In a recent post I commented on a remark made in one of the comboxes by a reader sympathetic to “Intelligent Design” (ID) theory. At the ID website Uncommon Descent, Vincent Torley has responded, in a post with the title “Hyper-skepticism and ‘My way or the highway’: Feser’s extraordinary post.” The title, and past experience with Torley, led me to expect that his latest piece would be short on dispassionate and accurate analysis and long on overheated rhetoric and misrepresentation. Past experience with Torley also led me to expect that it would simply be long, period, indeed of gargantuan length.
Both expectations were confirmed. Having cut and pasted Torley’s post into MS Word, I find that it comes to 42 pages, single-spaced. I envy Torley that he has time to write up a 42-page single-spaced commentary on a blog post written in reply to a reader’s combox remark. Why he thinks I (or other people with jobs, families, hobbies, etc.) would have time to read such a thing, I have no idea. As to the content, well, since Torley thinks you can infer quite a lot even from brief phrases, he’ll be happy to know that I agree with him to this extent: Having read the first section and quickly scanned a couple of other passages of his opus -- and seen how badly he there distorts what I wrote -- I infer that it would be a waste of time (time I don’t have in any case) to read the rest.
Consider
that first section. Why does Torley
label me a “hyper-skeptic”? Surely that
is a rather odd accusation to fling at someone who (as Torley later acknowledges)
thinks the existence of God can be demonstrated
via philosophical arguments. The reason,
it turns out, is this. Recall that the
reader to whom I was responding suggested that if we found the phrase “Made by
Yahweh” in every human cell, there would be “only one thing we can reasonably conclude.” Torley assures his own readers that:
[Feser] thinks a secularist would
have every right to disregard the discovery, and treat it as a
pop-culture-influenced hallucination…
and
Feser… argues that if scientists had
found a message in the cells of every human being’s DNA, referring not to
God, but to Quetzalcoatl or Steve Jobs, it
would be perfectly rational for us to dismiss the discovery as a collective,
pop culture-induced hallucination…
and
Feser
evidently thinks that this would be a rational way for an atheist to respond to
the discovery of a message referring to God in everyone’s DNA: to not only deny
that God was responsible, but to deny that an intelligent being was responsible. Reading that
left me speechless.
End quote. Note that by “left me speechless”
Torley apparently means “led me to churn out 42 single-spaced pages in reply.”
It doesn’t take a very close reading of what I wrote to see that Torley
has badly misrepresented it. I neither
said nor implied that it would be “perfectly rational” to interpret phrases
like the ones in question as hallucinations or as something other than a
product of intelligence, nor did I say or imply that “a secularist would have every right
to disregard” such weird events. What I said is that determining what to make
of such weird events would crucially depend on epistemic background context,
and that if we concluded that God was responsible (as of course we well might),
then that epistemic background context would be doing more work in justifying
that judgment than the weird events themselves would be. Whether you agree with this or not, there is
nothing remotely “skeptical” about it, nor is there anything at all in it that
implies either that we could never be justified in believing that God was the
source of such a message or that a secularist would, all things being equal, be
rationally justified in denying that God was the source.
I find that
this modus operandi is evident in
many of the responses ID sympathizers make to my criticisms: First, egregiously misrepresent what I have
said, at such prodigious length that the resulting cloud of squid ink
completely obscures the unwary reader’s view of what I actually wrote or what
the dispute is really about; second, evince befuddlement and outrage that I could
say the silly and horrible things wrongly attributed to me; third, sanctimoniously
express regret that ID sympathizers and Thomists aren’t on more “friendly”
terms (as Torley puts it).
Could such a
pattern -- albeit it is a pattern of cluelessness -- itself be a mark of intelligent
design? Indeed it could be, in the sense
that you have to be a rational animal in the first place in order to exhibit
the kind of irrationality that some
ID folks do.
There’s
more, but, as I say, I’ve read very little of Torley’s post and don’t have the
time or inclination to read any further.
I do see on a quick scroll-through that Torley makes other odd and false
statements, like: “The argument which
Feser most frequently touts as a knockdown demonstration of God’s existence is
a re-vamped version of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Fifth Way.” I don’t know why he says this. Of course, I do indeed defend the Fifth Way,
but it is most certainly not the
argument I “most frequently tout as a knockdown demonstration of God’s
existence.” I would have thought it obvious from my books, articles, and many,
many blog posts that it is the cosmological
argument in several of its versions that I regard as the chief demonstration of
God’s existence.
A final
comment: In the combox of my recent post, I said in response to a reader’s
remarks that “as far as I know, none of
my critics on the ID side has even addressed” my argument that a mechanistic
philosophy of nature tends toward occasionalism (an argument that I develop in
my Nova et Vetera article “Between
Aristotle and William Paley: Aquinas’s Fifth Way”). Torley replies:
Hello, Professor? Hello? One year
ago, I emailed you to inform you about my Uncommon Descent post, Building
a bridge between Scholastic philosophy and Intelligent Design (January 5,
2013), in which I addressed the very point you raised. I realize that you’re a
very busy man, but one year is a rather long time. In any case, I address the
charge that Intelligent Design is tied to occasionalism, later in this post.
Well, as I
said, “as far as I know” no ID defender
had addressed the claim in question, and I’ve never read the blog post Torley
is referring to. I thank him for the
correction.
That post of Torley’s, by the way, comes
to 39 pages single-spaced. His other posts on these subjects (many of
which I also haven’t read) are equally gargantuan. Mr. Torley should know that in addition to
all the other reading and writing I have to do (most of which, last year, was
devoted to work on Scholastic
Metaphysics), I have stacks of books and papers, many of them written
or edited by friends, that have been sitting here next to my desk for longer than a year waiting for me to
read, and in some cases review, them. Preternaturally
long-winded blog posts written by people with a track record of misrepresenting
what I write are, I have to confess, not even at the bottom of any of these
stacks.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeletePerhaps he has read through some of the comments here and felt he needed to be clear.
Well, yes, I do think he thought he needed to be clear. But given how fatuous his point was (if it's taken to be a "response" in the aforementioned sense), that comes across as condescending and ignorant, because he seems to think such a "deliberately naive response" has to be doled out to those credulous theists... which implies that he either has not read or did not understand Feser's work, in which Feser devotes quite a bit of space to defending his premises.
But that is the point I have been making too. The argument is manipulation of the premises. The choosing of the premises is all.
I don't know what you mean here. Deductive arguments do, of course, "manipulate" the premises and draw conclusions using valid rules of inference. And yes, to be sure, if a conclusion is deducible from the premises, then the conditional "if premises, then conclusion" is a tautology. This is miles away from the idea that choosing premises is a matter of indifference...
A lot of people refer to their opponents' premises as "assumptions," I assume because it is thought to be more disparaging. (I notice that people often do this on the right as well.) In some contexts this might be appropriate. But Feser argues for every premise of his cosmological argument... ie. that change occurs, that changes require external causes, that an infinite essentially ordered causal series is impossible.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteBut a currently untestable claim might nonetheless be true and could be confirmed so at some later time.
OK, but my (b) is: "the category of what may be considered to be true excludes the category of what is untestable." Everything is in present tense, so (b) holds. Your first and third categories are exclusive. It might be the case that some proposition moves from one to another, but they remain exclusive, because what is in the third category cannot be in the first.
A brief apologia,
ReplyDeleteDuring the pre-Heller years when the RKBA debate was in full force, and the distributive nature of the right to keep and bear was being challenged by political progressives of various subspecies, the argument eventually, as you might expect, ground down to very basic principles.
For those who shrugged at the principle of constitutionalism itself, it became necessary to illustrate the point that some absolute limitation on the political power to direct and coerce the individual, was fundamentally ordinate.
Natural rights arguments ensued.
Just as we see here, most of those confronted with the concept of natural law - and within the special case, the subordinate concept of natural rights - could not wrap their minds around the actual idea embodied in the notion of natural law.
For them, "natural law" was not the law of the development of human natures as it impinged on and shaped social law-making, but rather had something to do with beasts being beasts outdoors.
A typical (and deflective) response was: "It is only your own hubris that leads you to think that humans are different from any other creeping and crawling thing"
Since reasoning about the faculty of reason produced as few results as attempting to authoritatively quote, say, legal positivist Herbert Hart on the unavoidability of the notion of teleology in any meaningful and rational account of law, I decided as an experiment to grant them, these radical values skeptics, their premiss in particular, and see how well that flew.
So then, if all men lack predicate X and you are a man and you therefore necessarily lack predicate X, then what alternative predicate, if any, rationally mandates and entitles you to any level of otherwise unconditional intra-specific respect; etc, etc, ...
Never an answer. Plenty of indignation, fulmination, and deflection, but never an on point answer.
Strange, how those who both claim to be more rationally motivated than others and who most furiously assert that all existence is ultimately pointless, so heartily resent anyone who is willing to grant them their proposition as at least extending to themselves.
What, on their own account, could they possibly have to object to?
I have never found out, as they always refused, as does Alan Fox here, to say.
Glenn writes;
ReplyDeleteAlan Fox,
"Oops", indeed.
You link to a comment which appears under your post, which post contains a link to a post by Mr. Torley, which post by Mr. Torley opens as follows:
"In his reply to my latest post [sic], Edward Feser took me to task for focusing exclusively on the teleological argument instead of his favorite argument: the cosmological argument (which includes St. Thomas Aquinas' first, second and third ways)."
Some questions seem to be in order:
As you have provided your own answers, I am not sure whether you need me to respond. Just one point, Vincent holds a Ph D in philosophy, so that should be Dr Torley.
OK, but my (b) is: "the category of what may be considered to be true excludes the category of what is untestable." Everything is in present tense, so (b) holds. Your first and third categories are exclusive. It might be the case that some proposition moves from one to another, but they remain exclusive, because what is in the third category cannot be in the first
ReplyDeleteBut I agree that Evidentially supported claims and evidentially contradicted claims are exclusive. I say that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say.
DNW claims I am refusing to answer a question.
ReplyDeleteIf this is the question:
So then, if all men lack predicate X and you are a man and you therefore necessarily lack predicate X, then what alternative predicate, if any, rationally mandates and entitles you to any level of otherwise unconditional intra-specific respect; etc, etc, ...
Could you ask it in plain English and I'll do my best to answer. I'm not well-known for being reticent about expressing an opinion.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteBut I agree that Evidentially supported claims and evidentially contradicted claims are exclusive. I say that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say.
Of course. I would not and did not impute to you the contradictory view.
Your categories are not framed in terms of truth and falsity but of epistemic terms, ie. what is "provisionally true" (what we ought to believe, whether it is true or not, on the basis of present evidence) and what is "demonstrably false."
I was suggesting there are three categories of claim. Those that coincide with evidence and can be considered provisionally correct but always open to challenge from fresh evidence. Those that are contradicted by evidence. Those that are untestable.
If the first two categories were simply of true claims and false claims, then of course the category of untestable claims would overlap with them. But that's not how you defined your categories. (And of course, the categories would be nonfluid if they were ontological rather than epistemic. There have been many provisionally true claims that we know to be false. There have never been any true claims that we know to be false.)
My framing of (b) was attentive to how you defined your categories: "the category of what may be considered to be true excludes the category of what is untestable." "What may be considered to be true" is not the same as what is true; it is epistemic while the latter is ontological. Something may be true but we may have no basis for believing that it is true. Given the epistemic demarcations, the first and third categories are mutually exclusive.
Perhaps it's worth mentioning that the first and second categories are inconsistent. If some claims are demonstrably false, then their negations are demonstrably true, so there are some claims that are more than merely provisionally true, but are known to be so on the basis of evidence.
ReplyDeleteScientific naturalists would solve this issue, perhaps, by denying that claims can be demonstrated to be false. This is the problem of scientific underdetermination. If all of my science presupposes background assumptions (construing that broadly enough to include, say, psychological language as a theoretical system), then when I falsify a theory based on the evidence, I don't know for sure which part of the theory I have falsified.
Jeremy Taylor said:
ReplyDelete[quoting AF]I don't see anything directed at me from you that I have ignored.
You are either blind, stupid, or dishonest. Call it Jeremy's trilemma.
Well you are partly correct. I'm half-blind, having lost the sight of my right eye a while back. Stupid? Problem with that is there is no stupidity test. Intelligence tests only tell you how good people are comparatively at the particular intelligence test they are given. Dishonest? Well, nobody's perfect. Indeed, essentialism has no basis in reality.
Anyway, it's annoying to see Dawkins memes soar like an eagle and find one's own attempt to fly a meme fall flat.
Seriously, if I haven't responded to something, I have missed it or it appeared rhetorical.
Link to it or repost it and I promise to repsond.
Someone of a more Aristotelian bent would deny that genuine demonstrations are impossible in science (or in philosophy in general). William Wallace evaluates several case studies from the history of science which, he claims, were genuine demonstrations. For this to work, though, one would also have to deny that psychological language is an in principle falsifiable theoretical system.
ReplyDeleteIf some claims are demonstrably false, then their negations are demonstrably true, so there are some claims that are more than merely provisionally true, but are known to be so on the basis of evidence.
ReplyDeleteWatert is wet, therefore anything that is not water is not wet. I'm not sure this is right.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteWatert is wet, therefore anything that is not water is not wet. I'm not sure this is right.
Erm, "anything that is not water is not wet" is not the negation of "water is wet". The reliable way to negate a proposition is by adding "it is not the case that" to the beginning.
So "water is H2SO4" is something that could be hypothesized. But it has been empirically refuted. We have demonstrated it to be false. So it falls in your second category of claims.
But then "it is not the case that water is H2SO4" has been demonstrated to be true. So some claims can be demonstrated to be true, not provisionally (under the assumption that some claims can be demonstrated to be false).
Greg writes:
ReplyDeleteErm, "anything that is not water is not wet" is not the negation of "water is wet". The reliable way to negate a proposition is by adding "it is not the case that" to the beginning.
So "water is H2SO4" is something that could be hypothesized. But it has been empirically refuted. We have demonstrated it to be false. So it falls in your second category of claims.
But then "it is not the case that water is H2SO4" has been demonstrated to be true. So some claims can be demonstrated to be true, not provisionally (under the assumption that some claims can be demonstrated to be false).
Hmmm. I trained as a biochemist, so if you want to discuss chemistry, we can. I still think you are stuck in thinking mathematics makes rules for reality. Mathematics are a useful tool for modelling reality. I think reality is what it is due to inherent properties of particles and fields and their interactions. Reality does not follow rules. We propose models that fit reality more or less well.
I have a little math, so we could discuss this.
The main obstacle to communication here is linguistic. Language is at the core of what makes us human but the scope for miscommunication seems endless. It's easy to exploit that, as many commenters seem to do here from time to time when confronted with opposing views and propositions. Fine words can disguise emotion as logic.
Obscurity in language can obscure obscurity in thought. I hope that wasn't too obscure. :)
Greg quote AF/
ReplyDeleteBut I agree that Evidentially supported claims and evidentially contradicted claims are exclusive. I say that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say.
And responds:
Of course. I would not and did not impute to you the contradictory view.
This is an example of a linguistic and logical trap. You seem to think in dichotomies, which are often false. There is no real opposite to hot. Coldness is a perception. In reality, particles and groups of particles (matter) can have more or less vibrational energy, or theoretically at absolute zero, none at all.
What is the contrary view to "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say"?
This is miles away from the idea that choosing premises is a matter of indifference...
ReplyDeleteWell, exactly. Choosing valid premises is paramount to any development of an argument. Justifying the choice of premise distinguishes a premise from an assumption.
"Everybody knows that..." is not a justification. "We observe (citation included)..." is a justification.
Alan Fox,
ReplyDeleteJust one point, Vincent holds a Ph D in philosophy, so that should be Dr Torley.
Recall the last Q & A:
Q: Are Mr. Torley's reading skills poor?
A: The appearance is that they may be. But the reality may be that they are just fine, and that Mr. Torley simply massages and mischaracterizes certain of Dr. Feser's statements that the result might better serve what he himself wishes to say.
The presumption that his reading skills may be just fine was based on the fact that he has earned a Doctorate and the unlikeliness of a person earning a Doctorate without being in possession of adequate reading skills. That Mr. Torley has mischaracterized several of Dr. Feser's statements is a matter of public record. And given what he has written in his dissertation -- "Defining 'intentionality' in terms of 'directedness' or 'aboutness' is certainly in keeping with the historical roots of the term: the word 'intentionality' derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb intendere, which means being directed towards some goal or thing, as an arrow is towards a target (Jacob, 2003)" -- I think it safe to presume that Mr. Torley himself would agree that there likely is something intentional about his mischaracterizations. What might that be? I offered one possibility (which hasn't anything to do with poor reading skills).
This isn't a formal academic setting, and I'm not aware of any Ph.D who posts here requesting, let alone insisting, that s/he be referred to as "Dr." But I am a guest on his blog, so I use "Dr." when referring to the blog owner.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteHmmm. I trained as a biochemist, so if you want to discuss chemistry, we can.
I used an example from chemistry... a completely uncontroversial example at that. I am not looking to discuss chemistry; I am pointing out what sort of scientific claims (I assume) you would consider to be demonstrably false, ie. "water is H2SO4". But in demonstrating that that is false, you would also be demonstrating that "it is not the case that water is H2SO4" is true. The example is pretty irrelevant.
I still think you are stuck in thinking mathematics makes rules for reality. Mathematics are a useful tool for modelling reality. I think reality is what it is due to inherent properties of particles and fields and their interactions. Reality does not follow rules. We propose models that fit reality more or less well.
I have said next to nothing about math, unless by "mathematics" you mean to refer to what I've had to say about formal logic.
I don't think mathematics makes rules for reality. I also don't think formal logic makes rules for reality.
The view that "reality is what it is due to inherent properties of particles and field and their interactions" is not terribly far from something an Aristotelian would endorse. An Aristotelian accepts that natural substances have integral parts (like particles) that have inherent dispositions. What the Aristotelian denies is that natural substances are reducible to their integral parts; the higher level features are quite real.
I would suggest that this understanding is implicit even in the views of those who would prioritize the dispositions of particles in their theories. Whether or not elementary particles are composite is an open question limited by our capacities for observation (an elementary particle is defined as a particle whose substructure is unknown). So if one attributes inherent, real dispositions to fundamental particles that may or may not have substructures, then one is committed to the position that there are real dispositions that do not need to be reduced to their substructures. But if this exception is made in the case of fundamental particles, then there is no reason why it could not in principle be made elsewhere.
The main obstacle to communication here is linguistic. Language is at the core of what makes us human but the scope for miscommunication seems endless. It's easy to exploit that, as many commenters seem to do here from time to time when confronted with opposing views and propositions. Fine words can disguise emotion as logic.
Obscurity in language can obscure obscurity in thought. I hope that wasn't too obscure. :)
To be fair, you are often very unclear, and if I quote you and take your words at face value, you often have to adapt what you said. Often there appear to be distinctions in your posts (ie. between the epistemic and the ontological) that you are not aware of drawing. You don't seem to be incredibly familiar with formal logic (ie. how to negate a proposition). I don't think the theists are responsible for the lack of clarity and miscommunication here--at least, not primarily.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteThis is an example of a linguistic and logical trap.
No. You originally formulated your disjunction of types of claims in epistemic terms. I followed suit, and then you reframed it in ontological terms, ie. making an entirely different claim.
I'm pointing out that I never took you to deny that an untestable claim is actually true or false, but that's not what you were talking about earlier when you first proposed your three categories. What you said then was that claims can be provisionally accepted as true based on the evidence, demonstrably false, or untestable. Those categories are epistemic and don't necessarily track truth or falsity. This is no trap, neither linguistic nor logical. It's simply clarification of ambiguities and misunderstanding.
You seem to think in dichotomies, which are often false. There is no real opposite to hot. Coldness is a perception. In reality, particles and groups of particles (matter) can have more or less vibrational energy, or theoretically at absolute zero, none at all.
Hot and cold are vague terms to be sure, but if you fix some particular sense of them, then the law of excluded middle holds: "the tea is hot or it is not the case that the tea is hot". If by hot I mean something specific (say, over some temperature), then this is unobjectionable. That's not to say that I have to use hot in the same sense if I am talking about the heat of my car engine.
What is the contrary view to "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say"?
Contraries are different from contradictories. If two claims are contraries, then it is impossible that they both be true. (So "water is H2SO4" and "water is C12H22O11" are contraries. They are, in fact, both false. But if somehow one were true, the other could not also be.) If two claims (say "p" and "q") are contradictories, then "p & q" is a contradiction and "p v q" is a tautology. So you could always obtain a contradictory of p by negating p, although there would be others (ie. any proposition that is materially equivalent to the negation of p). And all pairs of contradictories are also pairs of contraries, since contradictories can't both be true, even though one of them must be.
So there are several propositions contrary to "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false". One is "It is not the case that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false."
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteWell, exactly. Choosing valid premises is paramount to any development of an argument. Justifying the choice of premise distinguishes a premise from an assumption.
Premises are propositions and can be either true or false. Validity is a property of arguments whereby the conclusion can be deduced by truth-preserving rules of inference from the premises. Or one might equivalently define a valid argument as an argument whose conclusion is never false if its premises are all true.
So Feser's arguments have premises, not assumptions, because he devotes a lot of space to justifying his premises.
Greg said:
ReplyDeleteWhat the Aristotelian denies is that natural substances are reducible to their integral parts; the higher level features are quite real.
In that sense I and scientists I note expressing a view agree with Aristotle, apparently. Reductionism is nineteenth century thinking and I see little or no relic of it in scientific thinking today. The idea of emergent properties is more current.
To be fair, you are often very unclear, and if I quote you and take your words at face value, you often have to adapt what you said. Often there appear to be distinctions in your posts (ie. between the epistemic and the ontological) that you are not aware of drawing.
Fair comment. But, as I said, language is a poor tool for expressing ideas. If you doubt this, try expressing a complex point or argument in a language other than your native tongue. I promise you it is not easy. :) As to the distinction between ontology and epistemology, being a pragmatist, I ask : is there a useful distinction here? OBEK?
You don't seem to be incredibly familiar with formal logic (ie. how to negate a proposition). I don't think the theists are responsible for the lack of clarity and miscommunication here-- at least, not primarily.
For approximately the first six decades of my life, blissfully ignorant. If I were a mischievous pragmatist, I might ask: what have I missed? But the point is accepted.
So there are several propositions contrary to "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false". One is "It is not the case that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false."
I'm having trouble with this. I can't see how there can be any useful discussion after agreeing "we can't say" as in "we can't know". And of course this is space and time dependent. A discovery tomorrow tells what we don't know today. We are limited by relativity and the speed of light in ever knowing what is outside the past and future light cone of the Earth.
Hot and cold are vague terms to be sure, but if you fix some particular sense of them, then the law of excluded middle holds: "the tea is hot or it is not the case that the tea is hot". If by hot I mean something specific (say, over some temperature), then this is unobjectionable. That's not to say that I have to use hot in the same sense if I am talking about the heat of my car engine
You prove my case in showing that language is positively misleading when it comes to understanding the concepts of heat and temperature.
Premises are propositions and can be either true or false. Validity is a property of arguments whereby the conclusion can be deduced by truth-preserving rules of inference from the premises. Or one might equivalently define a valid argument as an argument whose conclusion is never false if its premises are all true.
I see that and I don't dispute it as a pragmatic view. It seems to work. It's that little word "if". Aristotle is credited (from what I read of him) as the first recorded scientist. He seemed very curious about all sorts of things; cuttlefish, for example. He observed stuff.
So Feser's arguments have premises, not assumptions, because he devotes a lot of space to justifying his premises.
OK, so let's, for the sake of argument, accept (I certainly lack the training in formal logic to dispute it) that Dr Feser's argument is impeccable. What premises does he use to construct his argument and what is the justification?*
*I'm not asking you reinvent the wheel. Maybe a link to a summary.
Gregg wrote:
ReplyDeleteThis isn't a formal academic setting, and I'm not aware of any Ph.D who posts here requesting, let alone insisting, that s/he be referred to as "Dr." But I am a guest on his blog, so I use "Dr." when referring to the blog owner.
Why not call him Torley in the usual way of citing : "Torley wrote"? I'm sure he'd be happy for you to call him Vincent, alternatively, if "Vincent Torley" is too much typing.
I'm sure Vincent is not at all hung up on honorifics; I just thought you should be aware of your error.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteBut, as I said, language is a poor tool for expressing ideas. If you doubt this, try expressing a complex point or argument in a language other than your native tongue.
I don't doubt that expressing a complex point or argument in a language other than my native tongue is difficult, because I find it difficult to express anything in a language other than my native tongue. (The paltry Spanish and Latin I know notwithstanding, I am monolinguistic.) But how does the difficulty of expressing something in another language tell against the capacity of language for expressing ideas? Shouldn't language be judged at its best, ie. when people are speaking their native languages?
In any case, I would think any expressing of ideas is language. (Perhaps not a language in the sense of English or Russian. But the shaking of one's head to convey "no" is an expression of an idea and language, as would be a chart that does not employ any words.) So if language were a poor tool for expressing ideas, then I would think that's simply because expressing ideas is hard.
As to the distinction between ontology and epistemology, being a pragmatist, I ask : is there a useful distinction here? OBEK?
Of course. You yourself have distinguish between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what can or should be provisionally accepted as false. (You actually spoke of what is demonstrably false, but as I have said and argued, I don't think the epistemic asymmetry between truth and falsity can be maintained, because to demonstrate something as false is to demonstrate its negation as true. In my view, science is capable of demonstrations of both true and false claims. The naturalized epistemology route, ie. the underdetermination thesis, is to deny that either can be demonstrated. The popular view of science maintains the asymmetry, I suspect, because the limitation of truth claims to the provisional appears to be epistemically modest, while the limitation of scientific falsifications to the provisional appears to be relativistic.) These are different categories than what is true and what is false. You seem to accept that as well; you admit that an untestable claim is either true or false, but you deny that what can or should be accepted as true includes untestable claims. If the true (ontological designation) and the acceptable-as-true (epistemological designation) were the same, then untestable claims should either be excluded from both or from neither.
I'm having trouble with this. I can't see how there can be any useful discussion after agreeing "we can't say" as in "we can't know". And of course this is space and time dependent. A discovery tomorrow tells what we don't know today. We are limited by relativity and the speed of light in ever knowing what is outside the past and future light cone of the Earth.
ReplyDeleteI've misread you here. I thought you were asking for the negation of "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false", and then saying that "we can't say" what the negation is. But, in any case, the negation of (and therefore a contrary of)
(1) "Nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false [and] [w]e can't say [whether a given nondisprovable claim is true or false]."
is
(2) "It is not the case that (nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false [and] [w]e can't say [whether a given nondisprovable claim is true or false])."
(2) would be true, for example, if there were some nondisprovable claim that could be known to be true. However, I don't see how we could ever accept (1). For suppose that it is true. Then there would be no nondisprovable claim that we can hold as true or false. But (1) is nondisprovable, because ex hypothesi (ie. under the assumption that it is true) there is no nondisprovable claim that contradicts it. So according to (1) we can't say whether or not (1) is true.
So whether or not (ontologically speaking) (1) is true, it would always be a breach of epistemic responsibility to accept (1) as true.
You prove my case in showing that language is positively misleading when it comes to understanding the concepts of heat and temperature.
I showed that there are eliminable ambiguities in natural language. That does not mean that language is positively misleading, a conclusion which I think would be too strong even if there were some ineliminable ambiguities in natural language (as there probably are).
OK, so let's, for the sake of argument, accept (I certainly lack the training in formal logic to dispute it) that Dr Feser's argument is impeccable. What premises does he use to construct his argument and what is the justification?
Some of the premises of the First Way are: Change is the reduction of potency to act by something else in act. Change occurs. Infinite (or, more specifically, ungrounded) essentially ordered causal series are impossible. The principle of proportionate causality. He argues for each in a number of places.
Scholastic Metaphysics contains the most thorough arguments for those positions themselves but only alludes to the First Way. Its table of contents can be found here. Aquinas contains the actual argument. (Well, the books contain arguments and defenses of premises for the other four of Aquinas's Five Ways as well.) You won't really find arguments with full defenses of the premises online, at least not from Feser. That's why philosophers write books.
Is this a fair statement of the important premise?
ReplyDelete"Every being which does not have its sufficient reason in itself requires a cause."
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteIs this a fair statement of the important premise?
"Every being which does not have its sufficient reason in itself requires a cause."
The term "sufficient reason" can be vague, as scholastics and modern rationalists have understood it differently.
That premise is also not employed in the First Way, which argues from change. Something like it is employed in the Second Way, though. (What constitutes a "cause" also varies from scholastics to rationalists.)
The term "sufficient reason" can be vague, as scholastics and modern rationalists have understood it differently.
ReplyDeleteI'm quoting it from the paper by Norris Clarke that Dr Feser endorses it here
endorses! Ignore extraneous "it".
ReplyDeleteI'm quoting it from the paper by Norris Clarke that Dr Feser endorses it here
ReplyDeleteYes, I imagine Father Clarke would have clarified (whether explicitly or implicitly) the the context and sense of "sufficient reason" and "cause" (though I haven't read the paper so I don't know how much is exposition of the first cause argument and how much is calling attention to contemporary misunderstanding).
Alan Fox,
ReplyDelete> Gregg wrote:
>> This isn't a formal academic setting, and...
No, Greg did not write that.
@ Glenn
ReplyDeleteThanks for the correction.
Greg wrote:
ReplyDelete...I haven't read the paper...
I'm having a go at it. As the I'm skipping the refutations of the "strawman" misunderstandings of the argument. It makes the paper much shorter!
Looking in the comments to Feser's endorsement, quite a few commenters here are enthusiastic.
Oops, there's a displaced "as the". Hoping for some clarification on justification of premises, I'll take a break.
ReplyDeleteGreg said...
ReplyDelete@ Alan Fox
' Well, exactly. Choosing valid premises is paramount to any development of an argument. Justifying the choice of premise distinguishes a premise from an assumption. '
Premises are propositions and can be either true or false. Validity is a property of arguments whereby the conclusion can be deduced by truth-preserving rules of inference from the premises. Or one might equivalently define a valid argument as an argument whose conclusion is never false if its premises are all true.
So Feser's arguments have premises, not assumptions, because he devotes a lot of space to justifying his premises.
August 7, 2014 at 6:42 AM "
I've been looking in on the exchange and gathering some satisfaction from the fact that you have been employing a number of important if very elementary logical distinctions in your discussion with Fox.
However it is at the same time somewhat dismaying, that you would have to review this very basic material - essentially elements of the square of opposition, and the difference between syllogistic validity, and propositional or syllogistic soundness, with him in the first place.
And he hardly (your offering him a face saving fig leaf aside) needs any knowledge of formal logic for that. Merely some familiarity with the definitions and rules of categorical logic. Perhaps some familiarity with the hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens and tollens rules would be useful as well.
If a man purports to engage in philosophical argument, self-styled "pragmatist" or no, but has never even mastered the initial 10 or so chapters of Copi's old Intro to Logic, or some similarly canonical work, how can you expect to have a useful discussion with him?
And he styles his situation, "blissful ignorance".
W.T.F. ....
@ DNW
ReplyDeleteHowever it is at the same time somewhat dismaying, that you would have to review this very basic material - essentially elements of the square of opposition, and the difference between syllogistic validity, and propositional or syllogistic soundness, with him in the first place.
Well, most people don't know much about formal logic. New atheists in particular are taught that science is autonomous, whereas philosophy is a sophistical discipline invoked by theists to justify theism. If formal logic is perceived to be a philosophical subdiscipline, then to avoid it, you may find proposed a number of theses that would make any analytic philosopher groan: questioning of the distinction between ontology and epistemology, skepticism about the law of excluded middle, the possibility of violation of the law of non-contradiction, the position that proving things deductively is "easy" because you just need to "build the conclusion into the premises", verificationism...
However, I am glad that this exchange has become civil. No more talk of myths and shamans.
Hi all,
ReplyDeleteGreg, great exchange with Alan Fox; nice to see some caritas offered to the other side.
I wonder, would anyone be so kind as to explain, non-polemically, the difference between Continental and Analytic philosophers, and (at least in my experience),the cause of the two being vehemently opposed to each other?
Thanks.
Also, Greg, your point about most being unfamiliar with formal logic is vindicated by me as well.
I think we are all very lucky to have an "experiment" of this size which enables us to watch as Language unaided by Non-Language events (such as actual experiments or quests) degrades into Logorrhea.
ReplyDelete(Aside, I think my first meeting with the word "logorrhea" was in Felix M. Cleve's writing about Parmenides... )
I too would like to commend Greg for his charity, even if I fear it may be more charity than Mr. (Dr.?) Fox deserves. Anyway, I'm sure I'm not the only one who can't wait to see what objections to the First Way he comes back with.
ReplyDelete@ Greg Johnson
ReplyDeleteI wonder, would anyone be so kind as to explain, non-polemically, the difference between Continental and Analytic philosophers, and (at least in my experience),the cause of the two being vehemently opposed to each other?
I am not really that familiar with continental philosophy. I think analytic philosophers regard continental philosophy, as its worse (ie. Derrida and Foucault), as nonsense--using flowery words to talk about the complete subjectivity of the interpretations of texts or whatever. (It should be noted that the same impulses, albeit directed at a far less extreme instance, makes many analytical philosophers skeptical of Thomism, which uses terms like "being" substantively. You can see some of this attitude, I think, behind Feser's exchange with Keith Parsons.)
But continental philosophy is a large category. So some analytic philosophers draw from certain continentals--Nietzsche, Brentano, Heidegger, etc. But they generally would only engage with those who at least share some common vision of philosophy. Where continental philosophy becomes more "discourse-directed" than truth-directed, I think many analytic philosophers lose interest and respect.
"I wonder, would anyone be so kind as to explain, non-polemically, the difference between Continental and Analytic philosophers, and (at least in my experience),the cause of the two being vehemently opposed to each other"
ReplyDeleteI don't purport here to provide a dogmatic answer to your question, and Greg has offered some useful perspective. Especially interesting is his glancing reference reference to the term "being" and its conceptualization by Thomists as opposed to analysts.
However as to the difference between Continental and Anglo-American methods of doing philosophy, I think that most would agree that one obvious aspect of the difference is in method. A difference in method which is very noticeable in reading their works.
On the one hand you have the Continentals: and I think it is uncontroversial to say that the so-called "critical method" has in general broadly informed their way of approaching issues. The critical method of course is in essence (to follow Gilson's description) a program of seeking to understand or describe the underlying or hidden conditions which make any given phenomenon possible in the first place.
The analytic tradition includes in its kit bag much of what you have seen Greg doing here, but in greater depth: analyzing how words are used in ordinary language as a guide to their possible meanings; reviewing definitional adequacy; envisioning various contexts in which certain terms or claims might make sense or not, and how this might shed light on philosophical type claims; and the use of the rules of predicate and propositional logic in argument.
The old joke is that people from our side look at European philosophy and ask, "Where the hell is the argument?" I've felt that myself.
Whether this critical impulse is absolutely traceable to Kant or not, (and I don't know enough detail to say with any certainty) it is possible to trace it at least to Marx, and the development of the hermeneutical method.
The added notion of pure description, starting with consciousness itself, is obviously Husserl.
Their project is descriptive, "critical", and reads in the declarative mood.
The analytic project is reductive generally, inferential, somewhat commonsense, logical and indicative.
The meaning of propositions about phenomena taken as they are, and the logical adequacy of any conclusions drawn, on the one hand; and the "meaning" and possibility of social acts and acts of consciousness on the other.
And if that seems to be less than a helpful description, I'll bow out and let an expert take the helm.
Greg wrote:
ReplyDeleteI am glad that this exchange has become civil.
Yes, indeed. You set an example others could learn from.
In other news, I note Vincent Torley continues to dig his hole deeper in his dispute with Dr Feser.
ReplyDeleteGreg wrote:
ReplyDeleteYou won't really find arguments with full defenses of the premises online, at least not from Feser. That's why philosophers write books.
I was just asking about Dr Feser's argument for "God or the absolute ground of being" which I have inferred as different from the "straw man" that I and Bertrand Russell, among others have been mistakenly attacking. I think it is developed from Aquinas' Fifth Way.
For the moment, I am only asking about the initial premises. I'm not asking for a defence of them, just a hint about what they are.
@ Greg Thank you. I do have one question though. You write/;
ReplyDelete"(It should be noted that the same impulses, albeit directed at a far less extreme instance, makes many analytical philosophers skeptical of Thomism, which uses terms like "being" substantively. You can see some of this attitude, I think, behind Feser's exchange with Keith Parsons.)"
if Thomism uses being and the like substantively (and I don't know what that means), how has Feser as an analytical Thomist managed to square the two with conflicting expressions?
Thanks again for replying.
@ DNW Thanks for your comments; quite helpful. I wont pursue this at any greater depth (at least in this thread), since the two of you lost me along the way. I'm only a novice. Sorry.
@ Alan Fox,
ReplyDeleteSorry to jump in your exchange, but I figured this is easy enough to answer, so Greg doesn't have to waste time on it.
First, the argument most commonly employed by Feser is not the Fifth Way, but one of the first three, each being a variation on the cosmological argument. Hence, each have different premises, but the same conclusion.
Take the First Way. The premises include: that there is such as thing as change, that change consists in the transition from potentiality to actuality, that this transition can only be brought about by something already actual(c.f.whatever moves is moved by another), that there are two categories of causal series, accidentally ordered and essentially ordered, that the latter sort must have a logical (not temporal) first member, which must be pure actuality.
Here the First Way finishes, and deductions for the divine attributes begin, following logically from the conclusion of the First Way. (ie omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipresence, simplicity, personality, eternity, impassibility, etc.)
Thus pure actuality = God.
I should have done this earlier!
ReplyDeleteA previous blog post from Dr Feser says if you want to understand my cosmological argument, buy my book.
Fair enough.
I am going to assume Last Superstition is the seminal work but if someone wants to tell me how important Aquinas (A Beginner's Guide) is in understanding Feser's presentation of his premises that lead into his argument (not Aquinas) for God or etc. then I'm listening.
@ Greg Johnson
ReplyDeleteif Thomism uses being and the like substantively (and I don't know what that means), how has Feser as an analytical Thomist managed to square the two with conflicting expressions?
By substantively, I just mean that Thomism holds the term "being" to be used in a deep and contentful way. There is a long tradition in analytic philosophy (well, originating in Kant, really) of holding that "existence is not a first-order predicate". Frege "founded" analytic philosophy and his influential formulation was that existence is a second-order predicate, ie. something that is said not of objects but of concepts. So to say that "A cat exists" is to say that "There exists some x such that x is a cat." There have been several different flavors of this analysis.
Anthony Kenny (who is somewhat approving of Aquinas's philosophy of mind but is very critical of his philosophy of being and his arguments for God's existence) finds Aquinas's philosophy of being to be incoherent on Fregean grounds, for instance.
I don't know if Feser has addressed this particular issue at a lot of length. He treats some of Kenny's criticisms in Aquinas (for example, Kenny's claim that God's name "I am Who am" should be read as the incoherent fragment "There is one"). Some of what he has to say in his article on existential intertia is relevant (though the article is difficult to get a hold of).
The best argument against the "Frege-Russell-Quine" paradigm of existence coming from an analytical Thomist is without a doubt Barry Miller's The Fullness of Being. (That book contains Miller's view on the predicate "exists". He has two other books, which are far more difficult to come by, that contain his version of Aquinas's cosmological argument, the proof from De Ente et Essentia/the Second Way, if you read those the same way, and his philosophical theology.) Miller's view is not exactly Aquinas's, but it is very close. (There is a detail that he thinks has to be modified in Aquinas's account of why contingent beings must have a cause.)
Feser has also linked in the past to a review by Gyula Klima of Kenny's Aquinas on Being.
In short I think the analytic attitude toward "being" in the Thomistic sense is based on a prejudice toward the Fregean position and a suspicion that the term might be flowery and vacuous (ie. when someone might say, "I feel it deep in my being"--here the term "being" does not seem to add anything of ontological significance).
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteI am going to assume Last Superstition is the seminal work but if someone wants to tell me how important Aquinas (A Beginner's Guide) is in understanding Feser's presentation of his premises that lead into his argument (not Aquinas) for God or etc. then I'm listening.
Aquinas is really the fuller presentation of the Five Ways. The Last Superstition only addresses three of the five, and Aquinas addresses more of the criticisms that have been made. Both are about on par with respect to arguing for the general metaphysics/premises (whereas Scholastic Metaphysics is the fullest treatment of the general metaphysics).
Though I'll add: The Last Superstition argues against scientism more than does Aquinas I'll also say that atheists should only read The Last Superstition if they have thick skin; Aquinas is non-polemical.
ReplyDeleteGreg wrote:
ReplyDeleteI'll also say that atheists should only read The Last Superstition if they have thick skin; Aquinas is non-polemical.
Thanks for the advice. I did find Feser's suggestion that someone write a dumbed-down version of Philosphy for Dummies and call it Philosphy for Dawkins quite funny. Though maybe Dawkins might have a few tips for Feser on maximizing book sales. :)
But I now realise I've been covering some very well-trodden ground. I started at Amazon with the reviews and comments to the reviews. Then I've looked back at the exchanges of blog post between Feser, Coyne and Rosenhouse and glanced through the comments, of which there are a vast number, many of which I could have saved time and copy-pasted rather than starting from scratch.
I can see why some of the regular commenters have been a bit tetchy with me. They've had it all before. I see now I don't need to comment further. There has already been much more heat than light generated: so much heat that perhaps there is no light at all to be found.
Back at work from next week so that will curtail my internet activity severely.
I fully understand commenters reluctance to venture out into hostile environments after the verbal mauling some received but I still invite all to call in at The Skeptical Zone if you want some assumptions challenged.
Well, I do think it is a good exercise for people to read The Last Superstition. Feser's comments on homosexuality bother some but are certainly no less ridiculous than Sam Harris's comments on the idea that human skin cells are potential humans (and therefore traditional beliefs about the sanctity of life are silly). The fact is that writers on philosophy of religion generally believe their positions to have moral implications; that is probably why it is so difficult for people to detach emotionally from them.
ReplyDeleteFeser is also very clear that his polemic is not directed toward atheists in general, and there is evidence of that in his other writings. He aims to discredit vacuity that has somehow been received as wisdom, but he is respectful of atheists like Smart and Sobel.
@Greg:
ReplyDelete"Feser's comments on homosexuality bother some but are certainly no less ridiculous than Sam Harris's comments on the idea that human skin cells are potential humans[.]"
Heh, I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that you probably mean Feser's comments are no more ridiculous than Harris's. ;-)
@ Greg,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the elucidation and recommendation; I'll definitely take a look.
I have wondered about Kenny for some time now, as a particular instance of a more general phenomenon. Namely, the strange rejection of the classical arguments for the existence of God, especially since the clear explanation we have them so clearly set out and defended by the likes of Dr Feser. Prior to this, the charge that the arguments were not generally known or well understood would have held some weight, but now it has no force. I mean, I (a virtual idiot compared to others here) was struck by how eminently logical the Five Ways seemed when outlined, especially with the necessary metaphysical background already argued for on independent rational grounds. Surely a philosophical proof, like proofs in mathematics more generally, can be evaluated simply in terms of inferences from premises to conclusion; it is simply a question of whether the reasoning is correct or not. Perhaps formal logic notation would serve here. What say you Greg?
How do Kenny (and many other atheists)continue to object to them? My theory is that atheism has become too entrenched for them to see otherwise.
@ Scott
ReplyDeleteHeh, I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that you probably mean Feser's comments are no more ridiculous than Harris's. ;-)
Oops. Ha, yes you are right.
@ Greg Johnson
ReplyDeleteSurely a philosophical proof, like proofs in mathematics more generally, can be evaluated simply in terms of inferences from premises to conclusion; it is simply a question of whether the reasoning is correct or not. Perhaps formal logic notation would serve here. What say you Greg?
Well this is something Alan Fox and I touched on. That arguments in philosophy be valid, sound, and probative is a necessary condition of their being good arguments. Creating a valid argument that doesn't (at least glaringly) commit any fallacies is not too difficult. This is the "question of whether to reasoning is correct or not."
So I rather think that the main issue in evaluating a philosophical proof is whether the premises is correct. In this sense it is unlike mathematics; both are deductive, but in mathematics, when proving a theorem, one begins knowing for certain that you're on solid ground. A lot of what is interesting in mathematics comes to intuiting what sort of "trick" you must employ to prove what you want to prove. As things get more theoretical, this often involves defining things in the right way. (Consider, for instance, Cantor's diagonalization argument.) Mathematical proofs function quite differently in mathematics from how philosophical proofs function in philosophy. Most philosophical proofs are formally not very complicated. (This is why it's a bit silly to see it asserted that the problem with theistic arguments are illogical. They are logically pretty simple, and that's the dimension that professional philosophers are not likely to screw up.)
So most of Kenny's objections are not that the Five Ways are invalid. Besides the Third Way, each of the Five Ways can be rendered valid pretty easily. (Feser and Haldane both argue that there is a way to read the Third Way as valid. Other Thomists like Timothy Pawl think that it requires another premise to be made valid.) He objects more to the metaphysics (ie. Aquinas's philosophy of being) as well as the causal principle (he thinks Newton's law of inertia conflicts with it, and he thinks that self-movers are problematic). Among other things.
I had a look at Alan site and specifically the discussion on this topic, and it was the usual Gnu inanity - scientism, unargued for positivism and empiricism, and so on. It is interesting to compare the intellectual worth of the commentators there and here.
ReplyDeleteAnd what is it with Gnus being ignorant of basic logic and argumentation. Maybe we should start a fund to supply them with some basic logic and critical thinking textbooks.
And what is it with Gnus being ignorant of basic logic and argumentation. Maybe we should start a fund to supply them with some basic logic and critical thinking textbooks.
ReplyDeleteJust let me know where to send them, and I'll let you have my paypal details. Or shall I just embed it on the website?
Finding myself with a little spare time and a keyboard, as Greg has been so patient with me, I've had chance to re-read some of his comments that merit a response. For instance Greg wrote:
ReplyDeleteYou yourself have distinguish[ed*] between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what can or should be provisionally accepted as false.
Well, no. I think there is a false dichotomy here. Truth and falsity is a mathematical concept, whereas understanding the external world, reality, involves perception and shared experience. Falsity reliably works with reality but truth does not. Test and evaluate, the most reliable way of finding things out, easily eliminates incorrect assumptions. Provisionally correct assumptions can pass many tests that certainly reinforce the hypothesis in question. There is always the possibility of that hypothesis being found wanting in the future.
You actually spoke of what is demonstrably false, but as I have said and argued, I don't think the epistemic asymmetry between truth and falsity can be maintained, because to demonstrate something as false is to demonstrate its negation as true.
Initially, when I mentioned false dichotomies, my tongue was close to my cheek but you are starting to convince me I am on
to something. There is a predilection in humans to think in dichotomies that clouds issues.
In my view, science is capable of demonstrations of both true and false claims.
In my view, you are wrong. Science works by the testing of hypotheses. Those that make good predictions, fit well with the data, are retained as working hypotheses and can be accepted as theories. They are never immune to challenge.
The naturalized epistemology route, ie. the underdetermination thesis, is to deny that either can be demonstrated.
This may be so but I wonder how many working scientists are even aware of the underdetermination thesis.
The popular view of science maintains the asymmetry, I suspect, because the limitation of truth claims to the provisional appears to be epistemically modest, while the limitation of scientific falsifications to the provisional appears to be relativistic.) These are different categories than what is true and what is false. You seem to accept that as well; you admit that an untestable claim is either true or false, but you deny that what can or should be accepted as true includes untestable claims. If the true (ontological designation) and the acceptable-as-true (epistemological designation) were the same, then untestable claims should either be excluded from both or from neither.
I'll offer my own definition of an untestable hypothesis. A hypothesis for which no experiment, observation or any other kind of scientific edeavour can be devised that would enable a comparison of predictions of the hypothesis in question to reality.
*I see others also suffer from this annoying latency where letters you type don't register.
Greg
ReplyDeleteGoogling "underdetermination" led me to the serendiptious discovery that Willard Quine wrote on indeterminacy of translation.
Oops
ReplyDeleteSerendipitous
(can't blame that on blogger)
Greg wrote:
ReplyDeleteWell this is something Alan Fox and I touched on. That arguments in philosophy be valid, sound, and probative is a necessary condition of their being good arguments. Creating a valid argument that doesn't (at least glaringly) commit any fallacies is not too difficult. This is the "question of whether to reasoning is correct or not."
So I rather think that the main issue in evaluating a philosophical proof is whether the premises is correct.
I'm pleased to see I got my point across. This is the one point that I'd like to see addressed. I'm happy to accept, for the sake of argument, that Feser's TCA argument is logically valid.
What are the premises on which it is built?
@ Greg
ReplyDeleteThanks for introducing me to Sir Anthony Kenny. The Wikipedia entry includes a quote that I thought touches on the idea of truth only being provisional.
Many different definitions may be offered of the word 'God'. Given this fact, atheism makes a much stronger claim than theism does. The atheist says that no matter what definition you choose, 'God exists' is always false. The theist only claims that there is some definition which will make 'God exists' true. In my view, neither the stronger nor the weaker claim has been convincingly established"...
...the true default position is neither theism nor atheism, but agnosticism ... a claim to knowledge needs to be substantiated; ignorance need only be confessed."
Have there been any exchanges between Kenny and Feser regarding Feser's TCA?
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteWell, no. I think there is a false dichotomy here. Truth and falsity is a mathematical concept, whereas understanding the external world, reality, involves perception and shared experience. Falsity reliably works with reality but truth does not. Test and evaluate, the most reliable way of finding things out, easily eliminates incorrect assumptions. Provisionally correct assumptions can pass many tests that certainly reinforce the hypothesis in question. There is always the possibility of that hypothesis being found wanting in the future.
[...]
Initially, when I mentioned false dichotomies, my tongue was close to my cheek but you are starting to convince me I am on
to something. There is a predilection in humans to think in dichotomies that clouds issues.
The paragraph where you're quoting is a bit unclear (there are a few things I would change).
Let's just ask this: what group of categories of claims (I think it would be clearer if we start saying "propositions" rather than "claims") do you think accurately describe our ontological situation? What about our epistemological situation?
(A) Provisionally true, provisionally false, untestable
(B) Provisionally true, demonstrably false, untestable
(C) True, false
(D) Demonstrably true, provisionally true, provisionally false, demonstrably false, untestable
Or something else? Or some combination?
Here is the problem I see.
(1) Suppose that p is demonstrably false.
(2) Then p is false. (definition of demonstration)
(3) Then "it is not the case that p" is true. (definition of negation)
(4) If we know that p is false, then we know that "it is not the case that p" is true.
(5) So some propositions are demonstrably true.
At which step does this reasoning go awry? Since your problem is with dichotomies, would you deny that negations are valid? The cost of denying such an essential truth function is simply magnificent.
In my view, you are wrong. Science works by the testing of hypotheses. Those that make good predictions, fit well with the data, are retained as working hypotheses and can be accepted as theories. They are never immune to challenge.
Well, I have argued that either the strictly provisional nature of true must be forgone or the possibility of demonstration of falsehoods. (Or one must give up the validity of negation--and that is quite a contortion to retain this sort of epistemology.)
In any case, what you say here does not contradict the claim that there are demonstrable truths. One example of a scientific demonstration was Galileo's observation that the surface of the moon is not flat. Obviously someone can challenge this; but that doesn't show that it is only provisionally true, for scientific falsifications are always never immune to challenge either. (Consider any of the experiments that ruled out Newtonian physics in favor of general relativity. I could challenge all of those findings. That doesn't mean that the falsification was less than demonstrable. But then the fact that scientific hypotheses are open to challenge certainly doesn't show that truth is only provisional.)
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteThis may be so but I wonder how many working scientists are even aware of the underdetermination thesis.
Scientists are often unaware of issues in philosophy of science. (Some of the reaction to Thomas Nagel's recent book was representative of this. Naturalistic philosophers of science have accepted for a while that scientific practice does not proceed by way of reductionism, but some scientist commentators were almost surprised to hear that.)
But it's a pretty simple point. If my current experiments rely on several provisionally true hypotheses, then getting results contrary to my expectations is a falsification. But of what? I can only be certain of which hypothesis was falsified if only one of them is provisional; but if all truths are provisional, then that won't be the case. So my falsifications will have to be provisional as well. (This can be avoided by admitting that some hypotheses can be demonstrated as true.)
So we've seen that it goes both directions. If some propositions can be demonstrated false, then their negations can be demonstrated true. If all truths are provisional, then falsifications are merely provisional.
I'm pleased to see I got my point across. This is the one point that I'd like to see addressed.
I don't mean to keep score in crude fashion, but this was not really a concession on my part. All analytic philosophers are aware that the truth of the premises is what is at issue; the logic is sorted out rigorously because it's straightforward to get it right, so there is no need to waste time on it. (Of course, eventually one will have to argue for his premises non-deductively, since if each premise were justified by a demonstrative argument, you would have an infinite regress on hand. But Feser does that.)
The Wikipedia entry includes a quote that I thought touches on the idea of truth only being provisional.
I think he's saying that theism and atheism are substantive philosophical positions; one would need a good argument to say that one has been established. Kenny certainly isn't making the tendentious claim that claims are provisionally true rather than actually true.
Have there been any exchanges between Kenny and Feser regarding Feser's TCA?
Kenny reviewed The Last Superstition. He said that he didn't think that Feser addressed his arguments. TLS was written before Aquinas, though, and Feser addresses his arguments there. (No sort of exchange. I don't know if Kenny is doing much philosophy anymore.)
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteHere is that paragraph of mine that I said was unclear:
You yourself have distinguish between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what can or should be provisionally accepted as false. (You actually spoke of what is demonstrably false, but as I have said and argued, I don't think the epistemic asymmetry between truth and falsity can be maintained, because to demonstrate something as false is to demonstrate its negation as true. In my view, science is capable of demonstrations of both true and false claims. The naturalized epistemology route, ie. the underdetermination thesis, is to deny that either can be demonstrated. The popular view of science maintains the asymmetry, I suspect, because the limitation of truth claims to the provisional appears to be epistemically modest, while the limitation of scientific falsifications to the provisional appears to be relativistic.) These are different categories than what is true and what is false. You seem to accept that as well; you admit that an untestable claim is either true or false, but you deny that what can or should be accepted as true includes untestable claims. If the true (ontological designation) and the acceptable-as-true (epistemological designation) were the same, then untestable claims should either be excluded from both or from neither.
Here is what I meant to say in the first sentence:
You youself have distinguished between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what is actually true.
What I mean is that, in defining what is provisionally true, you have said things like this:
But a currently untestable claim might nonetheless be true and could be confirmed so at some later time.
But I agree that Evidentially supported claims and evidentially contradicted claims are exclusive. I say that nondisprovable claims might be true or they might be false. We can't say.
You refer to the ontological category of what is actually true, as opposed to the epistemological category of what we can accept as true. Without the former, you could not even define the latter. (Maybe someone could, and maybe some idealist philosopher has attempted it. But you have defined the epistemological category with reference to the ontological.)
I would repeat something I've said before: There have been many provisionally true claims that we know to be false. There have never been any true claims that we know to be false.
It's noteworthy that your defense consists (as far as I can tell) in denying very basic and generally uncontroversial philosophical points. You seem to question negation itself. You also seem to think that the ontological categories of true/false are dispensable, and that we can make due simply with what is provisionally true and demonstrably false.
for scientific falsifications are always never immune to challenge either
ReplyDeleteOops, drop the "always".
You youself have distinguished between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what is actually true
ReplyDeleteIf I gave that impression it was unintentional, because I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is "actually true". I am quite happy with "probationally true". We can concern ourselves with bits of reality and see whether we can come to a better understanding of it without ever worrying about an overarching truth.
Oops
ReplyDeleteThough I would be happier with "provisionally true"!
You refer to the ontological category of what is actually true, as opposed to the epistemological category of what we can accept as true. Without the former, you could not even define the latter. (Maybe someone could, and maybe some idealist philosopher has attempted it. But you have defined the epistemological category with reference to the ontological.)
ReplyDeleteThere are some adjectives that only get used in certain phrases. Who uses "arrant" except in "arrant nonsense"? I'm finding it harder the more I read definitions and explanations of "ontology" to see the emperor's clothes here. "ontological argument" seems a paraphrase for argument about "being" or "existence". What does the insertion or substitution of this adjective bring to the table?
I'm tempted to suggest a linguistic exercise. Try explaining something to me avoiding the use of adjectives.
@Alan Fox:
ReplyDelete"If I gave that impression it was unintentional, because I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is 'actually true'."
Even in making this statement you're distinguishing between what we can know to be true and what is true. That's precisely Greg's point, and I've just made it again without using the word "ontological."
Hi Scott
ReplyDeleteYou claim:
Even in making this statement you're distinguishing between what we can know to be true and what is true. That's precisely Greg's point, and I've just made it again without using the word "ontological."
I think we're miscommunicating.
I say we can't be certain of anything. I'm not sure how to define truth, let alone how to establish it or how to be certain about it.
I realize that the issue of "scientific" truth is supposedly being addressed here, but it seems as though the truth skeptical position being advanced is implied as going well beyond that.
ReplyDelete" I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is 'actually true'."
Certainly there are any number of mundane propositions the truth or falsity of which could easily (unless we wish to play bizarre Clintonesque games) be made clear and determined as 'actually true' or not.
- There are 6 black walnut trees in my back yard older than 40 years.
- My wife is blond and the daughter of a stockbroker.
- I took an 8 point buck last hunting season.
True or false, I fail to see in what interesting or significant way such propositions should have to be treated as in some way chronically indeterminate.
...generally uncontroversial...
ReplyDeleteHow does one settle a philosophical controversy? Seems there is only consensus.
@Alan Fox:
ReplyDelete"I think we're miscommunicating."
Perhaps you are. I'm not.
"I say we can't be certain of anything."
Are you sure that we can't be certain of anything? For that matter, are you sure that that's what you're asserting?
"I'm not sure how to define truth, let alone how to establish it or how to be certain about it."
And in saying so, you're denying only that we can know with certainty what is the case. You're not in any way denying that there's a fact of the matter that we just don't happen to be able to know. Those are two different propositions, and Greg is correct to say that you're confusing them even though (as he's shown by quoting you) you distinguish them yourself.
@Greg:
A minor point—TLS wasn't written before Aquinas.
Scott asserts:
ReplyDelete[AF said]"I think we're miscommunicating."
Perhaps you are. I'm not.
I admire your certainty. I think the test of whether you have miscommunicated depends whether your message has been understood correctly..
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteIf I gave that impression it was unintentional, because I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is "actually true".
I don't think it was unintentional; we are simply hearing a new song now. For example, take a given proposition that you (at least previously) would have said was untestable. Is it true or false? Or neither? (Previously you said it might be true or false, but we don't know.) By hypothesis, it is not provisionally true, nor demonstrably false, because there is no evidence for or against it. To say we can't be certain that it is actually true doesn't call into question that an untestable proposition is true or false. (You've said that circumstances can change and we can come to regard it as provisionally true under new evidence.)
I say we can't be certain of anything. I'm not sure how to define truth, let alone how to establish it or how to be certain about it.
Establishing and being certain about it are separate issues. When we say that a proposition is "provisionally true," what are we saying? That the evidence supports it? What does it mean for evidence to support it? How can you give an account of what it means for a proposition to cohere with the evidence apart from truth considerations?
We can concern ourselves with bits of reality and see whether we can come to a better understanding of it without ever worrying about an overarching truth.
OK... I don't get what your point is. I can go about my daily life, drive to work, text people on my iPhone, etc. "without ever worrying about an overarching truth." I can do all of those things without worrying about even the provisional scientific truths that make them possible.
There are some adjectives that only get used in certain phrases. Who uses "arrant" except in "arrant nonsense"? I'm finding it harder the more I read definitions and explanations of "ontology" to see the emperor's clothes here. "ontological argument" seems a paraphrase for argument about "being" or "existence". What does the insertion or substitution of this adjective bring to the table?
Kant named a certain class of arguments for Gods existence (those that proceed from definitions alone) "ontological arguments". They have nothing to do with ontology per se.
Ontology is simply the catalogue of what exists. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge; how do we know what exists? do we know what exists? what does it mean to know what exists?
Now, obviously, to abandon ontology, you will need to throw out this understanding of ontology, for "what exists" reeks of ontological superstition. I'm not sure how you hope to do it.
I'm tempted to suggest a linguistic exercise. Try explaining something to me avoiding the use of adjectives.
As Scott said, it's simply a matter of distinguishing between what is true and what we know (or hold/believe) to be true. When we hold that a proposition is true (ie. provisionally), what are we doing?
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteHow does one settle a philosophical controversy? Seems there is only consensus.
When I speak of what is controversial, I am not arguing that you are wrong, more pointing out that you are making claims that, if they are to be taken seriously, require a lot of support. Denying that negation or the law of excluded middle work, for instance, is a very controversial claim. I don't claim the consensus is right, just that if it is to be disputed, it needs to be argued against.
Now, I do think that if you abandon the negation truth function or the distinction between ontology and epistemology, then it becomes impossible to reason and discuss with you. I can understand someone who has doubts about S5 or quantified modal logic, or someone who thinks there are some very specific circumstances in which we need a many-valued logic. But someone who denies negation can't be reasoned with; if one denies negation, then a proposition and its negation need not have different truth values and one could literally embrace a contradiction. His philosophical system would be, as they say, non-falsifiable.
Scott wrote:
ReplyDelete...you're denying only that we can know with certainty what is the case. You're not in any way denying that there's a fact of the matter that we just don't happen to be able to know.
This is a bit garbled, so I'm not quite sure what your point is.
If it helps clarify, I'll restate what I think. I agree there may be time-dependent truths*. When DNW looks at his walnut trees, he is entitled to believe they are there at that moment. When does a nut become a tree? We can be charitable and assume DNW is not deluded or innumerate. We can be less certain of the moment when those trees were first there. historical accuracy is not guaranteed. And, I suggest there are no truths which will certainly be true for all time, or even tomorrow.
*though we haven't settled "what is truth?" yet.
@ Scott
ReplyDeleteAre you sure that we can't be certain of anything? For that matter, are you sure that that's what you're asserting?
I think just maybe we can't be certain of anything!
A minor point—TLS wasn't written before Aquinas.
TLS was published in 2008, Aquinas in 2009. (Maybe you're thinking of the TLS paperback, which was published in 2010.)
Now, obviously, to abandon ontology, you will need to throw out this understanding of ontology, for "what exists" reeks of ontological superstition. I'm not sure how you hope to do it.
ReplyDeleteSorry: you will have to throw out this understanding of epistemology.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteI posted this a while ago but got no response:
Let's just ask this: what group of categories of claims (I think it would be clearer if we start saying "propositions" rather than "claims") do you think accurately describe our ontological situation? What about our epistemological situation?
(A) Provisionally true, provisionally false, untestable
(B) Provisionally true, demonstrably false, untestable
(C) True, false
(D) Demonstrably true, provisionally true, provisionally false, demonstrably false, untestable
Or something else? Or some combination?
Here is the problem I see.
(1) Suppose that p is demonstrably false.
(2) Then p is false. (definition of demonstration)
(3) Then "it is not the case that p" is true. (definition of negation)
(4) If we know that p is false, then we know that "it is not the case that p" is true.
(5) So some propositions are demonstrably true.
At which step does this reasoning go awry? Since your problem is with dichotomies, would you deny that negations are valid? The cost of denying such an essential truth function is simply magnificent.
Answering this will give me a handle on what you are claiming now.
Greg:
ReplyDeleteYou youself have distinguished between what can or should be provisionally accepted as true and what is actually true.
AF/
If I gave that impression it was unintentional, because I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is "actually true".
Greg:
I don't think it was unintentional; we are simply hearing a new song now.
Krushchev telegram!
For example, take a given proposition that you (at least previously) would have said was untestable. Is it true or false? Or neither? (Previously you said it might be true or false, but we don't know.) By hypothesis, it is not provisionally true, nor demonstrably false, because there is no evidence for or against it. To say we can't be certain that it is actually true doesn't call into question that an untestable proposition is true or false. (You've said that circumstances can change and we can come to regard it as provisionally true under new evidence.)
There is still the filter of perception. Shared experience is a good guide to protect against delusion but absolute truth (depending how one defines it) is an unattainable ideal. That's why I'm a pragmatist..
Greg asks:
ReplyDeleteSince your problem is with dichotomies, would you deny that negations are valid? The cost of denying such an essential truth function is simply magnificent.
There is proposition A and its negative proposition B. If B is wrong, A is right and vice versa. I'm sure that works in mathematics. Doesn't work for reality. It assumes A and B neither overlap nor exclude possibilities we are unaware of. Not a way to be certain of something.
A trivial example. Define the boundary of the planet, Jupiter. I contend thet it is impossible to say where Jupiter begins and ends; what is Jupiter and what isn't Jupiter. Hint; it's a gas giant.
@Alan Fox:
ReplyDelete"This is a bit garbled…"
No, it isn't. I said, quite ungarbledly and plainly, that you're not denying that anything is the case at all, just that we can know with certainty what is the case.
At this precise moment, there either is, or is not, a golden sphere exactly ten feet in diameter sitting in my back yard at a distance of twenty to thirty feet from my garden shed. One of those two is the case, and you've nowhere denied—in fact you've affirmed, with varying degrees of explicitness— that there is a fact of the matter about such things. All you've denied is that we can know with certainty what the fact of the matter is—which, as Greg says, is an epistemological claim, not an ontological one, even if you don't like those words.
"If it helps clarify&…"
I'm afraid it doesn't. All you're doing now is introducing further extraneous issues—conceptual vagueness, indexicality, and so forth.
"I suggest there are no truths which will certainly be true for all time, or even tomorrow."
Including that one?
@Greg:
"TLS was published in 2008, Aquinas in 2009. (Maybe you're thinking of the TLS paperback, which was published in 2010.)"
Aha, yes, that's very likely it; thanks. I have the paperback.
Scott writes:
ReplyDeleteAt this precise moment, there either is, or is not, a golden sphere exactly ten feet in diameter sitting in my back yard at a distance of twenty to thirty feet from my garden shed. One of those two is the case, and you've nowhere denied—in fact you've affirmed, with varying degrees of explicitness— that there is a fact of the matter about such things.
I suggest that the claim "there is a golden ball in your garden, now" is a testable hypothesis. What does calling a claim such as "there is a golden ball in my garden" either ontological or epistemic add to the hypothesis?
Truth is something we can be certain about?
ReplyDeleteTrue or false?
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteThere is still the filter of perception. Shared experience is a good guide to protect against delusion but absolute truth (depending how one defines it) is an unattainable ideal.
What on earth is "delusion"? It can't be defined in terms of the way the world actually is, if ontology is eliminated.
Doesn't work for reality. It assumes A and B neither overlap nor exclude possibilities we are unaware of.
Any problem is the negation is going to be due to a problem in the original proposition; the problem is not with negation.
Take your example of Jupiter. Start heading away from Jupiter's core and consider the proposition "What I am pointing at is Jupiter." There will be points where this is true without a doubt. When you get far enough away, there will be points after which it is false without a doubt. There is some area where there is conceptual vagueness, where we don't know what to say.
But this has nothing to do with vagueness or excluded middle. We haven't said anything about them yet.
But as long as we use the same sense of "Jupiter" in "What I am pointing at is Jupiter" and "It is not the case that what I am pointing at is Jupiter", there is no issue. The issue only arises if you equivocate. (The same is true with your previous hot/cold issue.)
Frankly, this is the problem with scientism. Proponents of scientism are willing to give up literally anything to maintain their favorite flavor of verificationism.
But this has nothing to do with vagueness or excluded middle.
ReplyDeleteOops. Nothing to do with negation or excluded middle.
@Alan Fox:
ReplyDelete"I suggest that the claim 'there is a golden ball in your garden, now' is a testable hypothesis."
And I suggest that it is therefore, very obviously, either true or false, right now, independently of whether either of us knows which. This would be implied by its being testable even if you hadn't already acknowledged as much (which you have).
So, yet again, you're acknowledging that something is really the case, and that your doubts extend only to our knowledge of it.
"What does calling a claim such as 'there is a golden ball in my garden' either ontological or epistemic add to the hypothesis?"
Who cares? Greg's terminology is entirely accurate, but if you don't like (or understand) it, don't use it. I think I've made amply clear that it doesn't matter whether you employ those precise words or not.
Either there is, or there isn't, a golden ball in my garden; that's a statement about what is, or isn't, the case, as indeed any hypothesis must be. And if it's "testable," then there must be some way for us to go about finding out whether or not it's the case, even if the results aren't conclusive (and even if they don't also tell us whether there will be a golden ball in my garden tomorrow). None of this is the least bit affected by whether or not you want to use the terms "ontological" and "epistemological."
"A trivial example. Define the boundary of the planet, Jupiter. I contend [that] it is impossible to say where Jupiter begins and ends; what is Jupiter and what isn't Jupiter. Hint; it's a gas giant."
And I contend that this "example" is not only trivial but utterly irrelevant. In order for there to be any genuine doubt as to whether (say) I'm sitting at the core of Jupiter right now, there would have to be so much vagueness about what is and isn't "Jupiter" that the word would be meaningless.
Scott writes:
ReplyDeleteWho cares? Well, indeed!
Greg's terminology is entirely accurate, but if you don't like (or understand) it, don't use it.
I can assure you that I have neither written nor spoken either word (ontology, epistemology) since learning to read and write before posting comments on this blog. So no worries there. And I have only picked up on those words because I don't understand them.
As far as I can see we are still at point zero. I wonder how anyone can know anything of the external world without learning about it through their sensory inputs, making pragmatic assumptions, testing them and refining them, sharing experience.
I wonder what the initial premises to Dr Feser's TCA might be.
Alan Fox writes,
ReplyDelete" If it helps clarify, I'll restate what I think. I agree there may be time-dependent truths*. When DNW looks at his walnut trees, he is entitled to believe they are there at that moment. When does a nut become a tree? We can be charitable and assume DNW is not deluded or innumerate. We can be less certain of the moment when those trees were first there. historical accuracy is not guaranteed. And, I suggest there are no truths which will certainly be true for all time, or even tomorrow."
Well ...
Let's recall what you had actually written originally:
" I don't think we can ever be certain that anything is 'actually true'."
Now let's look at what you have more recently written:
"If it helps clarify, I'll restate what I think. I agree there may be time-dependent truths*"
Now let's take a look at what I had written in response to your original remarks:
" Certainly there are any number of mundane propositions the truth or falsity of which could easily (unless we wish to play bizarre Clintonesque games) be made clear and determined as 'actually true' or not.
- There are 6 black walnut trees in my back yard older than 40 years.
- My wife is blond and the daughter of a stockbroker.
- I took an 8 point buck last hunting season.
True or false, I fail to see in what interesting or significant way such propositions should have to be treated as in some way chronically indeterminate.
August 11, 2014 at 11:16 AM"
Maybe you need to look up the term "chronic".
In any event, as you have already expressed your lack of familiarity with basic logic and because you have just admitted more or less to the vacuity of your own objection, perhaps you would be interested in an acknowledged expert's take on this issue.
Therefore, I suggest that you refer to the (some days ago) aforementioned Copi's work. Especially the section on "Uniform Translation" of the constituent propositions of a categorical syllogism. This will serve to introduce you to the mystery of temporal parameters.
Maybe you need to look up the term "chronic".
ReplyDeleteIf you are using "chronically" in it's usual sense, I would have read that as "persisting over time" but you never know with philosophers. There may be a specialist use that I'm unaware of. In science, it is usual to define terms that may be ambiguous or have a range of meanings. Getting consensus definitions of philosophical terms seems a little less rigorous
I suggest that you refer to the (some days ago) aforementioned Copi's work.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the suggestion. I see it appears to be available on line. Do you think it will include duffer's definitions for "Ontology" and "epistemology"?
Alan Fox said...
ReplyDelete" 'Maybe you need to look up the term "chronic".'
If you are using "chronically" in it's usual sense, I would have read that as "persisting over time" but you never know with philosophers. ...
August 11, 2014 at 2:43 PM
Once again:
" - There are 6 black walnut trees in my back yard older than 40 years.
- My wife is blond and the daughter of a stockbroker.
- I took an 8 point buck last hunting season.
True or false, I fail to see in what interesting or significant way such propositions should have to be treated as in some way chronically indeterminate.
August 11, 2014 at 11:16 AM"
Blogger Alan Fox also said...
" 'I suggest that you refer to the (some days ago) aforementioned Copi's work.'
Thanks for the suggestion. I see it appears to be available on line. Do you think it will include duffer's definitions for "Ontology" and "epistemology"?
August 11, 2014 at 2:45 PM"
First we walk, then we run ...
@ Alan Fox,
ReplyDelete"I wonder what the initial premises to Dr Feser's TCA might be."
I do believe I've already addressed that question; never fear, I'll reproduce it for you:
Take the First Way. The premises include: that there is such as thing as change, that change consists in the transition from potentiality to actuality, that this transition can only be brought about by something already actual(c.f.whatever moves is moved by another), that there are two categories of causal series, accidentally ordered and essentially ordered, that the latter sort must have a logical (not temporal) first member, which must be pure actuality.
Here the First Way finishes, and deductions for the divine attributes begin, following logically from the conclusion of the First Way. (ie omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipresence, simplicity, personality, eternity, impassibility, etc.)
Thus pure actuality = God.
You're welcome.
Greg Johnson writes (in response to my question:
ReplyDeleteI wonder what the initial premises to Dr Feser's TCA might be.
I do believe I've already addressed that question...
Are you sure, Greg Johnson? You appear to be saying I need look no further than, say, here and lift the premises verbatim. These are the premises Dr Feser works from to complete his TCA?
That would be very convenient, if true. Does everyone agree with Greg Johnson that Feser's premises are identical to Aquinas' premises?
DNW asks:
ReplyDeleteTrue or false, I fail to see in what interesting or significant way such propositions should have to be treated as in some way chronically indeterminate.
Taking you at your word, true.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteI wonder how anyone can know anything of the external world without learning about it through their sensory inputs, making pragmatic assumptions, testing them and refining them, sharing experience.
Right, but no one is denying that, and this certainly doesn't amount to the collapse of ontology and epistemology. (That when we make judgments, even provisional judgments, they are "about" "the external world" is an ontological superstition as well. We encounter the same problem as before, that in trying to phrase things as though ontology is obviously extraneous, one speaks about what is the case apart from our beliefs and knowledge about it.)
1403...trying to phrase things as though ontology is obviously extraneous...
ReplyDeleteNot being difficult here. I just don't grasp what calling some concept "ontological" tells you about the concept to which the adjective is appended.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteNot being difficult here. I just don't grasp what calling some concept "ontological" tells you about the concept to which the adjective is appended.
Well, take two propositions:
- "My coffee cup is warm."
- "I know my coffee cup is warm."
One makes a claim about the way the world is, one makes a claim about how I believe the world is. One is an ontological claim, the other is epistemological.
Where is the confusion here...?
Another pair:
- "Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade."
- "There is evidence to believe that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade."
Note that the first is a logical part of the second; prima facie, the ontological claim (if the world "ontological" is too long, just think about it as a claim about what there is) is not eliminable from the epistemological claim.
Greg
ReplyDeleteThank-you for your patience.
By that explanation anything I say can be construed as an ontological statement. It's just briefer to omit the "I think, I believe, I am almost certain that...". Still seems a distinction without a whole lot of content.
Alan Fox,
ReplyDeleteWere there microorganisms in existence before the human discovery of microorganisms?
Were there microorganisms in existence before the human discovery of microorganisms?
ReplyDeleteI'm almost certain of it. Do you think knowledge or truth must involve a knower? Does the tree fall soundlessly unless someone hears it?
Do you know if Feser's TCA premises map on to Aquinas' original premises?
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteBy that explanation anything I say can be construed as an ontological statement. It's just briefer to omit the "I think, I believe, I am almost certain that...". Still seems a distinction without a whole lot of content.
I'm sorry but it's a distinction with a ton of content. The position is rife with inconsistencies; it sweeps every difficulty under the rug. That people who utter the types of propositions I gave examples of are saying different things is about as fundamental a truth about human language use as you can get. (It's interesting that you have basically slipped into a position Wittgenstein argues against in On Certainty. We regularly assert things as though they are certainly the case, ie. "I have two hands," "the moon exists," etc. Wittgenstein considers a hypothetical objector who would replace all of these with statements like "It's almost certain I have two hands" or "It's almost certain that the moon exists". And on his theory of meaning at least, this has no effect--because the new propositions have the same use as the old, and therefore the same meaning. We can't be systematically doubtful if we nevertheless behave as though we aren't.)
Another amusing consequence of your view is that it renders propositions disclosing epistemological facts epistemological themselves. Consider my previous example:
- "Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade."
- "There is evidence to believe that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade."
Is it true that "there is evidence to believe that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade"? To say something true on this analysis is to say that the evidence favors it, or that it is "almost certain," or something of the sort. It would be ad hoc to exempt epistemological claims from this (especially considering they're all that's left), so we get:
- "There is evidence to believe that there is evidence to believe that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade."
That's a strange beast. I don't think it accurately describes our epistemic situation: what sort of evidence is the second-level claim appealing to, exactly? (And there is, of course, no reason to stop here.)
Do you know if Feser's TCA premises map on to Aquinas' original premises?
Maybe I'm just blanking, but what is a TCA? Cosmological argument? I think Feser's premises are close to Aquinas's for the First Way. There is more exegetical leeway for the other four. (It's not clear whether the Second Way is the same as the argument from De Ente et Essentia or something else. Interpreters dispute whether the Third and Fourth Ways are even valid or, in the case of the latter, overly neo-Platonistic, and Feser has his own reading. And as the discussion with Torley shows, the Fifth Way is a topic of dispute, though I think Feser's reading is accurate.)
Alan Fox,
ReplyDeleteSorry, I don't know about how exactly Feser's argument is related to Aquinas's original.
Knowledge describes a relationship of a person to the truth, the latter of which would exist whether or not there are people at all. Knowledge and truth are therefore distinct and not interchangeable (as your question would have it).
So certainly, the fall of the tree produces vibrations, even when no one is present to hear those vibrations as sound.
You obviously know this, which is why you are "almost certain" that there were microorganisms in existence [TRUTH] before the human discovery of microorganisms [KNOWLEDGE].
The fact that you are not fully certain does no work here; if there were no distinction between truth and knowledge, there would be no meaningful proposition to be "almost certain of." Any talk of microorganisms existing prior to their discovery would be nonsense.
...but what is a TCA?
ReplyDeleteThomist Cosmological Argument. I presumed all regulars were familiar with the acronym.
Greg says:
ReplyDeleteI think Feser's premises are close to Aquinas's for the First Way.
And you are happy that this is a fair translation?
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.
Knowledge and truth are therefore distinct and not interchangeable (as your question would have it).
ReplyDeleteDon't think I've ever said that. I'm sure I've said that I'm not sure what truth is. I've also tried to indicate the difference between the ultimate limits of human knowledge - that that lies within the past and future light cone of the Earth and what is reliably (or less reliably) known currently.
Really?
ReplyDeleteIn the context above, you posed a yes-or-no question,
Do you think knowledge or truth must involve a knower?
which can only admit a yes-or-no answer if "knowledge" and "truth" are interchangeable.
This is beginning to smack of bad faith.
In the context above, you posed a yes-or-no question,<
ReplyDeleteDo you think knowledge or truth must involve a knower?
which can only admit a yes-or-no answer if "knowledge" and "truth" are interchangeable.
Yes, I apologise. That was sloppy. Delete "or truth". Although Perhaps it has something to do with the idea of universals. As a pragmatist, I don't find anything useful in the angst-ing over realism, nominalism, conceptualism etc.
This is beginning to smack of bad faith.
I'm rather more interested in establishing whether unmodified Aquinas forms the basis of Fesr's TCA.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteThomist Cosmological Argument. I presumed all regulars were familiar with the acronym.
I'm not familiar with it. There are at least 3 Thomist cosmological arguments, though, all with different exegetical dimensions.
And you are happy that this is a fair translation?
I'm fine with that. (But that's being an adequate translation of course depends on someone's background knowledge of Thomism, ie. what it means for something to be "moved." Aquinas defines motion in that paragraph, but that doesn't mean that you won't find people brazenly taken him to mean something else--ie. local motion.)
But (as is evident) for the most part there are not arguments for any of those premises in the statement of the First Way.
In "Existential inertia and the Five Ways," for instance, he states the argument this way:
1. That the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world follows from the occurrence of the events we know of via sensory experience.
2. The occurrence of any event E presupposes the operation of a substance.
3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes the concurrent actualization of a potency.
4. No mere potency can actualize a potency; only something actual can do so.
5. So any actualizer A of S’s current existence must itself be actual.
6. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of a further potency or (b) A’s being purely actual.
7. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of a further potency, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
8. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a causal series ordered per se, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
9. So either A itself is purely actual or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress of concurrent actualizers.
10. So the occurrence of E and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
(He qualifies that he does not claim to be doing exegesis. But the exegetical points are not really relevant, since to refute Aquinas's First Way, one would have to show that it does not instantiate any sound argument form.)
Your account of knowledge has been shown to be incoherent in two separate ways. If I were in your shoes, I suppose I'd want to talk about something else, too.
ReplyDeleteYour account of knowledge has been shown to be incoherent in two separate ways.
ReplyDeleteAh well, nobody's perfect. I didn't even realise I was on test for a good account of knowledge, whatever that is. I'm more interested in stuff than what you call stuff.
Greg writes:
ReplyDeleteBut (as is evident) for the most part there are not arguments for any of those premises in the statement of the First Way.
So Greg Johnson was wrong on this point. Ah well.
So this is the definitive set of premises for The First Way à la Feser:
1. That the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world follows from the occurrence of the events we know of via sensory experience.
2. The occurrence of any event E presupposes the operation of a substance.
3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes the concurrent actualization of a potency.
4. No mere potency can actualize a potency; only something actual can do so.
It's late so I'll get back to you. But just quickly, what might a "potency" be and what would be a process of "actualization"? Potential entity becomes real entity?
à Greg
ReplyDeleteNever mind, I see it's Aristotle.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteI didn't even realise I was on test for a good account of knowledge, whatever that is.
I think that's what people have taken you to be doing since you seem to be trying to eliminate ontology, leaving just epistemology (the study of knowledge, justified belief, what have you). (I say "seem" because you don't seem to be sure what you're doing.)
So Greg Johnson was wrong on this point. Ah well.
I don't know what you're referring to. Quickly scanning over his posts, it doesn't seem like he denied anything I said. (Aquinas's statement of the Five Ways in the Summa is a summary that also assumes familiarity with Aristotelian metaphysics. Certain premises are argued for elsewhere or were generally shared by Aquinas's contemporaries and were part of the general tradition. Feser argues for them a bit more explicitly, especially in Scholastic Metaphysics, since they are not accepted to such an extent today.)
It's late so I'll get back to you. But just quickly, what might a "potency" be and what would be a process of "actualization"? Potential entity becomes real entity?
Yeah, it's Aristotelian. There is really no point in debating this if you don't aim to get familiar with an extended treatment of the arguments and arguments for the premises in books like Aquinas and Scholastic Metaphysics, since I have no interest in regurgitating lengthy arguments in a combox to someone who has no coherent philosophical commitments and will deny anything (even the negation truth function or the distinction between ontology and epistemology) to maintain some sort of verificationism.
@ Alan Fox,
ReplyDeleteExcuse me. You were after something that Feser (specifically) formulated, rather than any version of the CA. I apologise. However, Having read his books TLS and Aquinas, I do have some knowledge of how the First Way at least runs; therefore I felt qualified to pipe up and answer you question, which was the premises were.
Not sure how I was wrong. You asked what "the initial premises" were, and I listed them, not argued for them. That does not entail that there were no arguments for them full stop. I wasn't quoting Aquinas directly, merely reconstructing from memory what the premises of the First Way were.
Good day
Alan Fox: I didn't even realise I was on test for a good account of knowledge, whatever that is. I'm more interested in stuff than what you call stuff.
ReplyDeleteYou were explicitly on an attack mission in the beginning, then ostensibly on a learning mission to get to see the Thomistic point of view, but already on the outset you tried to get rid of some necessary basic distinctions, such as ontological versus epistemological. Then you keep repeating the same with every distinction you encounter, such as with potentiality and actuality. Looks like every little word is new for you and at times you question the usefulness of words altogether.
This is philosophical potty-training, funny for some, but mostly frustrating. Greg has had immense generous patience with you, but it's totally futile when your aim is actually to find some perceived flaw based on which to call the whole system wrong without ever trying to understand the system.
If you are really interested in stuff rather than what people call stuff, then don't turn to people to learn about it. Do it on your own by yourself.
Commenting on these premises, a regular at TSZ, who happens to be a philosophy prof, commented on the premises Feser uses for his version of The First Way.
ReplyDelete1. That the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world follows from the occurrence of the events we know of via sensory experience.
2. The occurrence of any event E presupposes the operation of a substance.
3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes the concurrent actualization of a potency.
4. No mere potency can actualize a potency; only something actual can do so.
This is only intelligible by someone who already has a grasp on the concepts of “potency” (what Aristotle called dunamis, from which we get “dynamic”) and “actuality” (what Aristotle called energeia, from which we get “energy”). For Aristotle these weren’t esoteric terms of art — they were tightly integrated into his science, including physics, biology, astronomy, and psychology. (As well as into his ethics).
The chief error of contemporary Scholastics like Feser (and there are many others) is that they think that they can acknowledge that our physics and biology are no more longer Aristotelian, but that we can still retain Aristotelianism in our metaphysics.
That is, ironically, a deeply anti-Aristotelian thought. Aristotle uses these concepts in his metaphysics because they are central to his science. Aristotle understood that what we do in metaphysics — what he called “first philosophy” — is based on and answerable to what we do in science — what he called “second philosophy”. Aristotle would never have seriously entertained the thought that we can have a different set of basic concepts in our metaphysical vocabulary than we have in our scientific vocabulary. The two must go hand in hand.
Here
You were explicitly on an attack mission in the beginning...
ReplyDeleteNot correct, young man. See my first comment in this thread.
@ Greg Johnson
ReplyDeleteNo crime to be wrong. I'm wrong half a dozen times a day. Ask my wife. You kindly referred me to Aquinas' version of the "Five Ways" and I was asking specifically for Feser's version of the premises. This because Feser objects that people routinely attack a strawman and I didn't want to lengthen his list of names.
@Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteYou copied someone else's response who is not getting the distinction of potentiality and actuality (and is apparently proud of it too) and pasted it here as if this was something new. Seriously, it's not new at all when somebody is unwilling to learn a philosophical system, or form one's own, or is incapable of learning and forming philosophical systems. It's not new at all. It's very common.
It's impossible to talk to you because you have no commitments and no goals. It means you have no vocabulary to have a meaningful dialogue with. You simply copy-paste the internet.
Alan Fox: Not correct, young man. See my first comment in this thread.
Are you sure you are older than me? If you are, it makes it only worse...
Greg wrote:
ReplyDeleteI have no interest in regurgitating lengthy arguments in a combox to someone who has no coherent philosophical commitments and will deny anything (even the negation truth function or the distinction between ontology and epistemology) to maintain some sort of verificationism.
I already accept (I say for the sake of argument as I don't think we need to get that far) that the conclusions drawn from the premises may be unassailable . It's the basing of the premises in reality that is at issue. So please no long comments. I have only so many years left. I need to fast-track. I do follow links.
I agree that there doesn't seem much point in continuing as the premises to the "First Way" make no sense in the light of current science and reality. I may still be beating straw-men and I'll keep an eye out in case Dr Feser wants to correct any wrong impression. Otherwise thanks for your patience.
You or anyone else are welcome to look in here if ever you feel like having an assumption challenged.
Greg wrote:
ReplyDeleteI have no interest in regurgitating lengthy arguments in a combox to someone who has no coherent philosophical commitments and will deny anything (even the negation truth function or the distinction between ontology and epistemology) to maintain some sort of verificationism.
I already accept (I say for the sake of argument as I don't think we need to get that far) that the conclusions drawn from the premises may be unassailable . It's the basing of the premises in reality that is at issue. So please no long comments. I have only so many years left. I need to fast-track. I do follow links.
I agree that there doesn't seem much point in continuing as the premises to the "First Way" make no sense in the light of current science and reality. I may still be beating straw-men and I'll keep an eye out in case Dr Feser wants to correct any wrong impression. Otherwise thanks for your patience.
You or anyone else are welcome to look in here if ever you feel like having an assumption challenged.
You copied someone else's response who is not getting the distinction of potentiality and actuality (and is apparently proud of it too) and pasted it here as if this was something new.
ReplyDeleteNew? The Third Century BC is not new, in my book. When you say wrong, do you mean that Aristotle's ideas of potency and actuality have some explanatory power or is it just that KN is wrong in some detail?
It's impossible to talk to you because you have no commitments and no goals. It means you have no vocabulary to have a meaningful dialogue with. You simply copy-paste the internet.
Goodness me, that's a stretch! I run Feser's premises past a philosophy professional, he expresses an opinion and I repost it here because I sense a certain reluctance of commenters here to venture beyond the gate. And that's copy pasting the internet!
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteCommenting on these premises, a regular at TSZ, who happens to be a philosophy prof, commented on the premises Feser uses for his version of The First Way.
Kantian Naturalist is a philosophy professor? Oh dear...
This is only intelligible by someone who already has a grasp on the concepts of “potency” (what Aristotle called dunamis, from which we get “dynamic”) and “actuality” (what Aristotle called energeia, from which we get “energy”). For Aristotle these weren’t esoteric terms of art — they were tightly integrated into his science, including physics, biology, astronomy, and psychology. (As well as into his ethics).
The chief error of contemporary Scholastics like Feser (and there are many others) is that they think that they can acknowledge that our physics and biology are no more longer Aristotelian, but that we can still retain Aristotelianism in our metaphysics.
That is, ironically, a deeply anti-Aristotelian thought. Aristotle uses these concepts in his metaphysics because they are central to his science. Aristotle understood that what we do in metaphysics — what he called “first philosophy” — is based on and answerable to what we do in science — what he called “second philosophy”. Aristotle would never have seriously entertained the thought that we can have a different set of basic concepts in our metaphysical vocabulary than we have in our scientific vocabulary. The two must go hand in hand.
This is why I recommended that you actually read Feser's work. Feser offers a constructive case; unlike Kantian Naturalist, he does not appeal to the authority of Aristotle.
I am admittedly not entirely familiar with the exegetical details, so perhaps there is a sense in which "Aristotle uses these concepts in his metaphysics because they are central to his science." However, that doesn't tie Feser's use of them to Aristotle's science, as I hope is apparent. All this would mean is that Aristotle's scientific usage implies his metaphysical usage, not the other way around (which is what KN would need for Feser to be committed to Aristotelian physical science).
If the concepts can be given justification independently of Aristotle's science, then there is no issue. And that is what Feser does, because KN is neglecting their strictly metaphysical role in Aristotle's refutations of Parmenides and Heraclitus (which is where Feser gets the terms).
(There also are differences in the way that Feser uses the terms from how Aristotle does, because Feser is a Thomist, and in Thomism they relate differently, for example, to essence and existence, a distinction which Aristotle never formulated.)
Not to mention, for whatever reason I am skeptical that Kantian Naturalist is familiar with "contemporary Scholastics" like David Oderberg who have addressed these issues at considerable length. The A-T philosopher neither accepts Aristotelian biology full-stop, nor contemporary biology full-stop.
As I said before, proponents of scientism will deny literally anything to maintain their scientism. This is why all you asked for is a list of premises, rather than trying to view the arguments in the context of the general metaphysics which argues for the premises: because you want to go post them on "The Skeptical Zone" and figure out which one can be rejected.
I should note that another neat motivation for accepting actuality and potentiality is that they can be invoked to resolve the problem of future truth.
ReplyDeleteAristotle understood that what we do in metaphysics — what he called “first philosophy” — is based on and answerable to what we do in science — what he called “second philosophy”. Aristotle would never have seriously entertained the thought that we can have a different set of basic concepts in our metaphysical vocabulary than we have in our scientific vocabulary.
ReplyDeleteWhat is also a bit amusing is that Aristotle didn't have a "scientific vocabulary" in the way we do. Aristotelian science is not just underdeveloped modern science. To read Aristotle as making a distinction that is straightforwardly relevant to contemporary distinctions between metaphysics and science is anachronistic.
This is just a shameless reading of contemporary naturalism back into Aristotle.
@ Alan Fox
ReplyDeleteIt's the basing of the premises in reality that is at issue. So please no long comments. I have only so many years left. I need to fast-track. I do follow links.
Well, Feser's books are short and readable. His series of posts on Nagel (just search for "Nagel roundup") argue against scientism, although again, there are fuller treatments in his books.
I agree that there doesn't seem much point in continuing as the premises to the "First Way" make no sense in the light of current science and reality.
I'm glad your friends at The Skeptical Zone helped you to see that before you wasted any time reading your opponent's arguments for his own premises.
Otherwise thanks for your patience.
No problem. I hope you succeed in dispassionately sorting out your philosophical commitments.
Unnamed philosophy "professor":
ReplyDelete"The chief error of contemporary Scholastics like Feser (and there are many others) is that they think that they can acknowledge that our physics and biology are no more [sic] longer Aristotelian…"
Um, hello? Anybody even remotely with Feser's work should know that he most certainly does not "acknowledge" that physics and biology have been (or, in principle, ever could be) successfully transferred to a non-Aristotelian foundation.
Of course Feser acknowledges that the details of Aristotle's own physics and biology turned out not to be sound, but that's another matter. If that's what "Professor" X had in mind and he was just writing carelessly, then Greg has already given an adequate reply.
ReplyDeleteI'll just add that Feser and those who agree with him (including me) think Aristotle used those concepts in his metaphysics not merely because they were central to his science but because they're central to any science. Neither Alan Fox nor, it seems, his quoted source has given (or is likely to give) any serious consideration to the arguments for this claim.
("…even remotely familiar with Feser's work." Oops.)
ReplyDelete'Sure people argue over details but only the deluded might suggest the universe is not real.'
ReplyDeleteAlan, I don't know if you're still reading this, but you've managed to miss my point spectacularly. My 'Universe' argument was meant precisely as a Reductio Ad Absurdum of the view that religious diversity means that God doesn't exist. How do you not get that?
As for Venter, even he himself admits that they did not "create life from scratch". What they did was decode the chromosome of an existing bacterial cell and then inserted it into another bacterial cell. Please be careful when reading popular science magazines. Science journalists are even worse than their traditional couterparts when it comes to overhyping stuff.
ReplyDeleteAs for speciation, even young earth creationists accept it within what they called "baramins" or "created kinds". After all, how else could you get so many species in only a few thousand of years after the Flood? : - P It's not something they're bothered by, they NEED it. See baraminology.