Christianity
did not arise in a vacuum. The very
first Christians debated with their opponents in a cultural context within
which everyone knew that there is a God and that he had revealed himself
through Moses and the prophets. The
question, given that background, was what to think of Jesus of Nazareth. Hence the earliest apologists were, in
effect, apologists for Christianity as
opposed to Judaism, specifically.
That didn’t last long. As
Christianity spread beyond Judea into the larger Mediterranean world, the
question became whether to accept Christianity as opposed to paganism. Much
less could be taken for granted.
Still, significant
common ground for debate was provided by Greek philosophy. In Book VIII of The City of God, Augustine noted that thinkers in the Neoplatonic
tradition had seen that God is the cause of the existence of the world; had
seen also that only what is beyond the world of material and changeable things
could be God; had understood the distinction between the senses and their
objects on the one hand, and the intellect and its objects on the other, and affirmed
the superiority of the latter; and had affirmed that the highest good is not
the good of the body or even the good of the mind, but to know and imitate God. In short, these pagan thinkers knew some of
the key truths about God, the soul, and the natural law that are available to
unaided human reason. This purely
philosophical knowledge facilitated Augustine’s own conversion to Christianity,
and would provide an intellectual skeleton for the developing tradition of
Christian apologetics and theology.
In yet other cultural contexts, however -- such as the religions of the far East -- the Christian apologist could presuppose even less than what was known to the Greeks. The seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary Roberto de Nobili sought to remedy the problem by making use of the rich conceptual apparatus provided by Hindu philosophy in order to convince learned Hindus of the truth of a Thomistic natural theology, which could in turn be used as a stepping stone to Christian revelation.
Nor is it that hard to find common ground here. Hinduism affirms a single self-existent and
unchanging divine reality, even if this reality is usually conceived of in
pantheistic rather than theistic terms; and there are explicitly theistic
strands too in the Hindu philosophical tradition. Hinduism also has a notion of the soul, even
if its doctrine of reincarnation takes the idea in a direction foreign to
Christianity. In its affirmation of an
objective moral order that operates like a law of nature rather than an
arbitrary divine command, the notion of karma parallels that of natural law
(though of course there are radical differences too). In the Chinese context, Taoism, Confucian
ethics, and Neo-Confucian metaphysics also provide a rich set of conceptual
resources by which a discussion of natural theology and natural law might
proceed.
But in the
modern West, even less than that can be taken for granted. The Buddhist critic of Hindu metaphysics at
least thinks the debate is well worth having.
Though in substance his views are yet farther still from Christianity
than those of the Hindu, he is at least at the philosophical level more or less
in the same conceptual universe. But as
I noted in my
recent TAC talk calling for a return to Scholastic apologetics, the typical
modern Western secularist doesn’t regard theism, much less Christianity, even
worth the bother of refuting. And he is
often as dismissive of philosophy itself as he is of the theology the
traditional apologist would ground in philosophical arguments. It is, not always but often, empirical
science alone that he will take seriously.
Given this scientism, you need first to show him why he needs to take
metaphysics seriously, and then go from there to natural theology, before you
can finally turn to the defense of Christian revealed theology. (Not that that first task is hard to
accomplish if one’s interlocutor is intellectually honest. Scientism is not hard to refute. For the refutation, see chapter 0 of Scholastic
Metaphysics. For the ocean of
metaphysics any possible natural science presupposes, see the rest of the
book.)
The trouble with contemporary apologetics
So, the
modern apologist has his work cut out for him.
Though Christianity did not arise in a vacuum, it currently finds
itself, at least in the contemporary Western context, in something
approximating a vacuum. The religious
and philosophical milieu within which Christian revelation is intelligible --
and thus within which an intellectually serious and compelling Christian
apologetics must be situated -- has largely been forgotten. And unfortunately it is not only secularists
who have forgotten it, but Christians
themselves, including self-described Christian apologists.
I have often
complained that it is not just New Atheist types, but too many contemporary
Christian thinkers, who are operating with a seriously deficient conception of
God and a seriously deficient set of background metaphysical assumptions. That is part of the problem I have in mind
here. A sound apologetics must be
formulated in terms of classical
theism and classical (Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Scholastic)
metaphysics. But there is more to it
than that. We need also to rediscover
the depth, scope, and rigor of apologetics as it was understood in the
Neo-Scholastic tradition. Rightly understood,
apologetics is not a grab bag of ad hoc
moves designed merely to win over converts by whatever means are at hand. It is not a kind of rhetoric. It is a kind of science, in the broad sense of a
systematic body of objective knowledge.
It has a philosophical foundation and a logical structure, a proper ordering
of topics integrated into a theoretically coherent whole. It contains no gaps that require that the
chain of logical argumentation suddenly be interrupted, and the intellect
turned off so that will or emotion can take the reins. And if it is not treated this way -- as a
serious intellectual enterprise -- it
will not be taken seriously by most intelligent people, and will not deserve to
be.
One problem
with too much contemporary apologetics is that it reflects little awareness of
this theoretical structure of the discipline and the proper ordering of its
subject matter. Consider approaches
which jump straight to the Resurrection of Jesus as an argument for
Christianity, or even as an argument for theism. This might be effective with some people who
have no strong convictions either way vis-à-vis Christianity or theism, or with
a theologically conservative Jewish interlocutor who already affirms the truth
of Abrahamic religion and just needs convincing that Christianity represents
its correct development. But considered
as a completely general “opening move,” suitable for immediate deployment
against naturalists and atheists of any stripe, this approach is in my view
seriously wrongheaded. A sophisticated
naturalist supposes that he has good reason to think events like resurrections
just can’t happen, and good reason to think the body of religious teaching
associated with this particular resurrection story is a priori
implausible. So unless this set of
general background assumptions is first undermined, he will understandably
think himself perfectly justified in shrugging his shoulders and dismissing
even the strongest evidence for the Resurrection as just one of several odd
pieces of data we find here and there in history -- a curiosity perhaps, but
not something that could by itself undermine what he takes to be an otherwise
well-established naturalism.
Of course,
some apologists would at least preface a treatment of the Resurrection with an independent
argument for God’s existence. But even
that is not, by itself, an adequate prolegomenon. For one thing, not every argument for God’s
existence will get you to the specific conception
of God needed in order to establish the plausibility of a
resurrection. For another, the existence
of God is by no means the only piece of background philosophical knowledge
which can and should be put in place before a specifically Christian apologetic
begins. I will return to this issue
below.
Another problem
with too much contemporary apologetics is that it takes a “kitchen sink”
approach that seems more interested in persuading
the listener than in presenting the
truth. Hence an apologist will sometimes
dump out onto the page a bevy of arguments that have been or could be given for
some claim, leaving it vague whether he actually accepts all of them
himself. This is the apologist-as-salesman,
happy as long as you walk out of the store with something, and not too particular about what it is. Welcome
to 31 Theological Flavors! Come on in and
sample our wide array of proofs for God’s existence. See one you like? Excellent choice, shall I box it up for you
or will you be wearing it right away?
The trouble
here is not that one or more of the arguments might not in fact be good, and
sincerely believed by the apologist to be good.
And of course, if an argument really is good, it remains so even if you
throw a bunch of questionable arguments in with it. The point is rather that uncritically putting
forward anything that might help “make the case” dilutes the intellectual
seriousness of the enterprise, and reinforces the false perception of
apologetics as mere rhetoric rather than true philosophy.
At this
point I need to anticipate an obvious objection. Surely, the atheist or secularist critic will
say, any apologetics must of its nature be merely rhetorical
rather than truly philosophical or scientific in spirit. For the apologist (so the objection
continues) is engaged in putting forward reasons for conclusions which he has already decided
beforehand are true, conclusions he originally believed for reasons other than
the ones he now puts forward in his role as an apologist (for example, on the
basis of what parents and religious authorities told him when he was younger). And that sort of task is intellectually
unserious, even intellectually dishonest.
So many a
secularist will say. But if he is honest with himself, the
secularist will see that he doesn’t really believe this. Consider that almost everyone who believes what
modern science has to tell us does so on the basis of what some authority has
told him -- parents, teachers, makers of science documentaries, writers of pop
science books, and the like. Very few
people are capable of carrying out the study necessary to master even a single
scientific discipline, and no one can master all of them. Most people have to rely on the expertise of
others to know what they know of a scientific nature. But no
secularist considers this irrational or dishonest. No secularist would say that you can only
rationally believe what science says if you have worked it out for yourself,
and done so from first principles, without parents and teachers having first
taught you the conclusions before you learned the arguments.
Consider also
books like Richard Dawkins’ The Blind
Watchmaker, Philip Kitcher’s Abusing
Science, Michael Ruse’s Darwinism
Defended, and Jerry Coyne’s Why
Evolution Is True. It is undeniable
that these are works of apologetics -- Darwinian apologetics. They are in no way tentative and
dispassionate explorations of their topic, but written precisely to convince
the reader that Darwinism is true and to defend it against its critics. And while Darwinians are happy to acknowledge
that such books, like all books, might be wrong on this or that point of
detail, they will be very, very upset
if you do not firmly agree with the overall thrust of the books.
Such books,
and science books more generally, also set forth arguments few or none of which
their authors actually knew of when they first accepted the conclusions the
arguments are meant to support (e.g. when they accepted them in school, on the
basis of their teachers’ authority, or at best on the basis of simplified and
sometimes mistaken explanations that their teachers gave them). Nor were the arguments that are summarized in
such books actually discovered by anyone else
in a way that mirrors the order of presentation in the book itself. In science, what Hans Reichenbach called the
“context of discovery” is much, much messier and haphazard than the “context of
justification” would indicate.
Scientific textbooks give you the “finished product,” and their
arguments and order of exposition don’t necessarily mirror the way in which the
knowledge was actually arrived at historically.
Now,
secularists do not consider any of this in any way objectionable. Though science textbooks and works of
Darwinian apologetics are essentially giving you after-the-fact justifications
for conclusions that were originally accepted by their authors on the basis of
authority -- and justifications that do not entirely reflect the reasoning that
historically led to the acceptance of the conclusions by the wider scientific
community in the first place -- no secularists will for that reason dismiss
such works as mere “rationalizations” of “prejudice.” Nor does the fact that the conclusions are
presented in a way that is far from tentative, with critics dealt with
dismissively or even polemically, lead the secularist to regard such works as
mere rhetoric rather than true science.
In that
case, though, the secularist cannot consistently dismiss works of theological
apologetics a priori as per se
intellectually unserious or contrary to a truly philosophical or scientific
approach to their subject. He must
acknowledge the possibility that such works are relevantly parallel to
scientific textbooks or to books defending scientific theories against skeptics
-- that they are, like science textbooks, systematic presentations of ideas and
arguments that were historically arrived at in a more haphazard and
unsystematic way. He must consider the
arguments on their own merits, and cannot reasonably try to short-circuit
debate by dismissing the genre in which they are found.
The proper order of apologetics
So, what is
the correct order of topics in a philosophically rigorous apologetics -- the
kind I have attributed to Neo-Scholastic writers? The key point to emphasize here is how much must be, and can be, established by
purely philosophical arguments before one even gets to addressing the claims of
Christianity specifically. A rich system
of “natural apologetics,” as it is sometimes called, must precede specifically
Christian apologetics if the latter is to have its proper intellectual
foundation. And arguing for the
existence of God is only one part of this task.
Let me sketch out the order of topics I have in mind. (Mind you, I am not stating the arguments of natural apologetics or Christian
apologetics here. That would take a
book. I am sketching out what a complete
system of apologetics would involve, and does involve in the best authors on
the subject.)
I.
Metaphysical prolegomena
“Natural
apologetics” presupposes a number of basic metaphysical assumptions. So too, at the end of the day, does
specifically Christian apologetics, and indeed the whole system of Christian
dogmatic theology when given a rigorous intellectual articulation. Specifically, I would argue, these background
assumptions include the key elements of Scholastic metaphysics: the theory of
act and potency, the Scholastic theory of causal powers, the principle of
causality, the principle of finality, formal and material causes, the
Scholastic account of substance, the distinction between essence and existence,
and so forth.
To some
extent the notions in question can be introduced and defended in the course of
giving this or that argument in “natural apologetics.” For example, you could at least introduce the
theory of act and potency in the course of setting out the argument for the
existence of an unactualized actualizer (i.e. “unmoved mover”). And you typically won’t find, in old Neo-Scholastic
works on apologetics and natural theology, a section or chapter devoted specifically
to metaphysical prolegomena. One reason
is that the metaphysical background assumptions in question were perhaps
somewhat more widely known and less controversial in those days. Another is that there were in any event a
great many Neo-Scholastic works devoted entirely to metaphysics and philosophy
of nature. The interested reader could
easily be directed to such works if he had questions about the background metaphysics.
These days,
however, there is so much ignorance
and misinformation regarding the metaphysical underpinnings of Scholastic
arguments in “natural apologetics” that I think a prolegomenon devoted to those
underpinnings is necessary. (That is why
you have to plow through 50 pages or so of abstract metaphysics in The
Last Superstition and Aquinas
before you get to natural theology, philosophical anthropology, and natural
law. There are still book-length
treatments available too.)
II. Natural
theology
Natural
theology involves, of course, arguments for the existence of God. But it involves a lot more than that. For one thing, the key arguments of natural
theology -- the sort I have defended in many places (e.g. here,
here,
here,
and here)
-- do not merely get you to some
deity or other. They get you to nothing
less than the God of classical theism, specifically. That is to say, they get you to a cause of
the world which is pure actuality rather than a mixture of actuality and
potentiality; subsistent being itself rather than merely one being or existent
among others; absolutely simple or non-composite; absolutely necessary;
immutable and eternal; and something which could not in principle have had a
cause of its own but is self-existent. They get you to a God who is, accordingly (and
contra pantheism), necessarily utterly distinct from the world (since the world
is temporal, changeable, composite, a mixture of actual and potential, etc.). They get you to a God to whom we must
attribute intellect, will, omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. They also show that God causes the world not
merely in the sense of having gotten the ball rolling 13 billion years ago, but
in the more fundamental sense that he conserves
the world in being at every instant.
They show that if he were not continuously causing the world, the world
would instantly collapse into nothingness.
Natural
theology also establishes that there is a natural order of “secondary causes”
that is both distinct from but depends upon God as primary cause. Natural, secondary causes are real causes (so
that occasionalism is ruled out), but they can act only insofar as God imparts
causal power to them (so that deism is also ruled out). This is the idea of divine concurrence with natural causes. When worked out it entails, on the one hand,
that there is a natural order of things that can be known and studied whether
or not one affirms the existence of God.
Given just that natural order, certain things are possible and certain
things are impossible, and the “laws of nature” revealed by natural science tell
us which is which. But on the other
hand, the doctrine of divine concurrence tells us that since this entire
natural order operates only insofar as the divine primary cause concurs with
it, there is also the possibility of a supernatural
order of things -- an order of things over
and above the natural order, for the sake of which the latter might be
suspended. (Notice that “supernatural”
here has a technical meaning that is unrelated to the sorts of things popular
usage of the word suggests. It has
nothing to do with vampires, werewolves, zombies, and the like -- which, if
they existed, would be part of the “natural” order in the relevant sense,
rather than supernatural.)
Now both of
these ideas -- that some things are impossible given just the natural order of secondary causes, but
that the divine primary cause might act in a supernatural way -- entail the possibility of miracles. For a miracle in the strictest sense is
impossible in the natural order, and thus can only be caused by what is supernatural, which means it can only be
caused by God. (Note that the natural
order of things broadly construed includes angels, which, like us, are
creatures which must be preserved in being by God and whose actions require
divine concurrence. Hence a miracle in
the strictest sense could not be
caused even by an angel, since it is a suspension of the order to which even
angels are subject. Obviously,
“miracles” in the looser sense of remarkable events outside the ordinary course
of things could be caused by beings other than God, but these would be preternatural rather than strictly supernatural.)
Natural
theology also establishes divine providence,
which entails that God provides the means by which the things he has created
can attain the ends for which they exist, and that he allows evil in the world
only insofar as he draws greater good out of it.
So, a
completed system of natural theology, at least as developed in the Scholastic
tradition, tells us quite a bit. It
establishes the existence and key
attributes of the God of classical theism, the doctrines of conservation,
concurrence, and providence, and the possibility of miracles. It thereby tells us not only that there is a
God but that he is not a lame
“watchmaker” god of the Paley sort (which Hume and Dawkins rightly think would
require a cause of his own), that he is not
an impersonal Absolute or identical with the world (as pantheism claims), and (given
conservation, concurrence, providence, and the possibility of miracles) that he
is not an absentee god of the deist
sort. A necessary condition for any of
the world religions being true, then, is that it is consistent with all of
this. That rules out, among other
candidates, Buddhism and pantheist forms of Hinduism.
III.
Philosophical anthropology
That’s just
the beginning of what “natural apologetics” tells us. Let’s turn to human nature. The Scholastic argues that the human soul is
to be conceived of as the substantial form of the living human being, related
to the body as form to matter. The
intellectual and volitional powers of the soul are, it is argued, essentially immaterial, operating without direct
dependence on any bodily organ. This in
turn leads to the conclusion that the human soul is naturally immortal. For since the intellect and will do not
directly depend on the body when a human being is alive, they do not perish
with the death of the body. Hence the
human soul, reduced to its intellectual and volitional powers, carries on after
the loss of our corporeal functions. (I’ve
defended these claims in various places, e.g. here
and here.)
A
consequence of this view is that the soul, because of its immaterial powers, cannot
have a natural cause. Each individual
human soul requires a special divine
creative act, an act which goes beyond
divine conservation of, and concurrence with, the ordinary course of
nature.
Another
consequence is that a disembodied soul is not a complete human being, but, as I
have said, only a human being reduced to its intellectual and volitional
powers. For the complete human being to
be restored would require that the corporeal functions be restored; that is to
say, it would require a resurrection from the dead. Now there is nothing in the natural order of
things that can accomplish this. Like
the coming into existence of a new individual human soul, a resurrection would,
the Scholastic argues, require a special divine act.
Though not naturally possible, such a resurrection
is nevertheless supernaturally
possible because the human soul is immortal.
If there were nothing that
persisted between the death of an individual human being and his resurrection,
the resurrected human being would not really be the same human being, but only a duplicate. (This is why a non-human animal cannot be
resurrected. Since such animals have no
immaterial operations, there is nothing left of the individual after the death
of its body. The most that could come
into being after Rover’s death is an exact duplicate
of Rover, but not Rover himself.)
Your soul,
on this analysis, is also the form of your
body, specifically. It is, on the Scholastic
analysis, metaphysically impossible for a human soul to be reincarnated in the
body of another human being, much less a non-human animal. It is only ever your body that could come once again to have your soul. That entails that
the standard reincarnation doctrines are not correct accounts of human nature
-- a major strike against all forms of Hinduism and Buddhism.
Among the
other things that all of this tells us is that the divine cause of the world,
who conserves it in being at every instant and concurs with every exercise of natural
causal power, takes a special interest in human beings insofar as he acts in a
special way, beyond his ordinary conserving and concurrent activity, when a new
individual human soul comes into being.
Moreover, what he creates thereby is something immortal -- something which persists not only well after the brief
three score and ten years allotted to most of us, but forever. But in the natural
course of things, it only exists in a complete
way (i.e. together with the body) for a short span of time.
This tells
us that if any religion is true, it cannot be one which denies either the
special significance of human beings or personal immortality. Philosophical anthropology also at the very
least strongly indicates that if any of the allegedly revealed religions is
true, it will be one which teaches a doctrine of the resurrection. For while a resurrection is not strictly required given our nature and the special
interest God evidently take in us, it is especially
fitting given our nature and the special interest God takes in us.
IV. Natural
law and natural religion
The mainstream
Scholastic position is that the binding force of morality, and at least the broad
outlines of its content, can be known via natural reason. Among the many other things about the natural
law that we can establish through philosophical arguments is that our highest
end is God, that individually and socially we owe him worship, and that
religion is therefore absolutely essential to healthy moral and social
life. What all this entails in detail is
spelled out in standard Scholastic manuals of ethics. A necessary condition of the truth of any
religion (or of any non-religious view of things, for that matter) is that it
be consistent with what the natural law tells us about the content and binding
force of morality.
However,
human experience also tells us a few other crucial things about the moral
life. First of all, while it is possible for unaided human reason to
discover a great deal in the way of natural theology and natural law, in practice very few people have the leisure
or intelligence to do it, and even those who do tend to do so very
imperfectly. As with natural science, the
acquisition of a rigorous and systematic body of knowledge of a “natural
apologetics” sort is very difficult and is the work of many generations. Though there is, in different cultures,
always some knowledge of a natural theological and natural law sort, given the
limitations of our nature it is in
practice invariably mixed with greater or lesser amounts of error. Hence in practice our knowledge even of our natural
moral and religious obligations is often severely deficient.
Furthermore,
even when we are aware of our moral obligations we tend to find them very
difficult to fulfill. This is in part because
of the strong pull of our passions against our reason even in the best of circumstances,
and also because in the course of actual human life there is often a dramatic
mismatch between moral virtue and this-worldly rewards. In practice the good often suffer and the evil
go unpunished, and this, needless to say, can be extremely demoralizing.
Now as I have
said, the arguments of natural theology and philosophical anthropology
establish that God takes a very special interest in us, that our highest end is
to know him, and that we have a destiny in the hereafter. Natural law arguments also tell us what we
need to do in order to achieve our natural end.
Yet though it is in principle possible
for us to know all this through unaided reason and to live in accordance
with the natural law, in practice it
is very difficult to do so. This makes
it a priori fitting and indeed highly plausible that God would provide special
assistance, beyond what our very limited natural faculties provide. That is to say, it makes it a priori highly
plausible that he would provide a special revelation.
The only
means by which we could know with certainty that such a revelation has actually
occurred, though, is if it is backed by a miracle in the strict sense of a divine suspension of the natural order. Anything less than that -- anything that
could have been produced by natural or even by preternatural causes rather than
a truly supernatural cause -- would,
for all we know, be bogus.
V. Christian
apologetics
It is only
at this point that a specifically Christian
apologetics properly begins. “Natural
apologetics” tells us to look for a special divine revelation. It tells us that this revelation will have to
be backed by a miracle in the strict sense -- something that only God could in
principle have caused. And it tells us
that this revelation will have to be consistent with everything we know from
natural theology, philosophical anthropology, and natural law. As we have seen, given what we know from
those fields, that rules out quite a lot.
In fact, among the great world religions, it rules out the religions of
the far East and tells us to look instead to the Abrahamic traditions. The reason is in part that the content of the
religions of the far East is too greatly out of harmony with what we know from
natural theology and philosophical anthropology, and in part because it is in
the Abrahamic religions rather than the far Eastern ones that we even find in
the first place claims to a divine revelation backed by miracles.
Now while
there are miracle stories in the Islamic tradition, and even the occasional
attribution of a miracle to Muhammad, it is remarkable how little emphasis is
placed on the miraculous in Islam compared to Judaism and Christianity. Indeed, the chief miracle attributed to Muhammad
is supposed to be the Qur’an itself. But
of course, whether the Qur’an is even preternatural,
or indeed even something naturally
improbable -- let alone something that could not in principle have come
about except through a supernatural, divine cause -- is, to say the very least,
highly doubtful.
When we turn
to Judaism we find that there are no significant miracles affirmed by it that
are not also affirmed by Christianity. Hence, suppose it were established beyond any
doubt that (say) the miracles attributed to Moses really happened. That wouldn’t establish the truth of Judaism
as opposed to Christianity, since the biblical passages telling us about these
miracles are considered scriptural in both
religions.
Now the Resurrection
of Jesus Christ is something else altogether.
For one thing, if it really happened, it cannot possibly have had a
natural or even preternatural cause.
Only God himself could have caused it.
And if it really happened, it decisively establishes Christianity as
opposed to Judaism, and indeed as opposed to any other religion. This is
why Christianity has historically staked everything on this particular miracle. “If
Christ is not raised,” St. Paul tells the Christian, “your faith is worthless.” But if he was
raised, then the Christian faith is rationally established.
So, was he raised? Here,
I maintain, is where the work of the most formidable scholars of the
Resurrection -- of a William Lane Craig, say -- should enter the picture. If a skeptic is convinced of the truth of naturalism,
and you present him with no reason to doubt his naturalism except the defense of the Resurrection developed by a writer like
Craig, then it seems to me perfectly understandable why such a skeptic would regard
that defense as inconclusive at best.
However, suppose instead that the claims of natural theology,
philosophical anthropology, and natural law sketched above can all be independently
established. Seen in that context, I maintain, the arguments
of writers like Craig are compelling.
That is by
no means to deny that there are important considerations other than the
Resurrection. For example, I would argue
that it is only in light of the Incarnation, of God in the flesh suffering with
us, that the problem of evil can be dealt with in a practically and emotionally satisfying way (as opposed to a bloodlessly
intellectually satisfying way). And it
is highly plausible that, given his special concern for us, God would will to
answer the needs of our emotional nature, so as to make absolutely evident his
love for us. (Notice that I am not fallaciously
“appealing to emotion” here; I am not saying “Proposition p is emotionally
satisfying, therefore p is true.”
Rather, I am appealing to what God would plausibly will as conducive to
our well-being given that we are by nature creatures of emotion as well as of
reason.) I would also argue that the supernatural end revealed by
Christianity -- the beatific vision -- does greater justice to our rational
nature than do the natural ends posited by other purportedly revealed
religions. (Since I say this as a critic of Henri
de Lubac, this is a claim I would obviously want to formulate very carefully
in a fuller treatment!)
Obviously
much more could be said. But this is not
a post about Christian apologetics per se,
and it is a post that is already too long.
The point is that the full power of distinctively Christian claims about
God and man can only be appreciated within the context of a fully developed “natural
apologetics.” Scholastic writers of a
previous generation understood this. You
will find the approach I advocate followed in old books like Paul Glenn’s Apologetics,
Anthony Alexander’s College
Apologetics, Michael Sheehan’s Apologetics
and Catholic Doctrine, John McCormick’s Natural Theology, and in many multi-volume works of dogmatic or fundamental
theology in the Neo-Scholastic period.
The trouble with such works (other than the fact of their often being
out of print and hard to find) is that, being old, they do not address the
sorts of objections a contemporary analytic philosopher or a contemporary skeptical
biblical scholar might raise.
Hence there
is an urgent need for Catholic theologians and philosophers to return to the
task of writing works of apologetics with the depth, breadth, analytic rigor,
and systematic character prized in the Scholastic tradition. (It is only fair to note that the Eastern
Orthodox philosopher Richard Swinburne is something of a model, having produced
over the decades an apologetic oeuvre of remarkable depth, breadth, analytic
rigor, and systematic power. If only he
were a Scholastic, and if only he weren’t a theistic personalist!)
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteSince therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually.
I don’t see how that helps your case at all. In God, the divine intellect is the intelligible species, which is the divine essence. They are “altogether the same”, and only differ in our limited conception. Hence, if our intellect knows God, then it must have received the intelligible species of God -- because that is a necessary condition of knowledge -- which is none other than the divine essence, which is none other than God himself. Thus, to know God in any capacity is to receive God himself into our finite intellect, which is impossible, and therefore, we cannot possibly know God, according to Thomist epistemology.
I echo Scott's hope that the new born is dinging (sp?) well. ;)
The baby is just fyne.
(Btw, and for FFR: an inordinate amount of coffee, an inordinate amount of thinking and an inordinate amount of typing all rolled into one over a long period of time, especially when I really ought to be doing something else during that time, invariably lead to short, clipped, telegraphic and staccato-like sentences from me. So, no need to worry; that's all it is.)
ReplyDeletedguiller,
ReplyDeleteI don’t see how that helps your case at all. ...to know God in any capacity is to receive God himself into our finite intellect, which is impossible, and therefore, we cannot possibly know God, according to Thomist epistemology.
Hmm. I suppose one must then conclude that Aquinas himself was ill-informed re Thomist epistemology. And that he betrayed his lack of understanding when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, rather than the thing itself. Oh well, shows to go ya -- one can learn something new every day.
;)
Prof. Feser,
ReplyDeleteif the OT and ancient Israel was the way it was in order to pave the way for Christ and Christianity, then why were only a small minority of Jews early Christians. Why are the majority of Christians during the first century converted gentiles? In fact, the orthodox belief in the Mosaic Laws and the theology behind the OT prevented most Jews from becoming Christians.
You seem to argue that the emergence of monotheism is explained best as a preparation for the incarnation of the most supreme as a human. But doesn't it create the paradox that a man is not a God? A man can die, but God cannot die. If Jesus was God, then he never really died at the cross, he only appeared to be dead. A God who is dead is a logical contradiction.
I think the real reason why the Israelites insisted on monotheism is because they needed to defend themselves to hostile neighbors trying to take over them. Multiculti is a new invention of the 20th/21st century. Nations in the past were generally self-protective and isolationistic. The obvious resentment against idolatry is induced by the historic trauma of the Babylonean captivity. The Israelites could not understand why their living God who literally dwelled among them would allow his people and his Temple to be destroyed by a pagan nation like Babylon. Thus the hate against Babylon, an ever present theme in the OT. Thus the hate against idolatry, an ever present theme in the OT, because the Israelites blamed on idolatry for why they were completely defeated. They believed that God was angry at them because of their idolatry and thus the Israelites desperately looked for a way to reconciliation with God, that would allow them to get their country back. Note that the First Temple of Jerusalem was destroyed in 587 BC. According to the Babylonian Chronicles that recorded this event the manuscripts of the Jewish holy scriptures were destroyed during the siege, as the city of Jerusalem was plundered and razed to the ground. So what we know today as the OT is actually a reproduction by later Israelian elites who were under Babylonean captivity. It falls perfectly to the historical framework if the themes of anti-idolatry and a messianic reconcilliation with God was heavily developed from that time onward.
Please consider that the Babylonean captivity was the reason why there is a prevalent anti-idolatry and messianic theme in the OT.
Wey
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteWhat I am suggesting is that an explanation that involves factors that are well-studied and understood should be preferred to explanations that involve factors that are (a) less well-studied and understood and (b) conflict with factors that are well-studied and understood, unless there are compelling reasons to rule out the well-studied and understood factors themselves as applicable to this case.
In the abstract, perhaps, but not necessarily when we are talking about specific incidents. Your point seems to rely on a soft scientism: the view that natural science has explained most of the natural or corporeal world and there are few anomalies or gaps. I disagree. But, in the end, I just don't see why we should, where natural science cannot properly investigate, only follow the methods of natural science or endorse, even provisionally, only what has the exact levels of certainty of the best science.
But the paranormal can have bearing upon science....
What you write here is questionable, and depends on the borders of natural science. The make up of ghosts is mysterious. Natural science tends to deal with the quantifiably measurable and testable aspects of the corporeal world. Now, the extent of knowledge this gives us of the whole corporeal world is open to question. The paranormal can certainly contribute to our knowledge of the corporeal world, but not generally in the core fields of investigation of natural science. It would affect our knowledge of reality but not change, for example, what we know about physics or chemistry in their current confines. Whether we include knowledge of the paranormal in science or, like history or art, as separate category is really just a question of terminology. I see no argument against allowing the paranormal here.
History might make use of natural science, but it is not natural science. It is a knowledge of corporeal reality that is not scientific per se. Investigations of the paranormal should be as rigorous as possible. And history does not replace natural science, but it can testify to the paranormal itself. Whether we allow the reality of such testimony is much the same conversation as we having now, but history most certainly doesn't have to claim testimony about the paranormal is wrong or metaphorical or whatever.
But why not risk your life? Either such claims make a difference or they do not. If you genuinely believe them to be valid possibilities, then why not test them to see if they are true. You wouldn’t even have to jump yourself. Just throw some object instead and see if it floats!
I would have thought it was obvious why not risk your life: you don't want to die. We were talking about just suspending judgment, or not dismissing an incident. That is about as low certainty of a paranormal explanation you can have without preferring another, naturalistic explanation. It is not even endorsing a paranormal explanation per se. So, of course you wouldn't risk your life in such a situation. But you could or, and if you wanted to investigate thoroughly, test by all other possible means. In fact, one should make such tests before suspending judgment or coming to any conclusion.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteI suppose one must then conclude that Aquinas himself was ill-informed re Thomist epistemology. And that he betrayed his lack of understanding when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, rather than the thing itself.
Not at all. It could just mean that his system had an inconsistency that he missed, or simply downplayed in the interests of preserving the rest of the system.
And when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, he was grounding that likeness on the formal identity between the intelligible species and the form in the thing understood. Without the formal identity, there is no understanding, and the formal identity is based upon the idea that the form of the thing in the intellect is the formally the same as, albeit numerically distinct from, the form of the thing itself.
If that is correct, then for the intellect to understand or know God, then there must be a formal identity between the finite intellect and God, i.e. the divine intellect. I don’t see any way that this can occur on Thomist principles without compromising God in some way. For example, the intelligible species of God is the divine intellect, and thus the divine intellect would have to be received by the finite intellect, which would limit the unlimited, which is impossible.
So, unless you can show that Aquinas did not believe in formal identity, and if he did, then formal identity did not presuppose the same form in the knowing intellect and in the thing known, then I’m afraid that my objections hold true.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteAnd another problem is that if the human intellect receives the divine essence in order to know God at all, then according to Thomist principles, the divine essence must be limited by the human intellect. After all, a key Thomist metaphysical principle is that act is limited by potency. For example, esse (as act) is limited by essence (as potency) in a composite entity. Another example, form (as act) is limited by matter (as potency). If the divine essence is in act, which it must be as pure act, and the intellect is in potency, then when the divine essence is received by the human intellect, then the infinite has been limited by the finite, which is impossible.
I hadn't seen this until after my last response, and having made that last response, there didn't seem to be any point to responding to the above. But today is another day, so...
You reason to the conclusion that "the infinite has been limited by the finite". You then comment upon the conclusion you arrive at. Your comment on the conclusion you arrive at is that it, the conclusion, "is impossible."
If a conclusion is impossible, then there is something wrong with one or more of the premises employed and upon which that conclusion is based. This being so, your recognition that your conclusion is impossible is a tacit acknowledgement that there is something wrong with one or more of the premises you employ in reasoning to the impossible conclusion.
One such premise is stated in two slightly different ways: a) that "the human intellect receives the divine essence"; and, b) that "the divine essence is received by the human intellect".
That that premise is incorrect (though sources are referenced, difference sources are used for the sake of semantic simplicity):
1. "[God's] Essence is His Being. (ST I Q 3 A 4 (click on "page 30"))
2. But "[T]he being of God is… not received in any other[.]" (ST I Q 7 A 1 ad. 3)
3. Therefore, God's Essence, which is the divine essence (Compendium of Theology, Chapter 11), is not received in any other.
But you could or, and if you wanted to investigate thoroughly, test by all other possible means. In fact, one should make such tests before suspending judgment or coming to any conclusion.
ReplyDeleteThis makes absolutely no sense. On one hand you say it is obligatory to suspend judgment before investigating specific paranormal claims, on the other hand you say people should test specific claims by all possible means before suspending judgment - which must include the quantifiable tests that assume naturalistic explanations. However, if for some reason a specific claim cannot be quantifiably tested then all the historical tests that previously established its impossibility as a general rule are assumed inadequate and are not considered an overwhelming part of the historical record.
Wey: Why are the majority of Christians during the first century converted gentiles? In fact, the orthodox belief in the Mosaic Laws and the theology behind the OT prevented most Jews from becoming Christians.
ReplyDeleteDid it? Where are your numbers? Of course there are more Gentiles, because Gentiles outnumbered Jews. But it is not at all clear that "most" Jews did not become Christian; I have seen claims that most of them in fact did. Scriptural passages that sound otherwise must be taken in the context of the shepherd who goes after the one lost sheep: you would never conclude from all the effort that there are 99 others left behind. So language that puts emphasis on the stubborn can in no way be read as statistical figures; not to mention that references to "the Jews" can mean specifically the authorities or those who did not accept Christianity.
A man can die, but God cannot die. If Jesus was God, then he never really died at the cross, he only appeared to be dead. A God who is dead is a logical contradiction.
Indeed, and now that a religion based on such a paradox has caught your attention, you will no doubt want to investigate what Christianity actually claims [hint: it's not what you suggest above] and how Christian philosophy explicates these claims. An excellent place to start is by reading all the old posts on this site — Feser addresses some of these issues directly, but the other posts supply necessary background.
Glenn: This is evidenced not only by his having just managed to kill two birds with one stone, but by his having been nonchalant while doing so.
ReplyDeleteActually, I was pretty chalant... I just hide it well!
DGuller: What if the only way for the students to apply themselves is via some effort by the teacher, and that without this effort by the teacher, the students couldn’t possibly apply themselves at all?
This is true, and actually I think you are right about God's being able to cause us freely to love him too. And if God has given us the end of knowing Him, and this requires grace, then it follows that God must make that grace available to all — and this is in fact the case. God does give all men that opportunity; but of course an individual can reject or waste that grace. In my example that would be something like saying the teacher has to do something, namely teach the students, in order to sincerely will that they pass the exam. However, it does not follow that if a student goofs off all term, then the teacher is further obligated to provide that student an emergency all-night tutoring session right before the exam. Likewise, if our end is knowing God in the general case, that entails that God supplies the grace necessary for each of us in general, but not that He necessarily goes beyond that in every case in every way possible.
The only way for this to be possible is if one’s intellect could become the divine intellect, and thus one would have to become God himself to know God himself, which is impossible.
Well, there is of course the doctrine of theosis to take into account. So it is acknowledged that the Beatific Vision involves something beyond-natural; but beyond that, I will leave it to those who understand the matter better than I. If we consider only the natural level, I think it would be fine to say that God wills us [in the general case] to know Him as far as is possible naturally; and that is sufficient for Ed's original point (which he explicitly frames in terms of natural theology and natural law.)
Step2,
ReplyDeleteI most certainly didn't say it was obligatory to suspend judgment before investigating a paranormal claim. I'm not even sure what this means.
One should be opened minded, and not so biased, either way, that one doesn't investigate properly, if that is what you mean.
However, if for some reason a specific claim cannot be quantifiably tested then all the historical tests that previously established its impossibility as a general rule are assumed inadequate and are not considered an overwhelming part of the historical record.
I'm not sure what you are trying to argue here. It smells like question begging, though. It seems like you are trying to take the observations of natural science as if they must always hold.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteSo, unless you can show that Aquinas did not believe in formal identity, and if he did, then formal identity did not presuppose the same form in the knowing intellect and in the thing known, then I’m afraid that my objections hold true.
Let me see if I have this right: whether your objections hold true is a function of whether I'm capable of showing X? Is that what you're saying?
If so, then there's only a 1 in 3 chance that your objections hold true, and a 2 in 3 chance that your objections do not hold true:
1. If I'm incapable of showing X, then your objections are true.
2. If I'm capable of showing X, and do show X, then your objections do not hold true.
3. If I'm capable of showing X, but don't show X, then your objections do not hold true (for the reason that, even though I didn't show X, I am capable of showing X).
The probability that your objections are true appears to be somewhat dismal.
Additionally, if I don't show X, you have no way of knowing whether my not showing X is due to 1. or 3. above, and so you wouldn't be able to know with a reasonable degree of certainty whether your objections hold true. Knowing how much you like to mull over things, I'll not deprive you of that occupation, and so shall refrain from showing X.
;)
- - - - -
More seriously...
You have taken what Aquinas says about how we know what is within genus and species, and asserted that it applies in precisely the same way regarding how we know what is beyond genus and species. I myself am unaware of what Aquinas might have said which leads you to believe that that is the way to go.
Comment moderation is on, so that's it for me under this OP.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteOne such premise is stated in two slightly different ways: a) that "the human intellect receives the divine essence"; and, b) that "the divine essence is received by the human intellect".
That that premise is incorrect
I agree, but then you have a problem. If knowledge of X presupposes that the intellect has received the intelligible species of X, then if the intellect cannot receive the intelligible species of X, then knowledge of X is impossible. If the intellect cannot receive the divine essence, then the intellect cannot know God. Perhaps the intellect can receive the intelligible species of the divine essence, even though it cannot receive the divine essence itself, but then you have to explain what the difference is between the intelligible species of the divine essence and the divine essence itself. It was always my understanding that they are one and the same thing, and thus are only distinguishable in the human mind. If that is true, then when the intellect receives the intelligible species of the divine essence, then the intellect also must receive the divine essence itself, which we both agree is impossible. Thus, it seems that knowledge of God is impossible according to Thomist principles of epistemology.
Mr Green:
ReplyDeleteAnd if God has given us the end of knowing Him, and this requires grace, then it follows that God must make that grace available to all — and this is in fact the case. God does give all men that opportunity; but of course an individual can reject or waste that grace.
Aquinas writes that “in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace” (ST 1a.113.3). That implies that the free choice that is required to accept God in the context of grace is itself a byproduct and effect of the grace itself, i.e. the free will is moved by grace to accept grace.
Perhaps what Aquinas means is that the free will is nudged towards accepting grace, but that the ultimate decision still resides within the will itself, which remains free to reject it. But the problem with that position is that Aquinas has also argued that “the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous” (ST 1a.113.7), meaning that the infusion of grace and the choice to accept grace occurs at the same time. In other words, there is no gap between the infusion of grace and then the activity of the will, but rather “the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly” (ST 1a.113.8), and in this case, the cause and effect occur instantaneously, which simply leaves no room for free will to do anything on this account. In fact, free will appears to be akin to a puppet being simultaneously caused to move in a particular direction by a puppet master, which would be the very antithesis of freedom.
Well, there is of course the doctrine of theosis to take into account. So it is acknowledged that the Beatific Vision involves something beyond-natural; but beyond that, I will leave it to those who understand the matter better than I. If we consider only the natural level, I think it would be fine to say that God wills us [in the general case] to know Him as far as is possible naturally; and that is sufficient for Ed's original point (which he explicitly frames in terms of natural theology and natural law.)
But the problem is that for Aquinas, knowledge presupposes the reception of intelligible species into the intellect. As he writes: “the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands” and “the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands” (ST 1.85.2). If such reception is impossible, then knowledge is impossible. If it is impossible for the intellect to receive the intelligible species of the divine essence, because the intelligible species is the divine essence, then it is impossible for the intellect to know God at all, whether in this world or the next.
@dguller:
ReplyDeleteThis is not an easy subject. But as best I can understand it:
1. The clear distinction you are drawing between free will and grace, as moving the will, isn't really what St Thomas (following Augustine here) sees. The movement of the will, and the movement of grace, are the same thing, really. (Remember that the Holy Ghost is within us. He does explicitly say that Grace does not override the will (it does not move us by "violence".)
The real question is whether we can resist grace when it's offered. The Church generally seems to say "yes".
2. I'm not sure of the term "intelligible species of the divine essence" is one Aquinas would accept. There is no essence of God separable from God Himself (except perhaps in our minds).
He also says that God can be "known" but not "comprehended."
Professor Feser,
ReplyDeleteYou state that God "allows evil in the world only insofar as he draws greater good out of it."
David Bentley Hart has taken issue with this claim in his essay "Tsunami and Theodicy" (link attached below) and at greater length in his book "The Doors of the Sea". I'm curious to know if you have read either of these works and, if so, would be grateful to read any thoughts you care to share on them. Sincerely-Jamie
http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2010/01/tsunami-and-theodicy
Re: "Now while there are miracle stories in the Islamic tradition, and even the occasional attribution of a miracle to Muhammad, it is remarkable how little emphasis is placed on the miraculous in Islam compared to Judaism and Christianity."
ReplyDeleteIt is not at all remarkable how little emphasis is placed on the miraculous in Islam compared to Judaism and Christianity. The economy of the religion is completely different--different archetypal relationship between the Absolute and the relative.
Also, the Koran is not a miracle of Muhammad--that is not how it is viewed in the religion. Rather, Muhammad received the revelation of the Koran. In a sense, the role of Muhammad is analogous to that of the Virgin in Christianity.
In Christianity, the revelation is Christ: Word made flesh. In Hinduism and in Islam, as also in Judaism with the Pentateuch, the Word is made Language or Book.
For a clear exposition of this perspective, I recommend Frithjof Schuon's "Understanding Islam".
Natural theology does not grant you any priors that are relevant when assessing the truth of Christianity over any other theism:
ReplyDeletehttp://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2012/04/how-to-destroy-natural-theology-in-one.html
That's where the buck stops, if we even grant that it gained momentum.
Regarding Hindu monotheistic "pantheism," that is a misnomer. There is no pantheism at all in orthodox Hinduism, for the simple reason that pantheism is a metaphysical error. The supreme Principle, whether Brahma Saguna (the ontological creative Principle, the Self-determination of the Divine Essence) or Brahma Nirguna (the Absolute as such, the Divine Essence or Ipseity, absolute and infinite, Eckhart's "Gottheit"; the Sufic distinction between al-Wahidiya and al-Ahadiyya) by definition transcends the created or manifested order. There is essential identity between the Real and the relatively real, otherwise the latter would be an autonomous reality, which is absurd; but pantheism posits a substantial, not essential unity, and therefore is based on an error which effectively divinizes the created order. The immanence of the Divine within the created order is an "immanent transcendence."
ReplyDeleteDoctor Feser,
ReplyDeleteIn your post you suggest that there are Thomistic arguments that only God can raise the dead. Having skimmed through the Summa Contra Gentiles, I did find that, among the arguments in favor of the position that God alone can do miracles, one to the effect that finite causes can only bring about effects to which the subject of their action is naturally in potency. A dead body was given as an example of something that was, by its nature, not in potency to life. This is, sadly, not enlightening, as the proposition "a dead body, by its nature, is not in potency to life" is precisely what I want to know how to prove. I'm assuming that it has something to do with the fact that, since part of the human soul has immaterial operations, the body, once separated from the soul, no longer has a natural potency for the sort of rational life that characterizes human, but obviously any clarification/direction you can provide would be quite useful.
In particular, I'd like to know where in Aquinas' work he discussed the question - if indeed he did discuss it.
Thank you for your time,
-David
Great post like always, only have thing to add: Many people don't *want* Christianity to be true. Like Frank Turek often says, people should be asked: "If Christianity were true, would you become Christian?" Many, in fact, answer No.
ReplyDeleteThis is perhaps something that needs to be investigated in detail.