, an intrinsic logical contradiction exists in the idea that “an entity whose existence is impossible to be affected by the presence or absence of ANY condition and hence would exist in ALL kinds of conditions, failed to exist under the real world conditions.”)

      Conclusion:
      Therefore the only logical outcome is that such an entity whose existence is unconditioned on any condition exists not only in the world of logical possibilities but also in the real world. An unconditioned entity thus exists in the real world now.

      From the above conclusion, we can then proceed to prove that there exists only one such unconditioned entity, and its various attributes. And then what emerges would be the God of Classical Theism

      Delete
  11. Reasonable

    I like the line of thinking that you use. I would also like to think that it works, but I remain unconvinced.

    You seem to have slid from 'If X exists, nothing causes its existence' to 'If X does not exist, something must have prevented its existence.' You would, I think, need to show that if an unconditioned entity did not exist in the real world, it was failing to exist because something was preventing it from existing. How do you show that if something is logically possible but not actual, there must be some other thing that prevents its actuality?

    Or maybe I have misunderstood.


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hi Jonathan,

      Let’s avoid the expression “prevented its existence” then (since it may cause confusion). Think along this line instead:

      To argue that a world without an unconditioned entity is logically possible would entail an explicit or implicit premise containing this idea:

      Premise: It is a logical possibility for there to be a world where there exists no Unconditioned Entity.

      Such a premise is false/unsound because such a premise entails the contradiction that “an Unconditioned Entity, whose existence is unconditioned on any condition and hence would be an entity that exists regardless of whatever conditions are present or absent in any world, failed to exist in a certain world under certain conditions”.

      Again, the idea that “an unconditioned entity does not exist in a certain world” entails the contradiction that “somehow, the Unconditioned Entity, whose existence is not affected by any condition at all and hence would exist under any kind of conditions, could not exist under certain conditions”.

      Every premise that can be set up implicitly or explicitly entailing the absence of an unconditioned entity would entail the above contradiction.

      Since every such premise entails the above contradiction, it is logically impossible for there to exist any situation or any world of any condition for an unconditioned entity not to exist.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    2. An unconditioned entity is an entity that would exist under ALL kinds of conditions since its existence does not depend on any condition at all.

      An entity that exists in ALL kinds of logical conditions and yet does not exist under certain logical conditions is a contradiction.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
  12. Reasonable - thank you for your reply!

    An unconditioned entity is not an entity that exists in some world or other, it is an entity that necessarily exists in all possible worlds. An unconditioned entity that does not exist in some world or other is an entity that exists in no possible world – or do you disagree?

    We agree I think that both these statements are correct:
    1. It is logically possible for there to be an unconditioned being
    2. It is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being.

    However only one of these can and must be true:
    1. An unconditioned being is metaphysically necessary.
    2. An unconditioned being is metaphysically impossible.

    (But it may additionally be the case that the choice between these alternatives is not one that can be determined with certainty by beings such as we! )

    Your Premise is should rather be expressed thus: it is a logical possibility for there to be no Unconditioned Entity.

    The failure of the Unconditioned Entity to exist in a certain world under certain conditions is functionally equivalent to the failure of an Unconditioned Entity to exist, full stop. The phrase 'under certain conditions' seems to be otiose and misleading. It cannot be a condition in any particular world that would ground the non-existence of an unconditioned being. If such a being does not exist, the ground of that is that the existence of such a being is impossible, not that certain conditions obtain in some possible world to prevent it.

    Your second post in reply to mine shows (I think) the problem. I would have to rephrase the second paragraph:
    'An entity that exists in ALL kinds of logical conditions and yet does not exist under certain metaphysical conditions is a contradiction'. Expressed thus, the conclusion does not follow.

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    1. Hi Jonathan,

      Referring to your two statements:

      Statement 1. It is logically possible for there to be an unconditioned being
      Statement 2. It is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being.

      What I am saying below is on the assumption that both statements above are implicitly referring to logical situations/conditions/worlds and not referring to illogical situations/conditions/worlds.

      Statement 1’s idea is correct, because there exist no intrinsic contradiction in that idea.

      Statement 2’s idea is false because it entails an INTRINSIC contradiction.

      Statement 2’s “it is logically possible for there to be no Unconditioned Entity” entails “an unconditioned entity, WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO EXIST under all kinds of logical conditions/situations because its existence cannot be affected by any logical condition/situation, FAILS TO EXIST under at least one logical condition/situation” (or alternatively, Statement 2 entails “there is at least one logical condition or one set of logical conditions that affects the existence of an unconditioned entity, whose existence is impossible to be affected by any kind of logical conditions”) which is an intrinsic contradiction!!! So statement 2 entails an intrinsic contradiction, and is thus false.

      Putting the above in Modus Tollens form:

      Premise 1: If “it is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being” is true, then “there is at least one logical condition or one set of logical conditions that affects the existence of an unconditioned entity, whose existence is impossible to be affected by any kind of logical conditions”.
      Premise 2: “There is at least one logical condition or one set of logical conditions that affects the existence of an unconditioned entity, whose existence is impossible to be affected by any kind of logical conditions” is false, because it is an intrinsic contradiction.
      Conclusion: Therefore, the statement “it is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being” is false.

      (If X is true, then Y is true.
      Y is false.
      Therefore X is false.)

      Note that I used “at least one logical condition” which means I intended that expression to include the situation of “all logically possible conditions/worlds”. It is still an intrinsic contradiction to say “an unconditioned entity, which cannot fail to exist under all kinds of logical conditions/situations because its existence cannot be affected by any logical condition/situation, fails to exist in ALL LOGICALLY POSSIBLE WORLDS”.

      In addition, as previously laid out in my original thread’s Premise 1 or Step 1, unlike a circular square, there is no intrinsic logical contradiction in the concept of an entity whose existence is unconditioned on anything, and hence such an unconditioned entity would at least exists in the world of logical possibilities. So it is false to say “an unconditioned entity is possible to be non-existent in all logically possible worlds”. Thus it is impossible for Statement 2 to be correct. It is false for Statement 2 to say “it is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being” because an unconditioned being would exist at least in the world of logical possibilities. Statement 2 would need to be modified to have any chance to be correct. But...

      Even if you modify Statement 2 to “it is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being in the real world”, it is still false by a roundabout way. As shown in my original thread, an unconditioned entity’s existence in the world of logical possibilities entails its existence in the real world, WHICH WOULD BE EQUIVALENT, IN A ROUNDABOUT WAY, make it logically impossible for there to be no an unconditioned entity (in the real world or any logical world).

      Such an roundabout way is another way to show it is false for Statement 2 to say “it is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being”.

      There are thus at least two separate pathways that showed Statement 2 to be wrong. So it is LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for there to be no unconditioned being.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete

    2. Hi Jonathan,

      Additional comments on Statement 2’s entailment that an unconditioned entity does not exist in all logically possible worlds:

      As mentioned in my previous comment, in contrast to intrinsic contradictions such as a circular square, any concept that has no intrinsic logical contradiction is a logical possibility.

      Now, any entity that is a logical possibility exists in at least one logically possible world. So an unconditioned entity exists in at least one logically possible world and hence Statement 2’s entailment that “an unconditioned entity does not exist in every kind of, or all kinds of, logically possible conditions/worlds” is false.

      Since Statement 2 entails a false idea, Statement 2 itself would also be false by the logic of Modus Tollens.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    3. Hi Jonathan,

      The following is a different proof. Any feedback on it?

      3-premise deductive proof of an Unconditioned Entity using the red paint:

      Premise 1: The red paint on the red chair exists now as a conditioned entity. Its physical existence depends CONTINUOUSLY on the fulfilment of many conditions. One example is this series of concurrent conditions:

      red paint > molecules > atoms > protons > .......
      Note:
      (a) If all molecules cease to exist, the red paint would cease to exist, but if the red paint ceases to exist, molecules can still continue to exist. If all atoms cease to exist, both the molecules, and red paint, would cease to exist, but whether red paint or all molecules cease to exist, atoms can still continue to exist. In this sense the dependency is one-directional.
      (b) The red paint would cease to exist not only if molecules cease to exist; the red paint ceases to exist if all atoms cease to exist, or if protons cease to exist, or if any type of entities in the series ceases to exist. So the existence of molecules is one condition for the red paint’s existence; the existence of molecules is another condition for the red paint’s existence and so on. Every condition needs to be continuously fulfilled in order for the red paint to continue to exist.
      (c) The red paint’s existence is CONTINUOUSLY dependent on the existence of every type of entities in the series, just as the existence of your image in the mirror is continuously dependent on your existence in front of the mirror. If at the next moment you are gone from the mirror, then your image in the mirror would also be gone.

      Premise 2: Such a series is either a never-ending series or a series with an ending. If such a series comprises a never-ending quantity of conditions, then the red paint would not be existing now because it is impossible to achieve fulfillment of an never-ending quantity of conditions (it is a never-ending task to fulfill a never-ending quantity of conditions). Since the red paint exist now on the red chair, that means all the conditions have already achieved fulfillment, and therefore that series of conditions is not never-ending but has an ending. This means a last entity exists now, at the end of the series:

      red paint > molecules > atoms > ... > last entity

      Premise 3: The last entity's existence is either conditional or not conditional on any condition. If the last entity’s existence is conditional on some other condition, then it is impossible for it to exist NOW, because there is nothing after the last entity for it to be conditioned on. Since the last entity exists now (see Premise 2), the last entity’s existence is not conditional on any condition at all. Thus it exists unconditionally now, as an Unconditioned Entity.

      Conclusion: An Unconditioned Entity whose existence is unconditional on anything exists in the real world now. (from here, one can proceed to prove there is only one such Unconditioned Entity, and its other attributes)


      Cheers!
      johannes

      Delete
    4. Hi Jonathan,

      Additional comments on your two statements:

      Statement 1. It is logically possible for there to be an unconditioned being
      Statement 2. It is logically possible for there to be no unconditioned being.

      In the world of logical possibilities, only one of your two statements can be a logical possibility since each of the statements is a categorical statement and each claims the opposite of the other. Otherwise there will be a contradiction inside the world of all logical possibilities.

      Analogy of your two statements:
      1. It is logically possible for God (or unicorn) to be a logical possibility (or to exist in at least one of the complete/exhaustive list of possible worlds).
      2. It is logically possible for God (or unicorn) to be a logical impossibility (or to exist in none of the complete/exhaustive list of possible worlds).

      So only one of your two statements is a logical possibility. Both cannot be logically possible.

      To know which cannot be logically possible, we can parse out the statements (eg by discovering any illogical entailment).


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
  13. I love that this interesting post about a cool analogy turned in a discussion for the ontological argument. Philosophers, i guess :)

    Most objections to the argument seems pretty weak, but St. Thomas objection seems pretty strong to me, since the more i reflect on the cosmological arguments, the more i see that i don't understand God at all, apophatic theology and the doctrine of analogy is what helps.

    But while Thomas objection seems strong to me, almost no one seems to reply to it, the best i found is this:

    "Nevertheless, Aquinas had a second problem with the ontological argument. On Aquinas's view, even if we assume that everyone shares the same concept of God as a being than which none greater can be imagined, "it does not therefore follow that he understands what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally."

    One natural interpretation of this somewhat ambiguous passage is that Aquinas is rejecting premise 2 of Anselm's argument on the ground that, while we can rehearse the words "a being than which none greater can be imagined" in our minds, we have no idea of what this sequence of words really means. On this view, God is unlike any other reality known to us; while we can easily understand concepts of finite things, the concept of an infinitely great being dwarfs finite human understanding. We can, of course, try to associate the phrase "a being than which none greater can be imagined" with more familiar finite concepts, but these finite concepts are so far from being an adequate description of God, that it is fair to say they don't help us to get a detailed idea of God.

    Nevertheless, the success of the argument doesn't depend on our having a complete understanding of the concept of a being than which none greater can be conceived. Consider, for example, that, while we don't have a complete understanding (whatever this means) of the concept of a natural number than which none larger can be imagined, we understand it well enough to see that there does not exist such a number. No more complete understanding of the concept of a maximally great being than this is required, on Anselm's view, to successfully make the argument. If the concept is coherent, then even a minimal understanding of the concept is sufficient to make the argument."

    https://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/#SH2c

    To these that think the argument work, how would you respond to Aquinas objection?

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    1. If interpreted to mean that we cannot reason about a Maximally Great Being and see the relevant entailment it would involve, I think Aquinas's objection fails, and the response works. We might not have a perfect grasp of what a Maximally Great Being is, but we do have a grasp on modal concepts such as necessity and contingency, and we do have a good enough grasp on perfections to see that necessary existence would be one (or would be great-making).

      If, however, we interpret Aquinas to be saying that we cannot, apart from arguments, see that a MGB is metaphysically possible, then his objection fares better. Though there have been versions of the OA recently that made the possibility premise more plausible (for instance the "maximal God" thesis by Nagasawa). In general, I think that ontological arguments on their own only reach a stalemate. But what's good about them is they can be combined with other arguments, for example in modal cosmological arguments, or arguments from desire to possibility, etc

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  14. @Atno

    From what i get from the Summa, Aquinas says that God existence is self-evident in itself but not to us, for we don't know His nature, so we don't see that is self-evident that He has to exist.

    Is a bit like when we say that souls are immaterial, the average man understands that they are not material, but don't understands that this means that they have no color or extension, since he don't know all that the word implies. Of course, he could think about it and see that having color and extension are caracteristics of what is material, so the soul has none of it, in this way understanding what being immaterial implies while not reading the meaning of the word or asking someone.

    I was thinking that we could do something like that, since discussing Stage 2 of, say, Leibniz contigency argument show us that God existence has to be necessary, so we could "get" that His existence is self-evident, even if we don't understand His nature directly, just by thinking about what a MGB would need to have.

    In fact, this seemed like St. Anselm idea, for he admited that we could not understand God completely but defended that we could understand enough for the argument to work when Gaunilo tried to use this epistemological objection.

    About the second interpretation, i think the reverse ontological argument is not equal in power to the original, for the idea of a MGB is logically possible, so i think the burden of proof is on the one who thinks such a being can't exist. Ed says the same thing here: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/12/plantingas-ontological-argument.html?m=1

    You also could appeal to Stage 2 of cosmological arguments, for they show there could be a MGB, the discussion being if the cosmological argument proves that there is one.

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    1. 1. Indeed the reverse ontological argument fails in its first premise (or some may place it as a second premise) that “it is logically possible for an unconditioned being not to exist” (using the reverse of my version). If one thinks carefully on it, there is no logical world (that has something existing) in which conditioned entities can exist without any unconditioned entity.

      Hence the starting premise(s) of the reverse ontological argument fails.


      2. Another reason is that it is difficult for the premise “at least one logically possible world exists in which there is no unconditioned entity” to be shown to be plausible, while it is easy for the premise “at least one logically possible world exists in which an unconditioned entity exists” to be explained to be plausible. Why would an unconditioned entity, which conceptually means it is an entity with unconditional existence, fail to exist or cannot exist in that particular logical world? This seems difficult to be explained. In contrast, it is easy to answer why an unconditional entity can exist in at least one logical world.


      3. Furthermore, the ontological proof has already given a necessarily true conclusion (among various conclusions) that an unconditioned entity exists in all logically possible worlds where something exists (all sound deductive conclusions are necessarily true) and hence that by itself can be used to say that the starting premise of the reverse ontological proof is false. The one who wants to defend that starting premise of the reverse ontological proof would need to show which premise in the ontological proof is false before his starting premise can take off.



      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    2. I notice that you added in the presumptive condition "If one thinks carefully on it, there is no logical world (that has something existing) in which conditioned entities can exist without any unconditioned entity.

      Your "that has something existing" is, of course, an unacceptable narrowing of the "possible world" that must be considered for the atheist. As I understand it, any atheist would be prepared to demand that "there is a (logically) possible world which has no being (i.e. no substance)." And since all other being depends upon substance, that world would have no being, no existent.

      You can't prove that such a "world" is illogical or impossible from modal logic alone. (Not without equivocating on "exists" as, unfortunately, happened many times above).

      You might be able to prove it from modal logic AND the fact that there is one possible world, with a being in it, that actually exists (i.e. it is not merely a logically possible world, it is a real one: this one), but the proof would take you right past the elements that also prove God's existence separately.

      Delete
  15. How come a number is contingent

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  16. Hello Professor, thank you for the thoughtful post. I find it fascinating that a belief system famous for considering religion the "opium of the masses" collapses into a kind of pantheism. Despite the socialist's best efforts, he cannot help but live as if a god exists; it is a matter of who (or what) he considers god. He professes atheism, but practices a belief system that makes the state his god.

    Makes me wonder if you can ever truly be an atheist. You can only believe in what is true, or else believe in a fantasy. Either way, we live in the light of a god (true God or idol). We live lives of worship.

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    1. Will,
      "He professes atheism, but practices a belief system that makes the state his god. "
      No, for an atheist socialist the state is not god, pantheist or otherwise. That is the sort of thing a person who cannot understand not believing in god says. For some theists, it seems, the notion of not believing in any god at all is just so foreign and impossible that when one declares to be an atheist that theist goes thrashing about pointing at things and saying "oh no, X is your god, or Y is your god"

      No, I don't believe in any god, that's it, no god, no substitute god, no such thing.

      Delete
  17. A tweet from the Socialist Party this morning, backing up this analysis: https://twitter.com/OfficialSPGB/status/1230109284551348224?s=20

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  18. @reasonable

    Since your arguments here are very interesting i need to ask: what do you think about Aquinas objection to the ontological argument? He thinks that the existence of God is self-evident in itself but not for us, since we don't know His essence.Is interesting to adress this,for it seems we would need to know God essence to the terms in the arguments that refers to Him(like "necessary being") being more that empty names.

    I think is possible thos objection fails, since we can even say the truth about essences that don't exist(like a square circle, being self-contradictory, it has no essence). Maybe we could speak about God essence indirectly.

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    1. Hi Talmid,

      1. Aquinas’ objections was directed to only Anselm’s versions, and hence may or may not be applicable to others’ versions who used *different* concepts and *different* expressions in formulating their *different* versions of Ontological Proofs.

      2. I don’t think one needs to have a complete understanding of the essence of an entity before we can formulate a sound argument about the existence of that entity. I guess a partial but *sufficient* understanding may be *sufficient* to do the job *sufficiently* well.

      3. I do not know Aquinas’ *intended* meanings so my response is *intended* to be base on your explanation/interpretation of Aquinas’ *intended* objections.

      :D :D :D


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    2. @reasonable

      That was my interpretation. You can read Aquinas here, it probably will help understand his point: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article1

      What i fear is that we know the MGB so little that our a priori talk is only really about the meaning of words and not about His essence.

      But what is interesting about your point is that St. Anselm admited in the Proslogion that he could not understand God(he said that a being he could get would be inferior) but insisted in the argument. Gaunilo tried to use a similar objection to Aquinas one but Anselm responded that we could understand God enough.

      This epistemological objection is honestly the better one, but i'am not sure it works agains the argument, agnoticism about it working as a proof is the best i can do right now.

      Delete
    3. Hi Talmid,

      Do you think the epistemological objection works against my version of ontological proof?

      1. It is much more difficult to explain the idea of MGB which by definition involves omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and existence in every logically possible world of all logically possible worlds, as compared to explaining the idea of an unconditioned entity, which simply is an entity whose existence does not depend on any conditions (the conceor of unconditioned entity does not require it to exist in all logically possible worlds).

      2. Unlike the MGB version of Onto-Proof which claims in one of its beginning premises that it is possible for MGB to exist in ALL logically possible worlds, my version has a much humbler claim in the starting premise: that it is possible for an unconditioned entity to exist in one or at least one logically possible world. Hence I can simply give only one example of such a logical world and my starting premise is established: eg a world where there exists only one entity: just an unconditioned entity. Once I have given such an example, my starting premise is established. In contrast, for the MGB version, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give an example of one logically possible world in which the MGB exists, because MGB by definition is an entity that exists in all logical worlds. It is thus a very “heavy” concept to be illustrated by using only one single logical world as it intrinsically involves all other logical worlds even when only its proponent wants to illustrate it using just one logical world as an example. So MGB propenents tend to defend it by going along the line that “it is INTUITIVELY plausible” or that “there seems there is no intrinsic contradiction in it”.

      3. My version seems to be able to destroy more effectively any reverse ontological proof parasitical on my version. Any reverse ontological proof would need a premise along the line of “there is at least one logically possible world where entities can exist without any unconditioned entity”, and I would then point out that such a premise is unsound/false by showing that such a premise ultimately entails the intrinsic contradiction of “a conditioned entity exists and does not exist at the same time”. It is possible for me to do this because any existing concrete entity is either conditioned or unconditioned; impossible to have any third category.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    4. Typo and amendment to last sentence of point 1:

      (The concept of unconditioned entity, before we parse it out to see the various implications, is such that it is silent on whether or not it exists in all logical possible worlds. This is in contrast to how MGB is defined explicitly defined as a maximal excellent being (involving various omni-attributes) that exists in all the logical worlds.)


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    5. @reasonable

      Your argument is very interesting, very clear. I agree that it is way easier to understand that the one Plantinga gave us. What i like most is that the idea of a unconditioned entity is intuitively linked with the idea of omnipotence, a being that has all power would not need others to be. This and the clarity of the argument makes me think it would probably be the easier version to the average person.

      To put my dificult with the ontological argument as clear as possible i would say my fear is that the Unconditioned Entity is so unlike everything else(to be truly unconditioned, His essence would need to be the same as His existence and we get all the atributes that it entails) that we can't know it a priori, only a posteriori by His effects using others arguments(like cosmologicals or teleologicals).

      Like, your argument is completely solid, but when i say "unconditioned entity" in it are i talking about the essence of a being or just about the meaning of a word? If is the first, the argument works, if it is the second, is just word play.

      Normally, this fear of mine is not a problem, we can know a lot about most essenses just a priori, but the divine essence is so unlike everything else that we can at most know what it is not, so could we a priori understand enough to the argument to work? I have a feeling that the ontological argument works, but this dificult of mine leaves me thinking.

      Delete
    6. Hi Talmid,

      Would the problem you raised affects Aquinas’ Cosmological Proofs as well?

      I think Aquinas uses the idea of analogical language to solve the problem: the descriptions we used on God is to be understood in an analogous sense.

      Could the idea of analogical language thus be applied to solve the same problem you raised about ontological proofs as well? Do you find that solves the problem?

      (Incidentally, I prefer to prove the existence of an unconditioned entity via the cosmological pathway rather than via the ontological proof. (1) I start from a single specific conditioned entity, which usually would be the physical existence of the interlocutor I talk to, showing him that his existence now is CONTINUOUSLY dependent on certain conditioned entities which in turn is CONTINUOUSLY dependent on some further conditioned entities and so on. (2) Then I would explain that their existence now entails such a series of conditions is fulfilled, which entails such a series is not never-ending but has an ending, thus entailing a last entity existing NOW at the end of such a series. (3) Lastly I would explain that if such a last entity is a conditioned entity, the last entity would not exist which entails my interlocutor would not be existing now. Thus if he insists he exists NOW, then an unconditioned entity exists NOW. This will be the ground to go on to Stage 2 to show there is only one such entity, etc etc. As you would know, we do not assume this unconditioned entity is God in stage 1.)


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    7. Hi Talmid,

      Feser’s various books discussed about the need to understand the descriptions of God in an analogous sense. For example, see his Five Proofs of the Existence of God (pp 176 - 184 on Analogy of Being; and pp 229 - 232 on Incomprehensibility of God).

      Do u have any of Feser’s books? Very good to have them.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    8. Hi Talmid,

      Quoting a little bit of Feser’s Five Proofs for you:

      “Can we comprehend God?... Of course, much of what we know of God’s nature is of a negative or apophatic sort. We know that he is not composite, not changeable, not material, not in time or space. But that is REAL KNOWLEDGE, and to have it really is to understand at least something of God’s nature. We have also seen that the terms we use to name God’s positive attributes have to be understood analogically rather than univocally. But that too gives REAL KNOWLEDGE. The analogical language in question is not metaphorical but literal, and such analogical usage occurs in domains of knowledge other than theology.” (pp. 229-230; emphasis mine).

      It is important to read that book’s pages 176 to 184 that explains clearly the key ideas in the use of analogical language in general and then applying it to existence/being.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    9. reasonable,
      "1. Aquinas’ objections was directed to only Anselm’s versions, and hence may or may not be applicable to others’ versions who used *different* concepts and *different* expressions in formulating their *different* versions of Ontological Proofs."
      All versions of the ontological argument fail.

      Consider the first line of how Craig words the argument:
      "It is possible that a maximally great being exists."
      That is an unknown stated as a fact and is merely begging the question because that unknown is a part of the conclusion, yet it is stated as a known fact without support as the very first premise.

      Craig, like Anselm, Plantinga, and others use equivocation between a logical possibility and a real existential possibility, thus the arguments are logically invalid.

      Craig goes on to assert:
      "If a maximally great being exists in every (logically) possible world, then it exists in the actual world."
      This is just an elaborate way to say wishing makes it so. If you can imagine a being existing in every imagined world then it must exist in the real world, this bit of nonsense goes.

      For almost a thousand years since Anselm and today this sort of confusion between ones thoughts and reality has led theists to reformulate various arguments that attempt to define or imagine god into existence. They all fail because they all contain some version of this equivocation that leads to unsupported assertions and begging the question.

      Do you have a version of the ontological argument that you think is sound?

      Delete
    10. @reasonable

      I understand apophatic theology and the doctrine of analogy, i think they are the best we got. i was probably unclear on that, lol.

      "Would the problem you raised affects Aquinas’ Cosmological Proofs as well?"

      Nope:http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article2

      As Aquinas explains here, if we use cosmological arguments like your own(which seems like a neat version of the contingency argument) or teleological arguments we can know that God exists by His effects. We can also know what He is not by the arguments.

      But the ontological argument don't start from effects, what a ontological argument does is analyze the essence of God and show that by the way His essence is God can't fail to exist, so the argument needs that we understand his essence at least in a apophatic way.

      By the cosmological arguments we know this conclusion is solid, but i don't think the argument work as a stand-alone proof. I think that way because we know what God is not by His effects, so it seems we only have the knowledgment of God essence necessary for a ontological argument if we prove that He exists first.

      This is the problem. We only know God essence enough by the arguments, but if we use the arguments we prove that He exists, so the ontological argument is useless to prove God existence. I think the version that gets closer to winning here is the one from Descartes*, since he tries to go by our intuitions about God.

      *i was reading about it. Man, he was misunderstood. Kant reply just missed the point completely.

      Delete
    11. On Descartes version: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/

      Is way better that what i heard, really.

      Delete
    12. Hi Talmid,

      Perhaps we can think of the use of ontological proof this way:

      The wider public more or less came across ideas such as God’s existence is unconditional or necessary, God is omnipotent etc, and some among the wider public may say: “Well, such ideas of God are possible but they may be nothing more than ideas in the mind. How would we know whether or not such an idea of God as necessary being or a being with unconditioned/unconditional existence exists in the real world beyond existing merely as a nice idea?”

      Then the ontological argument enters the picture to prove that if it is possible for an unconditioned entity to exist as a logical idea, then it would be logically necessary that it exists in the real world as well. The ontological proof serves to demonstrate using deductive reasoning that it is a logical contradiction for God as unconditioned being to exists as a logical idea without it also existing in the real world.

      So the ontological proof need not used as a means to discover the essence of God from a blank state, but to prove that once certain ideas of God are accepted as logical ideas by our interlocutors, then God as described by those ideas exists in the real world.


      Cheers!
      johannes hui

      Delete
    13. reasonable,
      "prove that once certain ideas of God are accepted as logical ideas by our interlocutors, then God as described by those ideas exists in the real world."
      False, the ontological argument proves no such thing. The OA only proves that some people are easily convinced by blatantly fallacious arguments.

      Craig states the argument perhaps most simply, making it very easy to spot the errors.
      1 It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
      2 If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
      3 If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
      4 If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
      5 If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
      6 Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

      So, if we suppose that Craig means logically possible unless otherwise specified the errors are clear.

      1 suffers from an absence of definition of "maximally". I think a being that physically occupies all dimensions of a possible world is greater than a being that does not.
      1 is also deceptively worded compared to 6. If "exists" means the same thing in 1 as it does in 6 then the argument only proves that if you can think of a being that exists then that being exists in your thoughts.

      3 is obviously wrong. The "logic" used is patently false. If a maximally great being is 11 dimensional in an 11 dimensional possible world then it is incoherent to assert that same being can exist in a 3 dimensional world.
      If a maximally great being occupies fully all dimensions in a possible 3 dimensional world, and our real world is a 3 dimensional world without its dimensions fully occupied then it is again incoherent to assert that that same being exists in our real world.
      Logically possible worlds allow for an unlimited number of logical variations such that a being that is maximized in one logical world either cannot exist in another logical world or would not be maximized in other logical worlds.

      3 is also simply begging the question with an ad hoc assertion. Just because a being can be maximally great in one world in no way necessitates that it exists in all possible worlds. That simply does not follow.

      4 is just a way of saying wishing makes it so, an obvious non-sequitur. Just because you can imagine a being existing everywhere does not make it real anywhere.

      6 yes, by the usage of the word "exits" in 1, if you can think of an existent being in your thoughts then you have thoughts of an existent being.

      Craig shows in 6 that the ontological argument is simply a tautology as he has worded it, or it is an equivocation if you wish to assign different meanings to the same word within the same argument.

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    14. @reasonable

      Is interesting than that is exactly what i was thinking! The average person on western society has a concept of God who, being analized, could show that God truly has to exist. That is Descartes point really, he tried to prove God showing that his "clear and distinct idea" of God implied that His existence was not dependent on anything else. His argument was not a silogistic one(even if he made it that way sometimes for the others to get it) but more like a mathematical proof.

      It seems that the argument work as a proof, since even the average "fool"(like St. Anselm called) have a concept of God that could be refined by the help of the defender of the ontological argument. We only need to ask where this concept of the fool came from, since i deny inate ideas, but we could probably say it came from religious concepts of God and these probably came by the religious looking at the natural world and infering a cause of it.

      My real problem was epistemological, since i deny we have inate ideas about God or anything else, but you are right that the average person has enough information on God even not knowing the arguments for Him. As long as this information is not inate it seems things are good.

      Thanks for the help here! Ever since i really saw the ontological argument i had a feeling Aquinas objection to it failed. It seems St. Thomas only proved that God existence is not self-evident on a strong sense. On Descartes words:

      “St. Thomas asks whether existence is self-evident as far as we are concerned, that is, whether it is obvious to everyone; and he answers, correctly, that it is not”

      It seems we can have enough knowledgment of God essence(that He is not contingent, for example) for the argument to work even with no others arguments. Experience seems to show this.

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  19. And the comments to this socialist tweet we very funny. Seeing that someone responded to them was also funny.

    ReplyDelete
  20. Is a number necessary being or contingent

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    Replies
    1. Numbers, if they exist at all, are taken to be necessary, since mathematical truths are necessary truths.
      But they would be necessary *abstract* things. The notion of abstract here is a bit intuitive, but you should be able to naturally grasp that an abstract object is somehow "less real" than a concrete object. One popular defining factor is that abstract objects do not have causal powers. They cannot cause anything. They just are.

      God, by contrast, is a necessary *concrete* being. He can cause things - indeed he can cause the whole universe. So they'd be in different categories, so to speak; God or the NB reached at the end of cosmological arguments is a concrete being with real causal powers over reality, numbers - if they exist - are abstract objects with no causal power over reality.

      Whether abstract objects (such as numbers, propositions, etc) exist is one of the biggest and most controversial questions in philosophy. Platonism is the idea that such objects actually exist. Different brands of nominalism take it that they are purely constructs of the human mind.
      The "via media" is that abstract objects actually exist but grounded in a necessary concrete being (for instance, by being thoughts in the mind of God). This would avoid both the problems with Platonism and Nominalism. Some even make an argument for God's existence based on that. For more information, check out Edward Feser's "Augustinian Proof" in his Five Proofs of the Existence of God.

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    2. Ok, so then a number is not a contingent being

      Delete
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