There are
two sorts of people who might be tempted to think of death as a friend: those
who think the nature of the human person has nothing to do with the body, and
those who think it has everything to do with the body; in short, Platonists and
materialists. Protestant theologian Oscar
Cullmann summarizes the Platonist’s position in his little book Immortality
of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? as follows:
Our body is only an outer garment
which, as long as we live, prevents our soul from moving freely and from living
in conformity to its proper eternal essence. It imposes upon the soul a law
which is not appropriate to it. The soul, confined within the body, belongs to
the eternal world. As long as we live, our soul finds itself in a prison, that
is, in a body essentially alien to it. Death, in fact, is the great liberator.
It looses the chains, since it leads the soul out of the prison of the body and
back to its eternal home… [T]hrough philosophy we penetrate into that eternal
world of ideas to which the soul belongs, and we free the soul from the prison
of the body. Death does no more than complete this liberation. Plato shows us
how Socrates goes to his death in complete peace and composure. The death of
Socrates is a beautiful death. Nothing is seen here of death’s terror. Socrates
cannot fear death, since indeed it sets us free from the body. Whoever fears
death proves that he loves the world of the body, that he is thoroughly
entangled in the world of sense. Death is the soul’s great friend. So he
teaches; and so, in wonderful harmony with his teaching, he dies… (pp. 19-21)
Cullman sharply contrasts the death of Socrates with the death of Christ, and Plato’s attitude toward death with the Christian attitude:
In Gethsemane He knows that death
stands before Him, just as Socrates expected death on his last day… Jesus
begins ‘to tremble and be distressed’, writes Mark (14:33). ‘My soul is
troubled, even to death’, He says to His disciples… Jesus is afraid, though not
as a coward would be of the men who will kill Him, still less of the pain and
grief which precede death. He is afraid in the face of death itself. Death for
Him is not something divine: it is something dreadful… He was really afraid.
Here is nothing of the composure of Socrates, who met death peacefully as a
friend… [W]hen He concludes, ‘Yet not as I will, but as thou wilt’, this does
not mean that at the last He, like Socrates, regards death as the friend, the
liberator. No, He means only this: If this greatest of all terrors, death, must
befall Me according to Thy will, then I submit to this horror. (pp. 21-22)
For the
Christian, death, as St. Paul famously put it, is “the last enemy” (1 Corinthians
15:26). And victory over it comes with the
resurrection.
Now,
Cullmann overstates the contrast between the two ideas referred to in his
title. He speaks of “the Greek view of death” when what he’s
really talking about is a Greek view,
the Platonic view. It is not the same as the view of the Aristotelian,
for whom the human soul is the form of the body -- or, more precisely, the form
of something which has corporeal as well as incorporeal operations. Hence, while a human being is not annihilated
at death -- his intellect, which is incorporeal and operates partially independently
of the body even during life, is not destroyed when the bodily organs are -- he
persists only in a radically diminished
state. That the soul persists as the
form of this radically reduced substance is what makes resurrection possible, because
there needs to be some continuity between the person who dies and the person
who rises if they are to be the same
person. But until the resurrection
actually occurs, it is not the dead person who in the strictest sense survives,
but only a part of him, albeit the highest part. As Aquinas says (contra the Platonist), “I am
not my soul.” Thus, to Cullmann’s
question “Immortality of the soul or resurrection of the dead?”, Christian
Aristotelians like Aquinas answer: “Both.”
In a
blog post not too long ago, I responded to an objection to the effect that
a Cartesian view of human nature (which is a modern riff on the Platonic view) is
better in accord with the Bible than the Aristotelian-Thomistic view. The critic in question even quoted St. Paul, of
all people, in defense of this claim. In
that post I explained at some length what is wrong with this suggestion, and
one problem with it is that it cannot account for why death is, in scripture,
indeed an enemy, and why St. Paul
puts so much emphasis on the resurrection.
This is intelligible only if the body is integral to human nature in a
way the Platonic-Cartesian view cannot account for. Death is your enemy and resurrection your hope
because you are radically incomplete without your body -- so incomplete that
there is a sense in which you are gone after death and return only with the
resurrection. (Thus does Aquinas suggest
that if we were to speak strictly, we
would say “Soul of St. Peter, pray
for us” rather than “St. Peter, pray for us.”)
The way in
which the materialist might see death as a friend is, of course, very different
from the Platonist’s way. Indeed, it
might seem that the materialist would be even more inclined than the Christian to see death as an enemy, since he
rejects even the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the soul -- not to
mention the resurrection -- and thus (short of some science-fiction style upload
of the “software” of the mind onto a new “computer”) regards death as the end, full stop. (“Christian materialists” would accept the
resurrection, but I will put their odd view to one side for present purposes
and confine my attention to atheistic materialists.)
But on
reflection it is easy enough to see how a materialist might look at death in positive
light. If he’s lived an immoral life and
is even mildly troubled at the thought that all that damnation stuff could turn
out to be true, the idea of annihilation might bring relief. Or, just as atheists often operate with too
crudely anthropomorphic a conception of God, so too do they often operate with
too crudely this-worldly a conception of what an afterlife would be like. Hence, like
Bernard Williams, a materialist might conclude that immortality would be a
bore and judge death a rescue from endless tedium. To Cullmann’s two exemplars we could therefore
add David Hume, reclining cheerfully on his deathbed, as famously
recounted by Boswell.
Then there
is the suffering that often attends death.
As I noted in a
recent post, for Christian apologists of the Neo-Scholastic stripe, it is
not just God’s existence but also divine providence which can be known via purely
philosophical arguments. Hence, even
apart from special divine revelation, we can know that God allows evil in the
world only insofar as he draws greater good out of it. These truths of natural theology are crucial
to a complete natural law argument against the permissibility of suicide and
euthanasia. (See e.g. the account of the
immorality of suicide and euthanasia in Austin Fagothey’s always useful Right
and Reason.)
To be sure,
I think the traditional natural law theorist’s account of the good suffices to
show that it cannot be good
intentionally to end one’s own life or that of another innocent person, quite
apart from questions of divine providence.
But even if one sees the power in these arguments, if one is also convinced
that there is neither a soul that persists beyond death nor a God who can draw
a greater good out of any suffering, the arguments can seem awfully dry and theoretical
compared to the intense suffering that can attend death. There will seem to be no upside to enduring the
suffering other than respect for abstract principle. Hence the temptation in such cases to regard
death as a friend, whose arrival one should intentionally hasten.
As always,
the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosopher’s talent for finding the sober middle
ground saves the day. The body is
integral to you while not being the whole of you. By avoiding both the Platonist’s error and the
materialist’s error we see death for the enemy that it is.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteRight, and the important thing to keep in mind is that this scenario is thoroughly per impossibile (it has already been shown to be incoherent).
Yes, but one of the reasons why this scenario is incoherent is that is presupposes the possibility that God’s intellect apprehends that the less perfect is more perfect than the more perfect, which is clearly absurd. And yet that scenario is the direct consequence of the following assumptions: (a) God creates A and not B, (b) B is more perfect than A, (c) God knows that B is more perfect than A, and (d) God’s will actualizes what God’s intellect determines to be the good.
I suppose that the assumption that is more plausibly rejected is (d), but that would compromise the Thomist account of intellect and will, because according to that account, the will acts according to what the intellect determines to be the good. Aquinas himself endorses this view, even as applicable to God, and thus it would be puzzling for it to be inapplicable to God after all. Furthermore, it would introduce a kind of incontinence in God, which would compromise divine simplicity by introducing composition of different parts operating at cross purposes into God himself.
The coherence of BPU is NOT dispensable for your argument - it is a crucial presupposition. Do you want to stick with it or not?
By position is that Thomist epistemology, metaphysics and theology results in the contradiction that the BPU is both necessary and impossible. If you assume that the BPU is impossible, then it becomes impossible that God would create anything at all, because his intellect would never determine the good universe to create due to the infinite series of possible universes, and without the determination of the good universe to create by the divine intellect, the divine will could not create a universe at all. However, God did create a universe, i.e. ours, which means that the BPU is possible after all. But, that would mean that our universe is the BPU, which is impossible, because our universe can be made better than it is, which is a point that Aquinas himself endorses at ST 1.25.6 where he writes that God “can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not”.
Effectively, you keep hoping it will somehow make sense to talk about something that is both absolutely best but not absolutely good (both creator (God) and creature). Good luck with that!
Not at all. I am only assuming that every kind of thing has an ideal and perfect archetype contained within its essence that it is striving to actualize in reality. The degree of goodness and perfection of the thing is proportionate to the degree to which it actualizes the ideal archetype in reality. I thought this was standard Thomist metaphysics.
Yes. And I take it you think this is a problem?
ReplyDeleteI don’t think it’s a problem at all. But, it means that your claim that to say that “God knows other possible universes” just means that “God knows that his own essence is necessarily infinitely more perfect than any possible creature” is just to say that “God knows other possible universes” and “God knows that any possible universe is necessarily infinitely less perfect than himself”. My argument is focusing upon the part where God knows other possible universes, which would have to include his knowledge of their degree of goodness relative to one another. That’s all.
...or (3) the will was under no compulsion to maximize the possible good by its choice between A and B, a fact which is necessarily known and understood by the divine intellect (and even by created intellects, in accordance with the reasons laid out here), which knowledge and understanding thus set the condition for the perfectly free act of the creative will of God.
But that then falsifies the Thomist account of intellect and will whereby the intellect determines the good in a scenario and the will acts upon what the intellect determines to be the good in that scenario to make it a reality. Again, to say that God creates a universe that is less perfect than an alternative universe just means that God’s intellect determined that the less perfect is more perfect than the more perfect, which is absurd. Maybe if there was some way to neutralize this absurdity, the account can be salvaged, but I sure can’t figure out how. Maybe smarter minds than mine can.
@dguller:
ReplyDeleteAs far as I can understand, I think you just need to re-read what Thomas says about the divine intellect and will and realize that he explicitly denies what you continue to (explicitly or implicitly) affirm: that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will. For us, being is notionally prior to goodness, and a genuine act of the will (primarily in regard to the good) must be preceded by an apprehension of the intellect (primarily in regard to being). But in God, being and goodness are one. Intellect in no way precedes will, and will in no way precedes intellect. And in regard to our understanding of divine causation (here, creation), just as in other cases of causation, the notion of the good is prior to the notion of being; thus, so far as we can understand it, the will must be understood as notionally prior to the intellect in respect of divine causation(although again: it follows from the simplicity of the divine essence that in themselves the divine will and intellect must be perfectly united, in a way which is admittedly very difficult for us to intuitively grasp).
Scott: I don't think God allows evil so that He can bring good from it, any more than I think He allows acorns so that He can bring oaks from them.
ReplyDeleteThis may be merely a semantic quibble, but I wouldn't hesitate to say that God allows (well, directly creates) acorns so that He can bring oaks for them; "so that" doesn't imply that the acorns are necessary for that.
Glenn: [...] you can hold the pack by one filet mignon and get some good whipping action with the other filet mignon when swinging. However -- Bzzt! -- no, we do not order steaks from Omaha Steaks in order to increase the number of potential weapons available
OK; and likewise for most people in the world you inhabit — but then, God isn't most people. God has perfect knowledge of all the ramifications that are possible, and indeed, which will actually come to pass. If you, on the verge of acquiring some Omaha frozen steaks, gained certain knowledge that next week you would be away and your wife would thereby clonk some intruder — could you sincerely say that you no longer intended them to function as weapons? It doesn't seem to me that God could, at any rate.
Still, I agree that there is some sort of distinction. Can we describe it as a hierarchy? God fully intends all these different ends, and the interrelation of ends, and so on; but some may be intended as subordinate to others. So God intends acorns, but for the sake of oaks, rather than the other way around. Which is the same sort of distinction as between God's antecedent and consequent will: God wills everything that happens — as primary cause; I am able to act freely [and secondarily] because God wills [primarily] that my free will be efficacious, and for the sake of this, He causes/conserves my actions, good and bad. Which can be described as God's allowing those actions for the sake of my freedom, that is, for the sake of my nature as a free creature, because that is the sort of nature God willed to create. And we can call that permitting such evils for a greater good, since clearly God considers it a great good to create free beings. (Sure, that can be misunderstood; but it's not an unreasonable description.)
Dguller: If God knew that A is more good than B, and yet God chose B over A, then was that because (a) his intellect didn’t know that A is more good than B, in which case he isn’t omniscient, or (b) did his intellect know that A is more good than B, but his will did not follow his intellect, in which case divine simplicity is violated, or (c) his intellect knew that A is more good than B, his will wanted to do A more than B, but he couldn’t, in which case he isn’t omnipotent?
ReplyDeleteA very Scholastically-phrased presentation of the argument from evil. (Certainly it's less susceptible to emotional manipulation than more popular renderings!)
Scott: we don't know that God didn't create a multiplicity of worlds, or even every world that He could possibly have created. All we know is that we live in this one.
I'm surprised I don't see this point more often. Any time someone insists God must have created a better world than this one, I want to say, "He did!" [....for all we know]. Supposing arguendo that there is a better or best world that God should have made, then the obvious conclusion is that He did so. And having done so, reality could be made even better by creating the second-best world in addition to the first, thus nearly doubling the "overall goodness". And so on down the line — at least until reaching a world that was "more" bad than good... which this world, it's safe to say, is not.
Also, it seems pretty plausible that, as Aquinas says, there is no best possible universe, because there could always be a better one. And yet he also notes the need for proportionality; you can't make a good symphony ever better just by stuffing in increasingly more notes! So perhaps there is in fact a limit to how good a universe of this sort could be, beyond which any attempted improvement would necessarily decrease its goodness in some other respect. In the end, I think it requires a lot more understanding about how entire universes work and how they could even be measured against each other — which even if it were meaningful, is certainly not within human power to know.
George LeSauvage: Thus, gargoyles are certainly not there for their own beauty, but for the completeness of the building.
True, but perhaps the point DGuller is getting at is that the universe is not itself a substance. Thus in some way, the good of the individual substances in the universe are more important than the good of the universe as a whole. God could lop off the corner of a non-substance (so to speak) to make it fit the order of the universe itself, but He couldn't truncate or deform a substance — that would contradict its having its own essence; it would mean God's having two different and incompatible ends for the same thing. (Of course, God in fact creates substances and universe in such a way that everything fits together neatly, with no loose ends. But I take it the point is that substances cannot be considered merely as parts of the universe, or that the order of the universe can be considered at the expense of other substances. To some extent the universe exists for the sake of the substances within it rather than [exclusively] the other way around.)
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteI think you just need to re-read what Thomas says about the divine intellect and will and realize that he explicitly denies what you continue to (explicitly or implicitly) affirm: that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will
I do not affirm that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will in any way. They are one and the same thing by virtue of divine simplicity. However, they each have a characteristic activity that is somehow one and the same activity in reality. The intellect determines and apprehends the good and the true, and the will actualizes the good and the true that the intellect determined. In God, this is one and the same activity, which means that neither is prior to the other. But that does not mean that in God, his intellect does not apprehend the good or that his will actualizes that is determined to be the good. In fact, Aquinas writes that “His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will” (ST 1.19.4). In other words, the divine intellect conceives the good and the true, and the will is inclined to put the good and the true into actual reality. It is just that in God, these two distinct activities are somehow one and the same.
DGuller: So, we must reject either (a) that it is always possible that a better universe could be created than the one actually created, which would mean that there is a possible maximally perfect universe, or (b) that God’s will acts according to the determination of the divine intellect regarding what the good is.
ReplyDeleteI thought someone would have cited Leibniz by now. (If anyone knew about a calculus of goodness, it would be he!) I must confess to a certain sympathy with his conclusion that there therefore is a best possible world, and we're it. It's not that God "couldn't" choose otherwise, or that lesser worlds are not still good (as created), but it does feel so arbitrary. Still, there are various options: that God did create better worlds, and worked His way down to this one; or that universes are just not commensurable in the relevant way. And I realised something I don't recall coming across before: there may be local maxima, such that while there is no greatest possible world, there may be specific worlds that are greater than any of their "neighbours"; indeed, there may be a maximum local maximum, which is less good than infinitely many other worlds, and yet nevertheless qualifies as a non-arbitrary choice of universe to create.
Or, as others point out, God is simply able to choose to create any good world at any point... thus making it the best world (not the best possible, but the best actual — and actual trumps possible).
Scott: In [one novel], everybody is perfect. In the other, there are several flawed characters who not only never achieve their full perfection but indeed commit certain horrible acts. Why would that mean that the act of creating the second would be less "good" than the act of creating the first?
A human author can certainly write bad books (and I mean morally, not technically bad). Isn't this a problem with the act of creating? It's not necessarily that there is a repugnant character in the story, because good stories can have bad characters. Of course, humans have moral obligations, and it would be on that level that a creative work might fall down; a level that simply doesn't apply to God. On the other hand, while God cannot have moral obligations to His creatures, He has to act consistently with His own essence. The reason God doesn't lie is not because He sticks to some moral code, but because it would be against His nature. Given God's justice, and mercy, and love, therefore there must be worlds which He wouldn't create.
Thus in terms of the question of evil, it's not that God would have to prevent all pain if He's omnipotent; but that given death and suffering, they must be somehow compatible with God's mercy and love. This is of course exactly what is commonly claimed. As for Hart, I still don't understand quite what his position is. (And thanks to Glenn for posting the link from the discussion at Mere Comments.) Of course suffering and death were not caused (by Satan or Adam or the rest of us) to be something good or meaningful. But the point of Christianity is that God changed the story — He literally and physically intervened — and gave them meaning. So there is an ultimate meaning, at least there is now. Meaninglessness intruding upon the cosmos that God created good would surely sting; but death has no sting. Scripture is quite clear that suffering serves a purpose. Frankly, my understanding has been to agree with Esolen, that the Redemption raised us to an even higher level (and Hart gave no reason for dismissing Esolen's point about different infinities); but even without this, the Redemption makes this a greater world than without it but with sin. Again, there are several things Hart could mean that are clearly correct; but none of them stands in opposition to the general claim that people make when they say that God permits suffering for a purpose.
dguller: "I do not affirm that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will in any way."
ReplyDelete...and yet I think that implicitly, at least, you do. But the immediate question is: Okay, you understand that the divine intellect and will are really one; now look at your argument: Can you see that you nonetheless make the intellect notionally prior to the will in your argument? - whereas you ought to be doing the opposite, because (see ST I.19.4) the subject we are seeking to understand is divine causation, in virtue of the divine will.
DavidM:
ReplyDelete...and yet I think that implicitly, at least, you do. But the immediate question is: Okay, you understand that the divine intellect and will are really one; now look at your argument: Can you see that you nonetheless make the intellect notionally prior to the will in your argument? - whereas you ought to be doing the opposite, because (see ST I.19.4) the subject we are seeking to understand is divine causation, in virtue of the divine will.
I’m sorry, but I just don’t see it. The way that Aquinas describes divine causation necessarily involves (a) the divine intellect to apprehend the good and (b) the divine will to actualize the apprehended good in reality. The quote from ST 1.19.4 that I cited makes that explicit. However, one just must constantly be aware of the fact that in God, (a) and (b) is actually one single and simple activity without any really distinct components or parts that may involve potency of any kind. Whether (a) is notionally prior to (b) is irrelevant, because that is simply a byproduct of how the matter is presented to our finite intellects. As long as I make it clear that in reality neither (a) nor (b) is prior to the other due to divine simplicity, then my argument proceeds accordingly.
IIRC, Leibniz argued that if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists. But he didn't think it possible for us to strictly prove the antecedent.
ReplyDeleteI think the same might apply to the best possible world: if a BPW possibly exists, then this world is necessarily the BPW.
Regarding the possibility of multiple possible worlds: It seems to me that since these so-called distinct worlds are still necessarily all related to the one creator, for purposes of the question here, at least, they necessarily constitute one universe.
Mr Green:
ReplyDeleteSupposing arguendo that there is a better or best world that God should have made, then the obvious conclusion is that He did so. And having done so, reality could be made even better by creating the second-best world in addition to the first, thus nearly doubling the "overall goodness". And so on down the line — at least until reaching a world that was "more" bad than good... which this world, it's safe to say, is not.
Yes, I didn’t comment on Scott’s excellent point when he made it earlier. My only remark would that such a position would require the creation of all possible worlds, including those at the very bottom of the scale of goodness. After all, even those at the bottom have some goodness, and the addition of some goodness improves the overall goodness of the totality of worlds. However, that would mean that a world in which small children are raped for centuries by demons, and then do not receive eternal bliss in the afterlife as a recompense for their pain and suffering, would have to exist, as well. And if that world exists and God has created it, then that is simply despicable. So, presumably, some limit would have to be set, i.e. a degree of actual being beyond which it is simply not worth it for God create any world further. But that limit would be completely arbitrary, and does it make sense that God does anything arbitrarily? After all, he must act according to the goodness identical to his nature, and if goodness is coextensive with intelligibility, then what place is there for arbitrariness?
dguller:
ReplyDelete"...(d) God’s will actualizes what God’s intellect determines to be the good."
There is nothing explicitly false here, but do you recognize the necessary convertibility of the proposition with: God's intellect understands the goodness of what(ever!) God's will creates?
"I suppose that the assumption that is more plausibly rejected is (d), but that would compromise the Thomist account of intellect and will, because according to that account, the will acts according to what the intellect determines to be the good."
So no, there is no need to outright reject (d), but you have to free yourself from the subconscious instinct to read (d) as implying that intellect is prior to will in God. For without that implicit assumption, there is no incompatibility of (d) with (a), (b), and (c) ("(a) God creates A and not B, (b) B is more perfect than A, and (c) God knows that B is more perfect than A").
"...But that implies that God's justification for creating this world is inscrutable to us!"
ReplyDelete"YES."
"But then God's willing must be random!"
"NO."
[The unity of a universe is a consequence of the unity of its first cause. Corollary: If no first cause exists, no universe can exist.]
ReplyDeleteDavidM:
ReplyDeleteThere is nothing explicitly false here, but do you recognize the necessary convertibility of the proposition with: God's intellect understands the goodness of what(ever!) God's will creates?
Yes, I do, but that is different from God’s intellect understands the different degrees of goodness associated with other possible creations. That is what my argument requires to be true, and so far as I know, there is nothing in Aquinas that denies it.
So no, there is no need to outright reject (d), but you have to free yourself from the subconscious instinct to read (d) as implying that intellect is prior to will in God. For without that implicit assumption, there is no incompatibility of (d) with (a), (b), and (c) ("(a) God creates A and not B, (b) B is more perfect than A, and (c) God knows that B is more perfect than A").
And since I am not reading (d) as implying any kind of priority between intellect and will in God, then I’m pretty safe. ;)
"...But that implies that God's justification for creating this world is inscrutable to us!"
ReplyDelete"YES."
"But then God's willing must be random!"
"NO."
But that misses the point, I think.
In Thomist metaphysics, goodness is coextensive with act, and act comes in two kinds: (1) the sheer actual existence of any thing, and (2) the degree of secondary actuality of any thing with respect to how well it actualizes its essential powers to attain its final end in reality to become the best kind of thing it can be. Thus, any determination of how good a thing is must make reference to (1) and (2), or as Aquinas writes: “the complete perfection of the universe required the existence of some creatures which return to God not only as regards likeness of nature [i.e. (1)], but also by their action [i.e. (2)]” (SCG 2.46.3). If you know of any other standard of goodness in Thomism, I am open to hearing about it.
And so any reason that God has for creating anything must be because his intellect has determined that doing so is good. But it cannot just be good such that there could be something better, because the nature of the intellect is that what it presents to the will is what it determines to be the best of what it considers to be possibilities, i.e. the good, and not a good, even though, in reality, finite intellects often make mistakes in this regard. However, the divine intellect cannot make such a mistake, and thus whatever the divine intellect determines to be the best is what the divine will chooses to act upon (even though this is actually one and the same activity).
What that means is that we don’t have to know what the reason is, but only that there must be a reason, and the form of that reason must be that the choice made by the divine will was based upon the fact that the divine intellect determined the most perfect course of action amongst a range of possibilities, all of which are present to the divine intellect. That is why this world must be the perfect world, and the fact that this world is not the perfect world, because there are always better worlds that are possible, means that something is very wrong with the above account. After all, if God chose to create a universe that is less perfect than another, then that introduces an arbitrariness to his choices that belies the identity between his intellect and will.
Furthermore, at SCG 2.46, Aquinas argues that creation must have creatures that possess an immaterial intellect, because in order for the universe to be perfect, there must be some creatures that are able to return to their source, and since the Source is Intellect, some creatures must possess intellect to return to their source. Therefore, God cannot create any possible world, but rather must create a world that is guided by the principle that “[a]n effect is most perfect when it returns to its source” (SCG 2.46.2), and thus God must create only universes that return to their source, i.e. to God. That means that if one universe is closer to God than another in terms of similarity with respect to the degree of goodness of (1) and (2) above, then God must create the former and not the latter.
dguller:
ReplyDeleteYou almost convinced me this time... but not quite!
"Yes, I do, but that is different from God’s intellect understands the different degrees of goodness associated with other possible creations. That is what my argument requires to be true, and so far as I know, there is nothing in Aquinas that denies it."
But no; what you actually need is the following to be true: "God's intellect understands that his will is constrained to actualize only that universe which his intellect conceives to be better than any other." And what St. Thomas says clearly does deny that (see ST I.25.6 ad 3), and we have already gone over the reasons why this should be the case.
"And since I am not reading (d) as implying any kind of priority between intellect and will in God, then I’m pretty safe. ;)"
'Safe' you may be; but your argument is dead in the water. ;)
"...whatever the divine intellect determines to be the best is what the divine will chooses to act upon (even though this is actually one and the same activity)."
...and again, the fact that it is one and the same activity means that you can just as well say: whatever the divine will chooses to do is what the divine intellect understands to be the best.
"What that means is that we don’t have to know what the reason is, but only that there must be a reason," - YES - "and the form of that reason must be that the choice made by the divine will was based upon the fact that the divine intellect determined the most perfect course of action amongst a range of possibilities, all of which are present to the divine intellect." - NO
That "form of reason" is proper to finite deliberation (will follows intellect), not divine causation (will and intellect are perfectly united).
...I should add that even in finite deliberation, the intellect does not always precede the will, and I think it would be preposterous to deny this. (And if you think St. Thomas denies this, please show me the passage.)
ReplyDeleteSay that there are two universes, U and V, such that U has feature F and V lacks feature F. Furthermore, say that U is more perfect than V by virtue of the former’s possession of F and the latter’s lack of possession of F. I have been arguing that if God’s intellect knows that U is more perfect than V, then God’s will must create U and not V.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that Aquinas does, in fact, argue in this way in SCG.
He states that “[a]n effect is most perfect when it returns to its source” (SCG 2.46.2) and that “each and every creature returns to its source so far as it bears a likeness to its source, according to its being and its nature, wherein it enjoys a certain perfection” (SCG 2.46.2). In other words, if creature X resembles its source (i.e. God) more than creature Y, then X is more perfect than Y. He then states that “the perfection of the universe of creatures consists in its likeness to God, just as the perfection of any effect whatever consists in its likeness to its efficient cause” (SCG 2.46.5) and that “the complete perfection of the universe required the existence of some creatures which return to God not only as regards likeness of nature, but also by their action” (SCG 2.46.3). I take this to mean that “the complete perfection of the universe” is proportionate to the degree to which creatures return to their source 0r efficient cause, which is equivalent to the degree to which creatures resemble their source or efficient cause. That means that if universe U more closely resembles God than universe V, then U is more perfect than V.
The question is whether if U is more perfect than V, then God must create U and not V. Let us look at a universe U that contains beings with intellect and will and a universe V that does not contain beings with intellect and will. Aquinas argues that “as a result of the order established by God’s assigning to creatures the optimum perfection consonant with their manner of being, certain creatures were endowed with an intellectual nature, thus being given the highest rank in the universe” (SCG 2.46.1). He basically argues that U is more perfect than V, because the intellectual beings in U more closely resemble their origin than the non-intellectual beings in V, and thus God must have created intellectual creatures in order to attain the “optimum perfection” and that “the highest perfection of things required the existence of some creatures that act in the same way as God” (SCG 2.46.4).
Why would he argue in this way unless God’s will was constrained by his intellect to choose only that which the intellect determined to be more perfect as more closely resembling himself? Aquinas speaks as if God must have created a universe with intellectual beings in order to achieve a maximal degree of perfection in the universe, because “it befits the supreme good to make what is best” (SCG 2.45.5). Thus, if the divine intellect determines that U is better than V, then the divine will must create U and not V, according to the principles that Aquinas has elucidated.
Or so it seems to me.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteYou almost convinced me this time... but not quite!
Drat! So close!
But no; what you actually need is the following to be true: "God's intellect understands that his will is constrained to actualize only that universe which his intellect conceives to be better than any other." And what St. Thomas says clearly does deny that (see ST I.25.6 ad 3), and we have already gone over the reasons why this should be the case.
I am aware of what Aquinas wrote at ST 1.25.6.ad3. The problem is that it contradicts what he writes in that very same passage: “Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe”. If the current universe has “the most beautiful order given to things by God”, then how could God “add something to the present creation”, which would make it “a better universe”? If it already is “the most beautiful order”, then is he saying that a better universe would have less beauty than the current universe? It seems that he wants to hold two contradictory positions at once.
...and again, the fact that it is one and the same activity means that you can just as well say: whatever the divine will chooses to do is what the divine intellect understands to be the best.
But that doesn’t solve the problem, because if this universe is not the best, which Aquinas acknowledges, then what the divine will chose to do is not what the divine intellect understands to be the best, unless you want to say that Aquinas knows something that the divine intellect does not, i.e. that this current universe is not the best?
...I should add that even in finite deliberation, the intellect does not always precede the will, and I think it would be preposterous to deny this.
I don’t deny it with respect to creatures with intellect and will. With God, neither intellect nor will precedes the other. As you said, they are united in a single activity such that whatever the divine will chooses to do is what the divine intellect understands to be the best and what the divine intellect understands to be the best is whatever the divine will chooses to do.
dguller:
ReplyDeleteThose are good points, but I think you just need to make a distinction: God's freedom in creating is not fully random, nor is it fully comprehensible. What we have is a finite understanding. (That's how it always is with us and God.) On the basis of this finite understanding even we (maybe with some help from St. Thomas) can see that some possible worlds would be fundamentally defective. They would fail to communicate the divine being in rather obvious ways.
It does NOT follow that "God’s intellect understands the different degrees of goodness associated with other possible creations AND God's intellect understands that his will is constrained to actualize only that universe which his intellect conceives to be better than any other." (This is the proposition you require.) It only follows that God cannot possibly will to create a universe which would fail to achieve his end in creating that universe (namely, communicating his perfection).
ST I.25.6 ad 3 is difficult. It sounds rather like Thomas is thinking of the actual universe (this universe) as a well-ordered set, in the maintenance of which consists the good which is proper to this universe. But he seems to be clear enough on the point that there could be any number of well-ordered universes with their own proper good and which would be better in terms of the specific kinds of things in it and/or the number of things in it.
ReplyDeleteMr. Green,
ReplyDeleteStill, I agree that there is some sort of distinction. Can we describe it as a hierarchy? God fully intends all these different ends, and the interrelation of ends, and so on; but some may be intended as subordinate to others. So God intends acorns, but for the sake of oaks, rather than the other way around. Which is the same sort of distinction as between God's antecedent and consequent will: God wills everything that happens — as primary cause; I am able to act freely [and secondarily] because God wills [primarily] that my free will be efficacious, and for the sake of this, He causes/conserves my actions, good and bad. Which can be described as God's allowing those actions for the sake of my freedom, that is, for the sake of my nature as a free creature, because that is the sort of nature God willed to create. And we can call that permitting such evils for a greater good, since clearly God considers it a great good to create free beings. (Sure, that can be misunderstood; but it's not an unreasonable description.)
I've no qualms in acknowledging that that is not an unreasonable description (even though, as you suggest, it is not immune from being misundersood).
cont...
...cont
ReplyDeleteA brief recapitulation regarding certain kinds of ramifications:
- - - - -
I offered the following as the last of several responses to series of comments by Scott: "A pencil can be used to stir a can of paint, but that is not why pencils are made. Similarly, God can bring good from evil, but that is not why God allows evil."
dguller countered by saying, in part, that even though the primary function of a pencil is something other than that of stirring a can of paint, if the creator of the pencil had foreseen that a pencil could be used to stir a can of paint, then stirring a can would be part of why pencils were made. (While this is not exact quote, it does seem to me to be a fair representation of what he had actually said.)
In response to the general idea of this countering statement, which general idea hasn't anything to do with pencils per se, I offered three examples, one each involving Omaha steaks, sand in a bathing suit, and a car accident. These examples in toto may be taken as saying that not every use or consequence necessarily is intended, even if there is a foreknowledge of the possibility (or inevitability) of this or that use or consequence.
St. Thomas seems to have said something similar, at least in effect, when he wrote, "[T]he action of a more noble agent may happen to terminate in a less noble effect, but not as the end intended by that action[.]" (He went on to provide an example: "[T]hus the safety of a peasant is an end secured by the king's government, yet the king's government does not seek that peasant's safety as its end, for it seeks something better, namely the common good.")
- - - - -
The point of dguller's countering statement involving a pencil was to lay a foundation for countering the statement that bringing good from evil is not why God allows evil. And the countering of that statement -- that bringing good from evil is not why God allows evil -- concluded with:
a) "...why can't it be said that God favored a creation with evil for the sake of a greater good? " and,
b) "In other words, if there wasn't this greater good from evil, then evil would never be allowed to 'exist' at all."
Regarding a), if one takes the position that God favored a creation with evil (regardless of the reason, and even if for the sake of a greater good), then either one slips away from the notion that there is but one principle of creation (which single principle is 'good') and falls into the notion that there are two principles of creation (one of which is 'good' and the other of which is 'privation of good' (i.e., 'evil')), or one places oneself on the verge of doing just that.
Regarding b), "God allows some evils" not that greater good may result, but "lest many good things should never happen". That is, "Since God...provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects", not that greater good may result, but "that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered." Or, to put the same reason in yet another, more comprehendible way, "The perfection of the universe requires the existence of some beings that are not subject to evil, and of other beings that can suffer the defect of evil in keeping with their nature. If evil were completely eliminated from things, they would not be governed by divine providence in accord with their nature; and this would be a greater defect than the particular defects eradicted." **
- - - - -
** That indeed is how it reads, I kid thee not: "the particular defects eradicted." It is true, of course, that it is likely that ‘eradicated' is meant. But had I eradicted that particular defect, the lexical accuracy of the quotation would have been impaired. ;)
Oops; forgot to include references. I'll post them later (haven't the time just now).
ReplyDeleteErrata:
ReplyDelete1. "...stirring a can would be.." s/b "...stirring a can of paint would be..."
2. "...this is not exact quote..." s/b "...this is not an exact quote..."
3. "But had I eradicted..." s/b ... (well, that was intentional; so, no, it is not an erratum).
References:
1. "[T]he action of a more noble agent may happen to..." -- Will the Heavenly Movement Cease At Any Time? (6th para following 21st objection (under "—Secondly"))
2. "[T]hus the safety of a peasant is..." ibid
3. "God allows some evils" Article 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination? (ad. 3)
4. "lest many good things should never happen" ibid
5. "Since God...provides universally for all being..." Article 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God? (ad. 2)
6. "that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered." ibid
7. "The perfection of the universe requires ... eradicted." -- GOD’S GOODNESS AND THE PERMISSION OF EVIL (1st para)
Will errata never cease?
ReplyDeleteHere's another one:
"...several responses to series of comments..." s/b "...several responses to a series of comments..."
@Scott @Glenn
ReplyDeleteI like the way you both framed the point on actuality and perfection.
I think this is a line of thinking that never occurs to many gifted philosophers who are atheists (and in many cases theists). This is because they really don't realise the level of the assumptions they have inherited from their 'hero's'. No fault of their own. I dare say they too readily dismiss Scholastic Metaphysics without realising the far reaching implications i.e. many arguments just don't get off the ground. I will add that they are perfectly reasonable lines of thinking from their perspective because of the background they are working from.
This post may be too late in arrival but I will throw it in to the mix anyway:
ReplyDeleteThe more I think about it the more I am perplexed as to how the majority of atheist philosophers can even raise a question concerning Evil, since to do so is to de facto treat ‘Evil’ as something objective.– Does the proposed ‘Evil’ in this case share anything in common with another purported case? If so it is hard to see how can one do so without implicitly committing oneself to an essence an Universal of ‘Evil’ as it were.
Take the case of Hume: what is this mysterious non-physical entity called ‘Evil’ he invokes? To which of the five senses is it to be attributed? It cannot be a Universal since all beings are particular. How can he raise questions of ‘Evil’ whilst at the same time employing the famous Fact/Value’ distinction –might not we justly answer ‘there tis nothing more fundamental wick’d about wishing to destroy the world than wishing one end Enthusiasm; there is nothing more fundamentaly evil about torturing a cripple’d child than giving them aid’. The same could be said of Mackie with the Argument from Queerness. The Naturalist frame-works on which these philosophers depend seem to leave no room for an objective foundation for Evil.
I'm only halfway through the comments to this post, so excuse me if this point has already been made, but Ivan's argument in The Brothers Karamazov does not represent Dostoyevsky's actual view. The whole point of the rest of the novel was to refute Ivan's argument in the chapter "Rebellion." Dostoyevksy was a fairly devout Eastern Orthodox Christian.
ReplyDeleteDavidM:
ReplyDeleteIt does NOT follow that "God’s intellect understands the different degrees of goodness associated with other possible creations AND God's intellect understands that his will is constrained to actualize only that universe which his intellect conceives to be better than any other." (This is the proposition you require.) It only follows that God cannot possibly will to create a universe which would fail to achieve his end in creating that universe (namely, communicating his perfection).
But the question is what “his end in creating that universe” is. As you write, it is to communicate his perfection, which he accomplishes by making that universe as much like him as possible. And that makes perfect sense, because God is goodness itself, and his will necessarily wills goodness itself, i.e. by willing himself. To create, God must still somehow will himself, because that is the ultimate object of his will, and thus creation must be an extension of his goodness by resembling it, and thus the closer creation comes to resembling God, the closer God’s will comes to willing himself, which is a necessary aspect of the divine will itself.
Also, that would make sense of why Aquinas can argue that God had to create a universe with intellectual beings in it, because otherwise, an essential and necessary likeness to God himself would be missing in creation, and thus it would irredeemably deficient in respect of communicating his perfection. Without that crucial assumption, Aquinas’ arguments would have to be rejected in this matter, because they all presuppose that God has an obligation to create a universe that is as much like him as possible, and thus if there are two possible universes, U and V, and U is more like God than V, then God must create U and not V.
ST I.25.6 ad 3 is difficult. It sounds rather like Thomas is thinking of the actual universe (this universe) as a well-ordered set, in the maintenance of which consists the good which is proper to this universe. But he seems to be clear enough on the point that there could be any number of well-ordered universes with their own proper good and which would be better in terms of the specific kinds of things in it and/or the number of things in it.
On the subject to making a better universe, he makes a difference between (1) primary actuality/goodness, which is a thing’s essence, and (2) secondary actuality/goodness, which is a thing’s actualization of the powers flowing from its essence.
With regards to (1), he writes that a being with essence E cannot be made better with respect to E, because the possession of E is an all-or-nothing affair. In other words, every being qua possessor of E is equally good insofar as they each possess the same E. However, God can make a better being by replacing a being with E with a being with F, if F is better than E. For example, God can replace a dog with a human, which would be replacing an inferior being with a superior being, but that would involve different essences altogether.
With regards to (2), he writes that it is “that which is over and above the essence”. For example, a human being who exclusively focused their attention upon the material world is less perfect than a human being who also focused their attention upon God. Both have the same human essence, but the latter is exercising their characteristic powers to a greater extent than the former, and thus is more perfect than the former. So, God could increase the goodness of a being by increasing its secondary actuality, i.e. by increasing the degree to which it is actualizing the powers that flow from its essence.
The problem, as he identifies it in the reply to the objection, is that although he can improve the secondary actuality of a being (i.e. (2)), it would disrupt the overall order and balance of the universe, which would actually lead to a decrease in the overall goodness of that universe. As he writes: “if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed”. So, the only way to improve the goodness of the universe is basically to create a different universe -- i.e. “God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe -- because this universe is already maximally perfect, given the individual beings that exist within it and the overall balance and order that is imposed upon it by God.
ReplyDeleteBut there are a few problems with this.
First, it is hard to believe that an infinite and all-powerful being could not manage to maintain order and balance in a universe by miraculously willing that a child with cancer would be healed of their pain and suffering. Surely, that is within God’s power to do, and yet maintain the overall order and stability of the universe.
Second, and more importantly, it assumes that there is a distinction between (a) the overall goal of the universe, and (b) the individual goals of the particular beings within the universe. (b) is not controversial, and is essentially the striving of each particular being to maximize its resemblance to God by maximizing its secondary actuality by being the best kind of thing that it is.
But for (a) to make sense, the universe as a whole would have to have a purpose over and above the individual purposes of the individual beings within the universe. In other words, is the universe something over and above the individuals that compose it such that it is a substance in which the individuals are just parts? That would have to be the case for the universe to have a purpose (i.e. a final end) at all. After all, a final end presupposes a formal cause, and forms exist only in substances, either essentially or accidentally, according to Aristotelianism. So, is the universe a substance with a form, and the individuals within the universe the different parts of that single substance?
If not, then the universe itself has no overall goal or purpose independent of the individual final ends of the particular beings within the universe, and therefore, the goodness of the universe is directly proportionate to the degree to which those individuals maximize their secondary actuality. Surely, it is within God’s power to supernaturally “supercharge” the secondary actuality of every created being and miraculously make each one maximally actual, and thus maximally like God, which would fulfill God’s overall plan for creation. And such a universe would, indeed, by much better than the current universe, and would not even require a different universe at all, but only a supercharged version of this one.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteNow, Aquinas writes that “the good of one cannot be realized without the suffering of evil by another … If evil were completely excluded from things, much good would be rendered impossible. Consequently it is the concern of divine providence, not to safeguard all beings from evil, but to see to it that the evil which arises is ordained to some good.” (CT 142).
Say that “evil were completely excluded from things”. That would only be possible if every being existed as fully actual in the sense that their determinate powers were fully active at all times. Now, Aquinas says that in such a universe, “much good would be rendered impossible”, and my question is: what good is he referring to? In such a universe, there is full actuality, and so what extra actual being “would be rendered impossible”?
dguller,
ReplyDeleteOff the top of my head, I can think of four different people who have posted comments under this OP, the contents of which in each case provides enough info for a rational man such as yourself to work out the answer.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteThanks.
@dguller:
ReplyDelete"But the question is what “his end in creating that universe” is. As you write, it is to communicate his perfection, which he accomplishes by making that universe as much like him as possible. And that makes perfect sense..."
But again!: you're right back to effectively talking about "the number that is as close to infinity as possible" - i.e., talking nonsense. (And God's intellect knows it's nonsense and nonsense is not good and his will is certainly not bound to act upon the advice of such nonsense.)
"First, it is hard to believe that an infinite and all-powerful being could not manage to maintain order and balance in a universe by miraculously willing that a child with cancer would be healed of their pain and suffering. Surely, that is within God’s power to do, and yet maintain the overall order and stability of the universe."
Sure; and so, presumably, sometimes God does miraculously heal people - but always in accordance with the most fitting order which he has in fact willed for the universe.
"But for (a) to make sense, the universe as a whole would have to have a purpose over and above the individual purposes of the individual beings within the universe."
I've already argued that this finality of the universe as a whole is self-evident from the concept of a universe as such, which is the creation of the One First Cause who creates the one universe. He creates/understands/loves the one universe - unity is convertible with being and truth and goodness. Ergo, etc. Make sense?
...and let us not forget beauty!
ReplyDeleteDavidM:
ReplyDeleteBut again!: you're right back to effectively talking about "the number that is as close to infinity as possible" - i.e., talking nonsense. (And God's intellect knows it's nonsense and nonsense is not good and his will is certainly not bound to act upon the advice of such nonsense.)
I agree that it is nonsense, but that doesn’t solve the problem.
Either there is a BPU or there is not.
If there is a BPU, then God must create the BPU, because his intellect would recognize that the BPU is the best, and God’s will actualizes what God’s intellect determines to be the good (all in a single activity with no real distinction between the two). But that means that this universe is the BPU, which is impossible, and thus there cannot be a BPU.
If there is no BPU, then there is an infinite series of possible universes with a differential degree of goodness associated with each possible universe such that for any universe U, there is another possible universe V that has more goodness than U. However, in such a scenario, God would not create anything at all, because his intellect could not determine the good with respect to which universe to create. But he did create a universe, i.e. ours, and thus it cannot be the case that there is no BPU.
Sure; and so, presumably, sometimes God does miraculously heal people - but always in accordance with the most fitting order which he has in fact willed for the universe.
Again, would the beautiful order of the entire universe be undermined if a single 2 year old boy could be miraculously cured of his painful cancer? Sure, that would result in infinite spatio-temporal changes down the road, but I’m sure an infinite and omnipotent being could make the necessary adjustments to preserve the overall order of the system.
I've already argued that this finality of the universe as a whole is self-evident from the concept of a universe as such, which is the creation of the One First Cause who creates the one universe. He creates/understands/loves the one universe - unity is convertible with being and truth and goodness. Ergo, etc. Make sense?
But that isn’t self-evident at all. If the universe is nothing but the sum of its parts, then our concept of a universe would simply be a way of talking about the totality of entities that exist. And if the universe is more than the sum of its parts, then the universe must have a formal and final cause, and that is exclusively the domain of substances and accidents, which means that the universe is either a substance or an accident, neither of which makes any sense.
dguller:
ReplyDeleteI fear you're just not getting it here. You're just rehashing dead objections, not making progress.
I agree that it is nonsense, but that doesn’t solve the problem.
Either there is a BPU or there is not.
If you agree that BPU is nonsense, then why hang on to the dilemma? There is no BPU. So:
If there is no BPU, then there is an infinite series of possible universes with a differential degree of goodness associated with each possible universe such that for any universe U, there is another possible universe V that has more goodness than U. However, in such a scenario, God would not create anything at all, because his intellect could not determine the good with respect to which universe to create...
No. Again: God is free! Our universe is not the BPU. It is the BAU (best-(and only)-actual-universe), not lacking in any essential goodness, which God freely created.
"Again, would the beautiful order of the entire universe be undermined if a single 2 year old boy could be miraculously cured of his painful cancer?"
Again: no! - and so, presumably, sometimes God does miraculously heal people - but always in accordance with the most fitting order which he has in fact willed for the universe. (It's like you didn't read my answer the first time. Please don't do that.)
"Sure, that would result in infinite spatio-temporal changes down the road, but I’m sure an infinite and omnipotent being could make the necessary adjustments to preserve the overall order of the system."
No, that's nonsense. There are no spatio-temporal changes possible from the frame of reference of eternal divine wisdom (which is what institutes the most-fitting order of the spatio-temporal system, and which is what is relevant here).
"But that isn’t self-evident at all..."
And yet it is, provided you accept the convertibility of the transcendentals and that the universe is created by God, and think about what that implies(please read my argument again and think about it).
...in speaking of eternal divine wisdom, I'm referring particularly to eternal foreknowledge.
ReplyDeleteTo clarify: there is no "down the road" (i.e., no to-be-determined) in divine fore-knowledge (any "down the road"/to-be-determined is always on the side of the object of such knowledge, never on the side of the knowledge itself).
ReplyDeleteDavidM:
ReplyDeleteNo. Again: God is free! Our universe is not the BPU. It is the BAU (best-(and only)-actual-universe), not lacking in any essential goodness, which God freely created.
First, it is unclear to me whether God’s freedom is due to (1) the absence of external coercion, and/or (2) the possibility that he could have willed otherwise. If (2) is applicable to the divine will, then there are other possible universes that God could have willed that would have more goodness than this one. If (2) is not applicable, then Aquinas’ claims that God could have willed a better universe than this one make no sense at all.
Second, I do not understand what “best” means when you say that our universe is the “best-(and only)-actual-universe”. I agree that it is the only actual universe, but why does it follow that it is the best universe? Does actual correlate with best? If that is so, then if a child gets 50% on an examination, then can he tell his parents that he got the best score on the test? I don’t think that makes sense, because determining what is best requires starting with a range of possibilities or actualities, ranked in order of perfection, and the most perfect possibility is the best. (And if there is just one possibility, then it does not follow that that one possibility is the best. Why not say that it is the worst?)
Third, Aquinas writes that “that which is the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus” (SCG 1.62.5). If you are correct that the universe is one thing, then that thing must have an essence that determines what kind of thing that thing is supposed to be, and if it has an essence, then it belongs in a genus. If our universe is in a genus as a species of universe, and the different universes in the genus are being compared with respect to their degree of goodness, then there must be a universe as “the measure” that is “most perfect”. What does “most perfect” mean if not that species within a genus that lacks a more perfect species? And that seems to be the BPU.
Fourth, as far as I’m concerned, the most salient issue here is whether the good that is apprehended by the intellect and moves the will must be the best of all the possible goods present to the intellect.
ReplyDeleteWe both agree – I hope – that our intellect apprehends a number of goods and then determines which one is the best of the group, and presents that good as the object of the will, which moves the will to actualize that good in reality. Now, our intellects can be wrong about which of a number of goods is, in fact, the good, but that does not matter, because “in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good” (ST 2a.8.1). In other words, as long as the intellect apprehends a good as the good, then that good will act as the object of the will.
With God, there is no such possibility of error with respect to what the divine intellect apprehends to be the good: “in God there is pure truth, with which no falsity or deception can be mingled” (SCG 1.61.1). So, if the divine intellect apprehends that universe U is more perfect than universe V, then U is truly more perfect than V without the possibility of falsity. Now, God would also know that U would participate in God’s goodness to a greater extent than V, because U is more perfect than V. And since God “wills things other than Himself to be in so far as they participate in His goodness” (SCG 1.81.4), then he should create U and not V.
So, God must (a) know every possible universe that could be created, (b) know the degree of goodness of each possible universe that could be created, and (c) know that that it would be better to create a universe with a greater degree of goodness than a universe with a lesser degree of goodness, because more goodness is better than less goodness, by definition. Under this scenario, his intellect would apprehend that U would have a greater degree of goodness than V. Say that God created V instead of U, then his intellect would have to apprehend that what is less perfect (i.e. V) is more perfect than what is more perfect (i.e. U), which is impossible for the divine intellect to apprehend, because it cannot apprehend a falsehood. Thus, God cannot create V over U. Therefore, God must create U over V, if he is to create at all.
I'll reply to your other points later on.
ReplyDeleteTake care.
@dguller:
ReplyDelete"First, it is unclear to me whether God’s freedom is due to (1) the absence of external coercion, and/or (2) the possibility that he could have willed otherwise. If (2) is applicable to the divine will, then there are other possible universes that God could have willed that would have more goodness than this one. If (2) is not applicable, then Aquinas’ claims that God could have willed a better universe than this one make no sense at all."
Obviously.
"Second, I do not understand what “best” means when you say that our universe is the “best-(and only)-actual-universe”. I agree that it is the only actual universe, but why does it follow that it is the best universe? Does actual correlate with best? If that is so, then if a child gets 50% on an examination, then can he tell his parents that he got the best score on the test? I don’t think that makes sense, because determining what is best requires starting with a range of possibilities or actualities, ranked in order of perfection, and the most perfect possibility is the best. (And if there is just one possibility, then it does not follow that that one possibility is the best. Why not say that it is the worst?)"
Because 'best' is the superlative of 'good' and the actual universe is good.
"Third, Aquinas writes that “that which is the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus” (SCG 1.62.5). If you are correct that the universe is one thing, then that thing must have an essence that determines what kind of thing that thing is supposed to be, and if it has an essence, then it belongs in a genus. If our universe is in a genus as a species of universe, and the different universes in the genus are being compared with respect to their degree of goodness, then there must be a universe as “the measure” that is “most perfect”. What does “most perfect” mean if not that species within a genus that lacks a more perfect species? And that seems to be the BPU."
Clearly our universe is NOT in a genus containing different species. It is unique, like the sun or the moon or the earth (which, yes, are all unities - it seems like utter rubbish to think that unity implies belonging to a genus in the way you suggest - where did you get this idea??).
"Fourth, as far as I’m concerned, the most salient issue here is whether the good that is apprehended by the intellect and moves the will must be the best of all the possible goods present to the intellect."
And isn't it obvious that it need not be? Why do you think this?? I don't see an argument for this, just repeated assertion, despite the fact that it plainly seems to be false, as has been argued ad nauseam at this point. Why are you still hanging on to this??
"We both agree – I hope – that our intellect apprehends a number of goods and then determines which one is the best of the group, and presents that good as the object of the will, which moves the will to actualize that good in reality."
Sometimes that may happen, but as a universal account isn't that plainly false??
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteBecause 'best' is the superlative of 'good' and the actual universe is good.
Yes, if there is a range of goods, then the “best” good is the highest good, i.e. there are no other goods that are better than the best good. Hence, if you want to say that our universe is the best, then it follows that there cannot possibly be better universes, and yet Aquinas himself agrees that there could be. Therefore, our universe, although actual and good, cannot be the best.
Clearly our universe is NOT in a genus containing different species. It is unique, like the sun or the moon or the earth (which, yes, are all unities - it seems like utter rubbish to think that unity implies belonging to a genus in the way you suggest - where did you get this idea??).
That makes no sense. I am unique, and yet I am part of a genus. In fact, unless you want to say that each possible universe that could be created is only a “universe” in an equivocal fashion, then they must all be part of a common category, or genus, in order to all be universes at all. And to be an instantiation of one kind of thing does require the presence of a genus, or else there are no kinds at all.
And isn't it obvious that it need not be? Why do you think this?? I don't see an argument for this, just repeated assertion, despite the fact that it plainly seems to be false, as has been argued ad nauseam at this point. Why are you still hanging on to this??
Because that is what the Thomist account of intellect and will seems to entail to me. Brian Davies writes: “knowing something to be good goes with being drawn to it or attracted to it. And this ‘being drawn to’, this ‘being attracted by’, is what [Aquinas] has in mind when he speaks of will” (The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 142), and he cites Aquinas as saying that “[s]ince the understood good is the proper object of the will, the understood good is, as such, willed” (SCG 1.72).
Now, are you saying that if there are a number of possible goods presented to the intellect, and the intellect understands that one good in particular is the highest good, then the will can be inclined towards a lower good and not the highest good? This is only possible if (a) the intellect incorrectly identifies a lower good as a higher good, and/or (b) the intellect and will operate at cross-purposes where the will interferes with the activity of the intellect. However, neither (a) nor (b) is applicable to God, and so the only two ways in which the will can be directed towards a lower good when the intellect apprehends a higher good are impossible when it comes to God. Therefore, it must follow that if the divine intellect apprehends that good1 is higher than good2, then the divine will is directed towards good1 and not good2 (with the understanding that the intellect and will are one and the same in God).
dguller:
ReplyDelete"Therefore, our universe, although actual and good, cannot be the best."
Sure, if you say so. It's a verbal quibble. But 'best' is manifestly more appropriate than 'worst.' 'Good' is all we need, and 'best' here is simply a rhetorical expression of the very great goodness of God's actual creation.
"I am unique, and yet I am part of a genus. "
Therefore anything that is unique must be 'part' of a genus?? (Fail.)
"Now, are you saying that if there are a number of [incompossible] possible goods presented to the intellect, and the intellect understands that one good in particular is the highest good, then the will can be inclined towards a lower good and not the highest good?"
Manifestly this is so.
"This is only possible if (a) the intellect incorrectly identifies a lower good as a higher good, and/or (b) the intellect and will operate at cross-purposes where the will interferes with the activity of the intellect."
That is baloney. If the will chooses to create a lower good, which the intellect recognizes as a lower good, that does NOT entail any interference of the will with the intellect. That is garbage. It makes no sense whatsoever. You really need to think about this a little harder, mon ami.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteSure, if you say so. It's a verbal quibble. But 'best' is manifestly more appropriate than 'worst.' 'Good' is all we need, and 'best' here is simply a rhetorical expression of the very great goodness of God's actual creation.
Great. So, you agree that this universe is not the best universe that could be created, but is still very, very good.
Therefore anything that is unique must be 'part' of a genus?? (Fail.)
No, anything that exists as a member of a kind must be under a genus, and since each possible universe is an instantiation of the kind “universe”, it follows that each possible universe is under a genus.
That is baloney. If the will chooses to create a lower good, which the intellect recognizes as a lower good, that does NOT entail any interference of the will with the intellect. That is garbage. It makes no sense whatsoever. You really need to think about this a little harder, mon ami.
I’m just telling you what the Thomist account is. Under that account, all determination of what is good is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good. The will only chooses what the intellect apprehends to be good, which serves as the final end or object of the will. Although the good that is apprehended by the intellect is a final cause of the will, the will can be an efficient cause of the intellect (see ST 1.82.4). As an efficient cause, it can interfere with the activity of the intellect by redirecting and refocusing its attention away from the real good, but ultimately, “every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension” (ST 1.82.4), and thus even the efficient causality of the will must be directed towards a final end that was apprehended by the intellect.
So, perhaps the only way that a person can choose an objectively lesser good over an objectively greater good is due to a failure of the intellect to apprehend the truth of a matter. But in that case, my point remains unchallenged, because if that is true, then the only way for God to choose a lesser good over a greater good is if he is ignorant, which is impossible, given that he is omniscient. And that means that if the divine intellect knows that good1 is objectively and truthfully more perfect than good2, then it is impossible for the divine will to choose good2 over good1.
@dguller:
ReplyDelete"Great. So, you agree that this universe is not the best universe that could be created, but is still very, very good."
Uh, yeah. (You talk as if that were somehow something that had been in doubt up until now - weird.)
"No, anything that exists as a member of a kind must be under a genus, and since each possible universe is an instantiation of the kind “universe”, it follows that each possible universe is under a genus."
Wrong, guller. Universe is not a natural kind, any more than you, guller, are.
"I’m just telling you what the Thomist account is."
LOL. Good one. You're too much sometimes, really.
"Under that account, all determination of what is good is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good."
Where did you get this idea from? St. Thomas? Where?
You actually quote Aquinas: “every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension” (ST 1.82.4)
Very good, sir. Now please notice that your position does not follow from this. So, either you meant to quote a different passage, or you suck at logic. Which is it?
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteWrong, guller. Universe is not a natural kind, any more than you, guller, are.
First, if you are correct that there is no kind “universe” that can have different instantiations, of which our current universe is one in particular, then what sense is there to say that God could create different universes?
Second, if the universe is not a natural kind, then it has no nature, which means it has no essence, which means it has no final cause or end, and thus there is no sense in saying that one universe is better than another.
Where did you get this idea from? St. Thomas? Where?
Just to be clear, this is what you are denying is the Thomist account of intellect and will: “all determination of what is good is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good”.
So, let’s break it down into components:
(1) All determination of what is good is done by the intellect:
Aquinas writes that “the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself, as common to all things” (SCG 2.48.6), and that “through their intellectual cognition they judge of things to be done” (SCG 2.48.2).
(2) The will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good:
Brian Davies writes that “knowing something to be good goes with being drawn to it or attracted to it. And this ‘being drawn to’, this ‘being attracted by’, is what [Aquinas] has in mind when he speaks of will” (The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 142). And Aquinas writes that “every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension” (ST 1.82.4), because “since the understood good is the proper object of the will, the understood good is, as such, willed” (SCG 1.72.2). Furthermore, “the apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the aspect of the good or the fitting; for the outward action in things that move themselves proceeds from the judgment, made through that form, that something is good or fitting” (SCG 2.48.4).
So, it seems pretty clear that this is the Thomist account. If you want to disprove this thesis, then you will have to cite Aquinas or Thomist scholars to support you. Sarcastic snickering is insufficient.
Very good, sir. Now please notice that your position does not follow from this. So, either you meant to quote a different passage, or you suck at logic. Which is it?
My position is only that the will is the inclination to act upon what the intellect apprehends to be the good. In other words, if the intellect determines that doing X is good, then there must be an inclination towards doing X. Furthermore, if the intellect determines that doing X has more goodness than doing Y, then there must be an inclination towards doing X that is greater than the inclination towards doing Y. With created intellectual beings, there is a process and interaction between intellect and will, but with God, there is no such process and interaction, but rather there is a single act of apprehending the good and doing the good without any real distinction between them.
DavidM writes:
ReplyDelete>> "Under that account, all determination of what is good is
>> done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination
>> towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be
>> good."
> Where did you get this idea from? St. Thomas? Where?
dguller writes:
>> Where did you get this idea from? St. Thomas? Where?
> Just to be clear, this is what you are denying is the Thomist
> account of intellect and will: "all determination of what is good
> is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination
> towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good".
I understand DavidM's objection. And it would be helpful to be clear as to just what it is that he has objected to.
He has not denied that, as Eleanor Stump puts it, "apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect." Nor has he denied that "The intellect presents to the will as good certain thing or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances," or that "the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good." (My emphases.)
The reason why DavidM has not denied, and would not deny, any of these things is that he knows that that which is good is prior to, precedes and is independent of any apprehension or judgment of the intellect.
It is, In fact, for this very reason -- that that which is good is prior to, precedes and is independent of any apprehension or judgment of the intellect -- that DavidM has objected to the phrasing, "All determination of what is good is done by the intellect".
Such phrasing is at risk of being taken as implying that that which is good is a function of the intellect's determination. And it is this implication -- that that which is good is a function of the intellect's determination -- that DavidM has objected to.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteIt is, In fact, for this very reason -- that that which is good is prior to, precedes and is independent of any apprehension or judgment of the intellect -- that DavidM has objected to the phrasing, "All determination of what is good is done by the intellect".
Such phrasing is at risk of being taken as implying that that which is good is a function of the intellect's determination. And it is this implication -- that that which is good is a function of the intellect's determination -- that DavidM has objected to.
I see. If that is so, then I’ll revise my statement to avoid that misunderstanding: All apprehension of what is good is done by the intellect. By “determination”, I just meant, “understanding” or “realization” or “discovering”. But thanks for the helpful clarification.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteI’m wondering if you’d like to comment on my argument that if an intellect apprehends that good1 is more perfect than good2, then the will would necessarily be inclined towards good1 and not good2. The reason for this is that the will is just the inclination towards what the intellect apprehends as good. As Aquinas says, “it is of the nature of will to reach out to whatever the intellect can propose to it under the aspect of goodness” (SCG 2.27.2).
The only way for the will to be inclined towards good2 over good1 is if the intellect apprehended good2 as more perfect than good1. If good1 is objectively more perfect than good2, then the intellect that apprehended good2 as more perfect than good1 would be incorrect in its apprehension, which is certainly possible for a finite and limited intellect, but is impossible for an infinite and unlimited intellect, such as God’s, which cannot err in any way. Therefore, if good1 is objectively more perfect than good2, then the divine intellect must apprehend that good1 is objectively more perfect than good2, and since the will is the inclination towards what the intellect apprehends as the good, then the divine will must be inclined towards good1 and not good2.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteI'm wondering if you'd like to comment on my argument that...
I myself am wondering the same thing. ;)
I'll let you know.
dguller:
ReplyDelete"So, it seems pretty clear that this is the Thomist account. If you want to disprove this thesis, then you will have to cite Aquinas or Thomist scholars to support you. Sarcastic snickering is insufficient."
Sorry, man, I know you're trying and these are not easy questions.
"Just to be clear, this is what you are denying is the Thomist account of intellect and will: “all determination of what is good is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good”."
Right, so let's 'break it down' and see where the crucial strong modal part of your claim ("doing whatever") comes from:
"So, let’s break it down into components:
(1) All determination of what is good is done by the intellect:
Aquinas writes that “the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself, as common to all things” (SCG 2.48.6) [RELEVANCE?], and that “through their intellectual cognition they judge of things to be done” (SCG 2.48.2) [NEVER DISPUTED THIS].
(2) The will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good [THAT'S YOU TALKING]:
Brian Davies writes that “knowing something to be good goes with being drawn to it or attracted to it. And this ‘being drawn to’, this ‘being attracted by’, is what [Aquinas] has in mind when he speaks of will” (The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 142). [SURE, NO PROBLEM THERE] And Aquinas writes that “every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension” (ST 1.82.4) [AGAIN, NO PROBLEM WITH THAT], because “since the understood good is the proper object of the will, the understood good is, as such, willed” (SCG 1.72.2) [YES]. Furthermore, “the apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the aspect of the good or the fitting; for the outward action in things that move themselves proceeds from the judgment, made through that form, that something is good or fitting” (SCG 2.48.4) [NO DISPUTE ON THAT ONE]."
Hmmm... I couldn't find it. I'm sorry, but is it possible you just made that part up?
That's one thing.
The other is this: If the will is JUST the 'inclination' you mention, how does this entail anything about extrinsic execution? Do you think that 'is inclined towards' implies 'necessarily executes'?
guller:
ReplyDelete"First, if you are correct that there is no kind “universe” that can have different instantiations, of which our current universe is one in particular, then what sense is there to say that God could create different universes?"
Of course there's a kind 'universe,' just as there is a kind 'phoenix' and a kind 'goatstag' - after all, we can talk about them. But they are concept-kinds (res rationis), not natural kinds.
"Second, if the universe is not a natural kind, then it has no nature, which means it has no essence, which means it has no final cause or end, and thus there is no sense in saying that one universe is better than another."
The universe is not a natural kind because of the narrow connotations of that expression. The notion of having a nature or essence can be used with much broader connotations, so it could be applied analogously to the universe. In any case, there is only one universe. And things that are actually unique in reality (i.e., are not a member of a natural kind) cannot be defined, even though, obviously, they have essences:
Cf. Aristotle, Met. VII, 15: "As has been said, then, the impossibility of defining individuals escapes notice in the case of eternal things, especially those which are unique, like the sun or the moon..."
DavidM (to dguller): Do you think that 'is inclined towards' implies 'necessarily executes'?
ReplyDeleteExactly.
In fact, one of the SCG sections already quoted from by dguller makes clear that that 'is inclined towards' implies 'necessarily executes' is -- and I quote -- "patently false".
@DavidM:
ReplyDeleteHmmm... I couldn't find it. I'm sorry, but is it possible you just made that part up?
My claim is that “all apprehension of what is good is done by the intellect, and the will is just the inclination towards doing whatever the intellect determines to be good”.
I have shown that the will is just an inclination towards the good. I have shown that the good towards which the will is inclined is the good that is apprehended by the intellect. The will does not have its own independent standard of goodness that it operates according to, but rather is nothing but an appetite that is directed towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good.
For you to disprove this, you will have to demonstrate how the will can incline towards an end that is independent of the good that is apprehended by the intellect that serves as the object of the will. Good luck with that.
The other is this: If the will is JUST the 'inclination' you mention, how does this entail anything about extrinsic execution? Do you think that 'is inclined towards' implies 'necessarily executes'?
Yes, because there is nothing else about the will that could account for the execution. Otherwise, the will would be able to act independent of the intellect, which is impossible, because the will could not act without some object, and it is precisely the intellect that supplies this object. As I said, the will is nothing but an inclination, an appetite that is directed towards whatever the intellect apprehends to be the good that serves as the object of the will. It is the intellect that is ultimately in the driving seat here, and the will is the means by which the intellect acts upon the body, and itself.
If you think that there is something else going on here, then I’m all ears as to what it could be, and I would love some quotations of Aquinas to back you up.
Of course there's a kind 'universe,' just as there is a kind 'phoenix' and a kind 'goatstag' - after all, we can talk about them. But they are concept-kinds (res rationis), not natural kinds.
Okay, but if they are kinds of some kind, then they must include a standard of perfect actualization as part of their definition.
In any case, there is only one universe. And things that are actually unique in reality (i.e., are not a member of a natural kind) cannot be defined, even though, obviously, they have essences.
I agree that the individual cannot be defined, but the essence of the individual can be defined, even if there is only one instantiation of that essence in that particular individual.
@Glenn:
ReplyDeleteIn fact, one of the SCG sections already quoted from by dguller makes clear that that 'is inclined towards' implies 'necessarily executes' is -- and I quote -- "patently false".
Yes, that is at SCG 1.81.4. Aquinas is arguing there that if God willed to create in order for creation to participate in his goodness -- which is an indirect way of willing his own goodness, which is the sole object of his will -- then the fact that his goodness is infinite means that creation must also be infinite in order to adequately participate in his goodness. However, creation is finite, and not infinite, which means that there is only one finite creation, and thus it is false that there exists an infinity of creations. I don’t see how he infers from this that “God does not necessarily will even the things that now exist”.
And anyway, I’m still trying to figure out where my argument goes wrong. I’m not saying that God must create necessarily, but rather that once he chooses to create, then certain necessities follow by “supposition” in the sense that “whoever wills something, necessarily wills whatever it necessarily required for it” (SCG 1.83.5). So, once God chose to create anything, then his ultimate choice of which creation to create must be determined according to the principles by which his intellect and will operate, and that means that his will can only create what his intellect apprehends as the good.
"I have shown that the will is just an inclination towards the good."
ReplyDeleteYou have repeatedly asserted, never shown.
"I have shown that the good towards which the will is inclined is the good that is apprehended by the intellect."
This is correct.
"The will does not have its own independent standard of goodness that it operates according to, but rather is nothing but an appetite that is directed towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good."
This is not.
"For you to disprove this, you will have to demonstrate how the will can incline towards an end that is independent of the good that is apprehended by the intellect that serves as the object of the will. Good luck with that."
That does not follow.
"Yes, because there is nothing else about the will that could account for the execution."
ReplyDelete...apparently you forgot about its freedom.
"Otherwise, the will would be able to act independent of the intellect, which is impossible, because the will could not act without some object, and it is precisely the intellect that supplies this object."
...which implies nothing about acting independently of the intellect.
(We've gone through plenty of relevant quotations already that back up my position.)
"Okay, but if they are kinds of some kind, then they must include a standard of perfect actualization as part of their definition."
What?? Where are you getting this? Is this something Aristotle says? Thomas? (Or just you?)
"I agree that the individual cannot be defined, but the essence of the individual can be defined, even if there is only one instantiation of that essence in that particular individual."
Same questions as above.
To clarify:
ReplyDeleteThe will's freedom implies nothing about it acting independently of the intellect.
"And anyway, I’m still trying to figure out where my argument goes wrong. I’m not saying that God must create necessarily, but rather that once he chooses to create, then certain necessities follow by “supposition” in the sense that “whoever wills something, necessarily wills whatever it necessarily required for it” (SCG 1.83.5). So, once God chose to create anything, then his ultimate choice of which creation to create must be determined according to the principles by which his intellect and will operate, and that means that his will can only create what his intellect apprehends as the good."
ReplyDeleteApart from attributing temporal choosing to God, this is all correct - and your position, which PLAINLY contradicts Thomas', does not follow from it.
@DavidM:
ReplyDeleteYou have repeatedly asserted, never shown.
Aquinas says that the will is “the intellectual appetite” (ST 1.82.2), and that “the very movement of the will is an inclination to something” (ST 1.82.1). And clearly, it is an appetite for and inclination towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good.
Here’s Stump:
“Contemporary philosophers tend to operate with a conception of the will as the mind’s steering wheel, neutral in its own right but able to direct other parts of the person. Aquinas’s conception of the will is different. He takes the will to be not a neutral faculty, but a bent or inclination. The will, he says, is a hunger, an appetite, for goodness …
“By itself the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect. The intellect presents to the will as good certain things or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances, and the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good. For this reason the intellect is said to move the will not as an efficient cause but as a final cause, because its presenting something as good moves the will as an end moves an appetite” (Aquinas, p. 278).
And here’s Brian Davies, again:
“… knowing something to be good goes with being drawn to it or attracted to it. And this ‘being drawn to’, this ‘being attracted by’, is what [Aquinas] has in mind when he speaks of will” (The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 142). Notice that he identifies the inclination towards the good with the will. In other words, the will is not something other than the inclination towards the good.
Again, if you can find a single source that says that the will is other than an appetite or inclination towards the good that is apprehended by the intellect, then feel free to provide it. The fact that you have been unable to do so speaks volumes.
...apparently you forgot about its freedom.
But it’s freedom solely resides in its lack of external coercion and it ability to have chosen otherwise, neither of which is compromised by its status as an appetite or inclination. And anyway, the point is that this is Aquinas’ account of the will.
...which implies nothing about acting independently of the intellect.
Of course, it does. The will requires an object to act. If there is no object, then there is no act. The intellect is what supplies the object, and thus if there is no intellect, then there is no object, and then there is no act of will. The intellect and will form a unitary system in which the former provides the object or end of the latter, which then exercises efficient causality upon the system or upon the body to engage in some form of behavior in the world.
What?? Where are you getting this? Is this something Aristotle says? Thomas? (Or just you?)
ReplyDeleteI take it to be an implication of theirs, because if there is no perfect standard in the form of an ideal instantiation of a kind, then there is no sense in which one instantiation can be better than another, and clearly there are better and worse instantiations of kinds, whether natural or not.
The will's freedom implies nothing about it acting independently of the intellect.
Right. I’m not talking about the will’s freedom, but rather the necessary conditions for the will to function.
Apart from attributing temporal choosing to God, this is all correct - and your position, which PLAINLY contradicts Thomas', does not follow from it.
Sure, it does. If the divine will must act according to what the divine intellect apprehends to be the good, then if God apprehends that universe U would have more goodness than universe V, then God’s will must act according to that apprehension, because that is what the will does. It is an inclination or directedness towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good, and thus if the intellect apprehends that U is better than V, then the will must act according to that apprehension.
LOGIC, guller, it's about your LOGIC. Let's just take this:
ReplyDelete"If the divine will must act according to what the divine intellect apprehends to be the good, then if God apprehends that universe U would have more goodness than universe V, then God’s will must act according to that apprehension, because that is what the will does."
Now, guller, pay attention: these are two different and logically independent apprehensions:
(1) Universe U would have more goodness than universe V.
(2) God must create universe U rather than universe V (or in general: God must create the BPU).
IOW, God can apprehend (1) without apprehending (2). (2) does not follow from (1), and you have never presented an argument for thinking that it does. This is strictly and obviously entailed by what Thomas says and you shouldn't need me to reproduce the relevant quotations at this point.
Therefore, your argument fails. You assume that "act[ing] according to that apprehension" implies the necessity of creating U rather than V. It does not! (And none of your quotations suggest that it does, so they are all strictly irrelevant.)
"I take it to be an implication of theirs, because if there is no perfect standard in the form of an ideal instantiation of a kind, then there is no sense in which one instantiation can be better than another, and clearly there are better and worse instantiations of kinds, whether natural or not."
He takes it to be an implication of theirs... Good Lord, and he wants me not to get sarcastic with him!?
guller, you're way up shit-creek here. Think about this, if you will: You, guller, are an actual man; therefore you are a perfect instantiation of the form man! In terms of your substantial form, you're there, man, all the way! You did it! You don't need to go searching in the world of forms to find it! You fully instantiate the form man! That's how common natures/essences/forms work! (I sincerely hope this makes you feel good. ;) )
@DavidM:
ReplyDelete(1) Universe U would have more goodness than universe V.
(2) God must create universe U rather than universe V (or in general: God must create the BPU).
IOW, God can apprehend (1) without apprehending (2). (2) does not follow from (1), and you have never presented an argument for thinking that it does. This is strictly and obviously entailed by what Thomas says and you shouldn't need me to reproduce the relevant quotations at this point.
(2) does follow from (1) if God also knows that his will is inclined to do what his intellect apprehends to be the good, which he must know, because the will just is the inclination towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good.
Think about this, if you will: You, guller, are an actual man; therefore you are a perfect instantiation of the form man!
That is true with respect to primary actuality, but it is false with respect to secondary actuality, which is equally important. It is on the basis of secondary actuality that we differentiate between more perfect and less perfect instantiations of a form. For example, a triangle with straight lines is more perfect than a triangle with crooked lines, because even though they both perfectly instantiate the primary actuality of the form triangle, their different secondary actualities allow us to differentiate between them with respect to their differential perfection.
dguller (to DavidM): Again, if you can find a single source that says that the will is other than an appetite or inclination towards the good that is apprehended by the intellect, then feel free to provide it. The fact that you have been unable to do so speaks volumes.
ReplyDeleteOh dear.
Here is one source indicating that the will is not merely, only or solely what it is therein said to be:
o According to my understanding, freedom of the will necessarily requires that the will can choose actions that are, in reality, contrary to its natural end. -- dguller
If the will can choose actions, then it can choose from amongst two or more actions. And if the will can choose from amongst two or more actions, then it follows that the will is not an automaton inexorably and blindly chasing after whatever particular apprehension of good is presented to it by the intellect. This in turn means that, contrary to the assertion quoted above, the will is not merely, solely or only "an appetite or inclination towards the good that is apprehended by the intellect".
Of course, it may be countered that: a) the above source is a dubious source; and b) a more authoritative source is called for.
Regarding a): There is some reason to believe that others may experience an inclination to agree.
Regarding b): "[W]e find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect." -- ST I q 82 a 3
@Glenn:
ReplyDeleteRegarding b): "[W]e find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect." -- ST I q 82 a 3
Yes, but look at the context.
He says that “the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will”, but that when considered “relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect”. So, the question is, relative to what? I think what he means is as follows.
Say that the object of will is in X and the object of intellect is in Y, then if X is superior to Y, then we can say that the will is higher than the intellect. And since Aquinas says that the object of intellect is “in the one who understands”, it follows that if X is superior to “the one who understands”, then the will is superior to the intellect, under those circumstances. (It is also true that if “the one who understands” is superior to X, then the intellect is superior to the will, under those circumstances.)
The example he gives of the former is that the love of God is superior to the knowledge of God, because the object of the will is in God whereas the object of the intellect is in “the one who understands”. And since God is superior to a finite human being, it follows that the will is superior to the intellect, under those circumstances.
So, relative to whether X is superior (or inferior) to a human person, the will can be superior (or inferior) to the intellect.
And notice that none of this refutes the claim that the will is necessarily the inclination towards the good apprehended by the intellect, and that the ultimate source of motion of the will is the intellect’s apprehension of the good. As Aquinas says: “For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will” (ST 1.82.4).
@Glenn:
ReplyDeleteAlso, notice that the passage of mine that you cited does not contradict my position here.
I wrote: “According to my understanding, freedom of the will necessarily requires that the will can choose actions that are, in reality, contrary to its natural end.”
Say that the natural end or ultimate good is G* and other inferior goods are G1 and G2. If a person’s intellect apprehends that G1 is superior to G2, but they do not apprehend that G* is superior to G1 or G2, then the intellect will present G1 as the good. G1 will serve as the final end for the will, which will incline towards actualizing G1, even though, objectively speaking, G* is the good, and G1 is inferior to G*.
So, people can will to do actions that are contrary to their natural end by virtue of the fact that their intellects are fallible and finite, and often misapprehend an inferior good as the ultimate good at the moment of decision.
You continue to miss the point of the objections, which is not that the will doesn't behave, so to speak, in a certain way, but that there is more to the will than merely behaving in that certain way.
ReplyDelete@Glenn:
ReplyDeleteYou continue to miss the point of the objections, which is not that the will doesn't behave, so to speak, in a certain way, but that there is more to the will than merely behaving in that certain way.
Now, if only someone can explain what this “more” is supposed to be, and even better, if they can justify it with evidence from Aquinas and Thomist scholars. From what I’ve read, the will’s sole function is to be the inclination towards and appetite for the good apprehended by the intellect, such that the will acts as an efficient cause to bring the good apprehended by the intellect (i.e. the object or final end of the will) into reality. I’ve provided citations from Aquinas, Stump and Davies in support of this position. If you agree that the will does what they say it does, but that they also say that there’s “more to the will” than what I’ve cited them as endorsing, then I’m all ears.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteFrom what I've read...
Okay, stick to that. It won't hurt to do so, and it might lead to some good.
@dguller:
ReplyDeleteme: "Think about this, if you will: You, guller, are an actual man; therefore you are a perfect instantiation of the form man!"
dguller: "That is true with respect to primary actuality, but it is false with respect to secondary actuality, which is equally important. It is on the basis of secondary actuality that we differentiate between more perfect and less perfect instantiations of a form."
No. You are a perfect instantiation of the form 'man'; various accidental perfections can make you a better man in various accidental respects, but in respect of your nature/ essence/ substantial form, you are perfectly a man.
If you still want to say "if there is no perfect standard in the form of an ideal instantiation of an accidental perfection, then there is no sense in which one instantiation can be better than another," then I'll just have to remind you: check your LOGIC. That simply doesn't make sense.
Beyond that, I'll second Glenn's comment:
"You continue to miss the point of the objections, which is not that the will doesn't behave, so to speak, in a certain way, but that there is more to the will than merely behaving in that certain way."
So we have two propositions:
(1) Universe U would have more goodness than universe V.
(2) God must create universe U rather than universe V (or in general: God must create the BPU).
You claim (entirely begging the question, btw):
"(2) does follow from (1) if God also knows that his will is inclined to do what his intellect apprehends to be the good, which he must know, because the will just is the inclination towards what the intellect apprehends to be the good."
And obviously you're wrong here: (2) does not follow from (1). You may not understand what the 'more' is that characterizes the will, but Aquinas' position is clearly NOT what you say it is (i.e., that the will is NOTHING BUT...) and so for you to continue to produce quotes that only confirm that your view is indeed not Aquinas', and to pretend that you've thereby made an argument in support of your position, is bewildering.
Can you see that?
To clarify:
ReplyDelete"...and so for you to continue to produce quotes that only confirm that your view [of the will] is indeed not Aquinas', and to pretend that you've thereby made a [sound] argument in support of your position [which critiques Aquinas, and is based on (your false understanding of) his conception of the will], is bewildering."
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteNo. You are a perfect instantiation of the form 'man'; various accidental perfections can make you a better man in various accidental respects, but in respect of your nature/ essence/ substantial form, you are perfectly a man.
If you still want to say "if there is no perfect standard in the form of an ideal instantiation of an accidental perfection, then there is no sense in which one instantiation can be better than another," then I'll just have to remind you: check your LOGIC. That simply doesn't make sense.
Okay, so help me out here. I agree with you that the formal cause is perfectly actualized in any individual being, but my point was regarding the degree to which the final cause is actualized, which can occur in varying degrees of perfection. For example, an acorn has a form that is perfectly actualized, but its final cause is not perfectly actualized, because it is not an oak, which is the ultimate end of the acorn. So, an oak has a higher degree of secondary actuality than an acorn, even though both are equally perfect with respect to their primary actuality, i.e. the presence of the form. So, an oak is more perfect than an acorn, irrespective of the fact that they both perfectly instantiate – in the sense of primary actuality – the form of an oak.
And obviously you're wrong here: (2) does not follow from (1). You may not understand what the 'more' is that characterizes the will, but Aquinas' position is clearly NOT what you say it is (i.e., that the will is NOTHING BUT...) and so for you to continue to produce quotes that only confirm that your view is indeed not Aquinas', and to pretend that you've thereby made an argument in support of your position, is bewildering.
What is even more bewildering is making claims without any references to justify them. I have cited Aquinas as describing the will as an inclination and appetite towards the good as apprehended by the intellect. I have cited Thomist scholars, such as Stump and Davies, as well. (I can cite others, if you like, that say the same thing.) If you think that the will is more than what my references have described, then find me a single quote from Aquinas or a Thomist scholar that describes what this “more” is supposed to be. No more rude bluster. Just cite a quotation that refutes my position. Should be pretty simple for a scholarly chap like yourself.
And if the will is what I say it is, then God must know what his will is, and thus must know that his will must do what his intellect apprehends to be the good. It is impossible for his will to do other than what his intellect apprehends to be the good, not only because of the nature of the will, but also because the nature of the divine will is to be the divine intellect by virtue of divine simplicity. There is no gap that distinguishes the divine intellect and the divine will such that the divine will can act independently of the divine intellect. And God must know that to be true, because he is omniscient.
"I’ve provided citations from Aquinas, Stump and Davies in support of this position."
ReplyDeleteIf you could provide just ONE citation that ACTUALLY supported your position, that would be amazing.
"I agree with you that the formal cause is perfectly actualized in any individual being, but my point was regarding the degree to which the final cause is actualized, which can occur in varying degrees of perfection."
ReplyDeleteWrong. Accidents are formal causes too. It is the substantial form that is perfectly actualized in any individual substance.
"So, an oak is more perfect than an acorn, irrespective of the fact that they both perfectly instantiate – in the sense of primary actuality – the form of an oak."
That's debatable. But the point remains that there is no such thing as the "accidentally-best possible oak," and your argument to the contrary makes no sense. Try to focus on that: making sense.
"What is even more bewildering is making claims without any references to justify them."
How is that bewildering? Again, you're not making sense. Arguments do not stand or fall on whether you have produced references which you (in your case mistakenly) think support your argument. It just doesn't work that way. Your bluster about bluster is just more nonsense. Isn't it?
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteMy position is that the will is an inclination towards and appetite for the good as apprehended by the intellect.
Here’s my references, again:
Aquinas says that “the very movement of the will is an inclination to something” (ST 1.82.1), and that the will is “the intellectual appetite” (ST 1.82.2) that is directed towards an object, and “the object of the will is the end and the good” (ST 2-1.1.1). And what makes the will an intellectual appetite is that the good that is the object of the will is necessarily cognized as good by an intellect, whereas a natural appetite is an in-built directedness towards the good without any cognitive awareness (see ST 2-1.1.2). And there can be no movement of the will without an object of the will, and since the object of the will is the good as apprehended by the intellect, it follows that a necessary condition for movement of the will is the good as apprehended by the intellect. Without the intellectual apprehension of the good to serve as the object of the will, the will would not move at all. As Aquinas writes: “every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension” (ST 1.82.4) and “the understood good is, as such, willed” (SCG 1.72.2). So, it is pretty clear that, according to Aquinas, the will just is the inclination towards and appetite for the good as apprehended by the intellect.
And again, here’s two Thomist scholars that say the same thing:
“Contemporary philosophers tend to operate with a conception of the will as the mind’s steering wheel, neutral in its own right but able to direct other parts of the person. Aquinas’s conception of the will is different. He takes the will to be not a neutral faculty, but a bent or inclination. The will, he says, is a hunger, an appetite, for goodness …
“By itself the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect. The intellect presents to the will as good certain things or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances, and the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good. For this reason the intellect is said to move the will not as an efficient cause but as a final cause, because its presenting something as good moves the will as an end moves an appetite” (Eleanore Stump, Aquinas, p. 278).
“… knowing something to be good goes with being drawn to it or attracted to it. And this ‘being drawn to’, this ‘being attracted by’, is what [Aquinas] has in mind when he speaks of will” (Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 142).
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteThat's debatable. But the point remains that there is no such thing as the "accidentally-best possible oak," and your argument to the contrary makes no sense. Try to focus on that: making sense.
How is that debatable? The final end of an acorn is not the be an acorn, but to become an oak.
Here’s Feser, in a quote that nicely summarizes my points:
“For Aquinas, things naturally are inclined or tend towards their natural forms, and will not of themselves rest, as it were, until that form is perfectly realized; hence the acorn, for example, has a built-in tendency towards realizing the form of an oak, and will naturally realize that form unless somehow prevented by something outside it. What we are describing in this example is of course the goal-directedness of the acorn as something having a final cause. But other sorts of things have final causes, too. In sentient beings, namely animals, this inclination towards the perfection of their forms is what we call appetite. And in beings with intellect it is what we call will” (Aquinas, p. 124)
And here’s Feser on what the will is:
“That is just what will is on Aquinas’ account: a power to be drawn towards (or away from) that which is apprehended by the intellect (SCG IV. 19). (More precisely, it is the power to be drawn towards or away from that which is apprehended to be good or bad, respectively …) (Ibid., p. 149).
Again, this completely harmonizes with what I have been saying.
Okay, thank you for the citations (again). I will simply note that "just is" is not convertible with "is just."
ReplyDeleteNow how does your position on the necessity of God willing to create the BPU LOGICALLY follow from any of that?
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteOkay, thank you for the citations (again). I will simply note that "just is" is not convertible with "is just."
Sure, it is.
And if you think there is more to the Thomist account of will than I have explained, then the onus is upon you to prove it. I’ve made my case.
Now how does your position on the necessity of God willing to create the BPU LOGICALLY follow from any of that?
Not so fast. My argument hinges upon my account of the will. If you don’t accept it, then there’s no point going on. Do you accept it? If not, then prove why it is inaccurate. Otherwise, we are done.
How is that debatable? The final end of an acorn is not the be an acorn, but to become an oak.
ReplyDeleteHere’s Feser, in a quote that nicely summarizes my points:
“For Aquinas, things naturally are inclined or tend towards their natural forms, and will not of themselves rest, as it were, until that form is perfectly realized; hence the acorn, for example, has a built-in tendency towards realizing the form of an oak, and will naturally realize that form unless somehow prevented by something outside it. What we are describing in this example is of course the goal-directedness of the acorn as something having a final cause. But other sorts of things have final causes, too. In sentient beings, namely animals, this inclination towards the perfection of their forms is what we call appetite. And in beings with intellect it is what we call will” (Aquinas, p. 124)
dguller:
Here Feser is obviously talking about the acorn as being in POTENCY to being an oak - which is to say, it does NOT perfectly instantiate the form of an oak.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteHere Feser is obviously talking about the acorn as being in POTENCY to being an oak - which is to say, it does NOT perfectly instantiate the form of an oak.
That is irrelevant, according to you. The acorn, just as much as the oak, perfectly instantiates the form of oak. In other words, they are formally identical.
A: "An oak JUST IS a tree."
ReplyDeleteB: "Sure, but that doesn't mean it IS JUST a tree. It's also a source of shade, or wood, for example. And it's a particular kind of tree, and a particular individual, not JUST 'a tree.'"
A: "No, an oak JUST IS a tree and that means it IS JUST a tree."
B: (aside) Wtf???
"That is irrelevant, according to you. The acorn, just as much as the oak, perfectly instantiates the form of oak. In other words, they are formally identical."
ReplyDeleteSpeechless.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteA: "An oak JUST IS a tree."
B: "Sure, but that doesn't mean it IS JUST a tree. It's also a source of shade, or wood, for example. And it's a particular kind of tree, and a particular individual, not JUST 'a tree.'"
A: "No, an oak JUST IS a tree and that means it IS JUST a tree."
B: (aside) Wtf???
Look, I’m not going to get into semantics here, because it’s irrelevant. If you think that the will is other than the inclination towards the good as apprehended by the intellect, then (a) explain what this “other” function of the will is, and (b) justify it with citations from Aquinas and Thomist scholars. You still haven’t done (a) or (b), and instead want to engage in verbal gymnastics, which speaks volumes for the authority of your position.
"That is irrelevant, according to you. The acorn, just as much as the oak, perfectly instantiates the form of oak. In other words, they are formally identical."
Speechless.
If only. The acorn and the oak are formally identical, because they have the same form. What differentiates their degree of perfection is not the presence of the same form, but rather the extent to which they have achieved their final end. The oak is closer to achieving the final end that derived from the form than the acorn, and thus the oak is more perfect than the acorn, even though they have one the same form. In other words, although they have the same primary actuality, they differ in terms of their respective secondary actuality, i.e. the degree to which they actualize their final end. An oak that achieves its final end is the perfect instantiation of the oak, both in terms of its primary and secondary actuality. And it is because the final end is the ideal and perfect instantiation of a kind that it serves as the measure and standard by which all members of the kind are appraised and judged. That is what Aquinas means when he writes that “that which is the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus” (SCG 1.62.5).
guller:
ReplyDeleteSemantics are very rarely, if ever, irrelevant. Certainly they are not here.
A thing cannot be both in potency (e.g., acorn) and in act (e.g., oak) at the same time and in the same respect. This is semantics and is as basic as it gets.
"You still haven’t done (a) or (b), and instead want to engage in verbal gymnastics, which speaks volumes for the authority of your position."
LOL! I've done both. (KEYWORD: 'freedom.') I bet you think all your irrelevant citations and bad logic speak to the 'authority' of your position, don't you? Too funny.
ST I.25.1 ad 4: "Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified."
ST I.25.2 ad 2: "the power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it."
Let's expound: "the power of God [which is logically but not really distinct from God's will and intellect] is not ordered toward its effect [i.e., creatures, the universe] as towards an end [towards something that is good, or, a fortiori, best]; rather, it [God's power] is the end [the good, the final cause] of the effect produced by it [i.e., of the universe]."
ST I.19.4: "the will of God is the cause of things."
That's Aquinas.
So what was YOUR claim about the will again? The will is JUST "the inclination towards and appetite for the good as apprehended by the intellect." So who is right about Aquinas' view of the will? Aquinas or guller? It's obviously hard to say...
"An oak that achieves its final end is the perfect instantiation of the oak, both in terms of its primary and secondary actuality. And it is because the final end is the ideal and perfect instantiation of a kind that it serves as the measure and standard by which all members of the kind are appraised and judged. That is what Aquinas means when he writes that “that which is the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus” (SCG 1.62.5)."
ReplyDeleteI'd love to hear you try to explain in an actual rational, logical, valid, sound argument how you think that citation applies here, based on actually reading it in context.
In any case, what the hell do you mean by saying, "An oak that achieves its final end is the perfect instantiation of the oak, both in terms of its primary and secondary actuality"? Do you mean that every mature oak is 'the' perfect instantiation of the form 'oak,' both essentially and accidentally? How do you imagine that this claim in any way a) makes sense? b) supports your argument?
N.B.: the whole "I don't care about the meanings of words and phrases in a particular context" (i.e., "I don't care about semantics") schtick is flippin' ridiculous.
ReplyDeleteDavidM:
ReplyDeleteA thing cannot be both in potency (e.g., acorn) and in act (e.g., oak) at the same time and in the same respect. This is semantics and is as basic as it gets.
I agree with that, but the issue is whether the standard by which a thing is judged with respect to the kind of thing that it is is precisely the most perfect and ideal instantiation of the kind. You say, “no”, and I say, “yes”.
LOL! I've done both. (KEYWORD: 'freedom.')
And as I responded to you at the time, Aquinas’ definition of “freedom” is perfectly consistent with my account, and thus cannot contradict it.
Let's expound: "the power of God [which is logically but not really distinct from God's will and intellect] is not ordered toward its effect [i.e., creatures, the universe] as towards an end [towards something that is good, or, a fortiori, best]; rather, it [God's power] is the end [the good, the final cause] of the effect produced by it [i.e., of the universe]."
First, thank you for the quotations and exposition.
Second, your account is inadequate to rebut my points, because it ignores how the will works. Aquinas is clear that all movement of the will requires an object that is apprehended by the intellect as good. In fact, he says that the intellectual apprehension of X as good and inclination towards X are inseparable, which is the primary basis that he uses to argue that God has a will at all: “There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect” (ST 1.19.1). So, if you argue that the divine will, in choosing to create the universe, is not ordered towards an end apprehended as good, then you have simultaneously refuted the presence of will in God, as well, because an act of will without an object or end is incoherent. It would like arguing for the existence of a four-sided triangle.
In fact, Aquinas anticipates this very objection in objection 1 at ST 1.19.1: “It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.” His reply is:
“Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Question 6, Article 3): for the end has the aspect of good.”
But that does not solve the problem! Certainly, God can will himself, because he is the object of his will: “the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence” (ST 1.19.1). In other words, insofar as God has an end, he has a will (towards that end as object of the will), and since the only possible end for God is himself, it follows that God has will only insofar as he wills himself. As he writes: “[the divine will] wills nothing except by reason of its goodness” (ST 1.19.2), because “its goodness” is “the object of the divine will”. But then it follows that God does not will creation, because creating the universe is not an end for the divine will, and without an end, the will cannot function. However, this is absurd, because the only way that creation can possibly exist is if God wills it to exist.
That is why it is so important for you to clarify what you mean by “the will”. If you want to view the divine will as analogous to the human will, then certainly you will have to negate several features of the human will, such as the sequential process that seems to be involved in the interplay between the intellect and the will. In God, there is no such unfolding, but rather a unitary and eternal act that does not involve really distinct components at all. However, if you negate the very presence of an end with respect to the will, then you have negated the will itself, which necessarily must be directed towards an end, albeit in a manner that is consistent with divine simplicity.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteI'd love to hear you try to explain in an actual rational, logical, valid, sound argument how you think that citation applies here, based on actually reading it in context.
Each thing is a member of a kind, and each kind carries within it what counts as an ideal instantiation of the kind, and that ideal is precisely what each member of the kind is striving to actualize. That is just basic Thomist metaphysics.
In any case, what the hell do you mean by saying, "An oak that achieves its final end is the perfect instantiation of the oak, both in terms of its primary and secondary actuality"? Do you mean that every mature oak is 'the' perfect instantiation of the form 'oak,' both essentially and accidentally? How do you imagine that this claim in any way a) makes sense? b) supports your argument?
I am saying that the perfect instantiation of a kind is one that lacks any potency towards its final end, i.e. it has actually achieved its final end, at which point, it is at rest and no longer striving, having achieved its end.
"I agree with that, but the issue is whether the standard by which a thing is judged with respect to the kind of thing that it is is precisely the most perfect and ideal instantiation of the kind. You say, “no”, and I say, “yes”."
ReplyDeleteYou say "I agree with that," but then apparently you don't understand what 'that' means (unless you're admitting that what you said before about acorns and oaks was nonsense). As for your 'standard of judgment,' it's nonsense and you are obviously wrong. If not, please tell me how this works. Take an oak: how is there even any intelligible notion of an oak that is "the most perfect and ideal instantiation of its kind"? Seriously, man: you can say you believe this shit, but what the hell are you actually talking about??
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteYou say "I agree with that," but then apparently you don't understand what 'that' means (unless you're admitting that what you said before about acorns and oaks was nonsense).
Not at all. I agree that what is in potency (in some way) cannot be in act (in the same way).
As for your 'standard of judgment,' it's nonsense and you are obviously wrong. If not, please tell me how this works. Take an oak: how is there even any intelligible notion of an oak that is "the most perfect and ideal instantiation of its kind"? Seriously, man: you can say you believe this shit, but what the hell are you actually talking about??
Here’s Stump:
“… according to Aquinas, a thing’s differentia, which is a characteristic of the thing constituting it in its species, also needs to be understood as the power for an activity or operation peculiar to that species and essential to every member of the species … We can call the operative power that is the differentia of a thing its ‘specifying (that is, species-specific) potentiality’.
“The actuality of a thing can thus be understood in two ways, according to Aquinas. On the one hand, there is the actuality which a thing has just in virtue of existing as a thing of a certain sort, with a particular substantial form that confers on it the specifying potentiality characteristic of its species. On the other hand, that particular potentiality is part of the essence of the thing in question; and so as that potentiality becomes actualized, there is a sense in which the thing in question becomes actualized also, because a part of its nature that was only potential becomes actual.
“... So a thing is perfected when and to the extent to which the thing performs instances of its specific operation and thereby actualizes its specifying potentiality. A thing’s operation in accord with its specifying potentiality brings into actuality what was not actual but merely potential in that thing’s nature as conferred by its substantial form. In Aquinas’ sense of ‘perfect’, therefore, a thing is perfect of its kind to the exntet to which it actualizes the specifying potentiality conferred by its form.” (Aquinas, pp. 66-7).
What counts as a perfect instantiation of a kind is one that maximally actualizes its specifying potentiality, to use Stump’s term, and that specifying potentiality is the operation or power that is characteristic of the kind or species that differentiates it from other species. So, to speak of human beings, a person in the stage of infancy has a first potentiality to operate its powers of intellect, and once that person reaches the stage of adolescence and young adulthood, then that first potentiality becomes a second potentiality or first actuality in which their latent capacity or power can be actually exercised, and once that capacity is actually exercised, then they have achieved a second actuality. (This is all in De Anima II.5.) The higher degree of actuality they achieve, the closer they reach to perfection, and the highest degree of actuality corresponds to the achievement of perfection.
That is what I meant.
It was finding out about this grotesque remnant of Egyptian paganism - bodily resurrection - that turned me away from the Abrahamic faiths forever.
ReplyDelete