Monday, July 1, 2013

He refutes you thus


In the photo at left, Justice Anthony Kennedy presents his considered response to Plato’s Laws, Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, and his own Catholic faith.  Asked to develop his argument in a little more detail, Justice Kennedy paused and then solemnly added: “I got lifetime tenure, beyotch.” 

Court observers expect that Justice Kennedy’s subtle reasoning, backed as it is by a sophisticated philosophy of language and philosophy of law, puts him in the running for the prestigious Ockham Award for Catholic Statesmanship.  Competition for that prize has, however, been particularly fierce of late.

889 comments:

  1. I enjoy the extreme irony of BenYachov's complaints about bad manners while dropping the f-bomb and making threats. If he was a cunning linguist he should be able to live up to his own standard by answering questions, not repeating himself, being civilized.

    ReplyDelete
  2. >Step2 said...
    I enjoy the extreme irony of BenYachov's complaints about bad manners while dropping the f-bomb and making threats. If he was a cunning linguist he should be able to live up to his own standard by answering questions, not repeating himself, being civilized.

    Fuck you too! I don't have to be civil to a passive- aggressive troll or his cowardly pets!

    ReplyDelete
  3. BenYachov is humorless too.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Ben:

    So you think ignoring what I had just clearly explained, repeating your nonsense & refusing to read the links I cited is going to do anything other then prove me right about you acting like a jackass troll?

    If you look at my response at the previous thread, I actually cited QDP 9.7 as my primary source. Have a look and tell me what you think.

    I just did that with the "3-5=-2"! What a fucking jackass!

    But you are still using numbers. How do you get from transcendental multiplicity to numbers without using quantity? In other words, how do you go from one and many to numbers without using quantitative concepts?

    Also I never said no type of quantity can be applied to God & nobody I quoted ever did.

    But Aquinas denied it. He writes at QDP 9.7 that “in speaking of God we do not predicate the unity and plurality which belong to the genus of quantity, but one that is convertible with being and the corresponding plurality.” The transcendentals are not a “type of quantity” at all. If they were, then they would be accidents.

    G-L said "The numeral terms do not add anything positive to God since they express not a quantitative but a transcendental plurality, which is not properly speaking a number. "

    Exactly right. They are not “properly speaking a number”, because that would put them under the genus of quantity, and thus be an accident, which is impossible for God. So, what does it mean to talk about “numerical terms” that are “not properly speaking a number”? Why not also allow talk about God’s materiality, but say that it is not properly speaking material?

    Would "negative two" be a real number in this case?

    It would not be a real number, but it would still be a number, and thus a quantity.

    ReplyDelete
  5. I would have a sense of humor but maniacal laughter disturbs some people.

    ReplyDelete
  6. @dguller

    What part of "get lost" & "don't ask me anymore questions" do you not understand?

    You can't even read THAT & I am suppose to
    believe you when you claimed to have read ON THE POWER OF GOD or on the subject of transendental multiplicity?

    I don't believe you!

    I wasted a thousand posts of you pretending Divine Simplicity meant something other then God not having physical or metaphysical composition but you thought that meant no virtual or minor virtual composition as well. Don't even get me started on you pretending to know what ease in or esse ad meant.

    I am not getting suckered into correcting your mistakes on what Aquinas means when he says there is no "quantitative plurality" in God.

    I've seen how you "argue" and it's not argument it is ball busting sophistry. It is unkind, cruel and disrespectful! You have done this to me & to DavidM, Mr. X, Bill, Crude and others.

    I won't have it!

    Now get lost!

    ReplyDelete
  7. Even now I am very tempted to correct a lot of dguller misquotes, equivocations, misquotes, red herring, false inferences etc....

    But it gets us nowhere.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Ben:

    You can't even read THAT & I am suppose to 
believe you when you claimed to have read ON THE POWER OF GOD or on the subject of transendental multiplicity?



    I don't believe you!


    The best way to determine if I’m telling the truth is to check. Have a look at: http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?postID=1881816873760293084&blogID=8954608646904080796&isPopup=false&page=4 at June 27, 2013 at 8:37 AM. See for yourself. Or not. It’s up to you, Ben.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Ben:

    And as for your distinction between a discrete quantity and a continuous quantity, Aquinas does say at QDP 9.7 that magnitude (i.e. continuous quantity) can be predicated of God, but only “comparatively” as “denoting excess in relation to a smaller quantity”, which “denotes his eminence over all creatures”.

    You should notice two things here. First, Aquinas does not affirm that discrete quantity is predicable of God, which is precisely the kind that would involve the ability to count numbers, and is actually the most relevant kind of quantity here. Second, Aquinas is not saying that the continuous quantity that is predicable of God is measurable or countable, but is just a way of asserting and affirming God’s transcendence and eminence. You’ll notice that none of this explains how we get to countable numbers, which we would need in order to count the number of persons in God at all in a meaningful and coherent way.

    Furthermore, Aquinas has an interesting discussion of these two kinds of quantity in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics at 5.15.978. He writes that there are “two primary kinds” of quantity: plurality, which is numerable (and discrete), and magnitude, which is measurable (and continuous). He also says that number is only possible when plurality or multitude is limited. So, at least here, Aquinas is saying that in order to have a number of persons that are countable, there must be limitation in God. That seems to contradict Aquinas’ claim that “God is infinite negatively, in the sense that a being that is unlimited in every way is infinite” (CT 18). Or maybe God is limited in some ways?

    ReplyDelete
  10. @dguller

    You really can't read English now can you & you are in full passive aggressive mode?

    It's sick you can't see by the way you treated myself, DavidM, Mr. X, Bill & others with your asinine sophistry that nobody here trusts you as an honest dialog partner.

    We both know you came up with this sophistical bullshit that you can't nominally count the number of divine persons (whose existence can only be known by revelation & not human reason as Aquinas taught & as I told you repeatedly)because of the transendental multiplicity before you even read dick about it.

    You don't know what you are talking about.

    Heck by your own braindead sophistry & lack of common sense no Classic Theist(Christina, Muslin or Jew) can be called a monotheist since the oneness of God isn't a real number either.

    Get lost dguller I would be surprised if DavidM or Mr. X still want to waste their time with an idiot who lacks all manner of common sense.

    ReplyDelete
  11. guller: "You just begged the question. I said that if the good of the kidney consisted in it performing the activity of cleaning blood, then adding waste to blood that was cleaned to keep the kidney cleaning blood would be good for the kidney. It would not be pointless at all. It all depends upon what you define the good to be." - No, you dullard, I didn't beg the question. You completely misunderstand how to define the good in A-T metaphysics. Hint: this isn't done by means of idiotic stipulations. You can't just say, "well I've defined the good of a kidney in this idiotic way, so if you point out that my definition is arbitrary and idiotic, then you're begging the question - I think I have a right to define the good in this way." Guess what, dude?: If you want to do that, go ahead, but don't pretend to yourself - please have the minimal honesty not to pretend to yourself - that this is based on your having understood A-T metaphysics.

    "You’re missing the point. The aliens have figured out that the kidney balances electrolyte levels, maintains water volume, and filters certain chemicals from fluids. I would say that they have a partial understanding of the kidney’s function, because those are the immediate physiological activities of the kidney. You seem to say that they have learned nothing about the kidney’s nature, which I think would violate your sacred common sense. They may not know everything about the kidney’s function, but they certainly know something about the kidney’s function, i.e. the kidney’s immediate physiological activities." - This. Is. Simple. IF they only know what you claim, then they don't know that the kidney's functions even ARE physiological functions. So yet again you can't even get your own scenario straight. What a waste of time. I may have to just leave you to your smug, wilful incomprehension.

    ReplyDelete
  12. "The kidney’s nature includes the possibility of being used unnaturally. It is a necessary condition of being a kidney that the kidney could be used unnaturally. So, it’s unnatural use is part of its nature." - That. is. hilarious. You are a bit of a... what Ben said. Back to the drawing board, man - this is nothing like compatible with A-T metaphysics. Seriously: back to square one, learn the basics, then come back and maybe we'll be able to have an intelligent discussion.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Ben:

    We both know you came up with this sophistical bullshit that you can't nominally count the number of divine persons (whose existence can only be known by revelation & not human reason as Aquinas taught & as I told you repeatedly)because of the transendental multiplicity before you even read dick about it.

    Actually, I first read the idea that counting is problematic in God in Denys Turner’s book, Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait, where he argued that “God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way” (p. 121), which includes whether one is talking about God’s being one or God’s being three. “There can be no such counting in God either way” (p. 125). When you brought up transcendental multiplicity as a solution to this problem of how to count that which is uncountable, I certainly read your references.

    Unfortunately, at least as I understood those texts, they explained that transcendental unity and multiplicity are necessary for any kind of counting, mainly because they are necessary for any kind of anything, by virtue of being transcendentals, but the texts did not explain how one goes from transcendental multiplicity to countable numbers without including the category of quantity, and thus the accident of quantity. That’s what I’m interested in, because it fits with a personal interest of mine in how we can know or talk about what is beyond our knowledge or language.

    Heck by your own braindead sophistry & lack of common sense no Classic Theist(Christina, Muslin or Jew) can be called a monotheist since the oneness of God isn't a real number either.

    That is one of Turner’s points, as well. It superficially seems that the oneness of God would be less problematic than the Trinity of God, but the reality is that both kinds of counting are problematic. He writes that it is easy to think that “the mystery of the divine oneness is somehow less intense than that of the divine Trinity, as if the oneness of God were easier to get into your head than the Trinity. It is not” (p. 130).

    ReplyDelete
  14. guller's dictionary:

    misspeak: to say something which is correct, given a reasonable understanding of the context, but which a stupid person who wilfully misunderstands the context will be able to misinterpret

    So, yes, I 'misspoke' - in fact, I've done very little but. What a shame.

    ReplyDelete
  15. "But if someone says that the only reason that X exists is Y, then I take that to mean that Y is a necessary and sufficient condition of X, such that if there is no Y, then there is no X." - Damn you're ignorant. The same material thing is not necessarily the same thing simpliciter, according to Aristotle. If the same material thing X exists but its telos does not (think of your body before and after death), then X is the same material thing, but there is no X (except by equivocation). Like I said: back to square one. Your combination of ignorance and stubborn arrogance makes you unfit to participate in this kind of discussion.

    ReplyDelete
  16. DavidM:

    No, you dullard, I didn't beg the question. You completely misunderstand how to define the good in A-T metaphysics. Hint: this isn't done by means of idiotic stipulations. You can't just say, "well I've defined the good of a kidney in this idiotic way, so if you point out that my definition is arbitrary and idiotic, then you're begging the question - I think I have a right to define the good in this way." Guess what, dude?: If you want to do that, go ahead, but don't pretend to yourself - please have the minimal honesty not to pretend to yourself - that this is based on your having understood A-T metaphysics.

    No, you asked me earlier if it would be good for the kidney to keep having waste added to the blood that it cleaned. I replied that it depended upon what you took to be the good for the kidney, i.e. the activity of cleaning or the end of clean blood. If the former, then it would be good for the kidney to have waste added to the blood. If the latter, then it would not be good for the kidney to have waste added to the blood. It depends upon what you take the good to be for the kidney. If you take the good for the kidney to be the latter, then that’s fine, but that would require that you justify your claim with an argument. What would that be?

    This. Is. Simple. IF they only know what you claim, then they don't know that the kidney's functions even ARE physiological functions. So yet again you can't even get your own scenario straight. What a waste of time. I may have to just leave you to your smug, wilful incomprehension.

    How don’t they know that the kidneys sort through chemical substances that are delivered to them, and separate those chemical substances into two different outputs? How is that not a “physiological function” of the kidney? How does that not count as partial knowledge of their function? Do you really believe that they know nothing about the kidney’s function? Why doesn’t that violate common sense?

    That. is. hilarious. You are a bit of a... what Ben said. Back to the drawing board, man - this is nothing like compatible with A-T metaphysics. Seriously: back to square one, learn the basics, then come back and maybe we'll be able to have an intelligent discussion.

    We agree that a kidney can be used naturally and unnaturally, which means that the kidney has the potentiality to be used naturally and the potentiality to be used unnaturally. Without that potentiality, it could not be used naturally or unnaturally. Where did that potentiality come from? I think it is essential to the kidney that it could potentially be used unnaturally, because otherwise, you would have a kidney that couldn’t possibly be used unnaturally. However, since kidneys can be used unnaturally, this cannot be true. Therefore, the potentiality to be used unnaturally is a predicate of the kidney.

    The question is whether this predicate is an essential predicate or an accidental predicate. If it is an essential predicate, then it remains present throughout whatever accidental changes the kidney undergoes. Since the possibility that the kidney could be used unnaturally is always present throughout whatever accidental changes the kidney undergoes, it follows that this possibility is an essential predicate of the kidney. If it was an accidental predicate, then it could be absent from the kidney, and yet the kidney would remain a kidney. But what would it mean to have a kidney that couldn’t possibly be used unnaturally? Wouldn’t that have to be a kidney that is fixed in a permanent state of perfect function? I don’t think that is possible for a living thing existing in the material world of change and transition. So, if the only way that it could be an accident is impossible, then it cannot be an accident.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Damn you're ignorant. The same material thing is not necessarily the same thing simpliciter, according to Aristotle. If the same material thing X exists but its telos does not (think of your body before and after death), then X is the same material thing, but there is no X (except by equivocation).

    First, it is not the same material thing, because to be a material thing, it must have both a form and matter, and since it has a different form, it must be a different material thing. (And different forms mean different ends.) For example, before death, there was the form of the soul, and after death, there is the form of a corpse, and a living body and a corpse are different material things. In fact, I don’t even think that you can say that it is the same matter in both instances, because matter has no characteristics at all until it acquires a form, including the characteristics of identity and difference.

    Second, in the spirit of moving this discussion forward, I’m happy to agree with you that the telos is a necessary condition for the existence of any thing. It's not as if I ever denied it, after all.

    ReplyDelete
  18. DavidM:

    And just to return to our discussion about degrees of actuality. Say that you have five individuals: A, B, C, D and E. Each of them performs an activity that leads to the following ranking: A > B > C > D > E. Say that the ranking is one of strength. How do you account for this ranking? I would say that each individual has a certain amount of strength, and that A has more amount of strength than B, and B has more amount of strength than C, and so on. In other words, A has the same amount of strength as B plus some extra strength, and that extra strength is what accounts for A’s having more strength than B. And you would apply the same analysis to all the other individuals in the ranking.

    How would you account for this scenario without appealing to each individual having a particular amount of strength that can be ranked according to different amounts of strength?

    I'm genuinely interested.

    ReplyDelete
  19. >Actually, I first read the idea that counting is problematic in God in Denys Turner’s book,

    Stop lying I first brought up transendental multiplicity by citing G-L & you said you didn't understand him. But then like a dick when I went on vacation & quit the "discussion" you went on to "explain" what G-L meant. That is you read your own ideas into his writing like you do with Aquinas' philosophy in general.

    DavidM wrote:
    Your combination of ignorance and stubborn arrogance makes you unfit to participate in this kind of discussion.

    As I recall DavidM tried to be friendly to you dguller even when I was cussing you out. Now your jackassery has exhausted even his Christian Patience.

    The comedy here is you still don't think it's you just everybody else who doesn't understand Thomism or the Trinity like you do in your great wisdom.

    Why are you even here?

    ReplyDelete
  20. >I'm genuinely interested.

    Who still believes this?

    *sound of crickets*

    ReplyDelete
  21. Ben:

    And just one last comment about God’s unity or oneness. When Aquinas talks about it, he is not referring to the number one, but rather to the transcendental one. In fact, at ST 1.11.3, on sed contra 2, he explicitly distinguishes between “one” as “the principle of number”, which cannot be predicated of God, because it “belongs to the "genus" of mathematics”, i.e. is under the genus of quantity, and thus is an accident. When he is talking about the “oneness” of God, he is talking about the “one” that is “convertible with being”, i.e. a transcendental that is beyond the categories. And that is fundamentally based upon the fact that God has no accidents, and thus cannot be under the categories at all.

    Furthermore, Aquinas says that saying that God is “one” is actually a term of negation -- i.e. a term of “privation and remotion” -- and not a positive term at all. I think that the negation in question is the negation of division in the sense that God is indivisible in himself by virtue of his simplicity, but also that God is not divisible from creation. After all, to be divided from creation would imply that God is different from creation, and that would presuppose a common standard of comparison by which God and creation could be compared to see that God is X and creation is not-X. But since there is no such standard of comparison, because God cannot be under a genus nor be a genus, one cannot say that God is different from creation. And that is why his oneness is a transcendental, i.e. it is beyond the genera and categories.

    And this is what actually distinguishes God from creation. As Eckhart wrote, God’s distinction is his indistinction. He is distinct – i.e. “one” – by virtue of being indistinct. But notice that this has absolutely nothing to do with the number one.

    ReplyDelete
  22. So what?

    What does any of this have to do with pretending to know what "transendental multiplicity" means or being a dick to both David & myself?

    I know God's oneness is negative just as I know the Trinity is defined negatively & you have wasted my time after 2000 posts arguing about it as if it where a positive thing knowable by human reason & straw manning the shit out of it.


    ReplyDelete
  23. Ben:

    Stop lying I first brought up transendental multiplicity by citing G-L & you said you didn't understand him. But then like a dick when I went on vacation & quit the "discussion" you went on to "explain" what G-L meant. That is you read your own ideas into his writing like you do with Aquinas' philosophy in general.

    You first brought up transcendental multiplicity on June 21, 2013 at 2:11 PM. I told you on June 22, 2013 at 4:09 AM that I had no idea what transcendental multiplicity even meant if quantity had nothing to do with it. On June 22, 2013 at 6:41 PM, you posted links to the relevant texts, which I proceeded to read and comment on in the subsequent posts, and came to the conclusion that none of them actually explains how “three”, or any number, makes any sense without involving countable numbers, which are necessary quantities. You replied on June 26, 2013 at 2:18 PM by saying that G-L never denied that one could use numbers to count the number of persons in God, which still was not an explanation, and I replied on June 26, 2013 at 5:44 PM by bringing up Denys Turner’s arguments.

    So, you are correct that you first brought up the idea of transcendental multiplicity, but that does not negate my claim that “I first read the idea that counting is problematic in God in Denys Turner’s book”. So, no, I wasn’t lying, actually.

    ReplyDelete
  24. >So, you are correct that you first brought up the idea of transcendental multiplicity, but that does not negate my claim that “I first read the idea that counting is problematic in God in Denys Turner’s book”. So, no, I wasn’t lying, actually.

    Hair spliting rationalization for dishonest behavior.

    You have not only killed my trust but I suspect others here as well.

    Your credibility is dead here dguller & you can't get it back by pretending you can still have any type of discussion with us.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Ben:

    What does any of this have to do with pretending to know what "transendental multiplicity" means or being a dick to both David & myself?

    First, I do know what transcendental multiplicity means. It is the division between individual beings serves to differentiate and distinguish one individual from another individual that is a necessary transcendental condition for the categories to be possible.

    Second, I am trying to explain to you why it is impossible to apply countable numbers in any way to God, which includes the number one and the number three. These are quantities, and thus are subsumed under the category of quantity, which makes them accidents, and thus inapplicable to God. You are trying to smuggle them into the transcendentals without explaining how this is even possible. If you were consistent, then you would admit that countable numbers are inapplicable to God in any way.

    I know God's oneness is negative just as I know the Trinity is defined negatively

    Except that you acted as if you didn’t. You wrote that it was “braindead sophistry” and a “lack of common sense” to claim that “the oneness of God isn’t a real number”, and yet I cited both Aquinas and Turner denying precisely that position. They both deny that the “principle of number” can be applicable to God, and therefore the number one is equally inapplicable to God. That is why Aquinas, in his very discussion of God’s oneness, explicitly denies the “principle of number” as inapplicable to God. The only sense to God’s “oneness” is not the number one, but the transcendental one, which is just being with the additional sense of negating division, which means that God’s “oneness” is not a number at all, but a negative proposition. If you now agree with this, then you must also admit that the number one is completely inapplicable to God.

    ReplyDelete
  26. >Second, I am trying to explain to you why it is impossible to apply countable numbers in any way to God, which includes the number one and the number three.

    Yet Aquinas says there are three divine persons and God is one? So you are misreading him and equivocating big time & in the end it all serves to undermine your jackassery claim of "logical contradiction" making the trinity out to mean 1=3.

    Go away dguller your done here.

    ReplyDelete
  27. >Except that you acted as if you didn’t. You wrote that it was “braindead sophistry” and a “lack of common sense” to claim that “the oneness of God isn’t a real number”, and yet I cited both Aquinas and Turner denying precisely that position.

    We where debating the meaning of the Trinity and you cited Turner to me from a section where he wasn't talking about the Trinity(I pointed that out to you) & you ignored the parts where he did.

    You are a bad liar dguller.

    ReplyDelete
  28. Ben:

    Yet Aquinas says there are three divine persons and God is one?

    Yes, and the question is whether he can do so consistently. His principles necessarily mean that quantitative and countable numbers are prohibited from being applicable to God, because all such numbers are under the genus of quantity, and thus are accidents, which cannot be present in God at all. So, if God’s unity involved the number one, and if God’s Trinity involves the number three, then Aquinas has contradicted himself. I think that he has a decent way out of this inconsistency with regards to God’s unity by denying the number one, while affirming the transcendental one, but I don’t see any way out when it comes to the Trinity. The Trinity clearly and necessarily involves the countable number three, which would violate Aquinas’ prohibition of countable numbers with respect to God.

    We where debating the meaning of the Trinity and you cited Turner to me from a section where he wasn't talking about the Trinity(I pointed that out to you) & you ignored the parts where he did.

    First, it is perfectly relevant to the “meaning of the Trinity” to question whether it is meaningful to even use the number three when it comes to the Trinity, because all countable numbers are inapplicable to God.

    Second, Turner was talking about the Trinity in the section of the book I cited. The passage that I cited in particular comes from a section called “Two Ways of Being God”, which concludes with an explicit mention of Aquinas’ belief that the oneness of God does not contradict the Trinity.

    Third, are you denying that Turner endorses the view that counting is prohibited when it comes to God?

    ReplyDelete
  29. Hey Ben

    I love reading your contributions. You are a creature of extremes, and often entertaining for just this reason, but I must say that dguller has always been one subject about which I wished your feelings cleaved closer to Aristotle’s Golden Mean.

    Previously you had dguller under your aegis and petitioned all commenters to treat him as if he was Dr Feser’s recurring Special Guest Star, worthy of fulsome praise whatever his contribution, and possibly made out of gold. But what you’re now describing is nothing new from dguller.

    Whether it was him insisting that the law of non-contradiction may not apply to "deeper levels of reality," or that the Fifth Way is nothing but anthropomorphising the Necessarily Existing Ground of All Being (remember dguller's inclusion of final causes as a kind of being between actual being and potential being !?), or his mistaken notions about Divine Simplicity, the Doctrine of the Trinity, analogy, natural law, etc., a catalogue of his greatest misses would leave one in no doubt that dguller is committed to some prior idea that prevents him from reading for understanding; any explanation, no matter how far off the deep end, is better and more plausible than the generally prosaic, common-sense readings of untold Schoolmen and learned commentaries. Rather he reads to seek out some loose thread of inconsistency he can tug to unravel all of St Thomas’s system.

    However he does read. He was never as good as you caricatured him in the past, and he’s not as bad as you’re telling us now. I think that, because you had placed dguller in a favoured place behind your shield, you feel what he does a lot more painfully.

    But I don’t think he deserves all the invective (though Heaven help me I understand your frustration!). And I think you’d benefit from a reset on relations – you don’t need to champion him, but there’s really no need to tell him to “get lost,” either.

    ReplyDelete
  30. @Jack

    >However he does read. He was never as good as you caricatured him in the past, and he’s not as bad as you’re telling us now.

    The first part has been becoming painfully obvious to me & I am embarrassed for not seeing it. I admit my pride is wounded.

    As for the rest you might be right but I am only flesh and blood & I can't have a conversation with someone I no longer trust.

    If it was only me, (because I am quite extreme I fully admit that) I might cut dguller some slack because I can be off putting & he might have been reacting to my anger.

    But as I read the posts of others here I am not the only one losing patience with him.

    I don't see what can be done? But if you want to take over go for it.

    But I don't see any point in discussing anything with him anymore.

    ReplyDelete
  31. Jack:

    Fair and perceptive comments, as always.

    I'd only add that I always read any text with an eye towards the fragments that don't seem to fit the totality of the system, and yet are the very condition of possibility for the system at all. A great deal of Thomism makes sense to me, and I find it an incredibly brilliant system, which becomes more and more compelling the more I understand it, and yet there are aspects of it that touch upon truths that, from my standpoint, are chokepoints for the system, that are fragments that interfere with the smooth running of the machine, and that seem substantial until I come close, and then they become like specters or ghosts that simply do not seem to fit anywhere in the system. It is much like consciousness within contemporary materialism, as a phenomenon that is absolutely essential to any characterization of materialism, and yet cannot be accommodated by materialism without gross contradiction.

    So, when I read about the ghostly and indeterminate existence of prime matter, about an analogy between X and Y without any common connection between X and Y, about truth claims that are beyond our intellect, about three X’s where the number three is inapplicable, and so on, the warning lights on my dashboard start blinking red, and my attention becomes focused and fixated upon what has possibly gone wrong after things were going so smoothly. I suppose that is just my Kierkegaardian and deconstructive bent.

    ReplyDelete
  32. I sense the presence of mechanistic thinking in the Force.

    ReplyDelete
  33. Jack:

    And just to add one more thing.

    At the moments in which the system seems to choke upon a fragment that is also giving the system oxygen to breath, I am not saying that this means that the system is false or should be jettisoned. I just find myself in a moment of radical undecidability in which I do not know if the breakdown was a result of something so transcendent and beyond whose sheer weight is breaking the system at certain points, and thus the breakdown itself is pointing towards something so real that it cannot be contained, like a net that is being torn to shreds by the force of a massive whale. Or, if the breakdown was a result of an inherent weakness in the system itself, a loose thread that when pulled, the entire tapestry begins to unravel, and not because of something so massive that the system is being crushed under its weight, but because of something less real, almost unreal, beneath the surface that cannot bear the strain of the system, which is indicative of an inherent fragility of the system itself that cannot hold itself together upon such shaky foundations. It is kind of like the situation that one finds oneself in the mystical darkness of unknowing. Is the darkness due to too much light that blinds your vision, leaving you in darkness, or is the darkness due to too little light that provides inadequate illumination to see anything, and leaves you in the dark? The darkness itself does not leave you with any clue or hint, and you are left to your own devices to figure things out.

    ReplyDelete
  34. Ben:

    And here’s just one more thought I had.

    You claim that counting numbers is actually a necessary aspect of transcendental multiplicity. That is what must be the case, if saying that there are three divine persons is to have any meaning whatsoever. So, if you are correct, then there is a transcendental counting of numbers, which is above the genus of quantity, and there is an accidental counting of numbers, which is under the genus of quantity. But if that is true, then it would follow that everything that exists is countable, and thus quantifiable, because the transcendentals apply to everything that exists.

    However, that flatly contradicts DavidM’s claim that not everything that exists is quantifiable, which was one of his primary objections to my idea that there must be a way to determine how much human flourishing is in different individuals in order to determine which actions actually contribute to human flourishing, and which actions do not. If it is true that some things in existence are fundamentally non-quantifiable, then if human flourishing is in that group, then it is simply impossible to do what I claim must be done. However, if counting numbers is a transcendental, as your position implies, then it follows that the degrees of human flourishing, being a part of reality, should also be countable, and thus his objection loses its force entirely.

    What this means is that either counting numbers is transcendental or it is not transcendental. If the former, then human flourishing is countable, and DavidM is wrong. If the latter, then the doctrine of the Trinity is as impossible as God’s being material, because the Trinity presupposes the possibility of the counting the number three in God, and if this is impossible, then the Trinity is impossible. After all, if the necessary condition for X is impossible, then X is impossible.

    Any thoughts?

    ReplyDelete
  35. What makes arguing with dguller so pointless is he makes all these small mistakes maybe half a dozen or more and runs with them & ignores common sense till they become big mistakes. Trying to correct all of them is beyond human effort since he refuses to listen as we saw with his argument with DavidM. A donkey can make more mistakes then a wise man can correct.

    >about three X’s where the number three is inapplicable.

    No source I've read claims Transcendental multiplicity means I can't discretely count the number of Divine Persons or even divine attributes in God(divine goodness, divine justice two attributes 1 &2 etc, Father,Son, Spirit 3 persons etc).

    It merely means no such counting divides, multiplies or extends the divine essence or violates it's absolute unity. All my sources say as much without one dissident.

    None of the sources dguller has alluded too make the claim you can't discretely count the persons or attributes either.

    Not one. So he doesn't understand
    transcendental multiplicity.

    The problem with dguller is he takes simple summery definitions and absolutizes them in a way inconsistent with the intent of the definer.

    He did this with the divine simplicity. Taking the simple definition of there being no composition in God to mean other then no real physical or metaphysical composition and illegitimately extending it to mean no virtual or minor virtual distinction either. Feser at the beginning of this tread said that was wrong.

    dguller only learned about Transendental multiplicity when I brought it up and he already decided what it "really" meant before doing any reading on it.

    How can you argue with someone that dishonest & seemingly blind to it?

    ReplyDelete
  36. OTOH I think Feser reference is in the Avicenna thread?

    Well it doesn't matter. We all know Divine Simplicity merely means God has no physical or metaphysical composition.

    ReplyDelete
  37. Ben:

    >And here’s just one more thought I had.

    >You claim that counting numbers is actually a necessary aspect of transcendental multiplicity.

    That is a lie! I said no such thing that is your mischaracterization & what you want me to mean.

    When I made the analogy of a Flatlander not being able by nature to comprehend a 3D objects except as 2D analogs I explicitly said I wasn't trying to claim God was the literal equivalent of a hyper-dimensional physical object. You then went on to critique my analogy as if I was trying to claim God was a literal multi-dimensional in spite of me explicitly denying that was the intent of my analogy!

    You sir are dishonest & disingenuous!

    With all due respect for Jack I must respectfully disagree.

    You are worst!

    I think you really should go away & I doubt DavidM or anyone else will want to dialog with you again because of your dishonesty.

    ReplyDelete
  38. Ben:

    No source I've read claims Transcendental multiplicity means I can't discretely count the number of Divine Persons or even divine attributes in God(divine goodness, divine justice two attributes 1 &2 etc, Father,Son, Spirit 3 persons etc).

    First, counting is a quantitative activity, and thus an accident, unless you want to say that counting is a transcendental.

    Second, you keep begging the question. I know that you are counting different virtual compositions in God. The question is how this is possible, given that counting is an activity involving quantity, and thus accident, which is inapplicable to God. There would have to be a kind of counting that is above the genus of quantity, which means that counting itself is a transcendental. But that means that everything in reality is also countable, and thus quantitative, because if X is a transcendental, then X applies to everything in reality.

    Third, I’ve already quoted Aquinas as saying that the one as a transcendental is not numerical at all. He explicitly distinguishes it from “the principle of number” as a quantity. (Are you really saying that numbers are not quantities?) And I’ve quoted Turner who has argued, persuasively I think, that all counting is impossible when it comes to God, because counting implies that the things being counted exist under a common genus. Since there is no such possible genus in God, it is impossible to count in God. Also, counting implies numbers, which are quantities, and quantities are accidents. Since God cannot have accidents, God cannot involve countable quantities.

    It merely means no such counting divides, multiplies or extends the divine essence or violates it's absolute unity. All my sources say as much without one dissident.

    First, again, I’ve cited Aquinas and Turner, and thus there are dissidents.

    Second, you are confusing two different issues: numerical counting and division. Say that you have X, and X has different parts, A1, A2 and A3. I can count three parts in X, irrespective of whether A1, A2 or A3 can be separated or divided from one another, and from X. The reality is that one can have numerical counting without division, and one can have division without numerical counting.

    None of the sources dguller has alluded too make the claim you can't discretely count the persons or attributes either.

    Like I said, Turner explicitly stated that counting the number of divine persons is a problem, because there is no counting in God at all. He writes in Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait that “God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way” (p. 121), which includes whether one is talking about God’s being one or God’s being three. “There can be no such counting in God either way” (p. 125), where by “either way”, Turner is referring to either God being numerically one or numerically three.

    dguller only learned about Transendental multiplicity when I brought it up and he already decided what it "really" meant before doing any reading on it.

    I know that you introduced me to the idea, and then I read about it using the references that you posted. They do not explain how transcendental multiplicity can involve numerical counting, completely independent of the genus of quantity. As I said before, transcendental multiplicity just means that one individual is divided from another individual. The question is how you go from that to numerical counting without smuggling in the genus of quantity.

    ReplyDelete
  39. >However, that flatly contradicts DavidM’s claim that not everything that exists is quantifiable, which was one of his primary objections...

    So we can unequivocally compare our conversations with you on two radically different subjects (Natural Law vs Trinitarian Theology, Creation vs the Uncreated)?

    Really moron?

    So if you where discussing physics with one fellow & biology with another one could refute a principle of biology with one of physics?

    Like the old & very stupid Young Earth Creationist chestnut about the Second Law of Thermal Dynamics refuting evolution?

    dguller you need to realize you are done.

    There is no point in having any discussion with you.

    You are either dishonest or very incompetent or both.

    ReplyDelete
  40. >First, counting is a quantitative activity, and thus an accident, unless you want to say that counting is a transcendental.

    That just flatly ignored what I just said.


    It also shows he didn't really read ON THE POWER OF GOD Q9 Pt7.

    "1. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 13) “That Unity with Trinity in which we worship the supreme Godhead is not the same unity or trinity with which we or any other living being are acquainted.” Therefore seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God by way of remotion."


    ReplyDelete
  41. >First, again, I’ve cited Aquinas and Turner, and thus there are dissidents.

    Not one. You are just reading your own ideas into them. Logic dictates we harmonize him with other Thomists & Catholics.

    >Like I said, Turner explicitly stated that counting the number of divine persons is a problem, because there is no counting in God at all.

    It's a problem because it might lead to confusion among heretics. Nothing more.

    >He writes in Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait that “God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way” (p. 121), which includes whether one is talking about God’s being one or God’s being three. “There can be no such counting in God either way” (p. 125), where by “either way”, Turner is referring to either God being numerically one or numerically three.

    Merely means he agrees with all Trinitarians there aren't three Gods & the divine essence isn't multiplied, divided or extended.

    He is not a Muslim like you who was raised to believe the Trinity is Three Gods who are One God.

    He also believes in divine mystery.

    You do not.

    Since you reject QUOTE"...., truth claims that are beyond our intellect,etc".

    ReplyDelete
  42. Besides I was talking about discrete counting not real counting.

    I assume Turner is referring to real counting when he says "God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way".

    Just like when we say composition is ruled out of the DS in every way we pretty much only mean physical an metaphysical not logical or notional or illustrious.

    ReplyDelete
  43. Ben:

    That is a lie! I said no such thing that is your mischaracterization & what you want me to mean.

    You claim that one can count the divine persons, which presupposes that numerical counting is possible of God. I have given two arguments for why this is impossible. First, counting is a quantitative activity, which is under the genus of quantity, and thus is an accident, which makes it inapplicable to God, who lacks any accidents. Second, all counting presupposes that the things being counted exist under a common genus, which is impossible when it comes to God, because God is neither under a genus (CT 12) nor a genus himself (CT 13), according to Aquinas.

    Your reply to these arguments is to cite transcendental multiplicity. According to my understanding, transcendental multiplicity just means that one individual being is divided from another individual being as different and distinct beings. That’s it. Numbers have nothing to do with it, which is why Aquinas has distinguished the “principle of number” from the transcendentals at ST 1.11.3 and QDP 9.7. So, I have no idea how transcendental multiplicity leads to numerical counting without smuggling in the genus of quantity, while denying that one is doing so. I’ve asked you a few times to explain how this is possible, because the sources that you cited do not explain this. Simply calling me an asshole and a liar does not answer my question, Ben.

    When I made the analogy of a Flatlander not being able by nature to comprehend a 3D objects except as 2D analogs I explicitly said I wasn't trying to claim God was the literal equivalent of a hyper-dimensional physical object. You then went on to critique my analogy as if I was trying to claim God was a literal multi-dimensional in spite of me explicitly denying that was the intent of my analogy!

    That is completely irrelevant to this debate. I’m asking you how you can meaningfully use the number three in God when quantity cannot be applied to God. You would have to argue that there are numbers that aren’t quantities, which I think is absurd. You would also have to argue that counting numbers is a transcendental, which would be a radical claim in need of significant justification. If counting numbers is a transcendental, then it would follow that all of reality is countable, and thus quantitative, which would also make quantity not a genus at all. So, significant revisions to Thomism would have to occur, if you are correct here, which is fine, because Thomism is not perfect, after all. Everything needs revision from time to time.

    ReplyDelete
  44. >“There can be no such counting in God either way” (p. 125), where by “either way”, Turner is referring to either God being numerically one or numerically three.

    God is incomprehensible & we can only understand him by negation. We can only compare him analigiously to things not unequivocally.

    God is not a single being alongside other beings & not the single instantation of a species or one of a kind.

    God is not three essences or three Gods either.

    I am a classic theist not a theistic personalist.

    I resent how you read your own ideas both into my views and the views of my religion & Thomism.

    Do we really have to go threw 1000 posts of you not listening to me or anybody else?

    Do we?

    Do you really need the last word that badly?

    ReplyDelete
  45. >You claim that one can count the divine persons, which presupposes that numerical counting is possible of God.

    No it merely means discrete counting is possible like counting 5 units from 3 to -2.

    Not real counting since -2 does not really refer to something concrete.

    I don't believe in a concrete God.

    ReplyDelete

  46. >That is completely irrelevant to this debate.

    It's perfectly relevant in that it shows you are not interested in a fair or honest debate nor will you make a good faith effort to actually try to understand what I am saying.

    You just want the last word.

    ReplyDelete
  47. Ben:

    So we can unequivocally compare our conversations with you on two radically different subjects (Natural Law vs Trinitarian Theology, Creation vs the Uncreated)?

    Are you really saying that the conclusions of one conversation necessarily have no bearing upon other conversations?

    That just flatly ignored what I just said.

    All I want to know is how you can count without quantity.

    Therefore seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God by way of remotion.

    Notice that Aquinas says “seemingly numerical terms”, i.e. they superficially look like numbers, but actually aren’t numbers at all, because if they were numbers, then the principle of number would be applicable to God, which Aquinas has flatly denied is possible. And the “way of remotion” is explained by the negations involved in transcendental unity and transcendental multiplicity, neither of which involve actual numbers at all. So, this passage does not help your case.

    Merely means he agrees with all Trinitarians there aren't three Gods & the divine essence isn't multiplied, divided or extended.

    Have you read the book? Turner says that counting is ruled out when it comes to God. He actually says it on a number of occasions in the book, and gives arguments in support of this position, which are pretty compelling, I think. He is not saying what you are saying, and I challenge you to find anywhere in his book where he says what you claim he says. Good luck.

    Besides I was talking about discrete counting not real counting.

    Even Aquinas considers discrete counting to be under the genus of quantity, and so this doesn’t help your case.

    I assume Turner is referring to real counting when he says "God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way".

    That is not what he is saying. He is saying that counting, period, is impossible when it comes to God. Read the chapter. It’s very interesting.

    ReplyDelete
  48. >Second, you keep begging the question. I know that you are counting different virtual compositions in God. The question is how this is possible, given that counting is an activity involving quantity, and thus accident, which is inapplicable to God.

    Quote"seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God".

    It's a mystery you haven't gone back & tried to assert, based on some misquoting, that divine simplicity really means no composition at all including virtual, notional or minor virtual?

    You have no common sense.

    ReplyDelete
  49. >So, significant revisions to Thomism would have to occur, if you are correct here, which is fine, because Thomism is not perfect, after all. Everything needs revision from time to time.

    I absolutely believe Thomism and all philosophy requires continued revision and qualification.

    I just don't believe an obvious incompetent who expounds on a topic he only learned about a month ago is fit to point that out anymore then I am fit to point out to Richard Dawkins what revisions or qualifications are required in Evolutionary science or biology.

    ReplyDelete
  50. Ben:

    Quote"seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God".

    You are ignoring the fact that Aquinas is not saying that “numerical terms are predicated of God”, but that seemingly numerical terms are predicated of God. What do you think “seemingly” means here? I take it to mean that although the terms seem to be numbers, they are not actually numbers at all, but rather denote something else entirely, which is consistent with everything else that Aquinas has written in the texts that you cited.

    And look at what Aquinas also says in QDP 9.7:

    “One and many, i.e. number are in the genus of quantity. Now there is no quantity in God, seeing that quantity is an accident and a disposition, of matter. Therefore numeral terms indicate nothing positive in God.”

    Notice that Aquinas explicitly identifies “number” with the “genus of quantity”, and since “there is no quantity in God”, it follows that “numerical terms indicate nothing positive in God”, but rather are terms of negation or privation or remotion.

    Now, when Aquinas says that God is one, he is not saying that God is numerically one, but rather “when we say: The divine essence is one, we altogether deny that God’s essence is divided”. The negation involved in the affirmation of God’s unity is of division in God’s essence, but this has nothing to do with the number one, which Aquinas adamantly denies is predicable of God.

    What about when Aquinas says that God is three persons? How can this be a negative term? What exactly is Aquinas negating? Say that there is X, and that by negating X, Aquinas infers the number three. How is it possible that not-X = the number 3? That is what you would have to show in order for your account to be possible at all. What is X?

    ReplyDelete
  51. >they superficially look like numbers, but actually aren’t numbers at all.

    But they can still be counted? Like counting from 3 to -2 by 5 units!

    Are you really this stupid?

    >Are you really saying that the conclusions of one conversation necessarily have no bearing upon other conversations?

    I guess so.

    ReplyDelete
  52. Ben:

    No it merely means discrete counting is possible like counting 5 units from 3 to -2.

    That’s fine. I’ll use your terms, then. You deny that numerical counting is possible, but discrete counting is possible. Fine. Explain to me how discrete counting is possible without quantity. That’s the important issue. Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  53. Ben:

    God is incomprehensible & we can only understand him by negation. We can only compare him analigiously to things not unequivocally.

    First, we can understand God by affirmation, as well as negation, which is something that Rocca argues in his book. Saying that God is pure act and ipsum esse subsistens are positive propositions.

    Second, are you saying that when a Christian affirms that there are three divine persons, they are speaking analogously? I understand that “person” is used analogously, which is something that Aquinas himself affirms when he writes that “this name "person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way” (ST 1.29.3). In other words, the divine person is like a created person, but more exalted, more excellent, and more eminent. But how does this work with the number three? Is it also an analogy? Three is like the number three, but more excellent? What does that mean? Does it involve quantitative discrete counting, or some transcendent discrete counting? But what sense is there to a form of discrete counting that transcends all quantification? Counting and measuring is quantity, after all. Again, you may as well talk about a kind of matter in God that transcends material reality. If you can see that such a proposition makes no sense, then you should also see that talk about discrete numbers without quantity also makes no sense.

    ReplyDelete
  54. Guys,

    I have not read this thread or your previous threads. So I have no comment to make on the substance of your debate. However, a cursory inspection makes it clear that the tone is pretty nasty.

    This thread is now a few weeks old, which means that I have to moderate comments. When a lot of comments are posted, that means I've got to check in and approve them throughout the day. That's a pain. And when a dispute has descended into a pissing match, it's worse than a pain. It's a waste of my time. And I don't have time to waste.

    I suggest you wind things up.

    ReplyDelete
  55. This is my only response Dr. Feser to dguller.

    I am being nasty to him but I do feel it's justified, dguller IMHO (& you don't have to take my side in this or agree with me) is as Leiter is to you.


    My last response to him.

    >Explain to me how discrete counting is possible without quantity.

    Seriously? You can't discretely count 5 units from 3 to -2?

    Seriously?

    dguller I know this will not help you but try reading Aquinas ON THE POWER OF GOD Q9 Part 7 Art 4 and the reply to Art 4.

    Maybe you might actually get it for once?

    I doubt it.

    ReplyDelete
  56. Oh one more thing I forgot.

    "Without Quantity"?

    Do we mean "real quantity" or quantity that is not real like virtual, notional, minor virtual quantity etc?


    Do we mean "real quantity" such as the real number of subsisting persons which is really three persons but not really any real number in the sense of the absolute unity of essence?

    Do you know any of this?

    No & I doubt you have the will to learn it.

    Bye!

    ReplyDelete
  57. Ben:

    Seriously? You can't discretely count 5 units from 3 to -2?

    Sure you can. You can count discrete numbers down from 3 to -2. But note that you are still counting discrete numbers, which is exactly what is impossible when it comes to God for the reasons that I’ve elucidated.

    dguller I know this will not help you but try reading Aquinas ON THE POWER OF GOD Q9 Part 7 Art 4 and the reply to Art 4.

    Okay.

    The objection is that “the numerical terms” are “something really in God, and consequently predicated of him positively.” His response to that objection is that although he agrees that the numerical terms are “really in God”, that “it does not follow that they signify something positive besides the things to which they are attributed”. To me, Aquinas is just saying that the unity and multiplicity of the numerical terms are necessarily negative predicates, and not positive predicates. And the negative predicates do not add anything to the subject itself.

    How does this explain how one goes from the transcendental one and many to discrete numbers without invoking the genus of quantity?

    Do we mean "real quantity" or quantity that is not real like virtual, notional, minor virtual quantity etc?

    I mean a discrete countable number, such as one, two, three, and so on. This can be applied to really distinct entities, virtually distinct entities, and notionally distinct entities.

    Do we mean "real quantity" such as the real number of subsisting persons which is really three persons but not really any real number in the sense of the absolute unity of essence?

    You can ignore the essence part altogether, and just focus upon the three divine persons. What does the number “three” mean when you say “three divine persons”? Is it a discrete number? If it is, then it must be under the genus of quantity, and thus is an accident, which means that it cannot be predicated of God at all.

    If you deny this, then you must be claiming that there are discrete numbers that are not under the genus of quantity. This position is highly problematic. First, it implies the existence of discrete numbers that are not quantities, which is incoherent. Second, it implies that discrete numbers are transcendentals, which means that all of reality under the categories is countable by discrete numbers. But this is false, because there are some aspects of reality under the categories that is countable by continuous numbers, and not discrete numbers. Therefore, discrete numbers cannot be transcendentals, because they would have to apply to all of reality under the categories.

    So, I don’t think that you’ve made the case that it makes any sense to say that there are discrete numbers that are not under the genus of quantity.

    ReplyDelete
  58. Ed:

    Ben and I are wrapping it up soon, I think. Sorry about taking up your time.

    Just wondering, if you have a second, if you could recommend some resources for how discrete numbers can be applicable to God without presupposing the genus of quantity?

    Thanks, and take care.

    ReplyDelete
  59. >Ben and I are wrapping it up soon, I think. Sorry about taking up your time.

    It's already wrapped up & don't for a second think I will waste another 1000 posts trying in vain to correct your numerous blunders, misreadings, red herring, equivocations, errors & willful blindness.

    Including you latest ones.

    ReplyDelete
  60. BTW anyone ELSE reading this (Jack? DavidM? Mr. X? Bill?) who is interested in the concept of Transcendental Multiplicity I downloaded a copy of THE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS by Gilles Emery a month ago. Starting on .Page 137 (page 151 of the pdf document) gives a chapter on the subject.

    It is better to read the experts who studied this all their lives rather then persons who have only been familiar with it for oh let us say a month!


    Copy/paste this link an enjoy.

    http://opscriptis.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/94-gillesemeryop-thetrinitariantheologyofstthomasaquinas.pdf

    ReplyDelete
  61. This comment has been removed by the author.

    ReplyDelete
  62. Ben:

    BTW anyone ELSE reading this (Jack? DavidM? Mr. X? Bill?) who is interested in the concept of Transcendental Multiplicity I downloaded a copy of THE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS by Gilles Emery a month ago. Starting on .Page 137 (page 151 of the pdf document) gives a chapter on the subject.

    Actually, Emery does not give a “chapter” on transcendental multiplicity. He talks about it briefly in section 3 of chapter 7, from pages 137-141. And nowhere in that section does he explain how one goes from the transcendental one and many to numbers without smuggling in the genus of quantity.

    Furthermore, what he says basically confirms what I have been saying about transcendental multiplicity. I wrote above that transcendental multiplicity just means that “one individual being is divided from another individual being as different and distinct beings”, and Emery writes that “the transcendental multiplicity of the persons thus consists in the affirmation of each one person, and in the affirmation of the distinction of each person from the other” (p. 141). Or, as Aquinas writes in QDP 9.7: “a certain thing is undivided in itself, and distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.” That’s it.

    Didn't even do what I asked! You just skipped to reply 4. I knew it wouldn't help.

    I didn’t know what “Art 4” and “the reply to Art 4” in QDP 9.7 meant. I thought you meant the fourth objection and the reply to the fourth objection. I can’t find article 4 anywhere in QDP 9.7.

    Now, what I did find is Aquinas saying: “It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically”. What does that mean? Well, for Aquinas, a metaphor is when “what belongs to one thing is transferred to another, as when we say that a man is a stone because of the hardness of his intellect” (SCG 1.30.2). So, when you say that God is three divine persons, you are speaking “metaphorically”, which means that what belongs to the number three is transferred to God in the metaphor. But what is transferred from the number three to God in the metaphor? It cannot be the quantitative number three, which Aquinas has flatly denied is possible, because no quantitative numbers can be predicated of God due to their imperfections.

    I think that the metaphor can be explained as follows. In QDP 9.7 in the reply to objection seven, Aquinas writes that affirming multiplicity in God is a way of denoting “excess” (when using discrete quantitative terms of God) and denoting “his eminence over all creatures” (when using continuous quantitative terms of God). So, what is transferred from the terms of numerical multiplicity to God is the “excess”, “greater”, “more”, and so on in numerical multiplicity. That is the metaphorical meaning.

    But notice that nowhere does Aquinas affirm the actual number three of God, but rather uses numerical terms of multiplicity as metaphors to denote God’s eminence, excess and excellence, much like saying that God is a rock (Psalm 18:2) is just a metaphor for God’s being a strong foundation to build upon. That is why Aquinas said that these numerical terms only seem to be numerical. They are actually metaphors for God’s transcendence, and not indicative of actual numerical quantities in God, because that is impossible.

    Anyway, it’s been nice talking to you, as usual.

    Take care, and good luck with everything.

    *****************************************************

    And for anyone else who may be reading this thread, if you have any idea how the number three can be applicable to God when he transcends the genus of quantity, then please post some references.

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  63. And just to summarize, for anyone else who is reading, at the end of the day, this matter is quite simple.

    For the doctrine of the Trinity to be true, it must be possible to count discrete numbers in God, specifically counting to the number three. However, counting discrete numbers in God is impossible for two reasons. First, counting discrete numbers is a quantitative activity, and thus is under the genus of quantity, which means that the number that is predicated of God must be an accident. Since God cannot have accidents, it follows that God cannot have numbers, either, including the number three, which is necessary for the Trinity. Second, in order to count entities, they must first exist under a common genus as the same kind of countable thing. However, God neither exists under a genus nor is a genus himself, and thus this is also impossible. Therefore, counting is impossible with respect to God.

    Furthermore, Aquinas himself affirms that counting numbers is impossible with respect to God, which is why he denies that the “principle of number” is applicable to God. When he says that God is one, he is not saying that God is numerically one, but rather that God is transcendentally one, which just means that God is indivisible.

    When he says that God is three, he is using a term of numerical multiplicity (i.e. “three”) in a metaphorical fashion to affirm and denote God’s transcendence beyond creation. After all, when you have a numerical multiplicity (i.e. any number other than one), you necessarily have an ordered ranking of numbers. For example, the number 3 is a numerical multiplicity, and necessarily involves the ordered ranking of 3 > 2 > 1. It is precisely this ordered ranking in which some numbers are greater than others that Aquinas transfers to God when he uses terms of numerical multiplicity as predicates of God in a metaphorical fashion. Essentially, he is saying that God is greater than, is more than, is more eminent than, and is in excess of creation. In other words, he is transferring the “X > Y” relation to God in which X = God and Y = creation. However, he is not literally affirming the number three of God, which he has explicitly denied is possible.

    And if the number three cannot be literally predicated of God, then the doctrine of the Trinity cannot possibly be true of God, because it presupposes the validity of predicating the number three of God, which is impossible to do. It would be like affirming a doctrine that claimed that God was a material being. Since God cannot be material, it follows that the doctrine must be false. Similarly, if the Trinity states that God is countable, then if God is not countable, then the Trinity is false.

    ReplyDelete
  64. >And nowhere in that section does he explain how one goes from the transcendental one and many to numbers without smuggling in the genus of quantity.

    Except genus of quantity as Aquinas understood it, given his realism, refers to real numbers that signify real physical things.

    It doesn't exclude me from being able to say "divine goodness" and "divine justice" are two of God's attributes. Even thought neither is a genus of quantity and are only logically different from one another and not different in essence.

    It's that simple. The "two" here is a seemingly numeral term which is predicated of God as Aquinas says.

    That's just common sense.

    If you told Aquinas you are somehow forbidden to say DG & DJ are two divine attributes because there is no quantitative plurality in God he would have laughed in your face.

    You have no common sense dguller & you make mountains out of mole hills.

    Maybe now you can tell us how Ali wasn't the better fighter than Fazier in their second bout unless we can measure the actualize force of their punches?

    Because you know nobody can't tell how bear can be a better fight than a gator unless we do something similar.

    ReplyDelete
  65. Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is really two things given the complete otherness of God.

    But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.

    Why is this hard?

    ReplyDelete
  66. >And if the number three cannot be literally predicated of God, then the doctrine of the Trinity cannot possibly be true of God, because it presupposes the validity of predicating the number three of God, which is impossible to do.

    Of course if this latest misrepresentation & misinterpretation of Aquinas is somehow true then dguller's original MISINTERPRETATION of the Trinity being a "logical contradiction" can't then be true either since there is no way for him to claim the Trinity is somehow in some way teaching 3=1.

    In other words there is no way for him to somehow reformulate three persons in one essence to somehow mean 3=1.

    But then again nobody here believes he knows what he is talking about in the first place.

    WITH THIS I CLAIM THE LAST WORD

    ReplyDelete
  67. Ben:

    Except genus of quantity as Aquinas understood it, given his realism, refers to real numbers that signify real physical things.

    First, that is true. Aquinas says that “quantity properly speaking is a disposition of matter: so that all the species of quantity are mathematical entities which cannot exist apart from sensible matter”. That is yet another reason why numbers cannot be predicated of God, because numbers are necessarily quantities, and quantities can only exist in material beings as accidents. He also says: “It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically”. Since number is a “species of quantity” (QDP 9.7), it follows that no number can be predicated of immaterial beings, other than “metaphorically”.

    Second, that is irrelevant. We are talking about numbers. Not something that seems like it is a number, but is actually not a number, but actual numbers. “Three” is not seemingly a number, but is a number. Since numbers cannot be predicated of God, it follows that the number three cannot be predicated of God, either. When Aquinas says that God is three, he is not speaking numerically, but rather metaphorically to denote God’s transcendence.

    It doesn't exclude me from being able to say "divine goodness" and "divine justice" are two of God's attributes. Even thought neither is a genus of quantity and are only logically different from one another and not different in essence.

    That seems like an easy thing to do, but it is fraught with problems.

    First, to say that the divine goodness and the divine justice are two of God’s attributes presupposes that both are kinds of divine attributes, which would mean that there is a genus of divine attribute with divine goodness and divine justice as species of that genus, such that there is some differentiating factor that divides the two kinds of divine attributes. But God is beyond all genera, and thus this analysis cannot be applicable to God at all. And yet without this analytical structure, I don’t see how it is possible to count the divine attributes at all, because counting presupposes commonality of genus.

    Second, it presupposes the coherence of countable numbers that are not quantities. I think this idea makes as much sense as saying that there is matter that is not material. Aquinas says that “number” is a “species of quantity” (QDP 9.7), and thus is necessarily under the genus of quantity. When he talks about “number” being outside the genus of quantity, he says that it is “seemingly” a number, but not actually a number. Furthermore, he says that “number” when used outside the genus of quantity is actually a metaphor. So, when he says that God is one, he is not using the number one, but the transcendental one, which is a metaphor for God’s indivisibility. And when he says that God is three, he is using the number three as a metaphor for God’s transcendence and eminence with respect to creation. In other words, just as three is greater than one, God is greater than creation. It simply isn’t possible, under his system, to say that God is numerically three.

    Third, divine goodness and divine justice must have different essential predicates, which is the reason why they cannot be substituted for one another in a logical argument. For example, divine justice punishes, but divine goodness does not punish, and thus we cannot conclude that because divine justice punishes, therefore divine goodness punishes. That was the entire basis of your argument for why three divine persons does not necessarily imply three divine essences, i.e. a divine person is not a divine essence. Now, these are not accidental predicates such that they could be absent, and the divine attributes remain the same, but rather they are essential predicates. If X and Y have different essential predicates, then they must have different essences, and thus the divine attributes must have different essences.

    ReplyDelete
  68. It's that simple. The "two" here is a seemingly numeral term which is predicated of God as Aquinas says.

    Once again, you are ignoring the fact that Aquinas says that it is “seemingly” a numeral. When someone says that X is seemingly Y, they are not saying that X is Y, but rather that X only appears to be Y, but is actually not Y. For example, the stick seems to be bent in the water does not mean that the stick is bent in the water, but rather that the stick only appears to be bent, but is actually still straight. So, Aquinas is not saying that one can apply numbers to God, but rather is saying that one can use numerical terms about God as long as one recognizes that they do not represent actual numbers, but rather are metaphors for either God’s indivisibility or God’s transcendence.

    Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is really two things given the complete otherness of God.

    But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.


    The former is correct. The latter is incorrect. To say that there are two things implies a common scale between God and the universe, which you just said is impossible, given “the complete otherness of God”.

    ReplyDelete
  69. BTW nobody has bothered to define "genus of quantity".


    from the wiki on quantity.

    "In Mathematics the concept of quantity is an ancient one extending back to the time of Aristotle and earlier. Aristotle regarded quantity as a fundamental ontological and scientific category. In Aristotle's ontology, quantity or quantum was classified into two different types, which he characterized as follows:

    'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts, of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. 'Plurality' means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, magnitude that which is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one dimension is length; in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid. (Aristotle, book v, chapters 11-14, Metaphysics).

    In his Elements, Euclid developed the theory of ratios of magnitudes without studying the nature of magnitudes, as Archimedes, but giving the following significant definitions:

    A magnitude is a part of a magnitude, the less of the greater, when it measures the greater; A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind.

    For Aristotle and Euclid, relations were conceived as whole numbers (Michell, 1993). John Wallis later conceived of ratios of magnitudes as real numbers as reflected in the following:

    When a comparison in terms of ratio is made, the resultant ratio often [namely with the exception of the 'numerical genus' itself] leaves the genus of quantities compared, and passes into the numerical genus, whatever the genus of quantities compared may have been. (John Wallis, Mathesis Universalis)END

    When we say Divine Goodness and Divine Justice are two attributes of God are we making a ratio comparison between them? Are we dividing God's absolute essence when we compare them?

    So maybe simple comparitive counting "two divine attributes" isn't the same producing a genus of of quantity?

    Maybe?

    ReplyDelete
  70. Then there is "species of quantity" as defined by Aquinas?


    "Certain relations are founded upon quantity, especially upon that species of quantity which is number, to which the basic notion of measure pertains, as is evident in "double and half", "multiple and submultiple [fractions]" etc. Similarly "same", "like" and "equal" are founded upon unity, which is the principle of number.

    Joseph Kennedy OP Philosophy of nature Ch5.

    So how am I measuring God by saying "divine goodness & divine justice are two of God's attributes"?

    Nuff said.

    dguller doesn't know what he is talking about.

    He is just pulling shit out of his arse.

    ReplyDelete
  71. Anyway I know dguller is not really interested in a conversation with me anymore than I am with him.

    I will pray to make myself some.

    You can't argue with a troll.

    ReplyDelete
  72. Ben:

    Of course if this latest misrepresentation & misinterpretation of Aquinas is somehow true then dguller's original MISINTERPRETATION of the Trinity being a "logical contradiction" can't then be true either since there is no way for him to claim the Trinity is somehow in some way teaching 3=1.

    You are correct that if my argument against the Trinity presupposed the number three contradicting the number one, then it would not work if those numbers could not be predicated of God at all. However, that was never my argument.

    My argument was that if the divine persons were totally identical in every way in reality to the divine essence, then the divine persons could not be different from the divine essence in any way. However, since the divine persons are different from the divine essence in some ways, i.e. the divine persons are really distinct in some way and the divine essence is not really distinct in any way, then they cannot be totally identical to the divine essence in reality. This is perfectly consistent with the idea that God is a virtually composite entity with virtual components, i.e. the divine essence, the divine persons, the divine attributes, none of which is totally identical to the other, because they differ in important ways. That is why you cannot simply substitute one for the other in a logical argument, which is why it is not a logical contradiction to say that three divine persons necessarily means three divine essences. They are not the same virtual component in God, and thus have different essential predicates that define them.

    But what follows from this is that the divine essence is a different virtual component than the divine attributes and the divine persons. They are all the same in that they are virtual components of God, but they are different virtual components in that they have different essential predicates. For example, the Father generates, the Son is generated, the divine essence is not really distinct in any way, the divine justice punishes, the divine mercy forgives, and so on. The problem with this is that if the divine essence is identical to Being itself, then any virtual component that is not the divine essence is not Being itself, and anything that is not Being itself is a creature. It therefore follows that the divine attributes and the divine persons are all creatures, which is a logical contradiction, because they are supposed to be divine, and what is divine cannot be created.

    That is the contradiction.

    When we say Divine Goodness and Divine Justice are two attributes of God are we making a ratio comparison between them? Are we dividing God's absolute essence when we compare them?

    So maybe simple comparitive counting "two divine attributes" isn't the same producing a genus of of quantity?

    Maybe?


    First, thanks for looking that information up. It was interesting.

    Second, I do not understand what it means to say that a ratio leaves the genus of quantity and enters the genus of number. Does that mean that the ratio leaves the genus of quantity for a higher genus (of number) or for a lower genus (of number)? In other words, is the genus of number a transcendental, or is it a species of the genus of quantity? I am more inclined to say the latter than the former, but I’m open to arguments for the former.

    Third, I do not understand how saying that God has two attributes can be a “ratio comparison between them”. You are counting divine attributes using discrete numbers. Divine goodness, one attribute. Divine goodness and divine justice, two attributes. There is no ratio involved, and so I’m not too sure that this solves the problem.

    ReplyDelete
  73. >>>Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is really two things given the complete otherness of God.

    >>But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.

    >The former is correct. The latter is incorrect. To say that there are two things implies a common scale between God and the universe, which you just said is impossible, given “the complete otherness of God”.


    Yet both of us just did what you said cannot be done?

    Yet we just now talked about two things at once God and the universe?

    dguller you are quite mad & not in the angry sense I often am.

    I have to stop before I go mad in both senses.

    ReplyDelete
  74. dguller writes,

    Ben and I are wrapping it up soon, I think.

    Where have we heard that before?

    ReplyDelete
  75. Ben:

    "Certain relations are founded upon quantity, especially upon that species of quantity which is number, to which the basic notion of measure pertains, as is evident in "double and half", "multiple and submultiple [fractions]" etc. Similarly "same", "like" and "equal" are founded upon unity, which is the principle of number.

    Right. You have the genus of quantity, and number is a species of quantity, which is the “basic notion of measure”. How does this help your case at all? It just shows that I have been correct in saying that number is a species under the genus of quantity, and thus remains an accident, which means that it cannot predicable of God who lacks any accidents whatsoever.

    So how am I measuring God by saying "divine goodness & divine justice are two of God's attributes"?

    I never said that you are not measuring God. You are counting virtual parts of God, which is not permissible with respect to God, because counting necessarily involves counting numbers, and thus remaining under the genus of quantity.

    Yet both of us just did what you said cannot be done?



    Yet we just now talked about two things at once God and the universe?


    First, of course you can talk about God and the universe. I never said that you couldn’t. You just cannot meaningfully say that there are two things when you are talking about God and the universe, because God and the universe cannot exist under a common genus, which is necessary for counting. After all, counting involves counting things of the same kind, and if there is no common kind between things, then there can be no counting between them.

    Second, you can seem to be making sense, but actually be talking nonsense. I can write an entire treatise about how square triangles are impossible, and throughout the treatise use the term “square triangles”. However, just because I keep using that term does not mean that I’m actually saying anything meaningful when I say “square triangles”, even though I keep talking about square triangles. And that is because it is an incoherent pairing of words that mutually annihilate any combined meaning.

    Anyway, I think that we're done. Perhaps this subject can be revisited in the future.

    Take care.

    ReplyDelete

  76. >My argument was that if the divine persons were totally identical in every way in reality to the divine essence, then the divine persons could not be different from the divine essence in any way.

    So that is what it is now? So what was with all that mishigoss
    about not being able to figure out how the sense of three persons and the sense of one essence can't both be the same referent?

    Three persons/essences in one essence/person and all that? You agreed with that formula?

    "Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.

    Like saying God created everything from nothing therefore God must have created himself from nothing since God must be part of everything.

    Which is why you argument is sophistry not a logical contradiction.

    It's also jello trying to be nailed to a wall.

    Let's face it dguller this new argument you made up the day I first quoted G-L on Q30 will be different in a few weeks but you will still say it's the same argument & believe it too.

    ReplyDelete
  77. >Second, I do not understand what it means to say that a ratio leaves the genus of quantity and enters the genus of number.

    I'm sure you will make something up in harmony with your made up view of transendental multiplicity.

    ReplyDelete
  78. Our Conversation So Far

    dguller: The doctrine of divine simplicity appears to contradict the doctrine of the Trinity.

    BenYachov: That's not what Catholicism teaches. It's a mystery!

    dguller: That doesn't explain anything. There appears to be a contradiction, and I'm not convinced that Aquinas or anyone else has explained satisfactorily why it isn't really one. Here's why: [argument that doesn't quite engage the claim of mystery].

    BenYachov: Straw man! Troll! Fuck you! Everybody is sick of you! Rrrrrr! I'm so angry I could plotz! This is my last reply to this idiot!

    dguller: That still doesn't address my argument.

    BenYachov: Okay, this is my last reply!

    You two are going nowhere. Give it up and save Ed the time of moderating this counterproductive BS.

    ReplyDelete
  79. >First, thanks for looking that information up. It was interesting.

    >Second, I do not understand..............

    The only statement you have made lately that I agree with.

    How is it you made all these weird claims about Transendental multiplicity meaning I can't say "Divine Goodness and Justice are two attributes of God" without you first looking up the meanings of "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" and how Aristotle understood those terms to mean & how Aquinas understood them?

    QUOTE"Like substance, quantity seems like a reasonable candidate for a highest kind — quantities exist; quantities are not substances; substances are not quantities; and it is not clear what kind would stand above quantity. So, Aristotle's decision to make quantity a highest kind appears well motivated. Aristotle's treatment of quantity, however, does raise some difficult questions.

    Perhaps the most interesting question concerns the fact that some of the species in quantity appear to be quantified things rather than quantities themselves. Consider, for instance, body. In its most natural sense, ‘body’ signifies bodies, which are not quantities but rather things with quantities. The same is true of line, surface, place and arguably speech. Of course, there are quantities naturally associated with some of these species. For instance, length, breadth and depth are associated with line, body and surface. But Aristotle does not list these as the species under quantity. So, in the first instance, we can ask: does Aristotle intend his division of Quantity to be a division of quantities or quantified things?"END-Aristotle's Categories Standford Encl of Phil online

    ReplyDelete
  80. @Scott

    There are 2000 posts between dguller & I where I do address him directly point by point & cite the experts on these matters. He pretty much ignores my points & restates his argument. Over and over and over again. He did that to DavidM too. After all that I told him to go fuck himself & I don't take it back. DavidM got pissed at him too but he didn't use foul language..

    >You two are going nowhere. Give it up and save Ed the time of moderating this counterproductive BS.

    I guess dguller will have to be the better man.

    ReplyDelete
  81. >Right. You have the genus of quantity, and number is a species of quantity, which is the “basic notion of measure”. How does this help your case at all?

    The real question is how is saying divine goodness & divine justice are twoattributes of God equal some sort of measurement in God & thus making the use of the term "two"is a species of quantity? IT doesn't so it's not wrong to say ds & dj are two divine attributes.

    So obviously some type of discrete counting here is permitted provided you know your counting is not dividing, measuring or increasing God who cannot by nature be so counted by number. It's not an absolute counting which is what it seems both realists like Aristotle or Aquinas think "number" to be.

    Obviously predicating God with a species of quantity isn't done when we say Three persons either.

    Obj. Boethius says (De Trin.): That is truly one in which there is no number. But God is most truly one. Therefore number is not in him.

    Reply to the, First Objection. By these words Boethius means to exclude number from the divine essence: for this is the point of his discussion. -ON THE POWER OF GOD Q9 PART V.

    In your first reply to me you talked about the "category of quantity" not "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity".

    Nice bait & switch.

    > It just shows that I have been correct in saying that number is a species under the genus of quantity, and thus remains an accident, which means that it cannot predicable of God who lacks any accidents whatsoever.

    Rather you never bothered to find out what Aquinas or Aristotle meant by "number" or "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" or saying there are three persons. You just made up your own stuff by proof texting.

    ReplyDelete
  82. >I never said that you are not measuring God. You are counting virtual parts of God, which is not permissible with respect to God, because counting necessarily involves counting numbers, and thus remaining under the genus of quantity.

    How is counting virtual properties counting numbers in the sense of the genus of quantity? God is not really divided in his essence or quantified in his essence because of simplicity or increased in his essence when we say 3 persons or 2 attributes or more so they aren't examples of counting numbers in the genus of quantity in God.

    >First, of course you can talk about God and the universe.

    Which is talking about two things in some sense.

    > I never said that you couldn’t. You just cannot meaningfully say that there are two things when you are talking about God and the universe,

    In the absolute sense yes but Aquinas said "
    Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons. I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it."POWER OF GOD Ibin.

    So why are you complaining about something neither Aquinas nor I am trying to do? Maybe because you are not listening?

    >because God and the universe cannot exist under a common genus, which is necessary for counting. .

    Only in the absolute sense.

    I am not disputing the brute fact God is a Mystery and cannot be fully comprehended. But we can say things about God that are true as far as they go. So we are talking meaningfully about God as far as we can go on with our limited intellect talking true things about God.

    >Second, you can seem to be making sense, but actually be talking nonsense. I can write an entire treatise about how square triangles are impossible, and throughout the treatise use the term “square triangles”.

    Or I could be a two diminutional being talking to another about a tetrahedron(4 flat sides, 3 sided triangles) and you just think I am talking about a square circle and you refuse to even entertain the idea I am not talking about a Square triangle.

    >And that is because it is an incoherent pairing of words that mutually annihilate any combined meaning.

    Or maybe you just kept inventing your own meanings for terms instead of those of the tradition you are investigating?

    >Anyway, I think that we're done. Perhaps this subject can be revisited in the future.

    We can only hope we are done. Let it end.

    ReplyDelete
  83. Ben:

    So that is what it is now? So what was with all that mishigoss 
about not being able to figure out how the sense of three persons and the sense of one essence can't both be the same referent?

    We solved that problem by bringing in the virtual composition of God. The sense of “divine person” is different from the sense of “divine essence”, and the former refers to one virtual component of God, and the latter refers to a different component of God, but they both refer to God as the whole that has the different virtual parts.

    "Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.

    It isn’t. X is totally identical to Y iff X is the same as Y in every way iff X is not different from Y in any way. There never was any equivocation.

    Like saying God created everything from nothing therefore God must have created himself from nothing since God must be part of everything.

    I would never say such a thing.

    I'm sure you will make something up in harmony with your made up view of transendental multiplicity.

    My interpretation on transcendental multiplicity is supported by Emery and Aquinas, and I’ve provided quotations to that effect.

    How is it you made all these weird claims about Transendental multiplicity meaning I can't say "Divine Goodness and Justice are two attributes of God" without you first looking up the meanings of "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" and how Aristotle understood those terms to mean & how Aquinas understood them?

    That’s not an answer to my questions about ratio.

    The real question is how is saying divine goodness & divine justice are twoattributes of God equal some sort of measurement in God & thus making the use of the term "two"is a species of quantity? IT doesn't so it's not wrong to say ds & dj are two divine attributes.

    If all numbers are a species of the genus of quantity, then applying numbers to X means predicating an accident of X. Since God can have no accidents, it follows that God can have no numbers predicated of him. If that wasn’t the case, then Aquinas wouldn’t have said that the “principle of number” is inapplicable to God, but only transcendental unity/multiplicity are.

    So obviously some type of discrete counting here is permitted provided you know your counting is not dividing, measuring or increasing God who cannot by nature be so counted by number. It's not an absolute counting which is what it seems both realists like Aristotle or Aquinas think "number" to be.

    What is this “some type of discrete counting”? It involves numbers, and thus must be a species of the genus of quantity. But that cannot be possible for God, for the reasons that we talked about. That is why Aquinas said that it only seems like you are using numbers, but in reality, you aren’t. What he said was that whenever you use numerical terms of God, you are not actually applying numbers, but rather are speaking metaphorically. You are transferring a property of the number to God via the metaphor. When you say that God is one, you are not saying that God is numerically one, but rather that God is indivisible. When you say that God is three, you are not saying that God is numerically three, but rather that God is transcendent above creation.

    ReplyDelete
  84. As Aquinas says at QDP 9.7 at the response to the seventh objection:

    “According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) we speak of a number of things in two senses: first absolutely, and then number is the opposite of one: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller number, and then number is opposed to a few. In like manner magnitude may be taken in two ways: first absolutely, in the sense of a continuous quantity which is called a magnitude: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller quantity. In the first sense magnitude is not predicated of God but in the second, and denotes his eminence over all creatures.”

    Note that when Aquinas says “number” here, he actually means “multitude”, i.e. a plurality of number, like when you say, “there was a number of people”. He says that multitude can be taken in two senses: absolutely and comparatively. When it is taken absolutely, a multitude is simply “the opposite of one”, and when it is taken comparatively, it denotes “excess in relation to a smaller number”, or X > Y (e.g. 3 > 2, 5 > 2, etc.). He says that the absolute sense cannot be predicated of God, probably because that would mean that countable numbers are predicated of God, which he has already said is impossible when he denied that the “principle of number” can be applicable to God. But the comparative sense can be predicated of God, particularly in a metaphor in which “X > Y” can be transferred from multitude to God in order to denote God’s transcendence, greatness and eminence above creation.

    Otherwise, what does Aquinas mean when he says that numerical terms that are applied to God are not actually numbers, but are metaphors that only seem to be numbers? I’ve provided my explanation, which I think is consistent with Aquinas’ writings. What is yours?

    How is counting virtual properties counting numbers in the sense of the genus of quantity? God is not really divided in his essence or quantified in his essence because of simplicity or increased in his essence when we say 3 persons or 2 attributes or more so they aren't examples of counting numbers in the genus of quantity in God.

    Because you are using numbers, and numbers are a species of quantity, which means that they are under the genus of quantity, which means that they are accidents. And as you point out, numbers can only apply to what is divisible. If God is indivisible, then numbers cannot apply to God.

    Which is talking about two things in some sense.

    It isn’t. If there is no common genus between X and Y, then you cannot count X and Y.

    ReplyDelete
  85. In the absolute sense yes but Aquinas said "
Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons. I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it."POWER OF GOD Ibin.

    Let’s assume that it is possible to count numbers outside of the categories. That would mean that countable numbers are transcendental, because they would be applicable beyond the categories. And that would mean that everything in creation is countable, including the degree of human flourishing.

    It would also mean that countable numbers must be interconvertible with the other transcendentals. In other words, the number three would be identical in reality to being, to goodness, to truth, to beauty, and so on. To me, that makes absolutely no sense at all. The reason why is that if the number three is identical all the other transcendentals, then the number four must also be identical to all the other transcendentals, and since they are all interchangeable, then the number three must be identical to the number four, which is a logical contradiction.

    Only in the absolute sense.

    So, there is a relative sense in which God and creation do exist under a common genus? Can you elaborate, because this would violate everything I’ve ever read on the subject.

    I’ll tell you what, Ben. If your next response to me is civil and substantive, then I’d be happy to continue this conversation with you, perhaps on an unmoderated thread. But if you don’t actually address my points, and hurl abuse upon me, then I’ll let that be your last word. Or, you could just not respond to me, take this as an opportunity to learn to control your passions and feelings. You could be like the great Aquinas, and leave this work unfinished. :)

    Take care.

    ReplyDelete
  86. Scott:

    dguller: That doesn't explain anything. There appears to be a contradiction, and I'm not convinced that Aquinas or anyone else has explained satisfactorily why it isn't really one. Here's why: [argument that doesn't quite engage the claim of mystery].

    I have addressed Ben’s claims of mystery before. They probably just got lost in the shuffle.

    My argument against the claim of mystery is the following. Say that a person belonged to a faith that endorsed the following propositions:

    (1) God is material
    (2) God is pure act
    (3) It is impossible for there to be a logical contradiction in God
    (4) If there seems to be a logical contradiction, then the matter must be subsumed under the category of mystery

    Clearly, on the basis of (1) and (2), we get the following:

    (5) God has potentiality (by (1))
    (6) God has no potentiality (by (2))
    (7) (5) contradicts (6)

    Since (7) appears to be a logical contradiction, we must apply (3) and (4) to conclude:

    (8) It is a mystery how (1) and (2) do not logically contradict one another

    Only someone in the religion in question would endorse (8). Most people would conclude on the basis of (7) that either (1), (2), or (3) is false, by virtue of reductio ad absurdum, but with mystery, this move is completely blocked. In fact, one can theoretically never be permitted to apply a reductio ad absurdum, because one can always cry, “mystery!” For me, the fact that this attitude allows the endorsement of propositions as grossly contradictory as (1) and (2) shows this attitude to be a false one. After all, it makes clear logical contradictions permissible, which destroys the truth-preserving capacity of any rational system.

    ReplyDelete
  87. >I’ll tell you what, Ben. If your next response to me is civil and substantive, then I’d be happy to continue this conversation with you, perhaps on an unmoderated thread.

    The problem dguller is I don't believe you are civil nor do I find anything you have to say substansive. What? Didn't you notice the way you treated DavidM was wrong?

    Ignoring his points? Majoring in the minors? Repeating yourself instead of arguing his points? Acting like an arrogant know-it- all? Others commented negatively about your style as well.

    It is possible to be "uncivil" without uttering a single curse word. David was trying to be polite to you & you acted like a jerk.

    Aquinas says explicitly there is number in the Trinity but not in the Divine Essence in ON THE POWER OF GOD QUESTION 9 PART V. He also says elsewhere in part VII there is no number in God. So obviously he is using the term "number" in two different senses. I suspect the later has something to do with his realist view of mathematics that real numbers correspond to real objects in some fashion. God is not an object.

    >>"Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.

    >It isn’t. X is totally identical to Y iff X is the same as Y in every way iff X is not different from Y in any way. There never was any equivocation.

    Yet G-L says rather explicitly in his commentary on Q32 in the SUMMA that the Father is God and the Trinity is God but the Father is NOT the Trinity.

    So obviously the term "fully God" we traditionally use isn't equivalent to your made up term "totally identical". So you are arguing a Straw man & you won't find a single Catholic here familiar with the Trinity who thinks you are doing otherwise & you have been told as much by others (David, Bill Jack etc).

    There is no advantage to anyone here having a conversation on any of these issues with you IMHO.

    You condescending offer to continue this "conversation" is neither required or desired.

    Bye!

    ReplyDelete
  88. Ed:

    Could you please delete the last post I sent? I'll just let Ben have the last word here, and spare you the misery of having to moderate the thread.

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete