Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Neither nature alone nor grace alone


Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity… Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason…

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.1.8

Here’s one way to think about the relationship between nature and grace, reason and faith, philosophy and revelation.  Natural theology and natural law are like a skeleton, and the moral and theological deliverances of divine revelation are like the flesh that hangs on the skeleton.  Just as neither skeleton alone nor flesh alone give you a complete human being, neither do nature alone nor grace alone give you the complete story about the human condition.

By natural theology and natural law I have in mind, of course, the philosophical knowledge of God and of morality embodied in what is sometimes called the “perennial philosophy” -- the tradition represented by the classical (Platonic and Aristotelian) philosophers and brought to a higher degree of perfection by the great Scholastics.  By themselves natural theology and natural law as developed within this tradition are like a skeleton: striking, solid, and enduring, but also dry, cold, and dead.  That is to say, on the one hand the central arguments of natural theology and natural law are (when rightly understood, as they often are not) impressive and rationally compelling, but can also seem remote from everyday life insofar as they are sometimes hard to understand and deliver a conception of God and of morality that can seem forbiddingly abstract.  To be sure, I think the “coldness” and “abstractness” of natural theology and natural law are often greatly overstated, but I don’t deny that there is some truth to the standard caricature.

By the deliverances of divine revelation I have in mind, of course, what we know of God and of morality from scripture, from the creeds, councils, and tradition more generally, and from the Magisterium of the Church.  By themselves these deliverances are like flesh without a skeleton: warm and human, but also weirdly distorted and unable to stand on its own or to offer resistance.  That is to say, on the one hand the theological and moral deliverances of revelation are more profound than anything natural theology and natural law can give us, and speak to us in a more personal and accessible way.  But they can also seem (when wrongly understood, as they often are) to lack any objective rational foundation, and to reflect a culturally and historically parochial view of human life that cannot apply to all times and places.  To be sure, these purported defects of Christian theology are also, to say the least, greatly overstated, but there is some truth to this caricature too to the extent that Christian theology is not informed by natural theology, natural law, and the methods of philosophy more generally. 

There have of course been times when the significance of nature, reason, and philosophy have been overemphasized -- when the claims of grace, faith, and revelation have been deemphasized and religion reduced to a rationalist skeleton.   But the pressing danger today comes from the opposite direction.  Talk of “faith” has been bastardized, so that many believers and skeptics alike wrongly take it to refer essentially to a kind of subjective feeling or irrational will to believe.  Too much popular preaching and piety has been reduced to trashy self-help sentimentality.  Too many philosophers of religion have for too long been playing defense -- maintaining, not that theism is in a position rationally and evidentially superior to atheism, but instead conceding the evidential issue and pleading merely that religious belief not be regarded as less rational for that.  Too many theologians have turned their attention away from questions of objective, metaphysical truth to matters of aesthetics, or moral sentiment, or psychology, culture, or history.

In short, religious believers have been fleeing into a non-cognitive ghetto almost faster than skeptics can push them into it.  They are too often like the hypochondriac in Ray Bradbury’s short story “Skeleton,” who is pathologically fearful of his own bones and ends up losing them -- reduced in the horrific climax to a helpless, amorphous blob.  What Christian theology needs now more than ever is its traditional, Scholastic backbone.

717 comments:

  1. dguller,

    I am still rather confused.

    You described the consensus that this community reaches as "infallible." However, persons are infallible, not the propositions reached by a consensus. That is important to stipulate because I want to understand the authority this community claims for themselves - do they claim infallible authority or not? It seems that you are saying that they are only infallible when they agree. I sense that there is an internal inconsistency to that formulation, but I'd rather research Islam before continuing.

    In any case, do you agree that a divinely authorized interpreter and teacher is practically needed for a religion to be considered as a possible candidate for special revelation? btw, I see that you are arguing with Ben over the Trinity. Are you even a theist yet?



    Daniel,

    I sketched a rough answer to that question further upthread for dguller. More pressing for you, though, is that if my argument is sound, all of Protestantism just simply cannot be true. And so, denying the Catholic Church is a motive for atheism at that point, not Protestantism.

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  2. Brian: In prima scriptura, does the locus of ultimate interpretative authority remain with the Christian?

    No, the ultimate interpretative authority in prima scriptura is God himself. Man only understands scripture correctly through the spirit of God. It might seem individualistic, but it's actually not. It is a true body with Christ as the head and all believers getting their signals from him.

    There is no middle man between us and Christ Jesus.

    What we have done is split off into groups - eyes over here, ears over there - then the eyes tell the ears, “Because you are not an eye, you do not belong to the body”.

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  3. Daniel,

    When two Spirit-led Christians disagree, how do we decide who is correct? This is the question you asked, was it not? And it lies precisely on the faultline of my argument. In such a situation, there is no principled way to decide the issue, and each Christian does what is right by their Spirit-formed consciences. And so the locus of ultimate interpretative authority rests with the individual believer. There is no way to cross the gap from your provisional human theological opinion (how many times have you beliefs as a Protestant changed, btw?) to what is truly revealed.

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  4. Brian: if my argument is sound, all of Protestantism just simply cannot be true.

    Your argument relies on an assertion.

    And so, denying the Catholic Church is a motive for atheism at that point, not Protestantism.

    Not at all. I have at my disposal every tradition within Christendom - not just one. I can still access and choose to believe great swaths of Catholicism without accepting that church as the ultimate authority on earth. I can dig from every Christian scholar, every theologian, every Apostle... all of it is mine to mine.

    I'm here on this blog solely because of my love and respect for the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Do I agree with everything he wrote? No way. But I find lots of common ground and I've learned a lot from his writings.

    I am also right now reading Dante's "Divine Comedy" and Roger Williams "The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience".

    I take it all in and pray "God sort it out".

    That's how I roll man.

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  5. Daniel,

    Right, you are illustrating my argument. You, as the locus of interpretative authority, take bits from here and there, and you hope God will sort it out in the end. That is precisely what I mean by the unbridgeable gap between human theological opinion and divinely revealed truth. You hold to traditions of men, and your religion cannot possibly be considered as a candidate for special revelation.

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  6. First to Daniel Smith I appreciate you giving me your doctrinal profile. It seems similar to Norman Geisler.

    I don't believe in Protestantism but if you have to be one I am happy you are a Thomist!

    Go Sabbat!!!

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  7. Next briefly to dguller June 4, 2013 at 2:25 PM.

    That is all very interesting but as I keep trying to point out to you in vain it seems

    1 "No orthodox definition or formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinctions Person to Person is in anyway a type of real distinction in the divine essence nor between the Persons and the essence nor the Persons to each other threw the essence!"

    2 To violate the divine simplicity we have to say there is a real distinction in the divine essence of any kind.

    3 Since by definition the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinction between Persons is NOT any kind of real distinction in essence then by definition the divine simplicity can't be violated!

    4 We don't have to say what the real distinction between Persons is or what it means we only have to say IT IS NOT a distinction in the divine essence, or between the Persons and the Essence or the Persons to each other in Essence!

    So all those boring appeals to Aquinas' & the Holy Church's teaching one there being no real distinctions in the Divine Essence doesn't really tell me anything I don't already know, and read and believe in and it can't be cited to overthrow the doctrine of the Trinity correctly understood.

    Sorry but you must accept it.

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  8. My friends.

    In my time I've debated many an anti-Catholic whose main argument against any particular doctrine I held was a Straw Man caricature. For example I would debate Fundamentalist Christians on the Catholic teaching of justification whose main "rebuttal" would be to pretend the Catholic teaching was identical to the condemned heresy of Pelagianism. No matter how many appeals I made to the Council of Trent Secession VI Canon One, the writings of the Popes or how many formal explanations of the Catholic teaching online I would direct them too the inevitable result was the anti-Catholic would ignore me & continue to push his Straw Man. The same with the Catholic teaching on the Sacrifice of the Mass. If I had a dime for every time I heard a Fundamentalist's straw man caricature, that the Mass was a "Re-sacrifice of Christ where Jesus dies again" I would not be afraid to ever loose my job or become unemployed since I would be set for life. Sometimes I would get the anti-Catholic after a lot of haranguing to at least pay lip service to the actual Catholic content of the doctrine under discussion but inevitably they would revert back to the Straw Man because that is what they learned from their fellows what the Church taught. Tragically that is not the same as what informed Catholics where taught.
    dguller of course has been no better. After 500 posts he would come close to presenting the correct Catholic teaching on the Three Persons in One God only to devolve back into his self produced Straw Man caricatures of the Trinity. In one sentence he would earnestly proclaim he took the definitions I presented him into account only to have him say really stupid shit like "Do the Persons each only Partially possess the Divine Nature? The word "No" is clearly not in his dictionary. It is beyond surreal. Catholic Evangelist & Apologist Karl Keating was along with Frank Sheed one of my early influences on how to deal with Fundamentalists. He once wrote that when you hear anti-Catholics wax eloquent on doctrine in the back of your mind after rolling your eyes you always think. I can do your job for you! I can also do it better then you! I can criticize Catholic doctrine better than you can because I at least know what I am talking about!.

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  9. hat is what has to happen here. dguller has proven he is flying blind and has no idea what the doctrine of the Trinity says and doesn't say! He has offered a critique of a mere Straw Man caricature of his own making. Therefore I will take it upon myself to critique the Trinity if only to show how it should be done."

    First briefly let us dispense with the two illegitimate arguments. 1) The idea the Trinity is contrary to the Divine Simplicity. To violate the divine simplicity we have to say there is a real distinction in the divine essence. Since by definition the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinction between Persons is NOT any type of real distinction in essence then by definition the divine simplicity can't be violated!
    We don't have to say what the real distinction between Persons is or what it means we only have to say IT IS NOT a distinction in the divine essence. The second objection that the Trinity contains a logical contradiction is with ease dispatched when one looks at the Principle of Contradiction. Which states If A=A then A can't not equal ~A at the same time and in the same sense. The Trinity teaches that Persons and Nature are Principles of Action in different senses! Thus they are not the same sense thus saying Three Persons in One Divine Nature can't logically be a contradiction since they are not the same sense. If they where the same sense then we would be saying the Trinity is Three and not Three while being One and not One at the same time in the same sense which is a clear contradiction. The Three Persons and One Nature are put together in what James Anderson calls an unarticulated equivocation whose positive nature is a mystery but can be called a merely apparent contradiction though it can't be known logically to be a genuine one.

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  10. The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”-Edward Feser

    Now for some legitimate criticism of the Trinity
    One of the features of the Doctrine of the Trinity is it is a Mystery. Something that we can't fully comprehend or clearly understand. For example we can understand how in the Divine Essence because of the divine simplicity there is no real distinction between the Persons only a distinction in thought otherwise known as a logical distinction (see Summa Q39). Yet we know via divine revelation there is some unknown type of real distinction Person to Person but not Persons to Essence or Person to Person threw Essence. What could that possibly be? What could the nature of this unknown "real relation" be if it is not a real relation in the Divine Essence? We are told we don't know and are not ever capable of knowing. We are only told it is really there whatever it is? Ok then here is the criticism. How is that meaningful? Something with pure negative content asserted to exist having a positive attribute of existence being that it is "real" but the nature of it's reality is unstated, unknown and professed to be unknowable! Well how is that meaningful? Because if it contains no positive content that can be comprehended by the intellect then is it at least on the practical level really saying anything? Or to put it more simply "Why should I believe in something if I don't know what it really is & can't know?" .

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  11. The previous criticism is IMHO a legitimate criticism of the doctrine of the trinity. Now I don't believe it is a defeater for the doctrine unless one believes God is something we need to have clear positive knowledge of in order to believe in him. But for questioning non-believers in the Trinity it is a fair question as to why believe in something that appears to have only negative content? What are you being asked to really believe? If you can't say positively what it is then is your doctrine could be mere word content formulated to create a merely apparent contradiction though technically according to the laws of logic is can't be known to be a genuine one. Isn't it formulated this way merely to fit the facts of Scripture? Well given it might not be of real supernatural origin that may be the case if the non-believer is correct. So again this is IMHO a legitimate criticism of the Trinity for the non-believer. The idiot charges of logical contradiction and violating the divine simplicity are not. But this is IMHO.

    Now naturally as a believer I might answer myself by saying the point of this doctrine being revealed is not for you or I to understand God whom you can't ultimately understand but to love God more. God can't be well known The Lord can only be well loved. But for the person who hasn't gotten there these are still important questions.
    But in the end we require GRACE to believe their content.

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  12. Lastly

    Augustine, Aquinas and Frank Sheed analogously described the real relation between the Father and the Word as something akin to a Thinker generating a Thought. God the Father being a Divine Person and having a Perfect self-concept would generate a Thought/Word perfectly & as such the Thought would be a distinct Person like the Father. Since there can only be One Divine Essence in this divine operation the Father would fully give that One Essence to the Son without surrendering it or dividing it. God would really Know himself. The Father would love the Son perfectly and Love is the giving of yourself so with the perfection in this divine operation the Father would give the Holy Spirit to the Son and the perfection of the self-giving would guarantee the Spirit is also a real Divine Person like the Father & Son. I have always loved this explanation and when I first read it in Sheed as a young man it set fire to my soul. Now that I have grown older I still feel that way except I have this insight one that dguller seems to not understand.

    This is just an analogy it is not an unequivocal description of something that is literally unequivocally going on in the Godhead. The Father begetting the Word is like a Mind generating a thought but it is only like it. It is not telling us what literally is going on in God. God is not like a literal human mind thinking about himself. In the strict sense we don't know what is really going on when the Father begets the Son. We only know whatever it really is cannot be comprehended fully by the human intellect nor can it be understood as the immutable God actually changing or literally moving. Nor can it be understood as anything that is really distinct in the Divine Essence. It is analogously a real knowing and real loving in God but we still can't fully say what it really is only that whatever it is it is & it's like something we do in our minds.

    We can't say what the real distinction between Persons really and clearly is we only have to say IT IS NOT a distinction in the divine essence & is is similar in a sense to a Thinker generating a thought!

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  13. Should I bother? It will just go into one ear and out the other and 500 additional posts from now I will see this same idiot argument. repeated back to me as if I didn't already answer it here and now.

    What the heck I love to show off it is one of my many faults.

    >As you will agree, the essential problem here is that if the divine intellect is the divine will, which isthe divine essence, then they are all the same in reality,

    Which merely means they are God. That is their same reality.

    >and thus one cannot derive the different processions from the divine intellect and the divine will, because they are exactly the same as the divine essence,

    That doesn't logically follow since the different processions only mean distinct divine persons not more that one God, more then One Divine Essence or a God/Essence that is divided up.

    > which cannot differ in any way due to its formal and numerical unity.

    Not true it can't differ in any way due to its formal and numerical Unity in merely being God. This doesn't negate distinctions and relations between multiple divine persons who fully own that One Nature.

    I think I have explained this all before in one way or another but dguller needs at this point to believe his straw man caricature is identical to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. It's very intoxicating for him to think he has the silver bullet to shoot down the greatest Faith in the world. But he will have to do better then what he offers me here. & so far he hasn't. Now my criticism of the Trinity is much better.

    >So, Emery agrees with me that the source or origin of the distinction between the persons cannot possibly be due to the divine essence.

    Yeh after 400 posts I or maybe it was that lovely Anonymous fellow who took over for me ;-) cited Q39 that pretty much says the same thing.

    Whatever the real relations between the Divine Persons are they are not real relations in essence. We don't have to say what they are since by definition what they are is a mystery but only what they are not.

    Give it up dguller. I refuse on principle and negative theological grounds to ever say or speculate what the real relations between the Divine Persons really are & I will only say what they are not & whatever they really are I will say they cannot be comprehended even in principle by a mere human intellect even one given the Beatific Vision in Heaven That means any attempt on your part to try and put Three Persons and One Nature together & try to explain what you think they really are when put together I must reject in principle. Since what you come up with would either be a contradiction which is false or a comprehendible limited mutable God which I can't ever believe in. It would neither be good for my soul or fashionable for Catholics.

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  14. additional:

    That is it would not be a real Mystery and if it's not a real Mystery then it's not by definition the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity and therefore I am not fucking interested in believing it or defending it.

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  16. BTW saying the relations cannot be derived from the divine essence merely means the relations don't come from dividing the essence into real parts that really relate to other divided parts. They derive Person to Person not in Essence or Person to Person threw Essence.

    Nor does it mean the divine relations are not subsisting in the divine essence & that they are somehow outside the Godhead.

    Why is this hard? Read the rest of Aquinas he says the same thing I am saying.

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  17. Ben,

    Have you heard about this infallibility stuff in Islam? I heard of scholars that helped interpret the Koran, but I never heard that this community had infallible authority such that if any Muslim dissented from their rulings they would be denying the faith.

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  18. dguller,

    I think that you have an overly restrictive account here. There are surely more than logical truths that human beings can agree upon. Can anyone deny that the sun appears to shine during the daytime? Can anyone deny that a rock is harder than a feather? These are all empirical claims that humans can achieve consensus over, and would be independent of any particular tradition and not simply a truth of logic. Sure, how these empirical truths are described and talked about would depend upon the historical contingencies of a particular tradition, but the reality that is being referred to remains true independent of that particular description.

    What you are outlining are beliefs that recur between traditions. The same case could be made about the nature of God as described by every classically theistic religion, or about the nature of asceticism in Hinduism and Christianity.

    But it must exist, according to the rationalist tradition (amongst others). So, who is right, and how does one determine who is right?

    This is a point that Hart, by way of Wittgenstein, considers nicely in The Beauty of the Infinite:

    Wittgenstein, who understood extremely well the shifting fluidity and instability of linguistic "foundations", and the limitations placed upon communicable meaning by the "rules" of usage belonging to particular linguistic practices, understood also the immense difficulties that arise in the encounter between two "language games" whose schemes of reference and meaning are not only incompatible with, but even incomprehensible to, one another. In On Certainty, he reflects upon the possibility that one might find oneself confronted by beliefs and practices grounded in a view of reality so thoroughly alien to one's own that it would be impossible even to identify the "reasons" for the disagreement: if for instance we met a people who prefer to consult oracles rather than physicists, we might denominate their belief as "wrong," but in doing so we would merely be "using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs." "I said I would 'combat' the other man,--but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)" Wittgenstein perhaps fails adequately to address whether upon persuasion there might follow a cultivation of vision and reflection that, in its integrity and fullness, could supply reasons unavailable to the uncoverted heart, but finally compelling in their "rightness"; but the dynamics of the counter between two worldviews he describes with crystalline clarity: "Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic."

    It shows the limits of reasoning.

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  19. That is one reason that I like John Loftus’ Outsider Test for Faith. The general idea is that if you would reject the arguments that other traditions use to justify their beliefs, then you should equally reject those same arguments when they are used by your tradition to justify its beliefs. So, if you would reject another tradition’s claims when they say that their tradition says their claims are true, then you should equally reject such an argument for your own tradition.

    The problem with Loftus's test (which, by the way, I've seen before) is that he presupposes such a thing as "absolute zero" in terms of tradition and belief. He is suggesting that a person can judge a tradition without simultaneously relying on a tradition. Used as an argument, it just begs the question. Of course his kind of rationalism is a tradition. Of course Loftus is presupposing a certain understanding of personhood, reason and argument. All he's done is smuggle tradition in through the back door, under the guise of neutrality. It's an old Enlightenment trick. I'm glad you're going to pick up MacIntyre's work, because he spends a lot of time on this very issue.

    Put yourself in the position of a Jew in antiquity who saw and heard Jesus. Jesus utters the claim that he is God himself, embodied in the flesh as the Son of God. Should you believe him? If you should, then why should you?

    Jews expected the Messiah to arrive. As for whether I accepted his claim, I suppose I'd know whether it was true if I saw it. An encounter with the Son of God would not be just the same as any other encounter.

    Lots of figures from the ancient world allegedly performed miracles, many similar to those allegedly performed by Jesus.

    Indeed. But, then, I'm not making an argument about the probability of miracles according to the historical record. I'm simply saying that, traditionally, this has been considered a way that his disciples were convinced. If I saw a miracle, I'd certainly be convinced. Did Jesus's miracles actually happen? Totally different argument.

    So, say that you are part of a tradition that accepts miracles are possible, then that would factor in to the prior knowledge. Furthermore, say that the majority of purported miracles have been found to not be miracles, which would then be built into future priors, which would increasingly become smaller and smaller, and then ask yourself what the likelihood is of a future miracle being a real miracle or a false miracle.

    The problem is that even the standards of whether something is a miracle or not differ based on tradition. The Catholic Church is calling events miraculous every other day that an atheist would reject as flukes. That's how JPII canonized 483 people.

    Even if you believe in miracles, the odds become unlikely that a future miracle is a real miracle. That is why I said that this involves empirical phenomena, which one can check and test to see if one’s predictions are right or wrong, which then transforms future probabilities. (I’m sure I’ve screwed up some details here, but I hope the general idea remains clear.)

    I don't think you messed up anything, but your argument still doesn't get anywhere. You haven't even considered the influence of tradition on perception. The same event could be described as miraculous and random, real or illusory. You could call it the product of divine intervention or psychological suggestion--or even insanity. Your probabilities will alter as a result.

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  20. Ben:

    "No orthodox definition or formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinctions Person to Person is in anyway a type of real distinction in the divine essence nor between the Persons and the essence nor the Persons to each other threw the essence!"

    I know that.

    "Do the Persons each only Partially possess the Divine Nature? The word "No" is clearly not in his dictionary.

    I accepted your answer to my question to be “no”. So, obviously “no” is in my dictionary.

    The idea the Trinity is contrary to the Divine Simplicity. To violate the divine simplicity we have to say there is a real distinction in the divine essence. Since by definition the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinction between Persons is NOT any type of real distinction in essence then by definition the divine simplicity can't be violated! 
We don't have to say what the real distinction between Persons is or what it means we only have to say IT IS NOT a distinction in the divine essence.

    I agree with that, which is why I have built that very claim into my arguments. Unfortunately, it leads to a reductio ad absurdum conclusion. In other words, assuming your very position as a premise leads to a logical contradiction, and thus your very position should be rejected as false.

    One of my arguments is based upon a simple question: Are the divine relations completely identical to the divine essence in the same way that the divine goodness is identical to the divine essence? In other words, is the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence a notional distinction? There are only two ways to answer this question, if it is meaningful: yes or no.

    If you answer “yes”, then you have a logical contradiction, because that means that either (1) the divine relations lack any kind of real distinction, because they are identical to the divine essence, which lacks any kind of real distinction, which falsifies the Trinity, or (2) the divine essence has some kind of real distinction, because the divine relations have some kind of real distinction, which falsifies divine simplicity. Therefore, if one wants to preserve the truth of both the Trinity and divine simplicity, then one cannot answer “yes” to this question.

    If you answer “no”, then the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence, not only in our minds, but also somehow and in some way in reality. Since the divine essence is identical to Being itself, by virtue of divine simplicity, it follows that anything that is not the divine essence is either a creature or non-Being. That means that the divine relations are either a creature or non-Being. If the divine relations are a creature, then God himself is a creature, which falsifies the Trinity. If the divine relations are non-Being, then they do not even exist at all, which falsifies the Trinity. To avoid falsifying the Trinity, you must reject that the divine essence is Being itself, which means rejecting divine simplicity. And that means that, once again, if one answers “no” to my question, then one must either reject the Trinity and/or divine simplicity. Therefore, if you want to preserve the truth of the Trinity and divine simplicity, then you cannot answer “no” to this question, either.

    So, whether you answer “yes” or “no”, you cannot affirm the truth of the Trinity and divine simplicity simultaneously. You must give one, or both, of them up, if my question itself is meaningful and valid.

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  21. Another argument simply asks where the real distinction between the divine relations comes from or originates in God. It cannot possibly originate in the divine essence, and I have cited both Aquinas and Emery in support of this position. However, if the real distinction between the divine relations cannot originate in the divine essence, then it must originate in other than the divine essence. That is the only other logical option, because if X cannot originate in Y, then X must originate in not-Y. Since the only thing other than the divine essence is creation or non-Being, then it follows that the real distinction between the divine relations originates in either creation or non-Being. If it originates in creation, then the divine relations are dependent upon creation for their existence, which is impossible. If it originates in non-Being, then the divine relations are not eternal, which is impossible. Therefore, whether the real distinction between the divine relations originates in the divine essence or not, one cannot affirm the truth of divine simplicity and the Trinity simultaneously.

    Rather than addressing the premises and logical structure of my arguments, you simply dismiss them out of hand, because their conclusions violate your religious doctrine. That is like Hilbert rejecting Godel’s theorems, because his mathematical philosophy demands that all true mathematical propositions are provable, and that’s that. Unfortunately, that just doesn’t cut it, and you would happily reject a Muslim’s response to your arguments for Christianity simply on the basis of his Islamic faith in the Qur’an’s claims that Christianity is false.

    The Trinity teaches that Persons and Nature are Principles of Action in different senses!

    You never answered what you meant by “different senses”, because there are different senses of “different senses”. You can either refer to (1) different linguistic and cognitive representations in the human mind, or (2) different aspects or characteristics of a referent. Which do you mean? Or do you mean something else entirely?

    Which merely means they are God. That is their same reality.

    No, it means that they are exactly the same in reality.

    That doesn't logically follow since the different processions only mean distinct divine persons not more that one God, more then One Divine Essence or a God/Essence that is divided up.

    Of course, it does. If the divine procession of the Word proceeds from the action of the divine intellect and the divine procession of the Spirit proceeds from the action of the divine will, then if the divine intellect is the divine will, then the procession of the Word is the procession of the Spirit, which means that there is no real distinction between them. If I told you that the Ben did one thing, but the son of Ben’s father named “Ben” did another thing, then you would say that I was necessarily wrong, because Ben and the son of Ben’s father named “Ben” is exactly the same person, and thus cannot do different things from one another. Similarly, if I told you that the divine intellect did X, and the divine will did not-X, then you would say that I was necessarily wrong, because the divine intellect and the divine will do exactly the same thing, because they are exactly the same thing. That is precisely why Aquinas and Emery reject the idea that the divine relations can possibly be derived or originated from the divine essence, which you agree with.

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  22. Not true it can't differ in any way due to its formal and numerical Unity in merely being God. This doesn't negate distinctions and relations between multiple divine persons who fully own that One Nature.

    You’re missing the point. If those multiple divine persons each come from the same divine essence, then you would have to account for where the differences between the divine persons come from within the divine essence. If paternity and filiation are somehow “in” the divine essence, then that means that paternity is actualized in the Father while filiation if actualized in the Son. That means that filiation is unactualized in the Father and paternity is unactualized in the Son. But the divine essence is pure act, and thus cannot have any unactualized aspects or properties at all, which means that this account is impossible. Do you have another one?

    Think about it. It is not as if there are numerically two divine essences that are each actualized in a divine relation. There is only one divine essence in every sense of oneness. That single divine essence is fully actualized and does only one divine act in eternity. Where does the differentiation come in? It cannot come from the divine essence itself, and thus must come from somewhere else.

    Yeh after 400 posts I or maybe it was that lovely Anonymous fellow who took over for me ;-) cited Q39 that pretty much says the same thing.

    Good, so you agree that the divine relations cannot possibly by derived from the divine essence, which logically implies that they must be derived from other than the divine essence. Furthermore, you also agree that the divine relations cannot be fully and totally identical to the divine essence, which means that the divine relations must be other than the divine essence. And since anything other than the divine essence is either a creature or non-Being, because anything other than Being itself is a creature or non-Being, then it follows that the divine relations are either identical to creation or non-Being, or derived from creation or non-Being, all of which falsifies the Trinity.

    Whatever the real relations between the Divine Persons are they are not real relations in essence. We don't have to say what they are since by definition what they are is a mystery but only what they are not.

    I’m not saying I know what they are. My argument simply assumes that the divine essence excludes any kind of real distinction, and the divine relations include some kind of real distinction. The divine relations cannot be fully and totally identical to the divine essence, because that would lead to a contradiction between (1) no kind of real distinction and (2) some kind of real distinction. I don’t have to know anything about the kinds of real distinction involved, and only need the difference between all X’s and an X for my argument to work. I don’t need to know anything about what X is.

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  23. BTW saying the relations cannot be derived from the divine essence merely means the relations don't come from dividing the essence into real parts that really relate to other divided parts. They derive Person to Person not in Essence or Person to Person threw Essence.

    Then how can the divine relations be derived from the divine essence, if not by actualizing different aspects of the divine essence? The bottom line is that the same fully actualized divine essence is present in each divine relation, and thus that very same divine essence cannot be basis of any differentiation between them. For example, you and I share the formally identical human nature, and thus we cannot be distinguished on the basis of that same human nature. However, we can be distinguished on the basis of that same human nature being instantiated in two different parts of space-time by two different material entities. What this means is that if X and Y share A in common, then A cannot be the basis of the differentiation between X and Y. Something not-A must be that basis.

    Also, saying that the divine relations are differentiated through the divine essence does not help at all, because it presupposes a distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence. After all, for X to do something through Y presupposes that X is distinct from Y in some way, and if X and Y are distinct in some way, then they cannot be identical in every way. And if the divine relations are different from the divine essence, then the Trinity is false, as I’ve already argued. And that is the fundamental problem here. Either the divine relations are totally and completely identical in every way to the divine essence, which falsifies either simplicity or the Trinity, or the divine relations are not totally and completely identical in every way to the divine essence, which falsifies either simplicity or the Trinity. You are impaled on either horn of this dilemma.

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  24. @dguller

    Nothing you wrote is worth responding too(maybe one small thing or two). It's just a repeat of errors & mistakes I and another have long since refuted & correct.

    YOU ARE NOT IN ANY OBJECTIVE SENSE ARGUING WITH THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY BUT WITH A STRAW MAN CARICATURE OF YOUR OWN INVENTION!

    Thus you are arguing against a doctrine no Trinity believing Christian here (Catholic, Orthodox & Protestant) believes in the first place. So you are arguing with yourself & not with us. You are the fundamentalist who casts Trent's teaching on Justification as "salvation by our own works" contrary to the explicit teaching of Trent.

    >I’m not saying I know what they are.

    Then you can't logically say anything about them on what they can or cannot do. Logic then mandates you must be silent & affirm nothing positively or negatively about the possibility of an unknown and unknowable type of Real relations between the Persons only, that is not any kind of real relation in the essence or between persons and essence or between persons threw the essence.

    >My argument simply assumes that the divine essence excludes any kind of real distinction, and the divine relations include some kind of real distinction.

    You are also implicitly assuming contrary to the definition (& after being constantly corrected about it & ignoring me like a punk) they are real distinctions at the same time & in the same sense to one another.


    >Then how can the divine relations be derived from the divine essence, if not by actualizing different aspects of the divine essence?

    They are subsisting in the divine essence they are not derived from it. If they where derived from it they would divide the essence which would kill divine simplicity. They are not actualizing anything either.

    You are just making up your own doctrine not analyzing mine. This is very disrespectful.

    This is hopeless YOU ARE NOT IN ANY OBJECTIVE SENSE ARGUING WITH THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY BUT WITH A STRAW MAN CARICATURE OF YOUR OWN INVENTION!

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  25. >That is precisely why Aquinas and Emery reject the idea that the divine relations can possibly be derived or originated from the divine essence, which you agree with.

    Yet both Aquinas and Emery believe in the Trinity & instead of addressing their explanationS of the Trinity YOU MAKE UP YOUR OWN STRAW MAN DOCTRINE THAT NEITHER OF THEM WOULD RECOGNIZE OR CONFESS.

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  26. Questions for dguller.


    1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another persons?

    3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now?

    4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

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  27. >Are the divine relations completely identical to the divine essence in the same way that the divine goodness is identical to the divine essence?

    Of course they are but you leave out the question "How are divine relations different from divine attributes"?

    Attributes are properties of a nature Relations are identical to Persons which are defined as "Centers of Attribution" that operate a nature even in the case of God where the Persons operate one they are identical to in Essence.

    You are not even asking the right questions.

    LET'S FACE IT DGULLER YOU ARE NOT IN ANY OBJECTIVE WAY ARGUING WITH THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY BUT WITH A STRAW MAN OF YOUR OWN CREATION.

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  28. >In other words, is the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence a notional distinction?

    But the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity (which you never miss an opportunity to ignore) involves real distinction between Persons NOT real distinctions between divine relations and the divine essence since any real distinction between divine relations and essence would divide the nature and negate the divine simplicity.

    Why do you keep ignoring the actual doctrine of the Trinity?

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  29. Ben:

    You are also implicitly assuming contrary to the definition (& after being constantly corrected about it & ignoring me like a punk) they are real distinctions at the same time & in the same sense to one another.

    No, I am not. You keep confusing the conclusion of an argument with the premises of the argument. This is the argument:

    (1) The divine essence cannot involve real distinction of any kind (by the doctrine of divine simplicity)
    (2) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind (by the doctrine of the Trinity)
    (3) The divine essence is identical in reality in every way to the divine relations (assumption)
    (4) X is identical in reality to Y in every way iff X cannot differ from Y in any way in reality
    (5) The divine essence cannot differ from the divine relations in any way (by (3), (4))
    (6) The divine essence does differ from the divine relations in some way (by (1), (2))
    (7) Therefore, (5) and (6) are logically contradictory

    Given that the conclusion of this argument is a logical contradiction, we are forced to reject one of the earlier premises. My preference would be to reject (3) as false, because it is the only controversial premise, which leads to the following continuation of my argument:

    (8) The divine essence is not identical in reality to the divine relations (by the negation of (3))
    (9) X is not identical in reality to Y in some respect iff X is distinct from Y in reality in some respect
    (10) Therefore, the divine essence is distinct from the divine relations in reality in some respect (by (8), (9))
    (11) The divine essence is Being itself (by divine simplicity)
    (12) X is distinct from Being itself iff X is either a creature or non-Being
    (13) Therefore, the divine relations are distinct from Being itself (by (10), (11))
    (14) Therefore, the divine relations are either a creature or non-Being (by (12), (13))
    (15) The divine relations exist (by the Trinity)
    (16) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (14) and (15)
    (17) The divine relations are not a creature (by the Trinity)
    (18) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (14) and (17))

    So, once again, we have conclusions that are logically contradictory at (16) and (18), which means that we must reject one of the earlier premises to maintain logical consistency. We cannot reject (8), because that is the same as affirming (3), which we saw led to an earlier contradiction. Perhaps you want to reject (9), but that would be difficult, because part of what it means for X to be different from Y in some respect is for X to be distinct from Y in that very respect. For example, to say that a dog is different from a cat in the respect that one is a canine and the other is a feline just means that there is a distinction between a dog and a cat on that very basis. So, you cannot reject (9).

    You cannot reject (11), because that is an implication of divine simplicity, and rejecting (11) is equivalent to rejecting divine simplicity. And you cannot reject (15) and (17), because they are core aspects of the truth of the Trinity.

    So, what do you do?

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  30. They are subsisting in the divine essence they are not derived from it. If they where derived from it they would divide the essence which would kill divine simplicity. They are not actualizing anything either.

    First, you have really distinct relations “subsisting in the divine essence”, which means that you also have real distinction “subsisting in the divine essence”. How does that not violate divine simplicity? After all, if the divine relations subsist within the divine essence, then do they subsist in the entirety of the divine essence, or only in part of the divine essence. They cannot subsist in the entirety of the divine essence, because that would just mean that the divine relations are completely and totally identical to the divine essence, which we have seen leads to a logical contradiction. They cannot subsist in part of the divine essence, because the divine essence has no parts, being metaphysically simple. So, they cannot subsist in either the entirety or part of the divine essence, which means that it makes absolutely no sense to your claim that they are “in” the divine essence at all.

    Second, you never explained what “in” means in this context. “In” implies some kind of boundary between an inside and an outside. However, this makes no sense when it comes to God, because God is infinite, unlimited and unbounded in any way. The entire notion of a boundary makes no sense when applicable to God, because on the one hand, there is a distinction between God and creation in the form of the direction of causal dependency, and on the other hand, God exists in the most intimate inwardness of all creation by sustaining it in existence at all moments by efficient causality, by providing its very nature by formal causality, and by providing it with a teleological directedness towards himself as Goodness itself by final causality, and so God is “all up in there”.

    Of course they are but you leave out the question "How are divine relations different from divine attributes"?

    Walk me through this. I asked you the following:

    (19) Are the divine relations completely identical to the divine essence in the same way that the divine goodness is identical to the divine essence?

    You answered “yes” to (19). If the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in the same way that the divine goodness is identical to the divine essence, then it follows that any distinction between the divine relations does not actually occur in reality, and only occurs in our minds. After all, that is what a notional distinction is.

    But you then say that I fail to take into consideration the fact that the divine relations are different in some way from the divine attributes. The problem is that this completely undermines your earlier endorsement of (19). If the divine relations have a different relationship to the divine essence than the divine attributes, then it cannot be true that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in the same way as the divine attributes! They are different relationships altogether, and thus cannot be the same.

    This is actually a great example of how you keep making contradictory claims.

    Attributes are properties of a nature Relations are identical to Persons which are defined as "Centers of Attribution" that operate a nature even in the case of God where the Persons operate one they are identical to in Essence.

    If X “operates” Y, then X is distinct from Y in some way. I operate my car, because there is a distinction between myself and my car, for example. To say that the divine relations operate the divine essence necessarily implies that there is a distinction between them, which means that in some way, the divine relations are other than the divine essence, and thus cannot be totally identical to the divine essence. And that way leads to contradiction.

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  31. But the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity (which you never miss an opportunity to ignore) involves real distinction between Persons NOT real distinctions between divine relations and the divine essence since any real distinction between divine relations and essence would divide the nature and negate the divine simplicity.

    So, we agree that there cannot be a real distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence. The question is what kind of other distinction applies to them, and there are only two left: notional distinction and virtual distinction.

    In notional distinction, there would be no actual difference in reality between the divine essence and the divine relations, exactly like there is no actually difference in reality between the divine essence and the divine attributes in that they are all exactly the same thing in reality. But if that is true, then you have a logical contradiction.

    In virtual distinction, you still have a distinction that is grounded in reality between the divine essence and the divine relations, despite the fact that you cannot actually separate the two apart in reality. It is like a material entity being composed of a form and matter, which are distinct in reality, but not separable without destroying the material entity in question altogether. So, there is a virtual composition between the two. Regardless, it would still follow that there is a distinction between the divine essence and the divine relations, which leads to logical contradictions, as I demonstrated above.

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  32. >No, I am not

    Yes you are the POC is very clear & you are not following it or applying it to the actual definition.

    Anyway everything you JUST wrote above I am ignoring since they are not replies to me but misdirection.

    For example:
    >So, we agree that there cannot be a real distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence. The question is what kind of other distinction applies to them, and there are only two left: notional distinction and virtual distinction.

    What does any of this have to do with the nature of the real distinctions Person to Person?

    Nothing.

    I am not interested in your misdirection.

    YOU ARE NOT ARGUING THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY WITH ME

    Now answer my questions.

    1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another persons?

    3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now?

    4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

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  33. >So, what do you do?

    >June 5, 2013 at 9:58 AM

    I agree the logic in this argument is solid and cannot be contradicted BUT SINCE THE WHOLE ARGUMENT IS BASED ON A STRAW MAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRINITY AND NOT THE ACTUAL CATHOLIC DOCTRINE IT IS WORTHLESS.

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  34. >3) The divine essence is identical in reality in every way to the divine relations (assumption)

    Which given the definition of the Trinity CAN ONLY MEAN THE ESSENCE AND THE RELATIONS ARE BOTH GOD. THAT IS IT. IT CAN'T MEAN THE
    ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON WHICH WOULD CREATE AN ACTUAL LOGICAL CONTRADICTION.


    600 posts and you are still too stupid or obstinate to get that.

    Thus I reject you argument on the grounds it is a Straw Man not an actual argument against the Trinity which by definition contains no logical contradiction.

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  35. Definition: A Person is a Subject that acts.

    Definition: A Nature is that by which a subject acts.

    >The divine essence is identical in reality in every way to the divine relations (assumption)

    Can either mean both relations and essence are the same reality of being God OR relations/persons are defined as natures & natures are defined as persons all at the same time and in the same sense.

    I believe the former and dguller does not.

    dguller believes the later and I do not.

    Therefore you are talking past me & arguing a Straw man.

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  36. Ben:

    Anyway everything you JUST wrote above I am ignoring since they are not replies to me but misdirection.

    Sure, a formal argument is just “misdirection”.

    What does any of this have to do with the nature of the real distinctions Person to Person?

    It doesn’t. I’m talking about the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence. Focus, Ben.

    Which given the definition of the Trinity CAN ONLY MEAN THE ESSENCE AND THE RELATIONS ARE BOTH GOD. THAT IS IT. IT CAN'T MEAN THE 
ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON WHICH WOULD CREATE AN ACTUAL LOGICAL CONTRADICTION.

    First, the question is what you mean by saying that they are “both God”. In what sense?

    Second, that is not what the premise means. Think about it this way. We can differentiate between the divine relations and the divine essence in our minds. The former involve real distinction of some kind, and the latter does not involve real distinction of any kind. The next question is whether this distinction in our minds corresponds to a distinction in reality in some way. In other words, the question is whether the divine relations are identical in reality to the divine essence in every respect, or in some respect, or in no respect. Those are the only logical possibilities.

    If they are identical in every respect, then the distinction between them is only in our minds, and does not correspond to anything in reality. It would be exactly like the distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence. It is an illusory distinction, because the reality is that they are all one and the same thing. If that is true of the divine relations and the divine essence, then you have a logical contradiction, because it ultimately means that the divine attributes are the divine relations, which is logically impossible, as you yourself agree. Therefore, the relationship between them cannot be totally identical.

    If they are identical in some respect, then that means that they are partly identical and partly different. In other words, there is some respect (or sense) in which they are the same, and there is another respect (or sense) in which they are different. Another way of putting it is that the respect in which they are identical is the part in which they are identical, and the respect in which they are different is the part in which they are different.

    What that means is that the divine persons are partly identical to the divine essence in some respect(s) and partly different from the divine essence in some other respect(s). Look at the part (or aspect, or respect, or sense) of the divine relations that is different from the divine essence. It follows that this part must be different and distinct from Being itself, and thus must be either a creature or non-Being. And that would mean that the divine persons, which are each totally and entirely God himself, are partly created or partly nothing at all, which means that God himself is partly created or partly nothing at all, both of which are impossible and logically contradictory. Therefore, the relationship between them cannot be partially identical.

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  37. If they are identical in no respect, then they are completely different from one another, which means that the divine persons are totally and completely different in every way from the divine essence, which just repeats the problems in the previous paragraph. After all, if the divine relations are totally different from the divine essence, then they are also totally different from Being itself, and thus must either be creatures or non-Being, both of which falsify the Trinity. Therefore, the relationship between them cannot be totally different.

    So, no matter what kind of relationship you want to say exists between the divine relations and the divine essence, you have logical contradictions. Simply saying that they are identical in that they are both God is too vague and imprecise to be helpful. Do you mean that they are each totally identical in every way to God? Do you mean that they are each partly identical in some way to God? Both of these possibilities leads to logical contradictions, and thus makes no sense. But without these possibilities, then how can you account for the kind of identity that you are talking about? What sense of “identity” are you using here, if neither total nor partial identity?

    Can either mean both relations and essence are the same reality of being God OR relations/persons are defined as natures & natures are defined as persons all at the same time and in the same sense.

    You assume that those are mutually exclusive, when they are not. After all, if the divine relations and the divine essence both refer either (a) to the exact same partial aspect of the exact same referent or (b) to the totality of the same referent, then they ultimately mean exactly the same thing, and ultimately result in a logical contradiction. If the divine relations and the divine essence each refer to a different partial aspect of the same referent, then you can avoid the logical contradiction, because you have segregated the contradictory properties into different aspects or parts of the referent in question. The problem with this option is that it necessarily means that the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence, which leads to a different set of logical contradictions, and so it won’t work, either.

    A better way to put it is whether the divine relations and the divine essence are totally identical to one another in every respect or are partly identical to one another in some respect. That is much clearer and precise, I think. Unfortunately, it leads to the same nest of problems as before.

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  38. >First, you have really distinct relations “subsisting in the divine essence”, which means that you also have real distinction “subsisting in the divine essence”. How does that not violate divine simplicity?

    I only told you 100 times. The distinctions are Person to Person only, NOT Persons to essence or Person to Person in essence.

    Now it would be fair to ask "What does that mean?".

    But the only answer I can give is "The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”-Edward Feser

    9 It is a mystery.

    Now there is a wealth of criticisms in asking that question & criticisms that can be mustered against my answer.

    But none of them involve your Straw man fantasies of the Trinity violating the divine simplicity or containing a logical contradiction.

    I've seen Peter Lupu an Atheist argue the Trinity as a mystery need not contain a logical contradiction & I've seen him produce interesting criticism of Feser's conclusion.

    But you seem to need your straw man after 600 posts like you needed to believe the incarnation was God changing His Divine Nature into a human one.

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  39. >Sure, a formal argument is just “misdirection”.

    No a Straw Man is.

    >doesn’t. I’m talking about the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence. Focus, Ben.

    Then you are not arguing the Trinity.

    >First, the question is what you mean by saying that they are “both God”. In what sense?

    We don't know & we can't know it is a mystery.

    “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”-Edward Feser

    >Think about it this way.

    I can't then I would be thinking of something other then the doctrine of the Trinity and that does not interest me.

    >>an either mean both relations and essence are the same reality of being God OR relations/persons are defined as natures & natures are defined as persons all at the same time and in the same sense.

    >You assume that those are mutually exclusive, when they are not.

    They are by definition mutually exclusive there is no such thing as a Catholic definition of the Trinity that doesn't a priori define them as mutuallty exclusive.

    If you claim they are not mutually exclusive then you are admiting to me you are not arguing the Trinity but a Straw man of your own making.

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  40. So are you going to answer my questions?


    1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another persons?

    3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now?

    4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

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  41. >After all, if the divine relations and the divine essence both refer either...... b) to the totality of the same referent, then they ultimately mean exactly the same thing, and ultimately result in a logical contradiction.

    The referent is by definition the word symbol "God" that refers to an unknown equivocal third sense.

    We don't know what is means for both to be the same referent "God" therefore we cannot know if there is or is not a genuine contradiction.

    The only thing they both mean is that they are both the same God.

    Now tell me what is God? I don't care to know anything about him but what is God in essence?

    Good luck answering that.

    We have done all this before & you are still repeating the same Straw Man shit.

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  42. So are you going to answer my questions?


    1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another person?

    3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now regarding the Trinity?

    4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

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  43. >In other words, the question is whether the divine relations are identical in reality to the divine essence in every respect, or in some respect, or in no respect. Those are the only logical possibilities.

    No it merely means divine relations are identical in reality to the divine essence in that in every respect they are both God.


    You think it MEANS THE 
ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON.

    That is mutually exclusive to merely saying they are both God.

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  44. Your Straw man assumption here dguller is relations/persons are defined as natures & natures are defined as persons all at the same time and in the same sense.

    Of course Natures and Persons are predicated in different senses according to the definition of the Trinity.

    ReplyDelete
  45. So are you going to answer my questions?


    1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another person?

    3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now regarding the Trinity?

    4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

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  46. Ben:

    I only told you 100 times. The distinctions are Person to Person only, NOT Persons to essence or Person to Person in essence.

    So, does that mean that there is no distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence? Does that mean that they are exactly the same with no differences in any way, much like there are no differences between the divine attributes and the divine essence? Or do they have some differences between them, making them distinct and different from one another? You keep equivocating on these critical points.

    Now it would be fair to ask "What does that mean?".

But the only answer I can give is "The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”-Edward Feser

    First, the only important question from my standpoint is what exactly is the relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence in reality. And there are only three possible relationships: total identity/no difference, partial identity/partial difference, and total difference/no identity. That’s it. And each possible relationship leads to a logical contradiction.

    Second, what are you affirming if you cannot understand the very meaning of your affirmation?

    Then you are not arguing the Trinity.

    I am arguing that the Trinity is inconsistent with divine simplicity, according to Thomist principles. Focus, Ben.

    We don't know & we can't know it is a mystery.

    So, you don’t have any idea what it means for them to be “both God”? Then how can you say that there are different senses involved?

    Here’s an analogy. I believe that a square triangle exists. What? A square triangle is logically contradictory? Only if you confuse the senses! If you focus only upon the sense of squareness and keep the sense of squareness separate from the sense of triangularity, then there is no contradiction, because the senses are different! Its squareness is relevant only when it is considered as a square, and its triangularity is relevant only when it is considered as a triangle, and as long as these are not confused, then the consistency of a square triangle is preserved. What? What is the actual relationship between the squareness and the triangularity in the square triangle. It is a mystery to which I cannot assign any clarity or precision whatsoever!

    Now, doesn’t that just compel you?

    They are by definition mutually exclusive there is no such thing as a Catholic definition of the Trinity that doesn't a priori define them as mutuallty exclusive.

    They are only mutually exclusive under a particular interpretation that still leads to a logical contradiction.

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  47. 1. Do you know what a Straw Man is?

    Yes.

    

2. Is it ever legitimate to argue a Straw man with another person?

    No.

    

3. How do you know you are not arguing a Straw man right now regarding the Trinity?

    Because I am not arguing a straw man. There are a number of claims that are being made here, which I believe are logically contradictory, and I believe that I have provided a number of arguments to demonstrate this. Your only solution is to equivocate to the point of meaninglessness and declare victory via mystery. I suppose that is a kind of victory, but I believe that it is a pyrrhic one.

    

4. Can you find a single Trinitarian here who agrees with your formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity?

    My formulation of the Trinity is that there are three really distinct divine persons that are subsistent relations in some kind of a relationship with the undivided and indistinct divine essence. My only questions were about that particular kind of relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence.

    

5. Given in the past you have been know to insist your formulations of Catholic doctrine where the correct ones(like with the Incarnation) & all the Catholics here rejected it how do you know you are not doing the same right now?

    Because you object to my conclusions, and cannot identify where I go wrong in the arguments that lead to them.

    No it merely means divine relations are identical in reality to the divine essence in that in every respect they are both God.

    But this continues to be an imprecise and equivocal formulation. When you say that “in every respect they are both God”, this could mean:

    (a) The divine essence in every respect is God, and the divine relations in every respect is God
    (b) The divine essence is God in every respect, and the divine relations are God in every respect

    Here is another way of putting it:

    (c) The Morning Star in every respect is Venus, and the Evening Star in every respect is Venus
    (d) The Morning Star is Venus in every respect, and the Evening Star is Venus in every respect

    (c) clearly differs from (d). After all, (c) is true while (d) is false. It is true that the Morning Star in every aspect is identical to Venus, and the same is true of the Evening Star. However, it is not true that the Morning Star is Venus in every respect, because the Morning Star is only Venus in the respect in which Venus appears in the sky during the morning, which necessary excludes how Venus appears in the sky during the evening.

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  48. So, coming back to (a) and (b), which of the two do you say is true? If (a) is true, then the totality and entirety of the divine essence is identical to God, and the totality and entirety of the divine relations is identical to God. If (b) is true, then the divine essence is identical to the totality and entirety of God, and the divine relations are identical to the totality and entirety of God.

    The problem with (a) is that it still equivocates on what “identical to God” means. A better way to flesh it out would be as follows:

    (a1) The divine essence in every respect is totally identical to God, and the divine relations in every respect is totally identical to God

    (a2) The divine essence in every respect is totally identical to God, and the divine relations in every respect is partially identical to God

    (a3) The divine essence in every respect is partially identical to God, and the divine relations in every respect is totally identical to God

    (a4) The divine essence in every respect is partially identical to God, and the divine relations in every respect is partially identical to God

    (a1) would result in a logical contradiction. (a2) implies that the divine relations are a part of the divine essence, which is logically impossible. (a3) implies that there is a part of God in which the divine essence does not apply, which is impossible. (a4) implies that there is a part of God that is neither the divine essence nor the divine relations, which is impossible.

    And the problem with (b) is that it leads to a logical contradiction in the same way as (a1).

    You think it MEANS THE 
ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON.

    Nope. You just don’t understand my argument at all, and prefer to hide behind mystery and equivocation, because once you provide any precision and clarity, logical contradictions occur.

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  49. Trinitarian:

    Definition- A Person is a Subject that acts & that is all a person is & nothing else.

    Definition- A Nature is that by which a subject acts & that is all a Nature is and nothing else.


    Three Persons in One Nature= no logical contradition via the POC.

    Corrilation:We have no direct intellective experience of a Person with more than one nature & or a Nature that contains more than one person. Thus at best the Trinity can be called an apparent contradiction.

    Dguller's Straw Man:

    Definition-A Person is both a Subject that acts & that by which the subject acts.

    Definition-A Nature is both that which a subject acts & a subject that acts.

    Thus Three Persons in One Nature is no different then saying Three Persons in One Person or Three Natures in One Nature which is a contradiction.

    Corrilation: There can be no such thing as a Person who has more then one nature or a Nature that contains more then one
    Person.

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  50. >Because I am not arguing a straw man.

    I say you are.

    >Your only solution is to equivocate to the point of meaninglessness and declare victory via mystery.

    In other words I am arguing the definition of the Triniy. Now I posted at June 4, 2013 at 9:00 PM
    that the charge of "meaninglessness" is a legitimate argument. But your straw fantasy is not so why not argue that?

    >I suppose that is a kind of victory, but I believe that it is a pyrrhic one.

    It's the Catholic view of the Trinity. I don't believe in any other. Attack me for it's alledged meaninglessness. I won't mind.

    Continue pushing your straw man & I will loose all respect for you. Feser was right properly understood there can be no logical contradition.

    You are all but admitting it.

    Now can you stop with the Straw man please?


    >My formulation of the Trinity is that there are three really distinct divine persons that are subsistent relations in some kind of a relationship with the undivided and indistinct divine essence.

    Yes but you clearly understand that to mean something entirely different to how I understand it as I tried to explain in vain.

    >My only questions were about that particular kind of relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence.

    Answer there is only a logical one & that has nothing to do with the claims of the Trinity. Now Move on nothing to see here.

    >Because you object to my conclusions, and cannot identify where I go wrong in the arguments that lead to them.

    Your arguments are flawless but they are based on Straw men premises. So what would be the point in trying futilly in pointing out "where you went wrong in the argument"?

    >But this continues to be an imprecise and equivocal formulation.

    That is the point. Mystery! No mystery no Trinity and I wouldn't whipe the shit from my ass to believe in it.

    Do you get it now?

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  51. Correction.

    This is not a correct formulation taken at face value.

    >My formulation of the Trinity is that there are three really distinct divine persons that are subsistent relations in some kind of a relationship with the undivided and indistinct divine essence.

    This is the correct formula.

    Trinity-that there are three really distinct divine persons that are subsistent relations in the undivided and indistinct divine essence.

    "in some kind of a relationship" is merely commentary on your part.

    Watch the Straw man. We are Catholics here our theology is a Science & the rules will be applied without pity or the Nuns will have your knuckles with their rulers.

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  52. Ben:

    Definition- A Person is a Subject that acts & that is all a person is & nothing else.


    But that is false. A person also involves a nature, particularly a rational nature, and thus there is something else involved in a person other than just the person. In fact, in a human person, there is also matter involved, in addition to the essence of human nature.

    Definition- A Nature is that by which a subject acts & that is all a Nature is and nothing else.

    What do you mean “that by which a subject acts”? Do you mean that the nature is some kind of tool that the subject uses in its activity? For example, a hammer is “that by which” a carpenter builds something. But that would make absolutely no sense here. And furthermore, you are implying that there is a distinction between a person and a nature, which means that there is a difference between a divine person and Being itself, which would make a divine person a creature or nothing at all.

    Three Persons in One Nature= no logical contradition via the POC.

    That depends upon what you mean by “in”. Oh wait, I forgot. You mean nothing by “in”, which means that what you really mean is: “Three Persons * One Nature” where “*” means absolutely nothing. So, what is a *-relationship between three divine person and one divine essence? You have no idea, which means that this sentence is meaningless. You may as well say that “God is ^ man”. What does “^” mean here? It’s a mystery.

    Corrilation:We have no direct intellective experience of a Person with more than one nature & or a Nature that contains more than one person. Thus at best the Trinity can be called an apparent contradiction.

    You are missing the entire point of my argument. I am not arguing that three persons is logically inconsistent with one nature. I am arguing that whether the divine persons = the divine essence, or the divine persons =/ the divine essence, you get a logical contradiction. And since that exhausts the logical possibilities, then you cannot avoid a logical contradiction if you want to endorse divine simplicity and the Trinity at the same time.

    In other words I am arguing the definition of the Triniy.

    There is no definition without meaning, and if your account of the Trinity is meaningless, then you are not arguing anything at all, except word salad.

    Yes but you clearly understand that to mean something entirely different to how I understand it as I tried to explain in vain.

    First, the difference is that I understand it to mean something, and you understand it to mean nothing.

    Second, you agree with the words that I used in my definition of the Trinity. My question is about the relationship between the divine persons and the divine essence. What is this relationship? Is it total identity? Is it partial identity? Is it total difference?

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  53. Answer there is only a logical one & that has nothing to do with the claims of the Trinity. Now Move on nothing to see here.

    There is a “logical” relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence? What does that mean? It cannot mean that one can logically infer from one to the other, because one cannot make such an inference from the divine essence to the divine relations. Only revelation could disclose the divine relations, not reason itself. Do you mean that there is only a logical distinction between them in the sense that Aquinas would mean, i.e. a notional distinction that only exists in the mind, but not in reality? Sorry, too much to see here.

    Your arguments are flawless but they are based on Straw men premises. So what would be the point in trying futilly in pointing out "where you went wrong in the argument"?

    So, you admit that my arguments are logically valid. The only remaining question is whether they are logically sound, and that requires you to show that my premises are false. Which premises do you reject as false and why?

    That is the point. Mystery! No mystery no Trinity and I wouldn't whipe the shit from my ass to believe in it.

    If the terms and definitions involved in the Trinity are equivocal, then one cannot make any valid logical inferences involving those terms and definitions. And if that is true, then Aquinas completely wasted his time in ST Ia, Q27-43, because those questions and articles are loaded with arguments and analysis, which according to you is all completely invalid, because everything in there suffers from the fallacy of equivocation. Nice!

    Trinity-that there are three really distinct divine persons that are subsistent relations in the undivided and indistinct divine essence.

"in some kind of a relationship" is merely commentary on your part.

    But saying that the relations are “in” the divine essence means that there is a kind of relationship between them. To say that a cat is “in” a box means that the cat is in the relationship of being inside of the physical space of the box. In other words, “in” is essentially a relational term such that for something to be “in” is to be “in” something else. So, it is not “merely commentary” to spell this out, but rather it is absolutely necessary.

    And it still remains to be seen whether there is any sense at all to saying that the divine relations are “in” the divine essence. The bottom line is that if the divine relations are “in” the divine essence, then there is something that involves real distinction of some kind within something else that cannot involve real distinction of any kind. But if there is real distinction of some kind within the divine essence, then that would violate the prohibition of there being any kind of real distinction within the divine essence, which is a logical contradiction.

    Again, this all depends on whether you have any sense to the term “in” here. Personally, I think that if “in” has sense, then you have an unavoidable contradiction, which you can only avoid if you drain “in” of all possible meaning. But in that case, you may as well just say that the divine relations are “$%^” the divine essence where “$%^” means absolutely nothing at all. At least be honest that you are talking nonsensically.

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  54. And one more thing.

    To say that X is in Y necessarily means that X is not identical to Y. For example, to say that a cat is in a box necessarily means that a cat is not identical to a box. For example, to say that a thought is in a mind necessarily means that a thought is not a mind. For example, to say that a divine idea is in the divine intellect means that a divine idea is not identical to the divine intellect. Similarly, to say that the divine relations are in the divine essence necessarily means that the divine relations are not identical to the divine essence.

    And this is a general principle applicable to most relative terms, I think. To say that X is bigger than Y necessarily means that X is not identical to Y. To say that X is harder than Y necessarily means that X is not identical to Y. To say that X is the father of Y means that X is not identical to Y.

    So, if you want to use the word "in", then it must be the case that the divine relations are different from the divine essence in the sense that they are not totally identical to one another in reality.

    The only exception to this rule is to say that X is equal to Y could mean that X is identical to Y (if X is totally identical to Y), but it could also mean that X is different from Y (if X is partially identical to Y). But this exception does not help your case, because (1) you are using "in" and not "equal", and (2) if by "in" you mean "equal", then it leads to all the logical contradictions that I've argued above.

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  55. >Definition- A Person is a Subject that acts & that is all a person is & nothing else.


    >But that is false.

    But that is how Trinitarians define a Person in Trinitarian Theology? You are free define it however you choose but then you would be using YOUR OWN STRAW MAN definition not the one used by the Trinitarian.

    So how can any argument you come up with be anything but a Straw Man?

    You just admitted to me it is never valid to argue a Straw Man?

    >So, you admit that my arguments are logically valid. The only remaining question is whether they are logically sound, and that requires you to show that my premises are false. Which premises do you reject as false and why?

    I don't have too since the argument is a Straw Man therefore the underlying warrant (i.e. the authentic definition of the Trinity) is false.

    For example you just rejected the Trinitarian definition of Person and Nature etc and thus you are not giving me an argument based on those definitions thus you are not really arguing the Trinity with me.

    I don't need to go any further or argue anything else you said.

    STRAW MAN!

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  56. Furthermore, your entire argumentative strategy here is absurd. Say that one makes the following argument:

    (1) God is material
    (2) If X is material, then X involves potency
    (3) Therefore, God involves potency
    (4) God is pure act
    (5) If X is pure act, then X cannot involve potency
    (6) Therefore, God cannot involve potency
    (7) Therefore, there is contradiction between (3) and (6)
    (8) Therefore, (1) is false

    According to you, this argument is completely wrongheaded. You would say, “Of course God isn’t material! That is a total straw man! What are you stoooooopid?! Fuck shit piss ass!” In your expletive laden fecal eruption, you would completely have missed the point that the argument is a reductio ad absurdum, which means that it is supposed to show that a premise is necessarily false, because it leads to a logical contradiction.

    So, when I assume that the divine essence is identical in reality in every way to the divine relations, then I am trying to examine the logical implications of that assumption, if it is true. In other words, I am assuming that there is only a notional distinction between them, exactly like the notional distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence. You cannot argue that notional distinctions as such as inapplicable to God himself, because the divine attributes involve notional distinctions! So, my assumption is not meaningless, and thus is perfectly valid to postulate as possibly true. It just so happens that it leads to a logical contradiction, and thus must be false. And the bizarre thing is that you actually agree that it must be false, because otherwise, it would mean that the divine attributes are identical in every way to the divine relations, which you reject So, you agree with me that you must reject it as false.

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  57. > You may as well say that “God is ^ man”. What does “^” mean here? It’s a mystery.

    Actually it would be a bit clearer and have more contend if you would graciously allow us to use OUR HISTORIC DEFINITIONS OF OUR THEOLOGICAL TERMS & not substitute your own Straw Definitions that you pulled out of your muslim atheist asshole?


    Can we do that?

    Please?

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  58. >So, when I assume that the divine essence is identical in reality in every way to the divine relations, then I am trying to examine the logical implications of that assumption...

    Where as I and every Trinitarian merely see it meaning both are identically God in reality and are God in every way.

    dguller can't stop arguing against his STRAW MAN.

    What the shit?:-)

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  59. But that is how Trinitarians define a Person in Trinitarian Theology? You are free define it however you choose but then you would be using YOUR OWN STRAW MAN definition not the one used by the Trinitarian.

    Aquinas does not define “person” as necessarily excluding any mention of nature:

    “[T]he individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person"” (ST Ia, Q29, A1).

    “"Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature” (ST Ia, Q29, A3).

    I fail to see how following Aquinas’ own definition of “person” constitutes a straw man. It seems clear to me that Aquinas’ definition of “person” does not exclude all mention of “nature” as completely irrelevant and unnecessary to understand what a “person” is supposed to be. It is actually the case that without mention of “rational nature”, there is no sense to “person” at all.

    I don't have too since the argument is a Straw Man therefore the underlying warrant (i.e. the authentic definition of the Trinity) is false.

    You have to point out where there is a straw man in the premises of my argument. Thus far, you have failed to do so. All you have done is reject the conclusion as violating your faith, and patted yourself on the back with a job well done. Unfortunately, that is not a rational way to respond to a logical argument. Honestly, which premises are false? Pick one. Don’t just change the senses to suit your purposes, but demonstrate how my senses are either nonsensical or false.

    Actually it would be a bit clearer and have more contend if you would graciously allow us to use OUR HISTORIC DEFINITIONS OF OUR THEOLOGICAL TERMS & not substitute your own Straw Definitions that you pulled out of your muslim atheist asshole?

    First, you are still avoiding any coherent definition of your terms.

    Second, you are still missing the point that it is not meaningless to ask whether the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence is the same as the distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence. In other words, is the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence a notional distinction. This is a perfectly fair question to ask, and it makes perfect sense. It is just as fair to ask if God is material, even though God’s materiality is ultimately false, which is demonstrated by reductio ad absurdum. So, the important question is whether it is true or false that the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence is a notional distinction, and the problem, which I’ve demonstrated, is that either way, you end up with a logical contradiction.

    Sorry.

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  60. >Furthermore, your entire argumentative strategy here is absurd.

    My argument is you are arguing a Straw man.

    Your response is to stamp your feet and say I am not you then tell me my Trinitarian definition of Person is "wrong" & insist I substitute your Straw Man definition.

    ?How are you not arguing a Straw Man again?

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  61. >Aquinas does not define “person” as necessarily excluding any mention of nature:

    “[T]he individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person"” (ST Ia, Q29, A1).

    Yes and now show me in his explanations of the Trinity where he understands it to mean Essence or that it is definition-ally a synonymous with essence.

    Show me where G-L or any Thomist says Persons and Nature are given the same predicated definition?

    You can't because it doesn't exist.

    You pulled it out of thin air & made it up.

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  62. Where as I and every Trinitarian merely see it meaning both are identically God in reality and are God in every way.

    First, it does not matter how you see it. The question is whether my premise makes sense and is meaningful. If it is meaningful, then we can examine whether it is true or false. It is irrelevant if I start from somewhere that you don’t like, as long as my starting point is meaningful and makes sense, and it certainly makes sense to ask whether the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence is a notional distinction or not.

    Second, if the divine relations and the divine essence “are God in every way”, then does that mean that there are different ways to be God? What does “every way” mean here? Also, you are still equivocating between total identity and partial identity. Keep hiding behind imprecision and equivocation and mystery, Ben.

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  63. >You have to point out where there is a straw man in the premises of my argument. Thus far, you have failed to do so.

    Yes I have you just ignored me & continued to substitute your own.

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  64. >First, it does not matter how you see it.

    Then you are not really arguing with anything I in fact believe.

    STRAW MAN!!!!

    >The question is whether my premise makes sense and is meaningful.

    But if it is not what we Christians believe then it means nothing to us.

    STRAW MAN!

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  65. Yes and now show me in his explanations of the Trinity where he understands it to mean Essence or that it is definition-ally a synonymous with essence.

    First, I never said that it was identical in meaning to essence. You still don’t even understand what I’m doing, Ben. All I’m asking is what the relationship is between the divine relations and the divine essence. Their relationship must be either totally identical in every way, or partially identical in some way. That’s it. Those are the only two kinds of relationships anything can have to one another. If they are totally identical, then they are actually the same thing in reality. If they are partially identical, then they have parts (or aspects or senses) that are the same, and they are other parts (or aspects or senses) that are different. If they are totally different, then they have no relationship at all, and so we can exclude this option altogether. If you can think of any other kinds of relationships that are not subsumed under mine, then I’m all ears, but if you cannot, then you have to explain to me which kind of identity to use when interpreting the relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence, total or partial.

    Second, you said that the definition of "person" made no mention of "essence" or "nature". I showed that you are wrong. Part of the meaning of "person" necessarily involves "essence" or "nature". You were completely wrong here, Ben.

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  66. But if it is not what we Christians believe then it means nothing to us.

    So, if I assume that God is material, and subsequently show that this is impossible, then you would reject that argument, because Christians do not believe that God is material in the first place? If that is true, then you have a principled rejection of all reductio ad absurdum proofs and arguments, which means that you must reject the majority of Aquinas’ arguments altogether. Nice! Aquinas was very busy burning straw men!

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  67. >It is irrelevant if I start from somewhere that you don’t like, as long as my starting point is meaningful and makes sense,.

    It made sense to you that God becoming man meant God changed his Divine Nature to human nature.

    But it wasn't our belief.

    AT NO TIME AFTER 700 POSTS HAVE YOU EVEN ARGUED WITH THE CATHOLIC OR GENERAL CHRISTIAN TEACHING ON THE TRINITY BUT SUBSTITUTED YOUR OWN STRAW MAN. THE BURDEN IS ON YOU TO AGREE WITH US AS TO WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS AND TEACHES NOT FOR US TO AGREE WITH YOU TILL WE PROVE YOU "WRONG"

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  68. >So, if I assume that God is material, and subsequently show that this is impossible,

    I wouldn't have to show it is impossible I would just have to say "My religion doesn't teach the existence of a Material God so you are not addressing any type of God we believe in".

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  69. >First, I never said that it was identical in meaning to essence.

    Of course since you are not arguing using Catholic teaching on the meaning of person but your own straw man.

    You are making up your own terminology with it's your own meanings by proof-texting our theology texts.

    How is that not a Straw Man again?

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  70. >Second, if the divine relations and the divine essence “are God in every way”, then does that mean that there are different ways to be God?

    Maybe you see I still don't know what God is?

    >What does “every way” mean here?

    It's your words I am merely interpreting them in harmony with the Trinity.

    >Also, you are still equivocating between total identity and partial identity.

    No considering all trinitarians reject partial identity can ever exist in God.

    >Keep hiding behind imprecision and equivocation and mystery, Ben.

    I will keep believing in the Trinity you keep throwing up your straw man & nobody here will take you seriously.

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  71. Can we trade dguller for Peter Lupu?

    We need a rational atheist here who will argue the Catholic teaching on the Trinity & not some Straw man.

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  72. >Second, you said that the definition of "person" made no mention of "essence" or "nature". I showed that you are wrong. Part of the meaning of "person" necessarily involves "essence" or "nature". You were completely wrong here, Ben.

    No, rather you didn't show me HOW AQUINAS uses the definition or what parts of it he takes for the Christian definition.

    "Individual subject of a rational nature" simply means the Subject itself, is by nature, rational, not that the subject is an independent essence alongside the divine essence.

    Good grief!

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  73. Brian: Right, you are illustrating my argument. You, as the locus of interpretative authority, take bits from here and there, and you hope God will sort it out in the end.

    Well I DO know of an abundance of scriptural passages where God promises to do just that - so I think my hope is well founded. God is, after all, a living God.

    That is precisely what I mean by the unbridgeable gap between human theological opinion and divinely revealed truth. You hold to traditions of men, and your religion cannot possibly be considered as a candidate for special revelation.

    Well let me break your position down as I understand it (paraphrasing your comments as I interpret them)...

    I asked how an individual can discern truth from error.

    Your answer, in a nutshell, is: "we can't". You're saying that an individual cannot discern truth from error on his own (even with God's spirit indwelling) - he needs God's organization to do that for him.

    Then I asked how an individual can know which organization is God's.

    Your answer to that was "it's the Catholic church - because only the Catholic church has a system in place to distinguish truth from error".

    My dilemma is that - if your first answer is true, then *I* can't distinguish (even with the spirit of God indwelling) whether your second answer is true.

    You still have not given *ME* a way that *I* can distinguish truth from error.

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  74. BenYachov,

    Keep up the good fight and...

    "Run to the hills! Run for your life!"

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  75. Ben:

    AT NO TIME AFTER 700 POSTS HAVE YOU EVEN ARGUED WITH THE CATHOLIC OR GENERAL CHRISTIAN TEACHING ON THE TRINITY BUT SUBSTITUTED YOUR OWN STRAW MAN. THE BURDEN IS ON YOU TO AGREE WITH US AS TO WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS AND TEACHES NOT FOR US TO AGREE WITH YOU TILL WE PROVE YOU "WRONG"

    Is it meaningful to ask whether the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence is a notional distinction? If it is meaningful, then we can explore the logical implications of this position. If it is not meaningful, then you have to explain why it is incoherent.

    I wouldn't have to show it is impossible I would just have to say "My religion doesn't teach the existence of a Material God so you are not addressing any type of God we believe in".

    First, that’s not what I asked you. I asked if you would accept such an argument as sound. In other words, if an argument began with an assumption about God that you knew to be false, but logically demonstrated that such an assumption led to a logical contradiction, whch demonstrated the falsehood of that premise, then would you reject this argument altogether, simply because it dared to start with a premise that you rejected on the basis of your faith?

    Second, you seem to be saying that you will always reject any argument that begins with a premise that you reject, even if that argument is a reductio ad absurdum that demonstrates the falsehood of that premise. So, when Aquinas shows that there cannot be two beings that are pure act by assuming that there are two, and showing that this leads to a contradiction, then he is doing something wrong according to you?

    Third, your position would result in the implication that one could never rationally demonstrate the negative attributes of God, i.e. that he is immaterial, infinite, immutable, impassable, and so on. After all, all of these attributes are negations of some positive attribute, and the only way to demonstrate these negations is to first assume that the positive attribute is applicable to God, and then show that such an assumption leads to a logical contradiction. For example, to demonstrate that God is immaterial, one first assumes that God is material, and then shows how this contradicts with his being pure act, and thus God cannot be material at all. If you are right, then this entire procedure that forms the bedrock of natural theology is completely invalid and should be tossed aside.

    Maybe you see I still don't know what God is?

    Then how can you make specific claims about what is “God in every way”? You would have to have some idea of what this could mean, or else your claims are utterly meaningless. Seriously, Ben, if you have no idea what God is, then you cannot make any meaningful claims about him at all.

    It's your words I am merely interpreting them in harmony with the Trinity.

    Then what is your interpretation of “every way”? In order for this to make any sense, there must first be different ways to be God. What are these different ways? Is one way the divine essence? Is another way the divine relations?

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  76. No considering all trinitarians reject partial identity can ever exist in God.

    Great, so the only kind of identity in God must be total identity, which means that if X is identical to God, then X is the same as God in every way and does not differ from God in any way. Let’s look at the divine essence. The divine essence is identical to God, which means that it is the same as God in every way and does not differ from God in any way. Now let’s look at the divine relations. The divine relations are identical to God, which means that it is the same as God in every way and does not differ from God in any way.

    The problem is that by the law of transitive identity, if X is totally identical to Y and Z is totally identical to Y, then X is totally identical to Z. And that means that if the divine essence is totally identical to God, and the divine relations are totally identical to God, then the divine essence is totally identical to the divine relations, which means that the distinction between them is only in our minds, and not in reality. And this necessarily leads to a logical contradiction, because it means that the divine persons are totally identical in every way with the divine attributes, which even you recognize is logically impossible.

    I will keep believing in the Trinity you keep throwing up your straw man & nobody here will take you seriously.

    You don’t even understand what you believe in. I believe in garnarble! What is “garnable”, you ask? I have no idea, but I sure believe in garnable with all my heart and soul!

    "Individual subject of a rational nature" simply means the Subject itself, is by nature, rational, not that the subject is an independent essence alongside the divine essence.

    What are you talking about? I was asking if the subject (or “person”) that has a rational nature is distinct from the rational nature itself. This must be true, because it is possible for the rational nature itself to exist without being actualized in a person. For example, if there was never any human beings in existence, then you would have a rational nature existing in the divine intellect, but not as instantiated in particular rational entities. That is why there is a real distinction between essence and esse, according to Aquinas.

    The question is how this can work with God. It is my understanding that in God, the person does not have a nature in the same way that a particular created entity has a nature, but rather that the person is the nature in the sense of total and complete identity, which you agreed was the only kind of identity that could possibly be involved with God. This makes perfect sense by virtue of divine simplicity. But if that is true, then it makes no sense to make a distinction in reality between what acts (i.e. the person) and that by which the person acts (i.e. the essence), because they are one and the same thing in reality in every way, not differing in any way, the only distinction between them being in our minds. And if that is true, then you have a logical contradiction between something that involves real distinction of some kind being completely identical in every way with something that involves no distinction of any kind.

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  77. Ben:

    Here’s another way to look at what I’m trying to do.

    Say you start with an assumption X. X is meaningful, and thus is possibly true. One then analyzes X and discovers that if X is true, then it is impossible for the Trinity and divine simplicity to both be true, because if they are both true, then there is a logical contradiction. Naturally, this is objectionable to a Trinitarian, and so the next step would be to reject X as false, and thus endorse not-X as true. However, it then turns out that if not-X is true, then once again it is impossible for the Trinity and divine simplicity to both be true, because if they are both true, then there is a logical contradiction. What you have in this situation is that if X is true or not-X is true, then it is impossible for the Trinity and divine simplicity to both be true, because otherwise there is a logical contradiction. If the logic is valid, then one must reject either the Trinity and/or divine simplicity, or admit of a logical contradiction within one’s belief system, which would destroy that system’s ability to be truth determining and truth preserving. I believe that I have demonstrated this precise scenario when X is assumed to be the premise that the divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence.

    Your response has been that X is not proper Christian doctrine, but that does not work in this situation, because if X is false Christian doctrine, then not-X must be true Christian doctrine. After all, it is impossible for X and not-X to both be false, because that is the logical equivalent of X and not-X both being true, which is a logical contradiction. But as I have shown, if not-X is true, then a logical contradiction occurs if one wants to endorse the truth of divine simplicity and the Trinity, and thus this move simply does not work. It would work if not-X resulted in the preservation of those key Christian doctrines, but the fact is that it does not in this case. Therefore, your objection completely misses the logical dynamic of my argument altogether, and is a complete non sequiter and red herring.

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  78. dguller writes:
    > You don’t even understand what you believe in.

    Well.....I can't argue with that! Yep I'm convinced! Very compelling stuff! dguller understands the doctrine of the Trinity better than anyone here.


    @Prof Feser
    You see that Professor Edward Feser when you said "Hence if the doctrine “appears contradictory” to you, you have by that very fact misunderstood it and are not really entertaining it at all." then you sir are dead wrong!

    dguller understands the doctrine of the Trinity & we don't. Just look at everything he wrote! That is what someone who understands the Trinity would write!
    Isn't it?

    It's so obvious! Why didn't I see this?

    I am confident you will now return to Atheism Prof Feser.;-)

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  79. dguller,

    Say you start with an assumption X. X is meaningful, and thus is possibly true. One then analyzes X and discovers that if X is true, then it is impossible for the Trinity and divine simplicity to both be true, because if they are both true, then there is a logical contradiction. Naturally, this is objectionable to a Trinitarian, and so the next step would be to reject X as false, and thus endorse not-X as true.

    You're trying to analyze analogical concepts in terms of analytic propositions subject to the law of the excluded middle. This is a habit of yours. It's a very large category error.

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  80. >Keep up the good fight and...

    In the Grim Darkness of the Far Future there is only War!

    If Warhammer 40k isn't metal I don't know what is?

    Cheers Daniel!

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  81. Rank:

    What you are outlining are beliefs that recur between traditions. The same case could be made about the nature of God as described by every classically theistic religion, or about the nature of asceticism in Hinduism and Christianity.

    What I am outlining are truths that are common to all traditions, and thus are not derived from any particular tradition, unless by “tradition” you are referring to “human experience and activity”. It is not a tradition to empirically observe the world around us and perceive it as having a variety of qualities and aspects. It is something that all human beings, by virtue of being human beings, do. And my only point was that logical truths are not the only truths that remain true irrespective of which tradition one belongs to, and it seems that you now agree with me.

    if for instance we met a people who prefer to consult oracles rather than physicists, we might denominate their belief as "wrong," but in doing so we would merely be "using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs." "I said I would 'combat' the other man,--but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)"

    But the conclusion that he draws from this scenario is completely overblown. If we met a people that consulted oracles to predict the future of natural phenomena rather than physicists, then that behavior would make sense to us, given their background assumptions about the supernatural origins of natural phenomena. Certainly, it is not completely incomprehensible that there might be spiritual beings that control nature, and that appealing to them would allow one to control nature indirectly. And since we can understand them to such an extent, our language games could not be completely incommensurable and incomprehensible.

    Furthermore, we could even take steps to demonstrate that the physicists are better at predicting natural phenomena than oracles by conducting tests. At some point, the people would see that physicists are better at predicting natural phenomena, and thus should be consulted for such purposes rather than the oracles. As you said earlier, a tradition only persists if it works for a purpose. And if it turns out that the oracles are simply terrible at predicting, then the people would turn to the physicists. That doesn’t mean that they will accept the entire body of knowledge of the physicists, but it will mean that they will accept their predictive skills.

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  82. It shows the limits of reasoning.

    Not really.

    The problem with Loftus's test (which, by the way, I've seen before) is that he presupposes such a thing as "absolute zero" in terms of tradition and belief. He is suggesting that a person can judge a tradition without simultaneously relying on a tradition. Used as an argument, it just begs the question. Of course his kind of rationalism is a tradition. Of course Loftus is presupposing a certain understanding of personhood, reason and argument. All he's done is smuggle tradition in through the back door, under the guise of neutrality.

    Actually, he doesn’t. He says that either we are capable of objective beliefs that are true, or we are not. If the former, then we should be capable of using reason and logic to identify good and bad reasons for different beliefs, and as such, should shun and avoid all bad reasons, including those that we use to bolster our own traditional beliefs, and embrace all good reasons, including those that violate our traditional beliefs. If the latter, then we should be agnostics, and there is absolutely no justification for the certainty of faith, because there are no independent and objective grounds for it, other than from within in a particular tradition, which then becomes difficult to differentiate from sheer indoctrination and brainwashing, which also transforms people’s perceptions and beliefs into those of complete certainty and devotion.

    Jews expected the Messiah to arrive.

    Yes, but not for the Messiah to be crucified like a common criminal by the Romans. One of the many reasons why the majority of Jews rejected Jesus’ claims.

    As for whether I accepted his claim, I suppose I'd know whether it was true if I saw it. An encounter with the Son of God would not be just the same as any other encounter.

    And yet even his disciples abandoned him when he was arrested. So, such an encounter was not as transformative as you make it seem, because those closest to him who followed him as their teacher and observed his teachings and miracles abandoned him in his moment of need.

    Indeed. But, then, I'm not making an argument about the probability of miracles according to the historical record. I'm simply saying that, traditionally, this has been considered a way that his disciples were convinced. If I saw a miracle, I'd certainly be convinced. Did Jesus's miracles actually happen? Totally different argument.

    The point is that if miracles justify belief in someone’s divinity, then there are lots of candidates throughout antiquity that should equally demand your allegiance, and the question is how to differentiate between them. Again, this is part of the Outside Test for Fatih, as it were.

    The problem is that even the standards of whether something is a miracle or not differ based on tradition. The Catholic Church is calling events miraculous every other day that an atheist would reject as flukes. That's how JPII canonized 483 people.

    But that just proves my point. If 483 Catholics were canonized on the basis of confirmed miracles, then that is a tiny fraction of the events that were called miracles by others. He was pope for 27 years for over a billion Catholics, and he could only identify 483 miracles to confirm for sainthood? I highly doubt that there were only 483 claimants to miracles during that time period.

    I don't think you messed up anything, but your argument still doesn't get anywhere. You haven't even considered the influence of tradition on perception. The same event could be described as miraculous and random, real or illusory. You could call it the product of divine intervention or psychological suggestion--or even insanity. Your probabilities will alter as a result.

    Even with the influence of tradition on perception, the vast majority of what people believe to be miracles are not miracles that would qualify one for canonization, which I think even a Christian like yourself would agree with.

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  83. You're trying to analyze analogical concepts in terms of analytic propositions subject to the law of the excluded middle. This is a habit of yours. It's a very large category error.

    Are analogical propositions not bound by the law of the excluded middle? Are they not either true or false? How can one reason using them if this is the case? For example, when one argues on the basis of God as pure act that God cannot be material, then how is this possible unless one has demonstrated that God’s being pure act is a truth whose very meaning negates the possibility that God is material, thus making his materiality a falsehood? Furthermore, if it is true that God is pure act, for example, then it is false that God is not pure act.

    I can certainly see how one must be overly cautious when using analogical reasoning, because what you take to be the underlying commonality that grounds the analogy itself may be incorrect, but I don’t see how this necessarily implies that truth and falsehood are not relevant and cannot be mutually exclusive in terms of the propositional content of the arguments in question.

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  84. dguller,

    What I am outlining are truths that are common to all traditions, and thus are not derived from any particular tradition, unless by “tradition” you are referring to “human experience and activity”. It is not a tradition to empirically observe the world around us and perceive it as having a variety of qualities and aspects. It is something that all human beings, by virtue of being human beings, do. And my only point was that logical truths are not the only truths that remain true irrespective of which tradition one belongs to, and it seems that you now agree with me.

    You're engaging in a fallacy. Here is your chain of reasoning:

    1. Phenomenon Z is present in traditions Y and X.
    2. Therefore, Z is independent of Y and X.

    This is the coherent syllogism:

    1. If phenomenon Z is present in traditions Y and X, then Z may be independent of Y and X.
    2. Z is present in Y and X.
    3. Therefore, Z may be independent of Y and X.

    And then you would have to go about explaining why Z is not dependent upon tradition, without simultaneously presupposing a tradition. As this is impossible, the best you can do is to offer what the New Academics called a probable argument: verisimilitude.

    Furthermore, we could even take steps to demonstrate that the physicists are better at predicting natural phenomena than oracles by conducting tests.

    What you are describing is the process of finding common ground between traditions. Hart's example regarding oracles is a rough one, but the point remains standing. To expand on Wittgenstein's comment, the early missionaries to South America (for example) would be encountering a language game with premises so vastly different from their own that it would be impossible to engage in argument.

    He says that either we are capable of objective beliefs that are true, or we are not.

    "Objective" here is understood in the Enlightenment sense of certainty achieved through pure reason. This has no basis in antiquity, whose philosophers were, as Brandon said recently, obsessed with the question of truth and verisimilitude. Most agreed that there was some kind of objective truth out there, but, like Augustine, they had their doubts about our capacity to find it. For the most part, they certainly believed that there was objective truth, but, unlike Loftus, they didn't have a modernist understanding of that concept. Thus you and Loftus presuppose a tradition in your core premise.

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  85. If the former, then we should be capable of using reason and logic to identify good and bad reasons for different beliefs, and as such, should shun and avoid all bad reasons, including those that we use to bolster our own traditional beliefs, and embrace all good reasons, including those that violate our traditional beliefs.

    According to the modernist tradition of reasoning. Like I said, you already begged the question in your premise.

    If the latter, then we should be agnostics, and there is absolutely no justification for the certainty of faith, because there are no independent and objective grounds for it, other than from within in a particular tradition, which then becomes difficult to differentiate from sheer indoctrination and brainwashing, which also transforms people’s perceptions and beliefs into those of complete certainty and devotion.

    So, we have a lot of verisimilitude and very little truth. It does not follow that we should be agnostics, unless you presuppose modernism. This is one option--and one taken by few ancients.

    And yet even his disciples abandoned him when he was arrested. So, such an encounter was not as transformative as you make it seem, because those closest to him who followed him as their teacher and observed his teachings and miracles abandoned him in his moment of need.

    None of this suggests that they didn't believe him to be the Son of God. It just goes to show the power of human weakness.

    The point is that if miracles justify belief in someone’s divinity, then there are lots of candidates throughout antiquity that should equally demand your allegiance, and the question is how to differentiate between them. Again, this is part of the Outside Test for Fatih, as it were.

    But that's not relevant to my point. My argument is that Jesus's miracles have traditionally been considered a way that the disciples were convinced. The tradition does not state that they were convinced by other purported miracles at the time. This is not an argument about the probability of the actual occurrence of miracles based on history. It is simply as a statement that, if any miracles occurred, that would be a reason for them to be convinced. That is, it's an argument about what would happen if one witnessed a miracle first-hand, rather than an argument about the possibility of miracles as such. Whether or not any miracles really occurred is irrelevant: my only point is that, had the disciples seen miracles first-hand, they would have had a reason to be convinced.

    But that just proves my point.

    No, it doesn't. Your point is refuted by the simple fact that perception of events differs radically between traditions. There is no "objective" (in the Enlightment sense) way to adjudicate between probability claims in such an environment. Even a single miracle/fluke split would be enough to bring about this uncertainty.

    Even with the influence of tradition on perception, the vast majority of what people believe to be miracles are not miracles that would qualify one for canonization, which I think even a Christian like yourself would agree with.

    I can agree with that. But the Catholic church's examinations of miracle claims are very rigorous and are, by their nature, incapable of determining whether "weaker" claims are miraculous or not. Christians considered as a community of believers, though, are generally far more accepting of weaker claims.

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  86. Are analogical propositions not bound by the law of the excluded middle?

    They are not. They violate it flagrantly. Hence the traditional view in apophatic theology that the truth of "not-X" does not necessarily entail the falsehood of "X", or vice versa. Really, though, it comes back down to an issue of truth and verisimilitude. Analogies are verisimilitudinous by nature: they are neither true nor false, but are something in between that approaches truth. I'm not a tremendous fan of him, but Umberto Eco has made this point before--viz. that analogy violates the law of the excluded middle.

    For example, when one argues on the basis of God as pure act that God cannot be material, then how is this possible unless one has demonstrated that God’s being pure act is a truth whose very meaning negates the possibility that God is material, thus making his materiality a falsehood? Furthermore, if it is true that God is pure act, for example, then it is false that God is not pure act.

    We've already gone over this. The argument that God is not material is a negative argument based on denying imperfection and dependence. It is not a demonstration from the prior "fact" that God is pure act, which, again, is not truth but verisimilitude. Even Aquinas acknowledges this openly. And so it is neither true nor false that God is pure act, although it is closer to truth than to falsehood.

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  87. @dguller: It has been interesting reading (although, forgive me, not all of it with attention to detail).

    dguller asks: "Is it meaningful to ask whether the distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence is a notional distinction?"

    Let's see. First, what are these 'divine relations'? We have four real relations in God: the Father's paternity, the Son's filiation, the Father and Son's spiration, and the Spirit's procession. All of these real relations are eternally perfectly actualized within the perfect simplicity of the divine essence. They are not actualizations of potencies, but articulations of the internal dynamism of the divine essence considered in itself.

    Now, with that clarified, what exactly are you asking about?

    It seems you want to talk about the divine persons in comparison to the divine essence. These persons are the persons [Father, Son, Spirit] which subsist in the divine nature. So your question appears to be, what is THE(?) distinction between the three persons, on the one hand, and their common essence, on the other? To which we must reply, there is no real distinction, only a notional one, between EACH of the three persons and the divine nature/essence. Each of the persons is (essentially) identical to the essence.

    Now am I understand that you have an argument showing that these claims are absurd/meaningless? If so might I trouble you to repeat it to me or direct me to where you think you have most compellingly stated it?

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  88. @DavidM

    dguller is claiming having three persons distinct from one another in the Trinity violates the Divine Simplicity & that it's a logical contradition.

    Largely because Ex-Muslim that he is he like them equates Persons with divine Attributes & Persons definitionally with nature.

    Also he openly admits he understands the claim the "divine person/relations and the divine essence are absolutely alike in every way" to mean THE DIVINE 
ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON.

    I said it only means both are God he says "Why can't it be both"?

    You can try talking to this human headache who invents his own "Catholic" theological definitions off the top of his head from proof-texting Aquinas & ignores what Catholics actually understand their terms to mean and not mean.

    You can waste you time on someone who thinks we don't understand what we believe about the Trinity but I think at this point a conversation with Trolls like djindra, Beingitself and or Paps would be more fruitful.

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  89. Daniel:

    So your question appears to be, what is THE(?) distinction between the three persons, on the one hand, and their common essence, on the other? To which we must reply, there is no real distinction, only a notional one, between EACH of the three persons and the divine nature/essence. Each of the persons is (essentially) identical to the essence.

    Just to be clear, to say that the distinction between X and Y is a notional distinction means that X is totally identical in every respect to Y in reality, which means that any distinction whatsoever between X and Y can only exist in our minds. For example, saying that there is only a notional distinction between the divine goodness and the divine intellect means that the divine goodness is totally identical in every respect to the divine intellect in reality, and any distinction whatsoever between the divine goodness and the divine intellect can only exist in our minds.

    But if that is true, then the divine persons are totally identical in every respect to the divine essence in reality. However, they are not totally identical in every respect, because the divine persons involve real distinction of some kind and the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind, and thus they are different in this respect, which means that they cannot be totally identical in every respect. Therefore, if you want to say that they are totally identical in every respect in reality, then you have to either say that the divine essence involves real distinction of some kind, because the divine relations involve real distinction of some kind, which falsifies divine simplicity, or that the divine relations do not involve real distinction of any kind, because the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind, which falsifies the Trinity.

    That’s the argument, in a nutshell.

    What do you think?

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  90. Ben:

    Also he openly admits he understands the claim the "divine person/relations and the divine essence are absolutely alike in every way" to mean THE DIVINE 
ESSENCE IS PREDICATED DEFINITION-ALLY THE SAME WAY AS A DIVINE PERSON.

    It’s not about our definitions of them, but about their identity in reality.

    If you say that X is identical Y in every respect in reality, then if X differs from Y in some respect in reality, then X cannot be identical to Y in every respect in reality. So, if you want to say that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality, then they cannot differ from one another in any respect. However, they do differ from one another in some respect, because the divine relations involve real distinction of some kind, and the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind. Since they differ in some respect in reality, then they cannot be identical to one another in every respect in reality, which means that they cannot be only notionally distinct at all.

    The only way for them to be notionally distinct is if you reject either divine simplicity or the Trinity. If you want to embrace those two doctrines, then you must reject the notional distinction between the divine relations and the divine essence, which means that the distinction between them is not only in our minds, but rather in reality in some sense. But if that is true, then there is a difference between Being itself (i.e. the divine essence) and the divine relations, which would necessarily make the divine relations either a creature or non-Being, both of which are fatal to the Trinity. To save the Trinity, one must reject that the divine essence is Being itself, which means to reject divine simplicity.

    Therefore, whether the divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence, or whether the divine relations are not notionally distinct from the divine essence, one must reject either divine simplicity and/or the Trinity.

    Ultimately, what this comes down to is whether the following question is meaningful: are the divine relations notionally distinct from the divine essence? Is it, Ben?

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  91. Rank:

    1. If phenomenon Z is present in traditions Y and X, then Z may be independent of Y and X.
2. Z is present in Y and X.
3. Therefore, Z may be independent of Y and X.



    And then you would have to go about explaining why Z is not dependent upon tradition, without simultaneously presupposing a tradition. As this is impossible, the best you can do is to offer what the New Academics called a probable argument: verisimilitude.


    First, I think it would be helpful here if you could define what you mean by “tradition”.

    Second, I think that you are confusing the fact that we cannot help but view the world through a tradition with the further claim that all that exists is necessarily reduced to that tradition. We cannot help but understand God through our created perspective, but it does not follow that God himself is reducible to our created perspective. In fact, he must be both immanent within our perspective (in one sense) and transcendent beyond it (in another sense). So, just because we cannot help but perceive X except through Y does not mean that X is ontologically dependent upon and ultimately reducible to Y.

    Third, if Z is present in all traditions, then the fact of universal consensus would be a strong justification for Z’s objectivity, independent of those traditions. After all, there would have to be some explanation for why all those traditions achieved such a consensus when operating independently. It would be like a number of witnesses agreeing upon an empirical event, even without consulting one another. That would be strong evidence that they observed something objectively.

    What you are describing is the process of finding common ground between traditions. Hart's example regarding oracles is a rough one, but the point remains standing. To expand on Wittgenstein's comment, the early missionaries to South America (for example) would be encountering a language game with premises so vastly different from their own that it would be impossible to engage in argument.

    First, you presume that the “common ground” cannot be objectively true independent of the traditions themselves. As I mentioned above, a number of witnesses could achieve common ground by agreeing upon what they saw, but it does not follow that what they saw could not exist without their agreement and perception.

    Second, just because one must learn basic elements of communication in order to begin to argue is nothing of any significance. If I want to argue in Chinese with a Chinese speaker, then I first have to learn Chinese. That does not mean that the world from a Chinese perspective is necessarily incommensurable with the world from my perspective. It is the same world, but experienced and understood differently from within different perspectives. In order to speak the same language, we have to, well, speak the same language, and the fact that such communication is possible, even between missionaries and natives shows that our different language games cannot be so radically different after all, because there is a way to translate between them.

    "Objective" here is understood in the Enlightenment sense of certainty achieved through pure reason.

    It doesn’t. It just means something that is true, independent of our particular subjective perspective. On the one hand, a mountain would exist even if no human existed to perceive or understand it from their perspective, and thus would be an objective truth. On the other hand, our subjective experience of that mountain could not exist without human subjectivity, and thus would be a subjective truth.

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  92. This has no basis in antiquity, whose philosophers were, as Brandon said recently, obsessed with the question of truth and verisimilitude. Most agreed that there was some kind of objective truth out there, but, like Augustine, they had their doubts about our capacity to find it. For the most part, they certainly believed that there was objective truth, but, unlike Loftus, they didn't have a modernist understanding of that concept. Thus you and Loftus presuppose a tradition in your core premise.

    First, just because our account and elucidation of objective truth occurs within a particular tradition does not mean that what we are talking about is ontologically dependent upon the tradition and ultimately reducible to that tradition, having no bearing or reference to anything outside the tradition. That is a bit too radical, don’t you think?

    Second, I don’t think that Loftus would have a problem with an account of truth as similarity of some kind between the mind and reality. After all, all realists include an element of correspondence between the mind and reality, and saying that there is something in the mind that is isomorphic with something outside the mind is not prima facie objectionable. Realists may phrase this in different ways, but I don’t think that they would disagree with the core idea that something in the mind must match something in reality for truth to occur, and that would be the verisimilitude that you are describing, I think.

    According to the modernist tradition of reasoning. Like I said, you already begged the question in your premise.

    Can you give some examples of traditions where it is appropriate to use an argument in support of your position that you would reject if used by someone else to support their position?

    So, we have a lot of verisimilitude and very little truth. It does not follow that we should be agnostics, unless you presuppose modernism. This is one option--and one taken by few ancients.

    Why not? If you know that you don’t know X, then shouldn’t you reserve making a firm commitment about X? It seems eminently reasonable to me to suspend one’s judgment and admit that one simply does not know all the facts about the matter. I mean, if we didn’t know if John murdered Bill, then should be make a firm commitment that John is either guilty or innocent? Or do you simply say that there isn’t enough evidence to decide either way, and we will err on the side of innocence as the default condition?

    None of this suggests that they didn't believe him to be the Son of God. It just goes to show the power of human weakness.

    Wait. So, they knew that he was God himself in the flesh, and they believed him to be the all-powerful creator of all existence, and yet they ran from some Romans? These were his closest companions, those who heard his teachings, saw his miracles, and were supposed to be the initial transmitters of his subsequent tradition. If anyone should have believed in him, it should have been them. If you look at the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, then you see utterly devoted individuals who had no fear of death if it was to save him, and he wasn’t even God himself, but just one of his prophets.

    Isn’t it more likely that they didn’t believe that he was God himself, suspected that he was probably just a man about to die a horrible death, and since they didn’t want to join that man in that horrible death, fled to safety? I mean, to just say that this an example of the weakness of humanity is like responding to a child who has been raped by his father, and saying, “Hey, human weakness. What do you expect?” It seems far too glib a response in such a situation.

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  93. But that's not relevant to my point. My argument is that Jesus's miracles have traditionally been considered a way that the disciples were convinced. The tradition does not state that they were convinced by other purported miracles at the time. This is not an argument about the probability of the actual occurrence of miracles based on history. It is simply as a statement that, if any miracles occurred, that would be a reason for them to be convinced.

    You’re missing my argument. You claim that if X has performed a miracle, then X’s claims regarding the supernatural should be believed. You use this premise to justify the validity of believing in Jesus Christ’s claims, and I’m trying to show you that this very premise would be valid for many other figures in antiquity who have been recorded to have performed miracles, many identical to Jesus’. Since you do not accept them as valid transmitters of the divine, you must have other reasons beyond miracles to justify your rejection of them and your acceptance of Jesus. I’m curious what these other reasons are.

    my only point is that, had the disciples seen miracles first-hand, they would have had a reason to be convinced.

    But that very argument could be used to justify any faith tradition, and thus is insufficient to differentiate whether one faith tradition is more true than another. There must be something else to base one’s endorsement upon.

    No, it doesn't. Your point is refuted by the simple fact that perception of events differs radically between traditions. There is no "objective" (in the Enlightment sense) way to adjudicate between probability claims in such an environment. Even a single miracle/fluke split would be enough to bring about this uncertainty.

    First, that is not entirely true. What event is perceived is the same, but how that event is interpreted may be different. For example, everyone can agree to have seen a person who was thought to be deceased to subsequently rise up in life. The question is how to understand this event, i.e. as a miraculous resurrection from the dead, or a person who wasn’t truly dead at all, and who simply recovered from a natural state of paralysis.

    Second, as per a point made below, even those who endorse miracles as genuine events would agree that they are rare events, which means that the odds of an event being a miracle are low, even for those who believe in them. Of course, the odds would be astronomically low for those who disbelieve in them.

    I can agree with that. But the Catholic church's examinations of miracle claims are very rigorous and are, by their nature, incapable of determining whether "weaker" claims are miraculous or not. Christians considered as a community of believers, though, are generally far more accepting of weaker claims.

    Non-experts are typically more open to be mistaken about information that requires professional expertise. That does not make them authorities.

    They are not. They violate it flagrantly.

    How so? It all depends upon the senses. To say that God is good in the sense of being goodness itself means that it is false to say that God is not goodness itself. What you can say is that God is not good in the sense of being any created goodness that we know best, but that is a different sense of the term “good”. If the senses are kept clear, then the law of excluded middle certainly applies.

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  94. Hence the traditional view in apophatic theology that the truth of "not-X" does not necessarily entail the falsehood of "X", or vice versa.

    Again, that is only because “X” changes its meaning from the affirmation to the negation. If its meaning is kept constant, then there is a necessary logical entailment in the form of the law of excluded middle. To say that God is good in the precise sense in which that statement is true necessarily means that the negation of that precise sense is necessarily false.

    Really, though, it comes back down to an issue of truth and verisimilitude. Analogies are verisimilitudinous by nature: they are neither true nor false, but are something in between that approaches truth. I'm not a tremendous fan of him, but Umberto Eco has made this point before--viz. that analogy violates the law of the excluded middle.

    If I say that John is like a lion, am I saying something that is neither true nor false? If the analogy is based upon the similarity in which John is strong and a lion is strong, then the analogy is certainly true, if both John and the lion are both strong. Sure, they differ in that a lion is stronger than John, but we can still truthfully say that they are both strong when compared to the same entity that is weaker than them both. Therefore, your claim that all analogies are necessarily neither true nor false must be itself false. And if that is false, then it is necessarily true that all analogies are either true or false.

    We've already gone over this. The argument that God is not material is a negative argument based on denying imperfection and dependence. It is not a demonstration from the prior "fact" that God is pure act, which, again, is not truth but verisimilitude. Even Aquinas acknowledges this openly.

    Aquinas writes: “It is impossible that matter should exist in God … because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (I:2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.” (ST Ia, Q3, A2)

    The sole basis in this argument for rejecting materiality as predicated of God is that Aquinas had already demonstrated at ST Ia, Q2, A3 that “God is pure act, without any potentiality”. It is only on the basis of this demonstration that the key premise of God’s pure actuality gets its validity, and that the conclusion follows. So, it is only upon the basis of already demonstrated positive truths about God that the negative attributes can be derived by reason, and those positive truths are positive truths.

    And even if the meaning of the terms in this argument can only be understood analogically, the fact that Aquinas uses them in a deductive argument means that they carry truth that is propagated into the conclusion. Otherwise, what exactly is demonstrated in the conclusion, if not the truth of the conclusion?

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  95. @dguller:

    Let's analyze. "the divine persons are totally identical in every respect to the divine essence in reality."
    RI(dp, de)- There is a real identity between divine person and divine essence - correct.


    "However, th[e divine persons] are not totally identical [to the divine essence] in every respect, because the divine persons involve real distinction [IRD] of some kind"
    IRD(dp); therefore ~RI(dp, de) - hmmm... No; the divine persons do not "involve any real distinction" of a kind that would imply their non-identity with the divine essence. To assert the contrary is simply to beg the question.

    "...and the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind..." - but of course it does, insofar as it involves the real distinctions of relational opposition between the divine persons.

    "and thus they [dp and de] are different in this respect..." - no they are not.

    "Therefore, if you want to say that they are totally identical in every respect in reality, then you have to either say that the divine essence involves real distinction of some kind," - and obviously it does - "because the divine relations involve real distinction of some kind, which falsifies divine simplicity," - no; that is a non sequitur - the internal-to-the-divine-essence personal distinctions do not falsify the simplicity - the non-composition, the non-put-togetherness, the intrinsic supreme oneness, the eternal undividedness - of the divine essence.

    "...or that the divine relations do not involve real distinction of any kind, because the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind, which falsifies the Trinity." - And clearly we can't be taking this second option.

    What do you think?

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  96. >It’s not about our definitions of them, but about their identity in reality.

    No it's about our definitions since Straw Man definitions have no place in honest argument.

    But then again we Catholic don't really understand our doctrine of the Trinity where as you clearly do.

    How can we argue with that?

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  97. @DavidM

    >No; the divine persons do not "involve any real distinction" of a kind that would imply their non-identity with the divine essence.

    I've told him something like that repeatedly but dguller is the sort of Gnu Atheist troll who can't take "yes" for an answer.

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  98. Daniel:

    "However, th[e divine persons] are not totally identical [to the divine essence] in every respect, because the divine persons involve real distinction [IRD] of some kind"


    IRD(dp); therefore ~RI(dp, de) - hmmm... No; the divine persons do not "involve any real distinction" of a kind that would imply their non-identity with the divine essence. To assert the contrary is simply to beg the question.


    But that is precisely where the contradiction occurs. The divine relations are necessarily really distinct from one another (ST Ia, Q28, A3), and thus each divine relation necessarily involves a real distinction from the other divine relations. Since the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind, if the divine relations are completely identical to the divine essence in every way, then they would also have to not involve real distinction of any kind, which is a logical contradiction.

    Here’s another way to look at it:

    (1) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind (by the Trinity)
    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind (by divine simplicity)
    (3) X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality (principle of total identity)
    (4) The divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality (assumption)
    (5) Therefore, the divine relations cannot differ in any respect from the divine essence in reality (by (3), (4))
    (6) But, the divine relations do differ in some respect from the divine essence in reality (by (1), (2))
    (7) Therefore, (5) contradicts (6)

    Since there has been a logical contradiction in (7), then if the argument is logically valid, then the solution is to reject one of the earlier premises as false. Which would you reject?

    "...and the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind..."

    - but of course it does, insofar as it involves the real distinctions of relational opposition between the divine persons.


    But that would violate divine simplicity, which is the absence of any real distinction of any kind. Recall that the absence of composition is necessarily also the absence of distinction, because component parts must be distinct from one another to be parts at all. If there is distinction in the divine essence, then the divine essence can be construe has having parts of some kind, and Aquinas has written that “it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple” (ST Ia, Q3, A7). If the divine essence involves the composition between the really distinct divine relations, then God is not “nowise composite”, but is composite in some way, which means that he is not “altogether simple” at all.

    "and thus they [dp and de] are different in this respect..." - no they are not.

    But they are different. Think about it this way:

    (8) X involves real distinction of some kind
    (9) X does not involve real distinction of any kind

    If X is the same in both (1) and (2), then you have a logical contradiction, because it is impossible for one to say that X is both some kind of Y and X is no kind of Y.

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  99. "Therefore, if you want to say that they are totally identical in every respect in reality, then you have to either say that the divine essence involves real distinction of some kind," - and obviously it does - "because the divine relations involve real distinction of some kind, which falsifies divine simplicity,"

    - no; that is a non sequitur - the internal-to-the-divine-essence personal distinctions do not falsify the simplicity - the non-composition, the non-put-togetherness, the intrinsic supreme oneness, the eternal undividedness - of the divine essence.


    First, I just showed that they do. Look at it this way:

    (10) X involves some Z
    (11) Y involves no kind of Z
    (12) X = Y
    (13) X involves no kind of Z (by (11), (12))
    (14) Therefore, there is a logical contradiction between (10) and (13))

    If you want to say that X is totally identical to Y in the sense that they do not differ in any way, as per premise (12), then if (10) and (11) are true, then you have a logical contradiction.

    Second, if one is allowed to have real distinction within the divine essence between the divine relations, then why can’t one allow the exact same thing to occur with the divine attributes? Why can’t the divine intellect be really distinct from the divine will, if real distinction is now permissible within the divine essence?

    "...or that the divine relations do not involve real distinction of any kind, because the divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind, which falsifies the Trinity." - And clearly we can't be taking this second option.

    Yup.

    What do you think?

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  100. Ben:

    Are the divine relations notionally distinct from the divine essence?

    Yes, or no?

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  101. Like I said Daniel the sort of Gnu Atheist troll that can't take "yes" for an answer.

    >Are the divine relations notionally distinct from the divine essence?

    >Yes, or no?

    I reply: A Fish!

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  102. In the body of the article St. Thomas coordinates and synthesizes the conceptual analysis given previously.[528] He reasons as follows: Relations inhere accidentally in creatures, but in God they are the essence itself because their [esse in] is substantial. But a divine person, for example, the Father, signifies a subsisting relation.[529] Therefore the divine persons are not really distinct from the divine essence although they are really distinct from each other because of the opposition of relation. Symbolically, in the triangle the three angles are really distinct from each other but they are not distinct from the common surface.

    Reply to the first objection. This does not involve a contradiction because the relations are not distinguished from each other according to their [esse in] but only according to their [esse ad] because of their relative opposition.

    Reply to the second objection. But the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, and this is sufficient so that something may be affirmed of the essence and denied of the persons; for example, the essence is communicable but paternity is not, just as mercy is the principle of forgiveness and justice is not."-THE TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATORby by Garrigou-Lagrange

    See commentary on Q39.

    http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/trinity1.htm#13

    But of course G-L doesn't really understand Aquinas like dguller does. It should be obvious.

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  103. If Warhammer 40k isn't metal I don't know what is?

    Wow, I had to look that one up!

    Also, I think my name got substituted for DavidM's in some of the "trinity" posts.

    I'm not taking part in that debate.

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  104. Thanks Daniel!

    Note DavidM is not Daniel Smith!

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  105. Ben:

    Like I said Daniel the sort of Gnu Atheist troll that can't take "yes" for an answer.

    I take it that you are answering “yes” to my question, which means that you agree that the divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence. This makes sense, given the G-L quote that you cited afterwards, which we’ll look at now.

    Relations inhere accidentally in creatures, but in God they are the essence itself because their [esse in] is substantial.

    Again, are the relations “the essence itself”, or are the relations “in the essence”? If the relations are the essence itself, then they are the same thing. If the relations are in the essence, then they are different. After all, there is a world of difference between saying:

    (A) Jack is in the box
    (B) Jack is the box

    (A) and (B) cannot both be true, and so one must be reduced to the other, and the other must be a figure of speech. So, look at the following propositions:

    (C) The divine relations are in the divine essence
    (D) The divine relations are the divine essence

    Is (C) true, while (D) is a figure of speech? Is (D) true, while (C) is a figure of speech? And while you’re at it, maybe explain what “in” could possibly mean in (C), as well.

    But a divine person, for example, the Father, signifies a subsisting relation.[529] Therefore the divine persons are not really distinct from the divine essence although they are really distinct from each other because of the opposition of relation. Symbolically, in the triangle the three angles are really distinct from each other but they are not distinct from the common surface.

    So, “the divine persons are not really distinct from the divine essence”. We’ll come back to this.

    Reply to the first objection. This does not involve a contradiction because the relations are not distinguished from each other according to their [esse in] but only according to their [esse ad] because of their relative opposition.

    I’m sorry, so now there are two kinds of esse in God? Wow. I always thought that in God, his essence is his esse, but now his essence is one kind of esse, and his relations are another kind of esse. Nice. Except that it is impossible for there to be kinds of esse, because esse is not a genus at all. So, this account is completely muddleheaded.

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  106. Reply to the second objection. But the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, and this is sufficient so that something may be affirmed of the essence and denied of the persons; for example, the essence is communicable but paternity is not, just as mercy is the principle of forgiveness and justice is not."-THE TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATORby by Garrigou-Lagrange

    Here, G-L says that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”. Since the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, not in reality, but only in the human mind, and the divine persons are distinguished from the essence in the same way, then the divine persons are distinguished from the essence, not in reality, but only in the human mind. In other words, there is a notional distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence. This is fully consistent with what G-L wrote earlier: “the divine persons are not really distinct from the divine essence”, and is fully consistent with what you wrote earlier, as well. Great! Progress!

    The problem is that if X is notionally distinct from Y, then X is identical to Y in every respect in reality, which means that X cannot differ from Y in any way in reality. And if that is true, then the following argument is sound:

    (1) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind (by the Trinity)

    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind (by divine simplicity)

    (3) X is notionally distinct from Y iff X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality iff X is only distinct from Y in the human mind (by the definition of notional distinction)
    (4) The divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence (assumption)

    (5) Therefore, the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality (by (3), (4))
    (6) Therefore, the divine relations cannot differ in any respect from the divine essence in reality (by (3), (5))

    (7) But, the divine relations do differ in some respect from the divine essence in reality (by (1), (2))

    (8) Therefore, (6) contradicts (7)

    Since there has been a logical contradiction in (8), then if the argument is logically valid, then the solution is to reject one of the earlier premises as false. Which would you reject?

    You cannot reject (1), because then you would reject the Trinity. You cannot reject (2), because then you would reject divine simplicity. You cannot reject (3), because that is the very definition of notional distinction. You cannot reject (4), because you have already claimed that the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is not real, but only notional. And the problem is that if you accept (1) to (4), then you necessarily have a logical contradiction, as I’ve demonstrated on several occasions.

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  107. DavidM:

    Sorry. I accidentally said "Daniel" in my responses to you. Apologies.

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  108. Ben:

    One more comment about esse.

    In God, esse is essence. If essence is indivisible, then esse is indivisible. Therefore, there cannot be different kinds of esse in God. There is only ipsum esse subsistens, and it is indivisible in any way, particularly not as a genus is subsequently differentiated into different species.

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  109. >I’m sorry, so now there are two kinds of esse in God? Wow. I always thought that in God, his essence is his esse, but now his essence is one kind of esse, and his relations are another kind of esse. Nice. Except that it is impossible for there to be kinds of esse, because esse is not a genus at all. So, this account is completely muddleheaded.

    dguller vision translation: I don't know what it means and of course as I told BY actual Catholic definitions of terms are not important only "identity is," (whatever that means) but I am sure if I ridicule it hard enough and read into it my own self-serving meaning I just pulled out of my ass that will cover up the fact I never bothered to read G-L or any serious Catholic commentary on the matter.

    I reply: Well of course dguller we all trust since none of us really understands our own doctrine that if you say it then it must be true.

    You could maybe do some research on the meaning of these two latin terms(like I did) but of course you would have to read Catholic Theologians who can't be trusted to understand their own doctrine. That might be a problem.

    Yes you convinced me we should just blindly take your word for it. No need to explore G-L writings on the subject.

    You have explained it all! It is so obvious!;-)

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  110. To the rest of you if I may confuse you with my lack of understanding further exacerbated by actually reading G-L and other Thomist commentaries.

    >This does not involve a contradiction because the relations are not distinguished from each other according to their [esse in]

    This merely means if we cross reference it to Msgr Paul Glenn's commentary on Q39 the Persons are one and the same undivided and invisible divine essence.

    >but only according to their [esse ad] because of their relative opposition.

    Means they are distinct from one another in their relative opposition in their terminals(the persons) but none at all in their essence.

    There is no mention in either G-L, or Glenn or even McDermott of there being two kinds of "esse" in God. Those are latin praises [esse in/esse Ad]meaning "in essence" & relative opposition etc.
    G-L likes to write his commentary while reading the actual Latin of Aquinas. Silly git!


    But then again G-L, Glenn and McDermott are all Catholics and as dguller has proved conclusively by merely stating that it is so we Catholics don't really understand our doctrine.

    So you can disregard what I just wrote & we can all just listen to dguller.;-)

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  111. additional:

    According to The Metaphysics of the Incarnation : Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus: Thomas ... By Richard Cross page 211 QUOTE"Aquinas distinguishes between two different aspects of categorial relations: the esse-ad of the relation, and the esse-in of the relation. The esse-ad of the relation is `a repeat or condition toward another'. the esse-in of a relation is its existence….etc."end quote

    It seems Cross is a Rev. John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy University of Notre Dame.

    Which indicates he might be Catholic and as dguller has told us we Catholics do not understand our own doctrine.

    dguller has already told the rest of us G-L was teaching God had two Esse' which means he has two essences. We cannot argue with that! We cannot actually do any academic research here! dguller has explained it all to us & if he has found a contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity which he understands more clearly then the rest of us & has obviously done exhaustive research on then we must accept it!!!!

    ;-) ;D ;-)

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  112. Ben:

    I will happily concede the point regarding esse in and esse ad. It is completely irrelevant to my broader argument against the Trinity. :)

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  113. Ben:

    I'm much more interested in your comments on the following that I posted earlier:

    "G-L says that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”. Since the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, not in reality, but only in the human mind, and the divine persons are distinguished from the essence in the same way, then the divine persons are distinguished from the essence, not in reality, but only in the human mind. In other words, there is a notional distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence. This is fully consistent with what G-L wrote earlier: “the divine persons are not really distinct from the divine essence”, and is fully consistent with what you wrote earlier, as well. Great! Progress!

    The problem is that if X is notionally distinct from Y, then X is identical to Y in every respect in reality, which means that X cannot differ from Y in any way in reality. And if that is true, then the following argument is sound:

    (1) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind (by the Trinity)

    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind (by divine simplicity)

    (3) X is notionally distinct from Y iff X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality iff X is only distinct from Y in the human mind (by the definition of notional distinction)
    (4) The divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence (assumption)

    (5) Therefore, the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality (by (3), (4))
    (6) Therefore, the divine relations cannot differ in any respect from the divine essence in reality (by (3), (5))

    (7) But, the divine relations do differ in some respect from the divine essence in reality (by (1), (2))

    (8) Therefore, (6) contradicts (7)

    Since there has been a logical contradiction in (8), then if the argument is logically valid, then the solution is to reject one of the earlier premises as false. Which would you reject?

    You cannot reject (1), because then you would reject the Trinity. You cannot reject (2), because then you would reject divine simplicity. You cannot reject (3), because that is the very definition of notional distinction. You cannot reject (4), because you have already claimed that the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is not real, but only notional. And the problem is that if you accept (1) to (4), then you necessarily have a logical contradiction, as I’ve demonstrated on several occasions."

    Any thoughts?

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  114. >I will happily concede the point regarding esse in and esse ad. It is completely irrelevant to my broader argument against the Trinity. :)

    So now you "understand it completely" & can tell right away it truly is still not relevant to your argument?

    Does this new understanding flow from your power to understand the Trinity doctrine the rest of us Catholics clearly don't understand?

    Curious this understanding didn't inform you your previous correct understanding was in fact wrong?

    Oh well.

    >I'm much more interested in your comments on the following that I posted earlier.

    Why would you want to bother with that? You told me in an earlier post what I thought the Trinity meant didn't matter and that I don't understand the doctrine I've believed & studied for the past 25 years.

    But you do, so you should just post and not listen to what any Catholic here tells you like DavidM (who is saying the same thing I am). You found the contradiction! Good for you! You know it better then the rest of us even Prof Feser. Clever boy!:-)

    When Feser said "If you find a contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity then you have in fact misunderstood the doctrine & are not really entertaining it at all" you must accept he was wrong.

    He is Catholic thus by definition he doesn't understand the doctrine he once thought was a contradiction when he was an Atheist when he understood it correctly. All that god nonsense you see has clouded his mind. Made him stupid.

    No dguller you don't want to talk to anyone here. Just continue to speak & demand we listen but for Darwin's sake don't listen to us. We are confused & don't really know our own doctrine!

    Ok?;-)

    PS. It then follows what you think Aquinas means by "Person" (from your obvious accurate but brief reading of him) being another substance not a subject in the same sense as the divine substance then mst also be true.

    I am OTOH hand wrong because I couldn't possibility
    understand the Trinity like you do.

    I see that now.;-)

    Catch you later I have to go drink something fermented so this will all continue to make sense to me regarding your superior knowledge.

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  115. Coming soon to the rest of you.

    My Thoughts on the Trinity and FLATLAND.

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  116. Ben:

    So now you "understand it completely" & can tell right away it truly is still not relevant to your argument?

    Sure. Now that I’ve looked it up, I find it interesting that you truncated the quote from Cross. The full quote is:

    “Aquinas makes this clear by distinguishing between two different aspects of categorical relations: the esse-ad of the relation, and the esse-in of the relation. The esse-ad of the relation is ‘a respect or condition toward another’; the esse-in of a relation is its existence as an accident, its inherence in a subject. This esse-in is simply identified, by Aquinas, with the non-relational accident that grounds the relation … Real relations – categorical relations – have both the esse-in and the esse-ad of a relation. But rational relations have esse-ad without esse-in; in short, they are not grounded in any inherent accident” (Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, p. 211).

    The problem here is obvious. Aquinas says that “there is no accident in God” (ST Ia, Q28, A2). Therefore, there can be no esse-in with respect to God, if esse-in is defined as a relation’s “existence as an accident, its inherence in a subject”. In God, the relations are not accidental properties of a substance, but are subsistent themselves, meaning that they are “really the same as His essence” (Ibid).

    And regardless, although I was not aware of the Latin terms, “esse-in” and “esse-ad”, I am fully aware of what they are supposed to be about. And none of this affects the argument that I made earlier, an argument, it should be said, that you completely ignored to focus upon this distracting non-sequiter.

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  117. Ben:

    Just one more thing.

    “Esse-in” just means “existence in”, and “esse-ad” just means “existence towards”. Either esse-in is totally identical to esse-ad, or esse-in is not totally identical to esse-ad. If esse-in is totally identical to esse-ad, then they cannot differ in any way. But they do differ in some way. Esse-in points inwards, and esse-ad points outwards, and thus they cannot be exactly the same. If esse-in is not exactly the same as esse-ad, then they are different kinds of esse, which contradicts divine simplicity, because in God, esse is essence, and since essence is indivisible, esse is equally indivisible, which means that there cannot be an actual difference between esse-in and esse-ad at all, and they must both be the same esse that is identical to the divine essence.

    But again, this is just an interesting side note that has no bearing upon the actual argument that you are making a strenuous effort to avoid with completely unnecessary mockery and derision. If that makes you feel better, as a Catholic, then feel free to do so. And even though Jesus taught you to treat others as you wish to be treated, I won’t treat you with equal mockery and derision, simply because I would never want myself, or anyone else for that matter, to be treated in such a disrespectful and shameful fashion.

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  118. .

    >The problem here is obvious. Aquinas says that “there is no accident in God” (ST Ia, Q28, A2). Therefore, there can be no esse-in with respect to God, if esse-in is defined as a relation’s “existence as an accident....etc....*Yawn!*,

    I thought you understood the Divine Simplicity dguller? Since God is simple then if we apply the term "esse-in" to God it could only refer to his simple existence, since God has no accidents & this is the conclusion of G-L, Glenn etc...obviously if we apply the term to creatures it would refer to the thing's accidents which are it's existence. But God has no accidents so the term could only be used to apply to his simple existence in essence & indicated God existence is identical to God's essence. That is how all the other commentators you haven't read seem to understand it.

    But of course you understand it all better than Catholics. You understand that here, Aquinas is clearly using the term "esse-in" to claim that God has accidents & that the old bird just forgot all his arguments for the divine simplicity and now wants to claim God has accidents after all.

    That could be the only meaning because you said so & as we all know Catholics don't understand their doctrine but you do in spite of not being able to read the original Latin like G-L and Glenn. Most impressive.

    Clearly G-L, Glenn and everybody else reads Aquinas as using the term "esse-in" here to say God's existence(as divine persons) is identical to his essence(being God). But you blew the lid off of the conspiracy. Clearly you have found out that Aquinas is really saying God now has accidents.

    It's all so obvious!;-)

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  119. >I won’t treat you with equal mockery and derision, simply because I would never want myself, or anyone else for that matter, to be treated in such a disrespectful and shameful fashion.

    Of course I believe you. After all how could anyone being told they don't understand their own doctrine ever be offended? Also it is inconceivable the person making that accusation is in any way shape or form being disrespectful or shameful.

    Plus we all know Atheists don't have to be Christ-like in their behavior toward others. They can justly claim instant correct understanding of anything they read or that is quoted to them at the drop of a hat & shame on the wicked un-Christ like believer who takes offense.

    It is after all so fair to be punched in the face all the time using a Straw Man by a know nothing know it all who calls you un-Christ like for hitting back.

    You just keep up with your sinless behavior dguller.

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  120. additional:

    For the record your original response to the "esse in" & "esse ad" distinction wasn't in anyway mockery or derision when you jumped the gun and declared G-L was claiming God now had two essences!

    Well it did but you have said it did and as we all know you understand all this better then anyone here.

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  121. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  122. Ben:

    I thought you understood the Divine Simplicity dguller? Since God is simple then if we apply the term "esse-in" to God it could only refer to his simple existence, since God has no accidents & this is the conclusion of G-L, Glenn etc...obviously if we apply the term to creatures it would refer to the thing's accidents which are it's existence. But God has no accidents so the term could only be used to apply to his simple existence in essence & indicated God existence is identical to God's essence. That is how all the other commentators you haven't read seem to understand it.

    And I agree with all of that, but you cited Cross as an authority, and Cross defined “esse-in” as an accident. So, don’t blame me for fully citing your source.

    For the record your original response to the "esse in" & "esse ad" distinction wasn't in anyway mockery or derision when you jumped the gun and declared G-L was claiming God now had two essences!

    First, I was surprised by the implications of your position, and expressed my surprise in my comment. It was neither mockery nor derision.

    Second, I never claimed that God had “two essences”. I would truly appreciate if you could cite where I claimed such a thing. I only claimed that if “esse-in” is distinct from “esse-ad”, then there are two kinds of esse in God, which violates a number of Thomist principles, including that esse is not a genus, as well as divine simplicity. Perhaps reading me a little more closely would be helpful.

    Third, I’m still waiting for your comments on my argument at June 6, 2013 at 9:19 PM.

    Thanks.

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  123. >Either esse-in is totally identical to esse-ad, or esse-in is not totally identical to esse-ad.

    Why can't you accept Catholics understand both are totally identical in the shared identity of being God?

    Why do you insist "totally identical" means both technical terms are now to be understood as having the same interchangeable definitional predicated meaning?

    For example Divine Persons are totally the same as the Divine Essence. That does not mean both are merely God but that Persons are now defined & identified as "essences" and Essence is defined as "a Person"?

    Wait I don't tell me? That is wrong because you understand the Trinity better then the rest of us & what we think it means does not matter. It's what you think it means that is what the doctrine objectively says.

    So we should all listen to you.

    I am so convinced now you said it dguller how could you be wrong?;-)

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  124. >And I agree with all of that, but you cited Cross as an authority, and Cross defined “esse-in” as an accident. So, don’t blame me for fully citing your source.

    I didn't just cite him only.

    >Second, I never claimed that God had “two essences”. I would truly appreciate if you could cite where I claimed such a thing. I only claimed that if “esse-in” is distinct from “esse-ad”, then there are two kinds of esse in God, which violates a number of Thomist principles, including that esse is not a genus, as well as divine simplicity. Perhaps reading me a little more closely would be helpful.

    Of course because I must read you carefully & make every effort to understand what you are really trying to say even thought how we really understand our doctrines & what we are really trying to say about them doesn't matter according to you. It's how you understand them & our theological terms at the drop of a hat that matters.

    >Third, I’m still waiting for your comments on my argument at June 6, 2013 at 9:19 PM.

    Why? What I think it means doesn't matter? You will define for me my Catholic faith. What I think and believe doesn't count at all. Plus I am tired of repeating myself.

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  125. >and Cross defined “esse-in” as an accident.

    And as existence too.

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  126. >June 6, 2013 at 9:19 PM

    It's the same Straw man argument you have pushing all along.

    There is nothing new to say.

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  127. Ben:

    Why do you insist "totally identical" means both technical terms are now to be understood as having the same interchangeable definitional predicated meaning?

    Again, I am not talking about the meaning of terms, but about the reality that they refer to. To say that John is totally identical to Peter is just to say that they are exactly the same in every respect in reality. As such, any properties that John possesses must also be possessed by Peter, and vice versa. They only differ with respect to their names, but the underlying reality is exactly the same in every way.

    As I wrote earlier, there are only three ways of looking at this:

    (1) X is totally identical to Y in every way reality
    (2) X is partially identical to Y in some way in reality
    (3) X is not identical to Y in any way in reality

    (1) to (3) are the only kinds of relationships that are logically possible, except that (3) is the complete and utter absence of any kind of relationship between X and Y at all. You keep focusing upon terms and senses and meanings, and I’m trying to get an idea of what is behind those terms/senses/meanings and in reality itself. Unless you can demonstrate that (1) and (2) are meaningless or false, then I can certainly use them in my arguments. I would prefer to use them, because they are much clearer and precise than your mess of equivocations from which one cannot validly derive anything.

    For example Divine Persons are totally the same as the Divine Essence. That does not mean both are merely God but that Persons are now defined & identified as "essences" and Essence is defined as "a Person"?

    It means that in reality, the divine persons cannot differ from the divine essence in any way. That is what “totally the same” means in this context.

    Imagine I said that Ben and dguller are totally the same … except that we have different fathers, and different mothers, and live in different places, and have different jobs, and have different educations, and have different beliefs, and have different wives, and have different kids, and have different siblings, and have different friends, and have different names, and so on. But other than all that, totally the same! You would clearly say that Ben and dguller cannot be totally the same. At most, you could say that they are partially the same, meaning that they have some things in common, but differ in other things.

    Similarly, when you say that the divine relations are totally and exactly the same as the divine essence, then any reasonable person would think that they were actually exactly the same in every way in reality, much like the divine goodness is totally and exactly the same in reality as the divine intellect. There is no distinction whatsoever between them in reality, and the only distinction occurs in our minds. And so when G-L says that the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence in the exact same way as the divine attributes are distinct from one another, then that means that the divine relations are exactly the same in every way in reality as the divine essence.

    I didn't just cite him only.

    Who else did you cite specifically with regards to the meaning of the Latin terms “esse-in” and “esse-ad”?

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  128. Of course because I must read you carefully & make every effort to understand what you are really trying to say

    Yes.

    Why? What I think it means doesn't matter?

    If it didn’t matter, I wouldn’t ask.

    And as existence too.

    Cross: “the esse-in of a relation is its existence as an accident”. That is why I objected to your truncation of the quotation, because it gave a false impression of what Cross was actually saying.

    It's the same Straw man argument you have pushing all along.

    Then it should be easy for you to say which premise is a straw man.

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  129. >Again, I am not talking about the meaning of terms, but about the reality that they refer to.

    How many times do you have to be told God's reality is a mystery by definition otherwise He is not God?

    Sorry but unless you understand Three divine Persons is totally identical to One divine essence in every way reality to mean Persons are "Essences" and Essence is "a Person" then you can't get a provable contradiction. At best you can have an apparent one if you say it means both are merely in reality God.

    That's it & you can't accept it.

    The term "God" as James Anderson says can't be used as anything other than unarticulated equivocation in terms of it's true reality.

    You already conceded this to me as a pyrotec victory.

    Well that is not a problem considering Holy Writ says "God is a consuming fire" & also if your Johnny Storm it's still not a problem.


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  130. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  131. >Then it should be easy for you to say which premise is a straw man.

    None of them. Your Straw man is your unstated assumption that totally identical equates Persons now mean "essences" and Essence now means "a person" since they are both totally identical.

    My assumption is "totally identical" means both are God. Nothing more & I already said all this and you still believe "totally identical" means both are God and Persons are "essences" and the Essence is now "a person".

    You said it yourself "Why can't it be both"?

    My answer because that is not the authentic definition of the Trinity that is a Straw man.

    I know in my heart you will refuse to believe anything I have just written and merely repeat yourself and continue to re-define the Trinity your own way.

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  132. Ben:

    How many times do you have to be told God's reality is a mystery by definition otherwise He is not God?

    So, when you say that God is three persons, you do not mean that God is three persons in reality. Does that mean that his tri-personhood is only in our minds?

    Sorry but unless you understand Three divine Persons is totally identical to One divine essence in every way reality to mean Persons are "Essences" and Essence is "a Person" then you can't get a provable contradiction. At best you can have an apparent one if you say it means both are merely in reality God.

    X is identical to Y in every way in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any way in reality

    Agree or disagree?

    The term "God" as James Anderson says can't be used as anything other than unarticulated equivocation in terms of it's true reality.

    Then you cannot make any valid logical inference involving “God” on pain of committing the fallacy of equivocation.

    None of them.

    So, all my premises are true, according to you, and the logical form of my argument is valid, which means that my conclusion is also true.

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  133. Your Straw man is your unstated assumption that totally identical equates Persons now mean "essences" and Essence now means "a person" since they are both totally identical.

    It is not an “unstated assumption”. It is premises (3) and (4), which I think you just said are not straw man premises at all. So, all my premises are perfectly clear. There is nothing hidden at all. What you are basically saying is that you so dislike the conclusion that there must be something wrong with my premises, even though you cannot say exactly what.

    Think about it this way. Imagine I made the following argument:

    (1) All horses are brown
    (2) Peter is a horse
    (3) Therefore, Peter is brown

    You say that (1) and (2) are both true, but there is an “unstated assumption” that Peter is brown, and that you reject this “unstated assumption”. I point out that, no, there is no such “unstated assumption”. What you call an “unstated assumption” is the conclusion of the argument, which you have admitted is logically sound. So, you cannot say that (1) and (2) are true, and that the logical structure is valid, and yet reject the conclusion, because that is being completely illogical, which ultimately means embracing a logical contradiction.

    My assumption is "totally identical" means both are God. Nothing more

    But, again, there is a hidden equivocation here between the following propositions:

    (4) X and Y are both God in every respect in reality
    (5) X and Y are both God in some respect in reality

    Do you mean (4) or (5)? You cannot mean both, because they are mutually exclusive. Or perhaps you mean something else entirely? And if so, then what could that be?

    & I already said all this and you still believe "totally identical" means both are God and Persons are "essences" and the Essence is now "a person".

    It is not my belief, as if my ex-Muslim atheist gut is compelling me to believe it. It is the conclusion of a logical argument that you admit has both true premises and a valid logical structure, meaning that the conclusion is necessarily true.

    My answer because that is not the authentic definition of the Trinity that is a Straw man.

    Ben, either state which premises are false, or how my logical form is invalid, or just admit that you hate the conclusion and so refuse to accept it for dogmatic reasons.

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  134. BTW saying you can't have a Square-Triangle that is Three sides in one sense and four in another is tedious.

    Seriously google tetrahedron & you will see something that has four flat sides and three straight sides at the same time unless you live in flatland and your name is Flatguller.

    Just a spoiler for what I will post tonight on the Trinity and Flatland.

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  135. >It is not an “unstated assumption”. It is premises (3) and (4),

    Then those premises are Straw men.

    "Totally identical" can only mean Persons and Essence are God.

    >But, again, there is a hidden equivocation here between the following propositions:

    No there is an unarticulated equivocation in the term "God".

    But you stick with your Straw man to produce your Procrustean "valid conclusion".

    You after all understand the Trinity better then anyone here.

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  136. Oh & btw X and Y are both God in every respect in reality but of course their "reality" is that they are God.

    God is both his own existence and essence so God is his own reality.

    Now what is God that God is his own reality?

    Heck that I should know.

    PS Don't waste your time asking me if "X and Y are both God in some respect in reality?" because that is either wrong or too ambiguous to answer.

    I will take my victory in Fire.

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  137. >Ben, either state which premises are false, or how my logical form is invalid, or just admit that you hate the conclusion and so refuse to accept it for dogmatic reasons.

    Fallacy of a false set of alternatives. I choose none of the above.

    You warrant that "totally identical" equals Persons meaning "essences" and Essence meaning "a person" is not correct.

    As is your rejection of the term "God" as a unarticulated equivocation.

    You accept that given the definition of the Trinity there can be no provable logical contradiction.

    Atheist Philosopher Peter Lupu doesn't seem to have that problem but his more rich criticisms lie outside your manufactured problem.

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  138. >So, when you say that God is three persons, you do not mean that God is three persons in reality. Does that mean that his tri-personhood is only in our minds?

    No his tri-Personshood and one naturehood (without distinctions, divisions or multiplications) are ultimate reality.

    All this about God is true. But we can't concieve of what that reality might be only that it is.


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  139. >It is not my belief, as if my ex-Muslim atheist gut is compelling me to believe it. It is the conclusion of a logical argument that you admit has both true premises and a valid logical structure, meaning that the conclusion is necessarily true.


    Every Muslim religious apologist like Amad Dejat gives the same Straw man so why does it's logical consistency matter?

    "Do you still beat your wife" contains no formal errors but informal ones.

    A Straw man is an informal error.

    Your errors are informal trying to defend yourself by challenging me to find the formal errors in your argument is a Red Herring.

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  140. Ben:

    BTW saying you can't have a Square-Triangle that is Three sides in one sense and four in another is tedious.

    Seriously google tetrahedron & you will see something that has four flat sides and three straight sides at the same time unless you live in flatland and your name is Flatguller.


    Let me clarify. A square is a shape that has only four sides, no more, no less. A triangle is a shape that has only three sides, no more, no less. I then claim that one can have a square triangle such that the squareness is totally identical in every way to the triangularity, but I avoid a logical contradiction, because the sense of “squareness” is different from the sense of “triangularity”, and so everything is fine. As long as these senses are kept distinct, a logical contradiction is avoided. But remember, the squareness is totally identical in every way to the triangularity, and thus cannot differ in any way. The squareness is exactly the same as the triangularity. And yes, this may appear logically contradictory, but only if you make the crucial mistake of confusing the sense of “squareness” and the sense of “triangularity”, which obviously are completely different.

    Compelling, right?

    Then those premises are Straw men.

    So, you reject (3) and (4) as false.

    First, you cannot reject (4) as false, because that is the precise premise that G-L has endorsed, and that you have defended, i.e. if the divine attributes are only notionally distinct, then the divine relations and the divine essence are also notionally distinct. If you reject (4), then you literally have no idea what you are talking about.

    Second, you cannot reject (3) as false, because (3) is the definition of a notional distinction. If this definition is wrong, then give me a proper definition of notional distinction.

    

"Totally identical" can only mean Persons and Essence are God.

    Again, this equivocates between total identity in every respect in reality and total identity in some respect in reality. Both cannot be true, because they are mutually exclusive, much like it cannot be simultaneously true that the glass is full of water and the glass is half full of water. So, you have to pick one.

    Say that you pick that they are totally identical in every respect. Then my argument is sound, and you have a logical contradiction. So, that’s no good.

    Say that you pick that they are totally identical only in some respect. That would mean that they are different in some other respect. Recall that this is just another way of saying that they are partially identical in some respect and partially different in some other respect. It goes without saying that this is impossible with respect to the divine essence, which is indivisible and indistinct, and cannot have parts in any sense whatsoever, and thus any partiality can only occur in the divine persons.

    So, there is a part of the divine persons that is identical to the divine essence, and there is a part of the divine persons that is different from the divine essence. Look at the part that is different. Anything that is different from the divine essence is either a creature or non-existent. It would follow that part of the divine persons is either a creature or non-existent, both of which is impossible. Therefore, if the divine persons are partially identical to the divine essence, then either simplicity and/or the Trinity is false. So, that’s no good, either.

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  141. No there is an unarticulated equivocation in the term "God".

    I’m not talking about “God”. I’m talking about “totally identical”. Ignore “God” for a moment, and just fill in the following proposition:

    X is totally identical to Y iff …

    Oh & btw X and Y are both God in every respect in reality but of course their "reality" is that they are God.

    Again, there is an equivocation here:

    (1) The totality of X is identical to the totality of God
    (2) The totality of Y is identical to the totality of God
    (3) The totality of X is identical to a partiality of God
    (4) The totality of Y is identical to a partiality of God
    (5) A partiality of X is identical to the totality of God
    (6) A partiality of Y is identical to the totality of God
    (7) A partiality of X is identical to a partiality of God
    (8) A partiality of Y is identical to a partiality of God

    You wrote earlier that there is no such thing as a “partiality of God”, and so we can exclude (3), (4), (7), and (8), which only leaves (1), (2), (5) and (6) as possibilities.

    Say that X is the divine relations and Y is the divine persons.

    If (1) and (2) are true, then you have a logical contradiction, if X has properties that are different from Y. After all, it would be the case that the totality of X is the totality of Y, and if the totality of X has different properties from the totality of Y, then the totality of X could not be the totality of Y.

    If (5) is true, then a part of the divine persons is identical to the entirety of God, but then it would follow that another part of the divine persons is not identical to the entirety of God, and since God has no parts, then it is outside of God altogether. That means that there is a part of the divine persons that is either a creature or non-Being, which is impossible. Therefore, (5) is false.

    If (6) is true, then a part of the divine essence is identical to the entirety of God. But this is impossible, because the divine essence has no parts. Therefore, (6) is false.

    So, the only possibilities are (1) and (2), but they are mutually exclusive, and cannot possibly be simultaneously true. And that means that you have to give up either divine simplicity or the Trinity.

    Fallacy of a false set of alternatives. I choose none of the above.

    What? If you cannot show that my premises are false, then they are true. If you cannot show that my logical form is invalid, then it is valid. If my premises are true, and my logical form is valid, then the conclusion is true, by definition.

    You warrant that "totally identical" equals Persons meaning "essences" and Essence meaning "a person" is not correct.

    So, you reject the conclusion of a sound argument on the basis of religious doctrine. That means that you embrace a logical contradiction, because that is what it means to reject the conclusion of a sound logical argument. That’s what I meant by a pyrrhic victory. You give up logical coherence to preserve your dogma, and that is quite a price to pay.

    As is your rejection of the term "God" as a unarticulated equivocation.

    Funny how that term never shows up in my argument at all.

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  142. Ben:

    Every Muslim religious apologist like Amad Dejat gives the same Straw man so why does it's logical consistency matter?

    Logical consistency always matters.

    A Straw man is an informal error. 

Your errors are informal trying to defend yourself by challenging me to find the formal errors in your argument is a Red Herring.

    Except that you yourself have said that the kind of distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is the exact same kind of distinction as between the divine attributes. Since the distinction between the divine attributes is a notional distinction, then it necessarily follows that the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is also a notional distinction. So, you have handed me the following premise:

    “The divine persons are notionally distinct from the divine essence”.

    You cannot now cry foul that I’m using it in an argument. Furthermore, if you say that all my premises are straw men, then you yourself have endorsed the above straw man, as well.

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  143. >Except that you yourself have said that the kind of distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is the exact same kind of distinction as between the divine attributes.

    But I have never said nor would I say the distinction between different attributes one to another is the same kind of distinction as the one between Persons one to another.

    Let's face it buddy 1000 posts and you have no concept of what the doctrine of the Trinity is & I can guarantee you no Christian here thinks you do.

    You are not even trying & you are just afraid to even entertain the idea you got it all wrong & are pushing a Straw Man.

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  144. >I’m not talking about “God”. I’m talking about “totally identical”. Ignore “God” for a moment, and just fill in the following proposition:

    You are also not talking about the doctrine of the Trinity.

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  145. Ben:

    But I have never said nor would I say the distinction between different attributes one to another is the same kind of distinction as the one between Persons one to another.

    That’s what G-L said. G-L says that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”. I take this to mean that the kind of distinction involved in both is a notional distinction. So, either G-L is wrong here, and that they involve different kinds of distinctions, or G-L is right here, and either the divine persons and the divine essence are notionally distinct, or the divine attributes are not notionally distinct, but distinct in some other way. Those are the only logical options here.

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  146. Ben:

    You are also not talking about the doctrine of the Trinity.

    Do you have a definition of “total identity”, or don’t you? It’s easy, just fill in the blank:

    X is totally identical to Y iff …

    That would help me understand what you mean when you say that the divine persons are totally identical to the divine essence, or that either is totally identical to God. Otherwise, you are just equivocating, and it could mean anything at all. And if all the key terms in your theology involve crucial equivocations that cannot be untangled, then all arguments involved in your theology are unsound due to the fallacy of equivocation. Congratulations, Ben. You have destroyed Catholic natural theology, and the vast bulk of Aquinas’ work.

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  147. >Ignore “God” for a moment, and just fill in the following proposition:

    Then I wouldn't have the un-articulated equivocation I need for my fiery victory to solve the problem of "contradiction"?

    Also I would be giving up Mystery & I wouldn't be talking about the Trinity anymore but your "doctrine".

    Why would I want to do any of this?

    "Let it all end in Fire!!!"-Babylon 5

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  148. >That would help me understand what you mean when you say that the divine persons are totally identical to the divine essence, or that either is totally identical to God. Otherwise, you are just equivocating....

    Yes I am and so is Feser, Lupu, G-L Glenn, DavidM.

    That is the point!

    MYSTERY!!

    >and it could mean anything at all.

    Rather is can't mean ANYTHING WE COULD EVER COMPREHEND!!!!

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  149. >That’s what G-L said. G-L says that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”.

    Of course he does but HE NEVER SAYS "the distinction between different attributes one to another is the same kind of distinction as the one between Persons one to another."

    Go read it for yourself it's not there.

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  150. Ben:

    Then I wouldn't have the un-articulated equivocation I need for my fiery victory to solve the problem of "contradiction"?

    That’s fine. You avoid a logical contradiction by avoiding any meaningful premises. But without meaningful premises, you avoid logical argumentation altogether, which nullifies and destroys all natural theology, including all arguments involving God in Aquinas’ work. If you are okay with that price to pay, then that’s your choice.

    Rather is can't mean ANYTHING WE COULD EVER COMPREHEND!!!!

    Then it means nothing to us, which means that any meaning that those terms could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all. Saying that they are overflowing with too much meaning doesn’t help. After all, whether our blindness is due to too much bright light or the complete absence of any light, the bottom line is that we are blind, and thus cannot know either way, remaining a state of radical undecidability. And if we do not know, then we should remain agnostic about the matter, and keep focused upon things that we do know.

    Of course he does but HE NEVER SAYS "the distinction between different attributes one to another is the same kind of distinction as the one between Persons one to another."

    He says that they are distinguished in the same way. To say that X is distinguished from Y just as A is distinguished from B means that the same kind of distinction is operative between X and Y, and A and B. What else does it mean?

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  151. >You have destroyed Catholic natural theology, and the vast bulk of Aquinas’ work.

    Amazing the idea you might have misunderstood it never occurs to you?

    But then again as you already told me I don't understand the Trinity and you do.

    You understand it better then anyone here.

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  152. >That’s fine. You avoid a logical contradiction by avoiding any meaningful premises.

    Rather I accept the definition that tells me the ultimate meaning can't be understood by anyone but God.

    But you just conceded here I avoid logical contradiction.

    I accept your surrender.

    >Then it means nothing to us, which means that any meaning that those terms could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all.

    That is the point I though you read THE DARKNESS OF GOD?

    >After all, whether our blindness is due to too much bright light or the complete absence of any light, the bottom line is that we are blind, and thus cannot know either way, remaining a state of radical undecidability. And if we do not know, then we should remain agnostic about the matter, and keep focused upon things that we do know.

    YES I AM ALL FOR THAT! God cannot be well thought only well loved. We can talk about God but not say anything about what God is as God in essence!!!

    Welcome back to Thomism!

    >He says that they are distinguished in the same way.

    We went over this!

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  153. Ben:

    Amazing the idea you might have misunderstood it never occurs to you?

    If all your terms involve necessary equivocations that are impossible to untangle, then you will commit the fallacy of equivocation every time you use them in a logical argument. Those are the rules, my friend.

    But you just conceded here I avoid logical contradiction.

I accept your surrender.

    That’s fine. I’ll deny that there is a logical contradiction, if you deny that you can make sound arguments using any religious terms due to the inevitability of committing the fallacy of equivocation. Deal?

    That is the point I though you read THE DARKNESS OF GOD?

    I did, and I enjoyed it a great deal. It doesn’t change the fact that if all religious terms necessarily involve equivocations that we can never untangle, then you cannot use logic or reason to infer anything reliably about them or from them.

    We went over this!

    We didn’t. You just said that he did not literally say what I said, and I said that he certainly implied what I said.

    Like I said, if X is distinguished from Y in the same way that A is distinguished from B, then if A is distinguished from B on the basis of distinction D, then X is distinguished from Y on the basis of distinction D, as well.

    Again, G-L says that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”. I take this to mean that the divine persons are notionally distinct from the divine essence, which is the precise kind of distinction between the divine attributes.

    What do you think G-L means here?

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  154. >That’s fine. I’ll deny that there is a logical contradiction, if you deny that you can make sound arguments using any religious terms due to the inevitability of committing the fallacy of equivocation. Deal?


    As long as you admit the equivocation here is the religious term "God" and it can't be a fallacy because it's part of the definition.

    OTOH the Trinity IS NOT AN ARGUMENTit is DEFINED into existence because we believe in divine revelation, tradition and church. But you would have known this if you read the READING THE SUMMA blog like I asked 500 posts ago.

    We will talk more later & I will try to answer more of your questions.

    Finally some progress.

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  155. Ben:

    As long as you admit the equivocation here is the religious term "God" and it can't be a fallacy because it's part of the definition.

    First, you are equivocating on the following terms: “in”, “totally identical”, “the same as”, “God”, “fully”, and a few others. After all, you have refused to define any of these terms at all, and say that you simply cannot untangle the various possible meanings involved in them.

    Second, if the definition includes a key term that is inherently equivocal, then that definition itself cannot be used in a logical argument at all. So, any logical argument involving the term “God” is necessarily unsound due to the inevitability of a fallacy of equivocation. Like I said, you have negated all natural theology.

    OTOH the Trinity IS NOT AN ARGUMENTit is DEFINED into existence because we believe in divine revelation, tradition and church. But you would have known this if you read the READING THE SUMMA blog like I asked 500 posts ago.

    The only thing about the Trinity that I have assumed for my argument has been:

    (1) The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind
    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind
    (3) Either the divine persons are notionally distinct from the divine essence, or the divine persons are not notionally distinct from the divine essence

    If the official definition of the Trinity does not reject (1), (2), or (3), then my argument stands. I think that (1) is clearly true, based upon the truth of the Trinity. I think that (2) is clearly true, based upon the truth of divine simplicity. I think that (3) is true, by logical necessity in the same way that “p or not-p” is true, because if “not-(p or not-p)” is true, then “p and not-p” is true, which is a logical contradiction.

    The only thing left is to define what “notionally distinct” means, and we’re off to the races. My definition is:

    X is notionally distinct from Y iff X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality iff X is only distinct from Y in the human mind

    You have not offered your own definition of “notional distinction”. If my definition is correct, then adding it to (1), (2) and (3) results in all kinds of problems for Catholic doctrine. Your preferred solution is to say that key terms in my argument are equivocal, which avoids a logical contradiction, because it avoids the possibility of a logical argument altogether. Unfortuantely, since the terms that you clear are necessarily equivocal are key terms in natural theology, then it follows that all natural theology that uses those terms is also necessarily unsound due to the inevitability of the fallacy of equivocation in all its arguments.

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  156. So close and we are back to the Straw man.......

    He thinks the Trinity is an "argument"?

    Oy Vey!

    I am too old for this shit.

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  157. >1) The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind
    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind.

    "No orthodox definition or formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinctions between Persons is any kind of real distinction in the divine essence!"

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  158. I changed my mind you are hopeless dguller.

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  159. Ben:

    He thinks the Trinity is an "argument"?

    No, I do not. I think that the definition of the Trinity includes propositions that can be used in an argument. For example, the Trinity is defined as three really distinct divine persons, and thus real distinction (of some kind) is involved in each divine person.

    "No orthodox definition or formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinctions between Persons is any kind of real distinction in the divine essence!"

    To repeat, what I said was:

    (1) The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind

    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind

    In neither (1) nor (2) do I assume that “the real distinctions between the persons is any kind of real distinction in the divine essence”. I believe that I can demonstrate that as a conclusion of an argument with the additional premises of the definition of notional distinction and the assumption that the divine persons are notionally distinct from the divine essence. But those are additional assumptions for my argument that have nothing to do with whether (1) and (2) are true all by themselves.

    I changed my mind you are hopeless dguller.

    I’m crushed.

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  160. @dguller:
    (1) “The divine relations are necessarily really distinct from one another (ST Ia, Q28, A3)…” – yes.
    (2) “Since the divine essence [considered ABSOLUTELY] does not involve real distinction of any kind, if the divine relations are completely identical to the divine essence [considered ABSOLUTELY] in every way, then they would also [, considered ABSOLUTELY,] have to not involve real distinction of any kind, [that is, insofar as they are likewise considered ABSOLUTELY,] which is a logical contradiction.” – That is not a logical contradiction. The first claim considered the relations RELATIVELY to one another. The second considers them ABSOLUTELY, in terms of their identity with the divine essence.

    And we can go through this again with your seven point argument:

    (1) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind [i.e., relative opposition] (by the Trinity) [a.k.a., the real distinction of persons (why not be clear about this?)]
    (2) The divine essence [considered ABSOLUTELY] does not involve real distinction of any kind (by divine simplicity)
    (3) X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality (principle of total identity)
    (4) The divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality (assumption) [Let me correct you again on this; it should read: “EACH OF the divine relations (considered ABSOLUTELY) IS…”]
    (5) Therefore, the divine relations cannot differ in any respect from the divine essence in reality (by (3), (4)) [Again, this should read: “NONE OF the divine relations, considered ABSOLUTELY, DIFFERS…”]
    (6) But, the divine relations [insofar as we consider them RELATIVELY] do differ in some respect from the divine essence [insofar as we consider it ABSOLUTELY] in reality (by (1), (2))
    (7) Therefore, (5) [does NOT] contradict (6)

    Back to you.

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  161. The term "God" is in the definition of the Trinity an un-articulated equivocation I need for my fiery victory to solve the problem of "contradiction.

    You already conceded the following.

    A. I avoid a logical contradiction by avoiding any meaningful premises because I refuse to treat "God" as anything other then a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation.

    B. Then "God" means nothing to us in saying what he is, which means that any meaning that or picture we could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all.

    C. After all, whether our blindness is due to too much bright light or the complete absence of any light, the bottom line is that we are blind, and thus cannot know either way, remaining a state of radical undecidability. And if we do not know, then we should remain agnostic about the matter, and keep focused upon things that we do know.

    D. The things we do know are what we can deduce negatively via natural theology and what divine revelation tells us.

    We can talk about God but not say what He is.

    E. You can't take this back.

    >(1) The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind

    >(2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind

    The real distinctions between Persons is NOT any kind of real distinction in the divine essence! Thus 1 & 2 can't contradict given that negatively defined premise.

    We can't say what "real distinctions between persons" is only what it is not. Any meaning of "real distinction between persons" that we could conjure up in our minds in reference to essence, we must dismiss as necessarily false.

    It's that simple and you waste you time arguing contradiction & violations of divine simplicity.

    You can't take your concessions back.

    Attack it on grounds of meaning or equivocation but stop wasting time on this dog that won't hunt.

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  162. DavidM:

    (1) “The divine relations are necessarily really distinct from one another (ST Ia, Q28, A3)…” – yes. 


    (2) “Since the divine essence [considered ABSOLUTELY] does not involve real distinction of any kind, if the divine relations are completely identical to the divine essence [considered ABSOLUTELY] in every way, then they would also [, considered ABSOLUTELY,] have to not involve real distinction of any kind, [that is, insofar as they are likewise considered ABSOLUTELY,] which is a logical contradiction.”

    – That is not a logical contradiction. The first claim considered the relations RELATIVELY to one another. The second considers them ABSOLUTELY, in terms of their identity with the divine essence.


    I’ve read that exact same idea at ST Ia, Q28, A3, where Aquinas writes: “The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is relative.”

    Let’s analyze this a bit.

    The relations can be considered absolutely or relatively. When considered absolutely, they are only considered with respect to their total identity in reality with the divine essence. When considered relatively, they are only considered with respect to their relations to one another. What this means is that when considered absolutely, the relations do not involve real distinction of any kind (due to their total identity with the divine essence in reality), and when considered relatively, the relations do involve real distinction of some kind.

    To say that X can be considered under different aspects or different respects implies a kind of composition within X, if those different aspects or respects are really present in X, and not just distinctions that we exclusively make in our minds. So, to say that under aspect A1, X has property P, and under aspect A2, X has property not-P, means that to avoid contradiction, P and not-P must be segregated in X in some way by keeping A1 distinct from A2. That could only happen in one of two ways:

    (1) P is a property of the entirety of X while not-P is a property of a part of X
    (2) P is a property of a part of X while not-P is a property of a different part of X

    A contradiction would only occur if P and not-P were simultaneously predicated of the entirety of X, or simultaneously predicated of the same part of X.

    So, let’s see if (1) or (2) would work with respect to the divine relations:

    (1*) The divine relations in their entirety involve real distinction of some kind while the divine relations in part involve no real distinction of any kind

    (2*) One part of the divine relations involves real distinction of some kind while a different part of the divine relations does not involve real distinction of any kind

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  163. Examining (1*), we see that a part of the divine relations involves no real distinction of any kind, which means that that specific part is identical to the divine essence. That is because the divine essence is the part of God that lacks any real distinction of any kind, and thus it must be identical to the divine essence, because the divine essence is the only thing in existence that has this characteristic. But that means that the part of the divine relations that is not identical to the divine essence is also distinct from ipsum esse subsistens, which is identical to the divine essence, and anything distinct from ipsum esse subsistens is either a creature or non-Being. It would follow that a part of the divine relations is a creature of non-Being while another part of the divine relations is ipsum esse subsistens. That is absurd.

    Examining (2*), we see the exact same problem, because there is a part of the divine relations that is identical to the divine essence, and there is a part of the divine relations are is different from the divine essence. Once again, that means that part of the divine relations is a creature or non-Being, and another part of the divine essence is ipsum esse subsistens. Again, that is absurd.

    So, we must reject (1*) and (2*). But by rejecting (1*) and (2*), the only logical possibilities that are left are:

    (3*) The divine relations in their entirety involve real distinction of some kind while the divine relations in their entirety involve no real distinction of any kind

    (4*) One part of the divine relations involve real distinction of some kind while the same part of the divine relations involve no real distinction of any kind

    And as you can clearly see, if (3*) or (4*) are true, then you have a logical contradiction.

    Any thoughts? (Oh, and thanks for the respectful discussion. It’s a nice change of pace for me.)

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  164. Ben:

    E. You can't take this back.

    Yup, I know. But then to avoid logical contradiction, you necessary commit yourself to using inherently equivocal propositions, making it impossible to derive true conclusions from them due to the inevitable fallacy of equivocation. So, to avoid logical contradiction, you avoid using logic altogether, which means that theo-logy is finished, because it necessarily uses logic and reason to derive conclusions, which you have made completely impossible. Nice win!

    The real distinctions between Persons is NOT any kind of real distinction in the divine essence! Thus 1 & 2 can't contradict given that negatively defined premise.

    The only way for them not to contradict one another is if my (3) and (4) are false. (4) cannot be false, because it is your very premise. (3) cannot be false, because it is the definition of “notional distinction”. Unless you can provide me with a better one, just stick to your claim that logic is useless in theology instead, which is actually defensible, although also completely insane.

    We can't say what "real distinctions between persons" is only what it is not. Any meaning of "real distinction between persons" that we could conjure up in our minds in reference to essence, we must dismiss as necessarily false.

    I don’t have to say what they are. I only have to say that whatever the real distinctions are between persons, they are some kind of real distinction, and they cannot be present in the divine essence, because no kind of real distinction can be present in the divine essence. That is precisely what (1) and (2) mean.

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  165. > You can't take this back.

    >Yup, I know.But then to avoid logical contradiction, you necessary commit yourself to using inherently equivocal propositions, making it impossible to derive true conclusions from them

    I reply: Yes! Works for me!

    >due to the inevitable fallacy of equivocation.

    This is a fallacy of equivocation.

    A feather is light. What is light cannot be dark.
    Therefore, a feather cannot be dark.


    Or claiming God's nature contains no distinctions a logical distinction is a type of distinction therefore the simple divine nature contains no logical distinctions.

    Then there is your fallacy of equivocation

    The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind.

    The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind.etc

    So I admit to equivocation but I am not using it fallaciously unlike some people.

    I am using it definitionally.

    You can't take back your concessions.

    Try something else like attack it's lack of "meaning".

    But this dog won't hunt.

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  166. @dguller:
    "To say that X can be considered under different aspects or different respects implies a kind of composition within X, if those different aspects or respects are really present in X, and not just distinctions that we exclusively make in our minds."

    Okay. So, the personal and the essential are indeed different respects under which we consider God's being, and these are really present in God, but it does not follow that there is composition in God, that is, the *kind* of composition that conflicts with divine simplicity (and remember: we are concerned only with preserving *divine* simplicity, not any other kind of simplicity (e.g., the simplicity of prime matter)).

    Regarding properties, if P is a property, then not-P is not a property. (The negation of a proposition is a proposition, but the negation of a property is not a property.) Yet you write, for example:

    "P is a property of the entirety of X while not-P is a property of a part of X"

    Can you explain to me how this is supposed to make sense?

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  167. I am using the referent "God" in the definition of the Trinity as an un-articulated equivocation.

    I am not taking two articulated equivocals & mixing and matching them.

    Thus I am not guilty of a fallacy of equivocation.

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  168. You take over DavidM.

    I am so tired.

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  169. >The only way for them not to contradict one another is if my (3) and (4) are false.

    No you merely have to define "real relations between persons" negatively.

    Whatever a real relation between Persons is it is NOT any kind of real relation in the essence.

    Problem solved! Mystery wins!

    So complain about "meaning". Do it too your hearts content. But enough of this stupid dog of yours.

    I hate dogs I am a cat person.

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  170. Ben:

    I reply: Yes! Works for me!

    So, just to be clear, you are perfectly okay with embracing a position that makes any logical argumentation about the divine impossible, because the premises of any argument involve inherently equivocal terms? If one cannot use reason and logic to understand the divine, then one is only left with fideism.

    So I admit to equivocation but I am not using it fallaciously unlike some people.

    The problem with your position is that to say that a term is equivocal just means that it is open to multiple possible meanings without any determination of which in particular is meant. You are not offering multiple possible meanings, and saying that you cannot decide between them. Instead, you are offering no meanings whatsoever, saying that it is a complete mystery what the terms could possibly mean. That is worse than a fallacy of equivocation, because at least there is some meaning involved in the fallacy of equivocation, but it is indeterminate between multiple possible meanings.

    And since the preservation of the same meaning in the terms in the argument is paramount to preserve the truth of the argument, the fact that one cannot guarantee that the meaning is preserved makes the argument unsound. So, again, your position, even if not committed to the fallacy of equivocation, still makes any and all logical argumentation impossible, because there is no possible preservation of meaning throughout the argument, because there is no meaning at all! And once again, if the total destruction of natural theology is acceptable collateral damage to save the Trinity from logical contradiction is the price you are willing to pay, then all I can say is, wow!

    Whatever a real relation between Persons is it is NOT any kind of real relation in the essence.

    Right, because the divine essence cannot involve some kind of real distinction and no kind of real distinction without a logical contradiction occurring. Except that my argument shows that this contradiction occurs if one assumes (1) to (4), and you haven’t given any reason why (1) to (4) are false, except that you dislike the conclusion.

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  171. DavidM:

    Okay. So, the personal and the essential are indeed different respects under which we consider God's being, and these are really present in God, but it does not follow that there is composition in God, that is, the *kind* of composition that conflicts with divine simplicity (and remember: we are concerned only with preserving *divine* simplicity, not any other kind of simplicity (e.g., the simplicity of prime matter)).

    Yup. That’s not the argument at this stage.

    Can you explain to me how this is supposed to make sense?

    Good point. It would have been better if instead of not-P, you substitute Q, such that part of the meaning of Q is not-P. The point is that the contradictory properties, say P and Q, must be segregated in some way in order to avoid the contradiction, which can only occur in (1) or (2). So, just change not-P to Q such that Q partially means not-P. Everything else should follow nicely.

    What do you think?

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  172. >So, just to be clear, you are perfectly okay with embracing a position that makes any logical argumentation about the divine impossible, because the premises of any argument involve inherently equivocal terms? If one cannot use reason and logic to understand the divine, then one is only left with fideism.

    Not at all I can know there is a God via logical philosophical argument. In addition via philosophy I can know things about God via the logic of Natural Theology the primary being God is One, Simple, Infinite, Eternal, Being Itself, Pure Act and above all Good. I can know via Divine Revelation in God's Nature there are three subsisting Subjects that are distinct to one another & each fully possesses the One Divine Essence. I can also know that whatever these distinct relations really are they are NOT distinctions in the Divine Essence of any kind.

    All this I can know about God but I cannot know What God Is.

    So what is the freakin Problem?

    >The problem with your position is that to say that a term is equivocal just means that it is open to multiple possible meanings without any determination of which in particular is meant.

    You are thinking of a Pure Equivocal. I am using God as an Un-articulated one in the sense of "What God Is we know not What".

    >Instead, you are offering no meanings whatsoever, saying that it is a complete mystery what the terms could possibly mean. That is worse than a fallacy of equivocation, because at least there is some meaning involved in the fallacy of equivocation, but it is indeterminate between multiple possible meanings.

    No I have some imperfect analogous sense of what they mean such as the Word generated by the Father analogous but not identical to a mind generating a Thought about Himself abstracting away the created imperfections. etc….but I am not supposed to Know What God Really Is? I am merely suppose to Love Him.

    You are just put off because Feser was right in his negative traditional historic defining of the Trinity that properly understood there can be no contradiction but then again we are not suppose to know what God Is.

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  173. >And since the preservation of the same meaning in the terms in the argument is paramount to preserve the truth of the argument, the fact that one cannot guarantee that the meaning is preserved makes the argument unsound.

    Poor dguller your final Straw Man misunderstanding of the Trinity. The Trinity is defined as is via the correct interpretation of divine revelation. Argument is for mere Natural Theology. The Trinity does not belong to the category of argument since it can't be shown to be true via human reason. You believe it because God tells you nothing more. If you doubt God is telling you He is a Trinity fine but enough of the equivocating Natural Theology with revealed Theology. The Trinity is either Mystery or not worth a Christian Faith or worship.

    > So, again, your position, even if not committed to the fallacy of equivocation, still makes any and all logical argumentation impossible,

    Good because it is Infallible Dogma that we can't know God is a Trinity by human reason alone but only by revelation. If what you just said above where not True that would really overthrow the faith & I would have to become either a Jew or a Deist. I am not adverse to being a Jew with the Hebrew Nickname & I love the Jewish People but I do so love Bacon.

    >And once again, if the total destruction of natural theology is acceptable collateral damage to save the Trinity from logical contradiction is the price you are willing to pay, then all I can say is, wow!

    I don't see how since I still accept all the conclusions of Natural Theology. I merely have Natural Theology ++.

    >Except that my argument shows that this contradiction occurs if one assumes (1) to (4), and you haven’t given any reason why (1) to (4) are false, except that you dislike the conclusion.

    It's a Straw man argument I have rebutted already & like Peter Lupu or some other more informed Atheist philosopher I would believe there is no formal contradiction if I lost my Catholic Faith tomorrow. Believe me it's been tough to have faith when you see a once rational Atheist hit rock bottom with the irrational straw man arguments.

    Besides you can't take back your concessions and the God as Mystery suits me just fine since a comprehensible "god" is unworthy of a Scotman's devotion. It's worst then Theistic Personalist nonsense & you should know I never miss an opportunity to bash theistic personalism.

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  174. Ben:

    Not at all I can know there is a God via logical philosophical argument.

    You said that whenever we use the term “God” in an argument, the term “God” is “a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation” and that “any meaning that or picture we could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all”. See that part about “ultimately drains them of any meaning at all”? You agreed that the term “God” has no meaning at all. And without meaning, it cannot be part of a logical argument, which must preserve the same meaning throughout the argument. In order to preserve meaning, there must first be meaning, which you conceded does not occur with the term “God”.

    In addition via philosophy I can know things about God via the logic of Natural Theology the primary being God is One, Simple, Infinite, Eternal, Being Itself, Pure Act and above all Good.

    Are these truths about the divine essence? If they are not truths about the divine essence, then they must be truths about other-than-the-divine-essence. And if that is true, then if God is the divine essence, then these truths are not about God at all.

    I can know via Divine Revelation in God's Nature there are three subsisting Subjects that are distinct to one another & each fully possesses the One Divine Essence.

    So now we can add a third possibility:

    (A) The divine relations are the divine essence
    (B) The divine relations are in the divine essence
    (C) The divine relations each fully possesses the divine essence

    I can also know that whatever these distinct relations really are they are NOT distinctions in the Divine Essence of any kind.

    Look at the argument again:

    (1) The divine relations involve real distinction of some kind (by the Trinity)


    (2) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind (by divine simplicity)


    (3) X is notionally distinct from Y iff X is identical to Y in every respect in reality iff X does not differ from Y in any respect in reality iff X is only distinct from Y in the human mind (by the definition of notional distinction)

    (4) The divine relations are notionally distinct from the divine essence (assumption)


    (5) Therefore, the divine relations are identical to the divine essence in every respect in reality (by (3), (4))

    (6) Therefore, the divine relations cannot differ in any respect from the divine essence in reality (by (3), (5))


    (7) But, the divine relations do differ in some respect from the divine essence in reality (by (1), (2))


    (8) Therefore, (6) contradicts (7)

    What you keep repeating is (1), (2) and (7) in my argument. (1), (2) and (7) just say that the divine relations must be different from the divine essence, particularly in the sense that the former involve some kind of real distinction and the latter cannot involve any kind of real distinction. But this does nothing to address (3) to (6).

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  175. In order to address (3) to (6), you would have to show that (3) and/or (4) are false.

    You cannot show that (4) is false, because that (4) is the clear implication of G-L’s quote above that “the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another”. I take this to mean that the divine persons are notionally distinct from the divine essence, which is the precise kind of distinction between the divine attributes. You have not told me what else G-L could possibly mean here.

    You cannot show that (3) is false, because (3) is just the definition of “notional distinction”. If you have another definition that is better or more accurate than mine, then please provide it.

    So, unless you can show that (3) and/or (4) are false, simply repeating (1), (2) and (7) of my argument does not refute it at all.

    You are thinking of a Pure Equivocal. I am using God as an Un-articulated one in the sense of "What God Is we know not What".

    You are correct. At least, with a pure equivocal, you know what the possible meanings could be. With an “unarticulated equivocal”, you do not even have that, which means that it is meaningless.

    No I have some imperfect analogous sense of what they mean such as the Word generated by the Father analogous but not identical to a mind generating a Thought about Himself abstracting away the created imperfections.

    Saying that a term has an “imperfect analogous sense” is different from saying that “any meaning that or picture we could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all”.

    Poor dguller your final Straw Man misunderstanding of the Trinity. The Trinity is defined as is via the correct interpretation of divine revelation. Argument is for mere Natural Theology. The Trinity does not belong to the category of argument since it can't be shown to be true via human reason.

    You said earlier that the term “God” was drained of all meaning. “God” is used in natural theology. If “God” has no meaning, then it cannot be used in an arguments of natural theology, which you said that you have no problem with.

    I don't see how since I still accept all the conclusions of Natural Theology. I merely have Natural Theology ++.

    Except that natural theology necessarily uses the term “God”, which is a term that you admitted was drained of all meaning. For a term to be used in an argument, it must have some meaning, particularly a meaning that is kept the same throughout the argument. If “God” has no meaning, as you said earlier, then one cannot use it in any valid argument, which would make natural theology impossible.

    It's a Straw man argument I have rebutted already

    You haven’t rebutted it at all. You have endorsed (1), (2) and (7), and ignored (3) to (6) entirely, just repeating your endorsement of (1), (2) and (7), ad nauseum. I’m sure that you see that simply saying that you reject (3) to (6), because they contradict (1), (2) and (7) is not a refutation of them. The whole point is that (3) and (4) must be true, and thus a contradiction is inevitable, which means that if you refuse to reject (1), (2) and (7), then you must reject (3) and/or (4).

    The problem is that you cannot reject (4), because that leads to logical contradictions in and of itself. And you cannot reject (3), because that is simply the definition of notional distinction, and if you reject it, then that has huge implications for the relationship between the divine attributes, particularly that they now have a kind of distinction between them in reality, which falsifies Feser’s account of them in Aquinas.

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  176. @dguller

    >You said that whenever we use the term “God” in an argument, the term “God” is “a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation”....

    I've said no such thing I said when discribing the Trinity & to show it's lack of provable logical contradiction the term "God" is definitionlly required as an un-articulated equivocation" & in this case to stand as a referent for God as the unlimate unknown & unknowable.

    I have no time to keep correcting your Straw men & I am no longer interested in playing.

    You have conceded explicitly to me that if the term "God" is used as some type of equivocal therefore your "argument" for contradiction has a Fiery defeater.

    So again as they say on Babylon 5.

    "Let it all end in Fire".

    Go play with DavidM.

    He looks like he knows more than I & seems to have infinitly more patence.

    Bye!

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  177. additional:

    Because I am using Negative Theology here I don't have to explain what "real relations Person to Person" are but only what they are not.

    Since they are already predicated as not being any kind of relation in essence then no argument can be used to show they violate the divine simplicity since you need some type of real relation in essence for that to be the case.

    The divine relations are real Person to Person not Persons to Essence or threw Essence.

    It's a mystery & if you wish to continue to bitch about it not having any meaning then go for it.

    But both the "contradiction" arguments and "violations of DS" are epic fails when used against a negative definiton of the Trinity.

    PS. You are guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. Not being able to say WHAT GOD IS is not equivolent to not being able to say anything about God.

    Your "ultimately drains them of any meaning at all" meme only applies to WHAT not ABOUT.

    Now run along and play with DavidM.

    Don't drive him crazy with your sophistry.

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  178. Ben:

    I've said no such thing

    At June 7, 2013 at 2:13 PM, you cited a number of points of mine that you agreed with. At point A, you wrote, “I refuse to treat "God" as anything other then a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation”, and at point B, you wrote, “"God" means nothing to us in saying what he is, which means that any meaning that or picture we could conjure up in our minds, we must dismiss as necessarily false, which ultimately drains them of any meaning at all.” The fact that you cited my statements as points of agreement, and said that I “can’t take this back” indicated to me that you took them to be true. Now, you’re saying that you disagree with them. Then why did you call them concessions to your position in the first place?

    I said when discribing the Trinity & to show it's lack of provable logical contradiction the term "God" is definitionlly required as an un-articulated equivocation" & in this case to stand as a referent for God as the unlimate unknown & unknowable.

    First, I never use the term “God” in my argument, and so this point is irrelevant.

    Second, what do you mean by an “unarticulated equivocation”?

    You have conceded explicitly to me that if the term "God" is used as some type of equivocal therefore your "argument" for contradiction has a Fiery defeater.

    First, since the term “God” never appears in my argument, any points that I make about that term do not refute my argument.

    Second, I said that if the term “God” is purely equivocal, meaning that it has different meanings that we cannot decide between, then any argument involving the term “God” falls prey to the fallacy of equivocation. I also said that if the term “God” lacks any meaning whatsoever, then it avoids the fallacy of equivocation, but it still cannot be used in a logical argument, because for a premise of an argument to be true or false, it must first be meaningful. Therefore, if a premise is meaningless, then it cannot be a premise at all.

    Third, you still haven’t explicitly stated whether you accept or reject (3) and/or (4) of my argument. You clearly accept (1), (2) and (7), because you have been repeating them, ad nauseum, throughout our discussion. If you reject (3), then you must explain to me what a “notional distinction” is, and show that it is different from my definition of it. If you cannot, then (3) is true. If you reject (4), then G-L is wrong, and you have a different kind of logical contradiction via the following argument:

    (8) The divine essence is not identical in every respect in reality to the divine relations (by the negation of (4))

    (9) X is not identical in reality to Y in some respect iff X is distinct from Y in reality in some respect

    (10) Therefore, the divine essence is distinct from the divine relations in reality in some respect (by (8), (9))

    (11) The divine essence is Being itself (by divine simplicity)

    (12) X is distinct from Being itself iff X is either a creature or non-Being

    (13) Therefore, the divine relations are distinct from Being itself (by (10), (11))

    (14) Therefore, the divine relations are either a creature or non-Being (by (12), (13))

    (15) The divine relations exist (by the Trinity)

    (16) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (14) and (15)

    (17) The divine relations are not a creature (by the Trinity)

    (18) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (14) and (17))

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  179. Or here’s another argument for a similar conclusion:

    (19) The divine essence is not identical in every respect in reality to the divine relations (by the negation of (4))
    (20) X is not identical in every respect in reality to Y iff X is partly identical to Y and X is partly different from Y
    (21) There is a part of the divine relations that is identical to the divine essence (by (19), (20))
    (21) There is a part of the divine relations that is different from the divine essence (by (19), (20))
    (22) The divine essence is Being itself (by divine simplicity)
    (23) Therefore, there is a part of the divine relations that is different from Being itself (by (21), (22))
    (24) X is different from Being itself iff X is either a creature or non-Being
    (25) Therefore, there is a part of the divine relations that is either a creature or non-Being (by (23), (24))
    (26) The divine relations exist (by the Trinity)

    (27) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (25) and (26)

    (28) The divine relations are not a creature (by the Trinity)

    (29) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (25) and (28))

    So, rejecting (4), which is your only option, also leads to contradictions.

    Bye!

    Bye, Ben.

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  180. >At June 7, 2013 at 2:13 PM, you cited a number of points of mine that you agreed with. At point A, you wrote, “I refuse to treat "God" as anything other then a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation.

    How do you get from what I literally said here to me saying what your claim I said “whenever we use the term “God” in an argument, the term “God” is “a definitionally required un-articulated equivocation”?

    We have been arguing about the Trinity for almost 1000 posts. Thus anything I said refers to that topic exclusively & it is peresumpous to claim otherwise. I certainly nowhere said that in all discussions of God or arguments regarding God we must use the word “God” as an un-articulated equivocation. OTOH I am not surprised. Since the beginning I’ve charged you are not addressing the doctrine of the Trinity but a Straw man. This is just further proof you have not been really discussing the Trinity with me but a doctrine of your own making you label “Trinity”.

    Cheers.

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  181. >Second, what do you mean by an “unarticulated equivocation”?

    If you really are interested then go back along this thread and look for my links to a paper by James Anderson.

    No need to thank me.

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  182. dguller,

    First, I think it would be helpful here if you could define what you mean by “tradition”.

    A tradition, in the sense I'm using the term, is a method of thinking or acting that descends and develops over time. It's a background that's presupposed by us. You could say that it's similar to what Wittgenstein calls a language game. You could also call it a hermeneutic. You could also call it facticity, if you stretched that term a bit.

    Second, I think that you are confusing the fact that we cannot help but view the world through a tradition with the further claim that all that exists is necessarily reduced to that tradition.

    It isn't reduced to tradition so much as revealed or hidden by it. At least, that's the Christian claim about the Christian tradition, to which I belong. The point is that your hermeneutic of reality is always already present as a background to your encounter with the world. I think Heidegger makes a point similar to this one somewhere. The general idea is that it's impossible to escape the presupposition of a tradition. So, I agree that there is something outside of tradition that tradition interprets, but this does not entail that we can, as individuals, perceive it through our rational powers in any clear way. That claim directly contradicts the Christian tradition, in fact.

    Third, if Z is present in all traditions, then the fact of universal consensus would be a strong justification for Z’s objectivity, independent of those traditions.

    Then I suppose that classical theism and mystical experience are strong candidates for objectivity, on your terms.

    Also, who says that this is a strong justification? Rationalists? Or are you claiming that we have neutral, objective knowledge of these terms via the "view from nowhere"?

    First, you presume that the “common ground” cannot be objectively true independent of the traditions themselves. As I mentioned above, a number of witnesses could achieve common ground by agreeing upon what they saw, but it does not follow that what they saw could not exist without their agreement and perception.

    I never claimed that there was nothing other than tradition. That would put me in Derrida's camp. I said that tradition informs reasoning and perception. As a result, even though there is and must be objective truth, it does not follow that we can have pure access to it via a view from nowhere. We always bring factical conditions to the table. Again, Heidegger makes this point somewhere. I believe he uses the Earth/World distinction to describe it.

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  183. In order to speak the same language, we have to, well, speak the same language, and the fact that such communication is possible, even between missionaries and natives shows that our different language games cannot be so radically different after all, because there is a way to translate between them.

    I agree that there is a way to translate between traditions. This does not mean that we translate by somehow relying on the view from nowhere. We translate by finding pre-existent common ground between traditions. For example, pointing is commonly used to indicate an object. Hence we can point to an object to indicate it across traditions.

    But this does not entail that Christianity can be argued against, for example, Hinduism. We can try to persuade Hindus, but the principles of which we're trying to convince them are too specific and axiomatic to be shared or argued.

    On the one hand, a mountain would exist even if no human existed to perceive or understand it from their perspective, and thus would be an objective truth. On the other hand, our subjective experience of that mountain could not exist without human subjectivity, and thus would be a subjective truth.

    But this account rules out Loftus's stated goal. If we can't even get beyond ourselves, then we certainly can't achieve objective knowledge. That would undermine the entire purpose of the Outsider Test.

    First, just because our account and elucidation of objective truth occurs within a particular tradition does not mean that what we are talking about is ontologically dependent upon the tradition and ultimately reducible to that tradition, having no bearing or reference to anything outside the tradition.

    Again, I never said that. I said that tradition changes our perception and that tradition is inescapable. It is only the Christian tradition that encompasses the world in full, and so presents it to us as it really is. Other traditions are greater or lesser approximations of ours. Is there a way to defend this assertion rationally? No; that would presuppose the supereminence of human reason and place me in the rationalist camp.

    Realists may phrase this in different ways, but I don’t think that they would disagree with the core idea that something in the mind must match something in reality for truth to occur, and that would be the verisimilitude that you are describing, I think.

    No, that's not what I was trying to say. Verisimilitude is an appearance of truth; not real truth. If man had access to real truth, then philosophers would not disagree. Vast numbers of traditions would vanish overnight. The existence of these traditions and their incommensurability attests to the fact that man cannot discern much real truth with his own powers.

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  184. Can you give some examples of traditions where it is appropriate to use an argument in support of your position that you would reject if used by someone else to support their position?

    Every single tradition that has ever existed. This is because all tradition is fundamentally assertion, prior to which there is nothing. Even the idea of the view from nowhere is reducible to such a hermeneutic.

    If you know that you don’t know X, then shouldn’t you reserve making a firm commitment about X? It seems eminently reasonable to me to suspend one’s judgment and admit that one simply does not know all the facts about the matter.

    Again, most of what we have is what the Academics called probable knowledge. Even Aquinas admits this. But this does not entail agnosticism. If we were agnostics about everything that we did not know with certainty, then we would be reduced to claiming that our parents were not necessarily our real parents. It is fundamentally impossible to know with absolute certainty that your parents are really yours. But are you about to avoid "making a firm commitment" on that issue?

    Isn’t it more likely that they didn’t believe that he was God himself, suspected that he was probably just a man about to die a horrible death, and since they didn’t want to join that man in that horrible death, fled to safety?

    Not according to Christian tradition.

    You use this premise to justify the validity of believing in Jesus Christ’s claims, and I’m trying to show you that this very premise would be valid for many other figures in antiquity who have been recorded to have performed miracles, many identical to Jesus’.

    I'm not making a claim about the record. I'm making a claim about the actual first-hand experience of miracles. Assume for the sake of argument that Jesus never even performed any. My point would still hold: if he performed a miracle that the disciples witnessed first-hand, that would be a reason to believe him. I'm not saying anything more complex than that.

    Since you do not accept them as valid transmitters of the divine, you must have other reasons beyond miracles to justify your rejection of them and your acceptance of Jesus. I’m curious what these other reasons are.

    Well, I reject the idea that someone who was not a valid transmitter of the divine could perform a miracle, so that narrows the options a bit. I don't accept a rationalist position on miracles.

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  185. But that very argument could be used to justify any faith tradition

    Indeed it could. But I'm not sure what your point is, here.

    What event is perceived is the same, but how that event is interpreted may be different.

    And you are suggesting that we can have unmediated access to the event. For Christianity, this is more or less a claim to divinely revealed truth. That's the only way absolute knowledge of the event could exist. Until such knowledge is available, what we have are interpretations--most incommensurable.

    How so? It all depends upon the senses. To say that God is good in the sense of being goodness itself means that it is false to say that God is not goodness itself.

    Please don't bring up this Cajetanian inanity again. The whole sense/reference (or res/modus) business was a half-hearted attempt by Aquinas to describe in linguistic terms what Christian tradition had passed down about analogy. The subsequent writers who've tried to systematize it have misread and confused the issue to such an extent that their work essentially ends in heresy.

    It is simultaneously true and false that God is goodness itself. This is because whatever label we strain to apply to God is ultimately verisimilitudinous. There are more and less true or false statements about God, but there are no absolutely true or absolutely false statements about him. For this reason, the proposition "God is goodness itself" does not have a binary truth condition. We could only give a proposition about God such truth conditions if we had total a priori (i.e. from the cause) knowledge of him, which is impossible even given an infinite amount of time. Thus we can only make probable statements about God.

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  186. To say that God is good in the precise sense in which that statement is true necessarily means that the negation of that precise sense is necessarily false.

    Nope. The propositions "God is goodness itself" or "God is all that he is" cannot be said to be either true or false. They sit somewhere in between. For them to be true, they would have to encompass God totally. This is impossible. But if they were to be false, then they would have to signify nothing at all about God. That isn't the case either. Hence the law of the excluded middle is violated. The problem was trying to analyze them as propositions in the first place.

    If I say that John is like a lion, am I saying something that is neither true nor false?

    It cannot be said to be absolutely true or absolutely false. It is simply vague. Further, its coherence dissolves when put through a logically rigorous inspection. What does it even mean to say that something is like something else? Understood via the law of the excluded middle, this claim must be reduced to univocity: there is some quality X identical in both Y and Z. You've made this point yourself. But there is nothing identical between God and man. In fact, there is nothing identical between John and the lion. At best you might say that they are equally in the category "created being", but, since esse only exists as particularized, even this is reducible to a vague analogy.

    Therefore, your claim that all analogies are necessarily neither true nor false must be itself false. And if that is false, then it is necessarily true that all analogies are either true or false.

    I know this is just a rhetorical flourish, but I'm still going to point out that it's a non sequitur. Even if my statement that all analogies are neither true nor false happened to be false, it would not follow that all analogies are either true or false. It could be the case that some analogies are neither true nor false, but that others are subject to truth conditions in this way.

    But we have shown (I:2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality.

    "From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence." (ST I q2 a2 ro3)

    God is not pure act in any absolute sense. Aquinas would never dream of claiming otherwise, because to do so would be to say that one had quidditative knowledge of God.

    The sole basis in this argument for rejecting materiality as predicated of God is that Aquinas had already demonstrated at ST Ia, Q2, A3

    God cannot be material because, if he was material, then he would fall into a category of being and thus be incapable of grounding all categories. Hence we would have to posit another, higher God to ground him. This is all Aquinas is saying.

    So, it is only upon the basis of already demonstrated positive truths about God that the negative attributes can be derived by reason, and those positive truths are positive truths.

    And yet Pure Act is not a positive truth in any absolute way.

    And even if the meaning of the terms in this argument can only be understood analogically, the fact that Aquinas uses them in a deductive argument means that they carry truth that is propagated into the conclusion. Otherwise, what exactly is demonstrated in the conclusion, if not the truth of the conclusion?

    Aquinas uses a posteriori (i.e. from the effects) knowledge of God as a middle term in all syllogisms that describe God in propositional terms (ST I q2 a2 ro2). Hence his arguments are only demonstrative with respect to the "meaning of the word 'God'": they are probable arguments with respect to God himself. Anything less would be onto-theology.

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  187. Rank:

    A tradition, in the sense I'm using the term, is a method of thinking or acting that descends and develops over time. It's a background that's presupposed by us. You could say that it's similar to what Wittgenstein calls a language game. You could also call it a hermeneutic. You could also call it facticity, if you stretched that term a bit.

    So, it’s a conceptual framework that evolves over time within the life of a community of people.

    It isn't reduced to tradition so much as revealed or hidden by it.

    This is helpful. So, a tradition in your sense is like a lens through which we perceive reality. Some lenses are more transparent than others, and thus disclose and reveal more about reality than others. However, just because we cannot see those aspects of reality, except through that lens, it does not follow that what is seen is not real or independent of our perception and thinking. Thus, there is an independent reality that is perceived and understood to varying degrees of accuracy, depending upon conceptual framework that one uses.

    The general idea is that it's impossible to escape the presupposition of a tradition. So, I agree that there is something outside of tradition that tradition interprets, but this does not entail that we can, as individuals, perceive it through our rational powers in any clear way. That claim directly contradicts the Christian tradition, in fact.

    First, I think that there is an ambiguity here. When you say “our rational powers”, are you talking about the everyday and universal human activity of giving reasons for our beliefs or about the modern philosophical use of Reason to ground our beliefs in an indubitable and necessary foundation? The former is universal in human nature, and cannot be rejected without rejecting one’s humanity itself, including by Christians, and the latter is a particular philosophical tradition that one may accept or reject.

    Second, even if the use of our “rational powers” cannot provide certain and comprehensible knowledge about the reality outside of our thoughts and language, it does not follow that they cannot provide some knowledge about it, and that if we can know something about it, then there are varying degrees of accuracy of our knowledge, which means that there are better and worse ways of knowing that reality with our “rational powers”.

    Third, even rejecting our “rational powers” are insufficiently accurate and powerful is a position that itself is based upon reasons, and once one starts offering reasons for one’s positions, then one necessarily becomes involved in activity that has inherent standards, which means that there are good and bad reasons, many of which are completely independent of any tradition. For example, it is a universal standard of reasoning that one should accept good reason and reject bad reasons. Sure, what one would count as a good reason would differ, depending upon one’s background assumptions and conceptual framework, but the fact that one should accept what one counts as good reasons remains constant, and this standard is not a truth of logic at all, which means that there are non-logical truths that are common to all traditions.

    Then I suppose that classical theism and mystical experience are strong candidates for objectivity, on your terms.

    Except that classical theism is not a constant in all traditions. It certainly is rejected by contemporary strains of Protestant faith. And I would agree that experiences of mystical unity and transcendence are present in all human traditions throughout history. I would disagree that this necessarily means that such experiences are of the divine, because there are numerous hallucinogens and organic brain diseases that can cause similar, if not identical, phenomenological experiences.

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  188. Also, who says that this is a strong justification? Rationalists? Or are you claiming that we have neutral, objective knowledge of these terms via the "view from nowhere"?

    First, I think that even Christians would agree. Why have councils, unless on the assumption that when a group of individuals is in agreement upon a matter, then there must be an objective truth that is being agreed upon? Why not just have the Pope make a declaration, and leave it at that?

    Second, I don’t think we need a view from nowhere to have objective knowledge. I also don’t think we need to jettison language in order to talk about reality. To quote Wedding Crashers: “You shut your mouth when you’re talking to me!”

    I never claimed that there was nothing other than tradition. That would put me in Derrida's camp.

    Except that Derrida is not in that camp, either. But that’s a whole other matter.

    I said that tradition informs reasoning and perception. As a result, even though there is and must be objective truth, it does not follow that we can have pure access to it via a view from nowhere. We always bring factical conditions to the table. Again, Heidegger makes this point somewhere. I believe he uses the Earth/World distinction to describe it.

    I agree.

    I agree that there is a way to translate between traditions. This does not mean that we translate by somehow relying on the view from nowhere. We translate by finding pre-existent common ground between traditions. For example, pointing is commonly used to indicate an object. Hence we can point to an object to indicate it across traditions.

    I agree.

    But this does not entail that Christianity can be argued against, for example, Hinduism. We can try to persuade Hindus, but the principles of which we're trying to convince them are too specific and axiomatic to be shared or argued.

    You can argue from the “pre-existent common ground between traditions”. You have agreed that there is such a commonality, or else translation would be impossible, and thus there must be a launching pad from which to sustain a critique of an alternative tradition. The question is how large this “pre-existent common ground between traditions” is. I think it is quite large, and you seem to think that it involves nothing but the truths of logic. Is that your position? It would easily be falsified, I think, by the fact that people in different traditions interact with an environment that is outside of their minds via their senses and try to understand it using rational principles.

    But this account rules out Loftus's stated goal. If we can't even get beyond ourselves, then we certainly can't achieve objective knowledge. That would undermine the entire purpose of the Outsider Test.

    We can certainly get beyond our particular perspective to see matters in a different way by adopting a different perspective, which does not mean getting beyond any perspective.

    I said that tradition changes our perception and that tradition is inescapable.

    You’ve clarified the matter, nicely.

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  189. It is only the Christian tradition that encompasses the world in full, and so presents it to us as it really is. Other traditions are greater or lesser approximations of ours. Is there a way to defend this assertion rationally? No; that would presuppose the supereminence of human reason and place me in the rationalist camp.

    One way to defend this assertion rationally is to begin from the “pre-existent common ground between traditions” and work from there to show that, given that common ground, your tradition meets more of that common ground’s objectives and aspirations than the other traditions. Endorsing this strategy would not make you a rationalist at all, but only a reasonable human being.

    No, that's not what I was trying to say. Verisimilitude is an appearance of truth; not real truth. If man had access to real truth, then philosophers would not disagree. Vast numbers of traditions would vanish overnight. The existence of these traditions and their incommensurability attests to the fact that man cannot discern much real truth with his own powers.

    Wouldn’t you say that the fact that these traditions are not incommensurable in many important respects attests to the fact that man has discerned some “real truth with his own powers”?

    Every single tradition that has ever existed. This is because all tradition is fundamentally assertion, prior to which there is nothing. Even the idea of the view from nowhere is reducible to such a hermeneutic.

    Say that there are two traditions, X and Y. Tradition X and tradition Y both use an argument A to justify their traditions. From the perspective of tradition X, tradition Y’s use of A is logically invalid. Are you saying that once tradition X becomes aware of the logical invalidity of A when it is used by tradition Y, tradition X would continue to use A with full confidence in its truth, knowing that it is logically invalid?

    Again, most of what we have is what the Academics called probable knowledge. Even Aquinas admits this. But this does not entail agnosticism. If we were agnostics about everything that we did not know with certainty, then we would be reduced to claiming that our parents were not necessarily our real parents. It is fundamentally impossible to know with absolute certainty that your parents are really yours. But are you about to avoid "making a firm commitment" on that issue?

    But there are degree of probability for our knowledge, especially for our knowledge that falls short of absolute certainty. Thus, I can believe that my parents are really mine with a higher degree of probability than I can believe that you are my father. After all, I have a number of lines of evidence that support the former, and absolutely none that support the latter. Certainly, my appraisal could change if I was provided evidence, such as that my parents failed a paternity test, that another set of people stepped forward to claim my as their child, that they have corroborating documentation, such as my birth certificate, with my fingerprints, and so on.

    I'm not making a claim about the record. I'm making a claim about the actual first-hand experience of miracles. Assume for the sake of argument that Jesus never even performed any. My point would still hold: if he performed a miracle that the disciples witnessed first-hand, that would be a reason to believe him. I'm not saying anything more complex than that.

    But that same reason should be used to believe other figures in antiquity who also performed miracles, and claimed to have knowledge of the divine. You would need a reason, over and above the sheer fact of performed miracles, to differentiate your trust in Jesus’ claims from your skepticism of those other figures’ claims.

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  190. Well, I reject the idea that someone who was not a valid transmitter of the divine could perform a miracle, so that narrows the options a bit. I don't accept a rationalist position on miracles.

    Then do you accept the claims of any figure in antiquity who was recorded to have performed a miracle?

    Indeed it could. But I'm not sure what your point is, here.

    My point is that if the performance of miracles is a good reason to believe in a person’s religious claims, then that very reason would justify the belief in all religious traditions that have participants who have performed miracles that have confirmed their respective traditions. And then you are stuck with having to explain why you reject their traditions in the first place.

    And you are suggesting that we can have unmediated access to the event. For Christianity, this is more or less a claim to divinely revealed truth. That's the only way absolute knowledge of the event could exist. Until such knowledge is available, what we have are interpretations--most incommensurable.

    The sun rises. Every human tradition has experienced the perception of the sun rising. What that event meant to those traditions would likely differ. To the ancient Greeks, it was due to Apollo riding his chariot across the sky. To us, it is due to the rotation of the earth around the sun. The event is exactly the same, but our understanding and interpretation of that event is different. And notice that even though the ancient Greek and contemporary person differ as the cause fo the sun rising, they both agree that the sun rises in the sky. Thus, even in radically different conceptual frameworks, or traditions, there is still a huge area of commonality, which is indicative of a truthful and accurate connection with reality.

    Please don't bring up this Cajetanian inanity again. The whole sense/reference (or res/modus) business was a half-hearted attempt by Aquinas to describe in linguistic terms what Christian tradition had passed down about analogy. The subsequent writers who've tried to systematize it have misread and confused the issue to such an extent that their work essentially ends in heresy.

    And what did Christian tradition say “analogy” was?

    It is simultaneously true and false that God is goodness itself. This is because whatever label we strain to apply to God is ultimately verisimilitudinous. There are more and less true or false statements about God, but there are no absolutely true or absolutely false statements about him. For this reason, the proposition "God is goodness itself" does not have a binary truth condition. We could only give a proposition about God such truth conditions if we had total a priori (i.e. from the cause) knowledge of him, which is impossible even given an infinite amount of time. Thus we can only make probable statements about God.

    You say that “[t]here are more and less true or false statements about God”. To me, that means that there is a continuous scale from absolute truth about God, which only God himself would have, and down the scale to whatever has the absolute minimum amount of being in creation, because truth and being are both transcendentals, and if there is being, then there is truth. Only non-being would lack truth. Regardless, the bottom line is that this entire account presupposes degrees of truth and falsehood, depending upon the degree to which our statements correspond to God himself.

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  191. You have also said that we cannot make a true statement about God, because “[f]or them to be true, they would have to encompass God totally”, which is impossible. I take this to mean that we cannot make absolutely and totally true statements about God. However, you have also admitted that we can make less than absolutely and totally true statements about God, which vary in terms of how accurate they are of him, even though none of them can entirely encompass him, even given an infinite amount of time.

    What I want to understand is how a statement can be true at all about God. We agree that it cannot be absolutely and totally true, because only God would have comprehensive knowledge of his essence to be able to make such statements, and since we are not God, we cannot make sure statement. However, say I make a statement about God that is not absolutely and totally true. Since God is simple, and has no parts, including metaphysical parts, then how can I make a statement that is only partially true about God. What exactly does my statement correspond to that makes it true at all? It cannot correspond to the entirety of God, because that is impossible. It cannot correspond to a partial aspect of God, because God has no partial aspects at all. It cannot correspond to nothing about God, because then it would not be true of God at all. So, how exactly is this supposed to work?

    So, once again, we are stuck with a set of impossible options:

    (1) Statement S is totally true about God iff S refers to all of God
    (2) Statement S is partially true about God iff S refers to some of God
    (3) Statement S is totally false about God iff S refers to none of God

    As we just saw, (1), (2), and (3) are each equally impossible. (Even (3) is impossible, because all statements, by virtue of referring even indirectly to reality, must indirectly refer to the creator of reality.)

    It cannot be said to be absolutely true or absolutely false. It is simply vague. Further, its coherence dissolves when put through a logically rigorous inspection. What does it even mean to say that something is like something else? Understood via the law of the excluded middle, this claim must be reduced to univocity: there is some quality X identical in both Y and Z. You've made this point yourself. But there is nothing identical between God and man. In fact, there is nothing identical between John and the lion. At best you might say that they are equally in the category "created being", but, since esse only exists as particularized, even this is reducible to a vague analogy.

    It is only vague, until you specify the partial identity and partial difference. (I know. You just heard fingernails screech on the blackboard, didn’t you?) But that is true of all analogies. They are necessarily vague until you supply the specific details that explain the analogy to begin with. Until then, you are correct that the statement is too fuzzy and vague to mean much of anything. And with this particular example, there are a number of things that are identical between John and a lion, such as the fact that they are alive, they are animals, that they have limbs, that they have hair, that they have eyes, that they have a nose, that they have a mouth, that they have teeth, that they run, that they jump, that they procreate, that they are male, that they exist, that they are creatures of God, and so on.

    All that being said, the analogy is true if the partial identity and the part difference that are explained are true of the analogates. And it is not partially true or relatively true or only true to a certain extent. If it true, full stop. In other words, it is true, full stop, that John is like a lion in that they are both stronger than a house cat, but they differ in that the lion is stronger than John. All totally and absolutely true.

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  192. I know this is just a rhetorical flourish, but I'm still going to point out that it's a non sequitur. Even if my statement that all analogies are neither true nor false happened to be false, it would not follow that all analogies are either true or false. It could be the case that some analogies are neither true nor false, but that others are subject to truth conditions in this way.

    You are right. The true logical implication of the falsehood of the statement that all analogies are neither true nor false is that some analogies are true or false. But even that falsifies your earlier claim that all analogies are neither true nor false. Perhaps you meant that analogies between incommensurable analogates are neither true nor false? But even that is false, because if two analogates have nothing in common due to their incommensurability, then any analogy between them would be false, because to be a true analogy, there would have to be something in common and something that is difference. Since there is nothing in common, there is no analogy at all, and thus any analogy between them would be false.

    God is not pure act in any absolute sense. Aquinas would never dream of claiming otherwise, because to do so would be to say that one had quidditative knowledge of God.

    I agree. But that doesn’t solve the problem.

    God cannot be material because, if he was material, then he would fall into a category of being and thus be incapable of grounding all categories. Hence we would have to posit another, higher God to ground him. This is all Aquinas is saying.

    That is not what he argued in the passage of the ST that I cited, though. He said that because God is pure act, God cannot have any potentiality. If God were not pure act, then God would have potentiality, but since he is pure act, he has no potentiality. It is this truth that he uses to refute the claim that God is material, because matter has potentiality. It is the logical contradiction between God both having and not having potentiality that allows Aquinas to reject the premise that God is material. Sure, there are deeper metaphysical dynamics at work here, but the actual syllogism that Aquinas used is perfectly sound, and he did not make any mention of “category of being” or “grounding all categories”, although those are certainly related arguments. And all of this shows that your earlier claim that [i]t is not a demonstration from the prior "fact" that God is pure act” must be false.

    And yet Pure Act is not a positive truth in any absolute way.

    It doesn’t have to be. It just has to be true in some way, and in particular, in a way that can then sustain enough identity of meaning to be used in a logical syllogism. If it cannot, then one cannot make any logical arguments based upon it at all, which would destroy natural theology.

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  193. dguller,

    Thus, there is an independent reality that is perceived and understood to varying degrees of accuracy, depending upon conceptual framework that one uses.

    Yes, to your entire response. I'm glad this is cleared up.

    When you say “our rational powers”, are you talking about the everyday and universal human activity of giving reasons for our beliefs or about the modern philosophical use of Reason to ground our beliefs in an indubitable and necessary foundation?

    I was referring to the idea that reason can give us absolute and certain knowledge of the world. It can do this to a small degree, as Augustine proved with his arguments against the Academics--such as regarding the truth of one's own existence. Augustine's Against the Academics in general is an interesting exploration of the limits of reason. Beyond a few certainties, though, most of what we know is on much shakier ground. This is something that Aquinas himself explains in On the Apostles' Creed:

    [O]ur manner of knowing is so weak that no philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. We even read that a certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in order to know the nature of the bee.

    [...]

    [I]f one were willing to believe only those things which one knows with certitude, one could not live in this world. How could one live unless one believed others? How could one know that this man is one’s own father? Therefore, it is necessary that one believe others in matters which one cannot know perfectly for oneself.


    Human reason is a fairly weak and confused affair. We can achieve truth through it, but this is often mixed with errors that reason itself is incapable of detecting. The endless variety of religious and philosophical traditions--or "lenses", as you put it--attests to this fact. If truth was apparent, then this variety of contradictory assertions would not exist.

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  194. [I]t does not follow that they cannot provide some knowledge about it, and that if we can know something about it, then there are varying degrees of accuracy of our knowledge, which means that there are better and worse ways of knowing that reality with our “rational powers”.

    I'm in full agreement. This is directly connected to the claim that traditions reveal or hide truths about the world. We are capable of reasoning to a better or worse degree, which gives us greater or lesser truths. The problem is that reason in itself is so weak and confused that we often cannot tell the difference between a greater or lesser truth, or between truth and error. But if reason were placed within a tradition that revealed the full truth about the world, then it would have a framework to rationalize and check itself against. This to a large degree alleviates the problem of reason's weakness, and it's one of the core claims of Christian tradition.

    Third, even rejecting our “rational powers” are insufficiently accurate and powerful is a position that itself is based upon reasons

    It's based on an examination of the limits of reason.

    For example, it is a universal standard of reasoning that one should accept good reason and reject bad reasons. Sure, what one would count as a good reason would differ, depending upon one’s background assumptions and conceptual framework, but the fact that one should accept what one counts as good reasons remains constant, and this standard is not a truth of logic at all, which means that there are non-logical truths that are common to all traditions.

    I agree. But this truth is trivial at best. What constitutes a good reason in one tradition can be a direct contradiction of what constitutes a good reason in another. One might say that we have a good reason to accept the results of scientific experiments; another might reject them. One might say that mathematical proofs should be taken as reasons for this or that; on the other hand, one might be the narrator of Notes from Underground: "But, good Lord, what do I care about the laws of nature and arithmetic if I have my reasons for disliking them, including the one about two and two making four!"

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  195. I would disagree that this necessarily means that such experiences are of the divine, because there are numerous hallucinogens and organic brain diseases that can cause similar, if not identical, phenomenological experiences.

    Any event can be given a post-hoc rationalization depending on your background assumptions. But, yes, from a rationalist/atheist perspective one could appeal to hallucinations and brain disease to explain mystical experience. I don't know why this explanation is to be preferred, but it exists.

    Why have councils, unless on the assumption that when a group of individuals is in agreement upon a matter, then there must be an objective truth that is being agreed upon?

    Councils are generally believed to be guided by the Holy Spirit. It isn't a matter of building a consensus out of human reason.

    Why not just have the Pope make a declaration, and leave it at that?

    The recent declaration of papal infallibility seems to allow for that possibility.

    You can argue from the “pre-existent common ground between traditions”. You have agreed that there is such a commonality, or else translation would be impossible, and thus there must be a launching pad from which to sustain a critique of an alternative tradition.

    I agree that there are practices and beliefs shared between traditions. However, this is not enough to argue for the Christian worldview over, for example, the Hindu worldview. Why should I accept that there are angels instead of a pantheon of gods? Why should I accept Jesus or the Trinity? No rational argument could compel me to do so.

    The question is how large this “pre-existent common ground between traditions” is. I think it is quite large, and you seem to think that it involves nothing but the truths of logic. Is that your position?

    I certainly believe that there are more common beliefs and practices between traditions than logic alone. We all eat, for example, and most of us point in order to indicate things. Nearly all of us record mystical experiences, and most of us present a version of God. I could list stuff like this for hours, but you get the idea.

    We can certainly get beyond our particular perspective to see matters in a different way by adopting a different perspective, which does not mean getting beyond any perspective.

    Which, again, undermines Loftus's point. If we only get beyond one perspective by landing in another, then it follows that we will simply be accepting a different set of arguments that other traditions are not necessarily compelled to accept. And, in that case, we'll just be "insiders" again. This applies even to Loftus's rationalism, which means that the Outsider Test refutes itself.

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  196. One way to defend this assertion rationally is to begin from the “pre-existent common ground between traditions” and work from there to show that, given that common ground, your tradition meets more of that common ground’s objectives and aspirations than the other traditions. Endorsing this strategy would not make you a rationalist at all, but only a reasonable human being.

    I believe that MacIntyre makes this point as well. However, like I indicated above, much of what Christianity proposes has no common ground with other traditions. The absurdity of God being incarnated as a slave and then being murdered in the most humiliating way possible is a good example. As you pointed out, this was something that not even most Jews were willing to accept. There are numerous other examples--the bizarre practice of Eucharist, for example--, but this should suffice for now. Other traditions likewise propose beliefs and practices wholly alien to us. I agree that it can be useful to show that one's own tradition accomplishes a shared goal in a superior fashion, but the limitations on these shared goals--and the differences between understandings of "accomplishment"--make this far from an ideal method.

    Wouldn’t you say that the fact that these traditions are not incommensurable in many important respects attests to the fact that man has discerned some “real truth with his own powers”?

    Yes. But, again, it's truth mixed with error; and there is often no way for a human to tell the difference between the two.

    From the perspective of tradition X, tradition Y’s use of A is logically invalid. Are you saying that once tradition X becomes aware of the logical invalidity of A when it is used by tradition Y, tradition X would continue to use A with full confidence in its truth, knowing that it is logically invalid?

    "Logically invalid" is a loaded term. What X would discover is that it was not convinced by Y's use of A. This does not entail that A is invalid. If A is an argument of the variety covered by the Outsider Test, then it could, for example, be an appeal to holy texts. In that case, though, if X was not convinced by A as applied by Y, then X's abandonment of its own use of A would entail a rejection of X's central belief system. This would certainly be the case with Aquinas's theology, which argues from Scripture primarily and from philosophy secondarily (ST I a1 q8 ro2). None of the arguments that Aquinas presents against the Quran are properly demonstrative, but are simply probable or even rhetorical (SCG b1 ch6.4). None would pass the Outsider Test.

    And this is true of any belief system you want to present. All of them have central "myths" that are asserted prior to argument, which become the axioms of that tradition. That these axioms are incommensurable and "unconvincing" says nothing about their rightness or wrongness.

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  197. Thus, I can believe that my parents are really mine with a higher degree of probability than I can believe that you are my father. After all, I have a number of lines of evidence that support the former, and absolutely none that support the latter. Certainly, my appraisal could change if I was provided evidence, such as that my parents failed a paternity test, that another set of people stepped forward to claim my as their child, that they have corroborating documentation, such as my birth certificate, with my fingerprints, and so on.

    But, as you have admitted yourself, what counts as a good reason in one time and place will be different in another. Thus probability equations will change. If we lived in a culture in which it was easy to fabricate evidence of the type you mentioned above, for example, then it would be easy to doubt the claim of that other set of people. (And this is hardly far-fetched, given the extremes of communist spy programs and of the domestic knock-offs we've been producing lately.) We're still stuck in verisimilitude.

    You would need a reason, over and above the sheer fact of performed miracles, to differentiate your trust in Jesus’ claims from your skepticism of those other figures’ claims.

    Why? This sounds like a retreat to rationalism to me.

    Then do you accept the claims of any figure in antiquity who was recorded to have performed a miracle?

    Certainly. Those associated with the Christian tradition, and perhaps those outside of it who God saw fit to use as messengers of one type or another. Can I provide an argument for this other than an appeal to tradition? No. But that does not entail that my argument is circular. Tradition is my axiom, and so I may deduce beliefs from it without circularity. If this practice is circular, then so is the Enlightenment appeal to reason.

    My point is that if the performance of miracles is a good reason to believe in a person’s religious claims, then that very reason would justify the belief in all religious traditions that have participants who have performed miracles that have confirmed their respective traditions.

    Which presupposes that other traditions could perform miracles without the Christian God. You're smuggling a hermeneutic that I reject through the back door.

    Thus, even in radically different conceptual frameworks, or traditions, there is still a huge area of commonality, which is indicative of a truthful and accurate connection with reality.

    According to which tradition is commonality a criterion for correctness? Or is this an appeal to the view from nowhere?

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  198. And what did Christian tradition say “analogy” was?

    I think we've already gone over this in our arguments over Pseudo-Dionysius.

    Regardless, the bottom line is that this entire account presupposes degrees of truth and falsehood, depending upon the degree to which our statements correspond to God himself.

    Yes. This is the issue of verisimilitude.

    So, once again, we are stuck with a set of impossible options:

    (1) Statement S is totally true about God iff S refers to all of God
    (2) Statement S is partially true about God iff S refers to some of God
    (3) Statement S is totally false about God iff S refers to none of God

    As we just saw, (1), (2), and (3) are each equally impossible. (Even (3) is impossible, because all statements, by virtue of referring even indirectly to reality, must indirectly refer to the creator of reality.)


    I'm glad that we're agreed regarding the impossibility of failing to refer to God indirectly. It will make what I'm about to say much simpler.

    The problem of speaking about God is a problem of verisimilitude: not truth and falsehood, but truth and what's sort of like truth. All verisimilitudinous statements refer to an appearance rather than to an object in its essence. As 1 Cor. 13:12 holds, "For now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face". What our statements about God refer to is that mirror. This circumvents all three problems you listed. First, it avoids the problem of absolute statements. Second, it avoids the problem of referring to "parts" of God: we refer to the mirror, in which God appears "darkly" and disparately.

    Third, it escapes the idea that we do not refer to God at all. As you point out, it is impossible to fail to refer to God, because all of reality is a mirror of God. As Augustine says, "Look where he is--wherever there is a taste of truth" (Confessions IV. xii (18)). But in Neo-Platonic fashion, some things by nature are higher than others, and so they will have a higher degree of truth. By referring to these things, we refer to God more perfectly. The highest thing of all is esse, which grounds even angels. Hence by fabricating the name "Existence Itself" we create a mirror that is superior to other mirrors.

    (I know. You just heard fingernails screech on the blackboard, didn’t you?)

    To an extent, yes.

    And with this particular example, there are a number of things that are identical between John and a lion, such as the fact that they are alive, they are animals, that they have limbs, that they have hair, that they have eyes, that they have a nose, that they have a mouth, that they have teeth, that they run, that they jump, that they procreate, that they are male, that they exist, that they are creatures of God, and so on.

    But "alive", "animal", "limbs", "hair", "nose", "mouth" and the rest are analogous terms. It is impossible for them to exist identically anywhere, because then the same thing would exist in two different places. Remember that not even substantial forms within the same species are identical to one another: they are each numerically distinct. Your theory of partial identity and partial difference rests on an underlying contradiction, which is the idea that one trait can appear non-analogously in two places at once.

    The only option is to say that the vagueness of analogy is prior to any concrete reasoning about similarity. All "partial identity" presupposes a deeper vagueness.

    All totally and absolutely true.

    The only totally and absolutely true thing in this case is the existence of a concrete, singular substance. The analogies that we place this substance in are not absolutely true but fall between truth and falsehood. For the analogies to be absolutely true, as you state, a single trait would have be identical in two distinct substances, which is impossible

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  199. Rank:

    Human reason is a fairly weak and confused affair. We can achieve truth through it, but this is often mixed with errors that reason itself is incapable of detecting. The endless variety of religious and philosophical traditions--or "lenses", as you put it--attests to this fact. If truth was apparent, then this variety of contradictory assertions would not exist.

    All that is perfectly true, but it does not mean that endorsing a tradition does not involve reasons, and thus reason. Surely, you are not saying that one can accept and embrace a tradition for no reason at all, and still be fully justified in doing so?

    But if reason were placed within a tradition that revealed the full truth about the world, then it would have a framework to rationalize and check itself against. This to a large degree alleviates the problem of reason's weakness, and it's one of the core claims of Christian tradition.

    First, that framework itself would have to be justified by reasons, and since we both agree that there are good and bad reasons, it would have to be justified in particular by good reasons, because if this condition is unnecessary, then the only alternatives are to be justified by bad reasons or no reasons at all, both of which are completely invalid grounds for justification.

    Second, even the Christian tradition does not reveal “the full truth about the world”, because the “full truth” would involve God, and Christianity denies absolutely that one can know the full truth about God, which would mean that one can never know the full truth about the world, either.

    It's based on an examination of the limits of reason.

    And that examination finds reasons to support the claim that reason is limited.

    I agree. But this truth is trivial at best. What constitutes a good reason in one tradition can be a direct contradiction of what constitutes a good reason in another. One might say that we have a good reason to accept the results of scientific experiments; another might reject them. One might say that mathematical proofs should be taken as reasons for this or that; on the other hand, one might be the narrator of Notes from Underground: "But, good Lord, what do I care about the laws of nature and arithmetic if I have my reasons for disliking them, including the one about two and two making four!"

    First, this truth is not trivial at all, but foundational. The fact that all human beings who reason about anything at all must use the same epistemic standards is actually the core feature of the OTF. This is because if your tradition X says that argument A is not a good argument for position P in tradition Y, then you cannot use A for P in X, either. For example, if your Christian tradition says that it is false that any claim to a miracle means that the claimant is divinely inspired, and thus rejects the religious claims of non-Christian miracle makers, then a Christian cannot use this very argument to support itself.

    Second, the fact that there are differences of opinions does not change the fact that some opinions are right and some opinions are wrong. With regards to those who reject scientific experiments, one could demonstrate their foolishness by first showing that they themselves use rudimentary experiments every day, such as by checking to see if it is raining outside after hearing patter on the windows, and then showing how people can be fooled and deceived when making inferences about what is going on around them, and then showing how scientific experiments try to control for those self-deceptive factors to minimize distortion. If someone is arguing in good faith, then that account should be compelling.

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  200. Third, the Underground Man can feel free to walk off a building in his contempt for the law of gravity. He can feel free to stop eating in his protest against the laws of the gastrointestinal system. The fact that he continues to eat and avoids falling to injure himself means that his claims cannot be taken to be his true beliefs, but only provocative statements by an antisocial provocateur. In other words, they can be taken to be bullshit.

    Any event can be given a post-hoc rationalization depending on your background assumptions. But, yes, from a rationalist/atheist perspective one could appeal to hallucinations and brain disease to explain mystical experience. I don't know why this explanation is to be preferred, but it exists.

    It is to be preferred on probabilistic grounds. Even a person who endorses the reality of miracles would agree that hallucinations caused by hallucinogenic drugs and organic brain diseases (e.g. delirium, epilepsy, schizophrenia, encephalopathy, etc.) are far more common than miracles. Therefore, if someone claims to have a mystical experience, then even under a religious framework, it would be more likely that they are substance-induced or due to organic pathology.

    Councils are generally believed to be guided by the Holy Spirit. It isn't a matter of building a consensus out of human reason.

    I never said anything about human reason. My only point is that it is an assumption of the church is that if religious figures achieve consensus upon an issue, then that is an indication of the objective truth of their agreed upon claims. Otherwise, why bother with any consensus-building councils at all?

    The recent declaration of papal infallibility seems to allow for that possibility.

    First, that very declaration was the result of a council, which reinforces my point.

    Second, even if it is possible, then why isn’t it actual? In other words, why not ban councils outright as completely unnecessary, given papal infallibility? There seems to be a presumption that consensus is indicative of objective truth.

    I agree that there are practices and beliefs shared between traditions. However, this is not enough to argue for the Christian worldview over, for example, the Hindu worldview. Why should I accept that there are angels instead of a pantheon of gods? Why should I accept Jesus or the Trinity? No rational argument could compel me to do so.

    Why not? If religious share the idea of a transcendent reality that is the cause of the world, and that communicates with the world through different messages and messengers in order to awaken human beings to the true status of reality itself, then that can be the basis for a discussion of the pros and cons of different traditions that are rooted in this common idea. Why are the Gospels superior to the Vedas? Why should one live one’s life according to one, and not the other? It cannot be simply due to random factors, such as the cultural and religious background of one’s place of birth. Rather, it must be due to something else, and the question is whether this “something else” can be agreed upon by those traditions united by this common framework.

    I certainly believe that there are more common beliefs and practices between traditions than logic alone. We all eat, for example, and most of us point in order to indicate things. Nearly all of us record mystical experiences, and most of us present a version of God. I could list stuff like this for hours, but you get the idea.

    Good. That’s helpful, because during your discussions on Hart, you implied that if “logic alone” could not differentiate between traditions, then the non-logical axiomatic assumptions of different traditions were essentially incommensurable assertions, because there was nothing other than logical truth that was common to all traditions. Glad we cleared that up.

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