Since therefore grace does not
destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity… Hence sacred doctrine makes use
also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were
able to know the truth by natural reason…
St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.1.8
Here’s one
way to think about the relationship between nature and grace, reason and faith,
philosophy and revelation. Natural
theology and natural law are like a skeleton, and the moral and theological
deliverances of divine revelation are like the flesh that hangs on the
skeleton. Just as neither skeleton alone
nor flesh alone give you a complete human being, neither do nature alone nor
grace alone give you the complete story about the human condition.
By natural theology and natural law I have in mind, of course, the philosophical knowledge of God and of morality embodied in what is sometimes called the “perennial philosophy” -- the tradition represented by the classical (Platonic and Aristotelian) philosophers and brought to a higher degree of perfection by the great Scholastics. By themselves natural theology and natural law as developed within this tradition are like a skeleton: striking, solid, and enduring, but also dry, cold, and dead. That is to say, on the one hand the central arguments of natural theology and natural law are (when rightly understood, as they often are not) impressive and rationally compelling, but can also seem remote from everyday life insofar as they are sometimes hard to understand and deliver a conception of God and of morality that can seem forbiddingly abstract. To be sure, I think the “coldness” and “abstractness” of natural theology and natural law are often greatly overstated, but I don’t deny that there is some truth to the standard caricature.
By the
deliverances of divine revelation I have in mind, of course, what we know of
God and of morality from scripture, from the creeds, councils, and tradition
more generally, and from the Magisterium of the Church. By themselves these deliverances are like
flesh without a skeleton: warm and human, but also weirdly distorted and unable
to stand on its own or to offer resistance.
That is to say, on the one hand the theological and moral deliverances
of revelation are more profound than anything natural theology and natural law
can give us, and speak to us in a more personal and accessible way. But they can also seem (when wrongly
understood, as they often are) to lack any objective rational foundation, and
to reflect a culturally and historically parochial view of human life that
cannot apply to all times and places. To
be sure, these purported defects of Christian theology are also, to say the
least, greatly overstated, but there is some truth to this caricature too to
the extent that Christian theology is not informed by natural theology, natural
law, and the methods of philosophy more generally.
There have
of course been times when the significance of nature, reason, and philosophy
have been overemphasized -- when the claims of grace, faith, and revelation
have been deemphasized and religion reduced to a rationalist skeleton. But
the pressing danger today comes from the opposite direction. Talk of “faith” has been bastardized, so that
many believers and skeptics alike wrongly take it to refer essentially to a
kind of subjective feeling or irrational will to believe. Too much popular preaching and piety has been
reduced to trashy self-help sentimentality.
Too many philosophers of religion have for too long been playing defense
-- maintaining, not that theism is in a position rationally and evidentially
superior to atheism, but instead conceding the evidential issue and pleading
merely that religious belief not be regarded as less rational for that. Too many theologians have turned their
attention away from questions of objective, metaphysical truth to matters of aesthetics,
or moral sentiment, or psychology, culture, or history.
In short, religious
believers have been fleeing into a non-cognitive ghetto almost faster than
skeptics can push them into it. They are
too often like the hypochondriac in Ray Bradbury’s short story “Skeleton,”
who is pathologically fearful of his own bones and ends up losing them --
reduced in the horrific climax to a helpless, amorphous blob. What Christian theology needs now more than
ever is its traditional, Scholastic backbone.
Wow. That is too precious. 'Basically' you obviously haven't got a clue as to how the scientific method works. I'll give you a hint: the scientific method cannot be used to test the efficacy of the scientific method.
ReplyDeleteUntrue. You have the goal of understanding the empirical world. You have two options about how to do this.
(1) Actively seeking disconfirming evidence for one’s hypothesis in order to broaden the evidence base for one’s beliefs to include evidence that may refute one’s hypothesis, and ensuring that one examines one’s own hypothesis with the same high standards that one uses to reject others’ hypotheses
(2) Ignoring disconfirming evidence for one’s hypothesis and cherry picking evidence to only include evidence that supports one’s hypothesis, and using strict epistemic standards for other hypotheses while using lax epistemic standards for one’s own in order to avoid any chance of rejecting them
I think that you will agree that (1) is far more likely to result in a better understanding of the natural world than (2). In fact, (1) is built right into the scientific method, and is one of the key reasons that it has been so successful. Or maybe you believe that (2) is better than (1)? I highly doubt.
So, although you are correct that the scientific method cannot prove the scientific method without circularity, it is nonetheless true that the scientific method has proven to be the best method humans have yet devised to understand the natural world, just given its massive success in that domain. If you disagree with this, then tell me about a superior method that we can use to understand how the natural world works.
What does count against it is the OTFers cumulative pattern of failures to follow basic rules of rigorous thinking - which, *please* note, are the actual substantive means of avoiding confirmation bias, not any exercise of the imagination about being an 'outsider.'
Given unconscious psychological tendencies, I would say that those who firmly cling to beliefs that they are evaluating have less objectivity in assessing the evidence for and against their beliefs than those who do not firmly cling to their beliefs, but rather hold them in doubt. Would you agree?
Think about this: Surely there is no reason to think an 'outsider,' as such, will have better critical thinking skills than an 'insider,' as such?
There are good reasons to reject this, given human psychology. People apply solid analysis to beliefs that they reject, and they apply lax analysis to beliefs that they accept. So, as an empirical matter, you are wrong here.
- so why not just imagine oneself as an 'insider' with exemplary critical thinking skills, since they are what really matters, not insider or outsider status?
Because just thinking highly of your skills does not improve your skills, at least in this particular area. Like I said, there are lots of studies that show that the more firmly one believes one’s beliefs, the more likely one will reason erroneously. It is the fact that the beliefs are yours that makes the difference here, not how well you reason. People reason just fine in some contexts, but then their reason utterly fails them in others. How much one wants to believe something is one factor in such a scenario.
The only possible benefit of the OTF is to encourage more rigorous thinking; if champions of the OTF prove to be rather dismal critical thinkers, then surely this is prima facie evidence (note: not *decisive proof*) against the OTF.
ReplyDeleteAnd people who engage in motivated reasoning to minimize cognitive dissonance are Vulcan-like logicians? The bottom line is that nobody is perfect, and we are all human, which means that we are all vulnerable to the same underlying and unconscious cognitive mechanisms that distort the accuracy of our reasoning to determine the truth. We all have to take steps to minimize those distortions. One distortion occurs in the context of evaluating beliefs that one firmly holds, and it often results in rationalization rather than reasoning. Since this occurs less often when one evaluates beliefs that one does not firmly believe, then any strategy that helps one decrease the firmness of one’s beliefs will help decrease the biases and distortions here. The OTF is one such way, I think. People often see things when putting themselves in the position of others that they cannot see when in their own position.
Let's examine your (8) more closely:
"X is fully Y in reality iff X is identical to Y in every way in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any way in reality"
So Hesperus (X) is fully Venus (Y) in reality iff Hesperus is identical to Venus in every way in reality...?
False. Hesperus is fully Venus in reality, but not in every way in reality, since Venus can be seen in the morning and evening, whereas Hesperus can only be seen in the evening.
Hesperus is not fully Venus. Hesperus is partially Venus. Hesperus is the name for Venus as it appears in the morning. Since Venus also appears at other times of the day, how it appears in the morning is only part of its identity. However, Jin Xing (i.e. “the Gold Star” in Chinese) is fully Venus. They are just different names for the same planet in reality in its entirety.
So, (8) remains true. Remember (8) applies whenever you have the exact same referent in reality, but different terms for that referent, and different senses for that referent. However, in reality, the different terms and senses are just in the mind, and in reality, there is only the common and identical referent.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteOh my God you really have not been paying attention! The fact you and I as creatures both have a distinct essence that is distinct from out existence makes us metaphysically composite! God's essence is his existence and vice versa thus he is metaphysically simple! This is Philosophy & Natural Theology 101!!!
Just wanted to make sure we were both using the terms in the same way to avoid equivocation.
What part of "I I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.” do you not understand? I do not have to say what they are I just have to say they are absent any provable logical contradiction.
That’s fine. Just tell me what you mean when you say that there are different senses in God. It doesn’t have to be done “clearly”. Anything will do at this point. After all, to say that you do not see X “clearly”, means that you still see something of X. If you saw nothing of X, then it is not that you fail to see clearly. In that case, you fail to see entirely. So, even if you only have a partial or limited view of this issue, then share what you see and understand from that view, please.
The referent God is an unqualified equivocal(& if you want to call it some type of unqualified multivocal analogy go for it). As such we don't know what it is and cannot know but we can know something about it(He created us, is divinely simple, 3 persons yada yada) & that is why we cannot call it a pure equivocal.
First, if know something about X, but not everything about X, then you have partial knowledge about X. Unfortunately, as I’ve said before, this is impossible if X is simple.
Second, an analogy is a conceptual and linguistic judgment in the mind. To say that a referent is an analogy is to say that the referent itself is in the mind. Since you cannot mean that God is merely in the mind, you must be misspeaking above when you say that “the referent God” is “some type of unqualified multivocal analogy”.
I misspelled "Many" as "may". Feel better now?
Nope. Still incomprehensible to me. Sorry.
The numeral terms do not add anything positive to God since they express not a quantitative but a transcendental plurality, which is not properly speaking a number.
How can you say that saying that there are three X's does not involve the number 3? What exactly do you mean by "three X's" then?
Multitude does not do away with unity; it removes division from each of those entities which constitute the multitude……………..the transcendental plurality of persons in God does not destroy the unity of God.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that God’s unity is due to the divine simplicity of the divine nature. Aquinas writes that “"one" means undivided "being." This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being."” (ST Ia, Q11, A1). So, the unity in question is identical to God’s being, and since God’s being is identical to God’s essence, it follows that God’s unity is identical to God’s essence.
God’s unity is only violated if there is real distinction in the divine essence. You claim that the divine persons are in the divine essence, which means that there is real distinction in the divine essence, unless you want to claim that the real distinction in the divine persons is left outside the divine essence when the divine persons are inside the divine essence. Clearly, that is absurd, because their essential properties cannot leave them without destroying them altogether. Therefore, the divine essence contains real distinction, because it contains really distinct divine persons inside of it, which means that its unity is destroyed.
But if it were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature would be multiplied in the three individuals, and there would be three gods
I agree.
BTW you can't treat a transcendental plurality as unequivocally interchangeable with a qualitative one. Because that would not be coherent.
I don’t know what this means.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteYou know in my very first post to dguller I said this "dguller you are making the classic mistake(the one Bill V makes) of trying to see the Trinity as teaching there is One Hypostasis who is simultaneously Three Hypostasis. Or there is One Nature which is somehow Three Natures. Or deny the distinction between Hypostasis vs Nature/Essence."
And I have been saying to you from the beginning that to say that X is fully Y, or X is totally identical to Y, or X is 100% Y, means that there is nothing that is true about X that is not also true about Y, and that X and Y cannot differ in any way in reality. That is what “fully”, “totally identical”, and “100%” mean. You keep using these terms, or their equivalents, in ways that violate their very meaning, and thus are using them in a meaningless way. If you want to prove me wrong, then just define how you are using these particular terms.
Ladies and Gentilemen the dguller doctrine of the "trinity".- Being identical in essence means you must and can only be identical in person. So three Persons are the same as Three Essences in One Person who is One Essence.
That is only true if you say that the divine persons are 100%/fully/totally identical to the divine essence in reality. If you do not say that, then certainly three persons do not equal three essences, and one essence does not equal one person.
This proposition is true: the Deity is the Father. The reason is that personal substantive names, like Father, can be predicated of the essence because of the real identity of the essence and the person. Thus we can say, the divine essence is the Father, and the divine essence is the Son; but we cannot say that the divine essence generates or is generating or spirating, because these are adjective names, which are attributed to persons but not to the three persons.
G-L could mean one of two things when he says that there is a “real identity of the essence and the person”:
(1) A is really identical to B iff A and B are both in X as (real or virtual) parts of X. In that case, the divine essence is really identical to the divine persons iff the divine essence and the divine persons are both in God as (virtual) parts of God. This basically means that “A” and “B” are different terms for different referents, which are parts of X.
(2) A is really identical to B iff A is totally identical to B in reality iff A and B are the same in every way iff A and B are different in no way. In that case, the divine essence is really identical to the divine persons iff the divine essence is totally identical to the divine persons in reality. This basically means that “A” and “B” are just different terms for the exact same underlying referent as a whole.
Which do you think G-L means? My answer to what G-L must mean comes below.
So when you glibly state "each divine person is 100% God" are you making a formal predication or an identical predication? Because it seems like you are making an identical predication but equivocating in treating it like a formal one.
ReplyDelete“Formal predication” occurs when “the predicate belongs to the subject according to its formal nature”, while “identical predication” occurs when the predicates belong to the subject, but not according to its formal nature. G-L also calls identical predication, “material predication” elsewhere.
For example, the divine attributes of the divine mercy and the divine justice involve identical predication, and not formal predication. They are both predicated of a common subject, i.e. God himself, but they are not fully identical to one another, because they differ in some ways. As G-L says, “it does not belong to the divine mercy to punish; the divine mercy pardons, condones, and it is the divine justice that punishes”. That means that the nature of the divine mercy is different from the nature of the divine justice, and thus they do not “belong to the subject according to its formal nature”.
So, I would say that the divine persons must be identical – in the sense of identical predication – to the divine essence. That would have to correspond to my (1) above, which means that it is just another way of saying that the divine persons are a minor virtual part of God and the divine essence is a different minor virtual part of God, and their real identity corresponds to their both being predicated of a common underlying reality, albeit as different virtual parts of that underlying reality.
But, again, that account implies that there is a difference between the divine essence and the divine persons, and thus they are not fully identical to one another. At best, they are partially identical to one another since they are different virtual parts of God. In other words, they are partially identical in that they are both parts of God, but they are partially different in that they are different parts of God. Furthermore, they cannot be the same virtual part of God, because if they were, then there are not virtual parts of God at all, and there is only God. And since they are different, it follows that the divine persons are not fully identical to the divine essence – in the sense of (1) above – which means that the divine persons are creatures, because Aquinas has said: “[e]verything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST Ia, Q28, A2).
>Just wanted to make sure we were both using the terms in the same way to avoid equivocation.
ReplyDeleteThen why did you ask me what is "metaphysical composition" if you knew what it was all along? Why have you been denying you are arguing a Straw man when you have been arguing a view of "Divine Simplicity" that is more than mere physical and metaphysical simplicity?
So you have been mercilessly arguing by equivocation with me just "to make sure" we avoid equivocation?
Are you on drugs dgullers? Because it must be some awesome shit & I wouldn't mind knowing where I could score some.
>That’s fine. Just tell me what you mean when you say that there are different senses in God. It doesn’t have to be done “clearly”. Anything will do at this point.
So for the umpteenth time I will say the one true God is relative WHO'S and Absolute WHAT & what the one true God is as that is a mystery. Other then this I don't understand what you are really asking & also I don't know if you are secretly equivocating with this question like you where doing with the divine simplicity as some way to avoid equivocation.
What do you think a "sense" is?
>First, if know something about X, but not everything about X, then you have partial knowledge about X. Unfortunately, as I’ve said before, this is impossible if X is simple.
How does having no metaphysical composition and no physical composition(i.e. Divine simplicity) in essence make it impossible to know something about God? How is not knowing what God is in essence equivocal to know something about God other than what God is in essence?
>Second, an analogy is a conceptual and linguistic judgment in the mind. To say that a referent is an analogy is to say that the referent itself is in the mind.
No here we have a conceptual and linguistic judgment in the mind about unknowable Ultimate Reality which we can know something about but not what is it in essence.
>>The numeral terms do not add anything positive to God since they express not a quantitative but a transcendental plurality, which is not properly speaking a number.
ReplyDelete>How can you say that saying that there are three X's does not involve the number 3? What exactly do you mean by "three X's" then?
Who knows we will have to do more reading except whatever it is it does not involve a qualitative number so no arguments assuming "3 Persons" in One Essence involves qualitative numbers. Of oourse that will kill your search for a "logical contrition" but that is not my problem, It's your problem you are the accuser here the burden is on you. I am for the defense.
>The problem is that God’s unity is due to the divine simplicity of the divine nature. Aquinas writes that “"one" means undivided "being."
Which is just another way of saying No physical composition and no metaphysical composition.. Nothing more may be added to this definition without changing it & arguing a Straw Man.
>This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being."” (ST Ia, Q11, A1). So, the unity in question is identical to God’s being, and since God’s being is identical to God’s essence, it follows that God’s unity is identical to God’s essence.
There is nothing predicated in the Transcendental plurality that causes God to be separate Existence and Essence since it is not properly speaking a number. We would need a qualitative plurality to do that QUOTE"But if it were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature would be multiplied in the three individuals, and there would be three gods."
If you don't know what a TP is dguller you can't assume it is identical to a numerical plurality especially when it's said to be not.
>You claim that the divine persons are in the divine essence, which means that there is real distinction in the divine essence, unless you want to claim that the real distinction in the divine persons is left outside the divine essence when the divine persons are inside the divine essence.
This is the place you always return to in order to pretend to not know whatever "real distinctions" are (& as the Eastern Fathers say they are inscrutable) between persons they are not any kind of real distinction in essence is not really part of the doctrine of the Trinity. Then you say cray shit like "the essence is contaminated by relations that are real".
They are not really outside the divine essence since they are subsisting divine relations.
Now what is a subsisting divine relation & how is it really distinct from an opposing relation yet identical to all divine relations and attributes in essence? We can't know it is defined as a Strict mystery a human intellect cannot fathom.
Why is this hard?
>>But if it were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature would be multiplied in the three individuals, and there would be three gods
>I agree.
You just contradicted yourself dguller because if you agree it takes a numerical plurality in God to divide God into many gods or make him composite & a Transcendental plurality IS NOT a numerical plurality then you can't coherently say a Transcendental plurality is the same as a numerical plurality.
>>BTW you can't treat a transcendental plurality as unequivocally interchangeable with a qualitative one. Because that would not be coherent.
>I don’t know what this means.
You don't know what is means to say that something "which is not properly speaking a number" can't coherently be used interchangeably with something "that properly speaking is a number'?
You don't understand the principle that if A does not equal B then A cannot take the place of B?
>So, I would say that the divine persons must be identical – in the sense of identical predication – to the divine essence.
ReplyDeleteThat merely means the persons are the one God in essence. It does not mean Persons are Essences and Essence is a Person for the billionth time.
>G-L could mean one of two things when he says that there is a “real identity of the essence and the person”:
The answer is he means neither 1 or 2 in reference to God. If you read up one him instead of snapshots if you researched meanings instead of making up your own on the fly we would be discussing the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity for one.
Instead we are wasting time talking about the dguller-doctrin of the "trinity".
>above, which means that it is just another way of saying that the divine persons are a minor virtual part of God and the divine essence is a different minor virtual part of God,
We don't use the term "parts" but "distinctions".
See what I mean? You just make it up as you go along and yet claim with a straight face you are not arguing a Straw Man. Even though the two Trinitarian Christians you are talking too say you are.
dguller what profit is there (other then provoking my ill will) in discussing the dguller doctrine of the "trinity" instead of the Catholic one?
You have written so much confusing nonsense it is impossible to keep up correcting it al, having you resist the correction & having you on the spot making up your own definitions of terms without doing any research first so what is the point?
DavidM I think agrees with me. 1800 posts and you have yet to discuss the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.
@BenYachov:
ReplyDelete" . . . whatever it is it does not involve a qualitative number . . . "
You've written "qualitative" several times in this context. Do you perhaps mean "quantitative"? That would make better sense, and it's what your source earlier in the thread says.
DavidM is correct trying to answer dguller point by point is becoming tedious. Let's keep it simple.
ReplyDeleteTo put it all simply Christians believe there are Three Divine Persons subsisting in the One Divine Essence.
dguller interprets this to mean by his own admission to mean A) there are Three divine Persons/Essences subsisting in the One divine Person/Essence(i.e. a clearly conceivable contradiction also known as a logical contradiction).
The Christian says whatever the Trinity is it is not A!
Dguller keeps insisting the Trinitarian formula must be that & the fundamental problem with A is obvious.
A is not in anyway a Strict Mystery it is an easily conceivable contradiction.that is something that is unintelligible in itself, but not unintelligible only for us."-
When dguller tries to interpret the Trinitarian formula he either interprets it as a conceivable contradiction or as intelligible modalism or Tri-theism.
He never interprets it as a strict mystery that contains no obvious logical contradiction.
Thus he talks about anything and everything other then the doctrine of the Trinity.
God is distinct persons and absolute essence. Whatever distinct persons are in God they are not anything that causes distinction in the absolute essence. Whatever distinct persons are in God they can only be objectively a Strict Mystery. Which means whenever dguller asks "Then how are these persons really distinct if they don't cause the essence to be distinct"? That is an inappropriate question since it assumes there should be no mystery here & we should be able to conceive of what they are as opposed to something about them such as that is they distinct the persons one to the other. When he asks "Well then how can distinct persons be subsisting in the essence should they be outside the essence?". Same thing.
As Feser said and dogma says Mytery is not merely an option for Catholics it is required to do orthodox Trinitarian theology. Dropping it as dguller does means he has yet after 18000 posts to address the Trinity.
Another thing dguller refuses to get about the Trinity (though it is in all the literature I have recommend to him that he clearly has not read) is there is a Grammar of the Trinity. That is there are certain ways to speak of God as Trinity that convey the Truth of the Faith and there are other ways that do nothing but distort the Truth.
ReplyDeleteThe term "Fully" God merely is a term of identity. If individual divine persons, Attributes & or the Divine Essence are compared to each other as fully God that merely means they fully have the identity as God. That is they are equally Divine in the Classic Theistic Sense. That doesn't mean the Divine Essence begets the Son. Or the divine mercy condemns the wicked. Or the divine will came upon the Apostles at Pentecost. Or the Lord decreed according to his Holy Spirit. The Grammar of the Trinity is explained in detail in McDermott's translation of the Summa on page 76 starting with his commentary translation of Q39.
Here is an example of rejecting Mystery & some sophistry.
ReplyDelete>God’s unity is only violated if there is real distinction in the divine essence. You claim that the divine persons are in the divine essence, which means that there is real distinction in the divine essence,
Translation: The puppies are your brothers because you dog is their father & your dog is both your dog and a Father therefore your Father since it is your dog and a Father so you are the human brother to puppies.
You are a Sophist dguller & what I wrote above is what your "argument" looks like.
>unless you want to claim that the real distinction in the divine persons is left outside the divine essence when the divine persons are inside the divine essence.
Divine relations by definition are really distinct one from another but negatively they are not any kind of real distinction in essence & divine relations are subsisting in essence. This falls under the definition of a Strict Mystery that cannot be intelligible to a mere human intellect therefor to postulate positively the nature of the real distinctions between persons is a move that denies their strict mystery & tries to define them as something intelligible to the human intellect such as their subsisting outside the Absolute Essence. But since the real relations between persons are by definition a Strict Mystery ANYTHING you imagine or intelligently conceive them to be is wrong & they are not that. Wither it's a logical contradiction which by definition is intelligible to the human mind or some form of modalism, divine passibility. Tri-Theism etc…
You must accept Strict Mystery to have an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. If you throw it away you no longer have the Trinity but dguller-doctrine & who give a rat's butt abut that? Not this guy.
What is Transcendental plurality vs the divine Unity?
ReplyDeletesee here.
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#9:7
Here is another more popular explanation of Q30 which talks about it.
http://readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2010/11/question-30-plurality-of-divine-persons.html
Of course I don't have high hopes at this point. dguller seems to what to interpret all Trinitarian writings in terms of the dguller-doctrine of the "trinity" rather then in terms of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.
At best I fear I am merely giving him more material to misread and misinterpret with more fallacies of equivocation and Straw men. But there is that small hope the old dguller will come back with his open mind and open heart. Bah! Who am I kidding there is no hope. He is just going to come up with even more creative novel reinterpretations then he has inflicted on us so far.
This assumes he does the reading which also doesn't happen.
ReplyDeleteThank you Scott! Sometimes the auto-spell doesn't work right on my IMac.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteThen why did you ask me what is "metaphysical composition" if you knew what it was all along?
Because I didn’t want to repeat your equivocation on “equivocal”.
Why have you been denying you are arguing a Straw man when you have been arguing a view of "Divine Simplicity" that is more than mere physical and metaphysical simplicity?
I’ve admitted virtual composition in God, and said that virtual composition does not negate divine simplicity.
What do you think a "sense" is?
I’ve already defined it many times. A sense is a cognitive and linguistic representation or construct in the mind that points towards a referent. You said that you agreed with this definition, and yet you completely abuse it when you say that there are senses in God. That would mean that there are different cognitive and linguistic representations or constructs in God that point towards referent(s). That makes absolutely no sense at all, Ben. So, I want to know what you mean. It seems that even you have no idea what you mean by “sense”.
How does having no metaphysical composition and no physical composition(i.e. Divine simplicity) in essence make it impossible to know something about God?
Now that we both agree that there is virtual composition in God, I think that one can say that one can have partial knowledge about God, if one knows some of God’s virtual parts, but not others. However, there is another more important objection to knowledge about God. To know God is to have God’s essence as an intelligible form in our intellect. However, that would mean that one has God himself in his full actuality in our intellect, because the divine essence is Being itself. Unfortunately, this is impossible, because that would mean that God is limited by our intellect, and God is necessarily unlimited. Why is God limited by our intellect? Because God would have to be received into our potential intellect, and act is limited by potency that is receptive of the act. Therefore, God as pure act is limited by the potency of our potential intellect, which is receptive of God’s essence.
No here we have a conceptual and linguistic judgment in the mind about unknowable Ultimate Reality which we can know something about but not what is it in essence.
That makes sense. What you said earlier made no sense. You said that a referent is an analogy, which only makes sense if one is talking about a mental judgment, and not about anything outside of the mind.
Who knows we will have to do more reading except whatever it is it does not involve a qualitative number so no arguments assuming "3 Persons" in One Essence involves qualitative numbers.
What does “3” mean, if one strips it of quantitative number? (I don’t think you mean “qualitative number”, because that is incoherent.) If you can read something that can make any sense of this, then I’m genuinely interested in hearing about it. Perhaps you can also read something about a square with no sides, as well.
Of oourse that will kill your search for a "logical contrition" but that is not my problem, It's your problem you are the accuser here the burden is on you. I am for the defense.
ReplyDeleteThis has nothing to do with my argument at all.
There is nothing predicated in the Transcendental plurality that causes God to be separate Existence and Essence since it is not properly speaking a number. We would need a qualitative plurality to do that QUOTE"But if it were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature would be multiplied in the three individuals, and there would be three gods."
Again, I would love for you to explain to me what “plurality” means without “quantity”. “Plural” just means “more than one”, and “more than one” is a quantity, through and through.
This is the place you always return to in order to pretend to not know whatever "real distinctions" are (& as the Eastern Fathers say they are inscrutable) between persons they are not any kind of real distinction in essence is not really part of the doctrine of the Trinity. Then you say cray shit like "the essence is contaminated by relations that are real".
I don’t have to know what “real distinctions” are. All I need to know is that “real distinctions”, whatever they are, must be present in the divine relations, and so if the divine relations are in X, then their real distinctions must also be in X. Otherwise, you have the bizarre claim that an essential predicate of the divine persons is left outside the divine essence when the divine persons are inside the divine essence. I mean, where did the “real distinction” in the divine persons go when they are in the divine essence? That would be like saying that even though there is a blue ball in a box, there is no blueness in the box.
They are not really outside the divine essence since they are subsisting divine relations.
Then the real distinction of the divine relations must be present in the divine essence, and thus there is real distinction in the divine essence.
You just contradicted yourself dguller because if you agree it takes a numerical plurality in God to divide God into many gods or make him composite & a Transcendental plurality IS NOT a numerical plurality then you can't coherently say a Transcendental plurality is the same as a numerical plurality.
Nope.
You don't know what is means to say that something "which is not properly speaking a number" can't coherently be used interchangeably with something "that properly speaking is a number'?
I don’t know what “three” means once you’ve stripped it of all its quantitative meanings.
That merely means the persons are the one God in essence. It does not mean Persons are Essences and Essence is a Person for the billionth time.
See? Now you are avoiding using precise terminology and are equivocating, which is really ironic, if you think about it.
We already agree that the divine attributes, the divine essence, and the divine persons are virtually distinct from one another. A is virtually distinct from B iff (a) A and B both really exist in X, and (b) A and B can only exist together in X. For example, the divine goodness and the divine power both really exist in God, and the divine goodness and the divine power can only exist together in God, meaning that the divine goodness cannot exist apart from the divine power. In fact, (b) is what differentiates a virtual distinction from a real distinction. In a real distinction, one of the parts, say A, can exist apart from B in reality. For example, form and matter are really distinct, because they both really exist as parts of a material being, but form can exist apart from matter in reality.
What this means is that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence, even though both are really present in God. It also means that the divine persons and the divine essence cannot be fully identical in reality. If they were, then they would not be really or virtually distinct at all. They would be notionally distinct. Furthermore, it would mean that the divine persons are partially identical to the divine essence, and partially different from the divine essence. They are partially identical in that they are both really in God, and they are partially different in that they have different predicates, some of which only apply to the divine persons and others of which only apply to the divine essence. Certainly, they cannot be totally different, because then they both wouldn’t be in God in reality as something that they share in common.
ReplyDeleteThe answer is he means neither 1 or 2 in reference to God. If you read up one him instead of snapshots if you researched meanings instead of making up your own on the fly we would be discussing the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity for one.
No, what he means is (1) in reference to God.
We don't use the term "parts" but "distinctions".
All I mean by “part” is the following: A and B are parts of X iff (a) A and B are both really in X, and (b) A and B are either really or virtually distinct from one another. For example, form and matter are parts of Ben iff (a) form and matter are both really in Ben, and (b) form and matter are either really or virtually distinct from one another.
The term "Fully" God merely is a term of identity.
I know that. That is why I have asked for a definition of “fully identical”, and you resolutely refuse to provide one. You just keep using the terms without clarifying what you mean by them.
If individual divine persons, Attributes & or the Divine Essence are compared to each other as fully God that merely means they fully have the identity as God.
Again, what does “they fully have the identity” mean? Do you mean that they do not differ in any way in reality? Do you mean that they differ only in some way(s) in reality? Do you mean that their predicates are formally identical? Do you mean that their predicates are materially identical?
That is they are equally Divine in the Classic Theistic Sense. That doesn't mean the Divine Essence begets the Son. Or the divine mercy condemns the wicked. Or the divine will came upon the Apostles at Pentecost. Or the Lord decreed according to his Holy Spirit. The Grammar of the Trinity is explained in detail in McDermott's translation of the Summa on page 76 starting with his commentary translation of Q39.
I know. It means that the predicates of A and B are materially identical, which means that A and B are virtually distinct from one another, but are both really present in X. And that ultimately means that A and B have some predicates that they share in common, and other predicates that they do not share in common. For example, the divine essence and the Father have some predicates that they share in common, such as that they are both really in God, and have other predicates that they do not share in common, such as that the Father begets the Son but the divine essence does not beget the Son. And that is just the very definition of partial identity, which means that material identity is a kind of partial identity.
Translation: The puppies are your brothers because you dog is their father & your dog is both your dog and a Father therefore your Father since it is your dog and a Father so you are the human brother to puppies.
ReplyDeleteIt is nothing like that. This argument clearly equivocates on the meaning of “father”, and thus makes an invalid argument. Where precisely does my argument equivocate?
It seems pretty clear that if being really distinct is a necessary and essential predicate of the divine persons, then if the divine persons are in the divine essence, then they must remain really distinct in the divine essence. And if they are really distinct in the divine essence, then there is real distinction in the divine essence.
Furthermore, if they are not really distinct in the divine essence, then where else could they be really distinct? Since they necessarily exist in the divine essence, the only place they could be really distinct is in the divine essence, and thus their real distinction must be predicated of them while they are in the divine essence, which means that there is real distinction in the divine essence.
Divine relations by definition are really distinct one from another but negatively they are not any kind of real distinction in essence & divine relations are subsisting in essence.
This makes absolutely no sense. There are only two possibilities here. Either the divine relations are virtual parts – in the sense of “part” that I defined above – of the divine essence, or they are fully identical in reality to the divine essence.
If they are virtual parts of the divine essence, then there is a virtual part of the divine essence that has real distinction, and there is a different virtual part of the divine essence that does not have real distinction. Regardless, if A is P and A is in X, then P is present in X. In that case, it makes no sense to say that P is not present in X. For example, if a blue ball is in a box, then blue is present in the box. The blueness was not stripped from the blue ball as it entered the box, but rather remained a predicate of the ball even while it is in the box.
If they are fully identical in reality to the divine essence, then they share all the same predicates in reality, which leads to a logical contradiction, because that would mean that either the divine relations are not really distinct or the divine essence is really distinct.
If you reject both of these possibilities, then explain to me how A is essentially P, and yet while A is in X, A’s P-ness is not in X. For example, the ball is essentially material, and yet while the ball is in the box, the ball’s materiality is not in the box.
> A sense is a cognitive and linguistic representation or construct in the mind that points towards a referent. You said that you agreed with this definition, and yet you completely abuse it when you say that there are senses in God.
ReplyDeletePut the above together with the following.
>>No here we have a conceptual and linguistic judgment in the mind about unknowable Ultimate Reality which we can know something about but not what is it in essence.
>That makes sense.
Both the Divine Persons & the Divine Essence are each the same & together the same unknowable Ultimate Reality which we can know something about but not what is it in essence.. Sure we can know a bit more about the absolute divine essence using our reason alone & the divine persons are a strict mystery. But that is the way it is. There is no abuse, the rule set down by Feser(which is not his but is Tradition) "I don't know what it really is but I don't see a contradiction" is in effect. We don't know what something that has no physical or metaphysical composition is & we don't know what is a divine relation ultimately only what they are not.
Negative Theology! This must all be formulated in Negative theology.
>Now that we both agree that there is virtual composition in God,
Yeh let's just keep it simple. The presence or lack of real relations in essence it the issue. That and the brute fact really distinct divine persons/relations are strict mysteries
>What you said earlier made no sense.
The fault is yours your the one who is redefining the Trinity & resisting talking about the actual doctrine.
>That would mean that there are different cognitive and linguistic representations or constructs in God that point towards referent(s).
R1 which is relative persons and R2 which is Absolute Essence that together are conceived as R prime God. Now what relative persons are is a strict mystery. what absolute essence is, is also a mystery and what God ultimately is, is a mystery. We cannot define what God really is we can only talk about God. Essence is more knowable since we can arrive at knowledge about the divine essence via reason. We can't arrive at any knowledge of relative persons without revelation and even after it is revealed we know way less about it then Essence other than what it is not.
>So, I want to know what you mean. It seems that even you have no idea what you mean by “sense”.
ReplyDeleteWhy is this hard? Divine relations are God in one referent and Divine Essence is God in another referent.
You have two distinct referents, Persons and Essence & they share a common third referent of being the unknowable God. Again why is this hard?
>What does “3” mean, if one strips it of quantitative number?
Positively? Who knows? The Godhead is above unity and relativity as we understand it. Being a Strict mystery we can't really define it we can only define what it is not. Oh and I'm glad you caught Scott's correction my spellcheck is a little weird this is my first APPLE & you can maybe read some of the links above thought I wish you would do more reading with an open mind rather then read your own meaning into stuff.
Negatively since it's not a quantitative number all polemics that attack the Trinity by trying to claim Three equal one are straw men nothing more.
>This has nothing to do with my argument at all.
Since the beginning you have complained the Trinity contains a "logical contradiction" contrary to what Feser and the rest of us have said? Are you complaining about some other type of "contradiction" that is not a logical one?
>Again, I would love for you to explain to me what “plurality” means without “quantity”. “Plural” just means “more than one”, and “more than one” is a quantity, through and through.
ReplyDeleteWho knows or cares? But once you accept the negative definition admit there is no logical contradiction in the way Catholics formulate the Trinity, drop your interpretation of the dguller-Trinity then we can finally have a discussion on the Christian Trinity.
So is that going to happen or not? I am skeptical.
>I don’t have to know what “real distinctions” are.
Yes & you have to know what they are not too and they are not any kind of real distinction in essence. You have to stop changing the definition & redefining real relations between persons as some kind of real relations in essence.
>All I need to know is that “real distinctions”, whatever they are, must be present in the divine relations, and so if the divine relations are in X, then their real distinctions must also be in X.
All we know is subsisting in the essence there are distance persons that are really distinct from each other as persons but not distinct at all in essence. Also if we don't know what they are then we can't affirm or deny they cause distinction in essence & since they are already negatively defined as not being any kind of distinction in essence I am afraid you have no way out other then too admit no logical contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity.
Your only move is to redefine Trinity into dguller-doctrine by dropping the negative definition of real relations not being any kind of real relation in essence.
Let us not forget the strict mystery element of this doctrine automatically renders any attempt to try to conceive of what divine relations are positively, automatically wrong in principle.
>Otherwise, you have the bizarre claim that an essential predicate of the divine persons is left outside the divine essence when the divine persons are inside the divine essence.
For example-automatically wrong in principle.
>Then the real distinction of the divine relations must be present in the divine essence, and thus there is real distinction in the divine essence.
Yeh and my Dog who Fathered puppies is my Father…..distinct persons subsist in the divine essence but they are only distinct person to person not in essence. We don't know what distinct persons really are because they are a strict mystery but we know what they are not, distinctions in essence.
I don't see how redefining the Trinity to dguller-doctrine is helpful?
>I don’t know what “three” means once you’ve stripped it of all its quantitative meanings.
ReplyDeleteIt could mean the Three Persons have no quantitative meaning in essence. But we know what it doesn't mean so that is all you need. If you want to complain it has no real meaning like I suggested in the past then go for it as long as you concede this "logical contradiction" and "trinity violates divine simplicity" mishegoos is nothing more than barking up the wrong tree.
So what do you say?
>See? Now you are avoiding using precise terminology and are equivocating, which is really ironic, if you think about it.
No I am using precise negative terminology from the actual doctrine which by definition leads to some equivocating because of strict mystery. When I accuse you of equivocating I am accusing you of the fallacy of equivocation.
Big difference.
>A is virtually distinct from B iff (a) A and B
Enough of this formula mishegoos that drops the negative definition of divine relations as not being real distinctions in essence! DavidM already answered this & you just admitted virtual distinction don't harm the divine simplicity. Let us focus on the issue without getting distracted by tangents.
>No, what he means is (1) in reference to God.
Since G-L believes in the grammar of the Trinity he would reject using the term "part(s)" instead of distinction(s) even if "parts" here can mean not physical or metaphysical "parts". He fears it will lead to confusions by heretics. You proved him right.
>All I mean by “part” is the following: A and B are parts of X iff (a) A and B are both really in X, and (b) A and B are either really or virtually distinct from one another. For example, form and matter are parts of Ben iff (a) form and matter are both really in Ben, and (b) form and matter are either really or virtually distinct from one another.
Then this has no place in the discussion of the Trinity. God is not form and matter, divine relations or the divine intellect really subsisting in God's Essence means they are really in the essence but not that they are really distinct from the essence.
>I know that. That is why I have asked for a definition of “fully identical”, and you resolutely refuse to provide one. You just keep using the terms without clarifying what you mean by them.
ReplyDeleteFully means equally God in essence or equally possessing the essence & this is simply defined in the popular literature I've recommended which you have resisted reading so far.
>It is nothing like that. This argument clearly equivocates on the meaning of “father”, and thus makes an invalid argument.
Your argument equivocates between real relations between persons and real relations in essence. One is not the other in any sense. Distinctions between persons are not distinctions in essence. We can't know what they are but we know what they definitely are not.
>It seems pretty clear that if being really distinct is a necessary and essential predicate of the divine persons, then if the divine persons are in the divine essence, then they must remain really distinct in the divine essence.
Yes they are always distinct from each other in some mysterious inscrutable way but not separate &their real distinction remains by nature not any kind of real distinction in essence. I told you relative persons are a Strict Mystery &the human intellect cannot intelligibly know what they are that is a necessity feature of the orthodox doctrine. It may not be dispensed with. You are trying to intelligibly figure out what the divine relations really are in essence. You cannot in principle do that & anything you think or imagine is wrong.
> And if they are really distinct in the divine essence, then there is real distinction in the divine essence.
There is real distinction between divine persons who are subsisting in the divine essence without distinction from the divine essence. What you wrote is easy to conceive in your intellect & thus is not a strict mystery & thus not the Trinity. Stop trying to figure out what it is dguller that is not allowed by the definition of the Trinity in regards to mystery & whatever you come up with is automatically wrong.
>This makes absolutely no sense.
Of course it's a strict mystery! How can mere flesh & blood make sense of it? It's not a contradiction. To be a contradiction I would have to say something which is clearly contradictory (a clear contradiction is not a strict mystery either) such as the real relations between persons are real distinctions in essence and not real distinctions in essence at the same time in the same sense.
> There are only two possibilities here.
By definition they are both wrong since both possibilities are conceivable by the human intellect and not strict mysteries.
>If they are fully identical in reality to the divine essence, then they share all the same predicates in reality
If that is what you mean by "fully God" well I can tell you I don't mean that. In fact I have been telling you the opposite.
The dguller-doctrine is not the Trinity.
@dguller:
ReplyDelete"[E]xplain to me how A is essentially P, and yet while A is in X, A’s P-ness is not in X."
Because the only place in X for A's P-ness to be would be in X's A-ness. And that would be contrary to natural law.
Man, a guy can wait a lifetime for a straightline like that, and then when it finally turns up, it's on a moderated thread . . . ;-)
Scott with the p-ness jokes!
ReplyDeleteFunny!:D
>[E]xplain to me how A is essentially P, and yet while A is in X, A’s P-ness is not in X."
How are divine persons really distinct while in the divine essence which by nature has no real distinctions as an absolute essence?
1) The real distinctions between persons are not by definition any kind of real distinction in the essence.
2)Q: What are divine persons that they can be subsisting in essence and not cause the essence to be really distinct but are still really distinct from each other?
Answer: We don't know and cannot know because it is a strict mystery & by definition it is not intelligible to a mere human intellect but it is intelligible in itself. We just in principle can't ever know how. Also anything we think we can come up with by definition is wrong.
BTW can we stop this A=B shit? It's just confusing.
This is not how we formulate doctrine & it is not how I learned doctrine.
Keep it simple.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteTranslation: The puppies are your brothers because you dog is their father & your dog is both your dog and a Father therefore your Father since it is your dog and a Father so you are the human brother to puppies.
The difference is that this argument is invalid, because of an equivocation between two different senses of “father”. My argument is not invalid for the same reason, because the meaning of “real distinction” remains constant throughout the argument. I’ll admit that I don’t know what “real distinction” means when it is predicated of the divine persons, but whatever it is, if the divine persons are in X, then their “real distinction” must also be present in X. For your charge of the fallacy of equivocation to hold true, you would have to explain how the sense of “real distinction” changes from one place in my argument to another place in my argument. I just don’t see it.
Divine relations by definition are really distinct one from another but negatively they are not any kind of real distinction in essence & divine relations are subsisting in essence.
The question is how this could possibly make any sense, because it would mean that if A is essentially and necessarily P, then if A is in X, then P is absent in X. That would be like arguing that if a human being is essentially and necessarily rational, then if that human being is in X, then rationality is absent in X. Where did the rationality go? And once the rationality left, then the human being has become a non-rational animal, and thus not a human being at all. The entire account is impossible.
This falls under the definition of a Strict Mystery that cannot be intelligible to a mere human intellect therefor to postulate positively the nature of the real distinctions between persons is a move that denies their strict mystery & tries to define them as something intelligible to the human intellect such as their subsisting outside the Absolute Essence. But since the real relations between persons are by definition a Strict Mystery ANYTHING you imagine or intelligently conceive them to be is wrong & they are not that.
I can agree that “real distinction” as an essential predicate of the divine person is a total mystery. Regardless, whatever “real distinction” means when it is predicated of the divine persons must remain a predicate of the divine persons no matter where they are, if “real distinction” is an essential predicate of the divine persons. In other words, whatever “real distinction” means, it must be predicated of the divine persons, or else they are not divine persons at all. So, even granting your claim that “real distinction” is a total mystery still leads to an impossibility, i.e. if P is an essential predicate of A, then if A is in X, then P is also in X, because if P is not in X, then A is not A, because A lost an essential predicate.
On the other hand there is a transcendental notion of plurality that arises from dividing being into the one and the many. This latter is the only sort of plurality that makes sense for immaterial things. Aquinas claims that previous authors have become muddled on this issue by attempting to apply the first notion of number to God. Aquinas rejects this line of thinking, suggesting that if it is followed one can only make sense of numerical claims about God in terms of metaphor.
How are “one” and “many” not quantitative terms? It would presume that you could count the many as more than one, and that very counting necessarily implies quantity.
Both the Divine Persons & the Divine Essence are each the same & together the same unknowable Ultimate Reality which we can know something about but not what is it in essence..
ReplyDeleteRight. The divine persons are a virtual part of the “unknowable Ultimate Reality” and the divine essence is a different virtual part of the “unknowable Ultimate Reality”. They are materially identical, i.e. A in X is materially identical to B in X in that both A and B are in X, and yet A is not B.
Yeh let's just keep it simple.
Good. So, you agree that the divine persons are materially identical and virtually distinct from the divine essence, which just means that the divine persons and the divine essence are identical in that they are both in God, but the divine persons are different in that the divine persons are not the divine essence.
The presence or lack of real relations in essence it the issue.
It is one of the issues, yes. To make your argument, you would have to show how A can lose essential predicates, and still remain A, because that is what would have to happen for your account to make any sense. If the divine persons are necessarily really distinct from one another, whatever “really distinct” means, then if the divine persons lose their real distinction from one another, then they are no longer divine persons at all.
You claim that when the divine persons are in the divine essence, then there is no real distinction in the divine essence. That means that the real distinction between the divine persons is not in the divine essence. My question is how that is possible, because it would mean that the divine persons lost an essential predicate, and that means that they cannot be divine persons anymore. If you claim that they remain divine persons while losing an essential predicate, then you have a logical contradiction, because A cannot remain A if A loses an essential predicate.
That and the brute fact really distinct divine persons/relations are strict mysteries
I can accept that.
R1 which is relative persons and R2 which is Absolute Essence that together are conceived as R prime God.
That’s fine. According to my terminology, R1 and R2 are virtual parts of R.
Why is this hard? Divine relations are God in one referent and Divine Essence is God in another referent.
You have two distinct referents, Persons and Essence & they share a common third referent of being the unknowable God. Again why is this hard?
It was hard, because you confused intra-mental senses with extra-mental referents. Now that we have clarified things, it is all much clearer.
Positively? Who knows? The Godhead is above unity and relativity as we understand it.
ReplyDeleteHere’s the problem. If you have no clear sense of what “three” means in “three persons”, then you cannot deny that there are four persons, or five persons, or whatever. As Denys Turner writes:
“[I]f we can know what it is to say that there is a cat on the mat then thereby we know what it is to say that the cat is not on the mat. The ‘knowledge’ is the same in either case, but in the one it is affirmed, in the other denied. If the knowledge were not ‘the same’ there would be no opposition between the two statements, for what the one affirmed would not be what the other denied. So they could not contradict each other” (The Darkness of God, p. 36).
So, if there is no clear sense to “three persons”, then you cannot say that there are not four persons, because part of the meaning of “four persons” is “not-‘three persons’”. Therefore, if you truly have no idea what “three persons” means, because if every concept and thought that you have that is associated with “three persons” is necessarily false, then you cannot deny that there are four persons, or five persons, or six persons, or whatever.
Being a Strict mystery we can't really define it we can only define what it is not. Oh and I'm glad you caught Scott's correction my spellcheck is a little weird this is my first APPLE & you can maybe read some of the links above thought I wish you would do more reading with an open mind rather then read your own meaning into stuff.
No problem, Ben. We all make mistakes.
Who knows or cares? But once you accept the negative definition admit there is no logical contradiction in the way Catholics formulate the Trinity, drop your interpretation of the dguller-Trinity then we can finally have a discussion on the Christian Trinity.
What is the “negative definition” of “three persons”?
For example-automatically wrong in principle.
Yes, it is necessarily wrong in principle for the divine persons to remain divine persons while separating themselves from their predicate of real distinction, which is what would have to happen if they were in the divine essence, and there is no real distinction in the divine essence.
It could mean the Three Persons have no quantitative meaning in essence.
Sure, and a mysterious square has no sides in essence, but is still a square.
But we know what it doesn't mean so that is all you need. If you want to complain it has no real meaning like I suggested in the past then go for it as long as you concede this "logical contradiction" and "trinity violates divine simplicity" mishegoos is nothing more than barking up the wrong tree.
I would say that you are screwed either way. If the terms have meaning, then there are a variety fo logical contradictions. If the terms have no meaning, then they are empty signs without sense or referent, and thus are meaningless.
No I am using precise negative terminology from the actual doctrine which by definition leads to some equivocating because of strict mystery. When I accuse you of equivocating I am accusing you of the fallacy of equivocation.
No, you cited G-L as a source, and I am using his terminology, because it brings a level of precision that you are painstakingly avoiding.
Enough of this formula mishegoos that drops the negative definition of divine relations as not being real distinctions in essence! DavidM already answered this & you just admitted virtual distinction don't harm the divine simplicity. Let us focus on the issue without getting distracted by tangents.
ReplyDeleteThat is a separate issue. I just want us to agree that the divine essence is a virtual part of God and the divine persons are a different virtual part of God. That is what it means to say that the divine essence is virtually distinct from the divine persons. We can’t move on unless we start from somewhere we both agree. I agree that virtual distinction does not necessarily violate divine simplicity. Can you agree with my definition of “virtual parts”?
Since G-L believes in the grammar of the Trinity he would reject using the term "part(s)" instead of distinction(s) even if "parts" here can mean not physical or metaphysical "parts". He fears it will lead to confusions by heretics. You proved him right.
Would he object to my definition of “parts”, though? I don’t think so. I mean, come on. Aquinas never said “minor virtual distinction”, and yet G-L had to use such a term in order to clarify what Aquinas meant on some matters. Similarly, I am just saying that A and B are parts of X iff (a) A and B are both really in X, and (b) A and B are (really or virtually) distinct in some way. I highly doubt that he would object to such a definition. Why would he?
Then this has no place in the discussion of the Trinity. God is not form and matter, divine relations or the divine intellect really subsisting in God's Essence means they are really in the essence but not that they are really distinct from the essence.
I never said that they were distinct from the essence. I said that the divine persons and the divine essence are both virtual parts of God, in the sense of “part” that I just described. You are jumping the gun here.
Fully means equally God in essence or equally possessing the essence & this is simply defined in the popular literature I've recommended which you have resisted reading so far.
Okay. So, X is fully God iff the divine essence is formally and numerically identical in X and God.
Your argument equivocates between real relations between persons and real relations in essence. One is not the other in any sense. Distinctions between persons are not distinctions in essence. We can't know what they are but we know what they definitely are not.
No, it doesn’t. Call the kind of real relations in the divine persons RD. RD is essential to the divine persons. If a divine person lacked RD, then it would not be a divine person at all, because that is what it means to not have an essential predicate. If the divine persons are in the divine essence, then the essential predicates of the divine persons must also be in the divine essence. One of the essential predicates of the divine persons is RD, and thus RD must be present in the divine essence. There is no equivocation here. RD is in the divine persons, and if the divine persons are in the divine essence, then RD is in the divine essence. And notice, again, that I have no idea what “RD” means, thus preserving the mystery.
Scott:
ReplyDeleteBecause the only place in X for A's P-ness to be would be in X's A-ness. And that would be contrary to natural law.
And if P-ness is necessarily in A-ness, and A-ness is necessarily in X, then P-ness is necessarily in X. For example, if rationality is necessarily in human nature, and human nature is necessarily in John, then rationality is necessarily in John.
@dguller: "You have the goal of understanding the empirical world. You have two options about how to do this."
ReplyDeleteHow are these *options*? How is it possible to have (1) and (2) available to oneself such that one has the option of choosing (1) or (2)? HOW? Do you really have those OPTIONS? Or do you perhaps not, because your critical thinking skills are far to dismal for (1) to be a real OPTION for you (i.e., something that is actually *available* for you to choose is you so desire, not just an abstract possibility that you *imagine* to yourself as being available to you)?
Please think about this before answering.
@Ben: "Hey Dave I tried to keep it simple but he keeps multiplying tangents & switching from one level of doctrinal complexity to another." - Yes. But he's so sanguine about it. Ya gotta like him in spite of it all.
ReplyDelete@Scott: Thanks, man. You truly nailed that one.
@dguller: "Hesperus is not fully Venus. Hesperus is partially Venus. Hesperus is the name for Venus as it appears in the morning. Since Venus also appears at other times of the day, how it appears in the morning is only part of its identity. However, Jin Xing (i.e. “the Gold Star” in Chinese) is fully Venus."
So you're saying that Venus (as it appears in the morning) is not fully Venus? Please explain.
But JX (which also can be considered *as it appears in the morning*) is fully JX? Please explain.
Me: "Wow - how thoroughly obtuse of you; you again completely ignore my point. Tell me this: How likely is it, actually, and how have you determined this likelihood??"
ReplyDeleteguller: "It depends upon how firmly you hold the belief in question. For example, one classic study of this issue involved Festinger’s study of the Seekers, a small UFO cult in 1954. The people who joined the cult had given up their families, their jobs, and basically everything, because they firmly believed that the end of the world was coming, and that they would be taken away by aliens to escape from the apocalypse. Festinger infiltrated the group to observe them. He found that even after the apocalypse failed to happen, no-one left the group, because all of them simply rationalized the failure of the prophecy away by saying that their devotion and prayers saved the world from destruction. In fact, they ended up believing their doctrine even more firmly after it had failed."
So if you were to actually honestly answer my question, you'd say: "Actually I have no idea how likely it would be - I obviously haven't actually determined the actual likelihood at all. But I do have a bunch of red herring bullshit to feed you about UFO cults... But wait: seeing that that has nothing to do with actually answering your question and that it's fundamentally dishonest, you're probably not interested. I guess I should just apologize for once again making obviously groundless and irrelevant assertions in order to cling to truth of my prior silly assertions."
Then I would say: "No problem. Welcome to reality! And thanks for being honest - keep up the good work!" (Dare to dream, Dave, dare to dream.)
"Given unconscious psychological tendencies, I would say that those who firmly cling to beliefs that they are evaluating have less objectivity in assessing the evidence for and against their beliefs than those who do not firmly cling to their beliefs, but rather hold them in doubt. Would you agree?"
ReplyDeleteLet's see: If the beliefs in question are conducive to 'objectivity' (a problematic term), then it seems that those who firmly cling to these 'objectivity'-conducive beliefs will have more, not less, 'objectivity' than those who doubt. Would you agree?
Glenn, G-L, McDermott etc all say distinction is not always the same as division.
ReplyDeleteWhen we say Persons are "fully God" we simply mean the essence isn't divided into physical or metaphysical parts that are operated by one person and not another.
Persons are not really distinct from the essence as th essence but they are really distinct from one another without division since they all fully operate the one essence.
Attributes are not really distinct from the essence or really distinct from each other and thus are operated
by the Persons who equally possess the attributes.
Being fully God is does not mean they share all the same predicates in reality. The Son became incarnate not the Father and Spirit & it is absurd to talk of the attributes becoming incarnate.
Persons are subjects that are subsisting in the divine nature. The divine nature is that by which the divine persons act. The person is WHO acts.
There is no real distinction between the persons and the essence but there are real distinctions between persons & what they are & how they are real one way and absolute in another is a strict mystery and thus in principle any attempt to trying to intelligibly figure out what that is by definition will be wrong.
We must be content with eternal ignorance.
>Here’s the problem. If you have no clear sense of what “three” means in “three persons”, then you cannot deny that there are four persons, or five persons, or whatever.
ReplyDeleteIt's not suppose to be clear. Hello definition of a Strict Mystery anyone? If it where clear it wouldn't be a Strict Mystery and we would not be talking about the Christian Trinity. We know there aren't more persons because divine revelation doesn't tell us about them and the Church protected by the Holy Spirit has infallibly defined there are no more then "Three".
Now some forms of monotheistic Hinduism might resemble One God who is Thousands or maybe even infinite "numbers" of Persons but that's not my religion. That is a separate issue as to what divine revelations you will follow and why. Give we have been talking about the Christian Trinity (thought the jury is still out on you dguller. I say you are arguing dguller-doctrine). I cannot logically prove there is one Person or Three persons and I cannot logically prove there aren't "10,000" persons. But the Trinity is based on revelation not reason. It's a Strict Mystery not Natural Theology.
>As Denys Turner writes: …………..(The Darkness of God, p. 36).
Which refers to the perceptional names of God referred to in Chapter 4 of Pseudo-Dionysius' MYSTICAL THEOLOGY. "the universal and transcendent Cause of all things is neither without being nor without life, nor without reason or intelligence; nor is it a body, nor has it form or shape, quality, quantity or weight; nor has it any localized, visible or tangible existence; it is not sensible or perceptible; nor is it subject to any disorder or inordination nor influenced by any earthly passion; neither is it rendered impotent through the effects of material causes and events; it needs no light; it suffers no change, corruption, division, privation or flux; none of these things can either be identified with or attributed unto it."end quote.
That is all very interesting & tells me the perceptional names of God must be literal in some sense & negative theology isn't purely negative. But that doesn't change the nature of the divine relations being Strict mysteries. We don't know what they are but we know they are not real relations of any kind in the divine essence & that they are not qualitative numbers in reference to the essence.
>The difference is that this argument is invalid, because of an equivocation between two different senses of “father”.
ReplyDeleteYour argument is invalid because you equivocate between the different sense of "real relations" between persons and essence.
>The question is how this could possibly make any sense,
It's not suppose to make sense being a Strict Mystery it is suppose to be absent any logical contradiction. Even a logically contradictory proposition makes sense as a clear statement that clearly says A=A and not equals ~A at the same time and in the same sense. Relative Persons subsisting in Absolute Essence makes no sense but is not a clear contradiction like relative essences subsisting in absolute essence. Or Three Gods in One God.
Are you confusing "making sense" with "logical contradiction"? It seems to me you are.
> can agree that “real distinction” as an essential predicate of the divine person is a total mystery. Regardless, whatever “real distinction” means when it is predicated of the divine persons must remain a predicate of the divine persons no matter where they are, if “real distinction” is an essential predicate of the divine persons. In other words, whatever “real distinction” means, it must be predicated of the divine persons, or else they are not divine persons at all. So, even granting your claim that “real distinction” is a total mystery still leads to an impossibility, i.e. if P is an essential predicate of A, then if A is in X, then P is also in X, because if P is not in X, then A is not A, because A lost an essential predicate.
Love the slight of hand! Did you see what you did up there dguller? At no time did you define "real relations" between persons as no kind of real relation in essence. Why do you do this? Also I think you are confusing "inconceivability" with "impossibility". We can't conceive how Persons can be distinct but not separate in reality only as an abstract & we have no conception how this would manifest itself in reality if true. But it is not really impossible in itself since we are not postulating Persons who are distinct and not distinct with Essence or Persons who are distinct and not distinct as persons. That later two would be impossible.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteHow are these *options*? How is it possible to have (1) and (2) available to oneself such that one has the option of choosing (1) or (2)?
It is possible, because people do, in fact, act according to (2). Many people cherry pick evidence to support firmly held beliefs. Many people rationalize away unwanted evidence to maintain their beliefs. Clearly, (2) is an option for people to follow, because some people do actually follow (2).
So you're saying that Venus (as it appears in the morning) is not fully Venus? Please explain.
I’m saying that the part of Venus that appears in the morning is not the entirety of Venus, because it necessarily excludes the part of Venus that does not appear in the morning.
But JX (which also can be considered *as it appears in the morning*) is fully JX? Please explain.
No. JX is fully Venus. When JX appears in the morning, then that part that has appeared is identical to the Morning Star. When JX appears in the evening, then that part that has appeared is identical to the Evening Star.
So if you were to actually honestly answer my question, you'd say: "Actually I have no idea how likely it would be - I obviously haven't actually determined the actual likelihood at all.
My point was that if a person firmly holds to certain beliefs, then just providing them with compelling evidence will likely be insufficient to get them to reject those beliefs. You seem to think that it is irrelevant how firmly one holds to one’s beliefs, because all someone has to do is reason properly, and they will change their minds if the evidence demands it. The reality is that the mind has a number of subconscious cognitive mechanisms that distort our processing of the evidence in order to maintain and preserve firmly held beliefs. The UFO cult was supposed to be an example of this phenomenon. There are many others in which research subjects rationalized away or outright ignored clear evidence, especially when that evidence conflicted with beliefs that they had endured some sacrifice to acquire and endorse.
But wait: seeing that that has nothing to do with actually answering your question and that it's fundamentally dishonest, you're probably not interested. I guess I should just apologize for once again making obviously groundless and irrelevant assertions in order to cling to truth of my prior silly assertions."
Like I said, I am describing how human beings actually do reason about evidence in the real world, and in the real world, human beings cling tenaciously to beliefs in the face of evidence to the contrary, either by ignoring it, misperceiving it, or distorting it, and all on a subconscious level such that they are completely unaware of what they are doing. And simply pointing out what they are doing does not help, either, because the same underlying mechanisms get to work on that evidence, as well. The best option is to frame the issue in a way that minimizes these biases, and imagining that one does not firmly hold those beliefs via something like the OTF can be helpful.
Let's see: If the beliefs in question are conducive to 'objectivity' (a problematic term), then it seems that those who firmly cling to these 'objectivity'-conducive beliefs will have more, not less, 'objectivity' than those who doubt. Would you agree?
ReplyDeleteIf a person firmly holds to beliefs after analyzing them in an objective fashion that minimizes cognitive biases and distortions, then I would agree that their beliefs are more objective than those who fail to follow such a protocol. But even then, it might be helpful to examine new evidence against one’s firmly held beliefs in order to ensure that one’s evidence base is sufficiently broad to warrant one’s conviction. This can be a useful corrective from time to time to minimize confirmation bias, and other distortions.
Scott:
ReplyDeleteOMG, I just got your joke. Hilarious!
Ben:
ReplyDeleteBeing fully God is does not mean they share all the same predicates in reality. The Son became incarnate not the Father and Spirit & it is absurd to talk of the attributes becoming incarnate.
If the divine essence does not share the same predicates in reality with the divine persons, then the divine essence is different from the divine persons. After all, they must differ in terms of some predicates, and thus cannot be totally identical to one another in reality. Would you agree?
" if P-ness is necessarily in A-ness, and A-ness is necessarily in X, then P-ness is necessarily in X" - doh! But again, P-ness is NOT necessarily in A-ness (per Scott, that would be against natural law), so nothing follows here!
ReplyDelete>Right. The divine persons are a virtual part of the “unknowable Ultimate Reality”
ReplyDeleteStop saying "parts" we don't say "parts" even if after qualifying it & it could be given an orthodox interpretation. We say "distinctions" since as all the Fathers and orthodox Catholic Theologians say distinction(that would include real distinction) isn't always a division.
>>Yeh let's just keep it simple.
>Good. So, you agree that the divine persons are materially identical and virtually distinct from the divine essence,
I don't know what you mean by this since it could be more disguised dguller doctrine which you read your own meanings into? If it is a quote from an orthodox Catholic theological then politeness dictates you give me the citation. If it is one of your paraphrases then that just opens it up to mischief on your part. We are discussing "real" and "not real" distinctions. Anything more complicated leads to red herringsand what DavidM called misreadings and misconceptions.
>>The presence or lack of real relations in essence it the issue.
>It is one of the issues, yes
It is the only issue in regards to divine simplicity. If there are real relations in the absolute essence then the absolute essence is divided either physically or metaphysically and that is absurd. If there are subsistences in the absolute essence that have some mysterious real distinction between themselves but this distinction though real between them is not any kind of real distinction in absolute essence then the divine simplicity is maintained. Now can we intelligibly conceive of what these divine relations might be? No they are a Strict Mystery and in principle cannot be intelligibly conceived. Anything you conceive them to be is by definition wrong and not what they are in reality. Their reality is strict Mystery.
>To make your argument, you would have to show how A……….
How can I intelligibly show anything about something that is by definition a strict mystery & thus not intelligible to a mere human intellect? How dguller? How?
>>That and the brute fact really distinct divine persons/relations are strict mysteries
>I can accept that.
Then based on what you have asked me you still don't understand that. Divine relations are distinct from other divine relations but not from essence. That concept is not intelligible to a mere human intellect and anything the human dguller comes up with to make it intelligible is wrong. in principle.
>You claim that when the divine persons are in the divine essence, then there is no real distinction in the divine essence. That means that the real distinction between the divine persons is not in the divine essence.
ReplyDeleteNo that means the real distinction between the divine persons isn't any kind of distinction in essence. We still don't & can't know what they are and any attempt to make them intelligible (i.eThat means that the real distinction between the divine persons is not in the divine essence) is wrong since it violates the Strict Mystery of the nature of divine relations.
>That’s fine. According to my terminology, R1 and R2 are virtual parts of R.
It's your duty as an honest critic to not use your own terminology but to learn ours.
You have not done that & you have two witnesses here to testify to that effect.
>What is the “negative definition” of “three persons”?
What? Real distinctions between persons aren't any kind of real distinction in essence? I think your objection & resistance to that definition & use of some weird criticisms (Contaminated? Seriously?) is your inability to intelligibly conceive of what Real Relations between Persons that are not any type of real relations in essence could be. Well tough go back & read Feser's posts on the Trinity again. Give me more then lip service to Strict Mystery.
>>For example-automatically wrong in principle.
>Yes, it is necessarily wrong in principle for the divine persons to remain divine persons while separating themselves from their predicate of real distinction,
Nice obfuscation! No it's wrong in principle to try and intelligibly figure out what distinct persons really are and what makes them really distinct from each other and not distinct in essence since it is a strict mystery and not intelligible to human intellects. What you just wrote above is an attempt at intelligibly that in principle cannot be known.
>Sure, and a mysterious square has no sides in essence, but is still a square.
ReplyDeleteSquares are concrete objects not perfections like persons or attributes & can only be compared to God metaphorically not analogously. By definition a square has four qualitative sides or it's not a square that is what a square is in essence or it's not a square, We don't and can't know what God is in essence.
You still have much to learn as do I.
>I would say that you are screwed either way. If the terms have meaning, then there are a variety fo logical contradictions. If the terms have no meaning, then they are empty signs without sense or referent, and thus are meaningless.
Yeh it would help if you leaned more about those meanings & do the reading from the links I provide instead of charging blind( ease in & ease ad, Trnity is not a Principle of Contradition according to Aquinas in THE POWER OF GOD).
>No, you cited G-L as a source, and I am using his terminology, because it brings a level of precision that you are painstakingly avoiding.
You are using his terminology the way you want to use it & you are not making any effort to learn how he is using it. It's in the links. Go read or be like BeingItself or djindra or Paps and make it up as you go.
I'm not your teacher & I am tired of having to do all the heavy lifting for you.
>Would he object to my definition of “parts”, though? I don’t think so. I mean, come on. Aquinas never said “minor virtual distinction”,
He only uses the word "parts" seven times in TRINITY etc. (gotta love word search functions) & the singular "part" 25 times and he never uses it as a synonym for "virtual distinctions" minor or otherwise.
QUOTE from Q30 A1 " In God there are several persons because there are several real subsisting relations opposed to one another. In the reply to the fourth difficulty, St. Thomas notes that each divine person is not a part nor is the divine reality the whole, because the Father is as great as the entire Trinity, as will become clear below,[321] when St. Thomas explains: "All the relations are one according to essence and being, and all the relations are not greater than one alone; nor are all the persons greater than one alone since the entire (infinite) perfection of the divine nature is in each of the persons."[322]"end quote.
>No, it doesn’t. Call the kind of real relations in the divine persons RD.
Yes it does since you reject the definition "real distinctions between person are not any kind of real distinction in essence" because you cannot intelligibly conceive of what that is but that is the point of Strict Mystery.
>If the divine essence does not share the same predicates in reality with the divine persons, then the divine essence is different from the divine persons.
ReplyDeleteRather the divine essence is predicated differently as a WHAT and divine Persons are predicated differently as WHO's Three Who's that are One What. In reality there are Three Who's that are the same identical subsistent What. We predicate Persons as Relative, Persons to Person, and we predicate an Absolute Essence that is not relative in anyway as an essence. We cannot intelligibly know how Relative persons and Absolute essence can both be the same identical Deity via the principle of Strict mystery & anything we try to conceive intelligibly is automatically wrong.
> After all, they must differ in terms of some predicates, and thus cannot be totally identical to one another in reality. Would you agree?
No the total identical reality here is they are both the same identical Deity. That is the only predicated reality shared by relative persons and absolute essence.
This is not a negotiation. You either learn the doctrine & the rules of the doctrine or you don't. If you don't then anything you discuss is a straw man.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteIt's not suppose to be clear. Hello definition of a Strict Mystery anyone? If it where clear it wouldn't be a Strict Mystery and we would not be talking about the Christian Trinity. We know there aren't more persons because divine revelation doesn't tell us about them and the Church protected by the Holy Spirit has infallibly defined there are no more then "Three".
But you have no idea what “three” means! And if you have no idea what “three” means, then you cannot say that there are not four divine persons, because part of the meaning of “four” is “not-three”, which requires you to know what “three” means, and you have said that it is a mystery what “three” means, which means that you do not know what “three” means.
Which refers to the perceptional names of God referred to in Chapter 4 of Pseudo-Dionysius' MYSTICAL THEOLOGY.
No, it refers to “literal utterances” (Ibid., p. 36). So, the question is whether when you say that there are three divine persons, are you speaking literally or metaphorically? The problem with saying that that statement is a metaphor is that the negation of a metaphor is another metaphor (Ibid., p. 37), and thus it does not follow from the metaphorical statement that there are three divine persons that there are not four divine persons, or five divine persons, and thus the statement is logically consistent with an infinite number of divine persons.
Your argument is invalid because you equivocate between the different sense of "real relations" between persons and essence.
I don’t. I’ve clearly said that the sense is exactly the same. Whatever “real distinction” is in the divine persons must be in the divine essence if the divine persons are in the divine essence. To deny this is to say that X can remain X even while losing an essential predicate, which is impossible.
Are you confusing "making sense" with "logical contradiction"? It seems to me you are.
The logical contradiction is that X can remain X while losing an essential predicate. If X loses an essential predicate, then X is no longer X anymore, but rather something else, i.e. Y.
Love the slight of hand! Did you see what you did up there dguller? At no time did you define "real relations" between persons as no kind of real relation in essence. Why do you do this?
ReplyDeleteYou can do that, but then you get a logical contradiction anyway. If you define the divine essence as lacking any real distinction in the divine essence, then the fact that the divine persons have an essential predicate of real distinction and the divine persons are in the divine essence means that their real distinction, as an essential predicate, is also present in the divine essence. Therefore, there is real distinction in the divine essence, which contradicts the claim that there isn’t any real distinction in the divine essence.
The only way to avoid this is to affirm that the divine persons leave their essential predicate of real distinction outside the divine essence, and yet can remain divine persons. But this is impossible, because if X loses an essential predicate, then X is no longer X, and thus if the divine persons lose the essential predicate of real distinction, then the divine persons are no longer divine persons at all.
Stop saying "parts" we don't say "parts" even if after qualifying it & it could be given an orthodox interpretation. We say "distinctions" since as all the Fathers and orthodox Catholic Theologians say distinction(that would include real distinction) isn't always a division.
Fine. Let’s call them “distinctions”. The divine persons are virtual distinctions of God, and the divine essence is a different virtual distinction of God.
Also, what is the difference between a “distinction” and a “division”? I would agree that not all distinctions are ontologically separable in reality into independently existing entities. Real distinctions can be separated in such a way, and virtual distinctions cannot be separated in such a way.
I don't know what you mean by this since it could be more disguised dguller doctrine which you read your own meanings into? If it is a quote from an orthodox Catholic theological then politeness dictates you give me the citation.
“Material predication” is G-L’s term for “identical predication”. He uses them both as the same kind of predication that is distinct from formal predication.
If it is one of your paraphrases then that just opens it up to mischief on your part. We are discussing "real" and "not real" distinctions. Anything more complicated leads to red herringsand what DavidM called misreadings and misconceptions.
ReplyDeleteHere is how I see things.
You have virtual distinction A and virtual distinction B. A and B are both virtual distinctions in X. One can say that A is identical to B, but only in the sense of identical predication (or material predication), which means that some of the predicates of A are different from some of the predicates of B, and yet A is identical to B in that they are both in X.
To substitute, you have the divine persons (= A) and the divine essence (= B). The divine persons and the divine essence are virtual distinctions that really exist in the unknowable underlying Godhood (= X). The divine persons are identical to the divine essence in the sense of identical predication (or material predication), which means that some of the predicates of the divine persons are different from some of the predicates of the divine essence. For example, one of the predicates of the divine persons is the presence of real distinction, and one of the predicates of the divine essence is the absence of real distinction. (Similarly, one of the predicates of the Father is generating the Son, and one of the predicates of the divine essence is not generating the Son.)
Does this sound okay?
No that means the real distinction between the divine persons isn't any kind of distinction in essence.
Where did the real distinction between the persons disappear to when the persons are in the essence? If the persons are in the essence, then the real distinction between the persons is also in the essence, because the real distinction between the persons is an essential predicate of the persons. Similarly, if rationality is in human nature, and human nature is in Ben, then rationality is in Ben.
What?
You said that the definiton for “three persons” was a “negative definition”. I’m wondering what your “negative definition” is. “Three persons” is not … what?
Nice obfuscation!
It’s not obfuscation. It is following the logical implications of what you are saying. If A is necessarily P, and A is in X, then P is in X, because wherever A is, P also is. And if P is absent, then A is no longer A, but something else. Your claim is a logical contradiction by saying that A can be A even while losing an essential predicate. This is logically impossible.
No it's wrong in principle to try and intelligibly figure out what distinct persons really are and what makes them really distinct from each other and not distinct in essence since it is a strict mystery and not intelligible to human intellects. What you just wrote above is an attempt at intelligibly that in principle cannot be known.
ReplyDeleteSo, it is impossible to figure out whether God is material or not, as well? I suppose all the negative attributes are too mysterious to determine if they are true. Maybe God is mutable, temporal, finite, composite, material, and potential after all! However, it’s all just a mystery how any of this is possible, and we cannot use logic and reason to figure anything out here.
Squares are concrete objects not perfections like persons or attributes & can only be compared to God metaphorically not analogously. By definition a square has four qualitative sides or it's not a square that is what a square is in essence or it's not a square, We don't and can't know what God is in essence. You still have much to learn as do I.
That’s the point. Part of the definition of “square” is “four sides”. If you remove “four sides”, then you don’t have a “square” anymore. Similarly, part of the definition of “three” is a “quantity”, and if you remove “quantity”, then you don’t have “three” anymore. “Three” is incoherent without quantity as an essential part of its meaning.
He only uses the word "parts" seven times in TRINITY etc. (gotta love word search functions) & the singular "part" 25 times and he never uses it as a synonym for "virtual distinctions" minor or otherwise.
I know he doesn’t use the “term” in the way that I do, but would be object to the meaning of the term as I’ve defined it. I don’t think so. Anyway, I’ll just use virtual distinctions, if you like. The underlying logic is exactly the same, and maybe it avoids unwanted connotations.
Yes it does since you reject the definition "real distinctions between person are not any kind of real distinction in essence" because you cannot intelligibly conceive of what that is but that is the point of Strict Mystery.
Ben, I can totally conceive of real distinctions being in the divine persons and no real distinction being in the divine essence. That is not inconceivable or problematic. The problems and contradictions occur when you combine these propositions with other Thomist propositions.
DavidM:
ReplyDelete" if P-ness is necessarily in A-ness, and A-ness is necessarily in X, then P-ness is necessarily in X" - doh! But again, P-ness is NOT necessarily in A-ness (per Scott, that would be against natural law), so nothing follows here!
We agree that rationality is necessarily in human nature, and human nature is necessarily in any particular human being.
I am arguing that it is necessarily true that rationality is in any particular human being, in order for them to be a human being at all. If there was no rationality, then there is no human being, because a human being is necessarily a rational animal.
You seem to be arguing that it is possible for a human being to be a human being, even if rationality is not in the human being at all. That would mean that a particular being could lose an essential predicate, and still remain the same particular being, which I would argue is logically impossible, because an essential predicate is a necessary part of a particular being that makes it what it is. Without it, it is something else entirely.
@dguller:
ReplyDelete"You seem to be arguing that it is possible for a human being to be a human being, even if rationality is not in the human being at all."
I'm pretty sure DavidM was just picking up my earlier joke and running with it. ;-)
>But you have no idea what “three” means!
ReplyDeleteI only know that here it doesn't mean three essences & it only means three persons. I can't intelligibly say what God is to be three persons in one essence but that is the point of strict mystery.
The rest of your mishegoss that tries to intelligibly figure out what it is to be only three persons but one essence violates the principle of strict mystery.
>>Which refers to the perceptional names of God referred to in Chapter 4 of Pseudo-Dionysius' MYSTICAL THEOLOGY.
>No, it refers to “literal utterances” (Ibid., p. 36).
Yes of “literal utterances” of the perceptional names of God & footnote 47 refers to Mystical Theology & on neither page 36 or 37 is there any mention of the divine persons or that the real distinction of the divine persons is not a strict mystery. No out of left field you want to claim Three Persons are a metaphor? What pretending they are divine attributes is getting old now?
Redefining our doctrines and Christian philosophy from the ground up in your own image is getting old.
>I don’t. I’ve clearly said that the sense is exactly the same.
You do because the sense is not the same at all.
>Whatever “real distinction” is in the divine persons must be in the divine essence if the divine persons are in the divine essence.
Thus given the definition of the Trinity, however they are in the divine essence they don't exist as real distinctions in essence. They exist as real distinctions between persons who exist as really distinct persons without any real distinction in essence.
Be advised that still counts as a Strict Mystery and anything you try to clearly intellectively articulate it to be is wrong.
>To deny this is to say that X can remain X even while losing an essential predicate, which is impossible.
Except X is relative persons not Y which is Absolute Essence though both fully share the predicate of being Deity.
A logical contradiction is a clear formulation of something according to the principle of contradiction. You are confusing what is unintelligible by the mere human intellect with what is logically contradictory that is what is clearly unintelligible in itself.
A logical contradiction as to be clear. That is why Distinct Persons subsisting in Absolute Essence as God isn't a logical contradiction it is merely not intelligible. Saying clearly Distinct Persons subsisting in an Absolute Person is both not intelligible and clearly so since it clearly tries to say A=A and doesn't equal ~A at the same time and in the same sense,
>You can do that, but then you get a logical contradiction anyway.
No I get something that is at worst unintelligible but not a strict logical contradiction.
>If you define the divine essence as lacking any real distinction in the divine essence, then the fact that the divine persons have an essential predicate of real distinction and the divine persons are in the divine essence means that their real distinction, as an essential predicate, is also present in the divine essence.
No it means distinct persons indistinctly exist as an indistinct essence while staying distinct persons one to another at the same time they exist as an indistinct essence.
We humans can't intelligibly conceive of what that might be like(principle of strict mystery) and anything we try to conceive of is automatically wrong but there is no logical contradiction. We have clearly say when we say distinct persons we mean distinct essences & we also mean by indistinct essence we really mean distinct person. Because distinct persons can't be a indistinct person & an indistinct essence can't be distinct essences without clearly violating the POC.
>Fine. Let’s call them “distinctions”. The divine persons are virtual distinctions of God, and the divine essence is a different virtual distinction of God.
ReplyDeleteNo let us not since you are misreading and misinterpreting Catholic doctrine & philosophy enough.
We only care about real distinctions & not real distinctions and in what senses.
That is it.
>Also, what is the difference between a “distinction” and a “division”?
Divisions negate the divine simplicity and the Absolute Essence. They are the word we use to indicate material things are divined and or that something's existence is really distinct from it's essence which is metaphysical composition. Real distinctions in essence are by definition divisions. Other types of real distinction not so much.
>“Material predication” is G-L’s term for “identical predication”. He uses them both as the same kind of predication that is distinct from formal predication.
But he clearly states the difference between comparing predications of God with predications of created things & nowhere does he claim distinct persons subsisting in the divine essence divide the essence physically or metaphysically & he would reject that as heresy and not the teaching of the Trinity.
>Here is how I see things.
I don't care! How you see things has nothing to do with how I & my co-religious see the doctrine of the Trinity. Yeh I see God as something immutable but my Mormon Shipmate in the Navy didn't see God as immutable which was why he didn't care if God changed his mind and didn't allow a special temple to be build on the Temple Lot during Smith's lifetime(google it).
>Does this sound okay?
It could be read in orthodox way but all you have to do is trying to intelligible articulate what that is in reallty & we are back to you claiming "logical contradiction" where none exist. Add to that your dogma that because Persons are really distinct if they are subsisting in absolute essence they cause the essence to be distinct and not absolute. Which begs the question.
>Where did the real distinction between the persons disappear to when the persons are in the essence?
It is always there it simply has never at any time existed as any type of existence in essence. It only exists as a distinction between persons & never at any time a distinction in essence. Now what is that?
Don't/Can't know Strict Mystery. Anything you imagine or positively conceive of it to be is automatically wrong.
>Similarly, if rationality is in human nature, and human nature is in Ben, then rationality is in Ben.
Three distinct but not separate persons are in the divine essence & as Brian Davies said "Aquinas thought the Trinity was the Divine Essence and the Essence was the Trinity and God was the Trinity. Now what that is intelligibly? I can only negatively define it in such a way that avoids logical contradiction. I can't intelligibly tel you what is it.
>You said that the definiton for “three persons” was a “negative definition” I’m wondering what your “negative definition” is. “Three persons” is not … what?
Which means it's not three divine essences. Whatever a divine essence is as a divine essence? Which we cannot know but only know things about.
>It’s not obfuscation. It is following the logical implications of what you are saying.
How can you have a logical implication for something that us a Strict Mystery? You can't say what it is & anything you say it is in principle is wrong?
>So, it is impossible to figure out whether God is material or not, as well? I suppose all the negative attributes are too mysterious to determine if they are true. Maybe God is mutable, temporal, finite, composite, material, and potential after all! However, it’s all just a mystery how any of this is possible, and we cannot use logic and reason to figure anything out here.
ReplyDeleteWow you really are not arguing the Trinity on any level? Just dguller-doctrine. Did you forget we cannot threw human reason alone without divine revelation know God is a Trinity? Sure I can know God is not material. We can know this about the divine essence via Natural Theology and reason. God doesn't have to tell us jack!
We cannot know in God there are distinct persons who are not distinct in essence & we cannot know what it is to be something that is distinct as persons but not distinct as an essence.
the dguller-doctrine of the "trinity" 100% less mystery then the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.
>That’s the point. Part of the definition of “square” is “four sides”.
That is what the square is in essence by definition. We still cannot know God's essence.
>I I know he doesn’t use the “term” in the way that I do, but would be object to the meaning of the term as I’ve defined it. I don’t think so. Anyway, I’ll just use virtual distinctions, if you like. The underlying logic is exactly the same and maybe it avoids unwanted connotations.
Maybe but I've tried to find common ground with you before and you always go back to redefining the Catholic Doctrine your way instead of our way. Which is the only way that counts here. It's our doctrine.
>Ben, I can totally conceive of real distinctions being in the divine persons and no real distinction being in the divine essence. That is not inconceivable or problematic.
It's also not a strict mystery till you put them together while knowing whatever the real distinctions between persons really are they can't be any type of real distinction in essence and as to what they are is a mystery..
>The problems and contradictions occur when you combine these propositions with other Thomist propositions.
That is when you try to make them positively intelligible. Which the doctrine of the Trinity says you cannot do with a mere human mind.
I am wondering if you are really arguing "logical contradiction" anymore?
Ben:
ReplyDeleteI only know that here it doesn't mean three essences & it only means three persons. I can't intelligibly say what God is to be three persons in one essence but that is the point of strict mystery.
I’m not asking about three persons in one essence. I’m just asking about three persons, period. How can you say that there are three persons, if “three” is not a quantity? What does “three” mean in this context, if it is not a countable numerical quantity?
The rest of your mishegoss that tries to intelligibly figure out what it is to be only three persons but one essence violates the principle of strict mystery.
That is not what I’m arguing here.
Yes of “literal utterances” of the perceptional names of God & footnote 47 refers to Mystical Theology & on neither page 36 or 37 is there any mention of the divine persons or that the real distinction of the divine persons is not a strict mystery.
Yes, but there is mention of a principle: “eadum est scientia oppositorium”, which means “one and the same is knowledge of contraries”. If you want to deny that there are four persons, then you must know what it means to negate “three persons”, and that means that you must first have knowledge of what “three persons” means. Without this knowledge, you cannot deny that there are more or less persons in God.
No out of left field you want to claim Three Persons are a metaphor? What pretending they are divine attributes is getting old now?
I’m just asking the question, Ben. Are they a metaphor or are they literal?
You do because the sense is not the same at all.
How does it change? What does it change into from one place in the argument to another? I am telling you that the sense remains the same. The divine persons have real distinction as an essential predicate. The divine essence lacks real distinction as an essential predicate. “Real distinction” in both has the exact same sense, except that it is affirmed of the divine persons and it is denied of the divine essence. So, if you want to say that the sense of “real distinction” is S(RD), then the divine persons are S(RD) and the divine essence is not-S(RD). Notice that S(RD) remains the same in both the affirmation and the negation. This consistency of sense is what makes it a logical contradiction to affirm S(RD) of the divine essence and deny S(RD) of the divine persons. Otherwise, there is no logical contradiction at all, and one can affirm S(RD) of the divine essence and deny S(RD) of the divine persons.
Except X is relative persons not Y which is Absolute Essence though both fully share the predicate of being Deity.
That is completely irrelevant. The point is that the divine relations are necessarily really distinct, and thus they must remain really distinct even while they are in the divine essence. And if there is something that is really distinct in the divine essence, then there is real distinction in the divine essence. In the same way that there is rationality in human nature, and if Ben has human nature, then there is rationality in Ben. To deny this is to deny that Ben is human.
No it means distinct persons indistinctly exist as an indistinct essence while staying distinct persons one to another at the same time they exist as an indistinct essence.
ReplyDeleteFirst, only you could make sense of that word salad.
Second, we already agreed that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence, and thus the divine persons do not exist “as” the divine essence, because they are different distinctions in God himself. That is what it means to say that they are materially identical or identically predicated of one another. They are not the same thing, but they are both in the same thing.
Third, what you said makes as much sense as saying that the divine idea of human nature exists as the divine idea of dog nature while remaining the divine idea of human nature at the same time as it exists as the divine idea of dog nature.
No let us not since you are misreading and misinterpreting Catholic doctrine & philosophy enough.
What? So, now you are denying that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence?? Are you rejecting G-L on this point even after you specifically cited it to support your position?
Divisions negate the divine simplicity and the Absolute Essence. They are the word we use to indicate material things are divined and or that something's existence is really distinct from it's essence which is metaphysical composition. Real distinctions in essence are by definition divisions. Other types of real distinction not so much.
So, “division” is equivalent to “really distinct”. That is consistent with what I’ve been saying:
A is really distinct from B iff (a) A and B are really in X, (b) A is not B, and (c) A can be separated from B in reality
According to this, A would be divisible from B on the basis of the fact that A could be separated from B in reality. Furthermore, a virtual distinction cannot be a division, because it lacks (c), because if A is virtually distinct from B, then A cannot be separated from B in reality.
Is this correct?
But he clearly states the difference between comparing predications of God with predications of created things & nowhere does he claim distinct persons subsisting in the divine essence divide the essence physically or metaphysically & he would reject that as heresy and not the teaching of the Trinity.
I never said that he did. I’m just trying to make sure that I’m using his terms correctly. So, am I using his terms correctly here? If I am not, then how am I using them incorrectly?
It could be read in orthodox way but all you have to do is trying to intelligible articulate what that is in reallty & we are back to you claiming "logical contradiction" where none exist. Add to that your dogma that because Persons are really distinct if they are subsisting in absolute essence they cause the essence to be distinct and not absolute. Which begs the question.
ReplyDeleteBen, I’m going to ask you again. Did you notice anything incorrect in my account of virtual distinction above? I’ll repeat it again:
“You have virtual distinction A and virtual distinction B. A and B are both virtual distinctions in X. One can say that A is identical to B, but only in the sense of identical predication (or material predication), which means that some of the predicates of A are different from some of the predicates of B, and yet A is identical to B in that they are both in X.
“To substitute, you have the divine persons (= A) and the divine essence (= B). The divine persons and the divine essence are virtual distinctions that really exist in the unknowable underlying Godhood (= X). The divine persons are identical to the divine essence in the sense of identical predication (or material predication), which means that some of the predicates of the divine persons are different from some of the predicates of the divine essence. For example, one of the predicates of the divine persons is the presence of real distinction, and one of the predicates of the divine essence is the absence of real distinction. (Similarly, one of the predicates of the Father is generating the Son, and one of the predicates of the divine essence is not generating the Son.)”
Would you disagree with any of this? Forget about everything else that we have been discussing, and just focus on the above paragraphs. If you read it in a Thomist textbook, then would you object?
It is always there it simply has never at any time existed as any type of existence in essence. It only exists as a distinction between persons & never at any time a distinction in essence. Now what is that? Don't/Can't know Strict Mystery. Anything you imagine or positively conceive of it to be is automatically wrong.
So, the real distinction between the divine persons continues to be present even while the divine persons are in the divine essence. How is their real distinction not present in the divine essence if “it is always there”? It is clearly present in the divine essence, and thus real distinction is present in the divine essence.
Which means it's not three divine essences. Whatever a divine essence is as a divine essence? Which we cannot know but only know things about.
What does “three” mean here, if it lacks any numerical quantity?
Wow you really are not arguing the Trinity on any level? Just dguller-doctrine. Did you forget we cannot threw human reason alone without divine revelation know God is a Trinity? Sure I can know God is not material. We can know this about the divine essence via Natural Theology and reason. God doesn't have to tell us jack!
But you can’t know that God is immaterial, according to you. God is mystery such that anything that you can conceive is necessarily wrong. If I conceive of God as immaterial, then I am conceiving something that is necessarily wrong. If I conceive of God as material, then I am conceiving something that is necessarily wrong. That is what it means to say that anything that I conceive is necessarily wrong.
That is what the square is in essence by definition. We still cannot know God's essence.
I’m only talking about the definition of “three”. Focus, Ben.
It's also not a strict mystery till you put them together while knowing whatever the real distinctions between persons really are they can't be any type of real distinction in essence and as to what they are is a mystery..
ReplyDeleteWhy is it a mystery? The divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence, which means that they are different distinctions in God. If there is no mystery how the divine intellect can contain all divine ideas while the divine will actualizes reality itself, then why on earth would there be a mystery about how the divine persons are really distinct while the divine essence is not really distinct. It is only a mystery if you say that the divine persons are totally identical to the divine essence in the sense that they cannot differ in any way. But since you fervently deny this, then there is no mystery at all here. :)
edit:
ReplyDelete>Where did the real distinction between the persons disappear to when the persons are in the essence?
It is always there it simply has never at any time existed as any type of real distinction in essence. It only exists as a real distinction between persons & never at any time a real distinction in essence. Now what is that?
Don't/Can't know Strict Mystery. Anything you imagine or positively conceive of it to be is automatically wrong.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteJust wanted to correct something about Venus that I said earlier that was incorrect. When I said that the Morning Star is how Venus appears in the morning and the Evening Star is how Venus appears in the evening, I was wrong. The Morning Star is how Venus appears in the east before sunrise, when Venus is on one side of the sun, and the Evening Star is how Venus appears in the west after sunset, when Venus is on the other side of the sun. So, the different appears correspond to different parts of Venus’ rotation around the sun, and thus correspond to different spatio-temporal parts of Venus’ identity. When Venus is at one spatio-temporal location, it is the Morning Star, and when Venus is at a different spatio-temporal location, it is the Evening Star.
>If the divine essence does not share the same predicates in reality with the divine persons, then the divine essence is different from the divine persons.
ReplyDeleteRather the divine essence is predicated differently as a WHAT and divine Persons are predicated differently as WHO's Three Who's that are One What. In reality there are Three Who's that are the same identical subsistent What. We predicate Persons as Relative, Persons to Person, and we predicate an Absolute Essence that is not relative in anyway as an essence. We cannot intelligibly know how Relative persons and Absolute essence can both be the same identical Deity via the principle of Strict mystery & anything we try to conceive intelligibly is automatically wrong.
> After all, they must differ in terms of some predicates, and thus cannot be totally identical to one another in reality. Would you agree?
No the total identical reality here is they are both the same identical Deity. That is the only predicated reality shared by relative persons and absolute essence.
This is not a negotiation. You either learn the doctrine & the rules of the doctrine or you don't. If you don't then anything you discuss is a straw man.
me: "How are these *options*? How is it possible to have (1) and (2) available to oneself such that one has the option of choosing (1) or (2)?"
ReplyDeleteguller: "It is possible, because people do, in fact, act according to (2). Many people cherry pick evidence to support firmly held beliefs. Many people rationalize away unwanted evidence to maintain their beliefs. Clearly, (2) is an option for people to follow, because some people do actually follow (2)."
The fact that some people follow (2) some of the time does not mean that they were ever presented with both options, (1) and (2), and chose option (2). So your response here makes no sense as a response to my question - it is a non sequitur. Can you see that?
guller: "My point was that if a person firmly holds to certain beliefs, then just providing them with compelling evidence will likely be insufficient to get them to reject those beliefs."
ReplyDeleteBut my point was that that may or may not be true - you have no basis for making this *generalization*. It depends on the individual and it depends on the case. Pointing to an instance (UFO cult) where it is true does not amount to justifying your *generalization*. That's NOT how the scientific method works.
And my other point was that you made a false statement, and rather than just admitting it and dealing with the rational consequences, you try to get me to chase more red herrings. To me, that you do this is compelling evidence of something.
guller: "The Morning Star is how Venus appears in the east before sunrise, when Venus is on one side of the sun, and the Evening Star is how Venus appears in the west after sunset, when Venus is on the other side of the sun. So, the different appear[ance]s correspond to different parts of Venus’ rotation around the sun, and thus correspond to different spatio-temporal parts of Venus’ identity."
ReplyDeleteOkay, except Venus doesn't appear any differently in the morning and evening, does it? (Certainly not to the naked eye.) And it doesn't matter if you're only seeing part of Venus,* WHAT you're seeing is still Venus, Venus is still identical to Hesperus and Phosphorus, but not all predications true of Hesperus (or Phosphorus) are true of Venus.
*Notice, also, that there is not some constant *part* of Venus that anybody identifies with Hesperus or Phosphorus. Hesperus is not *the part of Venus* that appears in the evening, it is just *Venus, insofar as Venus (or *any part* of Venus) appears in the evening*.
>I’m not asking about three persons in one essence. I’m just asking about three persons, period. How can you say that there are three persons, if “three” is not a quantity? What does “three” mean in this context, if it is not a countable numerical quantity?
ReplyDeleteGod is not quantity in either His Unity in Essence or Relativity in Persons. God is just not a quantity at all. It means what I said & that is the only answer that can be given.
"the Trinity of the divine persons cannot be known by natural reason, that is, it cannot be understood or demonstrated. This statement does not depress but rather pleases the theologian."-G-L Q32 TRINITY
How are the Three Persons not quantitatively Three? They are not Three Essences. Live with it.
>That is not what I’m arguing here.
Then your argument is like nailing Jello to a Wall.
>Yes, but there is mention of a principle: “eadum est scientia oppositorium”, which means “one and the same is knowledge of contraries”.
dguller I have the book and the index does not list pages 36 & 37 under the subject matter Trinity. So this Red Herring has nothing to do with anything. Contraries are not contradictions. If I say A=B & then I say A=C those are contrary statements(God is Being, God is Good), God is Life). A=B and doesn't Equal ~B at the same time in the same sense is a contradiction. Then saying C doesn't equal B formally is a contradiction.
Since we can't know the Trinity by natural reason we can't know if there are or are not Person(s) in God or how many or if they are limited to 3 or more. We believe because divine revelation tells us. End of Story.
Stop equivocating between revealed & natural theology.
>I’m just asking the question, Ben. Are they a metaphor or are they literal?
Based on a section of a book on mysticism & divine mystery that isn't even talking about the Trinity or the content of Trinitarian Theology. The divine persons are literally divine relations subsisting in essence which is what it means to say they are literally persons. Nothing more.
>How does it change? What does it change into from one place in the argument to another?
It changes by definition. My whole argument has been a vain exercise in trying to explain the doctrinal content of the Trinity. Your have been trying to find some way to redefine the doctrine to produce a logical contradiction which is a Straw Man. By definition real relations between opposing Persons are not any kind of real relation in essence. There are distinct Persons subsisting in Absolute Essence. As they subsist in Absolute essence they are not distinct from that essence in any real way. But since they subsist as "distinct Persons" the Persons themselves are really distinct as persons but not in essence.
If you try to imagine what this must be like you will go mad because that is about as meaningful as me saying I know every digit of the value of Pi. It is not possible to comprehend a Strict mystery.
>“Real distinction” in both has the exact same sense,
No it has the same definition not the same sense. Meaning there exists actual distinctions instead of distinctions in the mind. The Persons are actually distinct (not separate or divided) from one another. The divine relation of Paternity is not the same relation as passive spiration etc…but they are the same in essence. Whatever it is about real relations between person that allows us to say the Father is not who the Spirit is etc does not allow us to say the Father is not what the Son is as the one God. The real relation between persons is not any kind of real relation in essence. If you reject this you are not arguing the Trinity.
>then the divine persons are S(RD
ReplyDeleteNo more of this formula Mishegoss! The Fathers didn't use them! The Church never uses them & they just confuse the issue & make it more complicated.. We will keep it simple. The real relations between Persons are not any kind of real relation in essence.
>The point is that the divine relations are necessarily really distinct, and thus they must remain really distinct even while they are in the divine essence
But by definition they don't divide the essence. The essence remains as an essence, absolute. Why don't they do this? We don't' and cant' know (Strict mystery). Firstly because we don't know what they really are so we can't know it is or is not impossible for this to be the case by our reason alone. We simply trust revelation and Church.
>First, only you could make sense of that word salad.
What part of "Strict Mystery not suppose to make sense" still doesn't make sense to you? It's supposed to be ad hoc defined so there is no logical contradiction. We are not suppose to be able to figure out what a "real relation between persons" is or why it allows the persons to be distinct but can't divide the essence which remains absolute. I get this & I would even if I become an Atheist tomorrow.
>Second, we already agreed that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence,
But I don't agree with your past claim this contradicts Prof Feser & it is not relevant. One of only two issues is relevant. Does the real relations between persons cause the divine essence to divide and not be absolute? Yes or no? The answer is no by definition.
>Third, what you said makes as much sense as saying that the divine idea of human nature exists as the divine idea of dog nature while remaining the divine idea of human nature at the same time as it exists as the divine idea of dog nature.
None of those are divine relations nor are they real relations in any sense they are archetypal divine ideas. Different topic & a Red Herring. We are discussing the Trinity specifically your phony claims of logical contradiction and phony claims of violation of the divine simplicity.
>What? So, now you are denying that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence?? Are you rejecting G-L on this point even after you specifically cited it to support your position?
ReplyDeleteNo I agree with G-L. I just don't want to talk about it since it confuses the issue. You claim the Trinity is a logically contradictory doctrine and it violates the divine simplicity. Thus the only thing we need discuss is "real relations" in their different senses & wither or not relative persons causes division in essence thus making the essence not absolute or not. I want to keep it simple. Your red herrings & tangents are getting old.
>So, “division” is equivalent to “really distinct”. That is consistent with what I’ve been saying:
You misunderstood again. Yet you ignored what I said"Real distinctions in essence are by definition divisions" which implies via the doctrine of the Trinity "Real distinctions between persons are not any type of division".
>Is this correct?
No you missed the point. Real distinctions in essence are division. Real distinctions between persons are not divisions which is why they are not any kind of real distinction in essence. Also don't bore me by trying to claim all real distinctions are somehow divisions. G-L says otherwise. Read him for once.
>I never said that he did. I’m just trying to make sure that I’m using his terms correctly. So, am I using his terms correctly here? If I am not, then how am I using them incorrectly?
It is self evident you are only reading bits of him.
>Ben, I’m going to ask you again. Did you notice anything incorrect in my account of virtual distinction above? I’ll repeat it again:
No more tangents & no more common ground. Either explain to me how you can know real relations between persons causes division in essence if they are not any kind of division in essence or confess you are not arguing the Trinity as taught by the church.
>Would you disagree with any of this? Forget about everything else that we have been discussing, and just focus on the above paragraphs.
Not interested. Virtual distinctions aren't real distinctions but the issue here is are there real distinctions/divisions in essence just because there are real relations between persons? Short answer no.
>But you can’t know that God is immaterial, according to you. God is mystery such that anything that you can conceive is necessarily wrong.
Now you are confusing revealed theology with Natural. We can know things about the divine essence using natural theology which involves philosophical argument. We cannot know the Trinity using natural theology since there is no philosophical argument that can demonstraight the Trinity. God has to tell us about the Trinity or we would know it.
>Why is it a mystery? The divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence, which means that they are different distinctions in God.
The mystery is how can persons be really distinct from one another as persons but not distinct in essence.
>It is only a mystery if you say that the divine persons are totally identical to the divine essence in the sense that they cannot differ in any way.
I would always add the qualifier which I will make more specific "cannot differ in any way being equally the one God".
QUOTE"In the Catholic Catechism, written by Cardinal Gasparri, this mystery is defined as:
(a) "God is one in the unity of nature in three really distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, who constitute the Holy Trinity."[47] Thus the Father is the Godhead but He is not the Trinity."-G-L TRNITY Preface.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteRather the divine essence is predicated differently as a WHAT and divine Persons are predicated differently as WHO's Three Who's that are One What. In reality there are Three Who's that are the same identical subsistent What.
You are saying that God has different predicates, one of which is the divine essence and another of which is the divine persons. The divine essence is identical to the divine persons in the sense of both being predicates of the same underlying subject, i.e. God. However, they are different predicates, because they have different natures. What this means is that they are material predicates, and not formal predicates, according to G-L’s terminology, which means that the essential predicates of the divine essence are not totally the same as the essential predicates of the divine persons. Otherwise, they would be formal predicates, and not material predicates.
What this ultimately means is that the different predicates of God are different virtual distinctions in God, which means that they are all identical in the sense that they are in God, and yet they are different virtual distinctions from one another, because they have different natures, and thus have different essential predicates that define them. That is why the divine mercy does not punish, but only the divine justice punishes. The nature of the divine mercy has different essential predicates than the nature of the divine justice, and yet both are in God.
No the total identical reality here is they are both the same identical Deity. That is the only predicated reality shared by relative persons and absolute essence.
Here is what I mean to say: If A has different essential predicates than B, then A differs from B in some way, and if A differs from B in some way, then A is not totally identical to B in every way. However, A can be partially identical to B in that A and B are both in X, and yet partially different from B in that they have different essential predicates.
Would you disagree with this?
@DavidM:
ReplyDeleteNot wishing to get heavily involved in the debate, I may as well still comment from the bleachers; after all, having jumped in on A-ness and P-ness, I may as well comment on V-ness . . . ;-)
"And it doesn't matter if you're only seeing part of Venus,* WHAT you're seeing is still Venus, Venus is still identical to Hesperus and Phosphorus, but not all predications true of Hesperus (or Phosphorus) are true of Venus."
That was my thought as well. The real object of my perception is Venus either way, and when I think about either one, the reference or extension of my thought is Venus no matter what my sense or intension is.
But I have two misgivings about the Venus business in the first place I'll take them in reverse order of seriousness, with the less serious first.
(1) I'm not at all persuaded that different spacetime segments of Venus would count as "parts" for the purposes of the doctrine of divine simplicity anyway. They may count as such for some philosophers, but I think it's a bit of a mistake to read modern mereology back into (say) Plotinus.
(2) More seriously, I'm not persuaded that Venus is all that relevant an example anyway. Consider the following as one possibly more pertinent to the current debate, or at least as food for thought:
In languages deriving from Indo-European (and, I think, in most or all others as well), the words for two" and "half" are etymologically unrelated. That's not true of "three" and "third," "four" and "fourth," and so on. The implication seems to be that when people first started using language, cutting something in two was not seen as involving there being two of something.
Now it's perfectly obvious to us in retrospect that "half" and "two" are intimately related: halving something makes there be two parts. But since that fact apparently wasn't obvious to the first users of these words and concepts, it seems that they were able to grasp (implicitly) the idea of "two" in two different ways and created two different, unrelated words for the resultant concepts.
My point is this. Because the number "two" is involved in each of two different concepts but not thought of in the same way, does that mean the originators of these languages weren't thinking of the same number "two" in each of those cases? Is the "two" involved in "halving" somehow different in and of itself from the "two" involved in "two-ness" just because early users of language didn't connect them?
The reason I think this is a somewhat better example is of course that the number two seems to be, in what ever sense it exists at all, timeless/eternal and without parts.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteRather the divine essence is predicated differently as a WHAT and divine Persons are predicated differently as WHO's Three Who's that are One What. In reality there are Three Who's that are the same identical subsistent What. We predicate Persons as Relative, Persons to Person, and we predicate an Absolute Essence that is not relative in anyway as an essence. We cannot intelligibly know how Relative persons and Absolute essence can both be the same identical Deity via the principle of Strict mystery & anything we try to conceive intelligibly is automatically wrong.
But here’s the problem. To say that the divine persons are identical to the divine essence uses identical predication (or material predication), which means that they do not have the same nature or essence, but exist in the same subject. It does not mean that they are both the same subject, but rather each is a different virtual distinction in the same subject. So, if the divine persons are A and the divine essence is B, then A and B are both in X, where X is the unknown Godhead, but A is not B, because they do not have the same nature or essence.
That is why the divine justice punishes, while the divine mercy cannot punish. If the divine justice was identical to the divine mercy in the sense of formal predication, then they could not differ in any essential predicates. The fact that they do differ in some essential predicates means that they have different essences, and thus cannot be formally identical at all. Instead, they are materially identical, which just means that although they have different essences, they are both in the same subject. That is how the divine justice has different essential predicates than the divine mercy, and yet they are both identical in the sense of both being in the same unknown Godhead.
No the total identical reality here is they are both the same identical Deity. That is the only predicated reality shared by relative persons and absolute essence.
Your “total identical” is my “partial identical”. You say that A and B have different essential predicates, and thus have different essences, and yet A and B are identical in that they are both in X. To me, that is partial identity, because they are partly the same in that they are both in X, and they are partly different in that they have different essential predicates, and thus different essences.
God is not quantity in either His Unity in Essence or Relativity in Persons. God is just not a quantity at all. It means what I said & that is the only answer that can be given.
That is no answer at all. To strip quantity of “three” is like stripping “sides” of “square”. You have eliminated an essential predicate, and thus changed it into something else entirely. It would be like stripping “rational” from “human”, and pretend that you are still talking about a human being. You are basically talking gibberish here. You are clearly using the number three and yet pretending that you are not. You can count the persons: Father, Son, Spirit. One, two, three. And yet, you are acting as if you haven’t just counted them, even though you just counted them. Without the counting, the use of “three” is incoherent, much like without the “four sides”, the use of “square” is incoherent.
How are the Three Persons not quantitatively Three? They are not Three Essences. Live with it.
You are missing the point. Ignore the divine essence altogether, and just focus upon the three persons. What do you mean by “three” if you deny that you mean a countable numerical quantity? You mean nothing at all, actually.
dguller I have the book and the index does not list pages 36 & 37 under the subject matter Trinity. So this Red Herring has nothing to do with anything. Contraries are not contradictions. If I say A=B & then I say A=C those are contrary statements(God is Being, God is Good), God is Life). A=B and doesn't Equal ~B at the same time in the same sense is a contradiction. Then saying C doesn't equal B formally is a contradiction.
ReplyDeleteIt is a different problem that I have with the Trinity that does not directly have to do with the contradiction matter. You claim as a matter of faith that there are “three persons”, and yet you have no idea what “three” means here. You cannot even distinguish “three” from “four”, which was my point, because in order to say “three” and not “four”, you must have a clear sense of “three”, which you completely lack. Like I said, you are using a number while pretending that you aren’t, which is ridiculous.
Just admit that you have no idea what “three” means, and stop using the word “three” altogether, because it has a denotation that you completely reject. Remember how you objected to my use of “virtual parts”, because the mention of “parts” could be misconstrued? Well, the same logic should lead to you reject “three”, because it necessarily involves countable numerical quantity, which cannot be predicated of God, because it is an accidental predicate, and God has no accidents.
Based on a section of a book on mysticism & divine mystery that isn't even talking about the Trinity or the content of Trinitarian Theology. The divine persons are literally divine relations subsisting in essence which is what it means to say they are literally persons. Nothing more.
Then they are “literal utterances”, which means that they must operate according to the principle that I cited above. That means that if you want to deny that there are “four divine persons”, then you must have a clear sense of what “three divine persons” means, because part of the meaning of “four divine persons” is “not three divine persons”. But you said this clear sense is impossible, and thus you cannot deny that there are four divine persons at all. In fact, the Trinity becomes logically consistent with an infinite number of divine persons!
It changes by definition.
Where did it change? You have no idea, and just say that it must change “by definition”. Here’s another argument:
(1) God is material, and thus has potentiality
(2) God is pure act, and thus has no potentiality
(3) It is impossible for (1) to logically contradict (2), by definition
Would you accept (1), (2) and (3)? You must, because I have denied a logical contradiction by definition, and according to you, that is sufficient to reject the presence of an actual logical contradiction.
No it has the same definition not the same sense.
What is the difference between a “definition” and a “sense”? To me, they are the same thing. They are both linguistic and cognitive representations in the mind that point towards a referent.
No more of this formula Mishegoss! The Fathers didn't use them! The Church never uses them & they just confuse the issue & make it more complicated..
So, you can’t point to where I’m wrong in my argument, and so object to the fact that I am trying to formalize it somewhat? Wow.
We will keep it simple. The real relations between Persons are not any kind of real relation in essence.
ReplyDeleteDo you agree that “real relations” in “the real relations between persons” has the same sense as the “real relations” in “not any kind of real relation in essence”? In other words, the real relations that are present in the divine persons is absent in the divine essence. Or, to use symbols, it is true to say that the divine persons are RR, and it is true to say that the divine essence is not-RR.
But by definition they don't divide the essence. The essence remains as an essence, absolute. Why don't they do this? We don't' and cant' know (Strict mystery). Firstly because we don't know what they really are so we can't know it is or is not impossible for this to be the case by our reason alone. We simply trust revelation and Church.
We don’t need to know what they are. Like I said, you can just call them RR, and have no idea what RR is, except that RR is an essential predicate of the divine persons. If RR was absent from the divine persons, then they wouldn’t be divine persons at all. It is essential to them being what they are, much like rationality is essential to a human being a human being. If you remove rationality, then you no longer have a human being at all.
If the divine persons are in the divine essence, then the divine persons are essentially and necessarily RR while they are in the divine essence. Their RR continues to exist within the divine persons, and has not left the divine persons to remain outside of the divine essence while the divine persons are inside the divine essence. If that were true, then you would have the logical contradiction that something can lose an essential predicate and still be the same thing, which is impossible. So, RR must be present in the divine essence, because the divine persons are present in the divine essence, and wherever the divine persons are, RR must also be. Therefore, there is RR in the divine essence.
It doesn’t help for you to just say that this is definitionally impossible. Your definition leads to a logical contradiction between there is RR in the divine essence and there cannot be RR in the divine essence. That is a logical contradiction, which requires more than saying that it is impossible to contradict by definition. The definition itself has led to a contradiction, and thus disproves itself, much like (3) above. (3) is clearly false, because there is a logical contradiction between (1) and (2). Similarly, the definition that there is no RR in the divine essence is false, because there is RR in the divine essence by virtue of the fact that there could be no divine persons in the divine essence unless RR was in the divine essence with the divine persons.
But I don't agree with your past claim this contradicts Prof Feser & it is not relevant. One of only two issues is relevant. Does the real relations between persons cause the divine essence to divide and not be absolute? Yes or no? The answer is no by definition.
So, you agree that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence. Right? Forget about what I think I can logically infer from this. Do you, at least, agree with this claim?
No I agree with G-L. I just don't want to talk about it since it confuses the issue. You claim the Trinity is a logically contradictory doctrine and it violates the divine simplicity. Thus the only thing we need discuss is "real relations" in their different senses & wither or not relative persons causes division in essence thus making the essence not absolute or not. I want to keep it simple. Your red herrings & tangents are getting old.
It is really simple, Ben. Do you agree that the divine persons are virtually distinct from the divine essence?
You misunderstood again. Yet you ignored what I said"Real distinctions in essence are by definition divisions" which implies via the doctrine of the Trinity "Real distinctions between persons are not any type of division".
ReplyDeleteSo, some real distinctions involve division, and other real distinctions do not involve division. Now I’m confused. What is the difference between a real distinction and a virtual distinction? It was my understanding that both involve a distinction between A and B such that A and B are both really in X, and the only difference between them is that if A is really distinct from B then A could exist independently of B, and that if A is virtually distinct from B, then A could not exist independently of B. For example, form is really distinct from matter, because form can exist independently of matter. However, the divine essence is virtually distinct from the divine persons, because the divine essence cannot exist independently of the divine persons.
But now I’m confused about what “division” means. I thought that if A and B are divisible, then A and B can exist independently of one another, but you are denying that this is right. So, I have to ask, what is the definition of “distinction”, and what is the definition of “division”? How are they different?
Also don't bore me by trying to claim all real distinctions are somehow divisions. G-L says otherwise. Read him for once.
G-L says: “A division, as Aristotle pointed out, must divide the whole, and in order that it be adequate it must be into two members opposed to each other by affirmation and negation and not into three members.” So, you have a whole X, which has two parts, A and B, such that A is not-B. In such a scenario, you have “division”. For example, there is a division between rational and non-rational animals.
But if this is true, then you must have a division between the divine persons, because “the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations” (ST Ia, Q36, A2). If you have two divine persons, P1 and P2, and P1 is really distinct from P2, then it follows that P1 is not-P2. In other words, the Father is not the Son, because the Father has the essential predicate of generation, and the Son lacks the essential predicate of generation. So, by G-L’s own terminology, there must be “division” between the divine persons.
No more tangents & no more common ground. Either explain to me how you can know real relations between persons causes division in essence if they are not any kind of division in essence or confess you are not arguing the Trinity as taught by the church.
Wow. You are like someone who replies to Aquinas’ analysis of act and potency with, “Enough with these tangents! Show me how they prove that God exists!” Well, you need to first clarify these terms and what they mean before they can be used in an argument for God’s existence. Same thing here. I want us both to understand our terms, because otherwise any arguments will pass one another rather than engage one another.
The mystery is how can persons be really distinct from one another as persons but not distinct in essence.
There is no mystery if you are correct that “really distinct” in the divine persons has a different sense from “really distinct” in the divine essence. Why would there be? If there is RD1 in the divine persons and no RD2 in the divine essence, then where is the mystery? There is only a mystery if you claim that “really distinct” has the same sense and referent in both the divine persons and the divine essence. Otherwise, there is no problem at all.
I would always add the qualifier which I will make more specific "cannot differ in any way being equally the one God".
ReplyDeleteThen there is no mystery. It’s all pretty mundane. It is like saying that it is mystery how John’s mood can be blue while John’s arm can be not blue. First, John’s mood is different from John’s arm. Second, “blue” means different things in the former versus the latter. So, no problemo.
>>No more tangents & no more common ground. Either explain to me how you can know real relations between persons causes division in essence if they are not any kind of division in essence or confess you are not arguing the Trinity as taught by the church.
ReplyDelete>Same thing here. I want us both to understand our terms, because otherwise any arguments will pass one another rather than engage one another.
No dguller the issue is do you understand the doctrine of the Trinity so you can mount a legitimate criticism instead of s Straw man and the only answer that can be given is you clearly do not I am not the only person here to come to this conclusion & I would like to thank DavidM for his support. Yet another half a dozen posts of misunderstandings, misreadings, red herrings and misrepresentations. Not only of my words but G-L and Feser and Aquinas. I tried to bring us back to simplicity so we can get to the heart of the issue & you resist doing even that! I guess you want to muck up the soup rather then admit you don't know what you are talking about. All that crap about me not believing in the "Three" in the Three Persons because of the Transcendental Plurality not being a quantitative number.
DavidM is right there is no point in answering it all this mishegoss post by post.
Did dguller even read G-L's commentary on Q30 & Q31 before he went off on his little tirade about me not believing in "three"? I read it did today. Interesting stuff I even ordered ON THE POWER of God which has a section on Transcendental plurality.
What is Transcendental plurality vs the divine Unity?
see here.
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#9:7
Here is another more popular explanation of Q30 which talks about it.
http://readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2010/11/question-30-plurality-of-divine-persons.html
Did you read any of this before you wasted all that time typing? We obviously not.
I just threw trying to teach or talk to dguller.
@DavidM
I see what you are trying to do with him. One simple point at a time. That is the only way he will learn.
I own a copy of G-L 's commentary on the Summa on the Trinity I take it with me to read. I recommend it.
Scott:
ReplyDeleteThat was my thought as well. The real object of my perception is Venus either way, and when I think about either one, the reference or extension of my thought is Venus no matter what my sense or intension is.
Here is why I brought this issue up. Look at the folllwing propositions:
(1) Venus appears in the east after sunset from position P
(2) Venus appears in the west after sunset from position P
(1) contradicts (2), because Venus cannot appear in the east and the west after sunset from the same position X. The resolution of this apparent contradiction is to segregate the contradictory predicates into different parts of Venus. In this case, the predicate of Venus in (1) would be applied to Venus as its rotation is around one side of the sun, and the predicate of Venus in (2) would be applied to Venus as its rotation is around the other side of the sun. It is only because Venus can be composed of different parts that the contradictory predicates can be segregated to avoid a logical contradiction. In this case, Venus is separated into different spatio-temporal parts, and it is those different spatio-temporal parts that have different predicates. You get a logical contradiction only when the contradictory predicates are simultaneously predicated of the whole of X or of the same part of X.
(1) I'm not at all persuaded that different spacetime segments of Venus would count as "parts" for the purposes of the doctrine of divine simplicity anyway. They may count as such for some philosophers, but I think it's a bit of a mistake to read modern mereology back into (say) Plotinus.
I don’t think that anyone would disagree that who you were is different from who you are, in the sense that your attitudes, thoughts, feelings, circumstances, spatio-temporal locations, and so on, are different at different points of your life. And yet, who you were maintains a continuity with who you are, because it is you throughout the changes of your life. I would understand these facts as based upon the fact that personal identity can be taken as a whole or as parts. The whole is the totality of continuous spatio-temporal events over the course of one’s life from birth to death (and perhaps beyond), but the whole is composed of different spatio-temporal events, which can be considered to be “parts” of one’s identity. Furthermore, the only way that it makes sense for there to be different senses of “identity” here is that you are a composite entity that is made up of parts, such that “identity” can either refer to the whole or to particular parts. Otherwise, the different senses of “identity” would lack corresponding referents.
The reason I think this is a somewhat better example is of course that the number two seems to be, in what ever sense it exists at all, timeless/eternal and without parts.
I disagree that 2 lacks parts. 2 is partly “1 + 1”, and partly “1.5 + 0.5”, and partly “1.75 + 0.25”, and so on. It’s just that these are virtual parts of 2.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteThe fact that some people follow (2) some of the time does not mean that they were ever presented with both options, (1) and (2), and chose option (2). So your response here makes no sense as a response to my question - it is a non sequitur. Can you see that?
The choice does not have to be a conscious one. That is the point.
For example, clinical researchers know that when studying the effect of a drug versus a placebo, they must be blinded to who is receiving the drug versus who is receiving a placebo. They know that there is an unconscious tendency to interpret findings on the basis of their personal preferences, such that they will unconsciously record the results of the subjects using the drug as better than the subjects that are using the placebo, if they have a positive attitude towards the drug. And yet this knowledge itself does not eliminate or minimize that unconscious tendency, and thus they are blinded to protect themselves and control for that confounding factor, which would distort the truth of their findings.
The point is that even people who know what they should do when they reason about evidence are still prone to unconscious cognitive biases and distortions that occur outside of their awareness. Yes, it is better to know about these biases and distortions than to remain completely ignorant of them, but knowledge itself is not sufficient to control them. If it were, then researchers would not need to be blinded at all in their studies, because they know not to favorably record the results of subjects who are using a treatment that they believe is good.
But my point was that that may or may not be true - you have no basis for making this *generalization*. It depends on the individual and it depends on the case. Pointing to an instance (UFO cult) where it is true does not amount to justifying your *generalization*. That's NOT how the scientific method works.
I can point to a number of psychological studies in which subjects are given false information, the subjects acquire certain beliefs, and even when told that the information was completely false, continue to hold those beliefs.
For example, Sutherland in Irrationality (p. 107) cites one experiment in which a group of subjects was given 25 suicide notes, and told to attempt to decipher which suicide notes were authentic and which were inauthentic. After reading each note, and making their determination, they were told whether they were correct or incorrect. Half of the subjects were told that they did well, and half were told that they did poorly. After they were done, they were told that each note was a fake, and shown how their successes and failures were completely meaningless, including being shown the table used to randomize them into either the successful or non-successful groups. Even after all that debriefing, the subjects in the success group thought that they were good at deciphering authentic suicide notes than those in the failure group. In other words, after acquiring beliefs, they continued to believe them, even when told that the basis for those beliefs was false. Sutherland concludes that “people first concoct an arbitrary but plausible explanation for something they are told is true and then they continue to believe it even when they are told the original information is false” (Ibid., p. 111).
The bottom line is that there are a number of psychological studies that show that human beings have a tendency to succumb to unconscious cognitive biases and distortions that affect their ability to objectively appraise evidence, which becomes progressively more skewed and distorted the more they believe the beliefs in question. The very effort and sacrifice that they made to cling to the beliefs in question, as well as the fact that those beliefs reappear in their minds with a high frequency, reinforces their strength to the point that even compelling evidence against those beliefs is insufficient, because it is either ignored, forgotten, misperceived or misinterpreted in whatever way is favorable to the preservation of the belief in question.
ReplyDeleteFinally, there are a number of studies that show that a “consider the opposite” approach in which subjects were directly and explicitly instructed to consider alternative explanations and outcomes reduced a number of cognitive biases and distortions, such as hindsight bias, explanation bias, and confirmation bias. The OTF is just one way to “consider the opposite” by placing the need to do so within the framework that justifies this tactic on the basis of cognitive psychology, unconscious biases and distortions, cultural influence upon beliefs, and so on.
And my other point was that you made a false statement, and rather than just admitting it and dealing with the rational consequences, you try to get me to chase more red herrings. To me, that you do this is compelling evidence of something.
I never made a false statement.
Okay, except Venus doesn't appear any differently in the morning and evening, does it?
I realized that. I corrected myself above.
And it doesn't matter if you're only seeing part of Venus,* WHAT you're seeing is still Venus, Venus is still identical to Hesperus and Phosphorus, but not all predications true of Hesperus (or Phosphorus) are true of Venus.
I realize this, and corrected myself above. The Morning Star and the Evening Star correspond to Venus at different halves of its orbit around the sun. When Venus is orbiting on one side of the sun, it is the Morning Star and when Venus is orbiting on the other side of the sun, it is the Evening Star.
There is a sense in which the Morning Star is the entirety of Venus, and there is a sense in which the Morning Star is part of Venus, i.e. Venus in one part of its orbit. It just depends upon what one is emphasizing. But the sheer fact that there are these different senses, I believe, can only make sense if the different senses correspond either to the totality of Venus or to different parts of Venus. If all the senses only corresponded to the same referent, then the differences would only be in our minds, and not in reality.
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteSorry, just one more thing. Here’s a quote from Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson’s Mistakes Were Made (but not by me):
“Once we understand how and when we need to reduce dissonance, we can become more vigilant about the process and often nip it in the bud … By looking at our actions critically and dispassionately, as if we were observing someone else, we stand a chance of breaking out of the cycle of action followed by self-justification, followed by more committed action” (p. 225).
That’s basically what I’ve been trying to argue here. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for “critically and dispassionately” evaluating the evidence for one’s beliefs if one continues to firmly believe that they are true, because once one firmly believes that one’s beliefs are true, then a host of unconscious cognitive biases and distortions kick in with the sole purpose of maintaining and preserving those beliefs, often by any means necessary.
As Tavris and Aronson write: “So powerful is the need for consonance that when people are forced to look at disconfirming evidence, they will find a way to criticize, distort, or dismiss it so that they can maintain or even strengthen their existing belief” (Ibid., p. 18), and that “[s]elf-justification purrs along automatically, just beneath consciousness, protecting us from the dissonant realization that we did anything wrong” (Ibid., p. 222).
If you really want to be objective, then this information about the human psychology of belief formation and retention must be taken into consideration. Much like blinding became a standard part of clinical trials once it became known that observers who were biased towards a treatment unconsciously distorted their observations in the treatment’s favor, controls must be put in place to minimize our cognitive biases and distortions when evaluating evidence for beliefs that we firmly accept. One way that has been shown to be helpful is to try to view one’s beliefs as if they were held by someone else, and one was assessing those beliefs as an outsider, which is what the OTF is all about. It is a way to “consider the opposite”, i.e. actively looking for evidence that falsifies one’s beliefs, which has been shown to an effective debiasing technique.
>So, you can’t point to where I’m wrong in my argument, and so object to the fact that I am trying to formalize it somewhat? Wow.
ReplyDeleteI have answered you & so far nobody believes you have at any point ever argued against the Trinity but a Straw man. David said it & I said it. All you have done is show that the dguller-doctrine contains logical contradiction and contradicts the Trinity.
Also you are not trying to formalize it you are being a pettifog.
>But here’s the problem. To say that the divine persons are identical to the divine essence uses identical predication (or material predication), which means that they do not have the same nature or essence, but exist in the same subject.
So more dguller-doctrine? You have trouble finding a real logical contradiction in the doctrine so you re-write the doctrine from the bottom up? So now it's not Three Persons in One Essence but two essences/natures in one subject?
BTW what happened to Three Persons/Essences in One Essence/Person dguller-doctrine? Or are they the same doctrine? Well neither is the Trinity so there you have it. This is just stupid.
>That is how the divine justice has different essential predicates than the divine mercy, and yet they are both identical in the sense of both being in the same unknown Godhead.
Really stupid. You really think re-writing the doctrine from the ground up swapping out terms you don't like with other terms you do is persuasive? I guess you are going to invent your own grammar of the Trinity instead of using Aquinas' as well eh?
Hey for your next project would you like to re-write the Immaculate Conception doctrine?
>That is no answer at all. To strip quantity of “three” is like stripping “sides” of “square”.
You are basically talking gibberish here…...Without the counting, the use of “three” is incoherent, much like without the “four sides”, the use of “square” is incoherent.
dguller I love how you make all these sweeping statements without getting off your fat ass & actually doing some reading & research on the matter for once. Like you just knew what "Esse Ad" & "Esse in" meant till I told you & then you have the nerve to accuse me of misquoting my source. What scorch did you look up on the subject and "accurately quote? None! You are a guy who can't even read a popular book on the Trinity or a book on Aquinas and the Trinity. Just everything else but it.
Did you read G-L on question 30 or 31? No! Did you look up Msgr Glenn's more simple explanation of Q30 & 31? Obviously not! Just google A TOUR OF THE SUMMA by Glenn. How about that "reading the summa" blog link?
I'm threw doing your homework for you ya lazy dog.
>Just admit that you have no idea what “three” means, and stop using the word “three” altogether, because it has a denotation that you completely reject.
Why don't you just admit you are making this all up from scratch and not doing any of the vital reading.
I already read up on G-L on transcendental plurality & Unity. I also ordered Aquinas' POWER OF GOD so I can read more. Fascinating stuff.
Do you own homework I am tired of carrying water for you.
QUOTE"A3: When we talk about plurality or number in the Godhead we are faced with one of the central mysteries of the Trinity: how can there be just one God (who is absolutely simple) and yet there be these three “persons” in the Godhead. So far, we may have been unconsciously assuming that we apply the concept of number univocally to God and to creatures; but is this valid? What does it mean to apply number to God? Do numerical terms imply some reality in God?
ReplyDeleteAquinas observes that the notion of plurality arises in two ways. On the one hand, material things can be divided into subsets and from this we associate number with quantity. On the other hand there is a transcendental notion of plurality that arises from dividing being into the one and the many. This latter is the only sort of plurality that makes sense for immaterial things. Aquinas claims that previous authors have become muddled on this issue by attempting to apply the first notion of number to God. Aquinas rejects this line of thinking, suggesting that if it is followed one can only make sense of numerical claims about God in terms of metaphor.
Aquinas therefore considers number as applied to the Godhead in terms of the transcendental notions of unity and multiplicity. Aquinas has already applied the transcendental notion of unity (convertible with being) to God’s essence in Question 11 Article 1: When we say that God is one, we are positively affirming that His being is an undivided reality. Here Aquinas applies transcendental multiplicity to the Godhead: what this affirms is that each person is undivided and that each person is not some other person. Put in this way, Aquinas claims that we can then affirm number to the Godhead as a reality and not just as a metaphor or simply as an intellectual construct. Moreover, as Aquinas lays out in his reply to the third objection, unity does not exclude multiplicity but rather excludes division. Similarly, multiplicity does not exclude unity but rather division between the realities out of which the multiplicity is formed."END QUOTE
http://readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2010/11/question-30-plurality-of-divine-persons.html
Why is reading this hard? If G-L is too sophisticated for you dguller why are you so adverse to reading something more popular?
All this bitching about "three" not really being three & it confirms an earlier charge of mine that dguller is treating God as if He where unequivocally a material object.
dguller your the guy who at one time argued with Gnus to explain their misrepresentations of Thomism. So you know how to read and look stuff up.
Why are you not doing that here?
dguller writes: [H]uman beings cling tenaciously to beliefs in the face of evidence to the contrary, either by ignoring it, misperceiving it, or distorting it, and all on a subconscious level such that they are completely unaware of what they are doing. And simply pointing out what they are doing does not help, either, because the same underlying mechanisms get to work on that evidence, as well.
ReplyDeleteAquinas put it like this: "[T]he received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver." ST I q84 a1
And Ben has talked himself blue in the face saying as much, or at least implying as much, in a hundred different ways.
@Scott: On (1), I can't say I know much about modern mereology, but I think guller's claims about the 'parts' of Venus are just red herrings. Hesperus and Phosphorus were both named by observing a *singular point of light* in the sky, one in the evening, the other in the morning. Neither name was assigned as the name of a particular space-time segment of the planet Venus.
ReplyDeleteOn (2), I don't really see the relevance. You have one/whole, two/half, three/third, etc. You also have one/first, two/second, three/third, etc. So you would argue that one and two were special in terms of the naming of their associated concepts, right? But why were they special?
I suspect because they are fundamental. I expect that once you have one and two and their related concepts down, you will understand their intimate relation, and this *prior* to understanding the similar intimate relations holding for other numbers, and the naming of the others is based on understanding this. Thus the naming does not indicate that there was initially some special mystery about one- and two-concepts, but that insight into one- and two-concepts is prior to and grounds the naming of higher number-concepts. So I see no grounds for your claim about the need for retrospection in order to see the intimate relation between two and half (or one and whole).
You write: "cutting something in two was not seen as involving there being two of something." Maybe, maybe not (and perhaps with good reason, perhaps not). Your analysis seems confused: "cutting something in two" seems ambiguous, not equivalent to "cutting something in half." So it seems to me that the "two" involved in "halving" IS different in and of itself from the "two" involved in "two-ness." For example, "cut the cake in two pieces" (not to mention "cut two pieces of cake") is different in and of itself from "cut the cake in half."
So still: maybe your example can be used to help guller grasp the point in question (about names and senses and reference), but I'm not sure how.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteDid you read any of this before you wasted all that time typing? We obviously not.
I did, actually. I cited that blog’s comment that “there is a transcendental notion of plurality that arises from dividing being into the one and the many”, and I asked you what “one” and “many” mean without involving quantity. You didn’t respond.
I have answered you & so far nobody believes you have at any point ever argued against the Trinity but a Straw man. David said it & I said it. All you have done is show that the dguller-doctrine contains logical contradiction and contradicts the Trinity.
You still haven’t pointed to where in my argument the terms changed meanings.
So more dguller-doctrine?
What are you talking about? You said that when one says that the divine persons are really identical to the divine essence, then it is in the sense of identical predication. Now you are objecting to the fact that I’m using your desired terminology?
G-L says that identical predication is based upon “the identity of the subject but not by reason of the thing signified”. So, when one says that the divine mercy is really identical to the divine justice, then they are identical in the sense that both are in the same subject, but each predicate in the subject signifies something different, i.e. each predicate has different formal or essential properties. For example, the divine justice punishes, while the divine mercy does not punish. The divine intellect has understanding, while the divine will does not have understanding. That is why it is not formal identity, which would be the case if they shared the same essential predicates.
I’m pretty sure that I’m using the term appropriately, Ben. If I’m not, then explain, using G-L quotes, where I am going wrong. I’d really appreciate it.
Really stupid. You really think re-writing the doctrine from the ground up swapping out terms you don't like with other terms you do is persuasive? I guess you are going to invent your own grammar of the Trinity instead of using Aquinas' as well eh?
Let’s look at this a bit. I wrote: “That is how the divine justice has different essential predicates than the divine mercy, and yet they are both identical in the sense of both being in the same unknown Godhead.” You said that what I wrote was “really stupid”.
Let me quote G-L: “it does not belong to the divine mercy to punish; the divine mercy pardons, condones, and it is the divine justice that punishes, although these two perfections are really the same, that is, materially the same but not formally”.
To say that the divine mercy and the divine justice are “really the same” just means that they are “materially the same”. What does “materially the same” mean? G-L says that “it is only materially true to say that the divine mercy and the divine justice are the same, because they are not really distinct, and by reason of their subject or matter they are in a sense the same”. In other words, what makes the two divine attributes “really the same” is “by reason of their subject”, which I took to mean that both divine attributes are predicates of the subject that is the unknown Godhead.
What do you think G-L means here?
Did you read G-L on question 30 or 31? No! Did you look up Msgr Glenn's more simple explanation of Q30 & 31? Obviously not! Just google A TOUR OF THE SUMMA by Glenn. How about that "reading the summa" blog link?
ReplyDeleteI did read it, actually, and it made no sense to me. Nowhere in any of those texts did anyone explain what “three” means without using a countable numerical quantity. I’m not asking what it means for there to be “three persons in one essence”, or anything like that. I am asking what it means to use a number to describe God and deny that one can ever use numbers to describe God, and still going on describing God using a number, and pretending that the denial never happened. It is like calling God material, and then denying that God can be material, and still going on calling God material anyway, pretending that the denial never happened. Just saying that the transcendental plurality is based upon the division in being between one and many doesn’t cut it, because you would have to show how one goes from “one” and “many” to “three” without using numbers. Good luck with that.
Aquinas claims that we can then affirm number to the Godhead as a reality and not just as a metaphor or simply as an intellectual construct
But this makes no sense. How can you “affirm number” while denying “quantity”? After all, in God “there is not quantity” (QDV Q1, A2). What does “number” mean without “quantity”?
dguller:
ReplyDelete"Even after all that debriefing, the subjects in the success group thought that they were good at deciphering authentic suicide notes than those in the failure group." - Fine. But do you think you're good at deciphering arguments? It seems you do. What grounds this belief? Did you once take part in one of these funny little psychological studies and you've been brain-washed ever since? Or something equivalent? That is, is the grounding psychological or rational? How would you ever KNOW? Would you know it from the fact that you are able to cite a study on people's tendency to recalcitrantly internalize praise from authority? It seems not... So HOW? According to you, the subjects of this study were given the 'outsider' perspective, and it didn't help - they still thought they were better. Does that apply to you too, perhaps?
"I never made a false statement." - That is a false statement (one of many). If you were open-minded and interested in the truth, you would ask me what the statement in question was and how I knew it was false. But I fear you are not open-minded or interested in the truth.
"When Venus is orbiting on one side of the sun, it is the Morning Star and when Venus is orbiting on the other side of the sun, it is the Evening Star." - That is another false statement. (Holy Astronomy-meshugas, as Ben might say!)
Tavris and Aronson: “Once we understand how and when we need to reduce dissonance, we can become more vigilant about the process and often nip it in the bud … By looking at our actions critically and dispassionately, as if we were observing someone else, we stand a chance of breaking out of the cycle of action followed by self-justification, followed by more committed action” (p. 225).
ReplyDeleteguller: "That’s basically [NOT] what I’ve been trying to argue here. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for “critically and dispassionately” evaluating the evidence for one’s beliefs if one continues to firmly believe that they are true, because once one firmly believes that one’s beliefs are true, then a host of unconscious cognitive biases and distortions kick in with the sole purpose of maintaining and preserving those beliefs, often by any means necessary."
Please note, guller: your quote mentions *nothing* about firmly believing what one believes contributing to confirmation bias or any kind of unsound reasoning. Thus you have here another false statement (as indicated) and the quote is another red herring. I could go on analyzing your factual errors and faulty reasoning, but what would be the point? You are just so obviously right, what would be the point in your producing sound arguments in favor of your position?
Ben:
ReplyDeleteLet me put it this way.
You have the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Each is a divine person in the unknown Godhead. I now proceed to count:
(1) The Father, one divine person.
(2) The Son, two divine persons.
(3) The Holy Spirit, three divine persons.
Therefore, there are three divine persons in the unknown Godhead. One, two, three.
I have counted to three using quantitative numbers. You just saw me do it. Unfortunately, according to Aquinas, this is impossible to do with God, because quantity is an accident, and God has no accidents. And since number is a quantity, there can be no number in God, which means that there is no counting of the number of divine persons in the unknown Godhead.
So, how can you explain how it was possible for me to count the number of divine persons in the unknown God head, just now?
dguller:
ReplyDelete"There is a sense in which the Morning Star is the entirety of Venus, and there is a sense in which the Morning Star is part of Venus, i.e. Venus in one part of its orbit." - Okay, Astronomy 101 (a class I never actually took): the Morning Star (a name picking out a point of light in the morning sky) refers to the planet VENUS in the entirety of its orbit (as it appears from the Earth in the morning).
"It just depends upon what one is emphasizing." - No; it *refers* to Venus, regardless of what one is emphasizing; just Venus; not any part of Venus (and not specifically any 'entirety of' Venus); just Venus; the planet Venus (not the goddess); a.k.a. the planet Jin Xing (not the transsexual ballerina who no longer has any P-ness (thanks a lot, Scott)).
"But the sheer fact that there are these different senses, I believe, can only make sense if the different senses correspond either to the totality of Venus or to different parts of Venus." - Okay, but you're wrong. The function of the different senses is neither to refer to "the totality of Venus" nor to refer to "different parts of Venus." You are literally astronomically wrong about this.
"If all the senses only corresponded to the same referent, then the differences would only be in our minds, and not in reality." - But again, that is clearly not the case. The differences are NOT only in our minds. They are a function of and must correspond to the (perfectly real) different vantage points available to us for apprehending the same referent.
ReplyDelete>I did read it, actually, and it made no sense to me.
Did you even read Sheed or the reading-the-Summa blog? They give the more popular simpler explainations? You never refered to them even once in this long ass discusion. I did all the heavy lifting on the quoting &pleaded with you to read.
If you really don't understand any of this then how can you be so certain you found a logical contradiction & conflict with the doctrine of the divine simplicity? Shouldn't you just say you don't know and leave it at that?
>Nowhere in any of those texts did anyone explain what “three” means without using a countable numerical quantity.
Nowhere does G-L say we can't use "three" to count the number of persons named by the dogma, New Trestament & divine revelation in general. He is explaining how really distinct persons can have the same identical simple nature & are not counted as three gods.
DavidM writes on another issue:
>Thus you have here another false statement (as indicated) and the quote is another red herring. I could go on analyzing your factual errors and faulty reasoning, but what would be the point? You are just so obviously right, what would be the point in your producing sound arguments in favor of your position?
The definition of insanity is doing the same futile thing over and over again expecrting a different result.
I am going upstate to Lake George to find sanity again.
>I have counted to three using quantitative numbers. You just saw me do it. Unfortunately, according to Aquinas, this is impossible to do with God, because quantity is an accident, and God has no accidents. And since number is a quantity, there can be no number in God, which means that there is no counting of the number of divine persons in the unknown Godhead.
ReplyDeleteHow can you claim Aquinas & G-L really mean we can't count the number of persons when both talk about how there can't be more than Three persons in Article 2 of Q30? They are talking about how God in one sense can be relative and in another be absolute? In the sense of essence we can't count the three persons as three gods. We don't count the 3's by the one's.
Why am I pointing this out? 1400 posts & you are still fighting the rest of us for the right to re-write our sacred doctrines in your own weird image while convincing yourself you really understand them better then the rest of us who are actually Christians.
You misread this stuff so badly! I think it's because you want there to be a logical contradiction and you don't want it to make sense.
After all you accused me of being irrational for believing in the Trinity. Allah forbid you might be wrong. Sat Nam forbid I might actually understand something I studied my whole life, better then some guy who started a month ago & still hasn't figured out the difference between natural theology and mystery.
@DavidM:
ReplyDelete"On (2), I don't really see the relevance."
I'm not entirely sure I do either, but what I have vaguely in mind is something along the following lines.
Our language acknowledges a relationship between "three" and "one-third" and so on but that in the primitive case of "two" vs. "half" that relationship isn't etymologically present.
It seems, then, that the first users of our language may not have seen a mathematical relationship between "cutting something (once) into equal parts" and the number two. In that case they may have been implicitly thinking of "two-ness" in two different ways, in somewhat the same way that references to the "morning star" and the "evening star" are thoughts of Venus in two different ways. But in this example it's even less plausible that they were really thinking of two different real objects (or two different "parts" of one object).
But if it doesn't lead anywhere, or if it's otherwise somehow wrongheaded, hey. Won't be my first time. ;-)
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteFine. But do you think you're good at deciphering arguments? It seems you do. What grounds this belief?
My reading and analysis of arguments, but I could be wrong in the quality of my argumentation. There are studies that show that often people that are the most confident in their abilities, actually have pretty poor abilities in the first place. It is called the Dunning-Kruger effect.
Did you once take part in one of these funny little psychological studies and you've been brain-washed ever since?
Nope. I’ve never participated in any such study, as far as I know.
That is, is the grounding psychological or rational? How would you ever KNOW? Would you know it from the fact that you are able to cite a study on people's tendency to recalcitrantly internalize praise from authority? It seems not... So HOW?
At some point, I would hope that my errors of reasoning would have a negative consequence in my life. For example, if I made a mistake in my reasoning about how to reach a destination, then there is a good chance that I will not reach my destination, and upon failing to reach my destination, I can backtrack and figure out where I went wrong.
According to you, the subjects of this study were given the 'outsider' perspective, and it didn't help - they still thought they were better. Does that apply to you too, perhaps?
I never said that the subjects were given the outsider perspective. They were just given evidence that their beliefs were false. The point is that that is not enough. One must make the conscious effort to look at one’s beliefs as if they were held by someone else, and then appraise the evidence for and against them. The subjects never did that, as far as I can tell.
That is a false statement (one of many). If you were open-minded and interested in the truth, you would ask me what the statement in question was and how I knew it was false. But I fear you are not open-minded or interested in the truth.
Yup, that was wrong of me to say. I should have said that I am unaware of any false statements that I have made. It’s perfectly possible that I have made false statements. What were they?
"When Venus is orbiting on one side of the sun, it is the Morning Star and when Venus is orbiting on the other side of the sun, it is the Evening Star." - That is another false statement. (Holy Astronomy-meshugas, as Ben might say!)
Nope. It’s perfectly true. I looked it up, because I wasn’t too sure. Have a look: http://www.johnpratt.com/items/astronomy/eve_morn.html.
Please note, guller: your quote mentions *nothing* about firmly believing what one believes contributing to confirmation bias or any kind of unsound reasoning.
You are right, it doesn’t. So, suppose that you are correct that the strength of one’s belief is irrelevant to determining the degree of cognitive biases and distortions. All that matters is that one believe the belief at all, irrespective of whether one beliefs strongly or weakly, and once one believes, then the unconscious cognitive biases and distortions begin to manipulate our analysis of evidence to support and strengthen our beliefs. That means that matters are even worse that I thought.
So, I’ll revise my claim to the following:
ReplyDelete“It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “critically and dispassionately” evaluating the evidence for one’s beliefs if one continues to believe that they are true, because once one believes that one’s beliefs are true, then a host of unconscious cognitive biases and distortions kick in with the sole purpose of maintaining and preserving those beliefs, often by any means necessary."
Any thoughts?
"There is a sense in which the Morning Star is the entirety of Venus, and there is a sense in which the Morning Star is part of Venus, i.e. Venus in one part of its orbit." - Okay, Astronomy 101 (a class I never actually took): the Morning Star (a name picking out a point of light in the morning sky) refers to the planet VENUS in the entirety of its orbit (as it appears from the Earth in the morning).
I’ve explained why this is wrong. Venus only appears in the morning if it is in one phase of its orbit around one side of the sun, and only appears in the evening if it is in a different phase of its orbit around the other side of the sun.
"It just depends upon what one is emphasizing." - No; it *refers* to Venus, regardless of what one is emphasizing; just Venus; not any part of Venus (and not specifically any 'entirety of' Venus); just Venus; the planet Venus (not the goddess); a.k.a. the planet Jin Xing (not the transsexual ballerina who no longer has any P-ness (thanks a lot, Scott)).
No. It can only refer to Venus appearing at a particular location and time in the sky due to being in a particular part of its orbit around the sun. It cannot simultaneously refer to Venus appearing at a different location and time in the sky by virtue of being in a different part of its orbit around the sun. That would be like saying that when I talk about me at 5 years old and me at 20 years old, then I’m only talking about me, and nothing else. Yes, I am talking about me, but about me at different spatio-temporal locations. Part of my identity is composed of my thoughts, feelings, behaviors, circumstances, and so on, at those different spatio-temporal locations. In no sense do those particular spatio-temporal locations correspond to my identity in its totality. And yes, I had a P-ness in all those spatio-temporal locations, and thus that part of myself remains invariant.
"But the sheer fact that there are these different senses, I believe, can only make sense if the different senses correspond either to the totality of Venus or to different parts of Venus." - Okay, but you're wrong. The function of the different senses is neither to refer to "the totality of Venus" nor to refer to "different parts of Venus." You are literally astronomically wrong about this.
I don’t think so. Venus is a material composite entity, and thus is composed of different material and metaphysical parts. Its material parts include its continuity as occupying a continuous region of space-time, which can be divided into parts, i.e. Venus at spatio-temporal location 1, Venus at spatio-temporal location 2, and so on. So, there is clearly a sense of Venus as either a totality, i.e. its entire material existence from its creation to its destruction as a continuous region of space-time, or as a part, i.e. one part of its material existence at a particular region of space-time.
"If all the senses only corresponded to the same referent, then the differences would only be in our minds, and not in reality." - But again, that is clearly not the case. The differences are NOT only in our minds. They are a function of and must correspond to the (perfectly real) different vantage points available to us for apprehending the same referent.
ReplyDeleteI agree that the differences are not only in our minds, which means that the differences must correspond in some way to something real in the referent. So, say you have one thought (i.e. T1) about a referent R, and another thought (i.e. T2) about the same referent R. T1 is different from T2, and if T1 only referred to R and T2 only referred to R, then it is impossible that the differences between T1 and T2 could both be in R, unless R was a composite entity such that T1 or T2 referred to either the whole of R or different parts of R.
So, our thoughts about the Morning Star include the predicate “appears in the morning” and our thoughts about the Evening Star include the predicate “appears in the evening”. If both thoughts referred to the exact same referent, i.e. Venus, then it would be true that Venus appears in the morning and appears in the evening, which cannot be simultaneously true. The contradiction is resolved when one refers the different predicates to different aspects of Venus, i.e. Venus at one section of its orbit around the sun appearing in the morning, and Venus at a different section of its orbit around the sun appearing in the evening. It is only by dividing Venus in this way into components or parts, and predicating the contradictory predicates of different parts, that the contradiction is resolved.
Again, for R to appear differently at different vantage points means that one vantage point sees one part of R and another vantage point sees a different part of R. If two vantage points saw the exact same R, then they would see nothing different at all.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteNowhere does G-L say we can't use "three" to count the number of persons named by the dogma, New Trestament & divine revelation in general. He is explaining how really distinct persons can have the same identical simple nature & are not counted as three gods.
I’m basing my claim upon Denys Turner’s argument that “God’s oneness entails that counting is ruled out in every way” (Aquinas, p. 121). To count at all requires that there be a number of individuals that each share an underlying commonality as members of a group that is countable. For example, to count apples is to count a group of instantiations of a common apple nature. In other words, the only way that we can make sense of counting a series of individuals is if those individuals are each an instantiation of a common underlying nature that places them in the same countable set.
Now, to count divine persons would require that each divine person be an instantiation of a common underlying nature, but this is impossible, because the only underlying nature would be the divine essence, and the divine essence is not a genus, and thus God cannot be one of a kind or a number of individuals of a kind. He can be no kind whatsoever, and therefore counting of any kind is impossible with respect to God.
And all of this is a side issue. I only have two questions for you:
(1) Are the divine persons virtually distinct from the divine essence?
(2) What does “virtual distinction” mean?
Once you have answered these questions, we can proceed with the argument.
ReplyDeleteOne last dig before I go on holiday.
>You said that what I wrote was “really stupid”.
You know that was an afterthought originally referring to the following nonsense.
To say that the divine persons are identical to the divine essence uses identical predication (or material predication), which means that they do not have the same nature or essence, but exist in the same subject. God is two essences in one subject? Re-define our whole religion & misread our theologians why don't you?
You say you don't understand G-L? even thought you read him? I guess your reading comprehension is off.
QUOTE"According to this law the middle term must be perfectly distributed, that is, taken in the same sense in the major and the minor. Hence, for example, the following argument is not valid because the major is only a material predication: in God mercy is the same as justice; but justice is the principle of punishment; therefore God inflicts punishment through His mercy. The argument is false because in God mercy and justice are not the same formally although they are the same materially. Again, in the Trinity it is conceded that the Father and the Son are actually the same as the divine essence, but they are not the same formally. Moreover the Father and the Son are relatively opposed to each other, but they are not opposed to the essence. It is clear, therefore, that the following syllogism is not valid: This God is the Father, but this God is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father. Nor is the following true: This divine essence is the paternity, but this divine essence is the filiation, therefore filiation is paternity. In these syllogisms we have merely material predications, and the form of the syllogism is not observed.END QUOTE G-L TRINITY
Ben:
ReplyDeleteThe argument is false because in God mercy and justice are not the same formally although they are the same materially. Again, in the Trinity it is conceded that the Father and the Son are actually the same as the divine essence, but they are not the same formally. Moreover the Father and the Son are relatively opposed to each other, but they are not opposed to the essence.
You are confusing the terms, again.
When G-L says that the divine persons are “actually the same as the divine essence”, he is using identical predication, which is not the same as formal predication. What is “formal predication”? It is when “the predicate belongs to the subject according to its formal nature”. In other words, to say that X is P would involve formal predication if P was part of the essence of X. In other words, P is an essential predicate of X. To say that P does not involve formal predication means that P does not belong to X “according to its formal nature”, or X’s essence. That is why it is incorrect to reason that because the divine justice punishes that therefore the divine mercy must also punish. Punishment is an essential predicate of the divine justice, and not an essential predicate of the divine mercy.
What all this means is that the different divine attributes and persons have some essential predicates in common, but they also differ in having different essential predicates. For example, the Father generates, the Son is generated, the divine mercy forgives, the divine justice punishes, the divine intellect understands, and so on. That is why one cannot substitute different terms for one another and infer identical predicates. They are all different in some way, and thus cannot be identical in every way, which means that you cannot substitute them in a logical argument without invalidating it. That is the primary basis for the argument denying that if there are three divine persons, then there are three divine essences.
Now, if X and Y have different essential predicates, then by definition, they have different essences. What else could it mean? It cannot be that the different predicates are not essential predicates, because the only alternative is if they were accidental predicates, but God admits no accidents, and thus this is impossible. So, if you want to agree with G-L that the different divine attributes and divine persons have differing predicates that make it impossible to interchange them during an argument and maintain its validity, which was kind of your entire point, then you have to explain whether those differing predicates are essential or accidental. Since they cannot be accidental, they must be essential, and that means that the divine attributes and the divine persons have different essences or natures.
Or, you could try to explain how the divine attributes and the divine persons have some predicates that belong to them according to their “formal nature”, and other predicates that belong to them other than according to their “formal nature”. To me, that means that some of their predicates are essential predicates, and other of their predicates are non-essential predicates. Perhaps there is a kind of non-essential predicate that is not an accident. I have no idea how that could make any sense, but even if that is true, then it still follows that these non-essential predicates cannot come from the divine essence. And that would make them creatures, because Aquinas has said that “[e]verything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST Ia, Q28, A2).
Enjoy your vacation, Ben.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteAnd one more thing about “transcendental multiplicity”.
The transcendentals are so-called, because they transcend Aristotle’s categories. Two of the transcendentals are relevant here, and they are “being” and “one”, which are interchangeable, and ultimately refer to the exact same thing in reality. “One” has two senses, one in terms of “the principle of number”, which is under the genus of the accident of “quantity” and the other in terms of “convertible with being”, which is a transcendental that is beyond all genera, including that of quantity. The former sense of “the principle of number” cannot be applicable of God, because God transcends all categories, because he is not a genus (ST Ia, Q3, A5), and he does not contain any accidents (ST Ia, Q3, A6), and thus the genus of quantity cannot be applicable to God. However, the latter sense of “convertible with being” can be applicable to God.
Focusing upon the transcendentals of “being” and “one”, they can be used as a transcendental unity or a transcendental multiplicity. Transcendental unity just means “undivided being” (ST Ia, Q11, A1) in the sense of a single undivided being, or “an individual being” (QDP Q9, A7). For example, when someone says that “the person is one”, the “one” in question is an individual being. Transcendental multiplicity just means that there is a multiplicity of individual beings that are distinct and divided from one another: “a ‘multiple’ is something made up of unities” (ST Ia, Q30, A3). Therefore, the sense of “transcendental” here is “undivided” and “indivisible” being beyond the genera and categories, substances and accidents.
The question is whether there is a sense of a transcendental number involving in both transcendental unity and transcendental multiplicity. In other words, whether “by one and many” there is meant “anything else but something pertaining to discrete quantity”. Aquinas has a discussion of this in QDP Q9, A7.
He says there that “since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division”. He says that there are two kinds of division, one that transcends the genus of quantity and one that is “in the genus of quantity”. The former involves “division according to formal opposition which has nothing to do with quantity”, because it comes “from their proper forms”. In other words, A is divided from B on the basis of having formal natures that oppose one another. The latter is “an accidental addition to the thing of which it is predicated, in that it measures it”. In other words, A is divided from B on the basis of an accident that is added to A that makes it different from B. Therefore, the former kind of division is due to opposing essences themselves, while the latter kind of division is due to an accident being added to the essence.
Transcendental multiplicity necessarily involves only the former kind of division. Transcendental unity “adds nothing to being except the negation of division, not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with indivision: for one is the same as individual being”. So, transcendental unity, as I said earlier, is identical to “individual being”. Transcendental multiplicity “adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms.” In other words, individual being A is distinct from individual B by virtue of the fact of “each one not being the other”.
What does this have to do with “number”? Aquinas says that “the number corresponding to it adds this to the things described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein is the essence of distinction.” In other words, you have individual beings that are undivided in themselves (i.e. transcendental unity), but divided from one another (i.e. transcendental multiplicity). Or, as Aquinas summarizes: “while one adds to being one negation inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself; plurality adds two negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.”
ReplyDeleteMy question was how you can get to the number 3 from transcendental unity and transcendental multiplicity. This above account completely fails to answer this question in any way. It starts with being, adds indivision to being, which gets to transcendental unity, and then adds division to the transcendental unity in which the multiple individual beings are distinct from one another to get transcendental multiplicity. There is no mention of how you go from “one” and “many” to “three”, which was the precise issue at hand. I agree that “three” necessarily involves “one” and “many”, which is why quantity as a genus necessarily involves the transcendentals to make any sense. However, it does not follow that the transcendentals themselves necessarily lead to a meaningful use of numbers independent of the genus of quantity.
This is important for the Trinity, because if “the persons in God are three in number” (QDP Q9, A9), and only transcendental unity and transcendental multiplicity can be applicable to God, then how exactly do you get to the number “three” in the persons of God? You would have to show how you can get to the number three only using transcendental unity and multiplicity, and without implicitly smuggling quantitative numbers into the account.
I have no idea how this is possible, and would love to read an explanation that demonstrates how it can occur. Just using transcendental unity and multiplicity, all you can say is that there is individual being A and individual being B, and A is different from B. That’s it. Once you start counting, then you pollute the transcendentals with the genus of quantity. In other words, once you start saying that A is one, B is two, and C is three, then you have smuggled quantity into the equation, as well as having to explain where C came from when all you can say is that there is individual being A and individual being B, and A is different from B.
Any thoughts?
dguller:
ReplyDelete"At some point, I would hope that my errors of reasoning would have a negative consequence in my life." - Okay. (I'm curious: why?) But then the fact is that you know of no actual way of knowing? (As you said: things are worse than you thought!)
"I never said that the subjects were given the outsider perspective." - Not in so many words - but isn't the researcher's perspective an outsider perspective? Didn't you say they were given that? Are you saying they simply refused to *believe* what the researchers told them about what really went on in the experiment?? Could you double-check that maybe?
"Nope. It’s perfectly true. I looked it up, because I wasn’t too sure. Have a look: http://www.johnpratt.com/items/astronomy/eve_morn.html."
Ah, I see what you mean; but that's not what you said. It isn't about the position of Venus' orbit around *the Sun*; it's about Venus' position relative to the position of *the Earth-Sun dyad*. Nice diagram though, I never knew all those details.
"All that matters is that one believe the belief at all,..." - Yes! And *that* is absolutely unavoidable, which was my point from the beginning!
"...irrespective of whether one beliefs strongly or weakly, and once one believes, then the unconscious cognitive biases and distortions begin to manipulate our analysis of evidence to support and strengthen our beliefs. That means that matters are even worse that I thought." - There's a lot to unpack in that assertion - but perhaps. Or perhaps, all things considered, in a way that you're not aware of for the time being, they're much better than you thought. Hard to say, right?
“It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “critically and dispassionately” evaluating the evidence for one’s beliefs if one continues to believe that they are true, because once one believes that one’s beliefs are true, then a host of unconscious cognitive biases and distortions kick in with the sole purpose of maintaining and preserving those beliefs, often by any means necessary." - But since by definition one believes that one's beliefs are true, this is way too convoluted. Just say: "It is *sometimes* extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “critically and dispassionately” evaluate the evidence for one’s beliefs - for instance, this one." What do you think?
dguller:
ReplyDelete"I’ve explained why this is wrong." - And I've explained why it is right.
So again: 'Phosphorus' simply refers to Venus; it also connotes particular conditions of observation, but what it denotes is just Venus.
RE. talking about yourself at 5 and at 20: you can do this, of course; but you can also just talk about yourself, without making specific reference to any particular age/place (e.g., "Someday - I don't know where and I don't know when - *I* may take an astronomy class.")
"I don’t think so. Venus is a material composite entity, and thus is composed of different material and metaphysical parts. [Etc.]" - None of this paragraph is responsive to what I actually wrote.
"I agree that the differences are not only in our minds, which means that the differences must correspond in some way to something real in the referent." - But you are wrong - they don't. Instead they respond to something real in *the relation between cognizing subject and cognized object* (i.e., the 'mode' that is operative between receiver and received).
"Again, for R to appear differently at different vantage points means that one vantage point sees one part of R and another vantage point sees a different part of R." - Okay, but when we talk about "seeing one part of R," there is a possible ambiguity: we could be talking about literally seeing *a part of R* (which clearly doesn't apply in this case); or we could be talking about *seeing R in the way in which R (just *R* - not (necessarily) any particular part of R) is visible from a particular vantage point*. IOW, partiality of seeing need not imply seeing of *a part* (indeed, partially seeing something may involve a *failure* to see any particular part of it).
"If two vantage points saw the exact same R, then they would see nothing different at all." - And this statement just doubles down on the afore-mentioned ambiguity. You might consider the theory-ladenness of observations here. Two observers can observe the same thing - or even the same parts of the same thing, if you like - (i.e., be presented with the same object) and yet not have exactly the same insight into the object seen. Again, as Aquinas says: This is obvious.
DavidM:
ReplyDelete"At some point, I would hope that my errors of reasoning would have a negative consequence in my life." - Okay. (I'm curious: why?)
Say that I think that I know that it is not raining. So, when I plan to go outside, I do not bring an umbrella. I then go outside, and it is raining. I clearly did not know that it is not raining, but only thought I knew. I can then try to figure out why I was wrong. Maybe I didn’t hear the patter of the rain on the windows. Maybe I was basing my knowledge upon an outdated weather forecast.
But then the fact is that you know of no actual way of knowing? (As you said: things are worse than you thought!)
I know when my beliefs are justified and true. They are justified if they are arrived at by reliable means, and they are true if they accurately correspond to reality.
"I never said that the subjects were given the outsider perspective." - Not in so many words - but isn't the researcher's perspective an outsider perspective?
No. The outsider perspective is the conscious adoption of an skeptical attitude towards one’s beliefs by projecting them onto others and examining them from that perspective. Just being given someone else’s information does not mean that you are now in the outsider’s perspective. You could be evaluating that information from the insider perspective instead.
Are you saying they simply refused to *believe* what the researchers told them about what really went on in the experiment?? Could you double-check that maybe?
I’m saying that it was all unconscious. They were not consciously aware of what they were doing. Even after they were told that the very basis upon which their beliefs were completely fabricated and false, they continued to persist in those beliefs. In fact, out of 20 subjects who were “successful” at detecting authentic suicide notes, only 3 changed their minds about their degree of skill in that regard after the thorough debriefing that showed that the entire experiment was a fake.
Here’s the study in question: http://osil.psy.ua.edu:16080/~rosanna/soc_inf/week5/perseverance.pdf
Ah, I see what you mean; but that's not what you said. It isn't about the position of Venus' orbit around *the Sun*; it's about Venus' position relative to the position of *the Earth-Sun dyad*. Nice diagram though, I never knew all those details.
Yes, you are correct. The bottom line is that the Morning Star is not Venus in the entirety of its orbit around the sun relative to its position to the earth, but only Venus during a particular part of its orbit around the sun relative to it position to the earth. At one part of its orbital path, it is the Morning Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is the Evening Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it does not appear as either. I take this to be an example of how different appearances of X correspond to different parts of X.
"...irrespective of whether one beliefs strongly or weakly, and once one believes, then the unconscious cognitive biases and distortions begin to manipulate our analysis of evidence to support and strengthen our beliefs. That means that matters are even worse that I thought." - There's a lot to unpack in that assertion - but perhaps. Or perhaps, all things considered, in a way that you're not aware of for the time being, they're much better than you thought. Hard to say, right?
ReplyDeletePerhaps, but not given what I’ve read on the subject.
But since by definition one believes that one's beliefs are true, this is way too convoluted. Just say: "It is *sometimes* extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “critically and dispassionately” evaluate the evidence for one’s beliefs - for instance, this one." What do you think?
Except that it is more often than just “sometimes”. Most people fall prey to the same unconscious cognitive biases and distortions in order to maintain and sustain their beliefs in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. And because these biases and distortions are fundamentally an abuse of reason to rationalize one’s beliefs, they make it extremely difficult to reason properly. One must take steps to minimize those biases, such as explicitly and consciously assuming that one’s beliefs are not true, and then looking for evidence to falsify one’s beliefs, which is just another way of saying that one assumes the perspective of the outsider, i.e. the belief is not held by me, but by someone else, and that decreases the biases and distortions, because now the belief is not mine, and those distortions only apply to my beliefs in order to preserve them.
So again: 'Phosphorus' simply refers to Venus; it also connotes particular conditions of observation, but what it denotes is just Venus.
Think about it this way. When I say that A is a part of X, then I am talking about a part of X, but I am also referring to the whole of X, of which A is just one part. After all, there can be no parts without wholes, and thus whenever one talks about parts, one inevitably and necessarily is also implying something about the whole, but in an indirect fashion. For example, when I am talking about the leg of a dog, I am directly talking about the leg, and I am indirectly talking about the dog whose leg it is. However, it makes no sense to say that I am referring to the whole dog, period, when I am talking about the dog’s leg, except indirectly. So, I would agree that the Morning Star indirectly refers to the entirety of Venus, because all parts indirectly refer to their wholes, but it directly refers to Venus appearing in the eastern morning sky by virtue it Venus being in one part of its orbit around the sun relative to the earth.
RE. talking about yourself at 5 and at 20: you can do this, of course; but you can also just talk about yourself, without making specific reference to any particular age/place
That is true. However, when one talks about oneself at a particular age, then one is talking about oneself at one part of one’s life. Of course, when one talks about oneself as a whole, then one is not making a “specific reference to any particular age/place”.
"I don’t think so. Venus is a material composite entity, and thus is composed of different material and metaphysical parts. [Etc.]" - None of this paragraph is responsive to what I actually wrote.
And yet it is a foundational part of the discussion that I wanted to keep clear.
"I agree that the differences are not only in our minds, which means that the differences must correspond in some way to something real in the referent." - But you are wrong - they don't. Instead they respond to something real in *the relation between cognizing subject and cognized object* (i.e., the 'mode' that is operative between receiver and received).
ReplyDeleteBut that relation is a real one only if the cognizing subject is cognizing something about the cognized object. If the cognition did not correspond to something real in the cognized object, then it would, in fact, be only in our mind, and not indicative of the external object in question.
So, if you have an object X, and it is conceived by A as X1 and it is conceived by B as X2, then if A and B are both correct in their conceptions of X as X1 and X2, then X must truly be X1 in one sense and X2 in a different sense, if X1 and X2 are different in some ways. In other words, if the differences between X1 and X2 are real, then they must correspond to something in X. Otherwise, the differences are merely notional, and solely exist in our minds.
There must be something about X that A understands as X1 and something else about X that B understands as X2 that grounds both their understandings as true. I understand the former “something” to be one part of X, and the latter “something else” to be a different part of X. Otherwise, the differences are merely notional and in the mind.
Okay, but when we talk about "seeing one part of R," there is a possible ambiguity: we could be talking about literally seeing *a part of R* (which clearly doesn't apply in this case); or we could be talking about *seeing R in the way in which R (just *R* - not (necessarily) any particular part of R) is visible from a particular vantage point*. IOW, partiality of seeing need not imply seeing of *a part* (indeed, partially seeing something may involve a *failure* to see any particular part of it).
If R appears differently according to different points of view, then what is it about R that is appearing differently in the different points of view? There must be something about R that is present in one point of view, but that is absent in the other point of view. That is what makes each point of view a partial understanding of R. Neither perceives R in its entirety, but only according to different parts of R.
So, when one person sees the Morning Star, then they are seeing Venus at a part of its orbit around the sun relative to the earth, and when another person sees the Evening Star, then they are seeing Venus at a different part of its orbit around the sun relative to the earth. These different points of view of Venus would be impossible unless Venus was composed of such spatio-temporal parts. The only other explanation for the differences in perception of Venus would be claiming that they are solely byproducts of the human mind, and not indicative of anything real about Venus at all.
And this statement just doubles down on the afore-mentioned ambiguity. You might consider the theory-ladenness of observations here. Two observers can observe the same thing - or even the same parts of the same thing, if you like - (i.e., be presented with the same object) and yet not have exactly the same insight into the object seen. Again, as Aquinas says: This is obvious.
And this just shows the partial nature of understanding, which just means that we are aware of some parts of X while being unaware of other parts of X. And again, this is only possible if X has parts of some kind, whether material or metaphysical, and whether real or virtual. Otherwise, the differences between the observers is solely due to their minds, and not about anything in X at all.
dguller:
ReplyDelete"Perhaps, but not given what I’ve read on the subject." - Let's just say that I think you're vastly over-confident in your own ability to identify the actual subject of what you're reading." - What the heck! How is that supposed to be an answer to my question??
"I know when my beliefs are justified and true. They are justified if they are arrived at by reliable means, and they are true if they accurately correspond to reality." - Seriously? So how do you know when your means have been reliable, when the 'means' is often something that you're not even aware of?? (It's subconscious, remember?) And how do you know if your beliefs correspond to reality if you don't already know that they're true? (Is this supposed to be a joke?)
"The outsider perspective is the conscious adoption of an skeptical attitude towards one’s beliefs by projecting them onto others and examining them from that perspective. Just being given someone else’s information does not mean that you are now in the outsider’s perspective." - But it does mean that, provided you believe what they tell you!
ReplyDelete"In fact, out of 20 subjects who were “successful” at detecting authentic suicide notes, only 3 changed their minds about their degree of skill in that regard after the thorough debriefing that showed that the entire experiment was a fake." - So three changed their minds - and presumably it wasn't 'extremely difficult' for them. Or was it??
Me: "Or perhaps, all things considered, in a way that you're not aware of for the time being, they're much better than you thought. Hard to say, right?"
ReplyDeleteguller: "Perhaps, but not given what I’ve read on the subject."
So, do you spend a lot of time reading on the subject of *stuff you're not aware of for the time being*? Can you recommend any particularly valuable works on this subject? (I just know you're not going to understand the absurdity of this, but oh well.)
"Except that it is more often than just “sometimes”. [IS IT?] Most people [NOT *ALL* PEOPLE?] fall prey to the same unconscious cognitive biases and distortions in order to maintain and sustain their beliefs in order to avoid cognitive dissonance." - Er, yes, I suppose *sometimes* they do. Why mention this bloody obvious point?
So let's talk some Venus:
ReplyDelete"The bottom line is that the Morning Star is not Venus in the entirety of its orbit around the sun relative to its position to the earth, but only Venus during a particular part of its orbit around the sun relative to it position to the earth." - So you're saying that the Morning Star is the Morning Star only when it is visible (i.e., when Venus appears in the morning sky)? So at other times, it ceases to be identical to itself - or what?
"At one part of its orbital path, it is the Morning Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is the Evening Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it does not appear as either." - No. Rather, at one part of its orbital path, it is (correctly) *referred to as* the Morning Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is (correctly) *referred to as* the Evening Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is not (specifically) referred to as either.
"I take this to be an example of how different appearances of X correspond to different parts of X." - Sure you do, but you're wrong, as I've already explained.
"When I say that A is a part of X, then I am talking about a part of X, but I am also referring to the whole of X, of which A is just one part." - So *my head* is a part of *me*. When I say, "If *my head* were veal, which I know it is not, it would be worth 54 dollars", how exactly am I referring to the *whole of me*?? (I'm not - I'm only referring to *my head*.)
me: "None of this paragraph is responsive to what I actually wrote."
ReplyDeleteguller: "And yet it is a foundational part of the discussion that I wanted to keep clear."
...then don't preface it with "I don't think so" as if you were attempting to actually respond to what I wrote, as opposed to ignoring it and going off on your own 'foundational' tangent. Is that too much to ask??
"if the differences between X1 and X2 are real, then they must correspond to something in X. Otherwise, the differences are merely notional, and solely exist in our minds." - So to clear up your obfuscation here: if the differences (i.e., *different senses*) of X1 and X2 are real[ly different], then they must derive from *different possible ways of observing* X.
"If R appears differently according to different points of view, then what is it about R that is appearing differently in the different points of view?" - It's nothing *about R* - it's *R itself* which appears differently from different points of view. The same temperature water feels warm to a warm touch and hot to a cold touch. The difference has nothing to do with the water undergoing any change or with different 'parts' of the water making themselves felt, but still, the qualitative experiences are real and genuinely different.
"These different [spatio-temporal] points of view of Venus would be impossible unless Venus was composed of ... spatio-temporal parts." - Riiight: A spatio-temporal POV implies a s-t object, i.e., an object with s-t parts.
"this just shows the partial nature of understanding, which just means that we are aware of some parts of X while being unaware of other parts of X." - Hmmm - it looks like you forgot to read what I wrote before pretending to respond to it here.
"this is only possible if X has parts of some kind, whether material or metaphysical, and whether real or virtual" - or whether relational/'personal'?
"Otherwise, the differences between the observers is solely due to their minds, and not about anything in X at all." - Question: In general, what is your criterion for deciding whether the differences between 'observers' (more properly: *observations*, or better yet: *conceptions*) is solely due to your mind (a figment thereof), as opposed to being about something in the conceived object?
David:
ReplyDelete"I know when my beliefs are justified and true. They are justified if they are arrived at by reliable means, and they are true if they accurately correspond to reality." - Seriously?
Sorry. I can see how what I wrote came across incorrectly. What I meant to say was that a person has knowledge about X if their beliefs about X (a) are justified by virtue of being arrived at by reliable sensory and cognitive mechanisms, and (b) are true by accurately corresponding to the reality of X.
Remember, I’m not defending some radical skepticism where all one’s beliefs are doubtful. It is possible to arrive at justified true beliefs, and to acquire knowledge about the world. Usually, our sensory and cognitive mechanisms are running smoothly, and there is no need to engage in rigorous skeptical inquiry about them, but when we come into conflict with reality or with an alternative set of beliefs about reality, then it becomes necessary to analyze the situation. Given the inevitability of unconscious cognitive biases and distortions, one must be very cautious in such a situation to avoid simply rationalizing one’s own beliefs by virtue of confirmation bias. In order to minimize this bias, one must consciously embrace a skeptical attitude towards one’s beliefs as if they could be false, and often projecting them upon another and assuming the position of an outsider can be helpful here.
So how do you know when your means have been reliable, when the 'means' is often something that you're not even aware of?? (It's subconscious, remember?)
I know that they are reliable when they are work to successfully navigate through the world. For example, I know that my senses are reliable, when they are working to accurately present the world to me in such a way that I can interact with the world successfully.
And how do you know if your beliefs correspond to reality if you don't already know that they're true? (Is this supposed to be a joke?)
That is redundant. Truth and corresponds to reality are identical, especially by virtue of the fact that true and being are transcendentals, and thus are interconvertible.
"The outsider perspective is the conscious adoption of an skeptical attitude towards one’s beliefs by projecting them onto others and examining them from that perspective. Just being given someone else’s information does not mean that you are now in the outsider’s perspective." - But it does mean that, provided you believe what they tell you!
But in order to believe them, you must believe that your beliefs are false. If you believe that they are true, then a whole host of unconscious mechanisms will be unleashed to preserve that belief in their truth. That is precisely what the experiment purported to demonstrate, i.e. that even when compelling evidence is given for the falsehood of a belief, the very fact that one’s believes that one’s beliefs are true results in a variety of distortions to persevere in that belief. In order to believe them, one must first seriously and consciously consider whether one’s beliefs might be false, and then one can be open to their evidence. Otherwise, it becomes a much more difficult task.
"In fact, out of 20 subjects who were “successful” at detecting authentic suicide notes, only 3 changed their minds about their degree of skill in that regard after the thorough debriefing that showed that the entire experiment was a fake." - So three changed their minds - and presumably it wasn't 'extremely difficult' for them. Or was it??
ReplyDeleteI would think that if 85% of people couldn’t accomplish a task, then that task is probably not an easy one to accomplish. Sure, it was easy for 15% of the subjects, but that just means that it is difficult for the vast majority of subjects.
So, do you spend a lot of time reading on the subject of *stuff you're not aware of for the time being*? Can you recommend any particularly valuable works on this subject? (I just know you're not going to understand the absurdity of this, but oh well.)
Like I said, I’ve done lots of reading in this area, and there is a body of evidence in support of the account that I’ve described. Obviously, I haven’t read everything about it, and thus there are gaps in my knowledge. I’d be happy to read something that attempts to refute the account that I’ve described, at the very least to minimize my confirmation bias.
"Except that it is more often than just “sometimes”. [IS IT?] Most people [NOT *ALL* PEOPLE?] fall prey to the same unconscious cognitive biases and distortions in order to maintain and sustain their beliefs in order to avoid cognitive dissonance." - Er, yes, I suppose *sometimes* they do. Why mention this bloody obvious point?
Because you are downplaying that prominent and common such biases and distortions are, and it is important to stick to the empirical data.
"The bottom line is that the Morning Star is not Venus in the entirety of its orbit around the sun relative to its position to the earth, but only Venus during a particular part of its orbit around the sun relative to it position to the earth." - So you're saying that the Morning Star is the Morning Star only when it is visible (i.e., when Venus appears in the morning sky)? So at other times, it ceases to be identical to itself - or what?
No, I’m saying that the Morning Star is part of the totality of Venus, and the Evening Star is a different part of the totality of Venus. Both parts are part of the totality of Venus, and thus each part refers to the whole by virtue of the fact that each is a part of the whole. Remember that “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” are just names for different appearances of Venus at different parts of its rotation around the sun.
"At one part of its orbital path, it is the Morning Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is the Evening Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it does not appear as either." - No. Rather, at one part of its orbital path, it is (correctly) *referred to as* the Morning Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is (correctly) *referred to as* the Evening Star, and at a different part of its orbital path, it is not (specifically) referred to as either.
So, you agree that the Morning Star is Venus “at one part of its orbital path, and that the Evening Star is Venus “at a different part of its orbital path”. Good. We’re on the same page, then.
"I take this to be an example of how different appearances of X correspond to different parts of X." - Sure you do, but you're wrong, as I've already explained.
Except that you yourself use the language of “parts” in your explanation.
So *my head* is a part of *me*.
ReplyDeleteYes, it is.
When I say, "If *my head* were veal, which I know it is not, it would be worth 54 dollars", how exactly am I referring to the *whole of me*?? (I'm not - I'm only referring to *my head*.)
I have no idea what this means. Sorry.
...then don't preface it with "I don't think so" as if you were attempting to actually respond to what I wrote, as opposed to ignoring it and going off on your own 'foundational' tangent. Is that too much to ask??
No, it’s not.
"if the differences between X1 and X2 are real, then they must correspond to something in X. Otherwise, the differences are merely notional, and solely exist in our minds." - So to clear up your obfuscation here: if the differences (i.e., *different senses*) of X1 and X2 are real[ly different], then they must derive from *different possible ways of observing* X.
But what accounts for the “different possible ways of observing X” is that one is observing is different parts of X. After all, if A and B each observed the entirety of X, then they wouldn’t experience X1 and X2. They would only observe X. The fact that they observe X1 and X2, and X1 is not identical to X2, means that A observes part of X, i.e. X1, and A observes a different part of X, i.e. X2. But all of that assumes that the differences are actually in X, and not just projections of our minds upon X.
It's nothing *about R* - it's *R itself* which appears differently from different points of view. The same temperature water feels warm to a warm touch and hot to a cold touch. The difference has nothing to do with the water undergoing any change or with different 'parts' of the water making themselves felt, but still, the qualitative experiences are real and genuinely different.
But the warmness and coldness of the water is a subjective experience that is only in the mind, and not in the water itself, which remains at exactly the same temperature. This is different from the Morning Star and the Evening Star example, because they appear differently, because they are Venus in objectively different orbits. They appear differently, because they are different in the sense of being Venus at different parts of its orbit around the sun relative to the earth. Remember, we are talking about situations in which the perceived differences are not merely in our minds, but are objectively present in the referent itself.
Question: In general, what is your criterion for deciding whether the differences between 'observers' (more properly: *observations*, or better yet: *conceptions*) is solely due to your mind (a figment thereof), as opposed to being about something in the conceived object?
Probably the same as yours. We both agree that there is a difference between when our minds perceive a distinction in X, and that distinction is just a projection of our minds onto X and when that distinction is really present in X. No need to get into this area, unless you want to question the distinction between a real/virtual distinction and a notional distinction altogether.
dguller: You've 'responded' to my every point, but you simply miss the point time and time again, often very badly. It will thus likely be pointless for me to continue with further iterations of this same pattern. However, a few responses:
ReplyDelete"But what accounts for the “different possible ways of observing X” is that one is observing is different parts of X." - No; different *aspects* of X. If you want to NOT beg the question and use 'part' as a synonym for 'aspect', fine. But then having 'parts' of this kind doesn't contradict divine simplicity and your argument depends on equivocation.
"After all, if A and B each observed the entirety of X, then they wouldn’t experience X1 and X2." - But neither A nor B observes 'the entirety of X' - so how is this relevant?
"But the warmness and coldness of the water is a subjective experience that is only in the mind, and not in the water itself, which remains at exactly the same temperature." - But remember: the *mind itself* is not only 'in the mind.' The mind is *in the world* and the subjective experience is an experience *of* the world (in this case, *of* the water). The point - please don't ignore it this time - is that diverse conditions make possible diverse experiences (and diverse true descriptions) of a unified subject. (Remember the 'mode of the receiver' bit?) And remember also: whenever we describe what is true *of an object* this objective truth is also *in our minds*. (Again: in accordance with the 'mode of the receiver.')
"This is different from the Morning Star and the Evening Star example, because they appear differently, because they are Venus in objectively different orbits. They appear differently, because they are different in the sense of being Venus at different parts of its orbit around the sun relative to the earth. Remember, we are talking about situations in which the perceived differences are not merely in our minds, but are objectively present in the referent itself." - Wrong. The appearance of Venus - of Venus!, of Venus itself! - in the morning is indistinguishable from its appearance in the evening. It's nothing but a particular point of light in the twilit sky. There is no objective difference whatsoever in Venus itself correlated to the fact that a viewer on Earth would be viewing it in the morning as opposed to the evening. I'm really nonplussed that you refuse to understand this. (You are also, again, astronomically wrong, in that there is no synchronicity between the respective orbits of Earth and Venus such that the morning appearance of Venus always occurs in the same particular phase of its orbit around the sun, and the evening appearance in a different one.)
"No need to get into this area, unless you want to question the distinction between a real/virtual distinction and a notional distinction altogether." - That's obviously exactly what I wanted to do and what I asked you about. Obviously there is a distinction, but I asked you what your criterion is for making the distinction in any given case. I wasn't asking you to simply repeat the names/abstract descriptions of the two classes. (And, in case you're wondering, I also wasn't asking for some question-begging, bullshit, could-mean-anything criterion like 'success' in 'navigating the world.')
me: "When I say, "If *my head* were veal, which I know it is not, it would be worth 54 dollars", how exactly am I referring to the *whole of me*?? (I'm not - I'm only referring to *my head*.)"
ReplyDeleteguller: "I have no idea what this means. Sorry."
Sorry, but really? Which part do you not understand??
(If you'd like the reference - which is not at all necessary for understanding the point -, search "kids in the hall gavin butcher shop" and go to the three minute mark in the video.)