Thursday, May 22, 2014

New Scholastic books


The old Scholastic manuals of the first half or so of the twentieth century are often hard to find, though fortunately many are now being made available again by Editiones Scholasticae, Wipf and Stock, and TAN Books, as well as by public domain reprint publishers like Kessinger, HardPress, and Literary Licensing.  Still, many remain out of print, and many have never been translated into English.  For some reason, the large older manuals of Catholic dogmatic theology seem harder to find than the philosophy and moral theology material.

Fr. Kenneth Baker has undertaken the project of translating Joseph Dalmau’s mammoth Sacrae Theologiae Summa (or Summa of Sacred Theology), originally published in 1955, into English.  It is being published by Keep the Faith, which puts out The Latin Mass magazine.  The first volume was recently published and advertised in the magazine.  Appearing out of sequence, it is Sacrae Theologiae Summa IIA: On the One and Triune God.  At the moment I do not see it advertised on their website, but I imagine that if you contact them by email you can find out how to order a copy.   (I ordered one after seeing the magazine ad -- the price was $35 -- and it arrived yesterday.)

The manual was originally published in four volumes, but given its great length Fr. Baker plans to publish the translation in eight volumes.  (The volume that just came out alone clocks in at 525 pages.)  The topics covered in the completed series of volumes will be as follows:

IA         Introduction to Theology.  On the True Religion.

IB         On the Church of Christ.  On Holy Scripture.

IIA        On the One and Triune God

IIB        On God the Creator and Sanctifier.  On Sins.

IIIA       On the Incarnate Word.  Mariology.

IIIB       On Grace.  On the Infused Virtues.

IVA       On Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance and Anointing.

IVB       On Holy Orders and Matrimony.  On the Last Things.

In his Foreword, Fr. Baker notes that Karl Rahner -- someone who is, needless to say, not usually associated with Scholastic theology -- once expressed the opinion that the Sacrae Theologiae Summa was the best summary of Scholastic theology available, and that mastering it was essential to becoming a theologian. 

Some other new and forthcoming books of Scholastic interest: New Scholasticism Meets Analytic Philosophy, edited by Rafael Hüntelmann and Johannes Hattler, collects papers from the recent conference on the theme in Cologne.  The contributors are Rani Lill Anjum, Edward Feser, Uwe Meixner, Stephen Mumford, David Oderberg, Edmund Runggaldier, and Erwin Tegtmeier.


The latest issue of the journal Res Philosophica is devoted to Neo-Aristotelian Themes in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind.

54 comments:

Scott said...

I'd already pre-ordered Davies's new book, but I didn't know about Brower's. That's great. His articles are hard to find and I've been wanting to read more of his stuff especially since James Madden's comments about him in an older thread. (Madden credited him for developing the idea of "form" and "matter" as functional concepts.)

Thanks for the heads-up.

Greg said...

I am definitely looking forward to Brower's book as well.

Daniel said...

Brower title is the one that struck me too. When I first glanced at the title - obviously before I saw it fully and found out who the author was - I thought it was the book on Aquinas' ontology Brian Leftow's been threatening for years.

By-the-bye, whilst embarking on my phenomenology readings I came across these two volumes which might of interest to people here:

Retrieving Aristotle in an Age of Crisis by David Roochnik
http://www.amazon.com/dp/1438445180/ref=wl_it_dp_o_pC_nS_ttl?_encoding=UTF8&colid=ES7KZLBX7HC0&coliid=I38IUVKJ7S4OIN

Aesthetic Genesis: The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature by Jeff Mitscherling
http://www.amazon.com/Aesthetic-Genesis-Origin-Consciousness-Intentional/dp/076185021X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1400791637&sr=1-1

The first is a phenomenological reappraisal of Aristotle's philosophy of science, comparing it to that of Galileian Mechanism. The second is an attempt derived from Realist Phenomenology to understand Mind-Body relationship in terms of Matter and Form, and the Formal Cause in general (interesting thing about this one is how the author manages to avoid mentioning Aristotlianism).

Anonymous said...

Speaking of Madden, assuming Amazon is right (which may not be safe) the 1-year anniversary of the publication of his book is tomorrow. Party!

ccmnxc

Greg said...

And 'nother book on the horizon...

Sami said...

Do these books explain the concept of God's love and its effects well/at all? I'm having trouble finding an explanation of the relation between God's love and creation.
I understand that God's love is the cause of good in all things. I also understand that since God's will is the same as his power, and God is omnipotent, whatever he wills necessarily comes true. Therefore love in god is necessarily reflected as good in creatures.
This part mostly makes sense. The main problem for me is what happens to God's love/intentions that aren't in effect for whatever reason. For instance, God loves humans so he made it so that at some point in the future those that accept his sacraments are resurrected in heaven. This promise exists in the present, but it is not literally "willed" in the present otherwise we would probably notice. Or for instance God loves some human who is in suffering but does not end this suffering due to some other reason (maybe this suffering is necessary for some other greater good or something). I think this is especially confusing given that Jesus said that God especially loves the poor and the suffering, but that love is not obviously reflected in the present reality.
I'm sure there is a good explanation somewhere, but all the ones I can come up with myself either reduce God to human terms or otherwise conflict with what St. Thomas says about God's love in the Summa. If there is a book about the topic I would appreciate a pointer.

David Alexander said...

I feel odd about doing this, but I've wanted to do it for years. My book, Goodness, God, and Evil defends, using contemporary methods, a thomistic account of the nature of goodness. I even defend, in a limited way, the fourth way in the last chapter of the book. Brian Davies wrote a nice blurb for the back cover of the book.

Heres a link:
http://www.amazon.com/Goodness-Continuum-Studies-Philosophy-Religion/dp/1628921668

Daniel said...

Please do correct me if I’m wronging the man (he is after all a philosopher of Late Medieval Philosophy) but Klima appears to have disturbingly Nominalist sympathies.

For the hardened classicist and Aristotle scholar:

http://www.amazon.com/dp/1587310503/ref=wl_it_dp_o_pC_nS_ttl?_encoding=UTF8&colid=ES7KZLBX7HC0&coliid=I1LXQDDFZ2YS1K

Greg said...

Please do correct me if I’m wronging the man (he is after all a philosopher of Late Medieval Philosophy) but Klima appears to have disturbingly Nominalist sympathies.

I really have not read him enough to say, though the thesis of his book on Buridan seems to be that Buridan managed "to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism."

Nickolas Steffen said...

Have they considered partnering with a software company (eg Logos) to publish these in a digital format?

Anonymous said...

David Alexander, that looks excellent. Do you know if there are any plans for a Kindle version any time soon?

Scott said...

@David Alexander:

That does look good. I've added it to my shopping cart.

Edward Feser said...

Hello David (Alexander),

Thanks for doing that. I wish I had called attention to it myself. I just came across your book a few weeks ago and it looks very interesting indeed. I look forward to reading it.

rank sophist said...

Hopefully this is at least somewhat on topic. I was flipping through Mortimer Adler's Ten Philosophical Mistakes recently, and I stumbled across this line: "We apprehend objects of thought, but never the concepts by which we think of them." He cites the ST in support of this view. This mirrors a statement by John Haldane in an interview with 3:AM Magazine (which Prof. Feser linked awhile back): "there is no medium of (intellectual) thought, or put another way there is no phenomenology of (abstract) thought."

Both seem to contradict Aquinas's own view in SCG b2 ch75.13: "Now, while we have said that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect is not that which is understood but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect, by a certain reflexion, from understanding itself, and its act of understanding, and the species whereby it understands."

It's a contradiction that has been bothering me for awhile. Has this passage simply been ignored by the writers in question--or am I missing something? A question for the senior Thomists here, probably.

Daniel said...

I believe all he is saying is that we are directly aware of perceptual objects via intentional reference but by reflection we can make these very intentional acts objects of reference in a sense (this is where the ‘Objects of Second Intention’ and Ens Rationis concepts occur).

Or am I misunderstand the question here?

rank sophist said...

Daniel,

Aquinas uses the word "reflexion" to signify reflexivity, such as when one understands one's understanding in a circular fashion. It's apperception, basically. Here's the full passage:

Now, while we have said that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect is not that which is understood but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect, by a certain reflexion, from understanding itself, and its act of understanding, and the species whereby it understands. Indeed, it understands its own act of understanding in two ways: particularly, for it understands that it presently understands; universally, so far as it reasons about the nature of its act. So, likewise, the intellect understands both itself and the intelligible species in two ways: by perceiving its own being and its possession of an intelligible species—and this is a kind of particular knowing—by considering its own nature and that of the intelligible species, which is a universal knowing. It is in this latter mode that the intellect and the intelligible are treated in the sciences.

In other words, the intellect can understand the concepts by which it understands, not just universally but on a case-by-case basis. At least, that's how I take it. I have no idea what a second intention is, so maybe that's the solution.

Greg said...

Here is another question: I am working through D.Q. McInerny's Metaphysics, and he says that being is always predicated analogically, ie. not just in "A cat exists" and "God exists" but "Cat A exists" and "Cat B exists". My understanding was predications of a transcendental of two things with the same essence are univocal.

McInerny's reasoning for this seemed to be that being would be predicated analogically of the two cats because they are different individuals. But on that basis, why would not all predications be analogical, and none univocal?

Anonymous said...

The Sacrae Theologiae Summa is available for free on the net if you read spanish... www.mercaba.org

Glenn said...

Greg,

FWIW:

1. “B]eing is not predicated of all things univocally[.]” -- Treatise On Separate Substances (see 41)

2. From Wippel's The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being:

“As to whether being is predicated univocally or analogically of substances which belong to one and the same species, it is...difficult to decide this issue on purely textual grounds. Thus John of St. Thomas rejects analogical predication of being in this case. 94 [94: ...As John sees it, when applied to individual members of the same species, being will still be transcendental but not analogical, since such individuals will not be formally but only materially unequal.] However, the logic of Thomas' own position points to a different conclusion. If individual substances belong to the same species, being may be predicated of them analogically, not univocally... If being were predicated of any two substances univocally, their individual and individuating differences would have to be added to being from without.

“...In his Commentary on I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1, a. 3 Thomas notes that something may be common to different things univocally or equivocally or analogically. In support of his contention that nothing can be said univocally of God and of any creature, Thomas reasons that we must take into account both the quiddity or nature of a thing and its esse. In things which are common univocally, there must be community in terms of the definition of the nature, but not in terms of esse. A given esse is present in only one thing. Thus the condition of being human (habitus humanitatis) is not realized with the same esse in two different human beings. Given this, Thomas concludes that whenever the form signified by a term is esse itself, this cannot pertain univocally to different things. Consequently, he continues, being (ens) is not predicated univocally. Since he has been discussing esse as realized in different human beings, presumably he would apply this conclusion to any two individuals within the same species.”

Glenn said...

Rank,

I’m not sure I see the contradiction.

In the second para following the one you quoted from, Adler writes, "A cognitive idea (including here percepts, memories, images, and concepts) cannot, at one and the same time, be both that which we directly apprehend and that by which we apprehend something else -- some object that is not an idea in our own minds, but unlike our subjective ideas is rather something that can be an object of consideration or of conversation for two or more individuals."

That “at one and the same time” seems to be an important qualification -- especially in light of the fact that, in the same sentence, he says that the enabling concept “can be an object of consideration”.

So, although the concepts which enable apprehension of objects of thought cannot themselves be apprehended at the time they are enabling our apprehension of objects of thought, they themselves do qualify as objects of consideration (at some other time).

Or so it seems to me.

Greg said...

Thanks Glenn.

Would it follow, then, that the other transcendentals are predicated of individuals of the same species analogically?

That would seem a bit counterintuitive to me. Geach's argument that "is good" is logically attributive seems to be based on the idea that it is analogical across species differences, but univocal for the same species.

Jacob said...

Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition" looks like it's out in November
http://www.amazon.com/Scotuss-Theory-Cognition-Richard-Cross/dp/019968488X

Glenn said...

Greg,

Would it follow, then, that the other transcendentals are predicated of individuals of the same species analogically?

Certainly with respect to "good" it would seem so:

"Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way." ST I, Q 5, A 1, ad. 1

Glenn said...

I kinda messed that up, didn't I? The specific quotation is not saying that both being and good are predicated of different things analogically, but that being is predicated of something one way, and that good is also predicated of the same thing, though not absolutely the same way. Oops.

Still, given the generic principle of "the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver", I am inclined to think that, at least with respect to “good”, the question is to be answered in the affirmative. A better justification than “I’m inclined to think that” will follow – if I come up with.

rank sophist said...

Glenn,

Actually, he says that objects of consideration are "unlike our subjective ideas" in that very quote. Your interpretation presents a possible solution to the problem of one's consciousness of concepts, but I don't think it's what Adler or Haldane really endorse. For example, see these other (clearer) quotes from Adler:

"[T]here are the cognitive ideas that have existence in the mind but, being the means whereby we apprehend all the objects we do apprehend, are themselves never apprehended" (p. 29).

"[T]he mistake of treating our ideas--our perceptions, memories, imaginations, and conceptions or thoughts--as objects of which we are directly aware or conscious" (p. 60).

I think it's fairly clear that he's denying the intellect's consciousness of the species by which it understands, when all of this is taken together. Especially in light of Haldane's similar comment.

Glenn said...

Rank,

Actually, he says that objects of consideration are "unlike our subjective ideas" in that very quote.

Yes, he does say that objects of consideration are “unlike our subjective ideas”. But he also says that, unlike our subject ideas, a cognitive idea is “something that can be an object of consideration”.

To wit: “A cognitive idea (including here percepts, memories, images, and concepts) cannot, at one and the same time, be both that which we directly apprehend and that by which we apprehend something else -- some object that is not an idea in our own minds, but unlike our subjective ideas is rather something that can be an object of consideration or of conversation for two or more individuals.”

I.e.: “A cognitive idea...cannot, at one and the same time, be both [A and B]... but unlike our subjective ideas is... something that can be an object of consideration[.]”

I don’t own a copy of TPM, and can’t locate an online copy or preview which doesn’t omit the pages containing the additional quotes you provide, so I’ll have to wait until I obtain a hard copy before saying anything about those quotes.

(Note also that he says in that quote--the one I provided--that a percept is included as a cognitive idea. But a percept is an object of perception, and to apprehend is to perceive. If what you're saying is true, then what Adler is saying that we cannot perceive objects of perception, which sounds rather silly. I still think he's saying that while we are busy directly perceiving some object of perception P, we cannot also at the same time directly perceive that which enables us to perceive P. But this wouldn’t mean that we wouldn’t be able to perceive the 'enables P to be perceived' at some other time. Although this is my thought on the matter presently, insisting that this view is correct prior to my reading all of what Adler has to say in the relevant chapter would be premature.)

Scott said...

@Glenn:

"But a percept is an object of perception, and to apprehend is to perceive. If what you're saying is true, then what Adler is saying that we cannot perceive objects of perception, which sounds rather silly."

Indeed it does, and it should, for that's not what Adler means. For him, a percept is that by which we perceive an object of perception, not that object itself, just a concept is that by which we conceive an object and not the object itself. The conflation of the two is precisely the "philosophical mistake" he's correcting, as it threatens to leave each of us imprisoned within our own perceptions with no direct access to a common objective world.

Instead, he says, we never directly perceive the percepts by which we come to know the objects of our perception; we perceive those objects themselves, through and by means of those percepts. Of course he doesn't mean that we can't conceive percepts, think about them, or make them "object[s] of consideration or of conversation"; obviously he's doing so himself in these very passages. He's simply saying that we don't ever encounter them in sensory perception, much as the eye doesn't see its own retina.

Or so I understand him, anyway.

Scott said...

And @rank:

Yes, he does also seem to be saying that we don't "apprehend" them in any other way either, but I take him to mean that we don't apprehend them directly, not that we just can't think about them at all.

Scott said...

@Glenn:

"I still think he's saying that while we are busy directly perceiving some object of perception P, we cannot also at the same time directly perceive that which enables us to perceive P. But this wouldn’t mean that we wouldn’t be able to perceive the 'enables P to be perceived' at some other time."

I think this is mostly right on the money. Adler is indeed saying that while we are perceiving (say) an apple, we can't also perceive the percept by which we see the apple. I think it's also true that in principle this doesn't mean the percept can't ever be perceived at all.

However, "at some other time," i.e., when I'm not perceiving the apple, I don't have that percept any more, which I'm sure you'll agree is going to make it a little tough to perceive. ;-)

Glenn said...

Scott,

"But a percept is an object of perception, and to apprehend is to perceive. If what you're saying is true, then what Adler is saying that we cannot perceive objects of perception, which sounds rather silly."

Indeed it does, and it should, for that's not what Adler means. For him, a percept is that by which we perceive an object of perception, not that object itself, just a concept is that by which we conceive an object and not the object itself. The conflation of the two is precisely the "philosophical mistake" he's correcting,


This a clear example why I need to rely on more than just some brief mulling of a google-preview snippet; something like, say, a hard copy of TCM. (I'm actually about to leave to go pick up one, but thought I'd pop in here for a moment before leaving.)

Glenn said...

Scott,

However, "at some other time," i.e., when I'm not perceiving the apple, I don't have that percept any more, which I'm sure you'll agree is going to make it a little tough to perceive. ;-)

Rather tough, yes indeed. Still, there are things such as after-images, after-effects, lingering traces, etc. Anyway, better to read that hard copy I'm about to go for than to continue to speak off the top of me head. I really would like to know just what it is Adler is saying / getting at, and if that means rearranging the furniture in mind, that is quite fine with me.

rank sophist said...

Glenn,

Yes, he does say that objects of consideration are “unlike our subjective ideas”. But he also says that, unlike our subject ideas, a cognitive idea is “something that can be an object of consideration”.

"Cognitive idea" and "subjective idea" are used by Adler to mean the same thing. There is no subtle distinction here; it's a layman's text.

Scott,

Yes, he does also seem to be saying that we don't "apprehend" them in any other way either, but I take him to mean that we don't apprehend them directly, not that we just can't think about them at all.

I think so, too. But, as I quoted above, Aquinas defines the intellect's knowledge of its own act in two ways. First, in its self-consciousness of its own particular act and species. Second, in its universal understanding, i.e. its ability to see intellects and species as kinds. Clearly, Adler is not denying the second kind of knowledge, or his discussion of the intellect would be self-refuting. He does seem to be denying the first type of knowledge, though, which (on my reading) runs contrary to what Aquinas taught. Even if Adler is not making the claim that concepts are unknowable from a first-person view, Haldane clearly is--so the problem remains.

Brian said...

If only Alphonsus Liguori's Moral Theology were translated... and read!

Glenn said...

Rank,

"Cognitive idea" and "subjective idea" are used by Adler to mean the same thing. There is no subtle distinction here; it's a layman's text.

Three things:

1. You have been correct, and I have been wrong. I had mistakenly taken the clause bookended by the double hyphen on the left and the comma on the right (" -- some object that is not an idea in our own minds,") as being in reference to "A cognitive idea"... when, in fact (as I now see (and you knew all along)), it is in reference to the "something else" in "that by which we apprehend something else".

2. I find that I'm not entirely in agreement with your statement above. Ironically, it was while wondering why you would say that Adler uses "cognitive idea" and "subjective idea" to mean the same thing that I realized the mistake just mentioned. So, although I'm not entirely in agreement with your statement, I'm glad you made it; had you not, it is not unlikely that I'd still be unaware of the mistake I had made.

3. The reason why I'm not entirely in agreement with your statement is that Adler is clear that not all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas:

a) He says that cognitive ideas are that by which something else is apprehended. ("[S]ome ideas (our cognitive ideas) are that by which we apprehend the objects of which we are conscious." p 14)

b) He says that bodily feelings are subjective ideas. ("But certain subjective ideas, such as bodily feelings, are exclusively subjective." p 11)

c) And he says that bodily feelings belong to that class of things each member of which is not that by which something else is apprehended. ("[B]odily feelings, emotions, and sensations... do not serve as the means whereby we apprehend anything else." pp 11-12)

Scott said...

@Glenn:

"He says that bodily feelings are subjective ideas. ('But certain subjective ideas, such as bodily feelings, are exclusively subjective.' p 11)"

But he specifically state that in saying so, he's using Locke's terminology. A couple of paragraphs later he rejects that terminology and makes a distinction he says Locke failed to make.

"And he says that bodily feelings belong to that class of things each member of which is not that by which something else is apprehended. ('[B]odily feelings, emotions, and sensations... do not serve as the means whereby we apprehend anything else.' pp 11-12)"

And for that very reason, in the very paragraph you've quoted, he denies that any of those are ideas at all, subjective or otherwise. That bodily feelings, etc., are subjective ideas is a view he attributes to Locke and does not himself hold.

Scott said...

On pp. 13-14, though, he presents his own view (the "opposing view" to the "philosophical mistake" he's correcting) in Lockean terms again. Here he treats bodily sensations, etc., as ideas, and says that all our other ideas are cognitive.

I think this is the source of the confusion. I think rank is right that Adler himself regards all subjective ideas as cognitive ideas, as he specifically states (on p. 11) that whatever can properly be called an idea has an object. However, in explaining the distinction he thinks Locke should have made, he adopts, then drops, then re-adopts Locke's own use of the term "idea."

At any rate it's that distinction itself that matters.

rank sophist said...

Glenn and Scott,

Glad the confusion is cleared up. Who knew an introductory guide could be so controversial--and require such close reading? I own the book, and even I wasn't aware of the distinction between subjective and cognitive ideas that Adler attributed to Locke.

Unfortunately, I'm now back to square one: does he or doesn't he deny subjective consciousness of the species by which one understands? And, if he does, is he in line with Aquinas in doing so? Based on SCG b2 ch75.13 and ST I q87 a3, I'm inclined to think that Aquinas taught that the intellect does know the species by which it understands, but secondarily. It primarily knows exterior objects, and indirectly knows the enabling causes of that knowledge (the species and the intellect itself) through an act of reflexive self-examination, i.e. phenomenologically. It seems to me that Adler denies this, and it's fairly clear that Haldane does. Maybe Brandon will show up out of the blue and save the day.

Glenn said...

Hm.

Glenn said...

Rank,

I'm inclined to think that Aquinas taught that the intellect does know the species by which it secondarily. It primarily knows exterior objects, and indirectly knows the enabling causes of that knowledge (the species and the intellect itself) through an act of reflexive self-examination, i.e. phenomenologically. It seems to me that Adler denies this...

He does seem to acknowledge it later on in Chapter 2 (p 39, 2nd full para).

Glenn said...

Scott,

Thanks for the helpful clarifications.

My a), b) and c), I’m embarrassed to say, were lexical cherry-pickings meant to serve as support for my overconfident and apparently unwarranted assertion that, "Adler is clear that not all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas".

I can see why it might be said that Adler regards all subjective ideas as cognitive ideas. But there is something about the notion of all subjective ideas (as Adler "defines" subjective ideas) being cognitive ideas (as Adler "defines" cognitive ideas) which, to be blunt about it, bugs me.

That all subjective ideas, each of which is unique to one individual, are cognitive ideas, each of which is that by which something else is directly apprehended, seems to imply that there is not, never is, and can never be, a single idea which serves as that by which two or more people directly apprehend the same thing.

(But perhaps what I say is an implication of the notion, is not an implication of the notion, but an inference I draw from the notion, and I equivocate (re "idea") while drawing the inference. I'm not yet sure.)

Scott said...

@Glenn:

"[T]here is not, never is, and can never be, a single idea which serves as that by which two or more people directly apprehend the same thing."

That's certainly Adler's view (and it's quite independent of whether all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas). Somewhere in that same chapter, he specifically says that my ideas and your ideas are different. The idea by which I apprehend (say) a cat is not the same idea by which you apprehend the same cat.

I take him to mean that they're numerically different, which is fine, but if he means more than that, it sounds odd to me too.

Scott said...

An afterthought: I think part of the reason it sounds odd is that Adler is using the rather Lockean term "idea," which doesn't mean in this context quite what it now means to us. It sounds less odd to say, for example, that you and I apprehend the same cat each with our own individual percept, or even that we have numerically (not necessarily formally) different concepts of cats.

In modern parlance, we can have, or entertain, the same "idea," but that use of the word isn't what Adler (or Locke) has in mind.

Glenn said...

Scott,

It sounds less odd to say, for example, that you and I apprehend the same cat each with our own individual percept, or even that we have numerically (not necessarily formally) different concepts of cats.

That does sound less odd, yes.

At the same time, it brings into sharper relief what it is I seem to be troubled by.

Our having numerically different concepts of, e.g., cats doesn't faze me. But if our concepts of cats are not necessarily formally different, then they may be formally the same. And it is here -- with our concepts of cats being formally the same (if indeed they are) – that, in relation to the statement "all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas", the trouble starts for me.

If they are formally the same, then the formal concept of cat either is not a cognitive idea (which seems ludicrous) or it is an example of a cognitive idea which, because it is the same for two or more people, is not also a subjective idea.

OTOH, if they are not formally the same, i.e., if they are formally different, then how do we manage to rightly agree that the purring ball of fur lapping milk from a saucer is indeed a cat?

I don't doubt that we do manage quite well to rightly agree that the purring ball of fur is indeed a cat, so I fall back on figuring that there must be cognitive ideas which aren't also subjective ideas.

Of course, the binary I set up may be a false binary. Or I may be overthinking the matter. Or reading too much into it. Or maybe... I don't know, maybe the formal concept of 'cat' doesn't actually reside in our consciousness (except on a temporary basis, and only when it is serving as that by which we directly apprehend a cat), and so, on this score, it is not quite an accurate example of, as you subsequently say, what Adler has in mind when using the word "idea" (at least vis-à-vis the first chapter of TPM).

Anyway, I've dragged this out long enough as it is, so will rest content for now with that last note.

Thanks for your thoughts on the matter.

Glenn said...

Rank,

Thanks to you as well for your thoughts on the matter.

Scott said...

@Glenn:

All subjective ideas are cognitive ideas doesn't in and of itself imply All cognitive ideas are subjective ideas any more than All cherries are fruits implies All fruits are cherries. For all that proposition says, it could be that there are cognitive ideas that are not subjective.

Now, I don't think that's Adler's view; he seems to hold that every idea (every that-by-which-we-apprehend-something) "belongs" to somebody in particular and is "subjective" in that sense. But I don't think he denies that two intellects can receive the same form, or that two ideas can conform to the same object.

Glenn said...

Scott,

> All subjective ideas are cognitive ideas doesn't in and of itself imply All cognitive ideas are subjective ideas any more than All cherries are fruits implies All fruits are cherries. For all that proposition says, it could be that there are cognitive ideas that are not subjective.

Yes, I know; a square necessarily is a rectangle, but a rectangle isn’t necessarily a square.

You had said, I think rank is right that Adler himself regards all subjective ideas as cognitive ideas, as he specifically states (on p. 11) that whatever can properly be called an idea has an object.

However, Rank did not say that Adler regards all subjective ideas as cognitive ideas. What he did say was: "Cognitive idea" and "subjective idea" are used by Adler to mean the same thing. It was this statement that I had objected to, which bugged me, which had to do with what troubled me, and which I had been, so to speak, reasoning out loud about.

But if “all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas” is the token pointing to the what Rank had said, then the token “all subjective ideas are cognitive ideas” is just an imprecise way, literally speaking, of referring to what Rank had said -- which is the notion that “cognitive idea” and “subjective idea” are used by Adler to mean the same thing.

Anyway, I think I’ll now go listen to one of those Steely Dan CDs I recently purchased in bulk. (Sorry, Dr. F.)

CCK said...

Can anyone recommend a good book (or other resource) devoted to the transcendentals? I know they appear all over the place in Thomistic literature -- and do a lot of work in the foundational arguments -- but I am curious to know where I might find a detailed and focused treatment. As their convertability is simultaneously one of the most important and least understood (by modern minds) principles of classical metaphysics, I want to get a better grasp the arguments and debates in the classical tradition up through today. (Where does beauty fit in? Etc.)

Thanks,

CCK

Glenn said...

All cognitive ideas are ubjective ideas any more than All cherries are fruits implies All fruits are cherries.

Right. But if it is said that "cherries" and "fruits" mean the same thing, then we're justified in saying that a banana is a cherry.

That's what I've been flailing about about.

Scott said...

@Glenn:

"What he did say was: 'Cognitive idea' and 'subjective idea' are used by Adler to mean the same thing."

Fair enough. Now I understand what you meant.

I was basing my reply mainly on this statement: That all subjective ideas, each of which is unique to one individual, are cognitive ideas, each of which is that by which something else is directly apprehended, seems to imply that there is not, never is, and can never be, a single idea which serves as that by which two or more people directly apprehend the same thing.

Glenn said...

Scott,

I was basing my reply mainly on this statement...

That too is fair. More than fair.

ttt said...

Sacrae Theologiae Summa is a great work and I am very happy to see it (finally) being translated into English. Yes, it's huge, but it is so complete, clear, argumented and well-organized. I especially like the clear and regular structure: thesis - notions - adversaries - teaching of the Church - dogmatic value - Proof(s) - Objections and replies.

Michael Sullivan said...

I want to add my approval for Sacrae Theologiae Summa. I have the 4-volume Latin BAC edition and think very highly of it. Until now, apparently, there's been nothing like it available in English. I wish they had translated the first volume first.

To CCK, may I recommend Alan Wolter's book The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?

Aloysius said...

Hi, Professor Feser,

I just managed to get my hands on the complete Sacrae Theologiae Summa, and am having a blast picking through it right now! (I've never owned an honest to God Latin manual of dogmatic theology like this before, and it's just beautiful stuff.) However, I got the impression that you thought it was solely the work of Mr. Dalmau - when in actuality he only wrote the treatise Deo Deo Uno et Trino. The other authors are Aldamas, Sagues, Gonzalez, Sola, Salaverri, Nicolai, and...I think there's one more. They all wrote the various treatises in the work as a joint effort. (As it says on the inside, it's a work of the "Patres Societatis Iesu Facultatum Theologicarum in Hispania Professors.")

Aloysius said...

And I agree with Michael: they should have translated the first volume first. Tractatus III: De Ecclesia is great stuff, as is the preceding treatise on revelation and the true religion. I think we need that sort of stuff these days more than we do a treatise on God One and Triune, in my ever-humble opinion.