Friday, October 9, 2015

Walter Mitty atheism


While writing up my recent post on Jerry Coyne’s defense of his fellow New Atheist Lawrence Krauss, I thought: “Why can’t these guys be more like Keith Parsons and Jeff Lowder?”  (Many readers will recall the very pleasant and fruitful exchange which, at Jeff’s kind invitation, Keith and I had not too long ago at The Secular Outpost.)  As it happens, Jeff has now commented on my exchange with Coyne.  Urging his fellow atheists not to follow Coyne’s example, Jeff writes:

If I were to sum up Feser’s reply in one word, it would be, “Ouch!” I think Feser’s reply is simply devastating to Coyne and I found myself in agreement with most of his points.

As Jeff also writes:

It shouldn’t come as a surprise, however, that often the same atheists who are so dismissive of theism tend to use such awful arguments and objections against it. In a sense, this is understandable. If you’ve concluded that belief X is not only false but stupid or even irrational, then you’re unlikely to spend much if any time trying to understand the best arguments for X.
 
Now, the irony of this situation is that in every attempt to justify their dismissive attitude toward theism, New Atheists like Coyne, Krauss, Dawkins and myriad others only ever succeed in demonstrating conclusively that that dismissive attitude is unjustified.  For you cannot rationally reject a position, dismissively or not, unless you first understand what it is.  And every time they open their mouths, these New Atheists show that they very badly misunderstand the central claims of, and arguments for, theism.  Indeed, it is amazing how the very same crude misunderstandings recur again and again and again, even after they have been patiently, clearly, and repeatedly explained.

Consider, for example, that Coyne and I first had an exchange on the subject of cosmological arguments for God’s existence over four years ago.  Coyne claimed at the time that he really wanted to know what the best arguments for theism are, and insisted that he was “dead serious here, and not looking for sarcastic answers.”  I recommended that he study the arguments of Aquinas, with the help of some serious commentators who could explain the metaphysical background to the arguments.  (Unsurprisingly, I recommended my own book Aquinas, though I also cited some other authors.)  Coyne said he would do so.  Very soon thereafter I posted an article explaining in detail the various common misunderstandings of cosmological arguments, including the versions of the argument presented by Aquinas.  I explained, for example, why the argument does not rest on the premise that “everything has a cause”; why, accordingly, the argument does not make of God some arbitrary exception to a general rule; why the argument nevertheless does not make of God a brute fact who just exists without any explanation (since not all explanations are causes); why versions of the argument like the ones defended by Aquinas and Leibniz (and by me, for that matter) are not concerned to show that the universe had a beginning; and so forth.  Coyne commented on that article.  In the course of doing so, he accused me of “intellectual dishonesty” -- on utterly preposterous grounds, as I showed here.  But if Coyne himself is as intellectually honest as he would like us to think, he presumably read the article before commenting on it.  In which case he would know that the kind of cosmological arguments I defend do not argue for a temporal beginning of the universe, do not rest on the premise that “everything has a cause,” do not make of God a brute fact who just exists without explanation, etc.

Flash forward four years to our current exchange.  As I noted in my recent response to Coyne, despite all the back and forth of four years ago, despite his purportedly “dead serious” intention to find out what the best arguments really say, despite his commitment to study Aquinas in particular -- despite all that, he still falsely attributes to me a version of the cosmological argument that “insist[s] that that world had to have a beginning,” and still falsely attributes to me the thesis that God is “just there” without explanation! 

But it is worse even than that.  Even after my recent response to Coyne appeared, he posted a further comment in his combox still asserting -- wait for it -- that my “main argument… is that everything has a ‘cause’” and that I “rely on everything having a cause -- except God” (!)  And he said this in reply to an atheist reader who complained about atheists like Coyne misrepresenting what theists really say!

Could it get worse even than that?  Well, on Jerry Coyne’s blog it sure can, and it does.  In yet another post two days later, Coyne claimed that the cosmological argument’s answer to the question “Why does God exist?” is: “He just does,” without explanation (!)  This despite the fact that -- as I explained in my response to him just days before (and as I explained in my exchange with him four years ago) -- that is precisely the opposite of what Aristotelian, Thomist, Leibnizian, and other defenders of the argument actually say!   And when a reader pointed out in Coyne’s combox that this is a caricature of the argument, Coyne banned him from posting any further (purportedly on the grounds that the reader was being rude)!

Needless to say, there is something truly pathological going on here.  And that, by the way, is one reason Coyne, Krauss, and company are worth at least a little of our attention.  Some readers have asked me why I bother replying to people who are so extremely irrational and dishonest, and therefore unlikely to respond well to serious criticism.  Part of the reason is that though Coyne, Krauss, Dawkins, and many of their fans are indeed impervious to rational argumentation, there are onlookers who are not impervious to it.  And those people are reachable and worth trying to reach.  After all, Coyne, Krauss, Dawkins, and some of the other better known New Atheists are, though irrational and dishonest, not stupid.  In their own fields, some of them even do interesting work.  For that reason, some people who know as little about philosophy and theology as they do but who are rational and honest might falsely suppose that these New Atheists must have something important to say about those particular subjects.  Hence it is useful now and again to expose Coyne et al. for the frauds that they are, so that well-meaning third parties will see that they are not to be taken seriously on philosophical and theological questions.  The more they make fools of themselves, the more they should be discussed rather than ignored, at least so long as there is any intellectually honest person who still somehow thinks the New Atheism is anything but a bad joke.

Another reason for paying them some attention, though, is that Coyne, Krauss, Dawkins, and company are simply genuine curiosities.  Again, they are not stupid, and indeed have serious intellectual accomplishments to their credit.  And yet on the subjects of religion and philosophy they are incapable of seeing that their self-confidence is laughably, cringe-makingly out of proportion to their actual competence.  They exhibit exactly the sort of stubborn, bigoted closed-mindedness and ignorance that they smugly condemn when they perceive it in others.  What exactly is going on here?  What makes these weird people tick?  That is a question of real intellectual interest.

The answer, I would suggest, is sentimentality.  I use the word in a semi-technical sense, following the analysis offered in The Aesthetics of Music by Roger Scruton (who was in turn building on some ideas of Michael Tanner).  A sentimental person, according to Scruton, tends to be quick to respond emotionally to a stimulus, will appear to be pained but will enjoy his pangs, will respond with equal violence to a variety of stimuli in succession, will nevertheless avoid following his emotional responses up with appropriate actions, and will respond more readily to strangers and to abstract issues than to persons known to him or to concrete circumstances requiring time, energy, or personal sacrifice.  In short, a sentimental person is one whose emotional life becomes an end in itself and loses its connection both to the external circumstances that would normally shape it and to the behavior that it ought to generate. Feelings of moral outrage, romantic passion, and other emotional states become valued for their own sake to such an extent that the actual moral facts, the well-being of the beloved, etc. fade into the background.  

For instance, someone who constantly chats up the plight of the homeless, but without any real interest in finding out why people become homeless or what ways of helping them are really effective, might plausibly be described as merely sentimental.  “How awful things are for the homeless!” is not really the thought that moves him.  What really moves him is the thought: “How wonderful I am to think of how awful things are for the homeless!”  His feelings of compassion function, not to get him to do what is necessary to help those who are homeless, but rather to provide him with assurance of his superior virtue.  His high dudgeon functions, not to prod him to find out whether the homeless are really being victimized by evildoers, but rather to reinforce his assurance of his superior virtue by allowing him to contrast himself with the imagined evildoers.  This kind of onanistic moralism requires a fantasy world rich enough to sustain it.  Poignant or dramatic images of suffering and of injustices inflicted are far more likely to foster such fantasies than are cold statistics or the actual, mundane details of the lives of homeless people.  Hence someone who is merely sentimental about homelessness might prefer movies, songs, and the like to social scientific study as a source of “information” about homelessness and its causes.

Now, the New Atheism, I submit, is exactly like this.  The New Atheist talks, constantly and loudly, about reason, science, evidence, facts, being “reality-based,” etc.  Equally constantly and loudly, he decries dogmatism, ignorance, wishful thinking, whatever is merely “faith-based,” etc.  And he relentlessly denounces “religious” people, whom, he imagines, are central casting exemplars of the latter vices.  But it is not reason, science, etc. that really move him.  What really moves him is the pleasure that the thought of being paradigmatically rational, scientific, etc. gives him.  Nor is he really moved by what religious people actually think.  After all, he not only doesn’t trouble himself to find out what they actually think, but often will expend great energy trying to rationalize his refusal to find out what they actually think.  (Consider e.g. P.Z. Myers’ shamelessly question-begging “Courtier’s reply” dodge.)  Rather, what moves him is the self-righteous delight he takes in his belief in his intellectual and moral superiority over “religious” people.  His “rationalism” consists, not in actually being rational, but in constantly chatting up rationality and constantly badmouthing those who, at least in his imagination, are not as rational as he enjoys believing that he is.

Here too, we have a kind of moralistic onanism which requires a rich fantasy life to support it.  Finding out what thinkers like Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. actually said would completely destroy the fantasy, because they simply don’t fit the New Atheist’s caricature of religion.  Hence the New Atheist nourishes his imagination instead with made-up examples of purportedly theistic ideas and argumentation, which he typically derives from reading other New Atheist writers rather than by reading what religious thinkers themselves have written.  He repeatedly calls these examples to mind when he wants to reassure himself of the stupidity of religious people and of his superiority over them -- especially when he encounters some religious opponent who doesn’t seem to fit his stereotype.  He thinks: “First cause arguments start from the premise that ‘everything has a cause’; all such arguments founder on their inability to answer the challenge ‘What caused God?’; theism is incompatible with science, or at least presupposes outdated science; theism always ultimately rests on appeals to faith, or the Bible, or emotion…” and so forthNone of this is true, and it is all easily refuted simply by consulting the actual writings of religious thinkers.  But the New Atheist is able to keep himself from seeing this by translating everything an opponent says into something he pulls from his mental bag of clichés about “what theists think.”

Hence, in response to my recent articles about Krauss and Coyne, we have Coyne saying the Bizarro-world things cited above.  We have an irate Krauss fan asking: “Why do you believe in God?  Because the Bible told you to, right?”  We have one of Coyne’s readers saying: “I'll admit I haven't read your entire response to Jerry here” -- and then going on nevertheless to attribute to me outdated scientific ideas I not only have never endorsed, but have many times explicitly rejected.  We have other Coyne readers simply refusing to get over their fixation on the stupid “Everything has a cause” argument that no philosopher or theologian has ever defended, even in the face of other, more sober atheist readers’ begging them to stop attacking this straw man.  We have Krauss, in the New Yorker article to which I replied in Public Discourse, deluding himself into thinking that it is his impoliteness, rather than his incompetence, that prompts other atheists to criticize him.  We have the breathtaking chutzpah of Coyne accusing, not just critics of the New Atheism, but even atheist critics of the New Atheism, of “distortion” of the New Atheists’ views.

It is as if these people are so lost in their delusions that they literally cannot see what is really there on the page or the computer screen in front of them.  All they can see is the New Atheist Fantasyland they’ve constructed, where every ticket is a scarlet-A-for-atheist ticket, and Coyne and Co. keep going on the same rides over and over and over again.  The New Atheists like to think that they win every argument, and indeed they do, though only in the way Walter Mitty wins every battle.

283 comments:

  1. Anonymous @ 1.05 said:

    'What about Walter Mitty theism and religion, and "metaphysics" (meataphysics) too!All of our beliefs whether secular or religious are just ways of feeling comfortable about the fact that this place is hell-deep entirely uncomfortable, or that death really does rule to here.
    Hence the "gospel" of Ralph.

    It is just Ralph. All of this is Ralph, and that is it. It is just a Ralphing. You are being Ralphed. You are Ralph. You do Ralph. You believe in Ralph. You hate Ralph and resist Ralph. You are troubled about Ralph. You fear Ralph. Ralph is going to snuff you completely sooner or later. You breathe Ralph and are completely dependent of Ralph. You think Ralph. You are in charge of Ralph and attempt to subordinate Ralph to your desire for immunity. Ralph is in charge of You.

    Substitute any other word or name for Ralph and see that it is all nonsense.

    Real life, true existence, all comes down to non-conceptual Reality, the Reality of Non-Separateness. There are no ultimate explanations for IT and no way to differentiate yourself from IT or get control over IT. You must just spontaneously and non-strategically give yourself up to "Ralph", the Unknown and the Unknowable, That Which is Beyond yourself. You cannot Understand the Real until you stop being your-self, stop separating yourself, and stop suffering the mind-created illusions of separateness.

    When there is no mind-created separation, no gesture, effort, or result of self-possession, then the "Ralph", or God, or Truth, Reality, is Inherently Obvious'




    Dude, I just smoked a bowl and that is so awesome - are you like kind of enlightened? I just wanna follow your meta-conceptual shit. But I'm puzzled about one thing in particular. Is Ralph just your 'feeling comfortable about the fact that this place is hell-deep entirely uncomfortable, or that death really does rule to here'?' or is it something even more awesome. I think it might be something more awesome, in which case that's awesome dude.

    ReplyDelete
  2. "Anonymous said...

    What about Walter Mitty theism and religion, ... our beliefs whether secular or religious are just ways of feeling comfortable about the fact that this place is hell-deep entirely uncomfortable ... the 'gospel' of Ralph "



    Well, it could also be that not everyone suffers from the perpetual discomforts Ralph feels, and that Ralph is just a poor specimen engaged in yelping.

    However, we also recognize that on the nominalist's own assumptions there are no natural kinds, and therefore no essential class natures to be, or which might be, poorly actualized.

    But either way, whether a badly stamped man, or no "man" at all in any objectively categorical sense, it leads to the same practical conclusion: it can't cope, as Herr Rorty puts it, with its environment.

    Do we shrug here?

    Whether "maladapted" as an example of an imperfect kind, or just an expression of this or that which is inherently incapable of coping and therefore squawking its squawk, the result is the same and would make no difference, except ... except morally, or perhaps, "intra-morally" as we might, coining a term, say. There might be said to be a rule of recognition in play if it were a broken like kind, rather than something morally other altogether

    But since the nominalist has no non-conventional moral claims based on being within an objective like kind class with convergent interests, the "intra-morally" dynamic doesn't apply.

    All the nominalist really has to cope with its "hell-deep entirely uncomfortable" existence is its yelping strategy; or as the yelpers prefer to term it, a "rhetoric" which appeals to "empathy".

    That is to say, the noises it makes which it hopes will provoke you to project upon it qualities which you subjectively feel; and provoke you to respond it, as if it were you or very like you ... which per the major premise, it most definitely is not.

    Funny, really. But, I guess it has worked to keep them in existence. Kind of like the promiscuous lesbian tomboy reproductive strategy.

    No wonder "progressives" are so fascinated with the notion of "subversion".

    What will they do, one imagines when their parents abort their little subversives before they are even whelped?

    Per the assumption, I guess they will do nothing ... but die.

    And then their non-kind kind will eventually fade into a sort of vague memory of what used to occur in the "bad old days" before reproductive hygiene was widely practiced and nipped problems like them "in the bud" so to speak.

    ReplyDelete
  3. To be fair, though, I do enjoy being told what I "must" do in order to stop thinking there's a me who's different from the him who's telling me to do it and realize that each of us is just the creation of the minds we don't really have.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Don Jindra says that very interesting one thing : that there are "very few real Christians in this world".


    NOW, there's at last one thing we can all agree on.


    Being a Christian doesn't only mean you believe in God ; it also means you BEHAVE in a holy way, and, thirdly, BELIEVE in that same "holy way".

    And vice-versa of course, for a Christian cannot by definition, not believe in God.


    To be a Christian, you must respect ALL these conditions : not just one condition, without the other (necessary) ones.

    And though all (real) of us Christians believe in God, still, very few of us behave the way we're supposed to.

    Which is a shame, for we have not only a HUMAN moral obligation to behave rightly, but also a DIVINE obligation indeed
    - way stronger than the first one, furthermore.

    ReplyDelete
  5. (Sorry, that reply was to Anon's post just above DNW's. Insert obvious usual explanation here.)

    ReplyDelete
  6. ...that's awesome dude.

    How awesome? This awesome.

    In other news (i.e., getting back to reality)...

    It is interesting that Anonymous took the time to make a distinction between a state of mind in which there are distinctions, and a state of mind in which there are no distinctions.

    That he was able to make that distinction, and that he was remarkably accurate in his attempts to hit or press the correct keys when typing up his message about that distinction, serves, I think, as a reliable indicator that he likely was not, at that time, in a state of mind in which there are no distinctions.

    It is also interesting, although I will allow that it is not as interesting, that a deplorer of separation should separate himself from the majority of the commenters here by posting anonymously.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Anonymous at 6 : 29,


    You write, quote ;

    "I also wonder - what do you think a miracle is?
    If it is a special instance of Divine action, then it is fairly clear how e.g. the five ways affect the probability that a miracle has occurred."


    Well, if i'm not mistaken, that's exactly how we Classical Theists conceive a miracle : a "special instance of Divine action, that could not - not even IN PRINCIPLE - be caused than anything other than God."


    It must therefore be UNDENIABLY caused by God.

    We're not talking about having flu or similar diseases cured a few hours after a prayer, there.


    In other terms, our definition of what's a miracle - which is also the oldest theistic definition of the word "miracle", if memory serves me well - is therefore NOT a God-of-the-Gaps one.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Scott, that really is far out. It's like you're you but you're not you and you're me but I'm not me. Oh man! That is awesome.

    Glenn,

    'It is interesting that Anonymous took the time to make a distinction between a state of mind in which there are distinctions, and a state of mind in which there are no distinctions.

    That he was able to make that distinction, and that he was remarkably accurate in his attempts to hit or press the correct keys when typing up his message about that distinction, serves, I think, as a reliable indicator that he likely was not, at that time, in a state of mind in which there are no distinctions.

    It is also interesting, although I will allow that it is not as interesting, that a deplorer of separation should separate himself from the majority of the commenters here by posting anonymously'

    It's more than interesting, it's awesome. Join us Glenn - there is no Glenn, there is only the anon.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Yes, the illusion of separateness is caused by your thinking that you're separate. I don't make that mistake, which is why I'm not separate like all the rest of you.

    ReplyDelete
  10. It's more than interesting, it's awesome. Join us Glenn - there is no Glenn, there is only the anon.

    I am please and flattered by the invitation. Thank you. Given both the longevity of the human race to date and the expected longevity of this lone individual, however, it is already quite likely that I'll be joining something -- and anon (relatively speaking).

    ReplyDelete
  11. Substitute any other word or name for Ralph and see that it is all nonsense.

    Hmm, how about "time" or "in the moment". Related to that, Heidegger’s magnus dopus.

    I think it might be something more awesome, in which case that's awesome dude.

    Everything is awesome!!

    ReplyDelete
  12. @Ralph:

    Careful thought can be an exertion, no? Like unaccustomed sprinting when one lives a sedentary lifestyle, it will cause some people to ralph.

    @Glenn: "It is interesting that Anonymous took the time to make a distinction between a state of mind in which there are distinctions, and a state of mind in which there are no distinctions."

    What an admirably acute way of hoisting Ralph by his own retard.

    But as you said, *getting back to reality*:

    @Jeremy Taylor: "Would it be stretching it to call Russell Kirk and Malcolm Muggeridge writers and essayists from recent decades?"

    Good prose is worth some looseness of categories. :) And I *have* missed a couple of those, so thank you for your suggestions! I'll look for them when I can.

    @Chad Handley: "As the existence of God is a specific Christian belief derived from specific revelation/the Bible/personal revelation, I would think P2 is self-evidently false. (Even if the existence of God can also be proved by reason, it is nonetheless a "specific Christian belief" as you define it.) / And if your point is that the New Atheists need only deal with the specific arguments for things like the Resurrection as offered by apologists like William Lane Craig, Clark H. Pinnock, N.T. Wright, Richard Swinburne,etc, then can you direct me to where they've done so in their writings?"

    It seems clear by now that Vaal does not mean "specific Christian belief," but rather "belief specific to Christianity." That is the only way it makes sense to claim, "P2. The arguments from classical theism DO NOT aid in justifying specific Christian beliefs." For as you rightly point out, classical theistic arguments *would* tend to aid in establishing at least, say, the first item of the Nicene Creed.

    Thank you for your list of apologists. Those are the sorts of folks I was thinking of, when I said that we atheists should acknowledge that there do exist arguments "from 'classical theism' TO the specific claims of a revealed religion." Let me concede also, that we could make that list much longer. Many of those apologists are of course theistic personalists, not classical theists; but their arguments are portable into several contexts, just like arguments in other studies.

    And this is also why I said, that it may be fruitful to think of the New Atheists, not as atheists, but as freethinkers. To be sure, they *are* atheists. But if you find yourself playing whack-a-mole with arguments to establish the logical priority of the existence of God, that may be because, as Vaal seems implicitly to have conceded, atheism is not truly the animus of the New Atheists, but is rather a secondary feature. "Hence focusing on those beliefs - the ones that actually motivate most religious believers - certainly makes the most sense if you are concerned about the consequences of religious beliefs," as Vaal said. *The ones that actually motivate most religious believers* is of course more a demotic criterion than a logical one, and if you add to that that that really means, "The ones that actually motivate most religious believers, *as far as the New Atheists can tell,*" well, we are still further from the sweetness of reason.

    ReplyDelete
  13. @Brandon: "If we are concerned with consequences and not truth, as in a sociological or psychological investigation, then how to trace out the consequences will depend on the particular group of believers being discussed and the particular ends of inquiry."

    Yup. And that theirs is partly a sociological critique, I would say is indicated by Vaal's quoting Wikipedia about "Dawkins regards religion as a 'divisive force' and as a 'label for in-group/out-group enmity and vendetta'".

    @George LeSauvage: "As best I can tell, Vaal is arguing for a particular view of the world, which seems to reject the notion of revelation, although doesn't quite absolutely reject the notion of miracles, per se, but only those which happened - or are alleged to have happened - historically. (Though not for historical reasons, apparently.)"

    Seems fair.

    @Crude: "The New Atheists are the ones who picked the fight with belief in God and gods, full stop. That it turns out they've bitten off far more than they can chew doesn't absolve them."

    Yup.

    @Vaal: "I've never seen anything close to a cogent argument against P2..."

    The word "cogent" seems to be doing an awful lot of work here.

    ReplyDelete

  14. My past behavior has been totally misrepresented by some here. So I don't know which imaginary me you expect. Besides, maybe I've been "born again" as a clear thinker and the god of reason has forgiven my past sins. :)


    Perhaps, but it would have to have been very recently, given I have argued with you, and seen others argue with you, not too long ago when you have either trolled or been totally incapable of seeing the fact you were relying on gross fallacies.

    I will say you have improved though. I was reading some of Dr. Feser's articles from five years ago or so and your comments were much worse then than when I argued with you. So let us hope you continue to improve!

    ReplyDelete
  15. George LeSauvage: As best I can tell, Vaal is arguing for a particular view of the world, which seems to reject the notion of revelation, although doesn't quite absolutely reject the notion of miracles, per se, but only those which happened - or are alleged to have happened - historically.

    I think that Vaal's position is supposed to be that theists and atheists agree that the fundamental worldview is Science!™ — except when it comes to religious things, whereupon the theist suddenly and inconsistently abandons Science unprovoked. Of course, there are obviously various problems with this: neither atheists nor theists take Science!™ as fundamental, except when they are actually in the science-lab. And even when people agree on something, it doesn't follow that they agree for the same reasons (except when one group is perhaps unwarrantedly riding on the coattails of a couple of millennia of cultural influence of the other group). And Vaal seems to view "God" as an extra checkmark on the theist's list of universal furniture — valid for explaining God-dependent things like miracles, perhaps, but otherwise superfluous to the rest of the furniture... which is like saying that discovering you're reading P.G. Wodehouse instead of Thomas Hardy is not going to influence the way you interpret a story. Theism is a whole different genre from atheism, and of course reading one kind of story as though it were the other will not make sense.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Vaal writes,

    P1. If the arguments from classical theism do not aid in justifying Christian beliefs, then the New Atheists do not have to contend with classical theism in order to criticize the justification for Christian beliefs.

    P2. The arguments from classical theism DO NOT aid in justifying specific Christian beliefs.

    Conclusion: The New Atheists do not have to contend with classical theism in order to criticize the justification for Christian Beliefs.


    There are two problems with this. The first, and lesser, problem is that the use of the term aid is unclear. We can agree there is a large gap between the arguments for classical theism and those for a specific revelation. So if you mean by do not aid that the latter alone cannot bridge this gap, then this is accurate. But, as others have pointed out, the latter arguments are aids in the sense proving God's existence makes miracles claims more probable.

    But more importantly, your argument doesn't accurately represent the position of the New Atheists. The New Atheists do contend with classical theism. That is, they very often blend criticism of all belief in religion, or indeed all non-naturalist and non-scientistic beliefs, whether philosophical or not, with their attacks on specific religions. This is not some afterthought or incidental aspect of their thought. It is normal and at the centre of their attacks on religion: they think God, or indeed anything non-naturalistic, is not just unproven but has no even half-decent arguments in its favour, and this is a constant part of their attacks.

    ReplyDelete
  17. The Frenchman:

    NOW, there's at last one thing we can all agree on.

    Being a Christian doesn't only mean you believe in God ; it also means you BEHAVE in a holy way, and, thirdly, BELIEVE in that same "holy way".

    And vice-versa of course, for a Christian cannot by definition, not believe in God.


    As a matter of fact, I do disagree.

    According to the Church, at the very least, everyone who has been validly baptized is a Christian (whether they know it or not). Some of them not be very good Christians, or their beliefs may be inconsistent, or they may not profess Christian belief at all; nor are all of them in full communion with the Church, perhaps because of heresy, apostasy, or schism; nor is baptism alone a guarantee of ultimate salvation. But if they bear the mark of Christ, then they are Christians, period. (And for that matter, if they ever will be baptized, then they're Christians as far as the eternal all-knowing God is concerned.)

    What you're describing sounds more like a standard for who counts as a "true Christian," and it's neither your place nor mine to judge anyone on that basis.

    More charitably, perhaps, you're describing what Christians are supposed to do and be, and of course in that respect you're right. But it's not right to say that only those who do and are those things are genuinely Christians. Great heavens, if I ceased to be a Christian every time I failed to "behave in a holy way," I'd be lying every time I claimed to be one.

    ReplyDelete
  18. @Daniel: "If Vaal is correct and the New Atheists see their prime target as 'revealed religion' then they still face the pointed charge of being woefully ignorant of their chosen target. When have any of those four showed a serious understanding of Christian Theology? One thinks of Harris' laughable construal of various Gospel passages. Needless to say this weakens one's confidence in their capacity to critique religious dogma (as often what they are critiquing turns out to be their own creation)"

    This does not seem quite right. Vaal seems to have conceded, that the New Atheists are not primarily attacking a "serious understanding of Christian Theology," but rather (among other things) the common man's understanding, which is of course generally crude. A crude argument may be quite effective against a crude understanding.

    When Bishop Colenso of Natal was deposed for heresy by the Bishop of Cape Town, it was after arguing on the crude grounds of arithmetic, that if you added up the sons born to and the pigeons eaten by the Israelites in the wilderness, and so on, the account was surely incredible, and therefore unlikely to have been composed by God. This inspired at least one timber merchant to start adding up the dimensions of the Ark, and to come to similar conclusions. Now, one might object that at least since Augustine, there have been more sophisticated ways to read the Bible. But then, that timber merchant, and that Bishop of Cape Town, were surely no good Augustinian readers. And if at the time one had objected to (say) the efforts of missionaries to stop Zulu polygamy, well then, some crude criticism might have been worthwhile.

    That the New Atheist blunderbuss has often been aimed at theology as such is nonetheless true.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Sometimes I think that Vaal would do better to just write a book with what he's thinking. If he's right about what's fundamental and what's valuable in the New Atheist critique, then it should be articulable apart from the drivel, error, and sophomorism.

    ReplyDelete
  20. One of the main reasons debates like these become so long and confused is that empirical claims get mixed up with conceptual ones and the distinction is not properly kept track of. New Atheists with their strong affinity towards a radical and naive empiricism are particularly prone to this error. Thus Vaal wrote

    The arguments for classical theism, for instance where Aquinas tries to demonstrate necessary conclusions about God, are different from the type of argument for contingent claims of God's specific intervention in the world (revelation).
    They are different in type [...]


    which suggest he understands the aforementioned distinction. But in an earlier post he says:

    I, like most atheists I know, am applying the same mind-set to claims about God. To not hold a belief in God (or even to hypothesis that there IS no God) is not to assign zero probability, because I accept the possibility I may be wrong.

    Here it seems reasonable to take "the same mind-set" to mean "an empirical one". If this is correct then he maintains both a conceptual as well as an empirical attitude towards the cosmological argument. Which is unlikely to produce a happy ending. To assign a probability to the truth of the cosmological argument is simply a category error as deductive logical truths are not subject to probabilistic assessment. One might as well put a probability on the question whether a physical object can be red and green all over at the same time.

    I am reminded here of The Selfish Gene in which Dawkins simultaneously argues for and against biological determinism. This affords him the rhetorical option to point out that he has said the opposite whenever anyone tries to nail him down on either position. And so the debates about what he really meant to say in this pseudo-scientific libretto of ultra-Darwinism go on interminably.

    Scott, Greg and others have made it clear that the questions about the existence of God on the one hand and of miracles on the other belong to different categories and are thus logically independent. Perhaps the reason Vaal cannot understand this is that he is, unintentionally, pulling a (conceptual) Dawkins.

    ReplyDelete
  21. Just to recap for clarity's sake:

    My own main reply to Vaal so far has been to his claim that belief in God is irrelevant to the probabilities we assign to the occurrence of miracles (whether in general or to proposed miraculous explanations of this or that specific event).

    I've responded that if we understand a miracle to be an event caused directly by God (i.e. involving no secondary or "natural" causation), then this claim is clearly false: the probability that a miracle occurs is zero on the hypothesis that God doesn't exist, and nonzero on the hypothesis that He does exist. I've said that this is a crucial, fundamental difference, in part because in the latter case our initial estimate of the probability of a miracle can be affected by evidence and argument, and in the former it cannot.

    Vaal has replied that this is not so, because he doesn't in fact assign a probability of zero to the hypothesis that God exists.

    This, I've said, is irrelevant and betrays the very misunderstanding under which I initially suggested he was laboring. If he means what he appears to mean, then he isn't distinguishing between the probability of a hypothesis (in this case, "God exists"), or P(H), on the one hand, and the conditional probability of other events or evidence given that hypothesis (in this case, "miracles occur given that God exists"), or P(E|H).

    That's where things now stand as far as I'm personally concerned.

    ReplyDelete
  22. Scott, thanks for the clarification.

    I'm no expert on Thomism, so I have to ask: Do Thomists agree that God causes miracles by means of primary causation (or is at least able to do so)? My understanding of Aristotelian primary causation is hard to reconcile with the idea of conceiving it as an event's only cause, since our ordinary understanding of "miracle" seems to be that of a contingent event. But perhaps Thomists disagree and see e. g. the resurrection as a necessary occurance.

    Now on the ordinary, contingent understanding of "miracle" (which is what atheists like Vaal use in their arguments) and given that the existence of God as proposed by the cosmological argument is not an event in the world, I would object to the formalization given by expressions such as P(M|G). First, recall that A|B in P(A|B) does not denote an event. Rather, P(A|B) means P_B(A), where P_B (read "P subindex B") is the event space P reduced to those of its elements for which B is true. Now what sense can one make of this if B is a necessary truth such as "God exists"? How do I reduce an event space using a proposition for which the adjudication of truth depends on the acceptability of its logical deduction? I would contend this is impossible: Suppose P is the space of all spatio-temporal occurances of the universe. Then I cannot filter out elements of P based on the hypothesis G ("God exists"), for G is not a property that is true or false of the elements of P. The problem is not that no elements of P get filtered out. It's that the method of filtering is not intelligible. It is not even thinkable that elements of P might be removed by applying G because G is logically/conceptually independent of anything we might say about the properties of P's elements. (@Vaal: The fact that an element e of P is primarily caused by God is not a property of e, since the existence of properties presupposes primary causation.)

    Thus I would agree (assuming "miracle" to denote a contingent event) that whether God exists or not does not alter P(M). But to express this as "P(M|G)=P(M)" seems nonsensical as the left side of the equation is not properly defined. (And if M is a logically necessary event - if such a thing exists - then not even P(M) makes sense.) This is not merely a formal quibble but a consequence of the concept of truth working differently for logical and empirical facts. The confusion arises from calling G a "hypothesis", which carries with it the temptation to treat a conceptual truth like an empirical one.

    If there are necessary events in the world (and I would really like to hear opinions about that), they escape the logic and thus the methods of probability calculus. The probability of a necessary event is not 1, just as the probability of a physical object being red and green all over is not 0. Rather, we should say that the concept of probability makes no sense for logically necessary (or logically impossible) events or facts.

    ReplyDelete
  23. pck:

    Briefly, yes, Aquinas defines a miracle as an event brought about by God without a natural cause. (In some cases it's an event that could have occurred naturally, in others not.)

    That doesn't mean they're "necessary," however, in any of the various senses of that word, and I'm not saying they are. I'm making the very different statement that without God, they're impossible—that the hypothetical nonexistence of God necessitates their nonoccurrence, since on that hypothesis there's no God to cause them. God isn't bound to perform any specific miracle, or any miracles at all, merely because He exists.

    ReplyDelete
  24. (There's a sense, though, in which e.g. the Resurrection is "conditionally necessary" in that, God's having decided to bring about the Atonement in the manner He has, the Resurrection had to occur given the Divine Will.)

    ReplyDelete
  25. Vaal seems to be saying that the New Athiests would rather argue with the average Christian, (whose case for belief in God Is based on personal experience,) than with those who have philosophical arguments for God. His justification being that the majority of believers are the former.

    IOW, they're going for the low hanging fruit.

    It's like a creationist saying he'd rather argue with atheists with no scientific background than with actual scientists.

    ReplyDelete
  26. It's like a creationist saying he'd rather argue with PEOPLE who have no scientific background than with actual scientists. (The word "atheists" was unnecessary).

    ReplyDelete
  27. Scott:

    Briefly, yes, Aquinas defines a miracle as an event brought about by God without a natural cause. (In some cases it's an event that could have occurred naturally, in others not.)

    So I take it that for Aquinas, it is impossible for humans to decide on purely rational grounds whether the event in question is a miracle? I can see how a miracle would be an event that is not naturally possible (see below), but one whose appearance is compatible with an explanation using secondary causes is tough for me to comprehend. If secondary causes that can explain some event E are available, what would be the (conceptual) difference between E the ordinary event vs E the miracle?

    That doesn't mean they're "necessary," however, in any of the various senses of that word, and I'm not saying they are. I'm making the very different statement that without God, they're impossible—that the hypothetical nonexistence of God necessitates their nonoccurrence, since on that hypothesis there's no God to cause them. God isn't bound to perform any specific miracle, or any miracles at all, merely because He exists.

    This coincides with my previous understanding. I was having a hard time figuring out what "impossible without God" might mean except what it obviously means, which is that nothing is possible without God since God is the precondition of all contingent existence. But this general notion of making everything possible did not seem to me to be enough to separate the notions of ordinary vs miraculous events.

    My reasoning was something like this: A miracle would have to be an event such as water spontaneously turning into wine, which according to water's nature, to use Aristotle's terms, cannot happen, but the notion of which is nonetheless conceivable. Now if secondary causation is out of the picture here, is primary causation enough to account for the water's transformation, given that primary causation is about subsistence? But I suppose now after reflecting on your replies that that would be to underestimate primary causation. A miracle might be conceived of as an act of (genuine) creation (but within an already existing world). It would introduce something to the world that could not have come into existence by mere (secondarily caused) transformations of what was already there. Might be bad news for physicists and the conservation of energy, but there you go.

    So the fact that any spatio-temporal event may be termed to be a contingent one is not the obstacle I thought it was.

    An additional thought: What this seems to say (particularly to an atheist) is that "With God in the picture, more things are possible than without God." But when I consider the notion of "what is possible" in a world without a creative force that grounds its existence, then without that epistemic anchor I am forced to simply say "it just is". Which is, as David Bentley Hart likes to point out, tantamount to a belief in magic. In this magical world what are we to say about possibilities? The tempting move to appeal to laws is not going to solve anything as any and all conceivable events can be made to conform with laws simply by rewriting the laws. So we are in conceptual limbo with regard to what is and isn't possible (given that in magicworld there is no such thing as necessity of any kind) and the part of the initial comparison which reads "more things are possible" becomes unintelligible. (I just mention this because it paralles my criticism of ascribing probabilities to logically necessary facts. Both procedures transgress the boundaries of sense even though they see legitimate on a formal level.)

    ---

    A correction to my post above:

    "Suppose P is the space of all spatio-temporal occurances of the universe."

    should be

    "Suppose P is the space of all possible spatio-temporal occurances in the universe."

    ReplyDelete
  28. pck:

    So I take it that for Aquinas, it is impossible for humans to decide on purely rational grounds whether the event in question is a miracle?

    Well, to the extent that any natural law is a matter of empirical investigation and falls short of mathematical certainty, I suppose so. If (say) a cat gave birth to an elephant, we'd probably conclude that the event was a miracle on the grounds that cats by nature give birth to cats, but we couldn't absolutely 100% rule out the possibilities that (a) we hadn't completely understood the nature of cats, that (b) the animal we thought was a cat was actually something else, that (c) the offspring we thought was an elephant was actually something else, and so forth.

    But we'd know enough, I think, to regard it as a rational certainty that something had interfered with the ordinary curse of nature—and if Jesus had apparently made it happen in support of His proclamation of the Kingdom, then I think we could decide on purely rational grounds that it was a miracle. At the very least we'd recognize it as an event that was contrary to our experience of the ordinary course of nature, as in e.g. Aquinas's example of the sun's reversing course.

    Note that this miracle is different from one that could have occurred naturally but didn't, as e.g. the curing of a disease. Thus secondary causes aren't always available to serve as an alternative explanation.

    Some relevant bits from St. Thomas, on miracles generally but not necessarily specific to the contents of this post: here, here, here, and here.

    ReplyDelete
  29. Heh, the ordinary curse of nature. I like that.

    "Course."

    ReplyDelete
  30. Scott, thanks very much for your comments and the links. The example of recovery from a disease answers my question about events which may or may not be the result of secondary causation.

    As for the empirical nature of things, I agree that we can never be completely sure of anything due to the limitations of human experience and/or epistemic capacity.

    [The following is only very loosely related to the previous exchange. But it was something in the back of my mind when I read through the parts of this thread which focus on the misguided "rational" criticisms the New Atheists have offered, which include a lot of abuse of allegedly scientific certainties.]

    My philosophical background centers on Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy, so it is perhaps no surprise that I don't subscribe to correspondence theories of truth. I take the meaning of "the nature of X" to be whatever is the current use (or range of uses) of that expression, not as a reference to something "out there" (aka a thing-in-itself). Thus when we say that "cats don't give birth to elephants", that is (partly) constitutive of the meaning of the expression "the nature of cats". It is at the same time an expression of a fact as well as a linguistic rule - inspired by human experience, but not a pointer-like reference to a reality independent of it. (This view is neither a form of idealism, nor does it "make everything about language", since it is grounded in the use of words in what Wittgenstein likes to call "the stream of life".)

    Despite all that, the idea that there is a world out there which is independent of our perception of it certainly makes sense. But whenever we want to start talking about any of the world's features, we will need a conceptual framework, which will necessarily be informed at least in part by human features. Thus we cannot completely divorce our understanding of nature from our own.

    Hence, the ordinary curse of nature (yes, that was a very nice typo) is for nature to be at once utterly familiar and mysteriously distant to us at the same time. I think this is something that theists and atheists could agree on without having to make any concessions they feel uncomfortable with. If they did, it might even help a little to avoid the presumptions of superiority which exist in the fundamentalist camps of both sides.

    ReplyDelete
  31. laubadetriste:

    Well, I could be wrong but I took Vaal to be saying that the main project of the New Atheists is attacking the legitimacy of revelation as an epistemology. The most common belief resulting from "revelation epistemology" is the belief that God exists. Most theists believe that God exists for the same reason they believe in the specific miracle claims of their religion -on the basis the same sort of personal/corporate/Scriptural revelation that Vaal claims New Atheists are primarily motivated against. That being the case, I don't understand Vaal's argument that New Atheists are justified in ignoring the arguments for the existence of God and concentrating solely on the arguments for specific miracles.

    ReplyDelete
  32. In case anyone is still around….

    I'd written: "Once again, I'm talking of the empirical attitude a rational person will have to vetting miracle claims. The attitude toward specific miracle claims ought not change if you add belief in God (that is the information about God delivered by classical theistic arguments). This is because "that God" does not help to raise probabilities of any specific miracle."

    And this is why I have continually raised *specific* examples - be it probabilities about every day empirical events, and/or about specific Christian miracles (which is why they feature in that syllogism).

    If you want to challenge this and say that the God of classical theism raises the probabilities of any *specific miracle* then it's up to you to do so. I've given reasons - again using specific examples - to be skeptical of the claim. No one here is actually providing any positive arguments for how classical theism raises the probabilities - ESPECIALLY in terms of aiding the rational acceptance of any specific miracle claim. It seems everyone has been doing his studious best to avoid answering the challenge.

    ReplyDelete
  33. Anonymous,

    What else other than the existence of God shows that Jesus rose from the dead?

    You've put the cart before the horse there. You can't beg the question by saying Jesus rose from the dead. The question is: IF God rose Jesus from the dead, HOW WOULD WE KNOW THAT?

    How can adding the creator of the universe not raise the probability of a specific miracle?

    You can answer this question for yourself by doing exactly what I've asked: try to show that adding God WILL raise the probability of a specific miracle (in any meaningful way in terms of justifying a belief a miracle occurred). Once you start trying, the answer to your question will become obvious.


    This is trivial. The important claim is "God does (not) exist"

    Nope, that's where you (and others) keep going wrong, and I've explained this numerous times. An atheist it not bound to asserting, or believing, that God does NOT exist." Hence both your 2nd and 3rd premises (- G, -M)) makes your formulation moot to my arguments here.

    An atheist can leave that question open as a conditional and say "ok IF God exists, how does that impact whether I ought to believe any SPECIFIC MIRACLE occurred?" This is precisely what the theist has to answer, given his belief in God (of classical theism). The theist is thus has no leg up UNTIL he starts answering that question. The silence on this, not surprisingly, has been deafening.

    "If you were to be open to the possibility of miracles occurring, for the sake of some investigation into the matter, it would not be on account of endorsing the conditional premise, but granting that God exists."

    But the conditional premise I'm talking about granting IS "God exists." This is granted to ask how it raises the justification for belief that any miracle, especially Christian miracles (my syllogism referred to specific Christian miracles), occurred.

    We should be open to whatever is true, and one way of modifying our beliefs, accepting new truths, is hypothesis testing. Arguing from conditionals is, after all, how hypotheses tend to be formed and tested. That is, as I've mentioned, how science progresses. The atheist can thus conditionally grant the premise "God exists" and ask what follows from this, especially in regards to it's support of any other specific claims (miracle claims). So none of your criticisms move an inch to disputing my position.

    ReplyDelete
  34. Anonymous,

    I also wonder - what do you think a miracle is?

    Something (quoting Ed Feser) "impossible in the natural order." You know…things like Jesus' purported miracles, e.g. rising from the dead.

    The problem is that - as even Edward Feser acknowledges - what is "possible in the natural order" is best decide by science (as Edward Feser has written before: "certain things are possible and certain things are impossible, and the “laws of nature” revealed by natural science tell us which is which." My quibble there would be the term "impossible" since that implies science deals in absolutes, which it does not as it allows for error, keeping possibilities open for revision). The problem for the classical theist is showing how to integrate CT (classical theism) God into the calculation of empirical "probabilities" so as to raise the justification in concluding any miracle occurred - e.g. Jesus rising from the dead. Edward Feser has not done this. No one here has done this. I've never seen a theist successfully achieve it. And I've given reasons for skepticism that it can be done. Until you manage to show how CT God raises epistemic justification for belief in specific Christian miracles, no atheist has to first defeat classical theism arguments in order to criticize specific miracle claims, such as Christian claims.

    If it is a special instance of Divine action, then it is fairly clear how e.g. the five ways affect the probability that a miracle has occurred.

    Are you familiar with "begging the question?" :-)

    If you can show the Five Ways raise, in any significant way, the epistemic justification for believing in Christian miracle claims….be my guest….and be the first :-)…..

    (And, actually, we've been through this at length in other threads here. There was IMO no success. This is because to the degree classical theism endorses our normal empirical inquiry, and science, it accepts the high bar raised by science in establishing justification for extraordinary claims, and claims from a distant past for miracles badly fail to meet such criteria. I think I'm justified in being skeptical anything new will come of you trying to produce a cogent argument).

    ReplyDelete
  35. Brandon,

    Vaal: You don't get justifications for specific Christian beliefs from the conclusions of classical theism.

    If by 'justifications' you mean 'proofs', that's certainly the case;

    No, you've phrased that in a goal-post moving manner. It should be clear I haven't been demanding "proofs" and nothing I've written even implies it. I've only asked how accepting the CT God aids, in any significant way, the justification in believing Christian miracles. And I've appealed to real world examples, suggesting that adding a "God who could intervene" does not seem to alter empirical inference-building, and hence doesn't alter rational skepticism about the odds of any specific miracle occurring, or having occurred.

    ReplyDelete
  36. Brandon,

    To understand my point, you simply have to apply Classical Theism to specific real world examples of empirical inference-building, to see how things work out.

    Take the methods of mountain climbing. It's predicated on conclusions about the"natural order" such as expectations concerning gravity. Pretty much all the methods assume gravity will not be interrupted, and that you must do X, Y, Z to avoid falling to your death.

    No add the CT God - make your mountain climber a classical theist. So now you've introduced the proposition "A God exists who could suspend the natural law - suspend gravity" and hence stop any climber from falling. Does adding this proposition ALTER in any substantial way how the mountain climber does, or ought to, approach mountain climbing? Should it alter his empirical assumptions about the likelihood of falling to his death if he makes the wrong moves? As in "Well, now I know that a God could intervene, I no longer should have confidence I'll fall if I let go of the cliff! So this alters my calculations of what type of caution and methods I should have in mountain climbing!"

    I hope you will agree, if you are sane, obviously this isn't the case. Classical Theists aren't going to be approaching mountain climbing differently than non-Classical Theists. Why? Because even if you accept classical theism, the empirical inferences about the apparent constancy of gravity and the likelihood of falling while mountain climbing remains justified.

    Even granting God's existence, our probabilities of what will happen must be built along the same lines of empirical odds-making.

    It is in this sense that adding the proposition "God COULD perform a specific miracle(e.g. save a falling climber)" does not *significantly* alter the empirically built expectations that God WON'T perform such a specific miracle.

    Now, either you can dispute that reasoning or not. I don't think you have, or will.
    So Brandon, and Scott, if you want to get my point, just think about the above example.
    IF you accept the CT God, who can intervene in the natural order, contemplate why it is this would not change the empirical expectations of mountain climbers, and hence their skepticism toward claims a God *would* or should alter their empirical expectations.

    The same reasoning applies to any miracle claim, most pertinent, miraculous resurrections from the dead. Even if you add "a God exists who could raise someone from the dead," the same logic applies as in the mountain climbing. How does this raise expectations for *any particular* instance of resurrection, or justifying belief in *any particular resurrection* has occurred ? Just as the CT God-believing mountain climber remains justified in maintaining his skepticism the odds have been raised for God saving him from falling, any rational person remains justified in maintaining skepticism that CT God would intervene to raise anyone from the dead.

    In the case of mountain climbing, we have all the empirical inferences about how God does not seem to interfere with gravity, and our expectations and skepticism is built upon
    our empirical experience. In the case of resurrections, we have all the empirical inferences about how God does not seem to interfere with people staying dead. The empirical "odds" seem, in terms of our EXPECTATIONS, essentially the same whether you include CT GOD or not.

    Is this some decisive argument against CT God aiding justification in specific miracle beliefs? No. But I am offering, with examples such as above, support for skepticism that the CT God will aid in raising expectations of specific miracle claims (and hence in justifying belief in them).

    ReplyDelete
  37. Greg,

    The original argument is basically trying to claim that the probability can non-question-beggingly be judged as though we were all naturalists.

    That's not correct, Greg. I've argued that it one can ASSUME the proposition of a supernatural God who can intervene in the natural order. Hence this is not question-begging having to be a naturalist. The question is, given a "natural order" and a supernatural order - a God who can intervene and do miracles - how do we establish what the "natural order" is in the first place? This has deep consequences for our accepting miraculous suspensions of that natural order! And I ask how does CT God raise expectations of any *specific* miracle happening, or in our establishing a miracle did occur or not?

    I'm simply asking for a consistent method from the supernaturalist here. And I'm giving examples for why this looks extremely problematic (with no rebuttals having been given for those specific examples).

    I'm as far from question-begging as one can be.

    ReplyDelete
  38. Anyway, this has gone afar of why I dropped in. Just to say that we should be very careful in psychologically assessing the other side, since it's something opponents in opposite sides of a debate tend to do very poorly.

    Cheers,

    Vaal

    ReplyDelete
  39. I should just add, since some seem so stuck on the idea of moving from "zero to non-zero" probabilities.

    (Taking for granted, for the moment, the position that adding CT God moves specific miracles from zero to non-zero propositions).

    Take the mountain climber example. Now add the CT God. Let's say this raises the probability of God miraculously intervening to save a climber falling from "zero" to "non-zero."

    Would it be rationally justified to say it follows that a mountain climber is NO LONGER JUSTIFIED in his skepticism in the proposition God will intervene if he falls?

    Surely not. Whoever would claim that has far more work ahead of him. And the efforts to do so face significant hurdles of the type I've been suggesting.

    And this is precisely the work I'm talking about, and giving reasons to be skeptical it can be done in the case of raising expectations in a way that *significantly* increases justification in specific miracles, such as those claimed in The Bible.

    ReplyDelete
  40. @ Vaal

    That's not correct, Greg. I've argued that it one can ASSUME the proposition of a supernatural God who can intervene in the natural order. Hence this is not question-begging having to be a naturalist. ...

    I'm as far from question-begging as one can be.


    You are misreading that sentence. It does not assert that you are begging the question or that the atheist is assuming God doesn't exist. It's characterizing your argument as trying to show the claim that the relevant probabilities related to miracle claims can be evaluated as though we were naturalists, i.e. that the God assumption is not relevant. That seems to be exactly how you've now gone on now to characterize your argument.

    In any case, the point of my posts does not hinge on that sentence.

    ReplyDelete
  41. @ Vaal

    Would it be rationally justified to say it follows that a mountain climber is NO LONGER JUSTIFIED in his skepticism in the proposition God will intervene if he falls?

    As I said earlier, your argument is stronger when you are comparing miracle claims than talking about "adding the CT God". But this example is not doing you any favors, since it's not parallel to warranted skepticism about the Resurrection. What would be more parallel: Various people saw a mountain climber fall off a cliff, hit the ground, and not move, but then several days later they see and talk to whom they believe to be the same mountain climber. In the first case it's hypothesized that "God will intervene," in the second that "God intervened"; in the second case, there is a hypothesis can be conditioned on some evidence.

    Assuming CT, both of these probabilities are nonzero, but the probability that there was a resurrection in the latter case is higher than the probability that there would be a resurrection in the former.

    ReplyDelete
  42. Does adding this proposition ALTER in any substantial way how the mountain climber does, or ought to, approach mountain climbing? Should it alter his empirical assumptions about the likelihood of falling to his death if he makes the wrong moves? As in "Well, now I know that a God could intervene, I no longer should have confidence I'll fall if I let go of the cliff! So this alters my calculations of what type of caution and methods I should have in mountain climbing!"

    Of course it would alter his behavior; why else do you think he would pray if something went wrong? Surely you realize that people pray, don't you? And that prayer is a behavior?

    As to probabilities, as people have pointed out explicitly to you before, divine interventions by definition are very low probability events, since they are 'interventions' in contrast to ordinary divine providence; why you think it is surprising that people don't count on them is simply baffling, and again shows that your handling of probabilities is less than entirely coherent.

    ReplyDelete
  43. Others have replied on other points; I'll reply on this one:

    The attitude toward specific miracle claims ought not change if you add belief in God[.]

    Well, it clearly does and should, and I'm not sure how many times we need to keep addressing this. Obviously the probability that any specific miracle (e.g. the Resurrection) occurred is greater on the hypothesis that the God of classical theism exists than on the hypothesis that He doesn't.

    ReplyDelete
  44. In case it's not clear: the reason I keep returning to this point is that if you acknowledge it (as you seem to have done), your "challenge" simply evaporates.

    As I've said, if the probability that a miracle has occurred in any specific case is nonzero, then arguments and evidence can "get hold" of the prior probability in the usual way and update it (via Bayes's Theorem or whatever else you prefer to use). In that case, if the probability of the proposed miracle is zero on the hypothesis that God doesn't exist, then we've identified an important, indeed fundamental, difference between the two cases that you said shouldn't be different.

    If instead you claim (as you sometimes seem to do, confusedly) that the probability of a miracle in that specific instance is non-zero even on the hypothesis that God doesn't exist because you don't assign a zero probability to the hypothesis itself, then (aside from perpetuating the confusion I've already noted between P(H) and P(E|H)) you're again acknowledging that the two cases don't differ as you said they did.

    ReplyDelete
  45. At this point, then, your only option would be to claim that the prior probability of a miraculous explanation for any specific event is zero on either hypothesis, which you're not doing and which would obviously be begging the question.

    So I have to concur with Brandon that there's some incoherence in your handling of the probabilities here.

    ReplyDelete
  46. Sorry, I introduced some confusion of my own in this paragraph:

    If instead you claim (as you sometimes seem to do, confusedly) that the probability of a miracle in that specific instance is non-zero even on the hypothesis that God doesn't exist because you don't assign a zero probability to the hypothesis itself, then (aside from perpetuating the confusion I've already noted between P(H) and P(E|H)) you're again acknowledging that the two cases don't differ as you said they did.

    Forget the last part of that sentence; it's nonsense, left over from an incomplete edit. All I need here is that you're "perpetuating the confusion I've already noted between P(H) and P(E|H)."

    ReplyDelete
  47. As I've said, if the probability that a miracle has occurred in any specific case is nonzero, then arguments and evidence can "get hold" of the prior probability in the usual way and update it (via Bayes's Theorem or whatever else you prefer to use).

    As a purely historical aside, it might be worth pointing out that this is precisely the point Charles Babbage makes against Hume in his Tenth Bridgewater Treatise (as Earman has pointed out more recently); so this is a point about probability that has come up quite a bit before in this kind of context.

    ReplyDelete
  48. Compare this as a possible parallel example, from Carl Sagan:

    "Who has ever witnessed such a thing? It's easy to dismiss it out of hand... [O]nce in a very great while, your car will spontaneously ooze through the brick wall of your garage and be found the next morning on the street. [This is] absurd! [But it is a consequence of quantum mechanics called barrier tunneling.] Like it or not, that's the way the world is. If you insist it's ridiculous, you'll be forever closed to some of the major findings on the rules that govern the Universe."--*The Demon-Haunted World,* ch. 17.

    What are the chances that a car has oozed through the brick wall of a garage, on the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is true, versus on the hypothesis that it is false?

    (Nine people [?] resurrected from the dead in the Bible, out of a total human population throughout history of 108 billion, last estimate I saw...)

    ReplyDelete
  49. What are the chances that a car has oozed through the brick wall of a garage, on the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is true, versus on the hypothesis that it is false?

    (Nine people [?] resurrected from the dead in the Bible, out of a total human population throughout history of 108 billion, last estimate I saw...)


    The chances are considerably less than 9 in 108 billion.

    But a closer parallel would be: You know quantum mechanics, so you know that there is a vanishingly small chance that your car will ooze through the brick wall of your garage. But you also know that one of your friends has keys to your garage and car; that is, it's in his power to move your car outside if he wants to. On a given night, you don't ascribe a high probability to the event that your friend will move your car outside overnight. But given that you find your car outside your garage in the morning, you are more inclined to entertain the hypothesis that a person moved it than that there was a quantum fluctuation.

    ReplyDelete
  50. "But a closer parallel would be: You know quantum mechanics, so you know that there is a vanishingly small chance that your car will ooze through the brick wall of your garage. But you also know that one of your friends has keys to your garage and car; that is, it's in his power to move your car outside if he wants to. On a given night, you don't ascribe a high probability to the event that your friend will move your car outside overnight. But given that you find your car outside your garage in the morning, you are more inclined to entertain the hypothesis that a person moved it than that there was a quantum fluctuation."

    :) We have embarked upon the first Quest for the Historical Valet.

    ReplyDelete
  51. The Babbage book was the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise; I'm not sure why I was thinking Tenth. (It was, in any case, not actually a Bridgewater Treatise at all, so I suppose the number doesn't matter all that much.) In any case, I thought some people here might be amused at Babbage's argument that it is much more likely that miracle-like events will happen than that they won't:

    It is more probable that any law, at the knowledge of which we have arrived by observation, shall be subject to one of those violations which, according to Hume's definition, constitutes a miracle, than that it should not be so subjected.

    To show this, we may be allowed again to revert to the Calculating Engine: and to assume that it is possible to set the machine, so that it shall calculate any algebraic law whatsoever: and also possible so to arrange it, that at any periods, however remote, the first law shall be interrupted for one or more times, and be superseded by any other law; after which the original law shall again be produced, and no other deviation shall ever take place.

    Now, as all laws, which appear to us regular and uniform in their course, and to be subject to no exception, can be calculated by the engine: and as each of these laws may also be calculated by the same machine, subject to any assigned interruption, at distinct and definite periods; each simple law may be interrupted at any point by the temporary action of a portion of any one of all the other simple laws: it follows, that the class of laws subject to Interruption is far more extensive than that of laws which are uninterrupted. It is, in fact, infinitely more numerous. Therefore, the probability of any law with which we have become acquainted by observation being part of a much more extensive law, and of its having, to use mathematical language, singular points or discontinuous functions contained within it, is very large.

    ReplyDelete
  52. @Vaal

    What else other than the existence of God shows that Jesus rose from the dead?

    You've put the cart before the horse there. You can't beg the question by saying Jesus rose from the dead. The question is: IF God rose Jesus from the dead, HOW WOULD WE KNOW THAT?


    The answer to that question is pretty obvious I think. We would know how by looking at the life of Jesus, who he was, who he claimed to be, how reliable he was, the miracles he performed including raising other people from the dead and what the focus of his three-year ministry was. Without a doubt he was focussed on God (I do not think that is a point to be debated on at all). So I think a better question for someone honestly looking for answers are how would we know that the Bible is accurate and not made up stories? (I will not get into answering that as I think a lot more capable people than me have already answered that).


    How can adding the creator of the universe not raise the probability of a specific miracle?

    You can answer this question for yourself by doing exactly what I've asked: try to show that adding God WILL raise the probability of a specific miracle (in any meaningful way in terms of justifying a belief a miracle occurred). Once you start trying, the answer to your question will become obvious.


    God is All-powerful AND All knowing AND All intelligent AND transcends space and time AND creator of the universe then adding Him to the equation very much raises the probability of a specific miracle (others have very much shown that too). If in our limited intelligence game developers can create modes inside the “physics of a game” that defy them then adding the game developer to the equation inside the “game world” does raise the probability of a something defying the laws (miracles) of that game world.

    I hope this helps your search for answers.

    ReplyDelete
  53. Just a note, FWIW, I hope to drop in to reply a bit tomorrow.

    (Again, my apologies, I post as my work load allows).

    Cheers,


    Vaal.

    ReplyDelete
  54. Ok folks,

    I've expressed skepticism that classical theism can significantly raise the justification for belief in specific Christian miracle claims ascribed to Jesus.
    (And hence, they are moot in terms of helping counter atheist arguments against believing in Christian miracles).

    The classical theist has to show how FIRST GRANTING classical theism somehow significantly raises the probabilities, or expectations, of specific miracles. Granting the existence of God and hence the mere "possibility of miracles" is utterly insufficient for this. Otherwise I may as well claim my cat is purring out a new divine revelation for mankind that we have to interpret. Hey, nothing unjustified about believing that since "miracles are possible."

    The replies about the existence of God raising probability of miracles from zero to non-zero" fail to speak to this problem.

    Say the local homeless guy, Fred, holds an extraordinary belief: that he will win the PowerBall lottery and retire in mansion in England. I express skepticism that he could even acquire a ticket, but point out "even IF you had a ticket, the odds of your winning are around 175 million to on, so owning a ticket would still leave your belief in winning unjustified."

    Fred replies that my argument is unjustified because he can prove to me his ticket exists - he holds it up to show me. Fred says "Your skepticism against my claim assumed the non-existence of my lottery ticket. Now that I've demonstrated the existence of my lottery ticket I've moved from a zero probability of winning to a non-zero probability. So until you can show my ticket doesn't exist, your skeptical arguments against my belief I'll win are moot."

    Clearly, anyone here will recognize Fred's is out to lunch in how badly he's misunderstood the crux of my skepticism. We can GRANT the existence of Fred's ticket (as I did) and still explain why his OTHER extraordinary belief that he will win the lottery is unjustified. Because "even if" he has a ticket, we can point to all the information we have about how lotteries work, and therefore how improbable his claim of winning remains.

    If Fred's only claim were that having a ticket made it "possible" to win
    the lottery, there wouldn't be much to argue about. But Fred is trying to use the existence of his ticket to justify a totally different, extraordinary claim: his belief that HE SPECIFICALLY will win the lottery.
    If that's Fred's claim, then his raising the probability from "zero" to "non-zero" is laughably insufficient. He hasn't shown how the existence of his ticket raises probabilities SIGNIFICANTLY ENOUGH to justify his belief he'll win, given the probabilities AGAINST his winning.

    And this is the point people answering me seem to keep avoiding.
    It doesn't matter to my argument, or to New Atheist criticism of Christianity if belief (via natural theology) in God makes it "possible" miracles will occur - a move from zero to non-zero probability. That tells me nothing about justifying an expectation for any specific miraculous claim. Just like Fred's lottery ticket, it doesn't show me how it RAISES the probabilities of a specific miracle significantly enough to help justifying belief in a miracle.( Either before or after the purported miracle occurred).

    If someone here wants to claim that classical theism helps justify belief in SPECIFIC extraordinary events, such as Jesus's miracles, then like Fred and his belief he'll win the lottery, you've got a long way to go. As Even granting natural theology arguments, as Hitchens was fond of rightly saying: "The theist still has all his work ahead of him.",

    ReplyDelete
  55. The point made by my earlier mountain climbing scenario is the same as the lottery ticket above.

    That someone falling off a cliff may pray on the way down is a red herring. The question is whether the mountain climber would be rationally justified in an extraordinary EXPECTATION of being saved.
    (And if he wasn't justified when climbing, he's no more justified while falling down). Say you were learning rock climbing. One instructor was taking all the normal safety precautions our experience has thus far suggested to be rational. Another isn't taking safety precautions, because as he explains: "God exists, so it's possible God can intervene if we fall…" Which instructor do YOU think is the rational one to go rock climbing with?

    ReplyDelete

  56. So, again, on the fundamental problem of probabilities and miracles:

    Take the calculations and the built-up empirical understanding of the universe that NASA scientists use to get rovers on to Mars. If all of NASA become convinced by the arguments of Classical Theism, and accept that a God exists who can miraculously intervene in the natural order they are presuming in their calculations, how does that enter their probability calculations? Unless one can show how classical theism raises the probability of some specific instance of intervention, it's impotent in regards to their empirical expectations.

    Of course classical theism wouldn't claim to suggest such divine interventions would occur in the natural order as it relates to NASA's empirical expectations. But the point is if you are claiming classical theism suggests OTHER specific miracles will occur, you face the same problems! You have to show how it actually must figure into our empirical expectations enough to ALTER our expectations (enough to accept such miracles).

    The same problem applies to claims of God intervening to do miracles like walking on water, turning water into wine, or raising a human body from the dead. How does classical theism significantly raise expectations for such miracles? Against our well justified empirical expectations of people staying dead?

    If you can't show how "God exists" (from classical theism) significantly raises the expectations of specific Christian miracles in the first place, then you are spinning your wheels when raising those arguments when New Atheists are criticizing Christian miracle claims. The theist remains stuck having to deal with the atheist appeals to empirical consistency in evaluating such claims, and classical theism throws no life-line.

    (Now, perhaps the classical theist CAN show how classical theism substantially raises expectations of something as specific as Jesus and his miracles. I've certainly seen many efforts to do so, but never a successful one IMO).

    ReplyDelete
  57. Scott,

    "In case it's not clear: the reason I keep returning to this point is that if you acknowledge it (as you seem to have done), your "challenge" simply evaporates."

    No, it really doesn't. With apologies for saying it again, but you've got your eye on the wrong ball and misunderstood the challenge. See my previous posts.

    "In that case, if the probability of the proposed miracle is zero on the hypothesis that God doesn't exist, then we've identified an important, indeed fundamental, difference between the two cases that you said shouldn't be different."

    Yet again: I'm not claiming a hypothesis "God doesn't exist" so this is moot. I"m asking you to show how "God exists" impacts our empirical inference of probabilities, in any substantial way.

    Take any equation predicting the trajectory of an object.
    Now add "God exists."

    Now show how "God exists (who could intervene) should alter ANY POINT of the equation, to alter the probabilities derived from that equation.

    Of course you won't be able to. You wouldn't even want to; you'd look nutty doing it. And that's the issue: if the proposition "god exists" alters our empirical calculations and expectations to a degree that may as well be invisible to those expectations, then you've not shown it to be relevant.

    You can talk abstractly all you wan about the mere possibility of miracles; but you won't be addressing the crux of my argument which concerns the relevance as applied to expecting any specific type of miraculous intervention.

    That is what is pertinent to the claim that "God exists" is relevant to justifying belief in specific Christian miracles.

    ReplyDelete
  58. @ Vaal

    Take any equation predicting the trajectory of an object.
    Now add "God exists."

    Now show how "God exists (who could intervene) should alter ANY POINT of the equation, to alter the probabilities derived from that equation.


    I am somewhat puzzled that you are drawing on examples of this form. Consider the Historic Valet I mentioned on October 19, 2015 at 3:05 PM. We can model the "trajectory" of my car with whatever equation you like; stipulate that we can describe it with Completed Physics.

    Now also suppose that I know my friend has keys to my garage and my car. How does this alter the probabilities derived from Completed Physics? It doesn't; but when we condition it on evidence that in the morning the car turned out to be outside, our judgment of the probability depends on our knowledge that there exists a being within whose power it was to put my car outside.

    Now suppose that my friend is actually a Cartesian Ego, whom I know by some metaphysical argument to exist and to be capable of interacting with the world. What does this change? I still will not tinker with my equations from Completed Physics in my ordinary day-to-day life, but (just as if my friend were part of the furniture of the world) I will be willing to entertain hypotheses in which he figures as a cause, in the face of evidence.

    ReplyDelete
  59. That someone falling off a cliff may pray on the way down is a red herring. The question is whether the mountain climber would be rationally justified in an extraordinary EXPECTATION of being saved.

    As already noted, to talk of expectations is to treat it as a high-probability event, which is not just incorrect but logically incoherent in this context. But in practical life and in rational inquiry we treat even low-probability events in a different way than no-probability events.

    ReplyDelete
  60. Unless one can show how classical theism raises the probability of some specific instance of intervention, it's impotent in regards to their empirical expectations.

    This (and the paragraph it concludes) is simply incorrect, and is again an example of your incoherent handling of probabilities.

    (1) You are supposed to be arguing about what happens even if classical theism is true. But if classical theism is true all regularities in the world, including those described in the equations, depend on God's existence. Therefore, on that supposition, which you claim to be conceding for the sake of argument, empirical expectations that are fully coherent and rational will are only possible on classical theism.

    (2) You are again incoherently pretending that recognizing the existence of a possibility that is by definition of extremely low probability requires treating it as if it were a sufficiently high probability event to be expected. This, again, doesn't even make elementary logical sense.

    (3) It is simply false in this context that classical theism needs to raise "the probability of some specific instance of intervention". The role of classical theism here is, by the very nature of the case, no different from recognizing any other presuppositions we may need in order to apply our equations correctly. It only needs to raise, even if only slightly, the probability of interventions in general. Any rational person will recognize that their applications of their equations will not necessarily yield the right answer if a cause outside the system being described interferes; this is an elementary principle of rational modeling. (This is also another way in which your relating of probabilities and expectations is incoherent; you are confusing the probability conditional on the equations being applicable and the probability of the unusual event in itself, and you are ignoring the fact that when 'expectations' in these cases usually only means the former, not how people take into account every higher-than-zero-even-if-still-extremely-low probability that they recognize as a possibility.)

    (4) As I think Greg pointed out to you before, your thinking in terms of expectations leads you to treat probabilities as only having effect predictively -- you repeatedly slip into this in your examples. But probabilities also have effect retrodictively in the tracing of causes of events that we have evidence have already happened. This is precisely the area of probabilistic reasoning in which interference of causes outside a modeled system and in which the real possibility of extremely low probability events has the most effect.

    So, again, your argument does not seem to be based on any coherent account of reasoning with probabilities.

    ReplyDelete
  61. @Vaal

    If Fred's only claim were that having a ticket made it "possible" to win
    the lottery, there wouldn't be much to argue about. But Fred is trying to use the existence of his ticket to justify a totally different, extraordinary claim: his belief that HE SPECIFICALLY will win the lottery.
    If that's Fred's claim, then his raising the probability from "zero" to "non-zero" is laughably insufficient. He hasn't shown how the existence of his ticket raises probabilities SIGNIFICANTLY ENOUGH to justify his belief he'll win, given the probabilities AGAINST his winning.


    I totally agree with your point here. I think it is what we are saying too but correct me if I am wrong that the assumption you are making in this analogy is that “existence of the ticket” is equal to the existence of God and that the winning of the lottery is a “miracle”.

    Keeping in view your own analogy I would like to change something to the analogy to show what a Christian theist mean. Now the change is that Fred is not placing his “faith” in the existence of the ticket but the existence of the creator of the PowerBall lottery (a person) who has sent Fred a letter saying that he is going to win the lottery. Now keeping this new information in view I think it would be very reasonable to think that it raises the probability that Fred win’s the lottery and his “faith” in the existence of the creator of PowerBall lottery and the letter is justified.

    ReplyDelete
  62. Greg, (Thanks for the very interesting comment btw.)

    Now also suppose that I know my friend has keys to my garage and my car. How does this alter the probabilities derived from Completed Physics? It doesn't;

    Yes, but make sure you are clear: that in order for your scenario to be analogous to what I'm arguing, the probabilities we are talking about aren't only those of how the physics of your car operate; they also concern the probabilities of your friend moving your car.

    As I've argued, even IF we grant that God exists: the expectations built up by our experience, as exemplified most rigorously in science, are in effect tests of God's nature. If God sustains the way things are, and all our experience and understanding of, for instance gravity, keeps telling the same story, then our experiments concerning gravity amount to concluding "It is not in God's nature to intervene in the attraction of mass." (i.e. suspend gravity miraculously).

    Thus we have the same empirical expectations either way, and adding God does not raise the odds of gravity being altered.

    So to be truly analogous, we have to say that though your friend may have a key, you have an overwhelming amount of evidence
    supporting the conclusion that your friend will not move your car when you aren't looking. Akin to how strong our expectations are that gravity will not be altered. Your friend moving the car is so improbable as to constitute a miracle. Hence the claim the car has been moved outside the garage not by yourself but by your friend (with no other possible explanation) should have to meet the most rigorous standards of scrutiny reserved for accepting that anything utterly anomalous to our experience has occurred.

    And therefore notice how the justification for belief your car was moved becomes dependant upon empirical methodology, NOT upon any odds that your friend moved it.

    Whatever justifications you had for believing your friend exists and had the key, however good those are, they do NOT help in justifying the *different* and by definition extraordinarily improbable claim that your car was moved. Remember, again, the question isn't "does God exist" it is "does granting that God exist help justify the belief that God did any particular miracle."

    And if it passes that scrutiny, congratulations, a miracle.

    So granting your friend exists and has a key and could move your car is an entirely different question than asking "Did your friend actually move the car?" Same thing with the fact "God exists" does not help justify a belief that any specific miracle occurred.

    I still will not tinker with my equations from Completed Physics in my ordinary day-to-day life, but (just as if my friend were part of the furniture of the world) I will be willing to entertain hypotheses in which he figures as a cause, in the face of evidence.

    Sure, and I can put myself be in the same position as you. I'd be willing to entertain the same hypothesis in which he figures as a cause.
    That's what hypothesizing is often about: accepting (for sake of speculation) propositions and suggesting what we should see if those propositions are true. And looking for evidence to support the hypothesis. And by analogy, the God of classical theism doesn't seem to affect this method of operating, so if someone (e.g. a New Atheist) is criticizing an empirical inquiry (e.g. of a resurrection) on consistent, empirical methodological grounds, then adducing that God doesn't help the situation at all!

    ReplyDelete
  63. Brandon,

    We have to talk about "expectation" given classical theism, if classical theism is to be adduced in support of specific Christian claims. The only REASON to adduce CT in supporting belief in Christian miracles is IF Christian miracles become more expected on classical theism than without classical theism.

    As already noted, to talk of expectations is to treat it as a high-probability event, which is not just incorrect but logically incoherent in this context. But in practical life and in rational inquiry we treat even low-probability events in a different way than no-probability events.

    Yes, but the issue is: If on "X" the occurrence "Y" remains an extraordinarily low probability, then "X" can not be used to show that Y is anything other than extraordinarily improbable!
    So adducing X into your expectations doesn't make it any more reasonable to believe that Y will, or has occurred.

    Again, please remember: the issue isn't whether God exists and makes extraordinary miracle events possible, it's whether God makes them more probable. If miracles, even given God, remain extraordinarily improbable, then you are left justifying your belief that something extraordinarily improbable happened on OTHER arguments.

    And the method of vetting the claim will be rigorous empiricism. Hence a conversation about "whether the miracle happened or not" will be an empirical methodological argument, NOT one about "whether God exists" since that doesn't help solve the question. Which is why…I'll say it again…the New Atheist remain fully justified critiquing the methodology underlying beliefs in SPECIFIC CHRISTIAN MIRACLE CLAIMS, without having to have shown first that God doesn't exist.

    ReplyDelete
  64. Re classical theism:

    It only needs to raise, even if only slightly, the probability of interventions in general.

    No, that's wrong for the reasons I've already given. I'm saying that the New Atheists can validly critique the methodology Christians use to accept specific miracle claims whether classical theism is true or not, since classical theism does not make those miracle claims significantly more probable. "Significantly" in terms of moving the beliefs in those miracles toward "justified." As in "New Atheist critiques of christian revelation fail because they don't address classical theism = If we add classical theism THEN the beliefs in Christian miracles become justified."

    But remember the lottery ticket example. Can Fred move the probabilities of his winning the lottery "slightly?" Sure. He can buy a ticket. Or two. Or a bit more…three. But having moved the odds only this much, has he justified his belief that he will win the lottery? Clearly not, right? He has to go much further than that to show his belief in the extraordinary unlikelihood of his winning the lottery is a rationally justified belief. Just holding a ticket doesn't do this.

    Similarly, moving the odds "slightly" in the direction of divine intervention - just showing it's possible - is of no use if that "slightly" doesn't raise the odds enough to to figure strongly in making the case a miracle DID occur. If the odds of a specific miracle happening remain incredibly low on the assumption "god exists" then justifying "that this extraordinarily improbable event occurred " will have to appeal to some other method of justification - e.g. strong empirical methodology establishing that the event occurred. And if your methodology doesn't hold up to critique, you aren't justified in believing Christianity, whether God exists or not. And appeal to classical theism can't help you.

    ReplyDelete
  65. Jason,

    Yes you got the basic analogy right. I appreciate that.

    Unfortunately your re-formulation of the analogy presumes a legitimate occurrence of revelation, and so it just begs the question.

    Cheers,

    ReplyDelete
  66. We have to talk about "expectation" given classical theism, if classical theism is to be adduced in support of specific Christian claims. The only REASON to adduce CT in supporting belief in Christian miracles is IF Christian miracles become more expected on classical theism than without classical theism.

    No, this is, again, simply false. Indeed, it is trivially easy to see that it is nonsense. To take just one example, even using your absurd reduction of probabilities to expectations (and in your examples purely psychological experiences of expectation, to boot!), one reason why one would adduce a claim or set of claims (A) in supporting belief in another set of claims (C) even though the latter (C) do not become "more expected" on the former (A) is if the (A) claims provide a framework of inference so that other evidential claims (B) in combination with the (A) claims make the (C) claims "more expected". This is an extraordinarily common epistemological situation; one finds it regularly in the sciences -- physical equations, for instance, almost always function in this way in actual scientific explanation, since they work by making it so that other claims (about initial conditions, for instance) raise the probability of this or that event.

    The point can be made without talking about expectations, of course, which is a good thing because (in any case) your attempt to reduce probabilities to expectations, particularly in the sense in which you use the term in your examples, is a highly dubious way of thinking through probabilities at best.

    Yes, but the issue is: If on "X" the occurrence "Y" remains an extraordinarily low probability, then "X" can not be used to show that Y is anything other than extraordinarily improbable!

    Again, this is false, and inconsistent with extremely common situations in probabilistic reasoning. Suppose, for instance, that I have a proof that it is really possible, although still very unlikely, that government agents are spying on my phone calls; and suppose I add to this that someone found a bug in my phone. The mere existence of the bug in my phone does not on its own raise the probability of government agents spying on me unless I already know that government agents are a possible, even if very low probability, cause of telephone bugging; but when the two are combined, the probability that government agents are actually spying on my phone calls is raised. If other evidence is added, the probability may be raised quite considerably. There are many more natural situations in which this kind of situation arises. Investigators into the causes of disasters regularly deal with causes that are provably unlikely on their own; but the very claims that establish that they are unlikely on their own combine with other evidential claims in such a way that, conditional on the combination, the likelihood of their actually having caused the event is quite high. Scott already pointed out to you that even a very low probability in the general case makes it in principle possible to establish the occurrences of the miracles in combination with the right evidence.

    ReplyDelete
  67. Again, please remember: the issue isn't whether God exists and makes extraordinary miracle events possible, it's whether God makes them more probable. If miracles, even given God, remain extraordinarily improbable, then you are left justifying your belief that something extraordinarily improbable happened on OTHER arguments.

    First, this discussion is not about miracles. This discussion is about your failure to provide a coherent (much less plausible) account of probabilistic reasoning that makes any sense of your repeated claims about reasoning about miracles. Second, this is not how probabilistic arguments work, since an argument establishing that X is possible even if improbable in itself and an argument establishing that certain other conditions have occurred may combine to yield in a single argument to yield the conclusion that X probably did occur despite its low probability. Third, you are incorrect about the 'issue' even in your own terms. As Scott previously pointed out to you, one of the issues is, in fact, your absurd claim (among several others) that divine intervention is not made more probable by the existence of God than it would be if God did not exist; and, as he also pointed out to you, once it is established that classical theism raises the probability of miracles, even if it leaves them very improbable, that raises the question of whether there is evidence that can combine with this fact to make it reasonable to believe that some miracle or other has occurred. Remember, much of this discussion started out with your claims that classical theism was a 'red herring' in this context; that believers in addressing certain critiques were engaging in what looked like a disingenuous trick; etc. All of this, again, seems to be backed by an utterly incoherent view of probable reasoning -- at least, people have been pointing out the problems with your claims about reasoning, and you have simply gone on reiterating them.

    ReplyDelete
  68. @ Vaal

    in order for your scenario to be analogous to what I'm arguing, the probabilities we are talking about aren't only those of how the physics of your car operate; they also concern the probabilities of your friend moving your car.

    As I've argued, even IF we grant that God exists: the expectations built up by our experience, as exemplified most rigorously in science, are in effect tests of God's nature. If God sustains the way things are, and all our experience and understanding of, for instance gravity, keeps telling the same story, then our experiments concerning gravity amount to concluding "It is not in God's nature to intervene in the attraction of mass." (i.e. suspend gravity miraculously).

    Thus we have the same empirical expectations either way, and adding God does not raise the odds of gravity being altered.

    So to be truly analogous, we have to say that though your friend may have a key, you have an overwhelming amount of evidence supporting the conclusion that your friend will not move your car when you aren't looking. Akin to how strong our expectations are that gravity will not be altered. Your friend moving the car is so improbable as to constitute a miracle. Hence the claim the car has been moved outside the garage not by yourself but by your friend (with no other possible explanation) should have to meet the most rigorous standards of scrutiny reserved for accepting that anything utterly anomalous to our experience has occurred.


    I'm aware you've given this argument; my car story is intended as a counterexample.

    In the example, I do not know much of anything about "the probabilities of [my] friend moving [my] car" prior to his doing so. I know that they are positive. In an appropriately elaborated story, I can also ascribe arbitrarily high probability to the proposition that the car won't move outside unless either me or my friend is involved (this is analogous to our knowing that people don't resurrect by natural means: I might know that my friend is still alive, keeps the key in a secure place, etc.). Likewise, I can ascribe arbitrarily high probability to the proposition that I didn't move my car outside (I do not remember doing so and have a good memory, my keys are where I remember setting them down the day before, my family all testify to my not doing so, etc.).

    I don't know what you mean by "an overwhelming amount of evidence supporting the conclusion that your friend will not move your car when you aren't looking". We can say that I gave my friend the key years ago and, every night since, he has not moved my car outside. But given that I now find the car outside, it is reasonable to ascribe high probability to my friend's having moved it. If my car did move overnight and other explanations are excluded with high probability, then - as Brandon has illustrated by another example - the probability of the remaining explanation (conditional on the evidence) can be made high - even if the bare expectation is low. This is just how probability works.

    ...

    ReplyDelete
  69. ...

    In responding to this, you seem to be (as you like to say) "moving the goalposts":

    Whatever justifications you had for believing your friend exists and had the key, however good those are, they do NOT help in justifying the *different* and by definition extraordinarily improbable claim that your car was moved. Remember, again, the question isn't "does God exist" it is "does granting that God exist help justify the belief that God did any particular miracle."

    In both cases, our interest is P(R|E). In the car case, R := "my friend moved my car", E := "my car had been moved in the morning, my friend has a key, I did not move it, etc.". In the miracle case, R := "God resurrected Jesus", E := "Jesus was seen to have died, Jesus was later seen to be alive by such and such witnesses, etc.".

    It isn't a question of my friends existence, but how my knowledge of his existence influences the way I judge the probability that my friend moved my car conditioned upon the fact that my car did move, and whatever other evidence I had. Even if the expectation of my friend moving my car is low, which in this context just means he has never done it in the past, the probability that he moved my car might be high. I will judge this probability to be nontrivially higher when I know that my friend exists and has a key; likewise, I will judge the probability of the resurrection to be nontrivially higher when I know that God exists and resurrection is within his power.

    ReplyDelete
  70. Vaal: "adding God does not raise the odds of gravity being altered"

    Forgive me for butting in here. I'm not a trained metaphysician, and am not capable of following some of the deeper reasonings going on, but to my simple mind that statement is obviously false. If God does not exist, then nothing exists that can alter gravity and the claim that gravity was altered must be false because it is an impossibility. If God exists, then something exists that can alter gravity and the claim that gravity was altered may not be false because it is a possibility.

    ReplyDelete
  71. @Vaal

    But remember the lottery ticket example. Can Fred move the probabilities of his winning the lottery "slightly?" Sure. He can buy a ticket. Or two. Or a bit more…three. But having moved the odds only this much, has he justified his belief that he will win the lottery? Clearly not, right? He has to go much further than that to show his belief in the extraordinary unlikelihood of his winning the lottery is a rationally justified belief. Just holding a ticket doesn't do this.


    I agree with you but I think the analogy that you are using where you equate the existence of a ticket with the existence of God does not follow in my humble opinion. Instead as I mentioned earlier the analogy with the existence of the creator of the PowerBall lottery is better equated with the existence of God.


    Unfortunately your re-formulation of the analogy presumes a legitimate occurrence of revelation, and so it just begs the question.


    That is exactly my point. If we re-formulate your analogy then asking whether the existence of the PowerBall creator does not raise the probability of Fred winning the lottery is fairly obvious. A better question would be to ask whether the letter to Fred (revelation) is legitimate or not. That is exactly the case with the existence of God. If you say that God exists then it is fairly obvious that the probability of a miracle increases as Scott, Brandon and Greg have shown. An interesting thought experiment to the analogy is that even if Fred gets the letter that says that he will win the lottery he still has to go buy the ticket and do his part in the process.

    As a side note I am not a metaphysician by any stretch and am still in the process of learning it. I appreciate very much not only this blog and Dr. Ed but also people like Scott, Brandon and Greg that have helped me so much by writing their comments on this blog. Keep up the great work and thank you.

    ReplyDelete
  72. Greg,

    To see why your car analogy isn't apt, and doesn't undermine what I've argued, you need to remember my argument grants the existence of a God who can do miracles, but is concerned with "given this, HOW will we know when God has done a miracle?" That is: What methodology will we use to vet any claim that something miraculous has happened?

    Now go back to your car analogy. Insofar as it would be relevant to my argument, your "finding the car outside the garage" would be analogous to "a miracle happened" (an extraordinary event impossible in the natural order). And your "friend" plays the role of God who can cause this event to happen.

    Now note in your analogy, you include this proposition:

    "But given that I now find the car outside, it is reasonable to ascribe high probability to my friend's having moved it."

    In other words, your analogy ASSUMES the "miracle" has been established! It's analogous to saying "Given we find that Christ had risen from the dead…." (and all other possibilities have been excluded). And then, gee, we can say God did a miracle!

    See how you have just begged the question, skipped right past my argument to assume what I'm asking you to argue for? It's the "how do we establish it happened in the first place?" that you are being asked to answer. The question isn't "How did assuming your friend can move your car justify your final conclusion he moved your car." The question is "Assuming your friend can move your car, by what method will you establish that your car has indeed been moved?"

    Does the existence of your friend establish THAT your car was moved?
    No, it doesn't at all. The argument showing your car was moved will necessarily be a different argument about empirical methodology for vetting improbable claims!

    And this is why, with apologies, I think your car analogy is poorly formed to grasp the point, because finding a car outside a garage is such a mundane proposition it makes it hard to keep in mind the type of extraordinary improbability associated with a miracle. The lottery ticket analogy is better because we are familiar with the fact that even granting "the existence of a ticket" that "winning the lottery" is incredibly unlikely, and hence owning a ticket, while *necessary* to win a lottery, still leaves winning the lottery extremely improbable. And thus even a ticket-holding person believing "I will win the lottery" is unjustified. They are two separate propositions, the second still requires a lot of justification not supplied by assuming the first. That keeps the problem much more in sight, than your car analogy.

    ReplyDelete
  73. Greg,

    So, again, granting the existence of a God who can perform miracles:

    Does this give us justification to believe that tomorrow:

    - My cat will start meowing a new divine revelation from God?
    - One childhood cancer ward full of kids will be cured?
    - A dinosaur will materialize at a Walmart with a new commandment written on it's side?
    - The crazy sounding guy on the street corner will be channeling God?
    - My Evian water will turn into wine?

    No. The list of "possible" miracles compatible with "God exists" is almost endless. It doesn't help focus justification that any specific miracle will occur.

    The same problem goes for miracle claims for the past. Put all those extraordinary claims in the past now. Does accepting the proposition "God exists" justify believing a claim that any of those miracles occurred YESTERDAY? Or any of the innumerable such claims that could be made? No. It doesn't give you any help in terms of sifting through those probabilities.

    And THIS is the gap between classical theism and the justification for accepting specific Christian miracle claims I'm pointing at. "God exists" still leaves a vast gap in terms of justifying specifically Christian beliefs. Prof Feser has written on this before, and he made an effort to sketch an outline of how one might employ classical theism in support of Christianity. He tried to derive from classical theism more specific expectations (just as I keep saying you need to do) for instance, that classical theistic arguments imply we ought to expect revelation, and that it would be most fitting in the context of a "resurrection."

    In previous posts, Prof Feser clearly understands and has tried to address (at least partly) the problem I'm arguing, and it's strange to see this obvious problem so resisted here. Prof Feser suggested that the arguments for classical theism can narrow probabilities and explanations so the type of miracles we would expect are more consistent with Christian claims than with other religions. EXACTLY what I'm saying you need to do!

    (Unfortunately Prof Feser punted to the evidentialist arguments of guys like W.L. Craig for the resurrection, and so he left that gulf he was building uncrossed, IMO. Atheist critiques of the empirical reasoning used by Craig and other apologists for the Resurrection are valid critiques).

    So as to your second post:

    It isn't a question of my friends existence, but how my knowledge of his existence influences the way I judge the probability that my friend moved my car conditioned upon the fact that my car did move, and whatever other evidence I had.

    As before, since you have formed your own analogy that would beg the question (by including the fact of the car moving), your analogy is irrelevant to my argument. Whatever point you wish to make, it is not arguing against the one I'm making :-)

    Cheers,

    ReplyDelete
  74. Brandon,

    As Scott previously pointed out to you, one of the issues is, in fact, your absurd claim (among several others) that divine intervention is not made more probable by the existence of God than it would be if God did not exist;

    I can't see the use in spending my time telling you, or Scott, yet again I've made no such argument. What I've said from the first is that I'm not taking the position "God does not exist," rather I can assume (for sake of argument or hypothesis) "God exists" and then see what follows. And in particular, "Granting God exists"…how will we determine that any miracle happened?

    Everything in your reply utterly misses this argument. Your example of government bugging your phone misses it too. Like Greg's analogies, yours seems aimed at showing how it is justified to conclude "God was the CAUSE of an extraordinary occurrence (e.g. a miracle)," but my arguments concern "how will you know that an extraordinary occurred in the first place?"

    If your Government analogy is to have any relevance to this, your finding the bug on your phone has to be analogous to a "miracle happened (an extraordinary occurrence not possible in the natural order)." In other words: including that you know your phone was bugged is the same as saying we know Jesus rose from the grave, which begs the question against the actual argument I've been making.

    So: IF you could establish the Jesus rose from the grave, and could exclude all other natural-order explanations, then, ok, classical theism allows you to say God Did It. (Though I'd dispute that in a different argument, I'm granting it for this argument). Note that this already allows the type of evidential connection you seemed to be arguing for in your bugging scenario. Yes, I can agree.

    But my argument isn't concerned with how "God exists" confirms "God did a miracle" AFTER you've established a miracle occurred! My argument is concerned with the question: what methodology will you use to establish a miracle occurred in the first place? E.g. what methodology will you use to establish Jesus rose from the grave, which will eliminate alternate possibilities within the natural order? The assumption "God exists" doesn't tell you the answer to that! Leaving you with some other method to vet all possible miracle claims.

    ReplyDelete
  75. Brandon,

    Scott already pointed out to you that even a very low probability in the general case makes it in principle possible to establish the occurrences of the miracles in combination with the right evidence.

    And "the right evidence" is the WHOLE POINT. If on the assumption "God exists" then any particular miracle is of extraordinarily low probability, then
    that proposition is not going to be what helps you know any miracle occurred.

    The "right evidence" therefore won't derive from "god exists," it will derive from your empirical methodology to determine IF A MIRACLE OCCURRED.

    The only way "God exists" could HELP in vetting miracle claims is if, from that proposition, you could derive reasons to narrow down what type of miracle claims were significantly more probable (or that we might expect, given classical theism). Again, Prof Feser has essentially acknowledge this by outlining how this might be achieved in previous posts (and I didn't think it looked promising).

    This leaves the New Atheist critiques of the method by which Christians claim to know Christianity is true, to be perfectly untouched by the assumption of classical theism (unless the classical theist can produce the argument showing otherwise…and I haven't seen a remotely successful one made yet)

    But, this being the internet, it's no use trying to continue until we agree :-)
    That was my last attempt to focus on my argument, and at this point I'll have to throw in the towel.

    Thanks folks,

    Vaal

    ReplyDelete
  76. And "the right evidence" is the WHOLE POINT. If on the assumption "God exists" then any particular miracle is of extraordinarily low probability, then
    that proposition is not going to be what helps you know any miracle occurred.

    The "right evidence" therefore won't derive from "god exists," it will derive from your empirical methodology to determine IF A MIRACLE OCCURRED.


    Again, this is simply false, for reasons I have explicitly stated before that you have not bothered to address in your eagerness to repeat yourself like a broken record.

    (1) The example was given was simply one of the many ways in which your explicit claims about probabilities are provably false. There was no claim that this is the only way things can go; the point was explicitly that your arguments repeatedly make false claims about probability, and that you have done nothing to establish your claims because they are repeatedly based only on arguments making claims that have easily identified counterexamples.

    (2) And they continue to do so, because your above statement is not even accurate as a statement of what is happening in the example scenario; as explicitly noted, the "empirical methodology" does not necessarily establish anything on its own -- it is the combination of the two. This kind of situation is one of the most common kinds of situation in any epistemology involving probabilities, because (as I explicitly pointed out already) it is precisely this kind of scenario that is needed to handle the way physics handles probabilities. Only an idiot would claim that the laws of motion contribute nothing to the assessment of the probability that a given particle will be in a given region because all the initial conditions must be established empirically -- this is quite clearly not how they work, since the initial conditions on their own don't establish the probability, nor do the laws of motion on their own establish the probability. It is the combination of the two that establishes such probabilities. So why are you here going around giving the exact analogue of the idiot's answer in this situation, as if this, one of the most common kinds of situations in probable reasoning, were impossible? You have never bothered to establish your claims about probable reasoning here despite the fact I have more than once pointed out that precisely these claims have extensive counterexamples?

    I have repeatedly asked you to give the account of probable reasoning under which these apparently nonsensical claims about probabilities would make any sense, and you have repeatedly failed to give any. I have given counterexamples that note that almost all the claims you have made about probabilities are wrong in some situations -- and not, it should be said, really weird or esoteric situations, but situations which are extremely common and very familiar to anyone who works a lot with probable reasoning -- and you have repeatedly ignored them as if they were not given, preferring to repeat dogmatically claims about probable reasoning that people have already shown are problematic. I put it to you again: On what coherent account of probable reasoning do any of the claims you've made make any sense at all? Don't just repeat yourself again: tell us why these claims are true rather than pretending that they are not, in fact, the entire issue under discussion.

    ReplyDelete
  77. And I want to be quite clear about this, so I will set it apart by itself: almost every claim you have made about probable reasoning is not only incorrect but obviously incorrect on every significant account of real-world probable reasoning of which I am aware. I honestly have no clue what theory of probable reasoning you are assuming to be true in making any of your claims; it is not one that I seem to have ever come across, and it is not clear to me how it would handle any of the situations I have explicitly raised as problematic for your claims.

    ReplyDelete
  78. @ Vaal

    The finding of my car outside is supposed to be analogous to testimonial evidence for the resurrection. Admittedly that analogy is not airtight, since testimonial evidence is defeasible in a way my immediate perceptual experience is not. Nevertheless the defect you claim to find in my argument does not vindicate yours.*

    The problem is easily removed by modifying the example: I am not the one who finds my car outside. Someone else does and reports it to be; I know him to be of good character and disinclined to joke. We can also say that he has strong incentives to deny that my car was found outside, or to say nothing to me, but he nevertheless testifies that my car was found outside. (You can tell a story about damage that was done to my car or something of the sort, if you like.)

    This example cannot be claimed to assume that the miracle has occurred. The general point is that when there is testimonial evidence that something that does not occur naturally has occurred, even universal inductive evidence from past experience does not determine the probability conditioned on the fact of the testimony.

    * I deny that my argument begs the question; I think the difference is that I am using an ontological notion of a miracle, according to which a miracle is an event for which there is no natural explanation. Thus "God resurrected Jesus" is a miracle, and its analog is "My friend moved my car". Finding my car outside can't be the miracle since it might happen by non-miraculous means. Maybe I did move it and I, along with my family, have forgotten. Or maybe there was some quantum fluctuation and it moved through the wall on its own, which speculation was the source of this example. These unlikely non-miraculuous explanations are supposed to be analogous to "The Romans faked Jesus's execution" etc. So I think that P(R|E), as I've defined it, is really what we are interested in; since E contains the claims like "I found my car outside" and "The Apostles testified to having seen Jesus", there's no begging of the question to be seen here; those are evidence for the miracle, which is the causing of the interesting events by an intelligent agent.

    Your argument is, frankly, all over the place. An example is here:

    See how you have just begged the question, skipped right past my argument to assume what I'm asking you to argue for? It's the "how do we establish it happened in the first place?" that you are being asked to answer. The question isn't "How did assuming your friend can move your car justify your final conclusion he moved your car." The question is "Assuming your friend can move your car, by what method will you establish that your car has indeed been moved?"

    You'd just accused me of begging the question "that I now find the car outside"; but here you accuse me of begging the question that "[my friend] moved [my] car". These are distinct events, which were kept distinct in my presentation of the example. But you elide the distinction and shout checkmate.

    ...

    ReplyDelete
  79. ...

    These kinds of claims remain puzzling:

    The lottery ticket analogy is better because we are familiar with the fact that even granting "the existence of a ticket" that "winning the lottery" is incredibly unlikely, and hence owning a ticket, while *necessary* to win a lottery, still leaves winning the lottery extremely improbable. And thus even a ticket-holding person believing "I will win the lottery" is unjustified. They are two separate propositions, the second still requires a lot of justification not supplied by assuming the first. That keeps the problem much more in sight, than your car analogy.

    There's no attempt here to construct an event remotely analogous to the resurrection. There is no analog of evidence, for example. The outrageousness of your general use of examples like this is that, to be credible, it has to imply the probability doesn't change when you condition the hypothesis on the evidence. Suppose the lottery has been drawn but you haven't seen the number. A reliable friend of yours, as well as several of your family members, knows your number, and they all insist that you've won; you also have reason to believe they would not be pulling your leg. Now, P(R|E) is considerably higher than P(R); but if your argument can't accommodate this basic fact about probability, it's worthless.

    The bizarreness continues:

    Put all those extraordinary claims in the past now. Does accepting the proposition "God exists" justify believing a claim that any of those miracles occurred YESTERDAY?

    Well, the obvious answer is it depends. As you say, we need an "empirical methodology" here; picking out descriptions of events with low expectations and ignoring the evidence on which they could be conditioned does not an apt empirical methodology make. Your cat and the crazy sounding guy on the street corner might be receiving revelations, but it's hard to imagine what evidence you would condition those on. I can't tell what meowing sounds like a divine revelation and what doesn't.

    For other examples, I think the answers to your question is possibly yes. If a childhood cancer ward is suddenly cured, and we know a lot about cancer and biology, and many doctors there testify that they regard it as a biological impossibility that they could not have played a substantial role in, then yes - the probability of a miracle is higher.

    Again, the bizarre implication of your argument is on display. Of course the probability of an arbitrary cancer ward of winding up cured tomorrow is low. Likewise, our expectation that God will cure an arbitrary cancer ward tomorrow is low. But suppose there is testimony that some cancer ward is now cancer-free. You've admitted that the probability in both cases is positive, but obviously the probabilities are not equal.

    ...

    ReplyDelete
  80. ...

    He tried to derive from classical theism more specific expectations (just as I keep saying you need to do) for instance, that classical theistic arguments imply we ought to expect revelation, and that it would be most fitting in the context of a "resurrection."

    Well, if he's relying on something like your argument to claim that classical theism has to argue for more specific expectations, then I think he's wrong, because your argument seems to me confused. But of course he is not relying on something like your argument, so that's beside the point.

    My approach here is also somewhat consonant with his. Part of the fittingness of the resurrection is that it's something we have good reason to believe has no naturalistic explanation, whereas remission of cancer, for instance, is different. Classical theists also hold that there's something to say about human anthropology and the relation of humanity to God, even on purely philosophical grounds; thus one might be more inclined to expect a miracle in a context that has a substantial impact on human conduct, and less inclined to expect a freak violation of Coulomb's law in a distant, lifeless solar system.

    I don't think the latter sort of argument is necessary. For that matter, I don't even think classical theism is necessary, though it helps. (And I imagine Professor Feser would agree with me: he doesn't think that the only rational Christians are those who have comprehended and accepted the arguments for classical theism.) I think the contemporary literature demolishing neo-Humean arguments against miracles is quite robust.

    ReplyDelete
  81. John, this isn't an echo chamber. If it was, then everybody would be agreeing about stuff. Instead, there are a large spectrum of perspectives here. You are correct to say that echo chambers (and bubble filters) have extremely negative characteristics; they make virtual monocultures, and monocultures tend toward extremism / totalitarianism because there is no dissenting view. Take, for instance, Nazi Germany, with its 97.5% Christian populace [according to the official census in 1939] or the largely Shinto population of Imperial Japan in the same era. The soldiers of the first group murdered 27 million people, largely civilians, and the second group's numbers are estimated at around 20 million, according to Wikipedia. Nazi apologists (read: Christians) tend to respond with whataboutisms regarding Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and Stalin's "Holodomor" - it is true that many died on their watch, I won't deny that. 8 nations out of all 200 consider those to be genocides, though- because no evidence could be found that they were intentional. Instead, they were a result of an attempt to modernize and build rifles/tanks to prepare for Hitler's invasion. Not enough farms were kept while converting to factories, and a perfect storm was created after the stock market crash / drought. It wasn't easy in the USA, either- google Dust Bowl. In any case, Communism as it existed in those days was also a monoculture- essentially a religion.

    ReplyDelete
  82. Here is what Public Enemy #1 of Nazi Germany had to say about this. (src: time dot com slash Einstein-England)

    Relevant Einstein quotes.
    "I'm not a Communist but I can well understand why they destroyed the Church in Russia. All the wrongs come home, as the proverb says. The Church will pay for its dealings with Hitler, and Germany, too."

    "You know what the Herdenmenschen (men of herd
    mentality) can do when they are organized and have a leader, especially if he is a spokesmen for the Church. I do not say that the unspeakable crimes of the Church for 2000 years had always
    the blessings of the Vatican, but it vaccinated its believers with the idea: 'We have the true God, and the Jews have crucified Him.' " (Einstein: anti-vaxxer? ;) )

    Hitler's religion is almost besides the point, because 97.5% of Nazi Germany was Christian after he unified the Protestants into the German Evangelical Church. (They were 54%, Catholics 40%, 3.5% were non-denominational Christians.) This is according to the official census in 1939. To think that an atheist duped everyone is silly; even at 70% the USA could never have a non-Christian POTUS. The reason our country hates socialism so much is that it has become "the Jew" or scapegoat for Nazi blame. Hey- its in the acronym itself, right? Well, try to explain pastor Martin Niemoller's "first they came for the socialists", written during his 7 years in the camps after rebuking Hitler. Or Einstein's "Why socialism?" essay. He was Public Enemy #1 of Nazi Germany, so you would think he would be a good judge of socialism, and of the church. See above quotes.

    I will mention it is specifically because most Western historians are Christian that he is regarded as an atheist. Die hard neo-Nazis have troves of videos and writings of his that "prove" he was Christian. Nothing he has ever said in a public speech or in Mein Kampf could be construed as anti-Christian, while there are nearly 100 references to God in Mein Kampf. Further: the Holocaust is almost exactly word-for-word following Martin Luther's instructions within his book "The Jews and their Lies".

    From WIkipedia:
    In the treatise, he argues that Jewish synagogues and schools be set on fire, their prayer books destroyed, rabbis forbidden to preach, homes burned, and property and money confiscated. Luther claimed they should be shown no mercy or kindness,[2] afforded no legal protection,[3] and "these poisonous envenomed worms" should be drafted into forced labor or expelled for all time.[4] He also seems to advocate their murder, writing "[W]e are at fault in not slaying them".[5]
    The book may have had an impact on creating later antisemitic German thought.[6] With the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, the book became widely popular among its supporters.
    During World War II, copies of the book were commonly seen at Nazi rallies, and the prevailing scholarly consensus is that it may have had a significant impact on justifying the Holocaust.[7] Since then, the book has been denounced by many Lutheran churches.[8]"

    Anyways- Real Christians don't even exist anymore. If you love your enemies, turn the other cheek, resist not evil, judge not- then you are a Real Christian. I think only John qualified. He and Jesus had a special thing going- he is the only one of the apostles who loved Jesus, really. The rest didn't even show up to see Jesus off! Some friends THEY were.

    ReplyDelete