Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Four questions for Keith Parsons [UPDATED 2/21]


Keith Parsons’ feelings are, it seems, still hurt over some frank things I said about him a few years ago (here and here).  It seems to me that when a guy dismisses as a “fraud” an entire academic field to which many thinkers of universally acknowledged genius have contributed, and maintains that its key arguments do not even rise to the level of a “respectable philosophical position” worthy of “serious academic attention,” then when its defenders hit back, he really ought to have a thicker skin and more of a sense of humor about himself.  But that’s just me.
 
Anyway, Parsons laments the bad “manners” I showed in having the temerity to give him a taste of his own medicine.  He says he wishes we could have had an “interesting discussion instead.”  So, in the interests of furthering that end I’ll refrain from returning his latest insults.  Instead I’d like to ask him four very straightforward questions to which I think both my readers and his would like to hear his answers.  A response should only take him a few moments.  I set out some context for each question, but I’ve put the questions themselves in bold so as to facilitate a speedy reply from Prof. Parsons.  Here they are:

1. Prof. Parsons, in your response to a reader’s comment, you say:

Unlike Prof. Feser, I would like to address the strongest claims of my opponents, and not those that seem weakest to me.

Evidently, then, you think I have failed to address the strongest criticisms either of my own arguments or of the arguments of philosophers to whose work I appeal (e.g. Aquinas).  So, who exactly are these critics I have ignored, or which of their criticisms, specifically, have I failed to address?  I’m sure you have something in particular in mind, so if you could take just a second or two to let us know what it is, I‘d appreciate it.

2. In the same response, you write vis-à-vis the doctrine of divine conservation:

Why, for instance, does a proton have to be maintained in existence? Why can't it just exist on its own? The very idea that existence is some sort of act that must be continually performed sounds to me, frankly, fatuous.

I assume, then, that you’ve studied and refuted the Scholastic arguments for divine conservation – which, of course, offer an answer to the question you raise -- and have just neglected to tell us where this refutation can be found.  So, could you tell us where we can find this refutation?  Is it in one of your books or journal articles?  Or could you point to some other author you think has adequately done the job?  (FYI, I have defended the Scholastic position at length in my American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly article “Existential Inertia and the Five Ways,” wherein I respond to the arguments on this topic presented by J. L. Mackie, Bede Rundle, John Beaudoin, and others.   I will be happy to email you a PDF of the article if you haven’t seen it, since I’d be very interested to hear which criticisms you think I’ve overlooked.) 

While I’ve got you, I also have a couple of questions about some remarks you made a few years ago when your dismissive remarks about natural theology were widely publicized: 

3. In response to a reader’s comment, you wrote:

I think Bertrand Russell's beautifully succinct critique of all causal arguments holds good: "If everything requires a cause, then God requires a cause. However, if anything can exist without a cause, it might as well be the universe as God."  Exactly.

Now, your Secular Outpost co-blogger and fellow atheist Jeffery Jay Lowder agrees with me that this is not in fact a good objection to arguments for a First Cause, because it attacks a straw man.  Specifically, Lowder has said:

[N]o respectable theologian or theistic philosopher has ever made the claim, "everything has a cause." Yet various new atheists have proceeded to attack that straw man of their own making. I remember, when reading The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, where he attacked that straw man and cringing. There are many different cosmological arguments for God's existence and none of them rely upon the stupid claim, "everything has a cause."

You won't find that mistake made by Quentin Smith, Graham Oppy, Paul Draper, or (if we add a theistic critic to the list) Wes Morriston.

End quote.  Now it would seem that what Lowder calls a “mistake” is one that you, Keith Parsons, have made.  But is Lowder wrong?  If he is, please tell us exactly which theistic philosophers who defend First Cause arguments – Avicenna? Maimonides? Aquinas? Scotus?  Leibniz? Clarke? Garrigou-Lagrange? Craig? -- actually ever gave the argument Russell was attacking.

4.  In response to another reader’s question, about Craig’s version of the First Cause argument, you wrote: “Both theists and atheists begin with an uncaused brute fact.  For Craig it is God, and for me it is the universe.”  Now, as you know, the expression “brute fact” is typically used in philosophy to convey the idea of something which is unintelligible or without explanation.  And your statement gives the impression that all theists, or at least most of them, regard God as a “brute fact” in this sense. 

But in fact that is the reverse of the truth.  Aristotelians, Neoplatonists, Thomists, Leibnizian rationalists, et al. would deny that God is a “brute fact.”  They would say that the explanation for God’s existence lies in the divine nature -- for Aristotelians, in God’s pure actuality; for Neoplatonists, in his absolute simplicity; for Thomists, in the fact that his essence and existence are identical; for Leibnizians in his being his own sufficient reason; and so forth.  (Naturally the atheist will not think the arguments of these thinkers are convincing.  But to say that they are not convincing is not the same thing as showing that the theist is either explicitly or implicitly committed to the notion that God is a “brute fact.”)

But perhaps you think the standard interpretation of the views of Aristotelians, Neoplatonists, Thomists, Leibnizian rationalists, et al. is mistaken.  Perhaps you think that these thinkers are in fact all explicitly or at least implicitly committed to the thesis that God is a “brute fact.”  So, could you please tell us where you have spelled out an argument justifying the claim that all or at least most philosophical theists regard God as a “brute fact” or are at least implicitly committed to the claim that he is?  Is there a book or journal article written by you or by someone else in which we can find this justification? 

Thanks.   I look forward to your answers and to an interesting discussion.

UPDATE 2/19: Over in his combox, Keith Parsons at first expressed interest in responding to my questions, but then in a follow-up comment wrote:

On second thought, after looking at your "straightforward questions" my answer is: Nah. I was expecting an invitation to a civil academic discussion, but I find that you are still in personal attack mode. My only response will be to assure you that you have not hurt my feelings at all. I think you are a horse's ass, and the disdain of your ilk is of no concern to me at all. Indeed, I consider it a badge of honor. Please do write more nasty things about me for the amusement of your ignorant and boorish followers. It makes my day when I piss off people like you guys.

I’ll let readers be the judge of which of us is “pissed off,” “nasty,” “in personal attack mode,” etc.; of whether I was right to characterize Parsons as too thin-skinned; and of why he decided not to respond to some polite and straightforward questions that should take him only a few moments to answer.  (Judging from his combox, Parson’s own readers aren’t too happy with his reply.) 

I’ve just posted a polite response in his combox.  Let’s see whether I’ve made his day again.

UPDATE 2/20: For those who aren’t following the proceedings in Parsons’ combox, in response to my polite restatement of my questions to him, Parsons wrote: 

Prof. Feser, 

You have written now, what is it, three lengthy columns attacking me? I think about you approximately zero percent of the time. Apparently, however, I am living rent free in your head. The kind of help you need is not the kind that I am professionally qualified to give.

By this point I found I couldn’t help but let slip the dogs of sarcasm, responding:

Prof. Parsons, 

Thanks for that. Just ran your comment through Google Translate. Here's what came out: "Prof. Feser, you've embarrassed me by asking four polite and simple questions I cannot answer, despite my having loudly shot my mouth off about the subjects in question for several years. So, I will try once again to deflect attention from this fact by accusing you of launching a personal attack, in the desperate hope that there might still be a few readers left who haven't bothered actually to read your blog post and see that my accusation is false. Also, I never give you any thought, except for all those times over the last few days and years that I've run to my computer to post comments to the effect that I never give you any thought." 

Can you confirm the accuracy of this translation?
 
To which Parsons replied: 

Prof. Feser, 

Thanks for the hysterical (in both senses of the term) calumny. You prove my point more eloquently than I ever could. Really, sir, you are in the grip of an irrational obsession. Get some help.  

Parsons’ readers have, almost to a man, expressed disappointment at his behavior, and now his co-blogger Jeff Lowder has called on Parsons to knock it off and just answer the questions I put to him.  But I doubt anything else he might say could be more illuminating than what he's said already.

UPDATE 2/21: If you’ve been following the continuing exchange in the combox over at Keith Parsons’ blog, you know that he has now agreed to an exchange with me, to be moderated by Jeffery Jay Lowder.  I’ll report the specific details after they are finalized.

369 comments:

  1. DavidT:

    This is a respectable and hardheaded position... but I find the consequences of the revelation need to be taken into account. I would expect the consequences of a mass delusion or fraud to to be a short-lived movement or a cult like Heaven's Gate. Its falsity is demonstrated by the fact that it soon self-destructs and is forgotten.

    But if you take into consideration other religions that would have to be based upon deception, fraud or delusion from your standpoint, then you can find numerous examples of flourishing religions. For example, look at Islam, Mormonism, Scientology, and so on. So, it rains upon the just and unjust alike.

    I find it implausible that this sort of revolution in human history could be caused by a fraud or hallucination. Those things just aren't deep enough. Something happened in the first centuries AD to knock human history off its natural pattern... and it seems me that something was the inbreaking of God into history in Jesus Christ.

    I’m no specialist in history, and so I can’t definitively rebut your claims, but it seems to me that the progress of Western civilization had more to do with Greek thought than Christianity per se. There was nothing specific about Christianity, other than its ability to speak to the majority of people in a way that allowed them to absorb its principles in an effective fashion, that accounts for the success of Western civilization. The belief in an ordered cosmos was present in Greek thought. The belief in the unity and interconnectedness of mankind was present in Greek thought. The belief in virtue as caring for the less fortunate, because of the fundamental equality of human beings, was present in Greek thought. The belief in a divine providence was present in Greek thought. The belief in science and efforts at acquiring knowledge for both its own sake and for the betterment of mankind was present in Greek thought. I will agree that Christianity combined these beliefs in a unique and powerful fashion that appealed not only to the elites and wealthy, but to everyone, but I’m hard pressed to agree that without Christianity, these ideas would never have existed.

    Then the question is: What about the 300 years before then? The history gets a little fuzzy, but based on the later 1700 years, I don't find a reason to doubt that the Church was consistently proclaiming the same message all the way back to Christ (and early versions of the Creed, agreeing in the basic details, are found in the letters of Paul, the oldest NT documents).

    Yes, that is the key question. I’d say that given the repeated schisms and disagreements that occurred in the last 1,700 years, and the fact that the early 300 years were a time of multiplicity and divergent theological views with powerful players asserting their dominance in doctrinal matters, paints a different picture of Christian orthodoxy. There is far more that we do not know than that we do know about early Christianity that any conclusions would have to be tentative and open to doubt. I don’t think that we can say we know enough to build a case for devoting one’s entire life to believing in the claims that were proposed during that period of time. Perhaps Kierkegaard was correct when he argued that it is foolhardy to build one’s faith upon historical claims, because they are always open to doubt and are inherently unreliable. Rather, faith is a subjective choice filled with passion and uncertainty and that makes infinite demands of believers, including putting one’s heart and soul into something that appears completely absurd from an objective standpoint.

    ReplyDelete
  2. dguller,

    So, lowering the bar somewhat, I’m interested in how one would distinguish an authentic revelation from an inauthentic revelation, and how one determined the criteria that are used for this goal.

    Failed prophecy. Inconsistent prophecy. Demonstrated dishonesty. Those all help strike against revelation.

    Miracles. Successful prophecy. Consistency. Those help favor it.

    I have no rapt formula, but then I don't think it's needed.

    I disagree. I think it begs the question to think that if there is a miracle, then there is a revelation. That presumes to know God’s intention, which is inscrutable, by definition.

    I don't think it does - I think it's a reasonable inference. Part of this is because I regard a miracle itself as fundamentally an act of communication - it communicates by happening, period. At that point I'm willing to assume that if I have a miracle on my hands, then at least the one working the miracle can be trusted to speak clearly.

    Now, you can fire back that in principle that trust can fail or be misplaced. Sure, but I just don't see that as a risk worth being afraid of in those situations.

    I’ve always wondered why a similar approach was never taken by Christians to preserve their message.

    Wasn't necessary, apparently. Another miracle. ;)

    You obviously do so on the basis of some criteria, and I wonder if that same criteria, when applied to your own religious claims, would ultimately lead in your rejection of your own beliefs.

    Not at all - I've tried it. I'm also willing to grant that various faiths are broadly 'reasonable' to believe in. That's another place where we differ - I don't regard accepting revelation to only be possible on pain of showing that all other rivals must be false. I'm open to a certain amount of pluralism. Not salvific pluralism or 'God doesn't care' pluralism, but reasonable differences all the same.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Crude:

    Failed prophecy. Inconsistent prophecy. Demonstrated dishonesty. Those all help strike against revelation.

    Miracles. Successful prophecy. Consistency. Those help favor it.

    I have no rapt formula, but then I don't think it's needed.


    Okay. The problem is that if someone has a passionate attachment to a claim, then they will rationalize away the false predictions associated with it. For example, Jesus said: “There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom” (Matthew 16: 28). In that situation, he claimed that some people listening to his sermon would not die until they first saw the kingdom of God. That means that if those people are no longer living, then the kingdom has already arrived, and if the kingdom has not arrived, then there should be some people who are over 2,000 years old. This goes to show that Jesus’ followers originally thought that the kingdom of God would arrive in their lifetimes, and yet it clearly didn’t. Rather than admit that Jesus’ prediction was wrong, they just reinterpreted it to mean a spiritual and heavenly kingdom. So, for religious prophecies, matters are complicated by motivated reasoning.

    I don't think it does - I think it's a reasonable inference. Part of this is because I regard a miracle itself as fundamentally an act of communication - it communicates by happening, period. At that point I'm willing to assume that if I have a miracle on my hands, then at least the one working the miracle can be trusted to speak clearly.

    I don’t see why one should believe that there is another communication in addition to the miracle. Why can’t the communication just be, “Hey! I’m an all-powerful God who can violate the laws of nature whenever I want! … That is all.”? Why can’t it be possible that the prophet is making additional claims over and above what God wanted to communicate to mankind through the miracle itself? And why is it that if God chose a particular person to be a vehicle for a particular miracle that you should trust everything else he says about God? Even Satan rebelled against God with full knowledge of his divine power, and so why can’t a human being also do so?

    Now, you can fire back that in principle that trust can fail or be misplaced. Sure, but I just don't see that as a risk worth being afraid of in those situations.

    And I don’t see how you could avoid it in such a scenario. Your leap of faith will determine your relationship with the creator, and so one should be extremely cautious and careful, rather than foolhardy and haphazard.

    Wasn't necessary, apparently. Another miracle. ;)

    Or, maybe the message was distorted and twisted, and without any chains of transmission, Christians are completely oblivious. And so why bother trying to find manuscripts and authorized editions of texts, if God miraculously will preserve his message? In fact, such editions were necessary, because of the differences between texts, which means that people did, in fact, make mistakes when transmitting the message. And since we have no way of knowing whether even the agreed-upon parts of the texts accurately correspond to the original texts, we are fundamentally in the dark. Again, reason for skepticism.

    Not at all - I've tried it.

    Can you direct me to where you’ve examined and rejected different faiths on the basis of some criteria, and rejected them on the basis of that criteria?

    I'm also willing to grant that various faiths are broadly 'reasonable' to believe in. That's another place where we differ - I don't regard accepting revelation to only be possible on pain of showing that all other rivals must be false. I'm open to a certain amount of pluralism. Not salvific pluralism or 'God doesn't care' pluralism, but reasonable differences all the same.

    Fair enough.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Scott,

    That is anti-confoundly true.

    Nicely done. I shall have to proceed [sic], and so won't continue.

    - - - - -

    In other news... The PGA's Northern Trust Open was held last week, at the Riviera Country Club in Pacific Palisades, California. Amongst the many participants was Ernie Els, who last won a PGA event back in 2012. After the NTO, Mr. Els was asked what he thought of the 13th hole, with its slight dogleg to the left. Mr. Els, who tied only for 35th place in the NTO, sounded somewhat miffed as he enigmatically replied, "I used to like the contour."

    ReplyDelete
  5. dguller,

    Okay. The problem is that if someone has a passionate attachment to a claim, then they will rationalize away the false predictions associated with it.

    Sure, but if someone also has a passionate attachment to another claim, or against a claim, they'll also tend to exaggerate deficiencies or explain away interpretations they dislike.

    Needless to say, I don't think what you offered up was a case of what you're talking about. But I'm trying to keep things abstract here - my goal isn't conversion to any specific faith, but to talk about the reasoning employed.

    I don’t see why one should believe that there is another communication in addition to the miracle. Why can’t the communication just be, “Hey! I’m an all-powerful God who can violate the laws of nature whenever I want! … That is all.”?

    We're back to logical possibilities - why must it be that? You're hitting a line of reasoning where you can take the Moses account with Pharaoh, grant its complete truth, even grant that each plague was a miracle, but still Pharaoh's sitting there unconvinced. Ten prophecied miracles and some guy in a beard is harping at him about bitchy slaves, what's the connection? I just don't find that compelling.

    And I don’t see how you could avoid it in such a scenario. Your leap of faith will determine your relationship with the creator, and so one should be extremely cautious and careful, rather than foolhardy and haphazard.

    Why? I mean why, from your perspective. What is it about classical theist... I know you don't like to call it God, but let's call it 'God sans revelation' that mandates your level of caution? I just don't see it.

    Likewise, you can be foolhardy and haphazard in your care. Arbitrarily high demands for evidence, overexacting demands for persuasion, justifying not granting even a modicum of trust to a being which ultimately requires trust for a relationship to exist. You can paint a solipsist as the most intellectually cautious individual around.

    Or, maybe the message was distorted and twisted, and without any chains of transmission, Christians are completely oblivious.

    They'd need to have hidden so much, and worked so consistently, to pull off what you're talking about in light of the evidence we do have that its obfuscation itself would come across as near miraculous.

    Can you direct me to where you’ve examined and rejected different faiths on the basis of some criteria, and rejected them on the basis of that criteria?

    Nope. You're talking about sitting down, reading, researching, looking for inconsistencies, looking for evidence, thinking about things, etc. Not exactly the sort of journey that keeps a record unless the record itself was my intention - which it wasn't.

    Why, got a faith you think deserves to be in the running?

    ReplyDelete
  6. I won't go further into the history because that would be an extended discussion in its own right...

    If Mormonism or Scientology produced the likes of Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, the Gothic Cathedrals, St. Francis, the Sistine Chapel, etc., I would be curious about their origins. Mormonism, as far as I can tell, produces some basically decent people but nothing that gives a hint that God has broken into history uniquely through them. L.Ron Hubbard is simply not impressive on any account.

    As far as Islam goes, it flourished for a time, mostly through military conquest, and it doesn't have the unique cultural achievements that the West does that leads me to wonder what happened in the West to make it so different than the norm.

    I'm a reader of Kierkegaard as well, and his analysis of the Incarnation as an instance of existential communication (comparing it with Socratic communication) in the Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript I found profound and deeply insightful. For that reason, I find it hard to believe that what happened in Palestine in the First Century was just a result of hallucination or fraud. Such things don't produce the matter from which profound philosophical meditations (Kierkegaard, Aquinas, etc) and sublime art are produced. For me, it's harder to believe that a chance hallucination somehow provided the foundation for the profound works of the Christian West, than that Christ rose from the dead.

    ReplyDelete
  7. David,

    L.Ron Hubbard is simply not impressive on any account.

    I'm pretty sure you can rule scientology out of this particular conversation just on the grounds that Hubbard never claimed to be dealing with revelation anyway. At least not in the sense that it came from God. Whatever that religion is, revelatory it ain't.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Crude:

    Sure, but if someone also has a passionate attachment to another claim, or against a claim, they'll also tend to exaggerate deficiencies or explain away interpretations they dislike.

    True. So, you have passionate defender of P and passionate defender of not-P. By virtue of their passionate attachment to their respective positions, there is an inherent bias and tendency towards distortion to minimize cognitive dissonance. What do we do to determine whether P or not-P is true? Just to put things in a less abstract way, say that I meet a Christian and a Muslim, and both are devoted followers of their religions, and both are claiming that their religions are the truth. What should I do to determine which one is more likely to be true without begging the question?

    Needless to say, I don't think what you offered up was a case of what you're talking about. But I'm trying to keep things abstract here - my goal isn't conversion to any specific faith, but to talk about the reasoning employed.

    I think it does. You identified some criteria to distinguish authentic revelation from inauthentic revelation, one of which was a false prophecy, and I replied that matters are more complex than that, because religious believers will not simply reject their faith on the basis of failed prophecies, but rather will rationalize the failures away into successes of a different sort. That is important to keep in mind, because one would have to approach a potential prophecy with a certain methodology to minimize the very bias that I described above.

    We're back to logical possibilities - why must it be that?

    I thought this approach was permitted. Early Christians used it when their prophecies were clearly falsified by events. They never expected their Messiah to be tortured and crucified. They expected him to bring a kingdom of tremendous power and authority to rule over their occupiers and persecutors. When their expectations did not occur, they grasped at logical possibilities that were consistent with the actual events that occurred, and found some that were appealing to them, such as that the kingdom in question was never worldly, but rather spiritual and other-worldly, and that his torture and death was part of the plan all along, and was actually necessary for the salvation of mankind. That seems like a pretty good example of pursuing a logical possibility to avoid rejecting a claim.

    You're hitting a line of reasoning where you can take the Moses account with Pharaoh, grant its complete truth, even grant that each plague was a miracle, but still Pharaoh's sitting there unconvinced. Ten prophecied miracles and some guy in a beard is harping at him about bitchy slaves, what's the connection? I just don't find that compelling.

    I don’t think you’ve demonstrated why every miracle must be associated with an additional communication from God.

    Why? I mean why, from your perspective. What is it about classical theist... I know you don't like to call it God, but let's call it 'God sans revelation' that mandates your level of caution? I just don't see it.

    My caution has nothing to do with my agreement with broad outlines of classical theism, because I have no reason to believe that the origin of contingent reality intervenes into history with miracles and messages. So, there’s no urgency for me at all in this matter. However, if you do believe that God does such a thing, then it is infinitely important that you get your understanding of that message right. I’m typically not haphazard and loose with things that matter a great deal to me, and I’m usually quite cautious to make sure that I’ve done things properly.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Likewise, you can be foolhardy and haphazard in your care. Arbitrarily high demands for evidence, overexacting demands for persuasion, justifying not granting even a modicum of trust to a being which ultimately requires trust for a relationship to exist. You can paint a solipsist as the most intellectually cautious individual around.

    I do trust this being to sustain and order my world, but I do not trust someone who claims to have heard from this being and has a special message for me, at least not without that person having something other than the message itself to appeal to that I can use to justify their veracity. People lie and deceive others, including themselves, and to claim something that incredible and demanding would require pretty impressive evidence to support it. And I’m not being solipsistic or overly skeptical here. Honestly, if I suddenly heard voices in my head telling me that God had a special mission for me, then I would likely see a psychiatrist and get treatment rather than abandon my family for a spiritual quest of some kind. And if someone told me the same, even in the presence of something that I couldn’t explain, I’d still lean more towards mental illness and coincidence than divine inspiration. There are pretty impressive conmen and illusionists out there who can seem to be performing miracles when they are not.

    They'd need to have hidden so much, and worked so consistently, to pull off what you're talking about in light of the evidence we do have that its obfuscation itself would come across as near miraculous.

    Not at all. Our sources are fragmentary, and there are lost works and texts, and enormous gaps in our records. We have no idea what is in those gaps, no why those gaps exist. Some gaps exist because of fraud and deception, and others because of accidents of history. And certainly, there was a winnowing process in early Christianity where certain texts were felt to be authentic and preserved, and others were rejected as inauthentic and disregarded.

    That’s not a conspiracy, but rather a community of individuals trying to preserve a message in a complex and messy way, and always believing that whatever they did, they did for the great glory of God. But since we have no access to information on how these texts were accepted and rejected, as well as many of the rejected texts themselves, we just do not know how authentic the current texts are. And the fact that the earliest New Testament text is a century after the time of Christ is also discouraging, I think, because a century is plenty of time for a message to be distorted and altered, especially given what we know about human psychology.

    Nope. You're talking about sitting down, reading, researching, looking for inconsistencies, looking for evidence, thinking about things, etc. Not exactly the sort of journey that keeps a record unless the record itself was my intention - which it wasn't.

    Okay, fair enough. But then can you at least give me the rough outline of your reasoning process that resulted in rejecting other religious claims?

    ReplyDelete
  10. dguller,

    Just to mention - I am going to pick and choose to what I respond to, because I find multi-comment responses to single replies in comboxes to not be worth the time lately. So pardon me if I'm brief.

    By virtue of their passionate attachment to their respective positions

    I don't see where passion comes into play at all. 'Devoted follower' doesn't mean 'ruled by emotion'. I've met some devoted physicists, but passion didn't seem to be the source of their devotion.

    You identified some criteria to distinguish authentic revelation from inauthentic revelation, one of which was a false prophecy, and I replied that matters are more complex than that

    Sure, it can be in principle. It simply doesn't have to be, and I don't think what you cited was an illustration of your claim.

    Also, I think 'He was supposed to die' gains a whole lot of credence when the dead person in question returns, resurrected, communicating why He died. Yes, it could be some kind of traumatic rationalization on the part of an individual experiencing the most personal miracle possible. Logical possibilities granted, I think I'll put stock in what He's saying.

    I thought this approach was permitted.

    When I said 'why must it be that', I was referring to your interpretation of the miracle.

    I don’t think you’ve demonstrated why every miracle must be associated with an additional communication from God.

    I wasn't attempting to - I said I regard miracles as themselves fundamentally acts of communication. I gave you the Moses example - given what I laid down, was Pharaoh's hypothetical response reasonable?

    My caution has nothing to do with my agreement with broad outlines of classical theism, because I have no reason to believe that the origin of contingent reality intervenes into history with miracles and messages.

    Got a reason to believe it doesn't? That's not flippant - it seems like you'd need that reason to get where you want to go here. Otherwise your default is 'I don't know'.

    However, if you do believe that God does such a thing, then it is infinitely important that you get your understanding of that message right.

    Why? You're implying a level of importance such that it's better to make no act than act with risk of error. That seems like something one would have to know by revelation.

    Not at all. Our sources are fragmentary, and there are lost works and texts, and enormous gaps in our records.

    Not really. Have you researched this? I mean, have you seen just how many of those sources, despite their separation, end up being faithful to each other and the earliest texts? What gaps there are aren't particularly worrying. We can even examine the earliest reasoning process for that winnowing of texts.

    Okay, fair enough. But then can you at least give me the rough outline of your reasoning process that resulted in rejecting other religious claims?

    'Examine the claims, check the veracity of the testimony, of the miracles, the reasoning employed, the priors appealed to, compare them to what I think is the best claim onhand, etc' Seems reasonable enough. Classical theism helps, since if the god in question is some creature with power over fire, I can at least realize that whatever this is, it's not the CT God. It won't even claim to be as much many times.

    ReplyDelete
  11. DavidT:

    If Mormonism or Scientology produced the likes of Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, the Gothic Cathedrals, St. Francis, the Sistine Chapel, etc., I would be curious about their origins. Mormonism, as far as I can tell, produces some basically decent people but nothing that gives a hint that God has broken into history uniquely through them. L.Ron Hubbard is simply not impressive on any account.

    Why does an authentic religion have to produce men and works of genius and majesty? Perhaps authentic religion produces humble and meek individuals rather than grandiose and awe-inspiring individuals?

    And I don’t know enough about Hubbard to comment with authority, but he claimed to know a cosmic truth that would lead to the betterment of mankind … for a fee!

    As far as Islam goes, it flourished for a time, mostly through military conquest, and it doesn't have the unique cultural achievements that the West does that leads me to wonder what happened in the West to make it so different than the norm.

    Again, I do not understand why “unique cultural achievements” are the hallmark of authentic revelation. Paganism had “unique cultural achievements”, and yet that does not add authority to its truth claims, but only to its amazing skills in a variety of domains. And isn’t there something unsavory about idolizing glory and majesty in creation over the glory and majesty of God? Like I said, it could be argued that submission and humility to God are more signs of devotion than mimicking his glory on earth with towering achievements, which could be construed as a sign of arrogance and pride rather than worship.

    ReplyDelete
  12. I'm a reader of Kierkegaard as well, and his analysis of the Incarnation as an instance of existential communication (comparing it with Socratic communication) in the Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript I found profound and deeply insightful. For that reason, I find it hard to believe that what happened in Palestine in the First Century was just a result of hallucination or fraud. Such things don't produce the matter from which profound philosophical meditations (Kierkegaard, Aquinas, etc) and sublime art are produced. For me, it's harder to believe that a chance hallucination somehow provided the foundation for the profound works of the Christian West, than that Christ rose from the dead.

    And I don’t see why delusion and fraud couldn’t be a viable account of what happened. Note that delusion could also be self-delusion in which passionate believers were so firmly committed to their beliefs that they engaged in unethical activity to further the cause, such as suppressing alternative viewpoints, undermining other interpretations, and so on. People are capable of strange things, especially when they feel justified, and the feeling of justification is not coextensive with actually being justified. And ideas, even ones that come from people who would be deemed to be mentally unbalanced, could “stick” and propagate if they are appealing and inspiring to people.

    The bottom line is that I think that we have two differing interpretations that we assign different probability values:

    (1) An inspirational and probably unbalanced individual convinced his followers that God would bring about salvation within their lifetimes by the introduction of the kingdom of God that would rule over their persecutors and masters and put those in submission in power and glory, and that after he was tortured and killed for disturbing the powers that be with his activities, his followers, in a state of intense cognitive dissonance, only found relief after they convinced themselves that his mission had succeeded after all, but in a spiritual sense, and felt sufficiently empowered by this new interpretation that they began spreading the good news to others around them with a great deal of success. This led to led to divergent opinions and schisms into different groups that competed with one another in a Darwinian fashion to the point that only one, or a few, survived that process and became the formational core of what became Christianity. This message happened to be one that appealed to the great mass of poor and impoverished individuals, as well as elite members of society with spiritual urges and angst, and as such, spread far and wide across the lands.

    (2) God himself assumed a human form to personally teach his message to a group of weak-willed and inadequate (at the time) followers who abandoned him to be tortured and crucified, which was necessary for God to undergo in order to wipe away the sins of disobedience inseminated into human nature when the first man ate an apple from a tree after being persuaded by his wife and a talking snake who was actually a disobedient angel seeking to sabotage the good favor that the first man enjoyed with God. This momentous event led to a three-hour darkness at noon and the Jewish temple being split, both of which would have been witnessed by large groups of people, but neither of which was mentioned by anyone other than his followers.

    I find the former far more likely than the latter, I’m afraid.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Let me thank dguller, Scott, Crude, David T and others for this enlightening discussion, and let me also add my $0.02.

    With much less brilliance, I have traveled the same path as dguller has, from atheism to a philosophical theism that still stops short of accepting a specific revelation or religious tradition. This was primarily due to Dr. Feser's books, articles and blog posts, as well the regular commenters here. I have only very rarely commented, because I have much to learn and little to contribute.

    My difficulties with accepting a particular revelation, besides the points that dguller has already raised, are twofold, which I'll call "the problem of history" and "the problem of asymmetry".

    First, the problem of history. To accept the Christian revelation, one has to accept the historicity of a miracle, Christ’s resurrection, which then gives a stamp of divine approval to Christ’s message and, through it, both to the predecessors that predicted it and the successors that have kept it. Mutadis mutandis, the same applies to Islamic or Jewish revelation. The resurrection, or any other specific possible miracle, can be studied with the tools of history, surely, but the hurdles are almost impossible to pass to all but the tiniest minority of humanity.

    Crude said in a comment above that one should “Examine the claims, check the veracity of the testimony, of the miracles, the reasoning employed”. To truly evaluate the historicity of the resurrection, you’d have to, off the top of my head: (i) get fluency in Greek, Latin, Hebrew and Aramaic; (ii) get a deep knowledge of the Jewish, Christian and Pagan traditions; (iii) get a deep knowledge of the territory where the events unfolded, which would be Palestine; (iv) track down the oldest manuscripts we have, analyze them, and determine how the text evolved from its putative origin to where we got them written down, etc., etc. etc. And once you’ve done this, say, for the miracle of the resurrection, then you’ll have to answer the apologetics of other religions. To truly evaluate whether Muhammad was right when he said that Jews and Christians had misunderstood their Scriptures and thereby caused errors to creep into them, you’d have to know whether he was a true Prophet, which would require you to study classical Arabic, know well the Arabian Peninsula, etc. etc. etc.

    That’s impossible, of course, unless you devote your whole life to this single task, and perhaps even so. I have no doubt that some people have tried to do this, but obviously this cannot be a requirement, or true intellectual assent to any revelation would then be restricted to one person in a billion. So, absent a personal revelation, we are forced to depend on authorities which are not God’s authority. If a read a book by an Christian apologist on the resurrection, it is he that has done the weighing of the evidence, not me – and this is supposing he did all the hand-on painstaking labor I outlined above, instead of, as would be only normal and expected, himself relying on secondary, tertiary, .. . ., sources. So it is not God’s revelation and miracles that I am trusting, but my (all too fallible) authority figures, be they priests, professors, virtuous and exemplary people, etc.

    ReplyDelete
  14. (continuing)

    Now, the problem of asymmetry. I accept that, following the arguments of philosophical theism, miracles are possible – but I have great difficulty in not seeing them as very unjust if they actually happen. The people who witnessed Jesus multiplying the loaves, for instance, had a good reason to pay attention to him, even if they ended up not becoming believers in the end; a reason which is denied to everyone who was not at that specific point in space and time, and who are – if, say, they are living in the early 21st century – dependent on that long succession of merely human authorities for making the same decision of accepting or refusing said revelation. Justice would seem to require that either there are absolutely no miracles, or that every person should witness them at some point in their lives. In the first option we get no revelations, as they are impossible to authenticate, and the second option is flatly contradicted by experience. An alternative is extreme predestination, in which God knows that I would have disbelieved even if I had witnessed a miracle, but this alternative is unpalatable for many reasons and accepted only, AFAIK, by a small minority of Christians.

    The only way I have found to solve these two problems, as far as I can tell, is to trust that, since God is just and merciful (and this is known from natural reason), His judgment will take all these factors into account. But this solution is also unpalatable, for it lessens the need for adherence to any specific religion and, perhaps, makes a mockery of profound religious adherence. It does not make sense that God would give a special revelation, and then not demand people to follow it. It does not make sense to me that I could, post-mortem, be told that “well, actually, Twelver Shia Islam (say) was the right answer, and you just didn’t get it; but you had good reasons not to get it, so this will not count against you”. But any other answer will damn many apparently innocent people (“damn” understood as either actual hell, or just a larger separation from God).

    Thanks to anyone who may have read these half-baked thought to the end. I also have an endless reading list, but if anyone can recommend works that deal with these difficulties, I shall be most thankful.

    ReplyDelete
  15. David T,

    As far as Islam goes [...] it doesn't have the unique cultural achievements that the West does that leads me to wonder what happened in the West to make it so different than the norm.

    Then you certainly are not familiar with Islamic geometric art, Islamic architecture (particularly the Dome of the Rock), Islamic manuscripts, maqam, Persian miniatures or the massive scientific and medical discoveries of early Islam. You must also be unaware of the metaphysical advances made by early Muslim philosophers, from whom the scholastics borrowed liberally. I could go on.

    dguller,

    To correct a few historical errors you made,

    The belief in an ordered cosmos was present in Greek thought.

    This is a massive misunderstanding of Greek philosophy. The entirety of Greek thought is based on a binary opposition of order and chaos, which are locked in an eternal struggle. Plato is the classic example. Aristotle's opposition of prime matter and the Unmoved Mover, and particularly his endorsement of the unpredictable and unintelligible "unusual accidents" caused by matter, are also good. Even the common Greek acceptance of fate as a divine ordering principle, such as among the Stoics, was not an appeal to order as Christianity defined that term. Order in Christianity is fundamentally eschatological, and it must always be understood in relation to the Fall. The world isn't orderly because order and disorder are sublimated into a totality of inscrutable fate that contains both (as Hart explains in The Beauty of the Infinite), but because disorder is an intruder into creation that began to exist in the Fall and will be removed at the end of the world. Christianity shifted order and chaos from an ontological and necessary key to a historical and contingent one.

    The belief in the unity and interconnectedness of mankind was present in Greek thought.

    This papers over the pagan love of strength and hatred of weakness. Mankind might be connected, but there are natural slaves and natural masters, and the strong and wise are inherently superior to the weak and ignorant. Christianity inverted this opposition and elevated the slave over the master, the poor over the rich and so forth. This is the "transvaluation of all values" that no serious reader of history can ignore. Interconnectedness and universal brotherhood take on entirely different meanings in Christianity.

    The belief in virtue as caring for the less fortunate, because of the fundamental equality of human beings, was present in Greek thought.

    That cracks me up.

    The belief in a divine providence was present in Greek thought.

    Again, the philosophies that endorsed divine providence did so as a way of sublimating chaos and order into a higher order, such that both became necessary expressions of order.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Crude:

    I don't see where passion comes into play at all. 'Devoted follower' doesn't mean 'ruled by emotion'. I've met some devoted physicists, but passion didn't seem to be the source of their devotion.

    What I mean is that if someone devotes a great deal of time and energy to a particular position, sacrifices and undergoes stressful circumstances in support of it, and then is presented with information that it might be false, the vast majority of people in such a situation will not casually throw away all their hard work and dedication, but rather will work extra hard to preserve their work from the information by rejecting, distorting, or ignoring it.

    To be passionate about something is to do it without (much) consideration for limits and boundaries, accepting that one will have to sacrifice other important things in order to prioritize what one is passionate about. Oftentimes, that involves a great deal of emotion, but one can certainly do so for intellectual purposes, as well.

    Sure, it can be in principle. It simply doesn't have to be, and I don't think what you cited was an illustration of your claim.

    What would be more helpful is some account of what would count as a “false prophecy”. Is it one that cannot possibly be reinterpreted as successful? Probably not, and so if it is always possible to reinterpret a falsehood as a truth, then what should one do? There should be some criteria in place to minimize the aforementioned risk.

    Also, I think 'He was supposed to die' gains a whole lot of credence when the dead person in question returns, resurrected, communicating why He died. Yes, it could be some kind of traumatic rationalization on the part of an individual experiencing the most personal miracle possible. Logical possibilities granted, I think I'll put stock in what He's saying.

    And on the balance of probabilities, I would put the odds on “traumatic rationalization” over God himself had to become a human being to suffer and die, and then come back to life to explain to his followers what just happened. The former is well-documented and understood as a genuine psychological phenomenon, and thus has a wealth of evidence in support of it. The latter has nothing but the word of the very traumatized followers in question that they are telling the truth. Human self-deception being what it is, I’ll put stock in what the psychologists say.

    I wasn't attempting to - I said I regard miracles as themselves fundamentally acts of communication. I gave you the Moses example - given what I laid down, was Pharaoh's hypothetical response reasonable?

    If the actual ten plagues were occurring as described in the Bible, with Moses accurately predicating them all with good specificity, then Pharaoh’s response was unreasonable. However, I think that you’ll agree that most miracles are nothing as spectacular as that. Furthermore, given the wide distance between ourselves and Moses’ time, I would take the Biblical account with a huge pillar of salt.

    Got a reason to believe it doesn't? That's not flippant - it seems like you'd need that reason to get where you want to go here. Otherwise your default is 'I don't know'.

    My reason is that the ground of all being would operate in the exact same way with each and every entity, and not show favoritism to one entity over another. They are all expressions of its nature, and even though rational entities are closer in proximity to it than non-rational entities, it does not follow that it “cares” about the rational entities more than the non-rational entities.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Got a reason to believe it doesn't? That's not flippant - it seems like you'd need that reason to get where you want to go here. Otherwise your default is 'I don't know'.

    My reason is that the ground of all being would operate in the exact same way with each and every entity, and not show favoritism to one entity over another. They are all expressions of its nature, and even though rational entities are closer in proximity to it than non-rational entities, it does not follow that it “cares” about the rational entities more than the non-rational entities.

    Why? You're implying a level of importance such that it's better to make no act than act with risk of error. That seems like something one would have to know by revelation.

    I’m making no reference to how someone comes to believe such a thing, but only that if they do, then the infinite importance of getting their decision right would require extreme caution. If someone is compelled to make a choice in the face of imperfect information, then one must do their best, but I don’t see any benefit to praising impulsivity.

    Not really. Have you researched this? I mean, have you seen just how many of those sources, despite their separation, end up being faithful to each other and the earliest texts? What gaps there are aren't particularly worrying. We can even examine the earliest reasoning process for that winnowing of texts.

    I’d love to hear about the wealth of materials for the first century of Christianity. From what I’ve read, the oldest text dates from the early second century. And if the texts after that century that are endorsed as authentic are faithful to one another, then how is that not explained by a powerful faction of early Christians prioritizing texts that supported their interpretation of Christ, and dismissing and removing inauthentic texts? After all, there were a number of divergent strands of Christianity, as far as I have read, and if they can all be traced to one interpretation, which defeated the others, then a non-supernatural account is perfectly plausible.

    'Examine the claims, check the veracity of the testimony, of the miracles, the reasoning employed, the priors appealed to, compare them to what I think is the best claim onhand, etc' Seems reasonable enough. Classical theism helps, since if the god in question is some creature with power over fire, I can at least realize that whatever this is, it's not the CT God. It won't even claim to be as much many times.

    Fair enough. So, how do you check the veracity of the testimony when there are no documents or evidence from the actual time of the witnessed events?

    ReplyDelete
  18. dguller,

    the vast majority of people in such a situation will not casually throw away all their hard work and dedication,

    ..In the face of clear and obvious evidence to the contrary? Says who? You could say that they would snap harder than a rubber band and be furious if you wanted to.

    There should be some criteria in place to minimize the aforementioned risk.

    A rapt and universally agreeable criteria? I'm skeptical.

    And on the balance of probabilities, I would put the odds on “traumatic rationalization” over God himself had to become a human being to suffer and die, and then come back to life to explain to his followers what just happened. The former is well-documented and understood as a genuine psychological phenomenon,

    No, it's a broad category of proposed psychological phenomenon that tends not to include consistent delusions that are apparently verifiable by third parties. You say 'put the odds', but that's more a fanciful description of intuition than an actual appeal to known odds - there aren't any.

    If the actual ten plagues were occurring as described in the Bible, with Moses accurately predicating them all with good specificity, then Pharaoh’s response was unreasonable.

    Okay. Why? Moses could be wrong. He could be misinterpreting things. In fact, if I take your logic, he could be out and out misrepresenting things on purpose. What is it that made that (call it hypothetical) situation acceptable for Pharaoh? Was it at plague 3? 5?

    My reason is that the ground of all being would operate in the exact same way with each and every entity, and not show favoritism to one entity over another.

    Where's the favoritism? Is it at all different from the favoritism where one person is born wealthy and healthy and the other's not?

    but only that if they do, then the infinite importance of getting their decision right would require extreme caution.

    How do they know it's infinitely important aside from revelation itself?

    From what I’ve read, the oldest text dates from the early second century.

    Can you point at massive changes and revisions to the texts? Say we're starting at early 2nd century. That's over a millenia of copies and such between then and now. Will I find massive alterations between the translation I have, and the books from the earliest points we have them?

    So, how do you check the veracity of the testimony when there are no documents or evidence from the actual time of the witnessed events?

    There's plenty of evidence from that point. I don't see any reason to regard copies of testimony from witnesses and actors at the time as 'not evidence from the actual time'.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Alat,

    Great post.

    Mutadis mutandis, the same applies to Islamic or Jewish revelation.

    It does, but you're missing something. First, Christians accept Jewish revelation, so there is no conflict. Second, a Christian could without contradiction accept as historical the events of the Quran. This is because the Quran records exactly zero miracles: Muhammad's revelations come in the form of private visions inaccessible to anyone else. A Christian could believe that Muhammad had these visions and yet reject their contents as false. Likewise a Christian could believe that Muhammad said and did all of the things that he is recorded as saying and doing, yet not find him to be a convincing messenger of God. The same does not apply to Jesus.

    That’s impossible, of course, unless you devote your whole life to this single task, and perhaps even so. I have no doubt that some people have tried to do this, but obviously this cannot be a requirement, or true intellectual assent to any revelation would then be restricted to one person in a billion. So, absent a personal revelation, we are forced to depend on authorities which are not God’s authority.

    The problem of assenting to things that we cannot guarantee to be true is one that was considered in detail during the church's early and middle periods. The counter-argument was generally skeptical in nature: very little of what we know can be guaranteed as true. I've hashed out Augustine's and Aquinas's arguments on this subject in these comboxes before, so I don't want to get too in depth. Suffice it to say that Aquinas's introduction to On the Apostles' Creed, and Augustine's Against the Academics and Confessions, are key texts. Christian belief is and always has been unprovable outside of lived experience. This has been the case since the resurrection was witnessed first hand, rather than deduced logically.

    In fact, Thomist metaphysics dictate that particular events, like the resurrection, cannot be deduced at all: only probable arguments for them can be provided. Accepting them as true is a matter of assent to something obscure, which is faith.

    Justice would seem to require that either there are absolutely no miracles, or that every person should witness them at some point in their lives. In the first option we get no revelations, as they are impossible to authenticate, and the second option is flatly contradicted by experience.

    Well, first of all, it depends on who's looking. Anyone who has been to a Catholic or Orthodox liturgy and witnessed the Eucharist has seen a miracle. Vast numbers of Christian miracles occur on a daily basis all around the world. Now, you might not realize that those events are miracles--but then the burden is no longer on God to provide miracles; it's on you to recognize them.

    Anyone who sincerely follows the Christian way of life will witness miracles, and most will come to recognize them. But it's always personal and existential.

    ReplyDelete
  20. As much as I enjoy Islamic Philosophy. I can say that it's texts read too much like they encountered a Gnostic form of Christianity and kind of co-opted it. It also had too much early dealings with statehood for my tastes.

    ReplyDelete
  21. dguller writes,

    All of which is to say that I have a tremendous amount of skepticism for revelatory claims, becuase it always seems more likely that people were hallucinating or deluded, were being deceptive and lying for the sake of some alterior end, or that the miracle in question was due to natural causes that are simply unknown at this time than due to a genuine intervention of a deity for the purpose of communicating a message to mankind.

    To me this seems somewhat question, in the sense C.S Lewis describes in his Miracles. It seems to me to assume that genuine revelations are unlikely. If one took a view more open to them, and certainly if one took the view that God wishes us to know and love him and therefore reaches out to us, then I don't think one could make the blanket claim that a revelation would be more likely to be an hallucination or whatever than authentic. I think, rather, it would take examination of the actual revelation and its bearer.

    I too though find the emphasis on miracles somewhat strange. Not just because I think they are widespread in most faiths, but I don't quite understand why they would be the central proof of a revelation.

    To me, miracles are only useful as part of a whole revelatory framework with its message, symbolism, and ritual.

    ReplyDelete
  22. - that shouold have been 'somewhat question begging'

    ReplyDelete
  23. Then you certainly are not familiar with Islamic geometric art, Islamic architecture (particularly the Dome of the Rock), Islamic manuscripts, maqam, Persian miniatures or the massive scientific and medical discoveries of early Islam. You must also be unaware of the metaphysical advances made by early Muslim philosophers, from whom the scholastics borrowed liberally. I could go on

    You make my point. Islamic culture developed to a high point (for ancient cultures), then stagnated at about the same level all other high cultures did. Only the Christian West - initially way behind Islam culturally - found a way beyond that into the modern world. You can have your "massive" early Islamic medicine and science. I'll take the science of Albert the Great, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Pascal and Leibniz - all professing Christians.

    You are right that St. Thomas read Avicenna and Averroes - he was willing to learn from anyone, including Islamic philosophers. But Western philosophy didn't stop with St. Thomas the way Islamic philosophy more or less stopped with Averroes. As it more or less stopped everywhere else.

    ReplyDelete
  24. It seems to me that Western traditionalists are often caught in an intellectual conundrum. When debating progressives at home, they are often critical of modernity, on the charge of being the "cult of man".

    Yet, when looking at the other high cultures of non-Western civilizations, it is the achievements and values of that same modernity that they point to prove the West's superiority.

    I'm not sure if classical liberalism represents the fulfillment of Christian principles or a departure from them.

    ReplyDelete
  25. David T,

    Only the Christian West - initially way behind Islam culturally - found a way beyond that into the modern world. You can have your "massive" early Islamic medicine and science. I'll take the science of Albert the Great, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Pascal and Leibniz - all professing Christians.

    You make it sound like modernity was unquestionably a good thing. Christianity's entry into the "modern world" was the dawn of secularism and Protestantism, and the corrupt metaphysics of both. Christendom was already being corroded by the 1600s. Out of the scientists you list, three (Newton, Galileo, Pascal) were heretics, and Leibniz offered an extremely repulsive and unorthodox view of God.

    But Western philosophy didn't stop with St. Thomas the way Islamic philosophy more or less stopped with Averroes. As it more or less stopped everywhere else.

    Islamic philosophy "stopped" because it was subsumed into theology, following the widespread acceptance of Al-Ghazali's attacks on Averroes as orthodox. Islamic thought continued to develop for centuries, most notably with Mulla Sadra between the 14th and 15th centuries. And the suggestion that philosophy ceased to develop "everywhere else" is simply ignorant.

    ReplyDelete
  26. I largely agree with Chris. Chesterton somewhere wrote that all that matters, ultimately, is the journey or fate of the soul. I'm not sure the science that David T talks about is spiritually (and therefore, in the final ananlysis, culturally) of much importance.

    I think there is a great risk that in evaluating the worth of Western civilisation, of giving too much of a place for worldly considerations.

    I would take Ibn Arabi or Rumi over all those names. And in Western, Christian terms is St. Symeon the New Theologian or Shakespeare not worth more, spiritually, in the end?

    Look what has happened to Western philosophy. I'm think the traditional Muslim or Hindu, surveying post-Cartesian Western thought, would be happy for the Westerner to keep his philosophical 'progress'.

    I remember reading from one learned Hindu that of all the great writers and thinkers of the West, it was not Descartes or Newton, or even the Angelic Doctor which a Hindu would see as the pinnacle of Western thought: it was Meister Eckhart.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Why do I never proofread? Perhaps there is a philosophical answer to this timeless riddle.

    ReplyDelete
  28. dguller,

    I certainly wouldn't dismiss your position as unreasonable… although I think your summary of the Christian worldview in #2 is a bit of a caricature and even wrong in some particulars.

    In any case, my aversion to your scenario #1 is that it is essentially a series of ad hoc assumptions made for the purpose of explaining what is otherwise inexplicable. It was just lucky that this collective hallucination, among others, happened to uniquely appeal to both rich and poor and so spread. The teachings of the unbalanced founder just by chance included profound philosophical and spiritual depths that seem inexhaustible and inspired thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, among many others. These teachings also, by chance, included the separation of ecclesial and secular authority that was crucial to the dynamism of the West, etc.

    Or I could simply accept one fact - that Christ in fact rose from the dead and everything follows naturally from that. (You can take or leave the three hour darkness and the temple splitting, I'm indifferent to the historicity of those events).

    Like I say, I don't say your position is unreasonable… but, for me, I couldn't accept an explanation of Christian origins that did not also provide a satisfying account for why all that followed it did in fact follow.

    ReplyDelete
  29. I was reading this essay from the Sydney Traditionalist Forum coincidentally just yesterday:

    http://sydneytrads.com/2014/01/01/m-w-davis-2/

    It quotes one of the leading contemporary Islamic thinkers as saying:

    “Philosophy is dead in the West.”

    Sometimes the distinctions made between modern and traditional or non-Western philosophy are somewhat exaggerated, no doubt, but I think this a good illustration that non-Westerners (and, except perhaps for some later Greco-Romans, pre-modern Westerners) meant something slightly different by philosophy than Bertrand Russell or Keith Parsons do.

    ReplyDelete
  30. As a professional philosopher myself, Parson's explanation for walking away from philosophy of religion sounds highly suspicious. It just doesn't sound judicious or reasonable. How can any educated philosopher, who has studied the writings and arguments of the great thinkers of the last two and a half thousand years, claim he is abandoning such an important discipline because the case for theism is a "fraud"? Disagree with the conclusions of theistic philosophers, yes; but to call it a fraud?

    My gut reaction to his announcement is that he's frustrated theism just won't die. His behavior is more like a petulant child than a logical adult; akin to Eric Cartman (from "South Park") who often will say, "Screw you guys, I'm going home."

    ReplyDelete
  31. @Jeremy Taylor:

    "I remember reading from one learned Hindu that of all the great writers and thinkers of the West, it was not Descartes or Newton, or even the Angelic Doctor which a Hindu would see as the pinnacle of Western thought: it was Meister Eckhart."

    Just curious—might that "learned Hindu" have been Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan? It sounds like something he might have said.

    ReplyDelete
  32. JT,

    I think that Hindu was Ananda Coomaraswamy?

    I would also add Dante.

    I have often wondered if there was something uniquely peculiar about Western Christendom that allowed it to so easily collapse before the assaults of nominalism and humanistic rationalism?

    ReplyDelete
  33. Scott,

    I believe it was Ananda Coomaraswamy. I didn't read it directly in his works, I believe, as I have only read one or two of these, but I saw it quoted somewhere. It might have been in one of Kathleen Raine's works.

    I can't locate the exact quote, unfortunately.

    ReplyDelete
  34. @Jeremy Taylor:

    Thank you. So Chris was right, then.

    ReplyDelete
  35. Chris,

    It probably won't be a popular opinion around here, but I think there was already something a little bit too rationalist and off-balance in the post-Hildebrand Papacy and in Scholastic thought from the beggining that allowed for these tendencies to arise and to become prominent. This is certainly the impression I get from comparison with the Christian East and the roughly pre-1100 AD West.

    Philip Sherrard argued this point at length.

    ReplyDelete
  36. Rank Sophist,

    No, I did not say modernity was unquestionably good. I said the history of the West includes unique achievements not found elsewhere. You countered with early Islamic medicine, science and Persian miniatures. I pointed out that the achievements of Islamic science, early, late or whenever, cannot compare with those of Galileo, Newton and company. Since you aren't pointing out any more Islamic scientific achievements, I take it you've given up on that point.

    Galileo, Newton, Pascal, etc. were all products of the Christian West and more or less believing Christians. I'll leave the heresy hunting to you. The point is that the Islamic world didn't produce anybody like them, of whatever mix of orthodox/heretical Islamic faith.

    Yes, I'm familiar with how Islamic philosophy was subsumed into theology. That was unfortunate for Islamic philosophy, and it was fortunate for Western philosophy that this didn't happen. Just chance, or were there deeper cultural reasons why the one happened and the other didn't?

    Your praise of Mulla Sadra and other non-Western philosophers would be more impressive if you actually found a use for them in your posts on this blog… but as far as I can tell, you have no more use for Mulla Sadra than I do, other than praising him here and then forgetting about him. Unless I've missed your frequent references to Mulla Sadra.

    ReplyDelete
  37. Yes, I just confirmed that. Coomaraswamy said that in the essay "The Vedanta and the Western Tradition".

    A European can hardly be said to be adequately prepared for the study of the Vedanta unless he has acquired some knowledge and understanding of Plato, Philo, Hermes, Plotinus, the Gospels (especially John), Dionysius, and finally Eckhart who, with the possible exception of Dante, can be regarded from an Indian point of view as the greatest of all Europeans.

    ReplyDelete
  38. David T,

    But surely the history of the West includes unique secularism, materialism, and atheism not found elsewhere? What is the connection between the trends you praise and these trends?

    ReplyDelete
  39. These teachings also, by chance, included the separation of ecclesial and secular authority that was crucial to the dynamism of the West, etc.

    While there was perhaps more of a partnership with the feudal state compared to other religions exerting more direct control, presumably based on the famous "Render unto Caesar..." verse, it wasn't until Philip the Fair more or less usurped Pope Boniface VIII that there was a real separation. Thus earning Boniface a special place in Dante's Inferno for his troubles.

    @dguller,
    Another thing to keep in mind about the prophets is that some of them, including Abraham, argued with God. Which would be sort of futile if they believed he was in fact immutable. A Jewish perspective on arguing with God makes for some interesting reading.

    TV quote: "Why is anything controversial? These people needed something to argue about."

    ReplyDelete
  40. Jeremy,

    You're right that the West has also introduced some novel trends that are disturbing… the thing about the West is its incredible dynamism, a dynamism that has transformed the world in previously unimaginable ways, for both good and bad. It's the origin of this incredibly innovative dynamism, that has put world history on a roller coaster trajectory, that I think must be accounted for.

    I see that dynamism deliberately introduced by Christ. "I did not come to bring peace, but a sword" and all that. Christ was, in todays parlance, "polarizing": He turned off the Pharisees and made an enemy of Judas, but also embraced lepers and whores, celebrated as a hero one moment and crucified by the mob the next. The dynamism of the life of Christ is reflected in the subsequent dynamism of Western history. I have a hard time believing it was all an accident.

    ReplyDelete
  41. Really enjoying the comments by Chris, Scott and Jeremy. Super interesting stuff.

    David T,

    Since you aren't pointing out any more Islamic scientific achievements, I take it you've given up on that point.

    I never claimed that Islamic science extended beyond early Islam. It's a known fact that Islamic interest in science dried up a few centuries after it began.

    Yes, I'm familiar with how Islamic philosophy was subsumed into theology. That was unfortunate for Islamic philosophy, and it was fortunate for Western philosophy that this didn't happen. Just chance, or were there deeper cultural reasons why the one happened and the other didn't?

    Was it unfortunate, really? Christian philosophy was subsumed into theology for the first thousand or more years of Christian history. It was only during the scholastic period that any kind of separation became apparent--and I would argue that it wasn't for Aquinas. David Bentley Hart has argued that the late medieval and early modern periods mark philosophy's quest to free itself from theology, resulting in secularism, and I'm inclined to agree with him.

    as far as I can tell, you have no more use for Mulla Sadra than I do, other than praising him here and then forgetting about him.

    I am not yet widely read in Islamic theology and philosophy. My knowledge is mainly limited to Avicenna and the Averroes-Ghazali period, and even there I'm barely at novice level. Perhaps once I'm more familiar with Mulla Sadra's actual writings, I'll have more "use" for him.

    Also, the same argument could be applied to any Christian writer who I've rarely-if-ever mentioned: Ambrose, Athanasius, Clement of Alexandria, Cyril, Hilary, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Jerome, Origen, Evagrius and others. Surely you don't mean to claim that someone's failure to mention these writers entails their irrelevance.

    ReplyDelete
  42. Rank:

    This is a massive misunderstanding of Greek philosophy. The entirety of Greek thought is based on a binary opposition of order and chaos, which are locked in an eternal struggle.

    First, I think that is an oversimplification. The Stoics certainly did not believe in chaos, and rather believed in the rational unfolding of the organized cosmos that was permeated by divine fire. The Cynics never included an element of chaos into their practice. The Skeptics would reject the binary opposition itself as dogmatic.

    Second, even if there was a fundamental binary opposition of order and chaos, the statement of that binary opposition itself is a statement of order, because it is subsumed within a rational system.

    Plato is the classic example.

    Plato proposed a cosmology in which a divine craftsman (i.e. demiurge) uses the Forms as templates to create particular entities within a passive receptacle (i.e. khora). Where is the chaos?

    Aristotle's opposition of prime matter and the Unmoved Mover, and particularly his endorsement of the unpredictable and unintelligible "unusual accidents" caused by matter, are also good.

    First, prime matter, if we can speak of such a thing, is not random chaos. It operates under certain restrictions, and thus has organized and ordered characteristics and properties, in a sense. For example, if prime matter were random chaos, then it could spontaneously become a duck.

    Second, his “unusual accidents” are just unpredictable coincidences. They are not unintelligible, especially when one can see the converging lines of causality after the fact.

    Even the common Greek acceptance of fate as a divine ordering principle, such as among the Stoics, was not an appeal to order as Christianity defined that term.

    I never said that the ancient Greek conception of order was identical to the Christian conception of order. Only that the idea of an ordered cosmos operating according to rational principles was an ancient Greek idea, and not unique to Christianity. Certainly, Christianity put its unique twist to the idea, but it did not invent the idea of order in the universe.

    ReplyDelete
  43. This papers over the pagan love of strength and hatred of weakness. Mankind might be connected, but there are natural slaves and natural masters, and the strong and wise are inherently superior to the weak and ignorant. Christianity inverted this opposition and elevated the slave over the master, the poor over the rich and so forth. This is the "transvaluation of all values" that no serious reader of history can ignore. Interconnectedness and universal brotherhood take on entirely different meanings in Christianity.

    Differences in individuals does not preclude a deeper unity. The Stoics, for example, saw all mankind as analogous to different parts of a single body such that if one part was injured or harmed, then the entire body would suffer. And this was due to the shared rational nature that each human being possesses that connects us all to the rational principle of the cosmos. Again, just because this unity in difference was different in Greek and Christian thought does not negate its existence in the former. Furthermore, even in Christianity there is a distinction between saints and ordinary sinners.

    That cracks me up.

    Did the ancient Greeks practice this principle to the same extent as the Christians? Of course not, and yet it was present in their thought. Of course, what they considered “less fortunate” depended upon which school one belonged to. The Cynics saw all humans as equally natural, and made it their mission to free those who were chained to arbitrary cultural restraints. The Stoics saw all humans as ignorant of the true causes of suffering, and offered their assistance to help others master their emotions and achieve tranquility. The Epicureans saw all humans as prone to fear of the future and the gods, and opened their schools to helping them free themselves of that fear. They even allowed slaves to attend their classes.

    Again, the philosophies that endorsed divine providence did so as a way of sublimating chaos and order into a higher order, such that both became necessary expressions of order.

    I've never read of anything like this.

    ReplyDelete
  44. The dynamism of the life of Christ is reflected in the subsequent dynamism of Western history.

    There can be no doubt that the history of the West has been "off the meter" dynamic.But then how do we account for the Christian East? It has been said by some that the East Roman Byzantine Empire was the most conservative society that has ever existed.

    ReplyDelete
  45. Has Professor Feser ever done a debate before?

    ReplyDelete
  46. I never claimed that Islamic science extended beyond early Islam. It's a known fact that Islamic interest in science dried up a few centuries after it began.

    Rank, I'm just not following you. You brought up Islamic science as a counterpoint to my point about the unique achievements of Western civilization. My whole point is that the West went beyond where other cultures stopped… and now you agree with me. I don't get it.

    As far as Mulla Sadra goes, I was reacting to your charge that I am ignorant. i was pretty sure you were just name-dropping Mulla Sadra without actually knowing squat about him, which you've now admitted. I think my point is made in the fact that in charging me with missing out on all that wonderful non-Western philosophy, you could only come up with a name you don't know anything about either.

    ReplyDelete
  47. Chris,

    That's why I'm Roman Catholic and not Eastern Orthodox.

    I don't mean to be flip. What strikes me about the West is the "non-natural" character of its history; how its history does not follow the usual course of civilizational rise and fall, and this is concentrated particularly in the Western Church rather than the Eastern - although I would not dream of getting into ecclesiastical disputes about Rome vs. Byzantium.

    With respect to non-Western philosophies, I got a little irritated with Rank but I actually do think non-Western philosophies have something to offer… as I've mentioned before, one of the characteristics of the West is its willingness to learn from anyone.

    But when I look at history, I see the power of Western ideas overwhelming the East. This is particularly the case with Marxism, which can be considered a degenerate and secularized form of Christianity ("immanentizing the eschaton"), but nonetheless swept through Asia with dire results. The fact that the East was, culturally, unable to resist a mutant Western philosophy says something to me about the relative substance of Eastern vs. Western philosophy.

    ReplyDelete
  48. Has Professor Feser ever done a debate before?

    I don't recall him ever entering a moderated debate, but he's had plenty of legitimate altercations that he's been in (at least, since starting this blog).

    ReplyDelete
  49. David T,

    I totally get one you mean by the West's "non-natural" character. Folks always like to repeat that saying "History repeats itself." I daresay it does. Nevertheless, there is something very special about the West which makes me think that we may currently be in uncharted historical waters?


    ".....unable to resist a mutant Western philosophy...."

    That's a strangely interesting comment. Just today I was reading something by a "neo-reactionary" of the "New Right" that was saying precisely that about Christianity- an alien Middle Eastern tradition, a "mutant" form of Judaism that easily penetrated into the heart of a decaying Roman Empire.

    ReplyDelete
  50. David T,

    But is not this dynamism, at bottom, simply another word for worldiness? It seems to me to have little to do either with spiritual tranquility and peace or with spiritual progress and growth.

    The Platonic take on the West's uniqueness might be that it represents the very depths of what is referred to as the Iron Age (not the archeological one, the mystical one), playing out inferior possibilities and leading the charge towards the very dissolution of this particular cosmic cycle. The East might not be able to resist the influx of Western thought because it too is part of a world whose days are numbered.

    I know Hindu thought echoes this perspective. In Hinduism this is the Kali Yuga, the dark age and we are at the very depths of that age.

    Anyway, that the East has not been able to totally resist Western evils is hardly much of a boast for a Western traditionalist.

    ReplyDelete
  51. JT,

    Not even a Guenon could have expressed that clearer.

    ReplyDelete
  52. Thank you, rank sophist, for your comments and your reading recommendations.

    First, Christians accept Jewish revelation, so there is no conflict. Second, a Christian could without contradiction accept as historical the events of the Quran. This is because the Quran records exactly zero miracles

    If your point is that miracles are way more central to Christianity's truth claims than in either Judaism or Islam, then no argument from me. But taken at face value, I can't agree with this. Yes, Christians accept Jewish revelation, but they also say that Jews misunderstood it (much like Muslims say Christians misunderstood theirs). If both Jews and Christians accept, says, Moses's miracles, does that prove Judaism's truth claims or Christianity's? So there is a conflict. In the same vein, to say that Christians "could without contradiction accept as historical the events of the Quran" is too strong, unless Christians also accept that the Archangel Gabriel dictated the Qur'an to Muhammad, which would demonstrate he was a true Prophet and therefore to be believed. I also think Muhammad's miraculous voyage to Jerusalem has already been mentioned in the thread.

    The counter-argument was generally skeptical in nature: very little of what we know can be guaranteed as true

    So man must make the most important of all his decisions on the basis of insufficient evidence - and even though the task is already beyond his power even when he has sufficient evidence (see the Israelites' apostasy of the Golden Calf after having witnessed Moses's miracles). It's exactly the reason for this that I have trouble understanding. The leap of faith necessary smacks of fideism to me, and cannot decide which revelation, if any, is true.

    Now, you might not realize that those events are miracles--but then the burden is no longer on God to provide miracles; it's on you to recognize them.

    I agree, but this does not really affect the argument I tried to make. If God makes several kinds of miracles, some routine (the Eucharist), and some very rare (the resurrection of Lazarus, the dancing sun of Fatima), then the problem becomes, why some people are denied the possibility of witnessing a "stronger" miracle, one perhaps sufficiently strong to jolt them into attention, while others are granted it?

    Now, to pitch in on the discussion about the trajectories of Western and Islamic civilisations and religions. It seems to me we just cannot give any evaluation of successes and failures, because we are time-bound creatures, and our opinions will reflect not truth, but the period of time in which we have been born. In 2014 AD, it's obvious that the West had leapt forward while Islam stagnated. In 1000 AD it was the exact opposite. In 3014 who knows how it will be? Homo sapiens is 200,000 years old and behavioral modernity some 50,000 years old, so any argument that rests on "but the West has done marvellously in the last 500 years" is meaningless compared with total human experience.

    And if I may also remember a quote by Samuel Huntington apropos David T's comment that But when I look at history, I see the power of Western ideas overwhelming the East:

    “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”

    ReplyDelete
  53. Rank Sophist,

    My knowledge of Islamic thought is basic. But I would strongly recommend the works of Henry Corbin as an introduction to Islamic philosophy, especially Sufi Illuminationist thought. He is also well worth a read for anyone of a traditional bent, although he is not the easiest auhor to read. His attention to the imaginal world is rare even in Platonism

    ReplyDelete
  54. Alat,

    If both Jews and Christians accept, says, Moses's miracles, does that prove Judaism's truth claims or Christianity's?

    Well, both. Why is that an either/or question?

    ...the problem becomes, why some people are denied the possibility of witnessing a "stronger" miracle, one perhaps sufficiently strong to jolt them into attention, while others are granted it?

    *Shrugs* Who knows? I'm not omniscient, but I think God is. In any event His plan is working to the extent that Christianity is, at least currently, the world's largest religion. And even if it weren't, the whole world, pretty much, knows about it. Why specific things do and don't happen is beyond my pay grade.

    I think your point about Western vs. Islamic culture is well-made, as is your point about how the West more or less conquered the world. Don't really have an argument there. I, specifically, am talking about the spread of Christianity. Maybe it could have been done better. Who knows? But I think the information has been disseminated pretty damn well, considering it started as essentially a Jewish cult around 32 AD.

    ReplyDelete
  55. Homo sapiens is 200,000 years old and behavioral modernity some 50,000 years old, so any argument that rests on "but the West has done marvellously in the last 500 years" is meaningless compared with total human experience.

    If you're going to start measuring things so numerically, you're going to have to realize the population of the world 500 years ago was around 500 million.

    The total human experience argument won't work well here.

    “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”

    Sadly, this is something everyone outside the west keeps telling themselves. But that doesn't make it true.

    ReplyDelete
  56. On topic for the original post: I come away from this with much respect for Professor Lowder and his readership.

    Sadly enough before this fiasco I might have said the same about Parsons, but his childish response to Feser's very reasonable questions shows, if not intellectual cowardice, a pettiness and immaturity that affects his reasoning - something he has in common with the gnus, unfortunately.

    Oh well. At least he's finally agreed to debate Feser head-on, albeit after stamping his feet and demanding he do it on his terms.

    ReplyDelete
  57. David T,

    you've been reading way too much orientalist scholarship about the trajectory of Islamic science. that stuff, although still persists here and there, is basically nonsense. truth be told, Islamic science and culture flourished well into just before colonial times, which was one of the main factors in decline really. i can, if you insist, give you examples of that flourishing in pretty much every branch of science cultivated in Islamic lands. and the stuff about Averroes being the end of philosophy cracks me up. i'm not surprised though that people still believe that orientalist garbage. i'm a bit surprised though that someone such yourself believes that.

    and no, islamic philosophy did not get subsumed under theology, period. that's partly true, insofar as, as one scholar put it, after Avicenna an "Avicennian pandemic" occurred and so the Muslim theologians could not but be influenced by him in way or another, changing their discipline is drastic ways. but still, in the Islamic tradition philosophy was always independent (and hence cultivated independently )from not only theology (understood as the technical discipline, kalam, of the theologians) but it was also independent of the religious sciences in general. the philosopher Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji, the son-in-law and student of Mulla Sadra, nicely explains this general attitude in the 16th century:

    "It must first of all be known that the intellect (‘aql) possesses complete independence in the acquiring of the divine sciences and other intellectual matters, and in these matters it does not depend upon the Shariah. Once this is realized it can be concluded that the way of the hukama [i.e., philosophers] is acquiring true science and proving the definite principles that govern over the essences of things in a way that is in accordance with the nature of reality. And this way is based upon reasoning and purely intellectual demonstration leading to self-evident premises that no intellect can refuse or resist to accept and in which the agreement or disagreement of any particular circumstances of peoples or religious communities does not have any effect. The knowledge acquired in this way is called in the terminology of learned men “the science of hikmah [i.e., philosophy].” Of necessity this science is in conformity with authentic revealed laws, for the truth of the Shariah is ascertainable in its reality through intellectual demonstration, but this agreement does not enter into the proof of the problems of hikmah, which do not depend upon the Shariah for their proof [...]."

    in the Islamic tradition, there were basically three main philosophical schools in the East after Avicenna (to this day), all of which were distinct from mainstream kalam (theology) i.e., Avicenna's own school (i.e., the Peripatetics), Suhrawardi's school (known as the Illuminationists), and then later Mulla Sadra's school (known as Transcendent wisdom/philosophy). (i'm obviously simplifying things though).

    every great philosopher, work of art, etc you can name from the West, i can name an equally great, if not greater, philosopher, works of art, etc, from the Islamic tradition. and please don't name any of those 17th century thinkers. nothing great about them really in my view. they are, after all, in large part responsible for the intellectual and moral decadence of your so-called great "Western civilzation". so i'm quite glad the Islamic civilization did not produce the likes of Descartes, Galileo, et al. thank God for that.

    Rank,

    i would, contrary to JT, discourage you from Corbin as an introduction to Islamic philosophy. he exaggerated many things and misrepresented certain figures badly. IMHO, his strong tendency to esotericism and the obscure and mystical prevented him from a proper understanding of it. if you'd like, i can recommend some works.

    ReplyDelete
  58. dd,

    Well, yes, I should have been clearer, it is specifically Sufi thought that I was suggesting Corbin is a good introduction too. I'm unsure why his concentration on the mystical would be out of place in this regard. But I know little about Sufi thought or Islamic philosophy in general.

    What is your opinion of William Chittick?

    ReplyDelete
  59. The debate sounds interesting! I hope it won't turn out like some of Feser's previous engagements, likethis or this for instance. ;)

    ReplyDelete
  60. JT,

    well you initially said Islamic philosophy. in any case, i suppose he's better for Sufism. but even then, he gets carried away by his obsession with the imaginal and as a result distorts things. Chittick criticized him for precisely this in the way he explained Ibn 'Arabi.

    as for Chittick, he's solid and the foremost scholar, some say, of Ibn 'Arabi in the West. he's also very good for Sufism generally. for Islamic philosophy, however, he's not.

    ReplyDelete
  61. We are all so fragile here, just as vulnerable as flowers.

    Hardly (even nary) a word of love, Grace, delight or beauty to be found in any of the comments.

    Keats : Beauty is truth, truth is beauty.
    Many others have told us that God Is Beauty or the Beautiful, and that Beauty alone will save the world.

    A single room is shown to be
    -- a unity, within and every where.
    No point of view is set apart.
    No word is made to say,
    This space is empty,
    or, this place is full.
    Only light itself is come
    -- a merest touch of brightness
    Neither the mind nor body can deny.
    It is the heart's explanation of Reality.
    It is Reality, plain spoken to the heart
    -- and by the heart alone.
    It is the Beautiful, itself.

    ReplyDelete
  62. ...and please don't name any of those 17th century thinkers. nothing great about them really in my view. they are, after all, in large part responsible for the intellectual and moral decadence of your so-called great "Western civilzation". so i'm quite glad the Islamic civilization did not produce the likes of Descartes, Galileo, et al. thank God for that.

    Nothing great about them? Nothing at all? And yet you make your point on an Internet, and using a computer, and an electrical grid, that owe everything to the science of Galileo and Descartes and nothing at all to "Islamic science."

    It's a virtual cliche that people who say they wish Descartes, Galileo, and the modern West in general never existed, wouldn't dream of living without the things the Modern west gives them, from Newtonian physics, to medicine, to a regime of natural rights and free speech that makes discussions like this even possible.

    ReplyDelete
  63. Alat:

    Excellent posts, by the way.

    I fully agree that the degree of information that one would require to make an informed decision about which faith to adhere to is simply beyond the vast majority of people, other than those who have directly experienced a profound miracle that could not be adequately explained by other natural factors. And as such, as Rank said, it ultimately is reduced to making a leap of faith, or as you said, fideism, but the problem with that position is that the first step on the path of faith is an arbitrary and random one that is completely unjustified that ends up becoming self-justifying over time, because it will organize the entirety of a person’s life to a degree that rejecting it will become extraordinarily difficult over time, and rationalization of its perceived defects and failures will also become inevitable.

    So, when Rank talks about coming to the knowledge of the truth of one’s faith after living it fully, he alludes to the internal justification of faith by the experiences of a faith-filled life, but what I see actually happening is that the life of faith shapes one’s perception and beliefs to the point that everything becomes subsumed under that framework, and so everything one experiences seems to confirm that framework, when really it does nothing of the sort. Rather, it just becomes one massive rationalization of an arbitrary choice that includes multiple biases and distortions designed to maintain its existence, even in the face of contradictory evidence.

    ReplyDelete
  64. Alat:

    Furthermore, I think what makes the situation even more galling to me is that not only does God force everyone to make a necessarily unjustified and uninformed decision, but he sets the stakes so high that the wrong choice leads to an eternity of punishment.

    And I don't see why those who randomly and arbitrarily chose correctly should be rewarded for all eternity. You may as well reward someone for rolling a certain number on a dice. And if you want to say that it isn't random or arbitrary, because God himself assisted those who chose correctly by nudging them in the right direction, then the question inevitably becomes why he didn't nudge everyone in that direction? And even a nudge would be insufficient, because a deep inner need, placed there by God, to make a choice is still being made in the face of insufficient evidence, and thus there are still more reasons to not make that choice than to make it, even with the nudge. In addition, many people have felt the same deep need to choose a path, and yet have chosen non-Christian paths. I doubt a Christian would say that they are all equally justified in their beliefs.

    Finally, the fact that it is within his power to simply create a paradise on earth, or in heaven, without this unjust arrangement, just makes it unfairness and injustice even more vivid. After all, he could grant all his children eternal happiness without setting up a rigged game in which he arbitrarily picks the winners and losers.

    ReplyDelete
  65. DavidT:

    In any case, my aversion to your scenario #1 is that it is essentially a series of ad hoc assumptions made for the purpose of explaining what is otherwise inexplicable.

    First, yes, something is inexplicable, if you reject explanations for it.

    Second, the advantage of my scenario is that it is based upon confirmed facts about human psychology. It does not require miracles or supernatural elements at all.

    It was just lucky that this collective hallucination, among others, happened to uniquely appeal to both rich and poor and so spread.

    There were certainly many elements of luck and chance in its spread, like in any spread of any idea or concept. That is, again, something that is in its favor, because there are many historical movements that were spread by virtue of skill and effort, but also many, many lucky breaks. Again, no appeal to miracles is necessary.

    The teachings of the unbalanced founder just by chance included profound philosophical and spiritual depths that seem inexhaustible and inspired thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, among many others.

    That’s a very narrow perspective. Is Buddhism true, because it has produced brilliant thinkers? What about Hindusim? Just because their brilliant thinkers are unfamiliar to us does not mean they do not exist, and had deep reflections upon reality and life.

    These teachings also, by chance, included the separation of ecclesial and secular authority that was crucial to the dynamism of the West, etc.

    I think so.

    ReplyDelete
  66. DavidT:

    Nothing great about them? Nothing at all? And yet you make your point on an Internet, and using a computer, and an electrical grid, that owe everything to the science of Galileo and Descartes and nothing at all to "Islamic science."

    I think that what he means is that their accomplishments, which were incredibly from a scientific and technological standpoint, were also a Trojan horse that included many factors that contributed to the spiritual decline of the West. Feser would say that their abandonment of formal and final causes, in their advance of mechanical philosophy, was the acid that corroded the traditions of metaphysics, theology and ethics.

    ReplyDelete
  67. But is not this dynamism, at bottom, simply another word for worldiness? It seems to me to have little to do either with spiritual tranquility and peace or with spiritual progress and growth.

    There is truth in this. Christ came to redeem the world - this physical, material world - and not merely to offer a path to personal tranquility or spiritual growth. So we can expect a worldly aspect in the Christian West that is not found in other traditions. And Christ promised his followers persecution and rejection rather than tranquility.

    Of course, there are evil forces at work in the world as well trying to undermine this redemption, which is why Western history has a dual aspect - Christ had followers in his own group of Apostles who denied him and betrayed him. Redemption is not a linear or straightforward process. Nonetheless, I'd rather live in 21st century Europe or the U.S. rather than anywhere in the pre-modern world.

    Anyway, that the East has not been able to totally resist Western evils is hardly much of a boast for a Western traditionalist.

    The point is that the game is conducted largely in Western terms - even by Asians. Mao adopted a Western philosophy and used it to capture and transform China. Same with Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge, etc. The places where Communism has been rolled back - the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - have a traditional relationship to the West and were subject to Western pressure (e.g. JP II's campaign in Poland). It seems it takes a good Western idea to beat a bad Western idea.

    The point is that, even in the East, the game is conducted in Western terms, and not merely by Westerners, but by the Easterners themselves. And that makes sense… Eastern philosophy isn't about transforming the world, but about coming to terms with it and making your peace with it. Spiritual tranquility. That's why Chinese civilizations didn't really change much for thousands of years before contact with the West. (Cue objections concerning the wonderful advances of Chinese science, etc. that rival those of the West. Not buying it.)

    That's all well and good - don't get the idea that I think Eastern philosophy is terrible and has no value, just as I think comparable Western philosophies of tranquility (e.g. Stoicism) also have value. But that just highlights all the more the radical uniqueness of the West and the need for an explanation adequate to the astounding trajectory of Western history.

    ReplyDelete
  68. I think that what he means is that their accomplishments, which were incredibly from a scientific and technological standpoint, were also a Trojan horse that included many factors that contributed to the spiritual decline of the West. Feser would say that their abandonment of formal and final causes, in their advance of mechanical philosophy, was the acid that corroded the traditions of metaphysics, theology and ethics.

    Well I completely agree with that… I see Western history as a sort of spiral, a titanic battle between the forces of Redemption (launched by Christ) against the forces of rebellion (headed by the Evil One), who works to undermine every good thing that happens in the West. Thus everything has a dual character… just as the West finally achieves the scientific breakthrough, that breakthrough is insidiously turned against us by using it to undermine centuries of painstakingly gained philosophical wisdom.

    I know that is way too religious an interpretation for you, dguller, and that is fair enough. The point is that you don't have to think that everything that has happened in the West is wonderful to suppose that the history of the West gives a hint that it had its origin in something extraordinary.

    And, finally, I think the only answer to the bad consequences of Western culture is good Western culture, not a retreat to pre-modern non-Western philosophies. That's just conceding the game altogether, because those philosophies, whatever their other merits, don't seem to have the cultural power to resist bad Western ideas.

    ReplyDelete
  69. I quite understand why many people in the East despise us… they rightly see us sunk in consumerism and materialism, lacking elementary virtues like self-discipline and modesty, focused entirely on worldly advantage rather than eternal things. In comparison to the typical Western degenerate, your moderate, dutiful Islamic head-of-household looks pretty good. And Eastern mystics, living a life of peace and tranquility, look really good compared to the average Westerner chasing his next BMW.

    As much as Easterners might be an example to us as far as that goes, Eastern philosophy can never be the answer for us, culturally speaking. The West is engaged, whether we like or not, in an epic drama, the latest chapter of which is the current decadence of Europe and the U.S. This isn't the first time it has happened… and the answer has always been a return to the original dynamism initiated by Christ, which results in a renewal of culture at a higher level - but also the introduction of possibilities for yet more evil. That's the game we are in, and there is no getting out of it….

    ReplyDelete
  70. For Islam, I think I would recommend Martin Lings.

    ReplyDelete
  71. I wonder what the odds are that this debate will actually happen. My guess is that even Parson's thick carapace of gnu arrogance has been unable to protect him from the awareness that this exchange has left him looking really bad, and agreeing to a debate is just a desperate attempt to save face until he can come up with something better. I wouldn't be surprised if in the next few days he announces that he has looked into TLS and is shocked by the "homophobia" it promotes, and that he refuses to dialogue with anyone so vile. That strategy seems to have worked for Dawkins.

    ReplyDelete
  72. dguller,

    Second, even if there was a fundamental binary opposition of order and chaos, the statement of that binary opposition itself is a statement of order, because it is subsumed within a rational system.

    This wasn't the ancient Greek opinion, and so it's irrelevant. We're doing history; not metaphysics.

    Also, my argument here is a repetition of one that David Bentley Hart makes, in line with Nietzsche and the other postmodernists. Pagan culture was defined by the Apollonian-Dionysian binary.

    Where is the chaos?

    Well, first of all, the khora you mentioned. Why else do you think postmodernists are so fascinated by it? Plato believed that the here below was a chaotic swirl that could only be forced into shape by the Forms.

    First, prime matter, if we can speak of such a thing, is not random chaos. It operates under certain restrictions, and thus has organized and ordered characteristics and properties, in a sense. For example, if prime matter were random chaos, then it could spontaneously become a duck.

    No, it couldn't. A duck is a form. Prime matter is amorphous and indefinite, like differance. It's fundamentally other than order. Order breaks into it from time to time to generate substances, which are combinations of chaos and order.

    Second, his “unusual accidents” are just unpredictable coincidences. They are not unintelligible

    No, they are fundamentally unintelligible. This is what he means when he says that they can have no science. See Aristotle's Concept of Chance by John Dudley, or the relevant passages in this Lonergan piece.

    ReplyDelete
  73. Certainly, Christianity put its unique twist to the idea, but it did not invent the idea of order in the universe.

    No one invented it. It has been present in every single society in recorded history, to my knowledge. You were trying to equivocate between the Greek concept of order and the Christian one, so I corrected you.

    And this was due to the shared rational nature that each human being possesses that connects us all to the rational principle of the cosmos.

    Which is completely different from the universal brotherhood that you were trying to ascribe to them. Don't be so naïve.

    Of course not, and yet it was present in their thought. Of course, what they considered “less fortunate” depended upon which school one belonged to.

    You're being naïve again. What you're doing here is reading Christian practices, which you take for granted, back into pagan culture. There was nothing in pagan culture like the drive that built schools and hospitals, that led the earliest Christians to live in communities with shared property, that equalized women and slaves with free men or that inspired Christians to tend to society's worst. This should be obvious enough to anyone who understands the historical incongruity of Christianity's placement of pride as the worst sin, which is a direct contradiction of pagan values. Whatever limited altruism existed among the Greeks, it was of a totally different species than that of the Christians.

    I've never read of anything like this.

    My argument here relies on David Bentley Hart's claims in The Beauty of the Infinite and Atheist Delusions, in particular.

    Alat,

    Yes, Christians accept Jewish revelation, but they also say that Jews misunderstood it (much like Muslims say Christians misunderstood theirs).

    Which is a problem of interpretation that exists even within Christianity. Obviously, cases must be made for the relative worthiness of this or that interpretation; but this is different from a wholesale conflict between competing miracle claims, which was your initial concern.

    unless Christians also accept that the Archangel Gabriel dictated the Qur'an to Muhammad

    I would also add the Quran's claim that Jesus did not die. I should have been clearer: I did not mean to suggest that a Christian could accept everything that the Quran claims to be true as truth. I meant that the historical narrative of the Quran, in terms of the actions and statements of Muhammad and his followers, could be taken as accurate representations of what Muhammad said and did. To my knowledge, Gabriel does not appear in the narrative outside of Muhammad's visions. However, I admit that my grasp of Islam is weak, so I could be wrong about this.

    ReplyDelete
  74. It's exactly the reason for this that I have trouble understanding. The leap of faith necessary smacks of fideism to me, and cannot decide which revelation, if any, is true.

    A few quotes from Aquinas:

    "For if man of himself could in a perfect manner know all things visible and invisible, it would indeed be foolish to believe what he does not see. But our manner of knowing is so weak that no philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. We even read that a certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in order to know the nature of the bee. If, therefore, our intellect is so weak, it is foolish to be willing to believe concerning God only that which man can know by himself alone."

    "Then, again, if one were willing to believe only those things which one knows with certitude, one could not live in this world. How could one live unless one believed others? How could one know that this man is one’s own father? Therefore, it is necessary that one believe others in matters which one cannot know perfectly for oneself."

    It's not fideism. It's based on the idea that human minds are inherently feeble, such that they are incapable of knowing most things with certainty. Aquinas and others present the Christian faith as just another acceptance of authority among many, rather than some totally different kind of leap.

    why some people are denied the possibility of witnessing a "stronger" miracle, one perhaps sufficiently strong to jolt them into attention, while others are granted it?

    How is this a problem, though? Is God responsible for the failure of humans to see what's right in front of them? This would seem to entail that he has a responsibility to prevent sin, which, as Benedict has said, arises from a kind of refusal to see one's own contingency and dependence upon God. I would argue that insisting that God provide strong enough miracles is tantamount to insisting that God prevent sin. There has to be room for free will in all of this.

    dd,

    Huge thanks for your input into this discussion; I always love reading what you have to say about Islamic history. Your post here cleared up a lot of misunderstandings on my part. And I'd appreciate any reading recommendations you have, although my book backlog is so huge that it will take awhile to get around to them.

    ReplyDelete
  75. dguller,

    what I see actually happening is that the life of faith shapes one’s perception and beliefs to the point that everything becomes subsumed under that framework, and so everything one experiences seems to confirm that framework, when really it does nothing of the sort. Rather, it just becomes one massive rationalization of an arbitrary choice that includes multiple biases and distortions designed to maintain its existence, even in the face of contradictory evidence.

    Why would this be any less true were "no faith" to be substituted for "faith"?

    Having faith is not a guaranty that one's intellect won't be misused or that one's will won't be corrupted. And the reality of the matter for people without faith is no otherwise than it is for people with faith.

    Indeed, not only is not having faith not a guaranty that one's intellect won't be misused or that one's will won't be corrupted, not having faith won't even make it more likely that either might not occur.

    Confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization, willful blindness, etc. are not products of faith; rather, they are part and parcel of what it is to be a fallible human being.

    I remember a friend from years ago explaining to me why he didn't belong to a religion. His reason was very simple: "It seems like its only people with problems who get involved with religion."

    With reasoning like that -- "Since only people with problems get involved with religion, my not being involved with religion is an assurance that I myself do not have problems" -- we might as well get rid of: a) lawyers (coz it seems like only people with legal problems, or a desire to avoid legal problems, avail themselves of lawyers); b) doctors (coz it seems only people with health problems, or a desire to avoid health problems, avail themselves of doctors); c) plumbers (coz it seems like only people with plumbing problems, or a desire to avoid plumbing problems, avail themselves of plumbers); and, d) etc., etc., so on and so forth.

    "Since it seems that only people of faith are bedeviled by confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization, willful blindness, etc., if I'm not a person of faith, I myself won't be bedeviled by confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization, willful blindness, etc."

    Uh-huh.

    This is not a subtle nudge to you, or anyone else, to get involved with a life of faith, just a statement to the effect that not having a life of faith is nowise an assurance of not being bedeviled by the things people without a life of faith see people with a life of faith being bedeviled by.

    ReplyDelete
  76. David T

    There is truth in this. Christ came to redeem the world - this physical, material world - and not merely to offer a path to personal tranquility or spiritual growth. So we can expect a worldly aspect in the Christian West that is not found in other traditions.

    But the world needs redeeming because it is worldly. That is what worldly means - it is another name for a general idolatry that forgets to see the world and its things in their proper spiritual place. I don't think this sort of worldiness has any place in Christian thought.

    Nonetheless, I'd rather live in 21st century Europe or the U.S. rather than anywhere in the pre-modern world.

    Well, we are all a product of our time, so even the most ardent traditionalist would have a hard time fitting into any other time and place.

    Anyway, I think the idea of transforming the world very strange from a traditional spiritual perspective. This seems ideological and utopian talk - immanentising the eschaton, to use a once popular phrase. We are, rather, meant to find God in the world and through the world. Certainly, culture and society should be orientated towards the divine, as tended to happen to some degree in traditional societies (and almost does not happen in the modern West!), but transforming the world seems utterly alien to traditional Christian spirituality as much as any other traditional form.

    I think it needs underscoring that men tend to have only a limited capacity for focus on concentration. Concentrating so much on natural science and its applications cannot be take away significantly from a societies room for spirituality. The history of the modern West seems to bear this out.

    ReplyDelete
  77. dd,

    Yes, Corbin does exaggerate the importance of the imaginal world. This is the case also for some of his followers, like Kathleen Raine and some of the Temenos people. Raine sometimes gets close to making the creative imagination the centre of all legitimate spiritual journeys. However, the imaginal world is such a neglected area, even in Platonism, that I can forgive him for this.

    ReplyDelete
  78. @guller:

    Glenn wrote:
    "Since it seems that only people of faith are bedeviled by confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization, willful blindness, etc., if I'm not a person of faith, I myself won't be bedeviled by confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization, willful blindness, etc." - Uh-huh. - This is not a subtle nudge to you, or anyone else, to get involved with a life of faith, just a statement to the effect that not having a life of faith is nowise an assurance of not being bedeviled by the things people without a life of faith see people with a life of faith being bedeviled by.

    [I guess you already read that once, guller, but I thought I'd encourage you to read it again. I think it's really an extremely simple and yet crucial point which I've tried to explain to you before (remember John Loftus' 'OTF'? - of which I have written a somewhat detailed critique, if you're interested).]


    Crude: "Yep, do a reasonable amount of research. And/or invest trust in relevant authorities. (This gets into a touchy issue for me, since my views about this are rather liberal.)"

    guller: "I think that’s fair, which is why I’ve always been so impressed by the Muslim collection of prophetic sayings, or hadith. The early Muslims recognized that transmission of information was prone to distortion and deception, and so they painstakingly compiled not only prophetic sayings and doings, but also meticulously traced those sayings and doings to specific individuals in chains of transmission that they then proceeded to analyze in terms of reliability and soundness. That seems pretty consistent with a group of believers being absolutely serious about preserving the integrity of their message, and not treating it as a haphazard affair. I’ve always wondered why a similar approach was never taken by Christians to preserve their message."

    It seems to me that you very fundamentally misunderstand the what revelation is in Christianity. The message/revelation is the man, Jesus Christ. Christians obviously do not understand Jesus as being just some guy who God sent to give us a message, a set of propositions about God/God's will, which we must accordingly meticulously preserve, because his point in being sent was to hand on these propositions about God, so that the smartest people around would be able to subject them to rational analysis (and then decide for themselves what to believe). To the contrary: We believe that Jesus was God, that he himself, and not the words which he (never) had his followers memorize verbatim, was the incarnate (in-the-flesh) revelation of God to man, as well as of man to himself. And then we believe in the Holy Spirit and the living authority of the Church. So now you'll have all sorts of interminable objections about the reasonableness of that, but in the meantime, try to at least keep the basic theological data in view when thinking about and commenting on this stuff. Christianity isn't Islam with a different prophet and a different book. If that's how you understand it, then you're misunderstanding it.

    ReplyDelete
  79. Well, we are all a product of our time, so even the most ardent traditionalist would have a hard time fitting into any other time and place.

    It's not a matter of fitting in. Pre-modern life was short, disease-ridden, painful, violent, and generally lived in abysmal ignorance and superstition. You were lucky if half your children made it to their fifth birthday, and you were never free of the worry that Vikings might show up tomorrow and slaughter you and your entire family. No thanks.

    Christian spirituality differs from other spiritualities in not seeing the material world as evil, as it is in, say, Platonism. God created the world and saw that it was good, and, even more, became material himself in the Incarnation. Moreover, God himself did manual labor and embraced and healed the sick. The was a revolution in spirituality. Instead of escaping from the world in mysticism or stoic withdrawal, the Christian transforms ordinary life in the service of Christ… and in doing so transforms the world. That's the right kind of worldliness, not the wrong kind.

    ReplyDelete
  80. Rank:

    This wasn't the ancient Greek opinion, and so it's irrelevant. We're doing history; not metaphysics.

    Are you sure?

    Also, my argument here is a repetition of one that David Bentley Hart makes, in line with Nietzsche and the other postmodernists. Pagan culture was defined by the Apollonian-Dionysian binary.

    Since when is Nietzsche an authority on ancient Greek philosophy?

    Well, first of all, the khora you mentioned. Why else do you think postmodernists are so fascinated by it? Plato believed that the here below was a chaotic swirl that could only be forced into shape by the Forms.

    First, khora is not chaos.

    Second, postmodernists are fascinated by khora, because it is an example of a necessary impossibility, i.e. something that does not fit into a system, and yet is essential for the system to function.

    No, it couldn't. A duck is a form. Prime matter is amorphous and indefinite, like differance. It's fundamentally other than order. Order breaks into it from time to time to generate substances, which are combinations of chaos and order.

    Chaos is the lack of order, and yet prime matter does have an order that is not a form. It’s order and organizing principle is that it is pure potentiality. That is its definition. The problem is that it is something that has a definition, and yet lacks a form, which is impossible. So, in that sense, prime matter would be like khora, i.e. necessary impossibility, or a fragment that is necessary for a system, but cannot possibly be present within the system.

    No, they are fundamentally unintelligible. This is what he means when he says that they can have no science. See Aristotle's Concept of Chance by John Dudley, or the relevant passages in this Lonergan piece.

    I’m not expert on this, but Aristotle writes that that he has “stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it” (Metaphysics 6.2). I find it hard to believe that something is “fundamentally unintelligible” if he can state not only what it is, but also “from what cause it arises”.

    ReplyDelete
  81. No one invented it. It has been present in every single society in recorded history, to my knowledge. You were trying to equivocate between the Greek concept of order and the Christian one, so I corrected you.

    I wasn’t equivocating. I was just trying to show that the idea of order was not invented by Christianity. I’m glad that you agree.

    Which is completely different from the universal brotherhood that you were trying to ascribe to them. Don't be so naïve.

    I never mentioned anything about “brotherhood”. I wrote: “The belief in the unity and interconnectedness of mankind was present in Greek thought.” You haven’t shown that I was wrong, but only that the kind of “unity and interconnectedness” in ancient Greek thought was different in some important ways from Christian thought.

    What you're doing here is reading Christian practices, which you take for granted, back into pagan culture.

    No, I’m not. I never stated that ancient Greeks did any of the things that you mentioned, because I know that they didn’t. I just made a simple and general point that ancient Greek philosophers cared about the well-being of other human beings, albeit in their own particular way, and using their own particular tools and exercises. Again, how they did this was radically different from how the Christians did it, but you seem to think that only the Christian form of caring counts as real caring, and anyone else didn’t care at all.

    ReplyDelete
  82. David T,

    Well, I simply think that you are judging the pre-modern world wrongly. In the end it is spirituality that alone matters, all else can only be judged from its effects on spirituality. The pre-modern generally was superior to the modern world was this perspective.

    Your description of the pre-modern could have come from the most died-in-the-wool progressive or modernist, as could your grounds for the superiority of the modern West.

    I think your description of the difference between Christian spirituality and other traditional forms on the world is a strawman. Very often other forms of spirituality have seen the world as good, reflecting God and being a veil through which he can be glimpsed.

    Indeed, in this sense of worldliness, Christianity, especially in the West has been accused of deficiency. It is to the Platonic and mystical strains of Western Christian thought, from Eriugena to Jakob Böhme, that has most stressed, for example, nature as a reflection of God and a route to him. The world, creation in this sense, was often neglected by a lot of mainstream Western Christian thought from at least Augustine onwards - it was simply the fallen background to man's spiritual pilgrimage. The Christian East tends to have had a more balanced view of creation and the world and it is famously the more Platonic perspective.

    Philip Sherrard traces this aspect of Western thought in The Eclipse of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences of Modern Science and The Rape of Man & Nature: An Inquiry Into the Origns and Consequences of Modern Science. Seyyed Nasr has written to much the same in Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man .

    Platonism doesn't say the world is evil. This, like such perennial canards as Eastern fatalism, is a massive strawman and does not help a proper understanding of the similarities and differences between different traditional spiritual and intellectual perspectives.

    ReplyDelete
  83. FOOTNOTE: Someone above said that for Aristotle Pure Act is infinite. As I learned it, Aristotle thought that Pure Act was finite. For the Greeks infinity was viewed as disorderly, and hence it is defective. It follows that for a Greek Pure Act cannot be infinite.

    This is a rare metaphysical issue about which Aristotle and Aquinas disagree.

    Sorry, I can't remember where I read that Aristotle held this. It's possible my source was wrong. Interesting question, anyway..

    ReplyDelete
  84. David T,

    Even leaving aside decadence of the modern West compared to pre-modern civilisations (in the literal sense of loss of true ends - the spiritual), I think its much vaunted progress is highly equivocal in all areas except health and sanitation. That is, there are in almost all other areas significant downsides for all the benefits of supposed progress that threaten to at least equal the advantanges.

    For example, we now have all sorts of electronic and multimedia means of entertainment, but we have largely lost traditional forms of entertainment (as living traditions), from Mummer's shows to storytelling, which each local community would maintain. Even leaving aside questions of philosophy and criticism of art and literature, the outcome seems to be neutral in terms of the benefits of modernity in this area, at best. If one does take into account questions of aesthetic, cultural, moral, and spiritual value of modern forms of entertainment compared to traditional ones, in most cases the former, I would say, are significantly inferior to the latter.

    This is a pattern one finds again and again with modern progress.

    Even with health and sanitation there are not insignificant downsides. One is the rise in disease caused by the healthcare system itself, as detailed by Ivan Illich and others. Another is the medicalisation of what were previouisly natural human functions. IVF and contraception are obvious examples here - natural functions are invaded by tests and technology, sometimes in a way degrading to their proper dignity (even absent other moral considerations). Finally, there is the rise, or the pandering to, of an attitude that tries to cling to our material existence at all costs. Neglecting the fact there is a natural cylce of life and death, this attitude tries to extend life as long as possible, despite decrepitude. I would argue it is an unhealthy attitude; for a start, it is clearly bound up with a lack of belief in anything beyond our earthly existence.

    ReplyDelete
  85. @Jeremy:
    So, yeah, you say many true things and nostalgia is nice, but do you actually care to eschew modern technologies (setting aside those that are intrinsically immoral)? I suppose Luddites had many true things to say too, and yet... With due respect then, I can't help wondering if the basic tendency of your thinking might be towards the reactionary and destructive (at least in an armchair sense, if not in terms of any real practical implications). Nature is great, spiritual values are indispensable, but do we really have to dump on art (technological achievements) in order to appreciate this?

    ReplyDelete
  86. Glenn:

    Why would this be any less true were "no faith" to be substituted for "faith"?

    Here’s the issue, as far as I can tell.

    A person is presented with a proposition to either affirm or deny, which requires them to appraise the evidence for and against the proposition. The degree to which one should affirm a proposition should be proportionate to the degree of the evidence for that proposition. Part of appraising evidence is attempting to determine to what degree some evidence is the byproduct of bias and cognitive distortion, because it can then be held to be less reliable than evidence that minimizes bias and distortion. You are correct that this is possible for everyone, because we all share the same underlying psychology, including the propensity towards bias and distortion. However, any evidence that does not take pains to reduce the risk of such bias and distortion is less persuasive than evidence that does take such steps.

    Now, the problem with accepting the truth of the resurrection is that one account has a wealth of empirical evidence in support of it that shows the impact of perceptual distortions, motivated and emotional reasoning, and so on, which could account for why those who believed in the resurrection did believe in it, and another account has virtually no evidence in support of it, other than the testimony of these very same individuals. However, this very testimony is what is accounted for by the first account, and thus is undermined, I think. Thus, the only evidence for the second account is completely undermined by the first, and since the first has a great deal of empirical support, and the second has none that is not question begging, I’d say that the first account is stronger.

    That’s how I see things, anyway.

    ReplyDelete
  87. DavidM:

    I guess you already read that once, guller, but I thought I'd encourage you to read it again. I think it's really an extremely simple and yet crucial point which I've tried to explain to you before (remember John Loftus' 'OTF'? - of which I have written a somewhat detailed critique, if you're interested)

    I’ve commented on Glenn’s post above, if you’d like to have a look. And I would love to read your critique of the OTF. Where is it?

    The message/revelation is the man, Jesus Christ … To the contrary: We believe that Jesus was God, that he himself, and not the words which he (never) had his followers memorize verbatim, was the incarnate (in-the-flesh) revelation of God to man, as well as of man to himself.

    But that man said and did things that were preserved in texts as purportedly accurate accounts of his sayings and doings. That speaks to some degree of attempt at historical accuracy, which speaks to the fact that his followers thought that it was important to preserve salient parts of his life in the historical record. Otherwise, why not begin the Gospel accounts with an admission that they did not attempt to be historically accurate at all, and were just one person’s subjective impressions of stuff that he heard from somewhere? And if there was an attempt at historical accuracy, then why not take some serious steps to preserve historical truth, much as the early Muslims did? I don’t think that you can have it both ways.

    ReplyDelete
  88. dguller,

    Since when is Nietzsche an authority on ancient Greek philosophy?

    He isn't. He's an authority on pagan culture. Nietzsche is a famed classicist for a reason.

    First, khora is not chaos.

    Khora is the passive and unstructured receptacle that stands between being and non-being. That sounds like chaos to me.

    Second, postmodernists are fascinated by khora, because it is an example of a necessary impossibility

    No, that is your strange personal obsession, shared by no postmodernist save perhaps Caputo. Khora is interesting to the postmodernists because it is Dionysian, a chaos that cannot be pinned down--as with Aristotelian prime matter.

    Chaos is the lack of order, and yet prime matter does have an order that is not a form. It’s order and organizing principle is that it is pure potentiality.

    Pure potentiality was chaos in the Greek mind. You've admitted yourself that you're no expert in history, and yet you're arguing this point against people who are (namely, Hart, Nietzsche and the postmodernists). Don't be ridiculous.

    So, in that sense, prime matter would be like khora, i.e. necessary impossibility, or a fragment that is necessary for a system

    Your pet theory, again, is irrelevant to this discussion.

    I find it hard to believe that something is “fundamentally unintelligible” if he can state not only what it is, but also “from what cause it arises”.

    Then rebut my sources.

    Again, how they did this was radically different from how the Christians did it, but you seem to think that only the Christian form of caring counts as real caring, and anyone else didn’t care at all.

    No; I was simply correcting your obfuscations regarding the impact of Christianity on the world. You were trying to make it seem like Christian practices were predated by the Greeks in some meaningful way, when that (as you admit) was far from the case.

    ReplyDelete
  89. dguller,

    You provided a description of what you see actually happening to a life of faith, and I asked how that description might be any less true when applied to a life of no faith. Nicely presented as your explanation as to why you think one account of the resurrection is more reliable than another is, I don't see the way in which it constitutes an answer to the question asked.

    ReplyDelete
  90. dguller,

    Also, given your acknowledgement that I am correct that confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization,, etc. "is possible for everyone" -- where "everyone" includes both those living a life of faith and those not living a life of faith -- mightn't talking about those things in such a way as to suggest that they are or might be a product of a life of faith, suggest a bit of either bias against, or an attempt to engender bias against, a life of faith?

    ReplyDelete
  91. (s/b "...given the acknowledgement that it is correct that...")

    ReplyDelete
  92. dguller, my $0.02 for what its worth. The arguments you find convincing about the ground of being show that belief in miracles is not per se irrational. After all, a being who can create the universe and its laws can surely suspend or violate them if He so desires. So you've established that belief that God could, if He so chose, incarnate Himself and perform the miracles attributed to Christ is not in itself irrational. I'm afraid Aquinas was right that that is about as far as reason will get you. Revelation requires more. It requires faith,which is harder for some than others. Faith requires a certain type of experience as well as logic. Also in part, it is a letting go. I'm not a big fan of Kierkegaard, fideism being a heresy for the Catholic church, but in the final analysis, when all the reasoning and argument are over, faith does take a certain amount of leaping. You just have to accept without any final rational or empirical assurance that what you accept is true.

    Fred

    ReplyDelete
  93. Rank:

    He isn't. He's an authority on pagan culture. Nietzsche is a famed classicist for a reason.

    I’m admittedly a novice in this area, and so I have a few questions. Would you say that his interpretation of pagan culture is the dominant paradigm that subsequent classicists necessarily must situate themselves within? Did anyone check his sources to determine whether his citations and interpretations were consistent with other texts and sources? Were there some elements of Greek drama and poetry that did not fit within his framework? Did he ever revise his opinions in The Birth of Tragedy, especially since it was an early work while he was only 28?

    Khora is the passive and unstructured receptacle that stands between being and non-being. That sounds like chaos to me.

    Chaos is the absence of any order, and yet khora does have some kind of order by virtue of the fact that it is a receptacle that is characterized by pure passivity and pure potentiality. If it was total chaos, then it would not have these features at all, but rather would be incapable of having any features whatsoever, because having a feature is having a kind of organization and order, which is impossible. In fact, the only genuine chaos would be non-being itself.

    No, that is your strange personal obsession, shared by no postmodernist save perhaps Caputo.

    And Derrida, who is kind of an important source on postmodern theory of khora, having initiated and defined the subject matter itself. Caputo simply extends and develops Derrida’s ideas on the subject. Both endorse the idea that khora is important as an essential feature of metaphysics that does not fit within metaphysics, and thus is an instance of an Other that lies beyond the limit of metaphysics, thus making it similar to differance and negative theology.

    ReplyDelete
  94. Khora is interesting to the postmodernists because it is Dionysian, a chaos that cannot be pinned down--as with Aristotelian prime matter.

    First, care to provide some citations of postmodern thinkers who associated khora with chaos?

    Second, Derrida himself says that “khora would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity in general, whether dialectical or not” (On the Name, p. 92), and as such, it cannot be situated at one pole, i.e. chaos, as opposed to another pole, i.e. order. It rather rests beneath the two poles of order and chaos, as the non-origin origin of both, and thus is a surname of differance (Ibid., p. 126), because they both operate according to a similar “logic” that is related to apophatic and aporetic language.

    Pure potentiality was chaos in the Greek mind. You've admitted yourself that you're no expert in history, and yet you're arguing this point against people who are (namely, Hart, Nietzsche and the postmodernists). Don't be ridiculous.

    First, I’m sorry if I doubt that your sources, albeit extraordinarily learned, are not the go-to sources of classicists to understand ancient Greek culture. Perhaps if you could cite reputable classicists of ancient Greek culture saying that your sources represent the dominant paradigm of classical study?

    Second, could you cite some ancient Greek thinkers that associated chaos with pure potentiality?

    Third, it is my understanding that chaos was something, according to the Greeks. In fact, it was represented in their mythology as a deity of some kind. And yet, pure potentiality is impossible, because if it is something, then it must have some determinate features that define what it is, and yet that is impossible for pure potentiality, which is supposed to have no defining features, being completely indeterminate and unstructured.

    Your pet theory, again, is irrelevant to this discussion.

    It’s not my pet theory. It’s the theory of Derrida and Caputo, both of whom are important postmodern theorists. You can’t just ignore the two postmodern thinkers who have written the most about khora as irrelevant to what postmodernists think about khora. Or, maybe you have other postmodern thinkers that have written extensively on khora and its significance?

    ReplyDelete
  95. Then rebut my sources.

    I just did. If X is “fundamentally unintelligible”, then our mind cannot know anything about it at all. If our minds can know something about X, then it cannot be “fundamentally unintelligible”. The fact that we can know something about such accidents, including what it is and what causes it, means that such accidents cannot be “fundamentally unintelligible”.

    Now, they may not be intelligible to the same extent as something that can be understood according to a science, but just because something cannot be understood scientifically does not mean that is un-intelligible, but only that it is not completely intelligible. There are degrees of intelligibility, after all.

    No; I was simply correcting your obfuscations regarding the impact of Christianity on the world. You were trying to make it seem like Christian practices were predated by the Greeks in some meaningful way, when that (as you admit) was far from the case.

    Christians certainly added a new twist to pagan beliefs about the interconnectedness of mankind, but they did not invent the very idea of interconnectedness of mankind to begin with. I give them all the credit in the world for their innovations, but I cannot give them all the credit in the world for the very thing that they subsequently modified in their radical direction.

    ReplyDelete
  96. Glenn:

    Also, given your acknowledgement that I am correct that confirmation bias, distortion, rationalization,, etc. "is possible for everyone" -- where "everyone" includes both those living a life of faith and those not living a life of faith -- mightn't talking about those things in such a way as to suggest that they are or might be a product of a life of faith, suggest a bit of either bias against, or an attempt to engender bias against, a life of faith?

    The scenario that I have in mind is the following.

    A man of outstanding moral rectitude and honesty comes up to you and states that he has been following a man who performed miracles, died, and rose from the dead to state that Jesus Christ was misinterpreted by his followers, and that he can preach the truth Christian message. In fact, he claims that there are others who can corroborate his claims, because they have seen what he has seen.

    Do you believe him?

    If you’re being honest, you probably will not give him the benefit of the doubt, and begin investigating his claims. Instead, you will think that he is lying, or deluded, or has been deceived in some way. And this is because you know that people operate under a number of biases and cognitive and perceptual distortions that would better account for his claims than the possibility that he has truly seen what he claims to have seen.

    In other words, someone claims something that violates many of your core beliefs to the point that if they are telling the truth, then substantial portions of your worldview will have to be abandoned. Rather than reject such fundamental aspects of your overall framework, you would more likely believe that what this person believes are more likely the product of the many biases and distortions that human beings are vulnerable to.

    That’s the main point I’m getting at.

    ReplyDelete
  97. dguller,

    Would you say that his interpretation of pagan culture is the dominant paradigm that subsequent classicists necessarily must situate themselves within?

    Leaving out the question of whether it should be the dominant paradigm, I think it can be said that it is the dominant paradigm. Any attempt to refute it would have to be pretty epic in scale. This should answer the rest of your questions as well. My argument never went beyond one from authority, so I have no interest in debating the rightness or wrongness of Nietzsche's position.

    If it was total chaos, then it would not have these features at all, but rather would be incapable of having any features whatsoever, because having a feature is having a kind of organization and order, which is impossible.

    This is your personal interpretation of the subject. It has no bearing on the Dionysian-Apollonian binary that I've been arguing from. If you want to refute that binary and instate totally new understanding, then be my guest--but I have no interest in that debate.

    thus making it similar to differance

    Which is what I've been saying. Differance is a Dionysian principle. The khora is a Dionysian principle. Dionysus represents chaos. Therefore, etc.

    It rather rests beneath the two poles of order and chaos, as the non-origin origin of both, and thus is a surname of differance (Ibid., p. 126), because they both operate according to a similar “logic” that is related to apophatic and aporetic language.

    Which fits in perfectly with his claim in Writing and Difference that Dionysus and Apollo are in fact intervals of Dionysus: "If we must say, along with Schelling, that 'all is but Dionysus,' we must know--and this is to write--that, like pure force, Dionysus is worked by difference". Difference is the original rupture by which history itself appears (i.e. an "opening" or khora), and so it is an unrepresentable Dionysian principle that stands between Dionysus and Apollo. It's the non-origin of history in that it is uncapturable in representation, but it most definitely is a kind of primordial chaos that stands behind historical chaos.

    Perhaps if you could cite reputable classicists of ancient Greek culture saying that your sources represent the dominant paradigm of classical study?

    If you're going to reject my sources off-hand, the onus is on you to provide an alternative group of sources.

    You can’t just ignore the two postmodern thinkers who have written the most about khora as irrelevant to what postmodernists think about khora.

    I am perfectly aware that Derrida's contribution to the theory of khora is the one to be grappled with. For Derrida, the khora is (again) a Dionysian principle that stands between Dionysus and Apollo, and that reveals the difference between order and chaos to be the original chaos of difference. This is, certainly, a higher chaos that defies representation; but chaos it remains.

    I just did.

    No, you didn't. You didn't even read them.

    Lonergan and Dudley have infinitely more clout than you do on this topic, so I have no reason to listen to your claim over theirs. Lonergan's statement that Aristotle "considered this objective lack of intelligibility [within unusual accidents] to be absolute", or Dudley's argument in section XIII of the aforementioned book, still stand.

    ReplyDelete
  98. dguller,

    The point you're getting at now is not all obvious from what you had earlier said, and what I had had a question about.

    Nonetheless, the point does seem clear enough.

    I think.

    But even so... I don't see how the defensiveness you mention, or the default, knee-jerk tendency to hold on to one's worldview, in the face of claims the acceptance of which would precipitate a major upheaval in one's worldview, is not a something which is generic, but a something which is specific to, as you had earlier indicated, people who live a life of faith, or even more specific to, as you now indicate, a Christian, and thus not equally applicable to atheists, theists, Buddhists, pagans, scientologists, etc.

    It's almost as if someone were to say, "Males tend to eat when hungry". And someone else were to say, "Well, yes, that is true. But it's also true that human beings tend eat when hungry, so there is nothing unique or special about the fact that males tend to eat when hungry." And then the first person responds with, "But the point I'm getting at is that brown-eyed males tend to eat when hungry."

    Anyway, on the off-chance that you find yourself in that type of situation or on the cusp of it, or feel that you're being drawn towards something like it, let me add that I'm not attempting to hasten anything, or give you a hard about whatever you might be going through (if indeed you are going through something).

    I'm just pointing out that what you've cottoned on to is generic and indiscriminatory, and not at all specific or peculiar to a particular group (or to particular groups) of people as distinguished by their worldviews.

    ReplyDelete
  99. This comment has been removed by the author.

    ReplyDelete
  100. Rank:

    I think it can be said that it is the dominant paradigm.

    Any citations to support your claim that Nietzsche’s position on Greek tragedy is the dominant paradigm?

    This is your personal interpretation of the subject. It has no bearing on the Dionysian-Apollonian binary that I've been arguing from. If you want to refute that binary and instate totally new understanding, then be my guest--but I have no interest in that debate.

    You claimed that khora was identified with Dionysian chaos. My reply is that this is impossible, because khora, like differance, is the “origin” of all binary oppositions, including that between order and chaos, and thus cannot itself be identified with chaos.

    Which is what I've been saying. Differance is a Dionysian principle. The khora is a Dionysian principle. Dionysus represents chaos. Therefore, etc.

    Again, this is impossible. Differance precedes all binary oppositions, including that between order and chaos. Therefore, differance cannot be identified with chaos, or with Dionysius over Apollo. As Caputo writes: “For just as khora, by providing the space within which the sensible copy of the intelligible is inscribed, precedes and precontains the opposition between the two, so differance precedes and precontains all the oppositions that are inscribed within it, including those oppositional distinctions with which philosophy opened for business among the Greeks” (Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p. 99).

    Which fits in perfectly with his claim in Writing and Difference that Dionysus and Apollo are in fact intervals of Dionysus: "If we must say, along with Schelling, that 'all is but Dionysus,' we must know--and this is to write--that, like pure force, Dionysus is worked by difference". Difference is the original rupture by which history itself appears (i.e. an "opening" or khora), and so it is an unrepresentable Dionysian principle that stands between Dionysus and Apollo. It's the non-origin of history in that it is uncapturable in representation, but it most definitely is a kind of primordial chaos that stands behind historical chaos.

    He is not saying that Dionysius is difference, but rather that (even) “Dionysius is worked by difference” (Writing and Difference, p. 29), because difference precedes Dionysius, as well as Apollo. One reason for this is that Dionysius can only exist in opposition to Apollo, meaning that they exist in a dialectical opposition, each defined as the negation of the other, much like light and darkness. So, how can that which can only exist as part of an opposition, also exist before all oppositions? I don’t think it can, which is precisely why Derrida wrote that “khora (n: like differance) would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity in general, whether dialectical or not” (On the Name, p. 92).

    ReplyDelete
  101. If you're going to reject my sources off-hand, the onus is on you to provide an alternative group of sources.

    I really do not know much on this subject. If you say that Nietzsche and Hart, as well as the postmodernists, define the dominant paradigm of classical Greek studies, then so be it. It just surprises me, that’s all. For example, you say that the dominant paradigm for the study of Greek tragedy is that it involved the conflict between order and chaos, and yet the word “chaos” only occurs once in the Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy (p. 107), which just talks about how “chaos” reigned in Ithaca while Ulysses was absent. Also, in the Blackwell Companion to Greek Tragedy, the word “chaos” only occurs twice (pp. 361, 442), and more as an incidental matter than one of fundamental importance. So, I’m just confused as to why the core paradigm to understand the meaning and significance of Greek tragedy is barely mentioned in two reputable works in the field.

    I am perfectly aware that Derrida's contribution to the theory of khora is the one to be grappled with.

    I wrote earlier that postmodernists were interested in khora, because it was an example of a “necessary impossibility”, by which I meant that it is an example of something that is necessary for a system to function, and yet cannot be a part of the system. In other words, from the system’s standpoint, it is both impossible by virtue of its necessary absence from within the system, and yet necessary by virtue of its necessary presence, albeit outside the sightline of the system.

    As Richard Kearney writes: “What interests Derrida – and by extension Caputo – is not, however, how khora came to be said, albeit inexactly, within the language of the logocentric tradition of metaphysics and metaphorics. It is rather how khora manages to escape this tradition of language, appearing instead as an absolute stranger to it” (A Passion for the Impossible, p. 109).

    You replied that this interpretation is a “strange personal obsession” that is “shared by no postmodernist save perhaps Caputo”. I stated that this interpretation is actually endorsed by Derrida himself, and you agree that his “theory of khora is the one to be grappled with”, which means that it is not a “strange personal obsession” of mine, but rather the interpretation “to be grappled with”.

    For Derrida, the khora is (again) a Dionysian principle that stands between Dionysus and Apollo, and that reveals the difference between order and chaos to be the original chaos of difference. This is, certainly, a higher chaos that defies representation; but chaos it remains.

    Again, khora is neither Dionysian nor Apollan, because it is the space within which that very dichotomy is possible. Therefore, it cannot be identified with either of them. Once you try to pin it down with some definite meaning, such as stating that it stands as one pole of a dichotomy, then it immediately erases itself and slips away from your grasp, leaving nothing behind but a trace of itself, if it has a self at all. That is why it is related to negative and apophatic theology, i.e. it necessarily slips away from any attempt to control it by delimiting it within a definite meaning. You cannot call it “chaos”, because that delimits something that is beyond any such delimitation.

    ReplyDelete
  102. Lonergan and Dudley have infinitely more clout than you do on this topic, so I have no reason to listen to your claim over theirs. Lonergan's statement that Aristotle "considered this objective lack of intelligibility [within unusual accidents] to be absolute", or Dudley's argument in section XIII of the aforementioned book, still stand.

    Do they explain how you can know what something is, as well as what causes it, and yet it is totally unintelligible? I agree that unusual accidents cannot be part of a predictable science, mainly due to the infinite number of possible variables involved.

    Aristotle himself recognized this when he wrote that “he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, and different-to put it shortly from all things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes” (Metaphysics 6.2). In other words, because there are “innumerable” accidental features of anything that one plans to do, it is impossible to take them all into consideration, and thus predict them all in a scientific fashion.

    Aquinas also endorses this view regarding predictability being the hallmark of a science: “with regard to “what happens in the other cases,” i.e., in the case of things which are neither always nor for the most part, it cannot he said when they will occur, for example, at the time of the new moon” (In Meta 6.2.1190).

    It seems that there is a conflation of unpredictability with unintelligibility. I’m not too sure that I agree with that. One can certainly retroactively trace a series of causal sequences that led to a chance encounter, which would make the chance encounter intelligible, even if it wasn’t predictable prior to its occurrence.

    ReplyDelete
  103. Dr. Feser recommended books on Scholastic philosophy and theology in a four-part series of posts called the Scholastic's Bookshelf. dguller, I know you hate reading lists, but some of the books he recommends are excellent texts on what's called fundamental theology, which considers the rational foundations of Revelation . Here is a passage taken from Brunsmann's Fundamental Theology:

    Fundamental theology must demonstrate with scientific accuracy that the religion which is embodied in the Catholic Church is based on divine supernatural revelation and that, consequently, the belief which the Church demands in the revealed truths which she proposes, can be fully justified before the tribunal of reason.

    So there is a robust intellectual tradition treating of the very same questions you are posing, and I encourage you take a look at it... eventually!

    ReplyDelete
  104. Brian writes:

    "[S]ome of the books he recommends are excellent texts on what's called fundamental theology[.]"

    I'll second that. Ed remarked at the end of the third post in that series, "There, I've now given you that most wonderful of gifts – a new excuse to spend enormous gobs of money on books." That's exactly what I did, and I filled up a bookcase with those bad boys (most of which are available either used or as cheap reprints). There's a lot of good stuff in those recommendations.

    ReplyDelete
  105. Ugh, where can I find Existential Inertia and the Five Ways? I heard some people got it for free, and I'm wondering if I can read it to...?

    Any help please? The link Prof. Feser posted won't even work for me.

    ReplyDelete
  106. This comment has been removed by the author.

    ReplyDelete
  107. Is there anywhere I can get Existential Inertia and the Five Ways for free? I heard you could...?

    ReplyDelete
  108. There was a year-long period where I all I read was fundamental theology, so the conversation you are all having now is right up my alley. Recently, though, after some exchanges with the editors over at Called to Communion, I'm wondering if the particular tradition of fundamental theology that I have studied is too rationalist and not (truly) representative of Magisterial teaching. I do not think that it is (rationalist), but it is a thought that I am exploring.

    If you remember, Scott, we delved into this together when I had questions about the motives of credibility and the act of faith. The questions, kind of, persist. Hope we can continue the discussion some time - your thoughts were very helpful to me.

    ReplyDelete
  109. Lol, sorry that went through twice :P

    ReplyDelete
  110. @Brian:

    I do remember, and I'm glad my thoughts were helpful to you. The discussion was helpful to me as well.

    (Lots of discussions on this site are helpful. I sometimes don't know exactly what I think until I have to articulate it clearly to someone else or reply to a counterargument!)

    ReplyDelete
  111. @zmikecuber:

    I don't know of anywhere it's available for free, although Ed has occasionally offered to email it to this or that person.

    ReplyDelete
  112. David M,

    Your post seems to be cobbled together from strawmen.

    I said several times that we are creatures of our time and even the most ardent reactionaries would feel out of place in another time and place (and, of course, it technically doesn't necessarily matter to the truth of my argument, what my own conduct is).

    I did not suggest simply that technology was bad. I criticised a viewpoint that seemed to have wrong priorities about the relative importance of modern developments.

    Also, technology is not monolithic. There are different technology, different uses for them, and different paths of development for these differing technologies. Modern technological development has not often had the truly human and the spiritual in mind in its development. I've long been quite interested in the alternative technology movement associated with those like E.F Schumacher. This movement does not eshew modern technology. Rather it stresses the need to better adapt technology to the human scale and true human needs - and, yes, to have limits to the amount of our lives that are subject to advanced technology.

    I certainly don't support any Luddism - modern technology is here to stay, although there are always choices to make about its development and use. But I don't see the lack of modern technology in the past as having much to do with the relative worth of those societies.

    ReplyDelete
  113. Appropriate technology is often the term used for this alternative, human scale technology.

    ReplyDelete
  114. Jeremy,
    Even leaving aside decadence of the modern West compared to pre-modern civilisations (in the literal sense of loss of true ends - the spiritual), I think its much vaunted progress is highly equivocal in all areas except health and sanitation. That is, there are in almost all other areas significant downsides for all the benefits of supposed progress that threaten to at least equal the advantanges

    An irony of this discussion is that the romanticization of pre-modern life is itself an affectation of modern life; the pre-moderns themselves didn't think their life was so wonderful. It was Rousseau and the Romatics who followed him who put rose-colored glasses on pre-modern existence (from the safety of modern life).
    And I think you have got Plato entirely wrong. The evil nature of matter vs the nature of the Good Itself (entirely immaterial) is fundamental to his philosophy. The philosopher yearns for death as an escape from the evil nature of embodied existence; this is one reason Socrates was not afraid of death.

    And it's not just about health and sanitation. Pre-modern life wa largely one not just of pain and disease, but of unending drudgery and a struggle for survival. It's only the machinery of modern life that has given average people like you and me the leisure time to discuss philosophy and the relative merits of modern vs pre-modern life. That's another irony: This discussion is only possible in the modern world; in the ancient world, only a few of the cultural elite had the leisure time to engage in philosophy. You and I would be spending virtually all our waking hours working and hoping we had something to eat the next day.

    And the cultured elites had time for philosophy because they were at the top of a servile society. Slavery was taken for granted virtually everywhere in the pre-modern world, and it never occurred to anyone to question it. Aristotle and Plato never did. On that point alone I don't see how any could prefer pre-modern moral attitudes to modern.

    The thing is, an advantage for us in the modern world is that we have the option of returning to pre-modern existence should we choose. Some romantic types have tried this - Walden Pond, hippies communes etc. - but the efforts pretty much always fail because the overriding realities of pre-modern existence - disease and a daily struggle for existence - become their realities. Really, that's why the pre-modern world became the modern world: People actually living the pre-modern world decided it sucked and wanted something different.

    The most admirable efforts at actually living out pre-modern existence, in my opinion, are performed by folks like the Mennonites and the Amish. I greatly respect their refusal to buy into the degrading aspects of modern life - the consumerism, etc. But their type of life is only possible because it is cocooned within modern life. When they get really sick, they don't resort to herbs and leeaches, but go to modern hospitals. And they can foreswear any type of weaponry because they are safely surrounded by a modern society of law and order protected by a police force. They don't need to worry about being raided by Vikings or Mongols.

    ReplyDelete
  115. Glenn:

    But even so... I don't see how the defensiveness you mention, or the default, knee-jerk tendency to hold on to one's worldview, in the face of claims the acceptance of which would precipitate a major upheaval in one's worldview, is not a something which is generic, but a something which is specific to, as you had earlier indicated, people who live a life of faith, or even more specific to, as you now indicate, a Christian, and thus not equally applicable to atheists, theists, Buddhists, pagans, scientologists, etc.

    My point is that everyone is confronted by people making different claims, and some of those people claim to be witnesses to extraordinary events. One must have some kind of approach to such situations in order to be able to appraise the likelihood of the veracity of such claims, and an essential part of that approach would be factoring in the possibility that either you or the witness is being led astray by bias, cognitive distortions, perceptual distortions, and so on. This is a universal truth about appraisal of evidence involving witnesses and testimony, both in religious and non-religious contexts, such as in legal courts.

    My further point is that this approach should be consistently applied, by which I mean that it should not be set aside for claims that simply appeal to one’s previous views. For example, when a Christian hears that another Christian has performed a miracle that confirms the truth of Christianity, then they typically will not engage in a skeptical inquiry to determine whether the witness was mistaken about what they think they observed. However, when a Christian hears a Muslim claim that they witnessed a miracle that confirms Islam as the true religion, then they will likely be highly skeptical of such claims. The ideal solution would be to apply the same standards in both cases, and follow whatever the ultimate conclusion turns out to be.

    And note that this is not a license for global skepticism or solipsism, or anything like that. It is about the targeted application of skeptical tools of inquiry to a part of one’s worldview, and not the doubting of the entire worldview itself, which would be impossible, because the very meaning and significance of doubt itself is part of the worldview.

    ReplyDelete
  116. Rank:

    Just one more thing.

    You mentioned Dudley’s Aristotle’s Concept of Chance as source that justifies your position that unexpected accidents are “fundamentally unintelligible”.

    Dudley writes in footnote 139 on page 132:

    “HALPER, One and Many … 9-11 writes that accidents cannot be ‘known’ according to Aristotle. While Aristotle writes that there is no … (scientific knowledge) of [sc. Unusual] accidents, it is unthinkable that they cannot be known at all. As Harper writes (ibid. 10): ‘The very idea of a treatment of accidents that shows their unknowability seems contradictory’.”

    I may be wrong, but this seems to show that although unusual accidents are not scientifically knowable, because “all science is of the unchangeable or the usual” (Ibid., p. 132), it does not follow that they are fundamentally unknowable and unintelligible at all. In other words, scientific knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge and intelligibility, which is what I have been trying to argue.

    And with regards to the connection between intelligibility and predictability, he writes on page 315:

    “But, more significantly, an event could not be said to occur ‘by chance’ unless it were unexpected … Hence the unexpectedness is an irremovable objective fact, since one could not say that an event had occurred by chance, if it were not unexpected.

    “The determinist, as Aristotle pointed out, has to maintain that there is no such thing as chance, i.e. to reduce that which we call chance to necessity or the analysis of necessity knowable by science. But Aristotle maintains that chance, i.e. events which people attribute to chance, refers to events that cannot be reduced to necessity and thus are inaccessible to the analysis of necessity or the unusual which we call science. Aristotle points out that the number of accidents or relations of a substance is unlimited. Almost all of the accidents of a substance are unusual and hence cannot be part of scientific knowledge …”.

    Again, this seems pretty consistent with everything that I’ve been claiming, i.e. that unusual accidents, although not amenable to scientific knowledge, are still intelligible to some degree, and thus cannot be “fundamentally unintelligible” at all.

    ReplyDelete
  117. Brian:

    dguller, I know you hate reading lists, but some of the books he recommends are excellent texts on what's called fundamental theology, which considers the rational foundations of Revelation .

    Thanks for the recommendations. I’ll remember to add them to my wish list, but they, and many other books that are sitting accusingly on my bookshelf will have to wait as my wife will be delivering our fourth child tomorrow morning. The intellectual stimulation of metaphysical analysis will have to be set aside for a time for the thought-provoking tasks of changing dirty diapers in a state of insomnia.

    ReplyDelete
  118. @dguller:

    "[M]y wife will be delivering our fourth child tomorrow morning."

    Best wishes to both of them, and to the rest of the family—including, of course, you. ;-)

    ReplyDelete
  119. dguller,

    My point is that everyone is confronted by people making different claims,

    Okay.

    and some of those people claim to be witnesses to extraordinary events.

    Okay.

    One must have some kind of approach to such situations in order to be able to appraise the likelihood of the veracity of such claims,

    Okay.

    and an essential part of that approach would be factoring in the possibility that either you or the witness is being led astray by bias, cognitive distortions, perceptual distortions, and so on.

    Okay.

    This is a universal truth about appraisal of evidence involving witnesses and testimony, both in religious and non-religious contexts, such as in legal courts.

    Okay.

    My further point is that this approach should be consistently applied, by which I mean that it should not be set aside for claims that simply appeal to one’s previous views.

    Okay.

    For example, when a Christian hears that another Christian has performed a miracle that confirms the truth of Christianity, then they typically will not engage in a skeptical inquiry to determine whether the witness was mistaken about what they think they observed.

    Okay, in the abstract.

    But three things: a) while it is highly unlikely that you, or anyone else, will catch me doing that (and I've no reason to believe that I'm anywhere near close to being unique in this regard), I can imagine that this might be true in a general way; b) this illustrates an example of, as you mention above, a universal truth -- applicable regardless of the group involved; and, c) there isn't anything peculiar or specific to or about Christians that makes that type of occurrence more likely to be found amongst Christians.

    (And a fourth thing: when, say, a baseball fan hears that his team lost each of the first three games of a four-game series by one run, and soundly clobbered the other team in the fourth game, he may not be unlikely to see the three loses as having been due to bad luck or bad breaks, and the one win as the truth finally shining through, i.e., as unimpeachable evidence that his team really is better.)

    However, when a Christian hears a Muslim claim that they witnessed a miracle that confirms Islam as the true religion, then they will likely be highly skeptical of such claims. The ideal solution would be to apply the same standards in both cases, and follow whatever the ultimate conclusion turns out to be.

    Okay.

    Although I notice you didn't say, "When a Muslim hears a Christian claim that they witnessed a miracle that confirms Christianity as the true religion, then they will likely be highly skeptical of such claims." And so I wonder, was the actual phrasing as it was because: a) you're an ex-Muslim (or so I've read here, without also having read a correction from you); b) out of recognition that there seems to be more Christian contributors here than Muslim contributors; c) you mentally tossed a coin; or, d) well, that's just the way it came out, and there really isn't any necessarily compelling reason or need to delve into the 'why' of it.

    (And note that part of what contributes to what you're getting at is that the claim usually is not "my religion is a true religion", but "my religion is the one true religion". If there is only one true religion, then, ipso facto, only one religion can be that true religion, and the ping-ponging of claim and counter-claim by fallible humans is unavoidable.)

    cont...

    ReplyDelete
  120. ...cont

    And note that this is not a license for global skepticism or solipsism, or anything like that.

    Okay.

    It is about the targeted application of skeptical tools of inquiry to a part of one’s worldview, and not the doubting of the entire worldview itself, which would be impossible, because the very meaning and significance of doubt itself is part of the worldview.

    Okay.

    And I would guess that this might have something to do with why, when a claim is submitted to the Church for official recognition of an event or occurrence as a miracle, and that claim is one of the percentage few which passes initial muster, a vigorous investigation is commenced -- an investigation which may take years to complete, and one whose outcome is by no (human) means guaranteed beforehand.

    - - - - -

    To the recommendations of others already made -- and for some variety for one who has shown an affinity for Xs and Ys -- I would add Polya's (Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume 2: Patterns of Plausible Inference.

    As for you're fourth child, you should have it all down to an exact science by now. Right? ;) "Best wishes" is already taken, so I'll say, "Good luck" (knowing full well that more than that is needed).

    ReplyDelete
  121. Jeremy wrote: "Your post seems to be cobbled together from strawmen."

    Really? I think not, but go ahead and identify these men of straw (from my post, I mean) if you are able.

    ReplyDelete
  122. dguller,

    Any citations to support your claim that Nietzsche’s position on Greek tragedy is the dominant paradigm?

    No. From my reading, his understanding is so taken for granted that it isn't even discussed as one option among many.

    Therefore, differance cannot be identified with chaos, or with Dionysius over Apollo.

    Differance is indefinite, violent and sublime. It's, again, an original, chaotic sundering that creates history. Perhaps my greater familiarity with Deleuze is what makes it obvious to me that Derrida is appealing to chaos here.

    I don’t think it can, which is precisely why Derrida wrote that “khora (n: like differance) would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity in general, whether dialectical or not” (On the Name, p. 92).

    I actually don't remember how we got from the Greek conception of chaos and order to the postmodern one, but I guess I'll just go with it. What you seem to be forgetting in all of this is that the postmodernists reject the idea that all is reducible to the binary of chaos and order. They invariably seek some sublime principle beyond the binary and beyond language. The vast majority of them conclude that this principle is chaotic in nature--i.e. a rupture, a sundering, a pure force. This is because they see difference as being prior to oneness. This is why the khora destroys even the "order" (notice his word choice) of polarity. Even the order provided by the order/chaos polarity is undermined by the chaotic rupture of the khora, which reveals polarity not to be an expression of original order, but of original chaos.

    The khora is not chaos in the sense of a chaos/order binary. It stands behind it as the principle of that binary's existence. But it's still chaotic and Dionysian, simply at a higher plane beyond criticism.

    So, I’m just confused as to why the core paradigm to understand the meaning and significance of Greek tragedy is barely mentioned in two reputable works in the field.

    The academic terms are Apollonian and Dionysian, or Heraclitean and Parmenidean. Order and chaos are more pedestrian renderings.

    ReplyDelete
  123. You replied that this interpretation is a “strange personal obsession” that is “shared by no postmodernist save perhaps Caputo”. I stated that this interpretation is actually endorsed by Derrida himself, and you agree that his “theory of khora is the one to be grappled with”, which means that it is not a “strange personal obsession” of mine, but rather the interpretation “to be grappled with”.

    Kearney's quote has absolutely nothing to do with "necessary impossibility". It has to do with the trace. The khora's appearance in language, despite its being an uncapturable sublimity, is an example of the trace. We've discussed the trace before, so I don't think I need to get too far into detail. Suffice it to say that the khora as a concept is a hole or absence that stands between the principles that create meaning, and this hole is a trace of differance's presence/absence in history. That is why Derrida is so obsessed with it.

    Once you try to pin it down with some definite meaning, such as stating that it stands as one pole of a dichotomy, then it immediately erases itself and slips away from your grasp, leaving nothing behind but a trace of itself, if it has a self at all. That is why it is related to negative and apophatic theology, i.e. it necessarily slips away from any attempt to control it by delimiting it within a definite meaning. You cannot call it “chaos”, because that delimits something that is beyond any such delimitation.

    Obviously. But apophatic denomination always suggests the character of that to which it refers, even if it doesn't capture it. Hence God is found apophatically in the most good, the most beautiful and so on. Where is differance found? In the hole, the rupture, the sublime, the gap--in anything that defies order. Hence it is a Dionysian principle, which Dionysus himself presupposes. This is why Derrida says that Dionysus is "worked by difference": he takes difference, with Deleuze, to be prior to oneness, which means that Dionysus is brought into being by an original difference (an original lack of oneness, which is identified with order).

    It seems that there is a conflation of unpredictability with unintelligibility.

    So explain Lonergan's statement. If you say he's simply wrong, I'll laugh.

    Again, this seems pretty consistent with everything that I’ve been claiming, i.e. that unusual accidents, although not amenable to scientific knowledge, are still intelligible to some degree, and thus cannot be “fundamentally unintelligible” at all.

    Unusual accidents are caused by the deficiency of matter. Rather than coming about from the efficient action of a transmitted form, they are unpredictable failures. They are not caused by the interruption of one efficient force by another: they are fluctuations, inherently random. They cannot be traced to any cause, because their cause is matter in itself, and matter in itself is unknowable. Aquinas, to my knowledge, rejects this account because it undermines God's providence. It's just an example of Aristotle's pagan belief in chaos.

    I’ll remember to add them to my wish list, but they, and many other books that are sitting accusingly on my bookshelf will have to wait as my wife will be delivering our fourth child tomorrow morning.

    Good luck with that. I hope it goes off without a hitch.

    ReplyDelete
  124. dguller,

    Congratulations on the impending addition to your family... I had three so you've bested me by one (so far!)

    Good luck and I will pray for a safe delivery.

    ReplyDelete
  125. @guller: My critique of the OTF (for the inspiration of which you are owed the full credit):

    http://davidmcpike.blogspot.ca/2013/07/john-loftus-outsider-test-for-faith.html

    http://davidmcpike.blogspot.ca/2013/07/six-objections-to-outsider-test-for.html


    guller wrote: "...And if there was an attempt at historical accuracy, then why not take some serious steps to preserve historical truth, much as the early Muslims did?"

    But I already explained this extremely important difference in attitude: Jesus himself was the revelation. The "serious steps" taken by the Muslims make sense in light of the fact that their revelation was a (purportedly) perfect Book - so it was the Book itself that they felt the need to meticulously preserve. But Jesus (reportedly) said:

    "the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send on my account, will in his turn make everything plain, and recall to your minds everything I have said to you." (John 14)

    And: "I have much to say to you, but you are not able to grasp it now. It will be for him, the truth-giving Spirit, when he comes, to guide you into all truth." (John 16) (N.B.: Jesus does not add: "and be sure to memorize what I just said and write it down so that you have an historically accurate text to hand on - you know, just in case the Spirit I just promised you turns out to be a no-show.)

    And this: "All authority in heaven and on earth, he said, has been given to me; you, therefore, must go out, making disciples of all nations, and baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all the commandments which I have given you. And behold I am with you all through the days that are coming, until the consummation of the world." (Matthew 28)

    Etc.

    You seem to be completely ignoring this. The certainty of faith (as understood by Christians) is a gift of grace given through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. As such, by its very nature it cannot be proven in virtue of merely natural human reasoning, including any such reasoning which makes reference to an 'historical' text, regardless of how 'historically accurate' that text may or may not happen to be; and so the degree to which any fundamental religious text has or has not been the object of careful scribal transmission is therefore entirely irrelevant to establishing the grounds for certain faith in the theological propositions connected to those texts.

    And of course the functioning of the Holy Spirit is not merely some haphazard affair, so there is much more to say; but again, it is crucial for you to be aware of and to keep in view the most basic theological data when discussing this stuff.

    ReplyDelete
  126. FYI, Parsons has his first response to Feser up. He even names me as an instigator!

    It's pretty civil, but there's not much there besides a pretty decent reading list of books Parson says contain strong atheist arguments.

    ReplyDelete
  127. Rank:

    No. From my reading, his understanding is so taken for granted that it isn't even discussed as one option among many.

    That’s certainly one explanation for why any supporting documentation is so difficult to find.

    Differance is indefinite, violent and sublime. It's, again, an original, chaotic sundering that creates history.

    I’m not too sure that is how Derrida would describe differance. Let’s just focus upon its violent aspect for now. Violence implies a delimitation and restriction preventing the free-flow of something and confining it without a boundary of some kind.

    In one sense, differance is violent, because it restricts the play of signification by keeping it within certain boundaries. That is why Derrida states that a close and patient reading of texts in conjunction with the best scholarly apparatus to clarify meaning is essential to perform a deconstructive reading of the text. He resolutely denies an attitude of “anything goes” and interpretation without any limits, and that is partly because differance itself is delimiting in a sense. After all, even to play requires rules of some kind, and any rule will be a boundary that restricts, and thus is violent.

    However, in another sense, differance is non-violent, because it inherently and constantly opens a space between a present signification and a future meaning to come that is beyond the present horizon, because it is always possible to repeat differently. This loosens and dislodges meaning and signification by preventing its self-enclosure in a full and complete presence, and leaving a residual trace that is open to the Other to come. As such, it resists, to an extent, violent enclosure, and thus is non-violent in a sense.

    So, again, I don’t think that you can pin differance to a single pole of a pair of opposites, whether order and chaos, presence and absence, and so on, because it operates between and within the differential space between any pair of oppositions. In fact, is (is) the spacing between the two (itself). It is the opening that provides both the space for a bounded signification and the space for alternative and different bounded significations. That is also why it is related to khora, as the original spatial receptacle of Western philosophy.

    Perhaps my greater familiarity with Deleuze is what makes it obvious to me that Derrida is appealing to chaos here.

    I have never read Deleuze, and so you may be right here.

    ReplyDelete
  128. The khora is not chaos in the sense of a chaos/order binary. It stands behind it as the principle of that binary's existence. But it's still chaotic and Dionysian, simply at a higher plane beyond criticism.

    Your position is that there are two kinds of chaos. One kind of chaos, which we can call chaos1, exists in a binary relationship with order, and another kind of chaos, which we can call chaos2, does not exist in a binary relationship with order. In fact, chaos2 exists outside all binary relationships, and stands as the originary “principle” of all binary relationships. The problem is that both chaos1 and chaos2 are defined by the absence of order of some kind. Maybe you want to say that chaos1 is defined by the absence of order1 and chaos2 is defined by the absence of order2. And that means that both chaos1 and chaos2 exist in a binary relationship with order1 and order2, respectively. And that means that chaos2 cannot exist outside all binary relationships, but rather is firmly entrenched within a binary relationship with order2.

    So, the price of identifying khora with chaos is necessarily placing it within a binary opposition of some kind, and thus eliminating its claim to be beyond all binary oppositions by virtue of being the originary source of all binary oppositions. To me, it is preferable to say that khora is neither order nor chaos, because it precedes and originates all binary oppositions as the opening or space within which all binary oppositions occur.

    The academic terms are Apollonian and Dionysian, or Heraclitean and Parmenidean. Order and chaos are more pedestrian renderings.

    None of those terms are prominent in the books that I mentioned, at least insofar as I can tell. That may be evidence of the fact that they are so taken for granted that they don’t even have to be mentioned at all, or that may be evidence of the fact that such an interpretation is not, in fact, the dominant one. I’m willing to leave the matter there, because I really don’t know.

    Kearney's quote has absolutely nothing to do with "necessary impossibility". It has to do with the trace. The khora's appearance in language, despite its being an uncapturable sublimity, is an example of the trace. We've discussed the trace before, so I don't think I need to get too far into detail. Suffice it to say that the khora as a concept is a hole or absence that stands between the principles that create meaning, and this hole is a trace of differance's presence/absence in history. That is why Derrida is so obsessed with it.

    The trace is necessary in order for there to be meaning at all. That is why differance, trace, supplement, and so on, are all called quasi-transcendental conditions for meaning. Without them, meaning becomes impossible, because iteration and repeatability become impossible, and thus they are all necessary. The trace, and the other associated terms, are also impossible, because they are “uncapturable”, as you put it, by any system of meaning or conceptualization. When you put the two together, you have something that is a necessary impossibility. You have something whose very possibility is its impossibility.

    But apophatic denomination always suggests the character of that to which it refers, even if it doesn't capture it. Hence God is found apophatically in the most good, the most beautiful and so on. Where is differance found? In the hole, the rupture, the sublime, the gap--in anything that defies order.

    And yet “the hole, the rupture, the sublime, the gap” are not the absence of any order, but only of the totalizing order that eliminates the possibility of anything Other.

    ReplyDelete
  129. So explain Lonergan's statement. If you say he's simply wrong, I'll laugh.

    He writes that Aristotle “considered this objective lack of intelligibility to be absolute; the per accidens arose simply from the multi-potentiality of prime matters”. I’ve already explained why I think that it is wrong to say that matter is absolutely unintelligible. We know a number of things about matter, such as that it is the passive recipient of forms, that it is a principle of potentiality, and the principle of individuation of material entities. All of these claims are intelligible. When we read them, our mind does not suddenly go blank, or grind to a halt, as it would to the claim that zork nord glip.

    So, the real issue is what precisely is meant by “unintelligible”. If intelligibility is exclusively limited to the reception of intelligible species by the intellect, then yes, matter is unintelligible, because matter is really distinct from form. However, one then has to account for the fact that we can know truths about matter, some of which I mentioned above. And how can we know something about that which is absolutely and fundamentally unintelligible?

    ReplyDelete
  130. Glenn:

    Although I notice you didn't say, "When a Muslim hears a Christian claim that they witnessed a miracle that confirms Christianity as the true religion, then they will likely be highly skeptical of such claims." And so I wonder, was the actual phrasing as it was because: a) you're an ex-Muslim (or so I've read here, without also having read a correction from you); b) out of recognition that there seems to be more Christian contributors here than Muslim contributors; c) you mentally tossed a coin; or, d) well, that's just the way it came out, and there really isn't any necessarily compelling reason or need to delve into the 'why' of it.

    You can just generalize my comments to person A from group X hears person B from group Y provide testimony about events that (a) someone in group X would find extraordinary and hard to believe, and (b) justifies group Y over group X.

    And I would guess that this might have something to do with why, when a claim is submitted to the Church for official recognition of an event or occurrence as a miracle, and that claim is one of the percentage few which passes initial muster, a vigorous investigation is commenced -- an investigation which may take years to complete, and one whose outcome is by no (human) means guaranteed beforehand.

    99.9% of the purported miracles are medical in nature, and involve a spontaneous cure of an allegedly incurable condition, which they associate with the sick person making a prayer to God or a Church figure. With medical issues, there is always the possibility of error: in diagnosis, in laboratory tests, in imaging interpretations, in pathological specimen examination, in medication composition, and so on. So, if someone was diagnosed with an incurable medical condition that spontaneously healed, then I would be much more likely to believe that they were misdiagnosed with a condition that they thought was incurable, but which actually had a tendency to spontaneously remit, and that the misdiagnosis was due to faulty tests or interpretation of those tests. But that’s an unfairly general statement that could be revised when examining a particular claim. It’d still be more comfortable with saying that I simply do not know what happened than God intervened, and for the same reason that I would be more comfortable saying that quantum events have unknown causes than saying that they are uncaused.

    ReplyDelete
  131. DavidM:

    My critique of the OTF (for the inspiration of which you are owed the full credit):

    http://davidmcpike.blogspot.ca/2013/07/john-loftus-outsider-test-for-faith.html

    http://davidmcpike.blogspot.ca/2013/07/six-objections-to-outsider-test-for.html


    I’ll read your critiques after I’ve read Loftus’ book on the subject. I’d like to read his best defense of his position before reading your refutation. Want to be charitable, and all. But I appreciate all the work that you put into your critiques, and I have bookmarked them for the future.

    But I already explained this extremely important difference in attitude: Jesus himself was the revelation. The "serious steps" taken by the Muslims make sense in light of the fact that their revelation was a (purportedly) perfect Book - so it was the Book itself that they felt the need to meticulously preserve.

    First, you’re half right. The Qur’an is part of the revelation that Allah sent to mankind. It is incomplete without the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad (i.e. the hadith) to serve as the commentary on the Qur’an. Thus, preservation of the Qur’an and the hadith was imperative to the early Muslims to preserve the divine message itself. Hence, the great lengths that they went through, right from the start, to preserve every aspect of the message.

    Second, you seem to be ignoring the fact that early Christians communicated both orally and in written form in a variety of ways to preserve the message of Christ. The New Testament is not just two lines that say, “God became man, Jesus Christ, who died on the cross and rose from the dead. That is all.” Rather, there are a number of details about Christ’s sayings and doings that seem to have been deemed important enough to put into writing and communicate with others. That means that the early Christian situation was similar to the early Muslim situation.

    You seem to be completely ignoring this. The certainty of faith (as understood by Christians) is a gift of grace given through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. As such, by its very nature it cannot be proven in virtue of merely natural human reasoning, including any such reasoning which makes reference to an 'historical' text, regardless of how 'historically accurate' that text may or may not happen to be; and so the degree to which any fundamental religious text has or has not been the object of careful scribal transmission is therefore entirely irrelevant to establishing the grounds for certain faith in the theological propositions connected to those texts.

    But the claim that “the certainty of faith … is a gift of grace given through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit” is itself a claim that was once made in history by a specific individual. Having some sense that this claim has been accurately preserved is important to know if the content is a truthful communication of the original claim. If not, then you have lost some justification. Also, if its truth is guaranteed only by itself, then you have a case of circular reasoning. If you accept circular reasoning as valid, then if anyone made a religious claim that was self-authenticating, then you have no basis to reject their claim, because your own position is based upon the same line of reasoning.

    ReplyDelete
  132. To all:

    Thanks for the kind words about the big day tomorrow. Oddly enough, prayers would be welcome. :)

    ReplyDelete
  133. Daivd M,

    I did identify the strawmen in my response: that I wish to get rid of all technology and so forth.

    David Ty,

    Where did I say pre-modern society was wonderful? What I said was that pre-modern society focused on the spiritual, which is the most important thing in life. So the alleged benefits of modernity you mention do not make up for this loss of spirituality. Even the most downtrodden members of many pre-modern societies lived lives suffused with spiritual values and ends. This is not true of modern society. You do not answer this part of my argument and it is the fundamental part. Your argument is basically worldly. You focus on the alleged advantages of modern life but you ignore the fact that, even if your decidedly one-sided and unexamined notions about the superiority of modern life were true, it doesn't matter in terms of what truly matters in life.

    It is not that I think we need focus completely on the spiritual and cannot try and improve things in this life. I simply object to the overwhelming focus on alleged material and social improvements.

    There is no difference in your views on pre-modern societies from the most diehard progressive or modernist. Indeed, you often seem to have got your descriptions of pre-modern life from a Monty Python film. Yes, life was often hard, but it was not an unmitigated hell. You talk, for example, of drudgery. There was a lot of drudgery, certainly, and there still is. But there was also a lot crafts and also agricultural work that - despite often being hard work - had more dignity and avenues for uplifting, even spiritual insights than almost all modern work.

    Slavery is a complex question. I think slavery is better off not existing, but I do not necessarily think indentured labour a massive evil in itself. This is especially true if we remember that in the end it is the spiritual that truly matters.

    No, you have Platonism incorrect. Socrates is expressing a viewpoint akin to all those of a genuinely spiritual bent. He is expressing the fact that there is a transcendent realm beyond our corporeal world that is the culmination of that world - against which the world utlimately pales. Even those who most stress the spiritual depths of nature and creation view it somewhat ambiguously: it is a route to God but in itself it is not God. Innumerable Christian Saints, sages, and mystics have talked of creation, of life, as Socrates does.

    Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it. Luke 17:33

    I think this passage speaks to your whole approach to modernity.

    ReplyDelete
  134. For those of you who do not know where to look, you'll find Parsons' reply in Answer Prof. Feser.

    His reply is pretty weak but admirable in that he apologized.

    ReplyDelete
  135. That is, Answering Prof. Fesser.

    ReplyDelete
  136. @dguller:

    --I apologize if this repeats a question from upthread (I think I read the whole thread before posting, but it is long)--

    As a "mere theist," are you persuaded or not by the classical theist argument Prof. Feser presents in the post "Law’s 'evil-god challenge'" that, since evil is a privation of good, and God is Pure Actuality, God must necessarily be all-good?

    If you are persuaded, does that raise the Problem of Evil for you, given the suffering in the world?

    If it does raise the PoE, is your solution broadly "Spinozist" somehow, or how do you manage it?

    Here's why I ask: The inquiry into the validity of claimed revelations seems to me to be a rather backwards way to approach Christianity for a mere theist.

    To me, the reason that my theism makes me a Christian is that my theism (with an all-good God) raises the PoE, and the Gospel proclamation (God Incarnate, God suffering in solidarity with our suffering, God redeeming the world) solves that otherwise insoluble aporia, rendering my worldview logically coherent. Of the other theisms on offer, none seems to me to offer a compelling solution to the PoE.

    (Sorry to but in on a discussion amongst my far more erudite betters. I usually just lurk on these threads, but I'm very curious what your answer is to my queries.)

    ReplyDelete
  137. @Bill:

    "[Parsons's] reply is pretty weak but admirable in that he apologized."

    I agree that the apology is admirable as far as it goes, but the response is more than weak; it seems to be at least a bit disingenuous. And the reason for that also means he doesn't get full points for the apology either.

    Parsons says: I admit that when I first saw your first question, my initial reaction was “What the BLEEP?” Since had never written anything in response to you, I did not know what exactly you were referring to. Then I recalled a conversation the previous day with Mr. Chad Handley in which I said the following:

    “Unlike Prof. Feser, I would like to address the strongest claims of my opponents, and not those that seem weakest to me.”

    This is the passage that prompted your first question, isn’t it?


    But Ed specifically explains this in his OP: Prof. Parsons, in your response to a reader’s comment, you say:.

    So did Parsons just see red and fly off the handle without bothering to read what Ed had actually written (and linked to)? It's a little (and more than a little) hard to believe that Parsons read Ed's question and didn't understand what it was based on.

    ReplyDelete
  138. @Irenist:

    "Sorry to but in on a discussion amongst my far more erudite betters."

    I'm pretty sure no one here would want you to feel that way. This site is overflowing with my far more erudite betters, and I can tell you from my own experience that (with very rare exceptions) you'll be welcomed, and treated, as an equal.

    ReplyDelete
  139. Irenist:

    I actually think that the classical theist position resolves the problem of evil without the need to appeal to Christian theology. If goodness is coextensive with being, then only Pure Act is goodness itself, which means that any being that is not Pure Act is an admixture of act and potency, and that means that any being that is not Pure Act is an admixture of good and evil. That is because, as you mentioned, evil is the privation of good, which is just another way of saying that evil is the privation of being. And that means that any being that is not Pure Act is evil insofar as it has unactualized potentiality.

    ReplyDelete
  140. @dguller:

    "I actually think that the classical theist position resolves the problem of evil without the need to appeal to Christian theology."

    So do I. But you'd better get ready for bed; you have a big day tomorrow and some sleepless nights after that. ;-)

    ReplyDelete
  141. ...any being that is not Pure Act is evil insofar as it has unactualized potentiality.

    Since any being which is not Pure Act has unactualized potentiality, and no being with unactualized potentiality is Pure Act, to say that "any being that is not Pure Act is evil insofar as it has unactualized potentiality" is to say "any being is evil insofar as it has unactualized potentiality". But any being which is evil is not evil by virtue of having unactualized potentiality, for unactualized potentiality as such is not evil:

    Is there Evil in Good?

    It seems that evil is not, for the following reasons:... 8. As good concerns actuality, so evil contrarily concerns potentiality. And so there is no evil except in things that have potentiality, as the Metaphysics says. But evil has potentiality, just as any privation does. Therefore, evil is in evil, not in good.

    Answer: ...[W]hatever has potentiality, from the very fact that it does, evidently has the nature of good...

    Replies to the Objections: 8. Although actuality as such is good, it does not follow that potentiality as such is evil; rather, the privation contrary to actuality is. And potentiality, by the very fact that it has an ordination to actuality, has the nature of good[.]
    -- De Malo

    ReplyDelete
  142. Correction:

    "Since any being which is not Pure Act has unactualized potentiality, and no being with unactualized potentiality..."

    ...s/b...

    "Since no being with unactualized potentiality..."

    ReplyDelete
  143. @guller:

    "First, you’re half right. The Qur’an is part of the revelation that Allah sent to mankind. It is incomplete without the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad (i.e. the hadith) to serve as the commentary on the Qur’an. Thus, preservation of the Qur’an and the hadith was imperative to the early Muslims to preserve the divine message itself. Hence, the great lengths that they went through, right from the start, to preserve every aspect of the message."

    Hmmm.... so then I'm fully right, am I not? If the only purpose of the hadith is to illuminate the Book, then as I said, the importance of the hadith again serves to illustrate the contrast with Christianity.

    "Second, you seem to be ignoring the fact that early Christians communicated both orally and in written form in a variety of ways to preserve the message of Christ."

    Ignoring? Certainly not.

    "The New Testament is not just two lines that say, “God became man, Jesus Christ, who died on the cross and rose from the dead. That is all.”"

    I did not not know that. But thanks.

    "Rather, there are a number of details about Christ’s sayings and doings that seem to have been deemed important enough to put into writing and communicate with others. That means that the early Christian situation was similar to the early Muslim situation."

    But you're just ignoring what I just explained to you with reference to the Holy Spirit and what Jesus himself said about this and (of course) how the early Christians themselves understood it. Of course the scriptures are vitally important, but because they lead to a personal relationship with Christ, not because they could ever possibly constitute a perfect revelation in themselves, regardless of how much perfectly accurate commentary one had on the sayings and doings of their authors (and consider: it is they, not Jesus, who would seem to be most analogous to Mohammad - Mohammad is just a prophet (pbuh, of course), but Jesus is the one we worship).

    ReplyDelete
  144. "But the claim that “the certainty of faith … is a gift of grace given through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit” is itself a claim that was once made in history by a specific individual."

    Well not just once, by one individual, but anyway...

    "Having some sense that this claim has been accurately preserved is important to know if the content is a truthful communication of the original claim. If not, then you have lost some justification."

    You're apparently completely misunderstanding what it means to at least start with an awareness of the theological data. You are simply ignoring what I said, and assuming your own foreign criterion here: that theological claims must be justified by appealing to some original 'communication,' and this original 'communication' must be justified in virtue of evidence of its having been accurately preserved - which is pretty silly if you think about it. Perhaps you think you can justify this criterion, but in fact I'm pretty sure you cannot. (But by all means, please try.) So in fact you are just begging the question.

    "Also, if its truth is guaranteed only by itself, then you have a case of circular reasoning. If you accept circular reasoning as valid, then if anyone made a religious claim that was self-authenticating, then you have no basis to reject their claim, because your own position is based upon the same line of reasoning."

    There is no reasoning without principles or premises. All reasoning must start with first principles that are self-evident (or proven by previous reasoning). All reasoning, then, begins with illumination or insight into first principles. There is nothing 'circular' about that, so I'm not sure what you're talking about here.

    Anyway, I have been praying today for God's blessing on you and your family at this special time and will continue. I'm sure I speak for many here in saying that we are excited to hear news of your little one's safe, insha'allah, arrival into the world.

    ReplyDelete
  145. @David M:

    "I'm sure I speak for many here in saying that we are excited to hear news of your little one's safe, insha'allah, arrival into the world."

    You speak for me. I'm sure you speak for many others as well. May God bless the child.

    ReplyDelete
  146. @Jeremy:
    "I did identify the strawmen in my response: that I wish to get rid of all technology and so forth."

    I suspected as much: the trusty old straw-man straw-man. (That's where you misrepresent what someone says so that you can accuse him of committing the fallacy of misrepresenting what you said.)

    ReplyDelete
  147. @David M and Jeremy Taylor:

    Now, now, fellas. I don't think David M's post was cobbled together from straw men (though I understand why Jeremy Taylor thinks it was), but I also don't think Jeremy Taylor was employing a straw-man straw-man (though I understand why David M thinks he was). How about we buy each other a couple of beers and carry on in a more convivial spirit?

    ReplyDelete
  148. Scott has the best idea, I think.

    ReplyDelete
  149. dguller,

    Surely, from a Classical Theist perspective, the problem of evil just makes no sense.

    The sceptic is implicitly appealing to the good in his attempts to criticise creation as not being good enough for an all-good, all-powerful God; but if God is the supreme good then he is appealing to the supreme good to be better!

    ReplyDelete
  150. Where did I say pre-modern society was wonderful? What I said was that pre-modern society focused on the spiritual, which is the most important thing in life.

    This will be my last entry on this thread, so you can have the last word if you want it. You state the above like it is self-evident, but I don't see that it is. Far from it. The ancient authors (Cicero, for example), are full of denunciations of the worldliness of their times. And I don't see anything especially "spirtual" about a population that spends its free time watching men kill each other or get torn apart by wild animals in the Colesseum. If everybody was already spiritual, why did Christ find it necessary to challenge people that you can't serve both God and money? Worldliness is a constant temptation of the human condition whatever your era. It's not peculiar to modern life.

    I'll concede one thing, however. The medicines, machines and conveniences of modern life make it easier for us to ignore bedrock realities - like death - than used to be the case. How many of us have seen a dead body? Monty Python didn't invent the fact that pre-modern life was subject to plagues and famines that would regularly wipe out large portions of the population, like the Black Death that killed half the population of Europe in the 1300's. Even in normal times, you could expect half your children to not make it to their fifth birthdays. When death is your constant companion, it does tend to focus the mind. In that sense, prior times were more "spirtual."

    But would I want to live in a time where one or two of my three children would succumb to measles or strep for the sake of "spirtuality?" No thanks. My mother, after seeing her own sister die of an ear infection in the 1930's at the age of 10, used to thank God that her own children were born in an age of antibiotics everytime I got strep throat. Christ Himself walked the Earth healing the lame and sick, and making the blind see. Doing everything in our power to follow His example and amelerioate the human condition is doing God's work, it's not same false "worldliness."

    The answer to the consumerism and materialism of contemporary life is not to yearn for an earlier time of an alleged superior spirituality - a romantic myth, in my opinion. Yes, mumps and the Black Death might make people think about God again. There are better ways to do it.

    ReplyDelete
  151. @ Scott

    I agree. Feser can have a field day with Parsons' reply, and I also think that Parsons' apology may have been forced. Still, he issued it--which helps to keep the dialog respectful.

    ReplyDelete
  152. @Scott and Jeremy: Fine idea. Thanks, Scott.

    @guller:

    We await your news, but in the meantime I had a thought which I thought might be worth your while to reflect upon:

    You can't reduce all metaphysical analysis to mechanical analysis. (I think we agree on this and understand it quite well.)

    I'm pretty sure that for analogous reasons, you can't reduce all spiritual/theological analysis to psychological analysis. (You may or may not understand this point in the abstract, but in practise I think you have a tendency to ignore it, as when you introduce psychological (pseudo-)'probabilities' as a deciding factor/sufficient criterion in evaluating claims regarding matters of faith.)

    ReplyDelete
  153. 1. David T wrote, God himself did manual labor and embraced and healed the sick. The was a revolution in spirituality. Instead of escaping from the world in mysticism or stoic withdrawal, the Christian transforms ordinary life in the service of Christ... and in doing so transforms the world. That's the right kind of worldliness, not the wrong kind.

    I'm not so sure Plato would entirely disagree with the general notion therein of something higher descending to something lower in order to be of service.

    2. It is true that, upon having related the allegory of the cave to Glaucon (in The Republic):

    Socrates then says, "This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed."

    And Glaucon agrees: "I agree...as far as I am able to understand you."

    And Socrates then says, "Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted."

    And then Glaucon again agrees: "Yes, very natural."

    3. But it also true that, a bit further along, Socrates engages in a bit of table-turning:

    "[T]he business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now."

    Glaucon seems puzzled: "What do you mean?"

    Socrates does not justify his meaning, but simply clarifies it: "I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not."

    Now Glaucon seems perplexed: "But is not this unjust...[O]ught we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?"

    And now Socrates justifies his meaning: "You have again forgotten, my friend, ...the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State."

    - - - - -

    Cheers

    ReplyDelete
  154. @David M:

    "@Scott and Jeremy: Fine idea."

    Great—then we can also toast Mr. and Mrs. dguller's new baby. [clinks of glasses and cries of "Hear, hear!"]

    I'm sure dguller will be busy[!] for the next few days or more, but I hope he'll have time to drop in briefly and let us know everything went well with dgullerette number four.

    ReplyDelete
  155. (Btw, in no way was that meant to be any sort of -- gads -- political statement on my part. I don't do politics. No way, no how.

    I was simply reiterating in a general way, and via Plato, what David T had written.)

    ReplyDelete
  156. dguller has not been my favorite person for reasons which I entirely blame him for ;-). :D


    ....but in spite of that I wish to wish him well on the new arrival and keep child and parents both in my prayers.

    Cheers.

    ReplyDelete
  157. PS.

    In case it's not clear my last was a joke. Dead Pan mode!

    Cheers.

    ReplyDelete


  158. We await your news, but in the meantime I had a thought which I thought might be worth your while to reflect upon:

    You can't reduce all metaphysical analysis to mechanical analysis. (I think we agree on this and understand it quite well.)

    I'm pretty sure that for analogous reasons, you can't reduce all spiritual/theological analysis to psychological analysis. (You may or may not understand this point in the abstract, but in practise I think you have a tendency to ignore it, as when you introduce psychological (pseudo-)'probabilities' as a deciding factor/sufficient criterion in evaluating claims regarding matters of faith.)"


    Could you explain this to me? I'm Catholic, and struggling a bit with the motives of credibility. Classical theism makes this much easier, but there's still something difficult here. I think I might be doing what you say dguller is doing.

    ReplyDelete
  159. David T,

    Later Greco-Roman society is not the best example of a pre-modern society. It is the pre-modern society closest to ours in the worldly features I'm referring to, as I vaguely alluded to earlier.

    Let us restrict things just to pre-modern Christian societies. It is certainly true that men are fallen and will do evil and foolish deeds in any society. I would never suggest otherwise. As I have always stressed in our conversation, pre-modern societies were far from perfect. However, pre-modern Christian societies were still suffused with spirituality. There were outlets and prompts to spiritual development for all classes. This is in marked distinction to modern society, where, if anything, the encouragement is usually the other way.

    I think I could even make a vague distinction between two levels of spiritual value. On the one hand there is pure spirituality. That is, Christianity proper, from the sacraments to sacred art. Then there is the level of value that T.S Eliot referred to as the permanent things. These are the great virtues, beauty and creative imagination, love (in all four traditional forms), community, a correct disposition towards nature, and so on. Pre-modern Christian societies tended to do all of these better than our modern society.

    Pre-modern life had many bad sides. What I disagree with is that it was simply bad, even for the masses much of the time.

    But most fundamentally our disagreement is the relative worth of new technology and the benefits of modern society. I think the benefits of these are marginal in the ultimate scheme of things. Spirituality and love and community and the like dwarf the benefits of modern technology and society, in my opinion.

    I think you just have the wrong priorities, from a traditional Christian or spiritual point of view, when you set out things like less disease as central to the superiority of modernity to pre-modern societies, or when you originally tried to argue the superiority of the Christian West on the basis of Galileo or Newton. If your perspective were correct, isn't it strange that Christ did not reveal to us the workings of the internal combustion engine and that, to use your example, he didn't spend anytime telling us about antibiotics? Perhaps he should have given his Sermon on the Mount on the secrets of Quantum Physics?

    I do not wish to return to the technology of the past. But one of the most important points I have been trying to is the limited concentration and focus that man, individually and collectively, has. The modern focus on natural science and its application perforce means the marginalisation of the spiritual. I'm not anti-modern technology but I'm certainly no technophile. I think we could do with being a lot more cautious about modern technology and a lot more selective and thoughtful in its development and use, taking things like spirituality, the human scale, and the permanent things far more into account. This is why I support appropriate technology and is one the reasons I'm a distributist.

    ReplyDelete
  160. All is well. Wife and son are healthy and happy.

    Thanks for all the kind wishes and thoughtful prayers.

    I return to the abyss ...

    ReplyDelete
  161. @dguller:

    "All is well. Wife and son are healthy and happy."

    Glad to hear it. Thanks for catching us up, and best wishes to all of you.

    ReplyDelete
  162. "I return to the abyss ..."

    I'm confused. You don't mean Nietzsche's abyss, do you? If your views are now classical theistic-ish, shouldn't that preclude the abyss from even existing in the first place?

    ReplyDelete
  163. Forgive me, I suppose I should have congratulated you. Yay Mr. and Mrs. Dguller!

    ReplyDelete
  164. I had a response to dguller planned, but it seems like it would be a waste now. He's got far more important things to worry about.

    ReplyDelete
  165. At least hold on to it. You may be able to make use of it, or portions of it, later (even if it should happen to be in another context, and with a different person.).

    ReplyDelete
  166. I should add the "paying for him" part is not the joke.

    ReplyDelete
  167. Ben,

    I found the joke clear from the get-go, and also had immediately recognized the well-wishing and the announced prayers' inclusion as sincere and genuine. I'm sure others did too.

    ReplyDelete
  168. @Ben Yachov and Glenn:

    "I'm sure others did too."

    Including me.

    ReplyDelete
  169. Ty wrote: "Could you explain this to me? I'm Catholic, and struggling a bit with the motives of credibility. Classical theism makes this much easier, but there's still something difficult here. I think I might be doing what you say dguller is doing."

    I can certainly try. In regard to mechanical explanation, it is tempting to think that if we explain all the physical/chemical/metabolic processes shaping some thing, then we have understood everything there is to know about the thing itself. But if you frequent this blog and you're familiar with Dr. Feser's work, you'll realize that these kinds of natural-scientific explanations are genuine explanations, but are necessarily limited in scope.

    The same applies (even more obviously, I think) if you try to analyze the formation/evaluation/adoption of beliefs in terms of psychological processes. These processes are real and constitute genuine explanations, but they too are necessarily limited in scope. For example, the notion of truth, or of free assent, or of the working of grace, necessarily, in principle,* transcend any possible evaluation in terms of psychological processes (that is, the kinds of processes of rationalization, for example, which guller refers to and which he claims we understand very well). (*Think of Feser's excellent sweeping-everything-under-the-rug analogy.)

    ReplyDelete