Someone posted the following clip at YouTube, in which William Lane Craig is asked about me and about his view of the dispute between classical theism and theistic personalism:
Craig kindly cites my series of posts on Alex Rosenberg’s The Atheist’s Guide to Reality as having been useful to him in preparing for his debate with Rosenberg. (I’m gratified that the posts were helpful to him. I’ve long admired Craig and his work, and as I’ve noted before, his excellent book The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz was very helpful to me in coming to see how shallow the usual characterizations and criticisms of the argument are, and played a role in my abandoning atheism.)
Regarding
the discussion of theistic personalism in the clip, some clarification is in
order. First of all, the expression
“theistic personalism” is not in fact my own.
As far as I know, it was introduced by Brian Davies, who uses it in his
book An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion to refer to a family of
contemporary views he contrasts with the classical theism of thinkers like Augustine,
Maimonides, Avicenna, and Aquinas. (Also
relevant is Davies’ discussion in his book The
Reality of God and the Problem of Evil of the issue of whether God is “a
person.”) Davies indicates that
“theistic personalism” is the same sort of thing referred to by Norman Geisler
as “neotheism” in his book Creating
God in the Image of Man? (See
also The
Battle for God by Geisler and H. Wayne House.)
As examples
of thinkers who take positions characteristic of theistic personalism, Davies
cites Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, John Lucas, Richard Creel, Charles
Hartshorne, and Stephen T. Davis. As
examples of thinkers who take positions characteristic of neotheism, Geisler
and House cite Plantinga, Davis, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Linda Zagzebski,
and (especially) proponents of “open theism” like Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John
Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger.
I don’t think Davies, Geisler, or House would claim that these writers
are in agreement on all the relevant theological issues. But there is a family resemblance between
their views that sets them all off from classical theism. I have also suggested that William Paley and contemporary
“Intelligent Design” theorists work at least implicitly with an essentially
theistic personalist rather than classical theist conception of God.
Contrary to
the impression given by the discussion in the YouTube clip, the main issue here
is not whether God is subject to a standard of goodness external to him. The difference instead concerns more general
differences in how classical theists on the one hand and theistic personalists
or neotheists on the other conceive of God.
The classical theist tends to start from the idea that whatever else God
is, he is essentially that reality which is absolutely ultimate or fundamental,
and the source of all other reality. He not
only does not depend in any way on anything outside him, but could not even in
principle have depended on anything outside him. Nothing less than this would be God, so that
to say that there is no being who is absolutely ultimate in this way is in
effect to say that there is no God.
Different classical theists might spell this basic idea out in different
ways. The Aristotelian will emphasize
the thesis that unlike everything else that exists, God is not a mixture of
actuality and potentiality but is instead pure actuality or actus purus. Neoplatonism emphasizes that unlike everything
else in reality, God is in no way composed of parts, either physical or
metaphysical, but is absolutely One, simple, or non-composite. Thomists will emphasize that God is not “a
being” alongside other beings, and does not merely “have” existence; rather his
essence just is existence, he just is Subsistent Being Itself or ipsum esse subsistens. Followers of Anselm will emphasize that God
is not merely the highest reality that there happens to be, but is that than which
no greater can even be conceived. And of
course, many classical theists will incorporate all of these notions into their
account of what it is to be the ultimate reality and the source of all other
reality.
Theistic
personalists, by contrast, tend to begin with the idea that God is “a person”
just as we are persons, only without our corporeal and other limitations. Like us, he has attributes like power,
knowledge, and moral goodness; unlike us, he has these features to the maximum
possible degree. The theistic
personalist thus arrives at an essentially anthropomorphic conception of
God. To be sure, the anthropomorphism is
not the crude sort operative in traditional stories about the gods of the various
pagan pantheons. The theistic
personalist does not think of God as having a corporeal nature, but instead perhaps
along the lines of something like an infinite Cartesian res cogitans. Nor do
classical theists deny that God is personal in the sense of having the key
personal attributes of intellect and will.
However, classical theists would
deny that God stands alongside us in the genus “person.” He is not “a person” alongside other persons
any more than he is “a being” alongside other beings. He is not an instance of any kind, the way we are instances of a kind. He does not “have” intellect and will, as we
do, but rather just is infinite intellect
and will. He is not “a person,” not
because he is less than a person but
because he is more than merely a
person.
The
difference between classical theism and theistic personalism shows up in their
respective attitudes toward some of the traditional divine attributes. Classical theists insist that God is absolutely
simple or without parts; theistic personalists tend to reject the doctrine of
divine simplicity. Classical theists also
insist that God is immutable, impassible, and eternal in the sense of outside
time altogether, while theistic personalists tend to reject these claims as
well. These differences also affect how
the two views interpret claims about God’s omniscience, will, goodness, and
sovereignty, with theistic personalists tending to interpret these in a more anthropomorphic
way.
I have said
a lot more about this subject in a number of posts, links to which interested
readers can find collected here. The question of where Craig’s own views fit
is a tricky one. On the one hand, the kalām cosmological argument, of which
Craig is famously a champion, seems (as Geisler points out) clearly to entail
that God is eternal or non-temporal. On the
other hand, Craig suggests in his book The
Kalām Cosmological Argument that “God is timeless prior to creation and in
time subsequent to creation” (p. 152). (But
as Geisler and House point out, this statement can be read in different ways,
and while on one reading it is incompatible with classical theism, it is not
necessarily incompatible with it on another reading.) Craig has also been critical of the doctrine
of divine simplicity. I have responded
to his criticisms here.
Mr. Green, in the spirit of Hillary Clinton, says, "So what?"
ReplyDeleteAs I stated earlier, you need to direct your barbs at an actual target. You missed the point then, and you're missing it now.
This thread demonstrates the logical errors of TD. You've been invited time and again to poke holes in our arguments. If you refuse to try, then please stop this silly back and forth. You're not trying to defend it because you can't, and if you can't just admit it and move on. Or, just simply move on.
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteIt's is at it's heart a straw man argument therefore it begs to be ignored. Make an argument against the Trinity.
I did. I defined the Trinity in a way that you agreed with, and then showed how such a defined entity could not possibly exist if divine simplicity was true, because divine simplicity necessarily implies that the divine essence is identical to Being itself.
"Relations" in the Trinity are used in a different sense then "Relations in the Divine Essence regardless of they are real or whatever.
I know that. The relations between the different attributes of the divine essence are all identical, and thus are only logically distinct. The relations between the different divine persons are all different, and thus are really distinct. I keep this distinction absolutely clear in my argument, and I would love for you to point out where I confuse these two kinds of distinctions.
Indeed I found this in Garrigou-Lagrange commentary on Aquinas. Q28
Let’s look at that, shall we?
There are two kinds of “real relations”, according to G-L:
(1) Transcendental relations, which are relations that are included as part of the essence of an entity.
(2) Predicamental relations, which are relations that are not included as part of the essence of an entity, but rather are accidental properties.
Neither of these is possible, when it comes to the Trinity.
Aquinas would completely reject (2) as impossible, because he writes that “it is clear there can be no accident in God” (ST 1.3.6), and thus the divine relations cannot be predicamental relations, which are necessarily accidental properties. So, we can easily dismiss this possibility. However, Aquinas would actually agree with (1), as he writes that “in the divine essence we must note that, by reason of its supreme simplicity, whatever is in God is his essence: wherefore the very relations by which the persons are distinct one from another, are in reality the divine essence” (QDP 2.5).
There are a few problems with (1), though.
First, if the divine relations are the same as the divine essence, then you have obliterated any way to differentiate between the different divine persons, because each divine person has the exact same divine essence, and so cannot be differentiated only upon the basis of their common divine essence. If there is to be differentiation, then it must be on the basis of something that is other than the divine essence, which was supposed to be the divine relations, but now the divine relations are actually identical to the divine essence after all, and thus there is no longer any basis to differentiate the divine persons.
Second, if the divine relations are included as part of the divine essence, then this negates the absolute simplicity of the divine essence. Remember that any distinction in the divine essence is only conceptual and in our minds, but is not grounded in the reality of the divine essence at all. If the divine relations are part of the divine essence, then this necessarily implies that there are parts to the divine essence, some of which are identical in each divine person, and some of which are different in each divine person. But this is impossible, if the divine essence is absolutely simple.
Therefore, (1) also is impossible, because it either obliterates the grounds to differentiate between the divine persons and/or violates divine simplicity.
So, G-L’s distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations does not save the Trinity from my argument.
Try again?
You are still equating Relations/Persons with Divine Essence as identical inter-changable senses. They are still different senses. Accept reality and move on.
ReplyDeleteHow do I equate the divine relations with the divine essence when my argument explicitly says that they are different? I clearly say that “the divine relations would have to be distinct from the divine essence”. My entire argument assumes that the divine relations would have to be different from the divine essence in order for differentiation between the divine persons, which is absolutely necessary for the Trinity to be true. Thus, it is bizarre to me that you accuse me of conflating the divine relations with the divine essence.
It seems that you are attacking a straw man now, no?
>I did. I defined the Trinity in a way that you agreed with, and then showed how such a defined entity could not possibly exist if divine simplicity was true, because divine simplicity necessarily implies that the divine essence is identical to Being itself.
ReplyDeleteYou giving mere lip service to the definition you are not & have not incorporated it into your argument. How can tell? Well divine simplicity, divine essence and being identical to Being Itself is all one identical sense the sense of the divine nature but Trinity & all the things contained in it are still in a different sense.
Sorry fail.
>I know that. The relations between the different attributes of the divine essence are all identical, and thus are only logically distinct.
No you do not know. Any "relations" at all, logical or real in the sense of the Trinity are not comparable to any "relations" at all, logical or real in the sense of Essence/Nature. You wish to pretend the only sense difference here is one between logical and real relations. But the "relations" themselves in general, in the two different senses of Trinity & Divine Nature are not "relations" in the same sense.
Don't you see the difference?
>The relations between the different divine persons are all different, and thus are really distinct. I keep this distinction absolutely clear in my argument, and I would love for you to point out where I confuse these two kinds of distinctions.
All "relations" regardless of type, in general, are different between the two senses. You are still collapsing the senses. Pretending the Trinity is the same sense as Divine Essence and wrongly concluding the only difference between them is one is logical and other real with relations in general being understood as the same sense. Rather "relations in general" are different in sense between Trinity and Divine Nature.
Do you understand now?
>There are two kinds of “real relations”, according to G-L:
With this slip of the tongue I need not address the rest of your tedious straw man argument. If they are different kinds(might we just as well say different "senses"?) then they are not comparable as "real relations" in the same identical sense! Hence Trinity sense "real relations" are not interchangeable with any relations in the Divine Essence logical or real. So via the POC they cannot contradict. They are still different sense not the same sense which is required by the POC to produce a logical contradiction.
"Real relations" of the Transcendental kind are by definition not of the same identical sense as hypothetical "real relations" in the Divine Nature which would destroy the divine simplicity. How would Transcendental relations destroy the divine simplicity? They wouldn't. The real question is why are they called "real". They obviously are "real" in a certain sense but not in the same sense as a hypothetical real relation in the divine nature which would blow up the divine simplicity.
I'm sorry but at the end of the day there is no strategy by which you can save this straw man.
>How do I equate the divine relations with the divine essence when my argument explicitly says that they are different?
ReplyDeleteBecause you are still treating "relations in general" in both senses in the same identical sense and not different sense. A hypothetical "real relation" in the Trinity is in the sense of being a Transcendental relation. A hypothetical "real relation" in the Divine Nature would not be transcendental or logical and given the sense of nature it would divide the substance and blow up the divine simplicity.
After much teeth pulling I got you to admit in theory Trinity and Divine Nature are different senses of the One God & not the same sense so as to not violate the POC. But you are still treating the elements within each sense as identical to a corresponding element in the other sense. They are not you just found a more sophisticated way to maintain your straw man.
So you are still conflating the Divine Relations with the Divine Essence only you are being more clever and complicated about it. But it's the same song and it is still out of tune.
Time too take your medicine and give up the straw man.
Here is the real question we need ask here. In what sense is the relations between the Persons "real"? If it is not a "real relation"' in the same sense as in the divine nature which would divide the substance and blow up the divine nature?
ReplyDeleteYou said it yourself "Two `kinds' (I prefer senses) of real relations". Well at this time I don't know the answer to the above question but I can and do conclude via the POC they can't be in contradiction to one another since neither are "real relations" in the same identical sense but in different senses. Remember for there to be a logical contradiction A=A and not equal ~A at the same time in the same sense.
Relations in general, in the sense of Trinity do not equal the Relations in general, in the sense of Divine Nature in the same identical sense since Divine Person and Divine Nature are not the same sense as one another in being The One True God..
It's like that and that's the way it is my friend.
ReplyDeleteBTW don't you own a copy of SPEAKING THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE GOD by Greg Rocca? You should check out page 81. It talks about the different senses of "equivocation" used by Aquinas and Aristotle.
It mentions the differences between "pure equivocation" on the one hand(i.e. only similarity is the word symbol) vs a sense of equivocation "broadly understood" as even including analogicals. The footnotes cite the relevant quotes from Aquinas & his use of the broad sense in his writings.
You had as I recall conceded if the word "God" is understood in an equivocal sense then it is possible for the two senses to be both different in sense from each other and still alike.
Once you master the concept of comparing things of like identity in different senses and see that the Trinity is defined that way top down you will see the final futility in your whole enterprise. There is no logical contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity. That is just an objective fact even if in the end there is no God.
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteYou giving mere lip service to the definition you are not & have not incorporated it into your argument. How can tell? Well divine simplicity, divine essence and being identical to Being Itself is all one identical sense the sense of the divine nature but Trinity & all the things contained in it are still in a different sense.
So, the divine nature contained in the Trinity is a different sense from the divine nature? How do the senses differ, pray tell? Or, perhaps the Trinity does not involve the divine nature?
No you do not know. Any "relations" at all, logical or real in the sense of the Trinity are not comparable to any "relations" at all, logical or real in the sense of Essence/Nature. You wish to pretend the only sense difference here is one between logical and real relations. But the "relations" themselves in general, in the two different senses of Trinity & Divine Nature are not "relations" in the same sense.
My argument does not have anything to do with relations, but with distinctions. So, your point, even if it were valid, is irrelevant. My argument is based upon the following truths:
(1) The divine essence is really indistinct (and is logically or notionally distinct)
(2) The divine persons are really distinct from one another (and is not logically or notionally distinct)
(3) The basis for the real distinction between the divine persons is their distinct divine relations
(4) The divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence in order for them to be the basis for the real distinction between the divine persons
Do you disagree with any of these propositions?
And notice how the only “relations” that show up at all in (1) to (4) are the divine relations, and their only relevance is that they are the sole basis for the differentiation between the divine persons (i.e. (3)), which you have not contested. Furthermore, the only way that the divine relations could be the basis for the differentiation of the divine persons is if the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence (i.e. (4)), which you have not contested. Instead of calling them “divine relations”, since you seem so hung up on “relations” for some reason, just call them “X”, and say that X is that which occurs in addition to the divine essence in the divine persons that is the basis for the differentiation between the divine persons.
With this slip of the tongue I need not address the rest of your tedious straw man argument. If they are different kinds(might we just as well say different "senses"?) then they are not comparable as "real relations" in the same identical sense! Hence Trinity sense "real relations" are not interchangeable with any relations in the Divine Essence logical or real. So via the POC they cannot contradict. They are still different sense not the same sense which is required by the POC to produce a logical contradiction.
Like I said, I’ve never contested that the kinds of relations between the attributes in the divine essence are different from the kinds of relations between the divine persons in the Trinity. It’s just that this is irrelevant to my argument. My argument is based upon distinction and not relations, and so you really are barking up the wrong tree here.
"Real relations" of the Transcendental kind are by definition not of the same identical sense as hypothetical "real relations" in the Divine Nature which would destroy the divine simplicity. How would Transcendental relations destroy the divine simplicity? They wouldn't. The real question is why are they called "real". They obviously are "real" in a certain sense but not in the same sense as a hypothetical real relation in the divine nature which would blow up the divine simplicity.
ReplyDeleteI never said that transcendental relations would destroy divine simplicity. What I said was that the divine relations cannot be transcendental relations, because if the divine relations were transcendental relations, then the divine relations would destroy divine simplicity. And why? Think about it this way. You yourself have agreed that each divine person has the exact same divine essence. And then the key question is: How could different divine relations come from the exact same divine essence in each divine person?
If the divine relations are transcendental relations, then they must come from the divine essence, because they must be a part of the divine essence. After all, the definition of a “transcendental relation” is “a relation included as part of the essence of an entity”. It is distinct from a predicamental relation, which is not included as part of the essence of an entity, but rather is an accidental property.
Say that the divine essence consists of the divine attributes, and the divine relations, which would have to be the case if the divine relations come from the divine essence, as they would have to if they were transcendental relations. The only way for each divine person to have the same divine essence, the same divine attributes, but different divine relations, is if one divine relation is actualized, while the others are left unactualized. And the problem with that idea is that it violates the divine essence as actus purus (i.e. pure act) by leaving part of the divine essence unactualized in each divine person. And if you fully actualize the divine essence in each divine person, which would have to be the case if the divine essence is pure act, then each divine person would have all the divine attributes and all the divine relations, because the divine attributes and the divine relations come from the same divine essence, which would completely falsify the Trinity. Furthermore, this account introduces composition into the divine essence, i.e. part of the divine essence is actualized and part of the divine essence is unactualized, which violates divine simplicity. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine relations to be part of the divine essence, which means that the divine relations cannot be transcendental relations.
Because you are still treating "relations in general" in both senses in the same identical sense and not different sense. A hypothetical "real relation" in the Trinity is in the sense of being a Transcendental relation. A hypothetical "real relation" in the Divine Nature would not be transcendental or logical and given the sense of nature it would divide the substance and blow up the divine simplicity.
First, I’m not talking about relations, but about distinctions.
Second, the divine relations cannot be transcendental relations or predicamental relations.
Third, you are still attacking a straw man, because you are attacking an argument that is based upon different kinds of relations, when my argument is based upon different kinds of distinctions. So, you have completely missed the point of my argument.
After much teeth pulling I got you to admit in theory Trinity and Divine Nature are different senses of the One God & not the same sense so as to not violate the POC.
ReplyDeleteYup, I conceded that, which is why I avoid the word “God” to avoid the inevitable equivocations that occur. Fortunately, my argument as currently construed does not equivocate in any way, as far as I can tell. Your claims about my equivocating based upon relations is irrelevant, as my argument is about distinctions.
But you are still treating the elements within each sense as identical to a corresponding element in the other sense. They are not you just found a more sophisticated way to maintain your straw man.
What “elements”?
So you are still conflating the Divine Relations with the Divine Essence only you are being more clever and complicated about it. But it's the same song and it is still out of tune.
I’m not conflating the divine relations with the divine essence. You are doing so by claiming that the divine relations are transcendental relations, which means that they must be derived from the divine essence. I have shown how this is impossible. Furthermore, my argument clearly states that the divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence in order for the divine persons to be differentiated from one another.
Here is the real question we need ask here. In what sense is the relations between the Persons "real"? If it is not a "real relation"' in the same sense as in the divine nature which would divide the substance and blow up the divine nature?
Define “real” however you want. Say that the definition of “real” with respect to the divine persons is “X”. All I need is to say that whatever “X” is, the divine essence cannot be “X”. In other words, however you want to define “real” in “real distinction”, that kind of real distinction is present between the divine persons, but absent in the divine essence. If it were present in the divine essence, then that would violate divine simplicity.
You said it yourself "Two `kinds' (I prefer senses) of real relations". Well at this time I don't know the answer to the above question but I can and do conclude via the POC they can't be in contradiction to one another since neither are "real relations" in the same identical sense but in different senses. Remember for there to be a logical contradiction A=A and not equal ~A at the same time in the same sense.
Yes, and the two kinds of real relations are transcendental and predicamental, and the divine relations can be neither of them. So, I’m still confused why you bothered to bring up that distinction at all, especially since my argument is not about relations, but about distinctions.
Care to actually respond to my argument, and not a figment of your imagination? Reread my argument at May 11, 2013 at 4:07 AM. I’d really appreciate a response to that argument, which you failed to do, except to accuse me of equivocating between different kinds of relations, when my argument actually hinged upon claims (1) to (4) regarding distinctions, which I hope you’ll actually be able to recognize.
>So, the divine nature contained in the Trinity is a different sense from the divine nature?
ReplyDeleteWhat you just wrote above does not appear in any known orthodox X-ian definition or explanation of the Trinity.
Must you insult me with these straw man re-definitions every time the argument doesn't go your way?
X-ian definition: Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Persons vs 1Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which he acts.
So they have the same principle in identity but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
From the above definition (which I have repeated more times then I can count) how do you get to the idea it is claiming that the Trinity has it's own separate divine nature different from the one divine nature? Where have I myself made this claim? Nowhere I can recall.
It's your straw man trying to build a straw house. You conflate the different senses of Persons and Nature as one sense so you can create your straw man logical contradiction after all if they are identical in the same sense and one sense involves distinctions and the other does not then logical contradiction. Different senses then no problem. Your repeated responses have been nothing but attempts to ignore the definition while giving lip service to it. First it's claiming "relations" in the Trinity are interchangeable with "relations" in the Divine Nature which is the same thing as treating them as having the same sense. You can substitute "distinctions" with relations in the previous sentence it makes no difference you are conflating the senses to invent your non-existent straw man. Now your latest is to concoct out of thin air this idea the Trinity has it's own nature different from the divine nature just because "relations" in both are still different senses of the Principle of Action & not the same sense. If this is you whole method of argument at this point to make up a new straw man stop wasting my time.
>How do the senses differ, pray tell? Or, perhaps the Trinity does not involve the divine nature?
ReplyDeleteThat first part is a good question & it's too bad you don't get off your butt and go do some reading before you come up with rash & easily disprovable accusations of logical contradiction based on straw man argument & ignoring the POC. Why don't you try to read what the commentators have said instead substituting your own speculations and redefinitions? You are an amateur like the rest of us don't get ideas above your station.
I am not going to explain anything to you. You can do your own homework. My role here was to show you that your argument was a Straw man & I succeeded. You admited you can't have a contradiction if there are two different senses and ten thousand red herrings about what you think a Transcendental relation can or cannot do (because you have not bothered to look it up now have you?) aren't going to change that little fact. Nor is trying to claim at this point I am making a straw man of your argument which changes with every post.
If you want a more simplified popular summery of the concepts in Q27 -Q43 if Garrigou-Lagrange is too high brow for you read this then.
http://www.catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part1.php?t=2
You have been answered and refuted.
> How could different divine relations come from the exact same divine essence in each divine person?
After all my efforts and careful explanations you still assume "relations" between persons are "relations" in the same sense as the Divine Essence. You are still conflating the senses. You are still building a straw man.
I did all I could if you don't understand then I can only conclude you have some mental reservation keeping you from seeing it.
>Yup, I conceded that, which is why I avoid the word “God” to avoid the inevitable equivocations that occur.
So you really do is change the definitions or omit vital parts of the same to keep this festering turd of an argument afloat? That has been your consistent tactic. I have news for you shit doesn't need help to float.
>Care to actually respond to my argument, and not a figment of your imagination? Reread my argument at May 11, 2013 at 4:07 AM.
ReplyDeleteWow dguller when did you degenerate into Paps or djindra? Straw man arguments can be internally logical so what? It is still based on conflating the senses as one sense.
>Define “real” however you want. Say that the definition of “real” with respect to the divine persons is “X”. All I need is to say that whatever “X” is, the divine essence cannot be “X”.
Again with the assuming they are identical senses when the definition says they are different senses.
Whatever "X" is it is not the same as it's equivocal in the other sense.
What an easy way to argue, make up your own definition or caricature & when you are exposed turn around and with infinite Chuzpah accuse your opponent of your own argumentative sins.
We have expected better of you & you fail in this instance.
>(1) The divine essence is really indistinct (and is logically or notionally distinct)
ReplyDelete(2) The divine persons are really distinct from one another (and is not logically or notionally distinct)
(3) The basis for the real distinction between the divine persons is their distinct divine relations
(4) The divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence in order for them to be the basis for the real distinction between the divine persons
>Do you disagree with any of these propositions?
Do you still beat my goldfish? A question that assumes one owns a goldfish and has in the past beaten it. But what if one has never owned a goldfish?
Your questions assume PERSONS and NATURE are identical senses not different senses. If they are different senses then logically all sense of "distinction" in one is not the same as the sense of "distinction" in the other.
No matter how you do this argument this straw man is an epic fail.
>I’m not conflating the divine relations with the divine essence. You are doing so by claiming that the divine relations are transcendental relations, which means that they must be derived from the divine essence. I have shown how this is impossible. Furthermore, my argument clearly states that the divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence in order for the divine persons to be differentiated from one another.
ReplyDeleteI find that an incredible claim considering you only just now heard of these different senses of real relation from me today?
Already you are trotting out new straw men to deal with them? What? Do you own a hay factory or something?
Amazing!
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteWhat you just wrote above does not appear in any known orthodox X-ian definition or explanation of the Trinity. Must you insult me with these straw man re-definitions every time the argument doesn't go your way?
What do you mean? That the divine essence is identical in all three divine persons, and yet when one talks about the divine essence, it means something different? That’s your claim, not mine.
X-ian definition: Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Persons vs 1Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which he acts. So they have the same principle in identity but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
We’ve already been through this.
First, I have no idea what a “principle of action” is.
Second, you already agreed that each divine person is composed of a divine essence and a divine relation. The divine essence is identical in all three divine persons, and the divine relation is different in each divine person. The divine essence is the foundation upon which each divine person is God, and the divine relation is the foundation upon which each divine person is distinct from the others. Are you now changing your mind and disagreeing with this analysis?
From the above definition (which I have repeated more times then I can count) how do you get to the idea it is claiming that the Trinity has it's own separate divine nature different from the one divine nature? Where have I myself made this claim? Nowhere I can recall.
Because you said that when I talk about “divine essence”, it has different senses in the Trinity. Are you now saying that when I’m talking about the divine essence per se and talking about about the divine essence in the Trinity, then “divine essence” has the same sense in both contexts?
First it's claiming "relations" in the Trinity are interchangeable with "relations" in the Divine Nature which is the same thing as treating them as having the same sense.
Except I never made this move.
You can substitute "distinctions" with relations in the previous sentence it makes no difference you are conflating the senses to invent your non-existent straw man.
No, I’m not.
Now your latest is to concoct out of thin air this idea the Trinity has it's own nature different from the divine nature just because "relations" in both are still different senses of the Principle of Action & not the same sense. If this is you whole method of argument at this point to make up a new straw man stop wasting my time.
That’s not the argument at all.
That first part is a good question & it's too bad you don't get off your butt and go do some reading before you come up with rash & easily disprovable accusations of logical contradiction based on straw man argument & ignoring the POC. Why don't you try to read what the commentators have said instead substituting your own speculations and redefinitions? You are an amateur like the rest of us don't get ideas above your station.
ReplyDeleteWait. You make a claim, I ask what you mean by that claim, and the onus is upon myself to go figure out what the hell you are talking about? Wow.
I am not going to explain anything to you. You can do your own homework. My role here was to show you that your argument was a Straw man & I succeeded. You admited you can't have a contradiction if there are two different senses and ten thousand red herrings about what you think a Transcendental relation can or cannot do (because you have not bothered to look it up now have you?) aren't going to change that little fact. Nor is trying to claim at this point I am making a straw man of your argument which changes with every post.
You claimed that my argument was a straw man, because it conflated different senses of “relations”. I told you that my argument wasn’t based upon “relations”, but upon “distinctions”, and you just pretend as if it makes no difference, because whatever words I use in my argument, they necessarily equivocate between different senses. And what are these different senses that you keep harping about? You have no idea. Wow. How compelling.
If you want a more simplified popular summery of the concepts in Q27 -Q43 if Garrigou-Lagrange is too high brow for you read this then.
What?! You mean Aquinas talks about this stuff in the Summa Theologica?!
After all my efforts and careful explanations you still assume "relations" between persons are "relations" in the same sense as the Divine Essence. You are still conflating the senses. You are still building a straw man.
First, I don’t, actually. Even after I explicitly deny that I do this, you continue to claim that I do. Could you cite somewhere in our recent exchange where I make such a claim about “relations”? If you cannot, then it is you who have set up a straw man.
Second, your claim is an equivocal one. You can mean one of two possibilities:
(1) You can mean that when one says that the divine persons have “relations” between one another and the divine attributes have “relations” between one another, then by “relations”, they differ in terms of the kinds of relations. In other words, the kind of relation involved between the divine persons is a real relation, and the kind of relation involved between the divine attributes is a notional relation. However, under this scenario, they are both relations, just different kinds.
(2) You can mean that when one says that the divine persons have “relations” between one another and the divine attributes have “relations” between one another, then by “relations”, they differ in terms of one being a “relation” and the other being something else entirely. In other words, they are not different kinds or types of relations, but rather are in different classes entirely.
Which do you mean?
So you really do is change the definitions or omit vital parts of the same to keep this festering turd of an argument afloat? That has been your consistent tactic. I have news for you shit doesn't need help to float.
ReplyDeleteI’m not omitting anything. I’m just refusing to use a word that necessarily equivocates, because it simply confuses the issue. Otherwise, I will have to use words, like God1, God2, God3, and so on, to keep the different senses of “God” distinct. It’s much easier to just talk about divine persons, divine essence and divine relations, because the different aspects of that underlying reality is what “God” refers to anyway.
Wow dguller when did you degenerate into Paps or djindra? Straw man arguments can be internally logical so what? It is still based on conflating the senses as one sense.
So, I take it the answer is “no”.
Again with the assuming they are identical senses when the definition says they are different senses. Whatever "X" is it is not the same as it's equivocal in the other sense.
If they are equivocal, then they have different senses and referents. Are you saying that “relation” between the divine persons and “relation” between the divine attributes have different senses and referents? That they only share the same “term”? That’s an interesting tactic, because it means that only one of them is about God, and the other is about something else entirely. Or maybe you mean that they are analogous, i.e. same term, different senses, and same referent?
Your questions assume PERSONS and NATURE are identical senses not different senses. If they are different senses then logically all sense of "distinction" in one is not the same as the sense of "distinction" in the other.
First, just because two terms have different senses does not mean that they are incomparable. For example, “animal” has a different sense from “sensation”, and yet “sensation” is part of the meaning of “animal”. “Sensation” is an aspect or characteristic of “animal”, and thus despite their different senses, they share a common referent, i.e. animality. And that means that just because “person” and “nature” have different senses, it does not follow that they both refer to the same underlying reality, albeit in different ways, “person” as the combination of essence and relation, and “nature” as the essence part of the combination. So, you have to do more than just say that “person” has a different sense from “nature”, and rather have to demonstrate that they do not refer to a common underlying reality under different aspects.
Second, just because two terms have different senses does not imply that everything included in those senses are equivocal. For example, “dog” has a different sense from “cat”, and yet they are still both different kinds of animals. Therefore, just because “person” has a different sense from “nature” does not necessarily mean that everything included in the definition of “person” must be completely different and incommensurable with everything included in the definition of “nature”. You have to provide an argument demonstrating this conclusion, because it is not a priori and prima facie true.
I find that an incredible claim considering you only just now heard of these different senses of real relation from me today?
You find it “incredible” that I analyzed your citation of G-L’s distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations, and concluded that neither could be applicable to God? And yes, I did that right after you asserted it.
Once again, I would like to know if you agree or disagree with any of these propositions:
ReplyDelete(1) The divine essence is really indistinct (and is logically or notionally distinct)
(2) The divine persons are really distinct from one another (and are not logically or notionally distinct)
(3) The basis for the real distinction between the divine persons is their distinct divine relations
(4) The divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence in order for them to be the basis for the real distinction between the divine persons
Perhaps you will continue to avoid answering my question by claiming that “distinction” in (1) is different from “distinction” in (2), and not in the sense of there being different kinds of distinction, but rather in the sense that one is a distinction and another is something-other-than-distinction. Good luck with that. It is much more plausible to say that there are different kinds of distinction, and they are different from one another. There is real distinction, virtual distinction and logical distinction, but they are all distinctions of some kind or another. To flesh out (1) to (4), I would say:
(1*) The divine essence involves logical distinction between the divine attributes
(2*) The divine persons involve real distinction between one another
(3*) The basis for the real distinction between the divine persons is their different divine relations
(4*) The divine essence and the divine relations involve virtual distinction between them within each divine person
To put it all together, you have a Trinity, which is identical to three divine persons (i.e. P1, P2, and P3). Each divine person is virtually composed of an identical divine essence (i.e. E) and a different divine relation (i.e. R1, R2 and R3). When you flesh it out, you get:
(a) P1 = E & R1
(b) P2 = E & R2
(c) P3 = E & R3
(The distinction between P1, P2 and P3 is a real distinction, and the distinction between E & R in each P is a virtual distinction, but the kinds of distinction are irrelevant, as long as we can agree that there are some kind of distinction involved between P1, P2 and P3, and between E and R1, R2 and R3.)
Assume that E is not distinct from R1, R2 or R3. That means that E = R1 = R2 = R3. If you plug that into (a) to (c), you get:
(d) P1 = E = R1
(e) P2 = E = R2
(f) P3 = E = R3
Two possibilities occur here. Either (A) the E’s involved in P1, P2 and P3 are not identical, but rather are different, or (B) the R’s involved in P1, P2 and P3 are identical. That is the only way that (d) to (f) makes any sense.
If (A) is true, then it is false that there is a single E that is shared by P1, P2 and P3, but rather that there are three E’s (i.e. E1, E2 and E3), which are distinct from one another, much like R1, R2 and R3 are distinct from one another. That would look like:
(g) P1 = E1 = R1
(h) P2 = E2 = R2
(i) P3 = E3 = R3
However, it is impossible for there to be E1, E2 and E3, because there can only be one E (according to ST 1.11.3). Therefore, (A) must be false, unless one wants to abandon divine simplicity and monotheism.
If (B) is true, then it is false that R1, R2 and R3 are distinct from one another, because they are all ultimately identical to E, and thus R1 = R2 = R3 = R. That would look like:
ReplyDelete(j) P1 = E = R
(k) P2 = E = R
(l) P3 = E = R
However, it is impossible for R1, R2 and R3 to be identical, because that obliterates any grounds to distinguish between P1, P2 and P3, which means that P1 = P2 = P3 = P, and that falsifies the Trinity, which necessarily requires that R1, R2 and R3 be distinct, because it is based upon this distinction that P1, P2 and P3 are distinct (according to ST 1.28.1-2). Therefore, (B) must be false, unless one wants to abandon the Trinity.
However, if neither (A) nor (B) is true, then E must be distinct from R1, R2 and R3. As I argued a few times above, if E is identical to ipsum esse subsistens, or Being itself, which it would have to be on the basis of divine simplicity, then it necessarily follows that anything that is not-E is either a creature or non-being. The former option is incoherent, and the latter option falsifies the Trinity. The only way to preserve the Trinity is to reject the claim that E is identical to Being itself, which can only occur if one rejects divine simplicity. Or, one can preserve divine simplicity, but reject the Trinity.
In conclusion, if E is not distinct from R1, R2 or R3, then you must either abandon divine simplicity to preserve the Trinity or abandon the Trinity to preserve divine simplicity. If E is distinct from R1, R2 or R3, then you must either abandon divine simplicity to preserve the Trinity or abandon the Trinity to preserve divine simplicity. Either way, it is impossible for the Trinity to be true and divine simplicity to be true.
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteJust wanted to elaborate on something you wrote:
X-ian definition: Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Persons vs 1Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which he acts. So they have the same principle in identity but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
What is the difference between “that which acts” and “that by which he acts”? The former implies the active agent himself, and the latter implies the means by which the active agent acts.
For example, say that there is a man who is running. The man is “that which acts”, but his body engaged in a running motion is “that by which he acts”. This implies that there would have to be a distinction between a man and his body, which would have to be a form of dualism. Unfortunately, for Aquinas, the man would be partly constituted by his body, and so he would not look at his body as a means by which the man acts, but rather part of what it means for the man to act at all. In other words, the distinction between the man and the man’s body would be a conceptual or notional distinction in the mind that does not actually correspond to any real separation between the man and his body as really distinct entities. They are two ways of describing the same unified underlying reality.
But perhaps you have something else in mind by the distinction that you mentioned. Perhaps you are thinking along the lines of an independently existing tool that the active agent uses in the action in question. For example, say that there is a man who is hammering. The man is that which acts and the hammer is that by which he acts. In this example, the means by which the agent acts is ontologically distinct from the agent, and thus there is a real distinction between them. But this cannot be what you have in mind, because the divine nature cannot be ontologically distinct from the divine persons in such a way that there is a real distinction between them.
It would be helpful if you could elaborate upon the above distinction, because it seems to be absolutely crucial to the case that you are trying to make. It seems to me that “nature” and “persons” are either (a) two different ways of describing the same underlying reality, or (b) two different descriptions of two different aspect of the same underlying reality. Although (a) and (b) seem identical, they are actually different.
Think about it this way.
ReplyDeleteAs an example of (a), say that you are talking about God’s power and God’s intellect. According to divine simplicity, there is no real distinction between God’s power and God’s intellect, but rather God’s power is God’s intellect, and any distinction between them is solely conceptual and notional in our minds, and does not correspond to anything in the reality of God. God does not have a part where his power exists and another part where his intellect exists, and our talk of his power is only about the former and our talk of his intellect is only about the latter. Rather, our talk about his power and our talk about his intellect are ultimately about the exact same thing in reality, even if his power and his intellect have different senses in our minds.
As an example of (b), say that you are talking about an elephant. Since the elephant has different parts, we can talk about those different parts according to different terms with different senses. For example, we can talk about the elephant’s legs and the elephant’s trunk. The elephant’s legs and the elephant’s trunk are different aspects of the same underlying elephant, and although both are ultimately about the same elephant, they are about different parts of the elephant. So, we can truthfully describe an elephant as an animal with four legs, and we can truthfully describe an elephant as an animal with one trunk, and there is no contradiction between the two, because part of the elephant has four legs and another part of the elephant has one trunk. But note that we can only do this if the entity in question is a composite entity, i.e. is made up of parts, each of which can have distinct properties. Without the ability to compartmentalize the different properties and separate them into different parts, you would have a contradiction if those properties were opposite.
So, when you are making a distinction between the acting agent and the means by which the agent in question acts, then is this a distinction that is more like (a) or more like (b)? Or is there another way to look at it?
You have made a number of claims during this thread, and it would be helpful if we clarified them.
ReplyDeleteYou stated that our talk about the divine persons has one sense (say, S(P)) and our talk about the divine essence has another sense (say, S(E)), which I agree with. One way in which S(P) differs from S(E) is that S(P) involves real distinction, whereas S(E) does not involve real distinction. If S(P) and S(E) both refer to the same referent R, then that might lead to a contradiction.
One way to avoid such a contradiction is to say that the differences between S(P) and S(E) are only in S(P) and in S(E), and not in R at all. Therefore, R is safe from contradiction, and the contradiction is only in our minds. But that is a problem, because then the differences between S(P) and S(E) are only in our minds, and not in R in reality, which means that our ideas about the divine persons and the divine essence have no bearing upon reality, and are merely subjective truths about our psychological quirks.
Another way to avoid such a contradiction is to say that S(P) and S(E) refer to different aspects of R, and as long as those aspects of R can be kept distinct from one another and compartmentalized in some way, then the contradiction is avoided. Here, S(P) would refer to R(P), which is the entire divine person P, and S(E) would refer to R(E), which is the part of P that is the divine essence E. So, S(P) refers to the whole and S(E) refers to the part. The whole involve real distinction and the part does not involve real distinction.
You do not use either of these options, and rather opt for a different way to avoid the contradiction by saying that because S(P) and S(E) are different, it necessarily follows that any meanings contained within S(P) must be completely different from any meanings contained within S(E). So, if S(P) involves “real distinction” as part of its meaning, and S(E) involves the absence of “real distinction”, then “real distinction” in S(P) must be completely different from “real distinction” in S(E), which would avoid the contradiction because “real distinction” is equivocal between S(P) and S(E), and thus cannot involve logical contradiction.
The problem with this approach is that it is completely baseless. I can think of plenty of counterexamples to this claim that if S(X) and S(Y) are different, then any part of the meaning of S(X) must be completely different from any part of the meaning of S(Y). As I mentioned in an earlier comment, say that we are talking about “dogs” and “cats”. The sense of “dogs” (i.e. S(dogs)) is different from the sense of “cats” (i.e. S(cats)). According to your claim, it would necessarily follow that anything contained in the meaning of S(dogs) must also be completely different from anything contained in the meaning of S(cats). So, even though part of the meaning of S(dogs) is “being a canine” and part of the meaning of S(cats) is “not being a canine”, the sense of “canine” is completely different in S(dogs) than in S(cats). But that is absurd, because that would mean that if there was an animal that was a dog, then we could not necessarily infer that it is not a cat, because that is based upon the fact that a cat is necessarily not a canine.
You would have to justify this principle by using other examples before it could be used to validate your claims about S(P) and S(E). I have shown that it is certainly not a universal and general principle that always applies whenever there are different senses, and thus the burden of proof is upon you to show that it does apply to S(P) and S(E), even though it cannot apply to S(dogs) and S(cats).
And two more things.
ReplyDeleteFirst, you object to my claim that the properties of the divine essence can have a bearing upon the properties of the divine persons. You claim that since the senses are different, whatever is involved in the meaning of the divine essence cannot have the same meaning as whatever is involved in the meaning of the divine persons. So, if the divine essence necessarily involves the absence of real distinction and the divine persons necessarily involve the presence of real distinction, then there cannot possibly be a contradiction, because “real distinction” means something totally different in the sense of the divine essence and the sense of the divine persons. Therefore, one cannot infer anything from the divine essence about the divine persons, and vice versa, because they are completely different senses.
Fine.
Then explain this to me.
Aquinas argues at ST.28.2 that relations in creatures are accidents, but since God has no accidents, the divine relations cannot be accidents. Rather, they are substantial, and not accidental. Upon what basis does Aquinas make this argument? Solely on the basis of the divine simplicity of the divine essence. He says that “since all in Him is His essence”, it follows that “whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God”. In other words, divine simplicity necessarily means that there is no distinction between substance and accident in God (ST 1.3.6), and on the basis of the fact that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence (ST 1.28.2), it follows that the divine relations cannot be accidents, either, and must be substantial.
If your argument that the different senses of “divine essence” and “divine persons” necessarily prohibits any logical inferences between the two, because the terms involved in their meaning are necessarily equivocal, then Aquinas’ argument above is completely invalid. After all, part of the meaning of “divine essence” is the “absence of accidents”, and since “divine relations” has a different sense from “divine essence”, then it follows – if you are right – that the “absence of accidents” in the divine essence is completely different from the “absence of accidents” in the divine relations, which means that one cannot infer from one to the other. However, the fact that Aquinas uses this very inference implies that he rejects your construal entirely. After all, he does what you claim is prohibited! So, I think that your argument from the distinction of senses to the impossibility of logical contradiction involving the referents is bunk.
Second, Aquinas writes: “Since power is considered as being rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as of the essence” (QDP 2.5). But you wrote that “Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses”. How does that square with what I cited Aquinas as writing? He says that God’s power is “the principle of action”, and that “the power and action” are “as of the essence”, which means that the principle of action is God’s power, which is the divine essence. Could you cite a text that supports your claim that the principle of action is also identical to the divine persons?
I'm not explaining shit to you because you wore me out with your obstinate & easly disproven nonsense that the Trinity contains a logical contradiction.
ReplyDeleteYou don't understand Philosophy, Theology, the importants of definitions or basic logic.
The POC is very clear & so is the definition of the Trinity and you did not factor any of this into any of your arguments until after the fact and then it was just a bunch of red herrings & arguments by special pleadings. You only used the principle of identity not the POC. You gave and are still giving a straw man version of the Trinity. Since the begining you have, contrary to Aquinas and other X-ian Fathers claimed Persons where the same as Attributes which is just another way of treating the different senses as one sense. You never missed an opportunity to treat the different senses as the same identical sense & it's tiresome & it's still a straw man. It also prevents any constructive legitimate criticism you could have brought forth about the Trinity.
But you insist on defining for the X-ians their doctrines for them & at best you seemed to have skimmed Aquinas and have not read in any depth authoritative commentaries on the isssue for a better explaination.
Oh & I love this bit:
>Second, Aquinas writes: “Since power is considered as being rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as of the essence” (QDP 2.5). But you wrote that “Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses”.
So now you are telling me that Aquinas never uses the technical terms like "PRinciple of Action" to refer to anything in theology or philosophy other than God?
Bitch are you fucking serious? How stupid are you? What are you a blonde? This is theology(which has a technical language & methedology you clearly haven't bothered to learn) not a game of dueling Bible quotes.
In fact that is what you sound like! You sound like the brain dead New Atheist or Dawkins wannabe who cites "Thou Shall Not Kill" as proof it's wrong for God to judge people by ending their lives. Yeh the point of "Thou shall not Kill" is only the X-ian God created and is the author of life. He hold the patent on life so only he has the right to take it since he can give it in the first place & man does not have that right.
Your prooftexting Aquinas like a teenage Atheist who argues with X-ian Fundamentalists with a 4th grade education.
It's insulting.
Bottom line you lost. There is no logical contradiciton in the Doctrine of the Trinity based on the given definition & the application of the POC. It is not clear what the Trinity is or how Three Divine Person can be in One Nature and vice versa but the X-ians don't care if you can't figure out the "Mystery".
But a contradiction bitch pleez! Been there refuted that & you need to get over it and move on.
>You have made a number of claims during this thread, and it would be helpful if we clarified them.
ReplyDeleteDon't you think it would have been smart to do that before coming up with that festering turd of an argument that "proves" the Trinity contains a "logical contradiction"?
Or is Ready? Fire! Aim? your call sign?
So many ignorant mistakes here & you can't even accept the simple one you made about finding a "logical contradiction".
What happened to the humble dguller who wanted to learn & look before he leaped? What is dguller tied up in a basement somewhere and djinda is using his name now?
Get lost djindra/dguller!
You really don't comprehend what it means to keep the senses seperate do you?
ReplyDeleteDo you?
A "real relation" in the sense of Nature would be a contradiction since it would divide the essence and that is impossible because of the Divine Simplicity & the Divine Infinity since after all how can you divide infinity?
But the "real relation" in the sense of Trinity is not a "real relation" in the sense of Nature.
It is a "real relation" in a different sense between Persons not between Persons and Essence!
A "real relation" in a created nature is a mere Accident in a divine nature it is a contradiction.
OTOH Between Divine Persons(i.e. subsisting Centers of Attribution) it is God really Knowing Himself as Himself & really willing His Own Good Self.
That is the "real" here & because it is a Principle of Action in the sense of WHO. It is Three Who's that each fully & distinctly possess the One Simple What.
You really don't know what it means to distinguish between different senses don't you?
You really didn't read any of the books recommended too you? did you?
Ready? Fire! Aim?
Good grief!
To the other "Anonymous"
ReplyDeleteWhat a shameful, disgusting and sad example of debate that you've displayed here. Your condescending, arrogant methodology is no substitute for rational debate.
It is clear that you are way over your head both with respect to logic and theology, and instead of having the integrity to admit your inability to handle dguller's arguments, you resort to cussing and a false proclamation of victory.
My many disagreements with dguller notwithstanding, he has done more than many, many atheists in attempting to both learn and to debate intelligently. In my opinion, dguller tends to be a Last Word Johnny and can resort to very curious defenses when genuine holes are poked in his arguments, but that is predominantly not the case here (nor is it the case in many of his debates). He has tried to objectively analyze nearly every objection offered in this thread, and it shouldn't get you twisted because you disagree with him. Either demonstrate that your disagreement has logical substance or admit your inability to do so. Your latest tirade proves the latter.
There are clearly logical issues with the doctrine of the Trinity and divine simplicity, including contradiction. Until you or anybody else can adequately address those issues (hissy fits don't cut it), the decent approach is to simply admit one's lack of expertise (as Rank Sophist honestly did).
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteI'm not explaining shit to you because you wore me out with your obstinate & easly disproven nonsense that the Trinity contains a logical contradiction. You don't understand Philosophy, Theology, the importants of definitions or basic logic.
Your only defense against my argument is that different senses necessarily mean completely different meanings of everything contained in the senses. So, one can negate “real distinction” in the divine essence, and one can affirm “real distinction” in the Trinity of the divine persons. However, what “real distinction” means in the former is completely different from what “real distinction” means in the latter, and that is how a logical contradiction is avoided, i.e. by claiming equivocation between the meanings of “real distinction” in the sense of “divine essence” and “divine persons”. But for this to be a valid way to avoid the logical contradiction, it would have to be true that if two terms have different senses, then any meaning contained within those senses necessarily must be completely different and equivocal.
That’s it.
That’s your claim.
I’m still waiting for you to justify this principle, because I’ve already demonstrated that it is not general, not universal, not a priori true, and not prima facie true. Unless you can demonstrate the truth of this claim of yours, then it is unsubstantiated, and thus can be dismissed as just a preference of yours, which no-one is bound to accept.
So now you are telling me that Aquinas never uses the technical terms like "PRinciple of Action" to refer to anything in theology or philosophy other than God?
No, I’m saying that he uses the term “principle of action” as identical to the divine essence, and I was wondering if you had any references where it was also used as identical to the divine persons. You know, that’s why I specifically asked: “Could you cite a text that supports your claim that the principle of action is also identical to the divine persons?” I honestly don’t know of any, but that certainly doesn’t mean that they don’t exist. Just cite one, please.
Bitch are you fucking serious? How stupid are you? What are you a blonde? This is theology(which has a technical language & methedology you clearly haven't bothered to learn) not a game of dueling Bible quotes.
Temper, temper.
Bottom line you lost. There is no logical contradiciton in the Doctrine of the Trinity based on the given definition & the application of the POC. It is not clear what the Trinity is or how Three Divine Person can be in One Nature and vice versa but the X-ians don't care if you can't figure out the "Mystery".
There is a contradiction, unless you can defend your claim that if X and Y have different senses, then any meanings contained in the senses of X and Y are completely different and equivocal from one another. Go for it. I’m genuinely interested.
Here’s my position, and I’d appreciate your feedback on it.
ReplyDeleteSay that the terms, “X” and “Y”, have different senses (i.e. S(X) and S(Y)). And say that S(X) involves the presence of property P, while S(Y) involves the absence of property P. (For example, “divine essence” and “divine persons” have different senses (i.e. S(E) and S(P)), and S(E) involves the absence of real distinction, while S(P) involves the presence of real distinction.) If S(X) involves P and S(Y) involves not-P, then the only way to avoid a logical contradiction is if S(X) and S(Y) have different referents (i.e. R(X) and R(Y)).
This could mean one of two things.
First, R(X) and R(Y) are really distinct and ontologically separate entities. For example, “a dog” and “a cat” have different senses that refer to a dog and a cat, respectively. Since a dog and a cat are really distinct entities, it follows that if a dog has the property of being a canine and a cat lacks the property of being a canine, then there is no logical contradiction. After all, there is an ontological gap or separation between R(X) and R(Y) that divides any contradiction from occurring.
Second, R(X) and R(Y) are ultimately referring to the same referent R, but are referring to different aspects of that shared referent. However, this is only possible if R is a composite entity of some kind, whether the composition in question is real or virtual. (I’m ignoring notional composition, which is solely in the human mind, and not in reality, and which would be the case if R was a simple entity.) That way, the possible combinations could be:
(1) S(X) refers to the whole of R, and S(Y) refers to a part of R
(2) S(X) refers to a part of R, and S(Y) refers to the whole of R
(3) S(X) refers to a part of R, and S(Y) refers to a different part of R
(4) S(X) refers to the whole of R, and S(Y) refers to the whole of R
(5) S(X) refers to a part of R, and S(Y) refers to the same part of R
As long as (1), (2), or (3) is occurring, then a logical contradiction can be avoided between S(X) and S(Y). However, if (4) or (5) occurs, then there is a logical contradiction between S(X) and S(Y), because R(X) = R(Y). Furthermore, if neither (1), (2), nor (3) is occurring, then a logical contradiction is inevitable. So, if this analysis is correct, then a logical contradiction would occur between the absence of real distinction in the divine essence and the presence of real distinction in the Trinity of divine persons, if it could be shown that (1), (2) and (3) could not apply to them, or that (4) and (5) must apply to them.
Let’s see how this would work.
Say that the sense of “divine essence” is S(E) and the sense of “divine person” is S(P). S(E) refers to R(E), and S(P) refers to R(P). I hope that we can agree that S(E) and S(P) ultimately refer to God himself, and that God himself is a Trinity of really distinct divine persons, each having the same divine essence, but differing in terms of having different divine relations. You had no problem with this definition earlier, and so I’m going to use it here.
Now, let’s plug this into (1) to (3):
(1*) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself, and S(P) refers to a part of God himself
(2*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
(3*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to a different part of God himself
(4*) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself, and S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
(5*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to the same part of God himself
It’s clear that (1*) and (2*) cannot apply, because the divine essence is not the whole of God himself, but only a part, and a divine person is not the whole of God, but only a part. (4*) and (5*) also don’t apply, for obvious reasons. But, (3*) can apply, though. So, as long as the divine essence is different from the divine person as different parts of a whole, then a logical contradiction can be avoided.
But, again, this presupposes that it is a valid Christian belief that the divine persons are virtually composite entities that are partly the same divine essence and partly different divine relations, which means that the divine essence is different from the divine relations, even though they are really inseparable from the divine persons (i.e. P = E & R). And this is a problem, because Aquinas explicitly denies that the divine essence is different from the divine relations (ST 1.28.2), as well as denies that the divine essence is different from the divine persons (ST 1.39.1-2). But he might be equivocating on what he considers “the same”. More damaging, I think, is that if the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence, which they would have to be in order for the divine persons to be distinct from one another, then the divine relations are either creatures or non-being, both of which lead to huge problems for divine simplicity and/or the Trinity. Therefore, although (3*) would avoid a direct logical contradiction, it still implies a framework that ultimately falsifies either divine simplicity and/or the Trinity.
ReplyDeleteDon't you think it would have been smart to do that before coming up with that festering turd of an argument that "proves" the Trinity contains a "logical contradiction"?
You’re right. We should have started with your foundational claim. My bad. Now, let’s focus upon it, and see if you can justify and support it.
@"First" Anonymous
ReplyDeleteYou are a mindless cheerleader nothing more. I jumped into this debate and & after more than 100 post I showed there was no logical contradiction here because dguller was attacking a straw man & ignoring the POC.
He is still doing that & challenging me to "prove" a definition which by definition is a given, is a red herring.
What have you done to contribute here?
Nothing.
So why should I give a shit what you think?
You are a fraud dguller.
>You’re right. We should have started with your foundational claim. My bad. Now, let’s focus upon it, and see if you can justify and support it.
ReplyDeleteNo we start with a foundational definition & how it explains the Trinity.
You still act as if Persons and Nature are defined as the same identical sense!!!!
Hopeless!!!!
You can't even understand a simple concept like the POC yet you want to comment with authority on Theology?
>No, I’m saying that he uses the term “principle of action” as identical to the divine essence....
ReplyDeleteYou simple minded git! The X-ian definition comes from BenYachov's citation from the book A MAP OF LIFE by a Catholic!
It serves as a basic definition of the Trinity!
So now you are throwing Red herrings out because you can't accept the simple brute fact.
There is no logical contradiction in the Trinity. You keep confusing the senses!
You are not interesting in an intelligent argument. You just want to pettifog!
Get lost!
>There is a contradiction, unless you can defend your claim that if X and Y have different senses, then any meanings contained in the senses of X and Y are completely different and equivocal from one another. Go for it. I’m genuinely interested.
ReplyDeleteIt a definition! Definitions are givens!
Calling you a blonde is an insult to dumb blondes!
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteYou still act as if Persons and Nature are defined as the same identical sense!!!!
Nope. I’m assuming that they are not. I specifically say that the sense of “persons” is S(P) and the sense of “nature” is S(E). S(P) is different from S(E). I really don’t know how many times I have to say this. I’ve even tried to understand how S(P) and S(E) refer to God himself in different ways. It just turns out that no matter how you slice it, the Trinity is inconsistent with divine simplicity, because asserting them both leads to contradictions.
It a definition! Definitions are givens!
Aquinas himself doesn’t even accept your definition, and so why should I?
Calling you a blonde is an insult to dumb blondes!
“Be not quick in your spirit to become angry, for anger lodges in the bosom of fools” (Ecclesiastes 7:9).
(Non-Insane) Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteThanks for the kind comments. I think this "discussion" will be wrapping up soon. After all, it is fruitless to debate lunatics. Regardless, it has been helpful for me to better understand the logical issues involved in the Trinity. I'll be ordering some books on the Trinity to see if my objections can be answered.
>Your only defense against my argument is that different senses necessarily mean completely different meanings of everything contained in the senses.
ReplyDeleteNo it is a brute fact that different senses mandate that everything that is in one has a different meaning in one then the other otherwise we would be comparing identical senses!
How are you so thick that you don't get that simple concept?
>So, one can negate “real distinction” in the divine essence, and one can affirm “real distinction” in the Trinity of the divine persons.
Yes!!!!!Which is how Aquinas, Scotus, Eastern Fathers etc do it! If you had actually bothered to read their whole expositions on the Trinity!!!!!
But you didn't did you?
If you read G-L's commentary you would know this!
If you read the readingthesumma blog you would know this!
If you read the link I gave to the online addition of TOUR OF THE SUMMA you would know this & wouldn't be driving me crazy with this ignorant blather about non-existent logical contradictions & maybe come up with something more substantive!
If you read the book BenYachov recommended you would know this!!!!!
But no you need to pretend they are one sense or you might have to actually say "I was wrong"!
You needed to build a straw man rather then address the doctrine of the Trinity as is.
hopeless!
>if X and Y have different senses, then any meanings contained in the senses of X and Y are completely different and equivocal from one another.
ReplyDeleteYou can even formulate a proper question!
If X and Y ARE different senses then by definition any meanings contained in the senses of X and Y are applied differently according to the senses!
That means if you apply a real relation to a Nature it becomes a division of that nature, if it is created, or you declare it a contradiction if you apply it to a Divine Nature. But of course being a different sense then persons none of this relates to how the persons are as persons.
Why is the simple concept of treating two different senses as two different senses and not one sense so difficult for you?
Maddening!
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteNo it is a brute fact that different senses mandate that everything that is in one has a different meaning in one then the other otherwise we would be comparing identical senses!
I already gave a counter-example to this claim. Take the terms “dog” and “cat”. “Dog” has the sense of “canine animal”, and “cat” has the sense of “feline animal”. We both agree that the sense of “dog” is different from the sense of “cat”. According to you, everything that is part of the sense of “dog” is completely different from everything that is part of the sense of “cat”. And that means that “animal” in the sense of “dog” is completely different from the sense of “cat”. That should be enough to show you that your position is absurd, because clearly the sense of “animal” is the same in “dog” and “cat”, even though “dog” and “cat” have different senses.
Yes!!!!!Which is how Aquinas, Scotus, Eastern Fathers etc do it! If you had actually bothered to read their whole expositions on the Trinity!!!!!
I’m confused. Are you now agreeing with me that the sense of “real distinction” in “divine essence” is the same sense of “real distinction” in “divine person”, with the only difference being that “real distinction” is absent in “divine essence” while “real distinction” is present in “divine person”?
If X and Y ARE different senses then by definition any meanings contained in the senses of X and Y are applied differently according to the senses!
I’ve already given a counter-example to this claim. Furthermore, Aquinas’ own arguments show that he rejects this idea, as I’ve already shown at May 13, 2013 at 1:40 PM. So, you’ve got nothing here, my friend.
That means if you apply a real relation to a Nature it becomes a division of that nature, if it is created, or you declare it a contradiction if you apply it to a Divine Nature. But of course being a different sense then persons none of this relates to how the persons are as persons.
Except that part of the meaning of “person” necessarily involves “nature”, because each person has a nature, specifically a “rational nature” (ST 1.29.1). So, that means that you cannot say that the sense of “nature” is completely different from the sense of “person”. After all, the latter includes the former.
Why is the simple concept of treating two different senses as two different senses and not one sense so difficult for you?
I have no problem with treating different senses as different. That is not where we disagree. We disagree about whether it is true that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then it follows that everything involved as part of the meaning of S(X) is completely different from everything involved as part of the meaning of S(Y). I think this is false, and have provided a counter-example to it. I think that what is true is that there must be something in the meaning of S(X) that must be different from something in the meaning of S(Y) in order for S(X) to be different from S(Y), but it is ludicrous to claim that everything in S(X) is different from everything in S(Y).
>Aquinas himself doesn’t even accept your definition, and so why should I?
ReplyDeleteNow you are being dishonest! Where is he contradicting it?
“Since power is considered as being rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as of the essence” (QDP 2.5). -ON THE POWER OF GOD
X-ian definition: Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Persons vs 1Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which he acts.
So they have the same principle in identity but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
First both say essence/nature are the Principle of Action. So they agree. Where in OPG is Aquinas talking about the senses of the Trinity? Where in OPG/QDP does he argue or contradict the idea Divine Persons or the Trinity is not the PRINCIPLE OF ACTION? Where does he say in QDP/OPG that the Principle of Action has only one sense?
He is discussing the divine attribute of Power which being an attribute is a sense of essence not a sense of Trinity?
The Divine Essence is the Principle of Action? Of Course the Principle of Action is just short for God. So you really are going to claim Aquinas doesn't believe the Trinity is God?
The Trinity is after all the Divine Essence just in a different sense. Likewise the Divine Essence is the Trinity but in a different sense.
You will quote anything out of context to deceive now won't you as well has to construct another Staw Man!
The definition of the Trinity I gave came from a Catholic Book from the section of the Book that was about the Trinity. Your response take a treatise on the Divine Attribute of Power which is discussing the nature of the Power of God(a different subject) proof texting it & claiming Aquinas doesn't agree with the X-ian definition I got from a Catholic Book that was explaining the Trinity.
I'm insane? Really but you think it is sane to mislead people?
Wow you can't argue in good faith!
>“Be not quick in your spirit to become angry, for anger lodges in the bosom of fools” (Ecclesiastes 7:9).
ReplyDeleteSo if the X-ian God exists I'll go to Hell. But if he doesn't you have still built a straw man & as we can see from that OPG misquote you tried to deceive.
Gee that doesn't make Atheists look like evil liars at all.....not.
>No, I’m saying that he uses the term “principle of action” as identical to the divine essence, and I was wondering if you had any references where it was also used as identical to the divine persons.
ReplyDeleteWhy would Frank Sheed give a phony definition of the Trinity or a phony explanation on the differences between PERSONS and NATURE?
Why would his book be given an Imprimatur if it contained and inaccurate definition of the Trinity?
Granted Frank was a Lay Theologian but the diocesan Censor would have been a professional?
So how can you claim Aquinas doesn't agree with his definition?
I can see why you fight the definition. Your argument is after all a Straw Man presentation of the definition of the Trinity.
You need to justify the Straw Man at all costs!
>>You still act as if Persons and Nature are defined as the same identical sense!!!!
ReplyDelete>Nope. I’m assuming that they are not.
You can't even tell the difference between a treatise on a Divine Attribute vs a formal definition of the Trinity given in the Chapter of a book that is trying to explain the Trinity.
You are useless!
>I specifically say that the sense of “persons” is S(P) and the sense of “nature” is S(E). S(P) is different from S(E).
But it is still a straw man because you will not allow God to be used as an equivocal term regarding the unknowability of God even thought Aquinas says it is equivocal in one of my citations which you ignored.
> I really don’t know how many times I have to say this. I’ve even tried to understand how S(P) and S(E) refer to God himself in different ways
They are defined that way by the Fathers and the Catholic Church. You are not suppose to understand how it is possible. That is the mystery.
That they are different given senses of God & not the same sense shows there is no logical contradiction.
Just a mystery.
>It just turns out that no matter how you slice it, the Trinity is inconsistent with divine simplicity, because asserting them both leads to contradictions.
Only because you refuse to believe the X-ian Roman Church, Catholic writers, Fathers etc define PERSONS and NATURE as different senses of God.
You need them to be the same.
Plus there is lying to me telling me Aquinas wouldn't agree with my definition & failing on your part to believe a Catholic writer who has educated generations of Catholics on the doctrine of the Trinity(Frank Sheed).
Don't you see how wrong that is?
Or is "Another" anonymous right in that you need the last word & you need it so much you can't even entertain how you might be wrong?
This is why you are wrong
You are giving a straw man argument. Not an illogical argument. The argument you have been giving contains no logical contradictions given the premises. But your premise that PERSON & NATURE are identical senses is wrong because of the definition of the Trinity.
All you have been doing is giving arguments as to why it's illogical to believe in Three Persons equals One Person or Three Natures equals One Nature.
I have tried to be logical with you but you refuse logic.
I will bet real money Feser thinks Frank Sheed has given a correct definition & I bet he won't agree with you that PERSONS & NATURE are inter-changable identical senses of God.
I bet Feser wouldn't agree with you that DIVINE PERSON are just mere personified Divine Attributes.
Ask him & prove me wrong.
>Now, let’s plug this into (1) to (3):
ReplyDelete>(1*) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself, and S(P) refers to a part of God himself
false!
>(2*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
False!
>(3*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to a different part of God himself
False
>(4*) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself, and S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
True!
>(5*) S(E) refers to a part of God himself, and S(P) refers to the same part of God himself
False!
>It’s clear that (1*) and (2*) cannot apply, because the divine essence is not the whole of God himself, but only a part, and a divine person is not the whole of God, but only a part. (4*) and (5*) also don’t apply, for obvious reasons.
The Divine Essence is the Whole God in one sense & the divine person is the Whole God in another sense.
There is no argument given why that cannot be so given that both are God who is an Unknown!
>But, (3*) can apply, though. So, as long as the divine essence is different from the divine person as different parts of a whole, then a logical contradiction can be avoided.
The distinct Persons of the Trinity are not Parts nor do they possess parts of the One Divine which can't be divided because of the Infinite and Simple Nature..
Each Person in Himself possesses the Whole of the Divine Nature & in the divine nature the Persons are identical.
The One Divine Essence is in the Three Persons who are only distinct from one another & not the Essence & the Persons are really distinct from one another in that they have real relations between them but these real relations are not real relations in the sense of essence because real relations in the sense of essence would divide the divine nature which is a contradiction.
Why don't you get this?
Anon: This thread demonstrates the logical errors of TD. You've been invited time and again to poke holes in our arguments.
ReplyDeleteWell, you've certainly missed my points. You don't have to like them, but to do more than show — at most — that a given argument is insufficient, you would need first to prove that you have a definitive and comprehensive description of the Trinity. Which means not merely claiming, but actually demonstrating that this is possible without understanding the divine Essence. If you don't want to do that, fine, but just be aware of the scope of what you're actually arguing.
>Aquinas doesn't agree with you.
ReplyDeleteThe Teaching Of The Church On The Trinity
The Catholic doctrine on the Trinity is expressed in the various creeds and definitions, such as the Apostles' Creed, the Athanasian Creed, the Nicene Creed, and many others of later date, and in Denzinger.[40] Finally, the Catholic belief in the Trinity was summed up by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) in that famous chapter, : "Firmly we believe and simply we confess that one alone is true God, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, three persons, but one essence, one substance, and one nature entirely simple. The Father is from no one, the Son from the Father alone, and the Holy Ghost equally from both... consubstantial, co-equal, co-omnipotent, and co-eternal... . We confess and believe with Peter Lombard that it is one supreme being, incomprehensible and ineffable; this supreme being is truly the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, three persons together and each one singly; and therefore in God there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing, that substance, that essence, that divine nature."[41]
Again, "No real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, but a real distinction exists between the persons among themselves."[42]
Again, the three persons are one principle of operation without, because the divine operation without proceeds from the divine omnipotence, which is common to the three divine persons.[43]
This definition of the Fourth Lateran Council was amplified by the Council of Florence (1439) in the dogmatic decree of the union of the Greeks: "We define that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son and that He has His essence and His subsisting being simultaneously from the Father and the Son, and that He proceeds eternally from both as from one principle and by one spiration."[44] Other definitions about each person in particular may be found here.
The mystery of the Trinity may be more briefly stated as the mystery of one God in three divine persons. But in opposition to the pseudo-synod of Pistoia it should be said that it is not one God divided into three persons but one God in three distinct persons, since there is no real distinction in the Godhead Himself, as the Eleventh Council of Toledo declared: "The Godhead is not reduced to single persons and is not increased into three persons."[45]-Garrigou-Lagramge-THE TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATOR (which is of course a commentary on the SUMMA Q27 to Q83) page 22
G-L agrees with Frank! No surprise!
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the wholeTrinity.(ST 1 Q45 Ar 6)
ReplyDeletedguller you need to stop with the Ready! FIRE! AIM!
dguller,
ReplyDeleteThis thread is about 3-4 hundred posts too long. Many times you repeated yourself in the vain attempt to get some contributors to understand basic logic. You've done an admirable job addressing nearly every objection with a better spirit than some of the so-called Christians here.
Although I've been called a cheerleader, I've been involved in these types of debates for a very long time. It was refreshing to take a break and watch somebody else take a few (well....many) swings at the topic (although I was ready to do "combat" with Mr. Green). Since I disagree with you so often, it was good to be on the same side this time.
All the best.
Now you are being dishonest! Where is he contradicting it?
ReplyDeleteI was talking about your definition that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then every part of the meaning of S(X) must be completely different from every part of the meaning of S(Y). I wasn’t talking about his definition of “principle of action”, or the Trinity, or anything like that.
The definition of the Trinity I gave came from a Catholic Book from the section of the Book that was about the Trinity.
I thought Ben gave the definition, and not Anonymous. ;)
Really but you think it is sane to mislead people?
Yes, tell me about misleading people.
But it is still a straw man because you will not allow God to be used as an equivocal term regarding the unknowability of God even thought Aquinas says it is equivocal in one of my citations which you ignored.
First, if you want me to be tedious and use “God1” to refer to the totality of God himself, “God2” to refer to each divine person, “God3” to refer to the divine essence, “God4” to refer to the divine relations, and so on, then I can do that, but what’s the point? It would be needlessly complicated when I can just use terms like “the totality of God himself”, “each divine person”, “the divine essence”, “the divine relations”, and so on, especially when doing so would avoid equivocation. Do you want to be deliberately obfuscating to appear mysterious? What is wrong is clarity?
Second, by “equivocal”, he probably meant “analogous”. As you said, there is the broad category of “equivocal”, by which he means “non-univocal”, and that category can be divided into “pure equivocal” and “analogical”. After all, if he “God” was a purely equivocal term, then it would differ in sense and referent, meaning that you would not even be talking about the same thing in the different uses of “God”.
They are defined that way by the Fathers and the Catholic Church. You are not suppose to understand how it is possible. That is the mystery. That they are different given senses of God & not the same sense shows there is no logical contradiction. Just a mystery.
But it isn’t a mystery. Here is my definition again: “God himself is a Trinity of really distinct divine persons, each having the same divine essence, but differing in terms of having different divine relations.” You accepted it earlier. Do you now reject it? If you accept it, then I have analyzed how it can have different senses that each truthfully correspond to their referent, and that can only be if God himself involves composition, either real or virtual. Is that acceptable Catholic doctrine? I doubt that it is, which means that the only way to understand the Trinity without never-ending equivocation is impossible. There is only a mystery if one demands an infinite series of equivocal deferrals of meaning that never get anywhere.
Only because you refuse to believe the X-ian Roman Church, Catholic writers, Fathers etc define PERSONS and NATURE as different senses of God. You need them to be the same.
ReplyDeleteNope. I just need it to be true that part of their senses to be the same. Do you disagree with that? Do you disagree that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then S(X) can be partly the same as S(Y)? I’ve already given an example in which this is true, e.g. S(dog) and S(cat) above.
Plus there is lying to me telling me Aquinas wouldn't agree with my definition & failing on your part to believe a Catholic writer who has educated generations of Catholics on the doctrine of the Trinity(Frank Sheed).
I said that Aquinas wouldn’t accept your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then every part of the meaning of S(X) must be completely different from every part of the meaning of S(Y). Here is what I actually wrote:
“If your argument that the different senses of “divine essence” and “divine persons” necessarily prohibits any logical inferences between the two, because the terms involved in their meaning are necessarily equivocal, then Aquinas’ argument above is completely invalid. After all, part of the meaning of “divine essence” is the “absence of accidents”, and since “divine relations” has a different sense from “divine essence”, then it follows – if you are right – that the “absence of accidents” in the divine essence is completely different from the “absence of accidents” in the divine relations, which means that one cannot infer from one to the other. However, the fact that Aquinas uses this very inference implies that he rejects your construal entirely.”
As is clear in that quote, I was not talking about your definition of the Trinity at all. Maybe if you slowed down, took a Xanax, and actually read what I wrote, then you wouldn’t keep attacking a straw man of your imagination?
>(4*) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself, and S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
True!
I just want to be clear here, because – as always – there is a danger of equivocation. You say that you agree with the following propositions contained in (4*) above:
(1) S(E) refers to the whole of God himself
(2) S(P) refers to the whole of God himself
My question is: Is “the whole of God himself” in (1) the same as “the whole of God himself” in (2)? If it is the same, then you have a logical contradiction if you assume that the characteristics of S(E) and S(P) both occur in God himself as a whole, and not as occurring in different aspects (or parts) of God himself.
If the meaning of “the whole of God himself” is different in some way between (1) and (2), then in what way? It seems to me that you would have to equivocate on the meaning of “whole” and/or “God himself”. If you want to equivocate on “whole”, then what does “whole” mean in (1) that differs from (2)? If you want to equivocate on “God himself”, then what does “God himself” mean in (1) that differs in (2)?
If you cannot answer these questions, then you have no grounds for denying that “the whole of God himself” in (1) means the exact same thing as “the whole of God himself” in (2), and then you have a logical contradiction after all, despite S(E) being different from S(P), which kind of completely undermines your previous argument.
The Divine Essence is the Whole God in one sense & the divine person is the Whole God in another sense.
ReplyDeleteIn what sense can one say that E is “the Whole God” and in what sense can one say that P is “the Whole God”? If “the Whole God” means the same in both, then it is logically impossible for E and P to both apply to “the Whole God” without logical contradiction occurring. For example, to say that the dog as a whole is brown and that the dog as a whole is white is logically contradictory, because the former implies a dog that is totally brown and the latter implies a dog that is totally white, and a dog cannot be totally brown and totally white without a contradiction occurring.
But this hinges upon what you mean by “whole”, “total”, “entire”, “full”, and so on. To me, to talk about the whole X (or the total X, the entire X, the fully X) means that one is talking about X without leaving any of X out in a residual fashion. There is nothing left over about X that is not being talked about. So, to say that E is the whole God means that there is nothing left over in God that does not involve E, and to say that P is the whole God means that there is nothing left over in God that does not involve P. The problem is that this is a contradiction, because it means that E covers the totality of God and P covers the totality of God, which means that the totality of God involves real distinction and does not involve real distinction, which is like saying that a dog is entirely brown and entirely white, i.e. a logical contradiction.
So, if you mean by “whole” the standard meaning of “wholeness”, then you necessarily have a logical contradiction, even if S(E) differs from S(P). If you mean something else, then what do you mean?
The distinct Persons of the Trinity are not Parts nor do they possess parts of the One Divine which can't be divided because of the Infinite and Simple Nature..
How can the divine persons be distinct from one another and not be some kind of parts? If X involves A and B, and A is distinct from B, then A and B are parts of X. In other words, if X lacked A or B, then it would not be X at all, but something else, and so A and B each partially determine the identity of X.
Each Person in Himself possesses the Whole of the Divine Nature & in the divine nature the Persons are identical.
Yup. That’s why I said that E is exactly identical in P1, P2 and P3.
The One Divine Essence is in the Three Persons who are only distinct from one another & not the Essence & the Persons are really distinct from one another in that they have real relations between them but these real relations are not real relations in the sense of essence because real relations in the sense of essence would divide the divine nature which is a contradiction.
I understand that the divine relations must be distinct from the divine essence. The problem with that claim is that since the divine essence is Being itself, then if the divine relations are not the divine essence, then they are not Being itself, and if they are not Being itself, then they are either creatures or non-Being. The former leads to absurdity, and the latter obliterates any grounds for the divine persons being distinct from one another. Again, this claim does not save your argument.
And you must see that you only have two options here:
ReplyDelete(1) The divine essence is the same as the divine relations
(2) The divine essence is different from the divine relations
If (1) is true, then it is impossible for both the Trinity to be true and divine simplicity to be true, on pain of contradiction. If (2) is true, then it is impossible for both the Trinity to be true and divine simplicity to be true, on pain of contradiction.
The only solution is to say that neither (1) nor (2) is true, which is incoherent, because to say that neither X nor not-X is true is logically equivalent to saying both X and not-X true. Therefore, (1) or (2) must be true, but either way, you must abandon either the Trinity or divine simplicity.
>I thought Ben gave the definition, and not Anonymous. ;)
ReplyDeleteIt originated in Ben's post and is repeated by Anonymous!
>Yes, tell me about misleading people.
I caught you in a lie. You said Aquinas would not agree with the definition. I showed you that your quote doesn't address the issue and my quotes do as they are actual definitions.
>Here is my definition again: “God himself is a Trinity of really distinct divine persons, each having the same divine essence, but differing in terms of having different divine relations.”
Then you are all but admiting here I am right because you are giving me your definition not the one held in common by all the X-ian Churches.
Straw man dguller!
The above is not the language used by the Christians. It is "the One Divine Essence" not "same divine essence" since the later can imply the essence can be divided.
You are giving me a straw man.
That is all you are doing at this point.
Your argument has devolved into justifying Sophistry!
>In what sense can one say that E is “the Whole God” and in what sense can one say that P is “the Whole God”?
In different senses not the same sense.
>If “the Whole God” means the same in both, then it is logically impossible for E and P to both apply to “the Whole God” without logical contradiction occurring.
Not if "rhw Whole God" is an equivocal term. Which it is. Part of your straw man is to deny the role of equivocal terms in the definition of the Trinity.
Pathetic at this point.
>You accepted it earlier.
ReplyDeleteI assumed then you where arguing in good faith but you are not. You read your own definitions into Catholic and general Christian doctrines & care nothing for nor cite authoritative definitions.
You even complain about the official definitions because they get in the way of your Straw Man.
Guess what? "Real Relations" between Divine Persons are not "Real Relations" in the same sense as in the Essence.
Different senses otherwise we would be comparing Nature & Persons in the same sense!
Your argument is a Straw Man!
Get over it!
PS No amount of Argument by Special pleading on your part will change that brute fact!
Mr. Green, what is the point of all of this? If you think that you can logically defend TD, why won't you do so? Why do you insist on revising what actually occurred?
ReplyDeleteAgain, I made a claim: TD is rationally indefensible.
Said claim is based on analyses of said doctrine as enunciated by those who believe it. At the end of the day, logical incoherence and/or contradictions are firmly entrenched. It is then perfectly reasonable to say that said doctrine is rationally indefensible.
It is clear that you disagree, so you've been invited numerous times to try your hand at resolving the contradictions. Time and again, you've avoided such an attempt. That's your prerogative, but if you have no stomach for such a debate, why don't you just drop it?
Instead of demonstrating how such a doctrine can be logically defended, you offered a useless counterargument that had no substantive relation to my claim.
You write,
You don't have to like them, but to do more than show — at most — that a given argument is insufficient, you would need first to prove that you have a definitive and comprehensive description of the Trinity.
Do you mean that I should have a definitive and comprehensive description of the God (Trinity) or is it TD as defended by those who believe it? You answer that with your follow up comment (below), but your statement is an unjustified tactic (see below).
Critics of TD attack the latter. If Mr. Green or anybody else insists that the doctrine of the Trinity is the truth, then they should expect rational persons to ask what that doctrine is. So far, believers in said doctrine have fired logical blanks, and since you refuse to defend it, you cede by default.
You go on...
Which means not merely claiming, but actually demonstrating that this is possible without understanding the divine Essence.
So, in order to cogently analyze the claims made by Trinitarians, one must comprehensively understand the divine essence? Is this a complete knowledge of God (quite impossible, you know) or is it merely a comprehensive knowledge of what Trinitarians claim? Nobody sane claims the former, so that leaves us with the claims made by TD's adherents. You appear to be arguing that since a comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence is unobtainable, TD is immune from rational criticism--in spite of the fact that Trinitarians have written reams of material trying to do what you appear to say cannot be done. Interesting. Beyond reason but not contrary to reason?? No cigar. Trinitarian explanations are definitely contrary to reason, your "flying pigs" counterargument notwithstanding.
Of course, you are free to show otherwise, but I'll not hold my breath.
>But it isn’t a mystery...........which means that the only way to understand the Trinity without never-ending equivocation is impossible.
ReplyDeleteBut the Trinity is defined and believed to be a mystery therefore it is a never-ending equivocation. There is no other Christian Trinity by definition.
Wow all this time where you where trying to talk about a Trinity we could understand?
No wonder you built the Straw Man and kept on collapsing the different senses into one sense?
>And you must see that you only have two options here:
Sorry but I don't have either of these Straw men.
>(1) The divine essence is the same as the divine relations I add: in the equivocal sense of both being the One Ineffible Unknowable God
>(2) The divine essence is different from the divine relations I add:in that both are different senses of the One equivocal Ineffible Unknowable God
That is the Trinity by definition accept it or get lost!
Your Straw Men make me ill.
@Mr Green
ReplyDeletedguller's cheerleader isn't offering you an argument. He or she just sits on the sidelines & shakes their pom poms while jumping up and down.
And don't try to hurt yourself trying to figure out what May 15, 2013 at 12:40 PM means.
I've read it twice and I don't think it is real English.
I wouldn't give em the Time of Day.
>But this hinges upon what you mean by “whole”, “total”, “entire”, “full”, and so on.
ReplyDeleteWhy is it so hard for you to look up how the Trinitarians define the meanings of these words & why should they give a shit about the meanings you make up off the top of your head to fit your straw man?
dguller why do you hate formal definitions?
Why do you refuse to give Aquinas' or G-L definitions of both NATURE and PERSONS?
Why do you insist on making up your own?
Anonymous:
ReplyDeleteI caught you in a lie. You said Aquinas would not agree with the definition. I showed you that your quote doesn't address the issue and my quotes do as they are actual definitions.
I did not lie. I said that Aquinas would reject your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y). Focus, please.
The above is not the language used by the Christians. It is "the One Divine Essence" not "same divine essence" since the later can imply the essence can be divided.
First, I want to clarify something, if you don’t mind. Say that there are two human beings. In one sense, we can say that there is only one human essence, because the human essence that each human being shares is the same human essence. The human essence is formally identical in each human being. In another sense, we can say that there are two human essences, because the human essence is instantiated in two distinct entities. The human essence is numerically different in each human being.
With regards to the divine persons, when you say that there is “one divine essence”, then are you talking about formal identity or numerical identity? I would agree that the divine essence is formally identical in each divine person. However, I would disagree that the divine essence is numerically identical in each person, because that would mean that there is only one person that is instantiating the divine essence. So, once again, there is the possibility of equivocation involving “one” divine essence, and we must keep the different senses distinct from one another.
Second, I have explicitly denied that the divine essence involves real composition, and thus cannot be really divided into parts or components. So, your objection is completely unfounded. If you want, I can change my definition of God himself to mean a Trinity of really distinct divine persons, each having the same undivided divine essence, but differing in terms of having different divine relations. There. Any more problems with my definition, or can we proceed?
In different senses not the same sense.
What are the different senses of “the whole God” in (1) and (2)?
Not if "rhw Whole God" is an equivocal term. Which it is. Part of your straw man is to deny the role of equivocal terms in the definition of the Trinity.
Just to be clear, because I don’t want you to equivocate on equivocation. Do you mean that “the whole God” is purely equivocal or analogical? If you say that “the whole God” is purely equivocal, then it must differ both in sense and in referent, which means that only one “the whole God” can refer to God, and the other cannot refer to God. If you say that “the whole God” is analogical, then they can have different senses, but the same referent. But the question remains, what exactly are the different senses of “the whole God”?
I assumed then you where arguing in good faith but you are not. You read your own definitions into Catholic and general Christian doctrines & care nothing for nor cite authoritative definitions.
ReplyDeleteGenetic fallacy.
Guess what? "Real Relations" between Divine Persons are not "Real Relations" in the same sense as in the Essence.
Why not? You haven’t given me an argument to justify this claim, which makes it completely arbitrary. Furthermore, if you are correct, then it would be impossible to infer anything about the divine persons on the basis of the divine essence, because it would necessarily mean that has committed the fallacy of equivocation. But Aquinas does this regularly (such as at ST 1.28.2), and so it seems that even he would disagree with you here. So, if even Aquinas rejects your position, and you have no argument to support it, then why on earth should I entertain it seriously?
But the Trinity is defined and believed to be a mystery therefore it is a never-ending equivocation. There is no other Christian Trinity by definition.
First, what terms in the definition of the Trinity are equivocal terms?
Second, if “God” is an essentially equivocal term, then it cannot be used in a logical argument, because one would always commit the fallacy of equivocation. You have nicely undermined all of natural theology. Congratulations.
(1) The divine essence is the same as the divine relations I add: in the equivocal sense of both being the One Ineffible Unknowable God
(2) The divine essence is different from the divine relations I add:in that both are different senses of the One equivocal Ineffible Unknowable God
You are completely missing the argument, and hiding behind equivocations.
You have the terms “the divine essence” and “the divine relations”. Each term has a particular sense, say S(E) for “the divine essence” and S(R) for “the divine relations”. S(E) is different from S(R). We agree so far, I hope. Moving on, say that S(E) refers to R(E) and S(R) refers to R(R).
You have two possibilities here with regards to the relationship between R(E) and R(R):
(1) R(E) is identical to R(R)
(2) R(E) is different from R(R)
If (1) is true, then R(E) = R(R) = R. That means that the distinction between the divine essence and the divine relations is a notional distinction that only exists in our minds, which necessarily means that the divine essence and the divine relations are completely identical in reality, and thus cannot differ in any way in reality. Any differences can only exist in our minds, and not in the underlying reality, because otherwise there would be a contradiction. (This would be the exact same scenario as the divine attributes differing in senses and concepts in our minds, but ultimately referring to the exact same underlying reality.) So, if (1) is true, then either the divine essence involves real distinction (and divine simplicity is false) or the divine relations do not involve real distinction (and the Trinity is false).
(And note that you cannot object by saying that they differ in senses, because I’ve already agreed with that, and so that objection is built right into my argument, and thus is irrelevant, because the issue is about the referents and not the senses.)
If (2) is true, then the divine essence is different from the divine relations, which necessarily means that the divine relations are either creatures or non-Being. The divine relations cannot be a creature, because that would mean that God is partly composed of creation, which is impossible. The divine relations cannot be non-Being, because then there is no basis to differentiate between the divine persons, and the Trinity is false. One way to avoid this conclusion is to reject divine simplicity, because that is the basis for the claim that the divine essence is identical to Being itself. Regardless, you must either reject divine simplicity or the Trinity, if (2) is true.
ReplyDeleteTherefore, the only way to endorse both divine simplicity and the Trinity is to reject (1) and (2), but that leads to a logical contradiction. After all, not-(X or not-X) is logically equivalent to not-X and X. Therefore, we must accept either (1) or (2), but accepting either (1) or (2) leads to the conclusion that one must abandon either divine simplicity or the Trinity.
That’s the argument. So, the only question for you to answer is whether R(E) is identical to R(R) or R(E) is different from R(R). Which is it?
Why is it so hard for you to look up how the Trinitarians define the meanings of these words & why should they give a shit about the meanings you make up off the top of your head to fit your straw man?
Be my guest and tell me how Trinitarians define “whole” in “the whole God”. If you claim that “whole” is equivocal and means one sense in one context and another sense in another context, then you must understand that the negation of “whole” is either “part” or “none”. So, to say that one sense of “whole” is “fully, total, entire, without anything left over”, and another sense is not that sense of “whole”, then it follows that that other sense of “whole” is either “part” or “none”. Wow. What a fine way of arguing for your position when “whole God” can mean “part God”! You weren’t kidding about the infinite series of equivocations that ultimately are completely disconnected and irrelevant to one another.
>I did not lie. I said that Aquinas would reject your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y). Focus, please.
ReplyDeleteClearly you did try to deceive since we are arguing what the formal definition is of the differences between PERSONS & NATURE are & you tried to cast weak doubt on Sheed's definition not being compatible with Aquinas because in that one treatise on Divine Power he only mentions the Divine Essence as being the PRINCIPLE OF ACTION & you tried to infer the Trinity was not the same. I showed otherwise with my better citations.
I love how you can't answer me & want to change the subject here. Your whole argument is a Straw Man & negates the POC.
Also you are giving me another red herring obviously Aquinas would NOT agree with the idea everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y).
After all when comparing the Divine Persons with the Divine Nature he would conclude the meaning that both S(X) & S(X) are the same Unknowable God & not different gods at all.
Really Straw Men arguments now Red Herrings? You should own a farm.
>With regards to the divine persons, when you say that there is “one divine essence”, then are you talking about formal identity or numerical identity?
ReplyDeleteThere is no unequivocal comparison between "Human Nature" and "Divine Nature" so I don't see how that is a valid question & even if we take your infamous objections to having any knowledge of God by analogy on board then on the level of equivocal comparison (& I exclude here pure random equivocal comparison) as discussed by Greg Rocca on page 81 of his book SPEAKING the incomprehensible God I can safely conclude it is neither.
Since God is ultimately Incomprehensible then whatever a "divine nature" is when compared to a "human nature" it is completely unlike it & so is taking senses and categories from one as they compare is unlike the other. OTOH if we bring analogy back on board, in spite of your past objections, for the sake of argument, then well analogy still only goes one way. We infer from creatures real perfections that they have(being, goodness etc) negate composition and move toward pure perfections which we conclude God contains both formally and eminently and we formulate what we can say about God in terms of the Divine Nature but it still falls short in saying What God really is as God. But it stops there since our reason stops there & we need Revelation to tell us God contains relations/Persons and they are of a different sense then from that which can be known by reason alone & revelation tells us their properties and we can only fit theses senses together without contradiction by making sure our language doesn't express them as identical senses which could lead to either the errors of modalism or Tri-theism. Analogy of course still goes one way since it can't end in telling us What God Is as God. It can only tell us things about God in his nature. Revelation can only tell us about God in Trinity which is knowing about God in a different sense. but we still can't say WHATGODIS so we can't say it's a contradiction to claim there are Three Divine Persons and One Divine Nature in the Unknowable God.
In fact now that I think about it your anti-analogy polemic is kind of a Trap here since it all but mandates you must see (in congruency with the definition of the Trinity) PERSONS and NATURE in different senses & only say they are the exact same Unknowable God & they can't be identically compared in any way accept this. Of course to bring analogy back doesn't help you either as I explained since it's one way. No matter which sense you go with YOU CAN'T GO FROM KNOWING WHAT GOD IS AS GOD down to any unequivocal or even analogical comparison to creatures no can you logically assert Three Persons in One Nature both being the One God is a contradiction.
At the end of the day your straw man is still a straw man & no objection you can produce can show logical contradiction. There is only Mystery and Divine Darkness.
On another note to quote from G-L' TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATOR on ST Q39
ReplyDelete"Reply to the second objection. But the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, and this is sufficient so that something may be affirmed of the essence and denied of the persons; for example, the essence is communicable but paternity is not, just as mercy is the principle of forgiveness and justice is not.
Reply to the third objection. If it should be said that nothing is subject to itself, the reply is that the divine persons are analogically considered as the subject of the divine essence without any real distinction, whereas in sensible things there is a real distinction between the matter, by which the thing is individuated, and the form which is given to this subject; similarly in created things a real distinction exists between substance and the accidents……………………………………..
We recall here Cajetan's admirable reply to Scotus on this question: "The Deity as it is in itself is above being and above unity, it is above all simply simple perfections, which it contains formally and eminently in their formal natures." These words of Cajetan are the sublimest comment on this entire treatise.[533]
"We fall into error," says Cajetan, "Then we proceed from the absolute and the relative to God, because the distinction between absolute and relative is conceived by us as prior to God and therefore we try to place God in one or the other of these two members of the distinction. Whereas the matter is entirely different. The divine nature is prior to being and all its differences, it transcends all being and is above unity... . Thus in God there is but one formal nature or reason, and this is neither purely absolute nor purely relative, not purely communicable or purely incommunicable, but it contains most eminently and formally both that which is of absolute perfection and whatever the relative Trinity requires."
This formal and most eminent nature is the Deity as it is in itself, and when the blessed behold God they see no distinction between the essence and paternity although the essence is communicable while the paternity is not. It appears therefore, as it were a posteriori, that the Deity is above being, although the Deity formally and eminently contains being; a sign of this is the fact that, whereas in the natural order being is particible, as are also good, truth, intellect, and will, the Deity as such cannot be participated in naturally by even the highest angel or creatable angel. Participation in the Deity can take place only through grace, which disposes us to see God immediately as He sees Himself, although not comprehensively.
The Deity inasmuch as it is above being, unity, intellect, and will is that great darkness of the mystics because it transcends the limits of intelligibility in this life.[534] "
@dguller
ReplyDeleteOne needs to repeat you argument for a logical contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity is invalid because it is a clear, though elaborate, Straw Man (it is also negligent toward the POC) & it is unreasonable to take a Straw Man objection seriously. That the argument itself (in spite of the faulty Straw man premises) is internally logical has nothing to do with it's clear straw man nature. Also challenging me on the validity of the internal logic of said arguments (as you repeatedly do) is a red herring. So cut it out. I don't deny if PERSONS and NATURE where understood to be identically God in the same sense there would be clear contradiction, rather I affirm the prima faca fact that the definition of the Trinity formally proclaims that PERSONS & NATURE are identically God in different senses not the same sense. Thus being different senses there can be no contradiction in saying Three Divine Persons in One Divine Essence. They are not identical senses of the Principle of Action being the One Ultimately Unknowable God but they are both in identity that same Principle of Action. Moves on your part to collapse the senses to date are all illegitimate. Since PERSONS & NATURE are different senses you cannot claim a Real Relation between persons would be a real relation in the same sense as an impossible real relation in the Divine Essence. They are still different senses and that move still treats them like identical senses and that violates the parameters of the definition.
Dogmatically asserting that they must is not an argument. If "real relations" in both could be compared in the same sense then PERSONS & NATURE would both be God in that same sense not different ones.
Also dogmatically proclaiming we cannot use God as an equivocal predicate between PERSONS & NATURE in which they have in common is another Straw Man move. As Aristotle said words represent ideas and the idea of an Incomprehensible God is an equivocal predicate compared to things that are known & necessary for doctrine of the Trinity as Mystery. Since the get go you have treated the Trinity as something we arrive at by argument. No it is brute fact defined via Revelation and it is clearly defined in such a way as to exclude logical contradiction. You refuse to use qualified definitions of the Trinity. Both Sabellians and Tri-Theists use the formula "Three Divine Persons in the One Nature" but they mean different things by this formula. Why you resist interacting with the qualified formulations of proffessional Trinitarian Theologians & opt to make up your own off the top of your head is just astounding.
ReplyDeleteNot to mention the moral problem with citing a treatise on a Divine Attribute rather then an exposition on the Trinity to make a vain argument by special pleading that the Principle of Action only referees to the Divine Essence & not the Trinity. Other citations I gave showed that is not true.
"Procession () is the origin of one from another, as light proceeds from the sun and a son from his father.
St. Athanasius[157] and St. Augustine[158] explained that the imperfections inherent in human generation are not found in the divine processions. In the divine processions, for example, there is no diversity of nature (the nature remains numerically the same) but only a diversity of persons according to the opposition of relation."Garrigou-Lagrance on Q27 IN TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATOR.
Even G-L thinks real relations between the Persons are not the same in sense as in the Essence because they don't cause diversity of nature thus logically they are different senses of relations & not merely Logical vs Real.
At the end of the day I might say how could a Just God permits such a person as you to loose his reason like you have in this vain plea for a Straw Man? If I followed that despair to it's end I might say there is no God then but if I do say that I must still stay your "argument" is a Straw Man and in principle given the definitions there can be no logical contradiction in the Trinity as it has been spelled out. There may be other difficulties but you will never figure them out holding fast to you straw man as you do.
That is your fate.
>You are completely missing the argument, and hiding behind equivocations.
ReplyDeleteThe equivocations are part of the argument and shield it from your straw man. Your rejection of them is the pole you stick up it's arse to hang it in a field. Your own rejection of Analogy mandates all comparisons between God and creatures are reduced to the equivocal so by your own standards you can't claim Persons and Nature share anything in common other then both being the unknowable God.
If you try to bring back analogy it still fails since analogy only goes one way. From us to God and then it terminates in Divine Nature. But from God to us then God is an equivocal term thought not a pure equivocation because we can rationally know God exists and created us & if we where not like Him in some way we could have no origin in Him. But it doesn't follow just because we are like Him as analogs of Him that He is like us as an analogs of us.
But you can debate analogy with others.
My points stand.
Why is it so hard for you to look up how the Trinitarians define the meanings of these words & why should they give a shit about the meanings you make up off the top of your head to fit your straw man?
ReplyDeleteBe my guest and tell me how Trinitarians define “whole” in “the whole God”.
So you are in effect telling me you have no interest in finding out for yourself & you wish to continue to address this issue from that point of self-impossed ignorance?
This is the Straw for the Straw Man.
If you claim that “whole” is equivocal and means one sense in one context and another sense in another context,
It should seem obvious to those who read the English language I am claiming "God" the Incomprehensible is an equivocal term to all that is comprehensible.
Thick as a Brick.
>I did not lie. I said that Aquinas would reject your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y). Focus, please.
ReplyDeleteClearly you did try to deceive since we are arguing what the formal definition is of the differences between PERSONS & NATURE are & you tried to cast weak doubt on Sheed's definition not being compatible with Aquinas because in that one treatise on Divine Power he only mentions the Divine Essence as being the PRINCIPLE OF ACTION & you tried to infer the Trinity was not the same. I showed otherwise with my better citations.
I love how you can't answer me & want to change the subject here. Your whole argument is a Straw Man & negates the POC.
Also you are giving me another red herring obviously Aquinas would NOT agree with the idea everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y).
After all when comparing the Divine Persons with the Divine Nature he would conclude both S(X) & S(Y) are the same Unknowable God & not different gods at all. Thus in that respect they would have the same meaning.
Really Straw Men arguments now Red Herrings? You should own a farm.
The following statement contains no logical contradiction.(note POC If A=A and is impossible for it to not equal ~A at the same time and in the same sense).
ReplyDelete"Joe got caught on fire and as a result froze to death."
Now on the face of that there seems to be a contradiction. Fire heats things so how can he have
frozen to death? Well I suppose he might have gotten caught on fire in the antarctic during the height of
the winter then rolled around in the snow passed out and of course froze to death.
Of course if I lived on a hypothetical planet with a uniform warm temperature Pole to Pole I might conclude in error that is a logical contradiction. He can't be hot and cold at the same time in the same sense. One negates the other. But the sentence given what we know about hot and cold and fire and ice & our world can be reconciled.
Even arguments with faulty premises can have no logical contradictions
fire freezes
Frank got caught on fire and the fire froze him to death.
No logical contradiction just an incorrect premise.
There Three Persons = One Divne Nature=the Unknowable Incomprehensible God.
Given the further qualified definition of PERSONS & NATURE being different senses of the same God and not the sames identical sense of God and given we don't know what God is to say He can't be both Three of PERSONS sense and One of NATURE SENSE we can't claim there is an obvious logical contradiction or a faulty premise because we would need to know what God is for that.
If we don't & can't know what God is then we still can't say He is both X and Not ~X at the same time and in the same sense since even if we plead we don't know that is impossible given his unknowable nature we can still know via logic the POC is true and that we can't saying anything may exist that is both X and Not ~X at the same time in the same sense. Because we would be saying whatever God is which cannot be comprehended by us He is still a contradiction and therefore cannot really be.
I see no logical path to Logical contradiction in the Definition of the Trinity.
Also you are giving me another red herring obviously Aquinas would NOT agree with the idea everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y).
ReplyDeleteGreat. So, why does “real distinction” necessarily have to mean something completely different in “divine essence” (= absence of “real distinction”) and “divine relation” (= presence of “real distinction”)? Why can’t I simply say that “divine relation” necessarily involves the presence of “real distinction”, and “divine essence” necessarily involves the absence of “real distinction”, where “real distinction” means the exact same thing in both, except that it is affirmed in one, and denied in the other?
After all when comparing the Divine Persons with the Divine Nature he would conclude the meaning that both S(X) & S(X) are the same Unknowable God & not different gods at all.
Right. They have different senses, but the same referent. But then again, you can say the same thing about the divine attributes, and their distinction is merely notional or conceptual. Why is it that different senses, but same referent, in one case is an example of notional distinction, whereas in the other case is an example of virtual or real distinction? Is there an argument that does not beg the question involved in justifying the distinction?
There is no unequivocal comparison between "Human Nature" and "Divine Nature" so I don't see how that is a valid question & even if we take your infamous objections to having any knowledge of God by analogy on board then on the level of equivocal comparison (& I exclude here pure random equivocal comparison) as discussed by Greg Rocca on page 81 of his book SPEAKING the incomprehensible God I can safely conclude it is neither.
First, why is this not a valid question? After all, “human nature” is a divine idea that is in the divine intellect, which is identical to the divine nature. Therefore, “human nature” is a virtual component of the divine nature. How can they not be compared if the former is a virtual part of the latter?
Second, you want to use terms like “the same”, “one”, “whole”, and so on, and yet resolutely refuse to define these terms. If they have no definition, then how can they mean anything? And if they do not mean anything, then they are meaningless.
No matter which sense you go with YOU CAN'T GO FROM KNOWING WHAT GOD IS AS GOD down to any unequivocal or even analogical comparison to creatures no can you logically assert Three Persons in One Nature both being the One God is a contradiction.
This is irrelevant. I’m not saying that I know “what God is as God”. I’m saying that I know some things about God, such as that he has a divine nature that is metaphysically simple and devoid of any kind of composition, and that he is a Trinity of three divine persons that are really distinct, and each share the same divine essence, but differ in terms of each having a really different divine relation. It is clear that the divine essence cannot involve real distinction (i.e. not-RD), and it is equally clear that the divine relations (and by extension, the divine persons) must involve real distinction (i.e. RD). You must agree that if we define RD as “whatever kind of real distinction is involved in the divine relations and divine persons”, then that very RD cannot be present in the divine essence, because that is part of what it means to be absolutely simple, i.e. there cannot be any real distinction of any kind.
Here’s another way to look at it. We agree that God is pure act, which means that he is devoid of any potency whatsoever. We also agree that creation is a combination of act and potency. My question is, when we say that “potency” is present in creation, but “potency” is absent in God, then does “potency” mean the same in both? If you are correct, then “potency” is an equivocal term when applied to God and creation, which means that it has a totally different meaning in both. However, that means that we cannot infer that God lacks potency and thus is pure act, because the very potency that we are denying of God occurs in creation. However, since that would completely undermine a core principle of Thomist theology, you must be wrong. In other words, because divine simplicity is a negative definition, it derives it very sense from negating some positive claim, such as negating matter, negating change, negating potency, and negating real distinction.
ReplyDeleteReply to the second objection. But the divine persons are distinguished from the essence just as the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, and this is sufficient so that something may be affirmed of the essence and denied of the persons
So, the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is a notional distinction, like the distinction between the divine attributes? Is that your claim? That would mean that the divine persons and the divine essence differ only conceptually, but are actually the exact same thing in reality. That would mean that this underlying reality both must involve real distinction and cannot involve real distinction. The only way to avoid this contradiction is to separate the contradictory properties into different aspects of that underlying reality, which would presuppose that it is a composite reality, because you need different parts to put the contradictory properties in.
Thus in God there is but one formal nature or reason, and this is neither purely absolute nor purely relative, not purely communicable or purely incommunicable, but it contains most eminently and formally both that which is of absolute perfection and whatever the relative Trinity requires."
First, G-L agrees that there is formal identity involving the divine essence in the Trinity, and so my question was “valid” after all.
Second, to say that X is not purely P could mean that X is impurely P. So, when G-L says that God is “neither purely absolute nor purely relative”, then does he mean that God is impurely absolute and impurely relative? That doesn’t seem possible, because impurity would be a sign of imperfection, and God is “absolute perfection”. Perhaps by “purely”, he means “entirely”, and so he means that God is neither entirely absolute nor entirely relative. But that could oly mean that God is partly absolute and partly relative, which implies composition in God. I’m okay with this, because it would mean that God is partly absolute in that he is partly composed of a divine essence, and God is partly relative in that he is partly composed of divine relations. The real question is whether the divine essence and the divine relations have the exact same referent in God, or have different referents in God. If the former, then you have a logical contradiction. If the latter, then you cannot embrace the Trinity and divine simplicity together.
This formal and most eminent nature is the Deity as it is in itself, and when the blessed behold God they see no distinction between the essence and paternity although the essence is communicable while the paternity is not.
So, the blessed are deceived in the beatific vision. After all, what they see (i.e. “they see no distinction between the essence and paternity”) is not what is true (i.e. “the essence is communicable while the paternity is not”). Nice.
The Deity inasmuch as it is above being, unity, intellect, and will is that great darkness of the mystics because it transcends the limits of intelligibility in this life.
ReplyDeleteAnd yet God is intelligible in some ways, otherwise we would know absolutely nothing about him.
I don't deny if PERSONS and NATURE where understood to be identically God in the same sense there would be clear contradiction
But what if they had the same referent? You keep talking about senses when I am talking about referents. My question is whether R(E) is the same as R(R), or not. You yourself have admitted the the divine essence is different from the divine relations in terms of having different senses, but the divine essence is identical to the divine relations in terms of having the same referent, because they are both about the same underlying divine reality. This seems to endorse the position that R(E) is the same as R(R), meaning that R(E) = R(R). Do you endorse this position?
Since PERSONS & NATURE are different senses you cannot claim a Real Relation between persons would be a real relation in the same sense as an impossible real relation in the Divine Essence. They are still different senses and that move still treats them like identical senses and that violates the parameters of the definition.
But see, you’re doing it again. You are saying that “since” (i.e. because) S(E) is different from S(P), it necessarily follows that the senses of all the meanings contained in S(E) must be completely different from the senses of all the meanings contained in S(P), which would have to include “real distinction” meaning something completely different in S(E) and in S(P). That is the major premise that is absolutely necessary for your argument to be sound. The fact that you continue to refuse to provide any justification for this premise, other than just repeatedly asserting it to be true, even in the face of my counter-examples that show it to be false, is remarkable, and not in a good way.
Dogmatically asserting that they must is not an argument. If "real relations" in both could be compared in the same sense then PERSONS & NATURE would both be God in that same sense not different ones.
I am not being dogmatic when I reject the major premise of your argument as false, and have provided a rationale for doing so. Your only rationale for the major premise of your argument is that without it, the Trinity is contradictory. But that simply assumes that the Trinity must be true at all costs. The interesting thing is that even if you do assume that the Trinity is true, then you are still stuck with a logical contradiction, because you must simultaneously affirm:
(1) If S(X) is different from S(Y), it necessarily follows that the senses of all the meanings contained in S(X) must be completely different from the senses of all the meanings contained in S(Y)
(2) If S(X) is different from S(Y), it does not necessarily follow that the senses of all the meanings contained in S(X) must be completely different from the senses of all the meanings contained in S(Y)
Since the get go you have treated the Trinity as something we arrive at by argument. No it is brute fact defined via Revelation and it is clearly defined in such a way as to exclude logical contradiction.
ReplyDeleteFirst, I have not deduced the truth of Trinity, but have assumed it to be true as a premise of my argument. You still don’t understand what is going on.
Second, the only way to avoid logical contradiction is to fudge and equivocate the meanings to the point that they are actually meaningless. If you want to embrace a meaningless doctrine, then be my guest, but you cannot use words, like “nature”, “the same”, “one”, “fully”, “different”, and so on, and pretend like they mean something when they actually mean nothing at all, because you cannot even tell me what they mean.
In the divine processions, for example, there is no diversity of nature (the nature remains numerically the same) but only a diversity of persons according to the opposition of relation
Wait, I thought you said that the very question of whether the divine essence is formally identical and/or numerically identical was not “valid”, and yet you have cited G-L as endorsing both formal identity and numerical identity. I suppose he is engaging in invalid inquiry, eh?
Anyway, it seems that G-L is saying that the divine essence in the divine persons is both formally and numerically the same. So, there is a single divine essence (both formally and numerically), and there are three divine relations. The three divine relations each have the same divine essence, which is formally and numerically the same, and they differ with respect to their different processions. What are these processions? There are two. One procession is derived from the action of the intellect, and another procession is derived from the action of the will (ST 1.28.4). But remember that the divine intellect is the divine will, and thus are actually the exact same thing in reality, and they are only notionally distinct in our minds. That means that there is actually only one procession, because there is only one divine essence, both formally and numerically, that anything can proceed from. And that means that the Trinity is false.
What this ultimately comes down to is the same thing I’ve been arguing from the beginning. If there is only one divine essence, which is formally and numerically identical, and everything proceeds from that one divine essence, including the divine relations, then it is impossible for there to be any differences between the divine relations. After all, where do the differences come from? They cannot come from the divine essence, because it is exactly the same, both formally and numerically, in each divine relation, and thus there is no grounds for any difference between them. And if they cannot come from the divine essence, then they either come from creation or non-Being, because the divine essence is Being itself, by virtue of divine simplicity.
The equivocations are part of the argument and shield it from your straw man.
Then all logical inferences involving those terms are fallacious. If that is the price you want to pay to preserve the Trinity, then that is certainly your choice, but it completely undermines all natural theology and reduces it all to the fallacy of equivocation.
Your own rejection of Analogy mandates all comparisons between God and creatures are reduced to the equivocal so by your own standards you can't claim Persons and Nature share anything in common other then both being the unknowable God.
To quote Marshall McLuhan, “you know nothing of my work”.
So you are in effect telling me you have no interest in finding out for yourself & you wish to continue to address this issue from that point of self-impossed ignorance?
ReplyDeleteWhy can’t you just tell me? Why do I have to go on a wild goose chase to find the answer to something that you already know. It’s simple. Either you know, or you don’t know. If you know, then just tell me, and we’ll proceed. If you don’t know, then you cannot say that the sense of “fully God” in the divine essence is different from the sense of “fully God” in the divine relations, because you do not know what “fully God” even means in either case. And that would completely undermine your position.
Honestly, it’s easy. In what sense of “fully” is the divine essence “fully God”, and in what sense of “fully” is the divine relations “fully God”. They cannot be in the same sense, or else you have a logical contradiction, and so they must differ in some way. How do they differ? Do you have any idea?
It should seem obvious to those who read the English language I am claiming "God" the Incomprehensible is an equivocal term to all that is comprehensible.
Then you cannot say that the divine essence is fully God, if “divine”, “essence”, “fully” and “God” are all equivocal terms that have completely different meanings from the meaning that those terms have within our comprehension. So, it is all incomprehensible meaninglessness. Great defense!
Given the further qualified definition of PERSONS & NATURE being different senses of the same God and not the sames identical sense of God and given we don't know what God is to say He can't be both Three of PERSONS sense and One of NATURE SENSE we can't claim there is an obvious logical contradiction or a faulty premise because we would need to know what God is for that.
The question, as always, is whether S(P) and S(E) have the same referent or do not have the same referent. If the referent for S(P) is R(P) and the referent for S(E) is R(E), then the question is whether R(P) is the same as R(E), or whether R(P) is not the same as R(E). You are still focusing upon senses, whereas I’m talking about referents. It’s actually quite easy, if you try.
If we don't & can't know what God is then we still can't say He is both X and Not ~X at the same time and in the same sense since even if we plead we don't know that is impossible given his unknowable nature we can still know via logic the POC is true and that we can't saying anything may exist that is both X and Not ~X at the same time in the same sense. Because we would be saying whatever God is which cannot be comprehended by us He is still a contradiction and therefore cannot really be.
Are you saying that we do not know that the divine relations must involve real distinction? If you are, then we do not know the key claim of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Are you saying that we do not know that the divine essence cannot involve real distinction (in the exact sense of “real distinction” as is involved in the divine relations)? If you are, then we do not know the key claim of the doctrine of divine simplicity.
To cite the wiki on Straw men and informal fallacy.
ReplyDeleteA straw man is a type of argument and is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position. To "attack a straw man" is to create the illusion of having refuted a proposition by replacing it with a superficially similar yet inequivalent proposition (the "straw man" in this case-the identifying of Persons and Nature as both being God in the same sense and not different senses in order to invent a contradiction that the Trinity claims Three Gods = One God or Three Persons = One Person or Three Natures = One Nature or distinctions between Persons =distinctions in Nature or the Divine Simplicity of the One Nature precludes distinction between the Persons only sans Nature...etc), and to refute it, without ever having actually refuted the original position. But of course any careful following of the way the doctrine of the Trinity is formulated will show it is not possible for there to be a logical contradiction in the Trinity unless one claims to know What God Is.
An informal fallacy is an argument whose stated premises fail to support its proposed conclusion. The problem with an informal fallacy often stems from a flaw in reasoning that renders the conclusion unpersuasive. In contrast to a formal fallacy of deduction, the error is not merely a flaw in logic.
The Divine Simplicity is a feature of the One Divine Nature & it only refers to the Divine Persons in the sense as G-L clearly says "No real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, but a real distinction exists between the persons among themselves."[42]. Belonging to the sense of Nature it cannot be invoked to claim there can be no real distinction between the Persons among themselves. Since each Person is fully God therefore each Person processes the One Simple Nature and in that Nature there is no division. But as G-L says distinction between Persons should not be identified as division but as distinction in the sense they have real relations between themselves Person to Person.
ReplyDeleteNature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which He acts.
So they have the same principle in identity as the Unknowable God but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
Speaking in general Persons have a nature and operate a nature and have all the attributes of that nature but Persons are not natures in themselves. A Person is not an attribute but operates a nature with attributes. The Divine Persons thought distinct from each other as Persons are not divided or separate each fully has the One Simple Divine Nature which contains no distinctions or divisions. Part of the Straw Man here since the beginning as been to treat Persons as Attributes by confusing the different senses. That and ad hoc redefinitions (dropping the word "God" in comparing Persons and Nature because the equivocal comparison renders the argument null and void. Well that is the point…..)
There is no logical contradiction here & there can be none since Persons and Nature are different senses of the One Principle of Action being God.
In order to contradict they must be identical l in sense. They are not defined as such. dguller's argument from the beginning has been nothing but an argument from special pleading trying to re-define the doctrine of Trinity in such a way as to produce an artificial contradiction not a natural one in the doctrine original qualified formulations.
The argument is a failure & divine simplicity cannot be invoked to support it. Persons and Nature are different categories of senses. You can only compare the relations in those different categories in reference to a third category or sense they have in common. But the only sense category the Three Divine Persons and the One Divine Simple Nature have in common is in both being the One Incomprehensible God. Since we cannot know What God Is we cannot Know that God can't be Three Divine Persons in One Divine Nature so we are stuck with a Mystery.
The logical contradiction charge is a fantasy. You either accept reality or you don't.
Now to deal with a few questions
ReplyDelete>Great. So, why does “real distinction” necessarily have to mean something completely different in “divine essence” (= absence of “real distinction”) and “divine relation” (= presence of “real distinction”)?
Rather if they are different senses how can they be the same? 298 degrees of heat is fatal in a short period of time in the sense of Fahrenheit but in the sense of Kelvin it is quite amiable. How is 298 degrees in one not completely different then in the other? You can convert them but that is not the same as saying 298 F = 298 K which is a contradiction. You can convert between Three Persons and One Nature but you cannot treat them as identical senses.
> Why can’t I simply say that “divine relation” necessarily involves the presence of “real distinction”, and “divine essence” necessarily involves the absence of “real distinction”, where “real distinction” means the exact same thing in both, except that it is affirmed in one, and denied in the other?
As long as you keep in mind "divine relations" & "divine essence" are not identical in sense to one another then you are good of course your "logical contradiction" cannot exist but that is the idea. The idea is to keep in mind they are different senses and to stop treating them as the same sense.
>Right. They have different senses, but the same referent. But then again, you can say the same thing about the divine attributes, and their distinction is merely notional or conceptual.
Divine attributes are identical to the Divine Essence in the same sense not different senses! The Divine Attributes have the Divine Essence as their same referent. The common referent of the divine relations & divine essence is both being the same Unknowable God. The divine relationsis not the referent of the divine essence in the case that relations are attributes.
>Why is it that different senses, but same referent, in one case is an example of notional distinction, whereas in the other case is an example of virtual or real distinction? Is there an argument that does not beg the question involved in justifying the distinction?
ReplyDeleteHere is your problem. It does not have to be justified at all since it is admitted to be a mystery. It merely has to be absent of any logical contradiction which as we can see is the case. If you want to argue there is a problem in believing in a mystery that can't be directly justified by reason then you should have opened with that rather then waste hundreds of posts on defending a straw man.
>First, why is this not a valid question? After all, “human nature” is a divine idea that is in the divine intellect, which is identical to the divine nature. Therefore, “human nature” is a virtual component of the divine nature. How can they not be compared if the former is a virtual part of the latter?
But how is it that still an unequivocal comparison? God's divine ideas in the Divine Intellect are just God, which cannot be unequivocally compared to creatures even creatures that reflect a particular idea. At best it is analogical comparison which goes from Creatures to God or some other equivocal comparison going the other way (but clearly not purely equivocal one). We via reason & analogy deduce the existence of divine ideas but even there we start with ourselves. Not with God who cannot be comprehended.
>Second, you want to use terms like “the same”, “one”, “whole”, and so on, and yet resolutely refuse to define these terms. If they have no definition, then how can they mean anything? And if they do not mean anything, then they are meaningless.
Actually it would help you would make common reference to the language of theologians rather then make it up as you go.
>This is irrelevant.
Contradicting your false claim there is a "logical contradiction" is the point! So it is quite relevant.
>You must agree that if we define RD as “whatever kind of real distinction is involved in the divine relations and divine persons”, then that very RD cannot be present in the divine essence, because that is part of what it means to be absolutely simple, i.e. there cannot be any real distinction of any kind.
Well since they are different senses(SOMEONE's vs SOMETHING, WHO's vs WHAT) it is not a problem. When you are saying there is a real distinction in the Persons you are merely saying they are distinct SOMEONE's but you are still not saying the indivisible SOMETHING is now divided or that there is now more than one SOMETHING.
So what the frak is the problem & where is the logical contradiction? Nowhere!
>Here’s another way to look at it. We agree that God is pure act, which means that he is devoid of any potency whatsoever. We also agree that creation is a combination of act and potency. My question is, when we say that “potency” is present in creation, but “potency” is absent in God, then does “potency” mean the same in both?
ReplyDeleteThis analogy makes no sense. It's like saying 298 degree Fahrenheit will burn you to death therefore if you are sailing on the open ocean & turn your ship 298 degrees off course you will burn to death. You are conflating the harmonizing of the conclusions of Natural Theology with Revealed Theology with comparing God to his creatures. This makes no sense no does it justify your straw man or treating the different senses of Persons and Nature as identical senses.
>So, the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is a notional distinction, like the distinction between the divine attributes? Is that your claim?
Whatever is in God is God who is simple. Sure but it doesn't logically follow Persons who are "centers of Attribution in a rational nature"/Person are attributes. Nor does it mean you can't have distinct "centers of Attribution in a rational nature"that are ether, spoken of individually or collectively, have only a notional distinction with the divine essence.
You have to stop confusing the senses. It's getting old it is a Straw Man.
>First, G-L agrees that there is formal identity involving the divine essence in the Trinity, and so my question was “valid” after all.
No it is not similar sounding linguistic phrases are not the same as identical categories and G-L condemns heretics who identify Persons and Nature in the same sense on pg 30 of his book. That everything in the sense of essence. So this is just wishful thinking.
>Second, to say that X is not purely P could mean that X is impurely P.
Yes and Three Persons in One Nature could mean modalism if you identify Persons as Attributes instead of according to the technical definition of Trinitarians . So what? What does it mean? Well the quote comes 6 pages into G-L commentary on Q39 & one should look it up after one first reads a simplified take on it over at the READING THE SUMMA blog or in Msgr Glenn. Or you can continue to read you own ideas in order to create the straw man you need to "win" this argument. I take it as a purely negative statement & it seems it was meant that way given the context. Nothing more.
>So, the blessed are deceived in the beatific vision. After all, what they see (i.e. “they see no distinction between the essence and paternity”) is not what is true (i.e. “the essence is communicable while the paternity is not”). Nice.
Rather a man without eyes simply cannot see. A man without an Eagle's eyes can't see like an Eagle. He is not being deceived rather he lacks the ability to see. The blessed merely lack the ability to see God as God sees Himself. So naturally we "see" Father, Son and Spirit as having no distinction. God givens better eyes for eternity but not His Eyes.
>And yet God is intelligible in some ways, otherwise we would know absolutely nothing about him.
ReplyDeleteWhich is why your READY, FIRE AIM nonsense about "the blessed are deceived in the beatific vision is all the more tedious."
>But what if they had the same referent?
Definition Wiki "The term referent may sometimes be ambiguous in that it can mean the thing that refers, or the thing which is referred to. In most fields, however, it usually has the second meaning – the thing to which another thing refers." We go with the second meaning.
Their referent is the One True Ultimately Unknowable God or just God. Three Persons in One Divine Nature both are God. Its not hard and since we have two different senses in one Referent we have no contradiction.
> My question is whether R(E) is the same as R(R), or not?
In what "sense"? Because as you have shown before you can confuses the senses in any of your questions to me in order to keep your straw man from burring to the ground & I don't trust you at this point. Sure I can agree The Three Persons and the One Divine Nature are the same thing that being God. But I have seen how you confuse the senses so you can come up with the Straw men of "Person is the same as Nature in the same sense" or "Persons are Attributes" etc. IT seems to me you are trying to add another layer of confusion between the different senses and their referent. Frankly I just wish you would drop the special pleading & sophistry and just admit the obvious. There is no logical contradiction in the Trinity by definition.
>Do you endorse this position?
I'd like to say yes but I don't believe you really say what you mean at this point. Besides your the one with the accusation of logical contradiction. The burden of argument is on you. You are required to explain how there can be a logical contradiction in the definition of the Trinity. So far you have failed.
>ut see, you’re doing it again. You are saying that “since” (i.e. because) S(E) is different from S(P), it necessarily follows that the senses of all the meanings contained in S(E) must be completely different from the senses of all the meanings
So you don't really believe 298 degrees in F is all that different from 298 degrees Kelvin? Well one is too hot for human life the later is a nice day. G-L, Sullivan, Sheed, the councils and the Popes all define the Trinity so & that is the end of it. The Quotes I have repeated by G-L say the same.
A "real relation" between Persons is not a "real relation" in the same sense as in the Divine Essence. If you want to say there are "real relations in the former" and "no real relations in the later" and mean "real relations" in the same sense you are in effect saying the same thing as in the sentence before it. Do you have to play word games dguller to save this straw man?
>The fact that you continue to refuse to provide any justification for this premise, other than just repeatedly asserting it to be true, even in the face of my counter-examples that show it to be false, is remarkable, and not in a good way.
The burden of proof is on you since you are the one with the accusation of logical contradiction. 78 degrees Farenheight is the same referent temperature as 298 degrees Kelvin. They are different senses of measuring and it doesn't bold well to claim 78 F is the same as 78 Kelvin because you are moving from a warm day on earth to a Warm day on Pluto.
Every authority I've cited treats distinctions between Persons vs Essence as different senses otherwise they would be claiming distinct Persons in One divisible Essence which is both Simple and divisible and that would be a contradiction. Then they might justify the contradiction by making an appeal to a divine deep reality where logic ceases to exist & contradictions may exist or some stupid idea like that.
ReplyDelete>I am not being dogmatic when I reject the major premise of your argument as false,
No you are being dogmatic in insisting your Straw Man accurately represents the teaching go the Trinity. It clearly doesn't hasn't from the beginning & you are just ad hoc by special pleading trying to save the Straw man. The Three Persons and One Divine Nature are not both God in the same sense to each other only their referent. Get over it.
>Your only rationale for the major premise of your argument is that without it, the Trinity is contradictory.
You admitted there is no argument just the Trinity as a brute fact accept you have to accept as the brute fact the actual definition which defines Persons and Nature in different senses and distinctions within those categories as different senses. You are disregarding it to make a straw man.
> But that simply assumes that the Trinity must be true at all costs
Not at all since there is nothing to stop me from saying there is no God, there is no Trinity and the doctrine as defined & developed contains no formal logical contradictions since Persons and Nature are still different senses and not the same sense which would produce a contradiction being three equals one at the same time and in the same sense. The Trinity is Three = One at the same Time and in different senses which can have no logical contradiction by definition.
>Second, the only way to avoid logical contradiction is to fudge and equivocate the meanings to the point that they are actually meaningless.
They don't by nature have logical contradiction since we are still saying 3 Persons = One Nature at the same time but in different senses. So logically there can be no logical contradiction. There only equivocate meaning is they are both God & we still don't know what God is so we can't claim he can't be Three Persons in One Nature.
> If you want to embrace a meaningless doctrine, then be my guest, but you cannot use words, like “nature”, “the same”, “one”, “fully”, “different”, and so on, and pretend like they mean something when they actually mean nothing at all, because you cannot even tell me what they mean.
If you wanted to claim it is meaningless to talk about something that we can't ultimately understand then that is your best argument and it would have been better to explore it rather then your phony straw man that produces a so called "logical contradiction" where no exists.
That is just being both suborn and thick.
>What this ultimately comes down to is the same thing I’ve been arguing from the beginning. If there is only one divine essence, which is formally and numerically identical, and everything proceeds from that one divine essence, including the divine relations, then it is impossible for there to be any differences between the divine relations.
ReplyDeleteRather there cannot be any differences between the divine relations in the essence. That is the essence cannot be divided by it's very nature. But distinctions between the Persons as Persons are not divisions of an essence. They are distinctions in a different sense from essence that are never the less real in their own sense.
Why is this hard? All you have to do is read along carefully and not confuses the senses?
After all, where do the differences come from? They cannot come from the divine essence, because it is exactly the same, both formally and numerically, in each divine relation, and thus there is no grounds for any difference between them. And if they cannot come from the divine essence, then they either come from creation or non-Being, because the divine essence is Being itself, by virtue of divine simplicity.
Or they are differences in a different sense then differences in essence, creation or non-being? Why are these the only choices? They are different WHO's only & not different WHAT's. They are the same indivisible WHAT which in essence can't be divided as a WHAT but can be operated by different WHO'S and the WHO's are the same single WHAT and the WHO's are not divided from each other or separate but distinct as WHO's.
Why is this hard?
>Then all logical inferences involving those terms are fallacious.
They are logically consistent it is your Straw Man and disregard of the POC that is responsible for this nonsensical claim of logical contradiction. If you just let it go you could have made more hay discussing wither or not it is meaningful to discuss an inconceivable mystery in the first place.
But no you are like the Gnu who claims Motion in Aristotle is physical movement not metaphysical change.
You are stuck with your irrational straw man.
>If that is the price you want to pay to preserve the Trinity, then that is certainly your choice, but it completely undermines all natural theology and reduces it all to the fallacy of equivocation.
Not at all since it is not natural theology but revealed & deals with God telling us something about himself that we could never deduce and even after knowing can't positively contemplate anyway only negatively affirm. Divine Darkness.
>To quote Marshall McLuhan, “you know nothing of my work”.
I think I do & in the future I will point out how you confuse the senses of unequivocal with the sense literal in your critique of analogy. You seem to have this cognitive inability to make a distinction between different senses that goes beyond your straw man attack on the Trinity.
>>So you are in effect telling me you have no interest in finding out for yourself & you wish to continue to address this issue from that point of self-impossed ignorance?
ReplyDelete>Why can’t you just tell me? Why do I have to go on a wild goose chase to find the answer to something that you already know.
Because you should do your own homework, you pissed me off with your in-traction and finally my point was why would you of all people the so called open minded fair Atheist dare to venture a critique based on a Straw man? One it was identified to you as a Straw Man you should have gone back to the drawing board instead of trying to redefine the doctrine of the Trinity.
> It’s simple. Either you know, or you don’t know. If you know, then just tell me, and we’ll proceed. If you don’t know, then you cannot say that the sense of “fully God” in the divine essence is different from the sense of “fully God” in the divine relations, because you do not know what “fully God” even means in either case. And that would completely undermine your position.
Do your own homework! If you can't figure out Three Persons = One Nature at the same time(being God) but in different senses(Who's vs What) is not a logical contradiction then you need to do more studying on your won & I am not your teacher just your fucking opponent. If you can't figure out the divine simplicity merely means the WHAT can't be divided but it has nothing to do with the Father not being WHO the Son is or The Spirit etc….then you haven't read anything of significance on the Trinity.
>>It should seem obvious to those who read the English language I am claiming "God" the Incomprehensible is an equivocal term to all that is comprehensible.
ReplyDelete>Then you cannot say that the divine essence is fully God, if “divine”, “essence”, “fully” and “God” are all equivocal terms that have completely different meanings from the meaning that those terms have within our comprehension. So, it is all incomprehensible meaninglessness. Great defense!
So you think you can find a X-ian in all of X-iandum that can tell you What God Is? What the Divine Essence Is as God? What it is to be Divine and Not created using positive explanation and not a negative one?
You haven't been paying close attention then have you? We can talk about God via Natural Theology & or Revelation. But we can't say What God Is.
>The question, as always, is whether S(P) and S(E) have the same referent or do not have the same referent.
Same referent is just a fancy way to say they are the same thing. That is being the One Unknowable God.
But we still don't know what that Thing is other then it is One WHAT and THREE WHOS.
>If the referent for S(P) is R(P) and the referent for S(E) is R(E), then the question is whether R(P) is the same as R(E), or whether R(P) is not the same as R(E). You are still focusing upon senses, whereas I’m talking about referents. It’s actually quite easy, if you try.
No you are trying to come up with creative ways of stuffing this straw man to artificially produce the logical contradiction the doctrine as authentically spelled out doesn't in fact give you since it defines Persons and Nature in different senses. Their identical sense in being the same Referent is per the definition of referent from the dictionary is they are the same thing both being the One God. Why would I ever say either the Three Persons or the One Nature are not the same thing being God?
The Straw man is ashes.
>>If we don't & can't know what God is then we still can't say He is both X and Not ~X at the same time and in the same sense since even if we plead we don't know that is impossible given his unknowable nature we can still know via logic the POC is true and that we can't saying anything may exist that is both X and Not ~X at the same time in the same sense. Because we would be saying whatever God is which cannot be comprehended by us He is still a contradiction and therefore cannot really be.
>Are you saying that we do not know that the divine relations must involve real distinction? If you are, then we do not know the key claim of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Pay attention dguller Iam giving you an example of a hypothetical "God" that is incomprehensible and yet could be doctrinally defined as a logical contradiction.
>Are you saying that we do not know that the divine essence cannot involve real distinction (in the exact sense of “real distinction” as is involved in the divine relations)? If you are, then we do not know the key claim of the doctrine of divine simplicity.
Bitch what did I just say? I am giving you an example of an unknowable God who could never the less be defined in true logically contradictory terms. Of course it looks nothing like the Trinity or Natural Theology that is the point.
Your argument is a STRAW MAN & it cannot be saved even in a cold godless universe.
Let us put it in very simple terms. The Trinity say Three Persons in One Nature which is the One True God.
ReplyDeleteSo there are Three Persons in One Nature at the same Time(Being God) but in different senses(THREE WHO's vs ONE WHAT). No logical contradiction via the POC.
The divine simplicity means the WHAT is not composite and cannot be divided and is an indivisible WHAT that contains no distinctions in it's WHATNESS. But the WHO's as WHO's can be distinct in that One WHO is not Another WHO even thought all WHO's are the same single WHAT and because they are the same indivisible simple WHAT they are not separate or divided from one another or too the WHAT or to each other threw the WHAT.
Now this Trinity we can't really positively contemplate what it is to be three divine who's in one divine what. We can't clearly see how it could possibly be the way it is because it is a mystery but we can't say there is a logical contradiction & be true to the definition of the Principle of Contradiction.
Now go read Frank Sheed, re-read Feser's posts on the Trinity then work your way up to the difficult stuff. stuff.
God may not exist since He has not heard & granted my prayer for you to merely get it. But the logic stands by itself as logic.
BTW I know that Roman X-ians in their theology claim, in genera,l Fatherhood is a Person to Person relationship not only a relationship between individual separate human natures and only nominalists think so. But between rational persons.
ReplyDeleteAn animal nature cannot in the strict definitional sense be a "Father" merely a Sire. I note how G-L discusses in Q28 how Mary can be a real Mother and have the real relationship of a Mother to Son with the Incarnate Person of the Word even thought she did not obviously given him any divine Nature.
So Person to Person relations can be in a certain sense "real" even if the Mother is a Human Person and the Son is Divine and thus clearly the "realness" has nothing to do with altering an unchanging simple nature.
See page 135 of G-L THE TRINITY AND GOD THE CREATOR.
The Divine Simplicity is a feature of the One Divine Nature & it only refers to the Divine Persons in the sense as G-L clearly says "No real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, but a real distinction exists between the persons among themselves."[42].
ReplyDeleteIf no real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, then they are exactly the same thing. In other words, in reality, there is no difference between the essence and the persons, except in how they present to our minds as senses and concepts. That is what it means to say that there is no real distinction between X and Y. In reality X = Y, even if in our minds, X is distinct from Y. If that is true, then in reality – not in our minds – the divine essence is the divine persons, in the exact same way that the divine intellect is the divine will, i.e. notionally distinct, but really one and the same. And if that is true, then you have a logical contradiction, because the divine essence is indistinct and the divine persons are distinct. And it does you no good to point to different senses, because – as always – I am talking about referents.
Belonging to the sense of Nature it cannot be invoked to claim there can be no real distinction between the Persons among themselves.
It can, if the divine nature is the divine persons, which is what it means to say that they are not really distinct.
Since each Person is fully God therefore each Person processes the One Simple Nature and in that Nature there is no division.
So, “fully God” just means “has the divine essence”. Then why bother saying “fully God” at all? It has unwanted connotations that end up confusing the matter significantly. Also, your position leads to the unusual conclusion that the divine essence has the divine essence, which is absurd. The divine essence does not have the divine essence, but rather the divine essence is the divine essence.
But as G-L says distinction between Persons should not be identified as division but as distinction in the sense they have real relations between themselves Person to Person.
That is wrong. There is not the persons who have relations. The persons are the relations, specifically subsistent relations. The question is whether the relations are distinct from the divine essence. If the relations are the same as the divine essence, then you have a logical contradiction. If the relations are not the same as the divine essence, then the relations are either creatures or non-Being, both of which are absurd.
Nature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature)
ReplyDeleteSo, S(E) and S(P) have the same referent R, which is the “principle of action (God)”. Now we just need to clarify what you mean by “the same referent” here.
Take the Morning Star and the Evening Star. In one sense, they both refer to the totality of Venus, and thus have the same referent. Call this the total referent, i.e. it refers to the entirety of the referent. In another sense, they each refer to different aspects of Venus, the former refers to how the Morning Star appears in the morning and the latter refers to how the Morning Star appears in the evening. Call this the partial referent, i.e. it refers to one partial aspect of the referent. In both kinds of referents, the different senses are referring to the same referent, but one example refers to the entirety of the referent, whereas the other example refers to partial aspects of the referent.
So, when you say that S(E) and S(P) have the same referent, then you could mean either:
(1) S(E) and S(P) each refer to the same referent in totality (i.e. R)
(2) S(E) and S(P) each refer to different partial aspects of the same referent (i.e. R(E) and R(P), where R(E) and R(P) are partial aspects of R)
If you mean (1), then you have a logical contradiction. That is because if S(E) refers to the totality of R and S(P) refers to the totality of R, then it must be the case that whatever properties S(E) has must be present in the totality of R, and whatever properties S(P) has must be present in the totality of R. Therefore, if S(E) and S(P) have contradictory properties, then R must have contradictory properties, which would make R impossible to exist.
If you mean (2), then you avoid a logical contradiction, because you segregate the contradictory properties into different partial aspects of the shared referent, R(E) and R(P). But then you make R a composite entity involving R(E) and R(P), which means that R(E) is not identical to R(P). If R(E) was identical to R(P), then there would not be composition at all in reality.
However, if R(E) is different from R(P), then R(P) is either a creature or non-Being, both of which are absurd. Therefore, R(E) cannot be different from R(P), which means that R(E) is identical to R(P), which means that you cannot mean (2) at all, because in order for (2) to be possible, you must have different R(E) and R(P), which we have just seen is impossible. Therefore, all you can mean is (1), which is completely unable to segregate the contradictory properties of R(E) and R(P), because R(E) = R(P).
And again, it does you no good to say that I’m ignoring the different senses, because I’m taking them into consideration by saying up front that S(E) is different from S(P). I’m focusing upon the referents, and whether R(E) is the same as R(P) or whether R(E) is not the same as R(P). If you say that R(E) is the same as R(P), then you have a logical contradiction. If you say that R(E) is not the same as R(P), then you have absurd conclusions. Either way, you have to abandon a key doctrine.
A Person is not an attribute but operates a nature with attributes.
So, a person is distinct from the nature that it is operating. You have to be distinct from X to operate X. Great, then a person is either a creature or non-Being.
In order to contradict they must be identical l in sense. They are not defined as such. dguller's argument from the beginning has been nothing but an argument from special pleading trying to re-define the doctrine of Trinity in such a way as to produce an artificial contradiction not a natural one in the doctrine original qualified formulations.
ReplyDeleteYou still get a contradiction, once you keep the referents clear. Yes, the senses are different, but the question is whether the referents are the same or different. If the referents are both about the totality of the referent, then you have a contradiction, because the totality of R cannot have contradictory properties. If the referents are each a partial aspect of the totality of R, then as long as each referent is a different partial aspect of the totality of R, then you avoid a logical contradiction. If each referent is the same partial aspect of the totality of R, then you have a logical contradiction, because the same part of R cannot have contradictory properties. So, the only way to avoid a logical contradiction is if R(E) is different from R(P), but if that is true, then R(P) is a creature or non-Being, which is absurd.
Rather if they are different senses how can they be the same? 298 degrees of heat is fatal in a short period of time in the sense of Fahrenheit but in the sense of Kelvin it is quite amiable. How is 298 degrees in one not completely different then in the other? You can convert them but that is not the same as saying 298 F = 298 K which is a contradiction. You can convert between Three Persons and One Nature but you cannot treat them as identical senses.
Both measure the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules, but in different scales. And notice that “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” means the exact same thing in “298 degrees F” and “298 degrees K”. Again, your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be completely different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y). Here, part of the meaning of “298 degrees F” is “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” and part of the meaning of “298 degrees K” is “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules”, and “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” means the same thing in both. So, your example fails as a counter-example to my claim.
Also, you failed to even address my point. Say that there are different kinds of real distinction, i.e. RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on. Furthermore, say that the divine persons/relations involve only RD1, and that the divine essence does not involve RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on. That means that the divine persons/relations must involve RD1, and the divine essence cannot involve RD1 (because the divine essence cannot involve RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on). And also notice that “RD1” means the exact same thing in the divine essence and the divine persons/relations.
As long as you keep in mind "divine relations" & "divine essence" are not identical in sense to one another then you are good of course your "logical contradiction" cannot exist but that is the idea. The idea is to keep in mind they are different senses and to stop treating them as the same sense.
The logical contradiction does exist, if “RD1” means the same in the divine essence (i.e. “not-RD1”) and in the divine persons (i.e. “RD1”), and if S(E) and S(P) both refer either to (a) the same referent in totality, or to (b) the same partial aspect of that common referent. The logical contradiction is only avoided if (c) S(E) refers to R(E) and S(P) refers to R(P) and R(E) is not the same as R(P). But then you have absurd conclusions that you must reject.
Divine attributes are identical to the Divine Essence in the same sense not different senses!
So, you are saying that “the divine intellect” has the same sense as “the divine power”? Even Aquinas disagrees with you. He says that they differ “in mind”, and thus must have different senses.
The Divine Attributes have the Divine Essence as their same referent.
ReplyDeleteWhich has no bearing upon whether they have the same sense or different senses.
The common referent of the divine relations & divine essence is both being the same Unknowable God. The divine relationsis not the referent of the divine essence in the case that relations are attributes.
But the question is whether their common referent is the same totality of God, the same partial aspect of the totality of God, or different partial aspects of the totality of God. All of these options are problematic.
At best it is analogical comparison which goes from Creatures to God or some other equivocal comparison going the other way (but clearly not purely equivocal one). We via reason & analogy deduce the existence of divine ideas but even there we start with ourselves. Not with God who cannot be comprehended.
Then you admit that it is a valid question, as long as it is pursued analogically.
Actually it would help you would make common reference to the language of theologians rather then make it up as you go.
So, what do the theologians say they mean?
Well since they are different senses(SOMEONE's vs SOMETHING, WHO's vs WHAT) it is not a problem. When you are saying there is a real distinction in the Persons you are merely saying they are distinct SOMEONE's but you are still not saying the indivisible SOMETHING is now divided or that there is now more than one SOMETHING.
It is a problem, because it means that they have the same sense of “real distinction”, and that means that your claim that I was equivocating on “real distinction” is invalid. The only remaining question is whether the referents are the same total referent, or the same (or different) partial referents. But your charge of equivocation is completely rebutted.
Also, I’m not saying anything about “someone” versus “something”. That is completely irrelevant to my argument. All that I need is that part of S(P) is the presence of a kind of real distinction, and part of S(E) is the absence of any kind of real distinction, which necessarily must include the absence of the kind of real distinction in S(P). Similarly, when I am arguing geometry, it is irrelevant what color the shapes are, even though they must be some kind of color.
This analogy makes no sense. It's like saying 298 degree Fahrenheit will burn you to death therefore if you are sailing on the open ocean & turn your ship 298 degrees off course you will burn to death. You are conflating the harmonizing of the conclusions of Natural Theology with Revealed Theology with comparing God to his creatures. This makes no sense no does it justify your straw man or treating the different senses of Persons and Nature as identical senses.
Actually, your analogy makes no sense. All I’m saying is that to say that God is immaterial, you must first have a sense of “material”, and then negate that sense. If you say that “material” in material beings versus God is equivocal, then you cannot say that God is immaterial. Similarly, to say that God is absolutely simple, you must first have a sense of composition and real distinction, and then negate that precise sense of composition and real distinction in order to get simplicity. To say that the sense of “distinction” changes means that you cannot meaningfully say that God is simple at all. Once again, your charge of equivocation is completely bogus.
Whatever is in God is God who is simple. Sure but it doesn't logically follow Persons who are "centers of Attribution in a rational nature"/Person are attributes. Nor does it mean you can't have distinct "centers of Attribution in a rational nature"that are ether, spoken of individually or collectively, have only a notional distinction with the divine essence.
ReplyDeleteSure, it does. If the divine persons/relations “have only a notional distinction with the divine essence”, then in reality, the divine persons/relations are completely identical to the divine essence. It is the exact same scenario in which the Morning Star and the Evening Star are really just the planet Venus. It is the exact same scenario in which the divine power and the divine intellect are really just the divine essence. That is what it means for notional distinction to be operative, i.e. any distinction is only in the human mind, and not in reality.
So, if that is true, then you cannot have a common underlying reality that both involves real distinction and does not involve real distinction, unless that common underlying reality is a composite entity in which one part involves real distinction (i.e. the divine persons/relations) and another part does not involve real distinction (i.e. the divine essence). But then it is false that there is a notional distinction between the divine persons/relations and the divine essence, but rather there is either a virtual or real distinction between them. Unfortunately, that does not help your case either, because if there is a real distinction between them, then you have absurd consequences, such as that the divine persons/relations are creatures or non-Being, neither of which can be applied to God, who is pure act.
The only way for your case to work is by equivocating between terms every chance you can get. You have to equivocate between “the same in reality”, “notional distinction”, “real distinction”, “God”, and so on, to the point that these terms actually end up meaning nothing at all.
You have to stop confusing the senses. It's getting old it is a Straw Man.
And you have to stop confusing the senses with the referents.
No it is not similar sounding linguistic phrases are not the same as identical categories and G-L condemns heretics who identify Persons and Nature in the same sense on pg 30 of his book. That everything in the sense of essence. So this is just wishful thinking.
So, when G-L writes that “in God there is but one formal nature or reason”, he does not mean that there is a formal identity between the divine essence in each divine person/relation? What does he mean then?
Rather a man without eyes simply cannot see. A man without an Eagle's eyes can't see like an Eagle. He is not being deceived rather he lacks the ability to see. The blessed merely lack the ability to see God as God sees Himself. So naturally we "see" Father, Son and Spirit as having no distinction. God givens better eyes for eternity but not His Eyes.
You haven’t addressed my argument at all. If I see X, when the reality is not-X, then I see falsely. If I see God as having distinction, and God actually lacks distinction, then I am seeing God falsely.
Sure I can agree The Three Persons and the One Divine Nature are the same thing that being God.
So, you are saying that R(E) = R(P)? And furthermore, are you saying that R(E) and R(P) each refer to the totality of God in his entirety, or are they each referring to only a partial aspect of God himself?
A "real relation" between Persons is not a "real relation" in the same sense as in the Divine Essence.
Then we cannot say that God is immaterial, immutable, infinite, pure act, simple, and so on, because all of those terms are negations of creaturely affirmations. If you want to say that when I negate X, then the sense of “X” changes, then you have destroyed any ability to negate any affirmative proposition.
If you want to say there are "real relations in the former" and "no real relations in the later" and mean "real relations" in the same sense you are in effect saying the same thing as in the sentence before it. Do you have to play word games dguller to save this straw man?
ReplyDeleteNope. If the divine essence lacks any kind of real distinction, and the divine persons have one kind of real distinction, then it follows that the divine essence must lack the kind of real distinction that the divine persons have, because it must lack all kinds of real distinction. There is no arguing against this, and so you cannot use this equivocation to save the Trinity.
Every authority I've cited treats distinctions between Persons vs Essence as different senses otherwise they would be claiming distinct Persons in One divisible Essence which is both Simple and divisible and that would be a contradiction. Then they might justify the contradiction by making an appeal to a divine deep reality where logic ceases to exist & contradictions may exist or some stupid idea like that.
Once again, I’m talking about the referents. And you have just agreed that the referents are exactly the same in reality. The question is how the same underlying reality can present in different ways to the human mind.
They don't by nature have logical contradiction since we are still saying 3 Persons = One Nature at the same time but in different senses. So logically there can be no logical contradiction. There only equivocate meaning is they are both God & we still don't know what God is so we can't claim he can't be Three Persons in One Nature.
Say you have X and Y, where X is a planet and Y is a sandwich. It is part of S(X) to be a planetary object in space, and it is part of S(Y) to be a digestible food from earth. It is clear that S(X) and S(Y) are different. Say that someone comes along and says that X is the same as Y in reality. You will naturally say that this is impossible, because S(X) contradicts S(Y) in fundamental respects. You will say that the only way that X can be the same as Y in reality is if there is a larger entity that is composed of X and Y such that any statement about X or Y can loosely be about this larger entity. Similarly, talking about a dog’s legs and tail are both ways of talking about a dog, but this only works if the referent is a composite entity of some kind, such that the different senses can be about different parts of the entity. Otherwise, you cannot compartmentalize the contradictory properties at all.
And you want to have it both ways. You want to say that S(E) and S(P) are both about the same underlying reality, which could either mean:
(1) R = R(E) = R(P)
(2) R = R(E) & R(P)
If (1) is true, then R(E) cannot have contradictory properties from R(P), because then R would have contradictory properties, and thus be impossible. If (2) is true, then S(E) is specifically about R(E) and generally about R, and S(P) is specifically about R(P) and generally about R. But notice that R(E) is not identical to R(P), even if R(E) is similar to R(P) in that both are part of R. But if R(E) is different from R(P), then R(P) is a creature or non-Being, which is impossible. And that means that (1) must be true, but if (1) is true, then irrespective of the different senses, if R(E) cannot involve RD of any kind and R(P) involves RD of some kind, then you have a contradiction in R, which means R is impossible.
Or they are differences in a different sense then differences in essence, creation or non-being? Why are these the only choices? They are different WHO's only & not different WHAT's. They are the same indivisible WHAT which in essence can't be divided as a WHAT but can be operated by different WHO'S and the WHO's are the same single WHAT and the WHO's are not divided from each other or separate but distinct as WHO's.
ReplyDeleteThis does not help. Either the divine essence is fully identical to the divine persons, the divine essence is partly identical to the divine persons, or the divine persons are totally different from the divine persons. Those are the only logical options, and each leads to inconsistencies and contradictions.
The distinction between WHO and WHAT does not help here, because you still have the same problems. Either WHO is fully identical to WHAT, WHO is partially identical to WHAT, or WHO is totally different from WHAT. Each of these options leads to inconsistencies and contradictions. Just labeling things differently does not change the underlying logical dynamics involved in this issue.
I think I do & in the future I will point out how you confuse the senses of unequivocal with the sense literal in your critique of analogy. You seem to have this cognitive inability to make a distinction between different senses that goes beyond your straw man attack on the Trinity.
Haha. Go ahead, and good luck.
Do your own homework!
I’ll take that as you just don’t know and are blustering here. Nice.
If you can't figure out Three Persons = One Nature at the same time(being God) but in different senses(Who's vs What) is not a logical contradiction then you need to do more studying on your won & I am not your teacher just your fucking opponent. If you can't figure out the divine simplicity merely means the WHAT can't be divided but it has nothing to do with the Father not being WHO the Son is or The Spirit etc….then you haven't read anything of significance on the Trinity.
Except that WHAT and WHO are supposed to be God. And as I said, that means only one of the following:
(1) God = WHAT = WHO
(2) God = WHAT & WHO
Both (1) and (2) lead to huge problems. Simply relabeling the divine essence as WHAT and the divine persons as WHO does not change the logical dynamics of the issue at all. You can call them “John” and “Frank”, if you like, as well.
Same referent is just a fancy way to say they are the same thing. That is being the One Unknowable God. But we still don't know what that Thing is other then it is One WHAT and THREE WHOS.
Yes, but the further question is whether one is referring to the totality of that same thing, or to different partial aspects of that same thing. If one is referring to the totality of God, then the totality of God cannot be both really distinct and not really distinct. If one is referring to different partial aspects of that same thing, then as long as the referents are distinct in some sense, then the contradiction can be avoided. However, that means that they are distinct, which means that the divine essence and the divine relations/persons are also distinct, and that means that the divine relations/persons are either creatures or non-Being. Therefore, no matter what you do, you end up losing something important.
Their identical sense in being the same Referent is per the definition of referent from the dictionary is they are the same thing both being the One God. Why would I ever say either the Three Persons or the One Nature are not the same thing being God?
ReplyDeleteBut the question, as I’ve asked multiple times, is whether S(E) is referring to the totality of God or a partial aspect of God, and whether S(P) is referring to the totality of God or a partial aspect of God. We must be clear, because otherwise one would equivocate on “referring to the same thing”. After all, one can talk about a dog’s legs and a dog’s tail. In one sense, each is referring to something different, i.e. different aspects of the dog, but in another sense, each is referring to the same thing, i.e. the dog itself.
The divine simplicity means the WHAT is not composite and cannot be divided and is an indivisible WHAT that contains no distinctions in it's WHATNESS. But the WHO's as WHO's can be distinct in that One WHO is not Another WHO even thought all WHO's are the same single WHAT and because they are the same indivisible simple WHAT they are not separate or divided from one another or too the WHAT or to each other threw the WHAT.
But here’s the problem. There is formally and numerically only one divine essence. This is different from the human essence, which is formally one, but numerically multiple, because it is instantiated in multiple individual human beings. That is how you can have one (formal) WHAT (i.e. human nature) and multiple WHO’s (i.e. individual human beings). In God, this does not work, because the divine essence is not instantiated in three distinct individuals. It is formally and numerically one. Since there are three distinct divine persons, they must be different from the divine essence, because in order for the divine essence to be a part of the divine persons, it would have to be multiplied in three distinct instantiations, which contradicts its numerical oneness. It would be like saying that there is formally and numerically one human nature, but three human beings. It is nonsensical to make such a claim.
Furthermore, your entire account does not save the Trinity. Either WHAT = WHO (i.e. R(E) = R(P)) or WHAT =/ WHO (i.e. R(E) =/ R(P)).
If the former, then there is only one referent, and the different senses are merely conceptual and notional, i.e. are only present in our minds, but not in the referent, which means that the referent must either involve real distinction or not involve real distinction, but cannot involve both, on pains of logical contradiction. The only way to avoid a logical contradiction is to segregate or separate the contradictory properties into different aspects of the referent, but then it is false that R(E) = R(P), and rather they refer to distinct aspects of the shared referent. Therefore, it must be the case that R(E) =/ R(P), because that is absolutely necessary to avoid a logical contradiction.
But if R(E) =/ R(P), then R(P) is either a creature or non-Being. Why? Because R(E) = Being Itself = ipsum esse subsistens, and anything that is not Being Itself is either creation or non-Being. If R(P) is a creature, then the divine persons are creations of God, and not God himself, which negates the Trinity. If R(P) is non-Being, then the divine persons do not exist at all, which negates the Trinity. Therefore, to preserve the Trinity, one must reject the proposition that R(E) =/ R(P), which means that R(E) = R(P). But we just saw that if one assumes that R(E) = R(P), then one necessarily has a logical contradiction, unless one can separate R(E) and R(P). But we just saw that if we can separate R(E) and R(P), then the Trinity is false.
I'm sorry but your "argument" is still a straw man & cannot be anything else. It can never produce a "logical contradiction". You can't get blood from a turnip and trying to dip this turnip in blood does not constitute really getting blood from it. Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
ReplyDeleteThe Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition that treats Persons and Nature as two different senses. These different senses includes everything including the different senses of "distinctions".
The logic is consistent & your special pleading can't make it otherwise. You can't make 2+2=5 by merely redefining the symbol "5" to mean four objects and then act like you are really referring to five objects.
You can't redefine the Trinity to make Persons and Nature one identical sense. If you do so then all you are doing is finding a contradiction in the doctrine of irrational modalism or irrational Tri-MonoTheism. You are not addressing the Trinity.
You must accept it.
A "distinction" between Persons merely means One Person is not WHO Another Person is. That's it. There is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person . Both Persons are the exact same single WHAT & there is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person.
You must accept it.
Since the Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition you can't argue with it as such by redefining it without committing the Straw Man fallacy.
It is really that simple and in this cold godless universe the only human persons who can accept your "argument" are irrational dogmatics. Either extremist Atheists or anti-Trinitarian Theists with an agenda & both have an aversion to reason.
Rational Atheists and non-Trinitarian Theists will see the Trinity as formally defined contains no logical contradictions. At best they might argue such a Mysterious doctrine is meaningless(the rational Atheist) or it is not the conclusion of their accepted revelations or interpretations of common revelation & therefore wrong.
But that is all you can do.
Anonymous: Mr. Green, what is the point of all of this?
ReplyDeleteI could ask you the same, since you haven't dealt with any of the issues I raised, and yet you keep replying.
It is then perfectly reasonable to say that said doctrine is rationally indefensible.
Uh-huh. Just as it is perfectly reasonable to say that you can't throw half the parts of a sphere away and end up with the same sphere. Except, of course, for being wrong.
Is this a complete knowledge of God (quite impossible, you know)
The question is, do you know? Because it's hardly a secret that many in fact claim that the Trinity cannot be clearly understood because it's impossible to have full knowledge of God. But that means you cannot disprove it — at worst, it would be unknowable either way. (Thus a more constructive strategy would have been for you to try claiming that Trinitarian proponents have failed to define their position clearly enough, and may on their own terms be unable to do so). But again, this is not a new idea. I am not going to try to jump in with a defence because this is not something I have studied well enough, and there is no point claiming to have foolproof demonstrations when one is not very well-acquainted with all the relevant material. Perhaps you are under the impression that folks like Augustine and Aquinas and all the rest never noticed the obvious problems with their position, but I can assure you the issue is a little more sophisticated than that. Instead of snapping your fingers and demanding an answer to your liking in a 700-post comment form, you might consider studying the literature on the topic. It's not an easy job, but if you are genuinely interested in serious answers, it's the only way.
Benonymous: dguller's cheerleader isn't offering you an argument. He or she just sits on the sidelines & shakes their pom poms while jumping up and down.
ReplyDeleteBut at least he hasn't been hurling invective like that which has been most unfairly aimed at Dguller. I think he deserves another apology by now, don't you?
Mr. Green,
ReplyDeleteI think that I've clearly explained why I made my initial claim. And I think that the record shows that I addressed everything you raised.
One more time? Critics of TD analyze the claims made by its advocates. The above "discussion" (really, excepting for a few posts offered by Ben, dguller has been the only one looking at this rationally---there I go again with the pom-poms) is illustrative of what I have claimed: At the end of the day, the DDS conjoined with TD cannot avoid logical contradictions.
You write,
Because it's hardly a secret that many in fact claim that the Trinity cannot be clearly understood because it's impossible to have full knowledge of God. But that means you cannot disprove it — at worst, it would be unknowable either way.
You're right, it is hardly a secret, and critics are well aware of it. That doesn't turn a contradiction or an incoherent argument into something rational.
Ok, so you're not going to defend TD, that's fine. You just think that I've bitten off more than I can chew with the sweeping claim that I made. I respectfully disagree, and since I've described why, I won't bother to repeat it here. I will add, however, that there is a world of difference between something not being clearly understood and a flat-out contradiction. You perhaps do not intend to say what you imply, but your statement amounts to an insistence that illogical arguments about the nature of God must be accepted because we cannot fully understand God. For a rational person, that's eyebrow raising.
Forgive me for giving the impression that I was snapping my fingers. I simply wanted to move beyond the "valid argument" rut that wasn't going anywhere.
You recommend that I study relevant literature on the Trinity. Believe me, I have. In fact, I used to be a Trinitarian, so the criticisms I offer are not from somebody who was raised to fight against TD.
At least we can agree on something: The other Anonymous has sullied this thread with unfair invective.
Excepting this topic, I have agreed with many of your posts. Thanks for the dialog, and all the best.
>If no real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, then they are exactly the same thing.
ReplyDeleteThey are the same WHAT. So what? The Persons are still distinct from each other as WHO's not distinct from WHAT they are in the essence or threw the essence. Wow you are thick!
>In other words, in reality, there is no difference between the essence and the persons, except in how they present to our minds as senses and concepts.
Now we are back to pretending senses don't matter. dguller the Straw Man fucktard rides again.
>That is what it means to say that there is no real distinction between X and Y. In reality X = Y, even if in our minds, X is distinct from Y.
So now you are ignoring everything we talked about & resetting back to your Straw man. Typical brain dead New Atheist move! You have lost any right at this point to claim you are a thoughtful careful Atheist. You are an irrational bigot dguller nothing more.
>If that is true, then in reality – not in our minds – the divine essence is the divine persons, in the exact same way that the divine intellect is the divine will, i.e. notionally distinct, but really one and the same.
The divine essence is WHAT the divine persons are but the divine person are still different WHO's from each other. Thick as a brick!
>And if that is true, then you have a logical contradiction, because the divine essence is indistinct and the divine persons are distinct. And it does you no good to point to different senses, because – as always – I am talking about referents.
The referent is both are the One Mysterious God and that is a third sense. Like I said Straw Man if you just stick your fingers in your ears and chant "Senses! Senses! Go Away! Come again some other day"! That somehow that will help?
>It can, if the divine nature is the divine persons, which is what it means to say that they are not really distinct.
The divine nature is WHAT the divine persons are & there is no "WHAT" distinctions there but the persons are still distinct WHO's from one another because of the different senses(3 WHo's in One WHAT) thus no contradiction. Live with it straw boy!
>So, “fully God” just means “has the divine essence”. Then why bother saying “fully God” at all?
So heretics & Straw making Atheists don't claim each Person has a Third of the essence or some such bullshit.
>It has unwanted connotations that end up confusing the matter significantly. Also, your position leads to the unusual conclusion that the divine essence has the divine essence, which is absurd. The divine essence does not have the divine essence, but rather the divine essence is the divine essence.
ReplyDeleteThe above nonsense is proof positive you have approached this whole matter from the beginning pretending Persons and Nature are identical senses. Why don't you just admit you are making a straw man?
>That is wrong. There is not the persons who have relations. The persons are the relations, specifically subsistent relations.
How do you know? You haven't read it! If you did you would see that is exactly what he says & of course he doesn't deny Persons are relations but they are still distinct from each other as relations?But not divided in the essence. Distance WHO's but the same identical WHAT.
>The question is whether the relations are distinct from the divine essence. If the relations are the same as the divine essence, then you have a logical contradiction.
The relations are indivisibly the same WHAT as the divine essence. But the relations are still different WHO's from each other. We are of course not saying the relations/persons are different WHO's from the essence because the Essence is not a WHO but a WHAT. Different senses no contradiction go have a good cry about it .
>So, S(E) and S(P) have the same referent R, which is the “principle of action (God)”. Now we just need to clarify what you mean by “the same referent” here.
I quoted the dictionary & now you want to redefine "referent"? Same referent merely means the same identical thing. They are both The One God which is unknowable in essence & thus we can't know if it is possible or impossible for The One God to be Three Who's in One What. Three Who's is One Sense & One What is another different Sense and The One God is the equivocal third sense Referent that is unknowable.
It's not hard asshole & there is no amount of sophistry that can make this a logical contradiction.
>Take the Morning Star and the Evening Star. In one sense, they both refer to the totality of Venus, and thus have the same referent. Call this the total referent, i.e. it refers to the entirety of the referent. In another sense, they each refer to different aspects of Venus, the former refers to how the Morning Star appears in the morning and the latter refers to how the Morning Star appears in the evening. Call this the partial referent, i.e. it refers to one partial aspect of the referent. In both kinds of referents, the different senses are referring to the same referent, but one example refers to the entirety of the referent, whereas the other example refers to partial aspects of the referent.
ReplyDeleteDon't think I don't notice this red herring long winded bullshit is just so you can obfuscate & pretend you are not dealing with distinct non-identical senses here. The referent in regards to the Trinity is just a third sense that is undefined & unknown. But since it is undefined and unknown one can't say Three Who's can be the same identical WHAT. So you are just wasting time with more straw man bullshit! Gnutard!
>(1) S(E) and S(P) each refer to the same referent in totality (i.e. R)
>(2) S(E) and S(P) each refer to different partial aspects of the same referent (i.e. R(E) and R(P), where R(E) and R(P) are partial aspects of R)
>If you mean (1), then you have a logical contradiction.
Accept we know what the Planet Venus is & we know it's positive properties. We don't know what God is & we only know by reason alone negative properties of God. And the negative properties tell us God is an indistinct WHAT but there is no way we can know what He is to know if it is or is not possible for that WHAT to contain Three distinct WHO's whose distinction is WHO based not WHAT based.
Try again.
>That is because if S(E) refers to the totality of R and S(P) refers to the totality of R, then it must be the case that whatever properties S(E) has must be present in the totality of R, and whatever properties S(P) has must be present in the totality of R. Therefore, if S(E) and S(P) have contradictory properties, then R must have contradictory properties, which would make R impossible to exist.
They can only have contradictory properties if they are identical senses but they are different senses so there can be no contradiction. It all comes back to elaborate ways for you to pretend different senses don't exist in the definition of the Trinity and your need to make a straw man.
>And again, it does you no good to say that I’m ignoring the different senses, because I’m taking them into consideration by saying up front that S(E) is different from S(P). I’m focusing upon the referents,
ReplyDeleteAccept you are arguing from a known referent who positive properties and nature are known to an unknown referent & you are still ignoring the different senses. After all the Morning Star is Venus but it isn't the Evening Star when Venus appears in the Morning. Morning and evening are different senses of time.
You can't argue from them having the same referent to Morning and Evening being the same time in the same sense.
But all this doesn't explain to me how Three Who's can or cannot be the Same What. As a WHAT it is incoherent to talk about God as a WHAT that can be subdivided into different parts of WHAT or multiplied into more than one WHAT. But WHO's is a different sense then WHAT & you have thus far given no logical reason why Three Who's each being the same WHAT but not WHO the others are as WHO's is a contradiction. You are just looking for fancy ways to pretend Sense doesn't matter.
>So, a person is distinct from the nature that it is operating.
Says Who? A Who can be indistinct from a WHAT in the sense of WHAT it is.
>You have to be distinct from X to operate X. Great, then a person is either a creature or non-Being.
Sorry but there is no distinction between Persons and Essence in that they are the same WHAT.the same WHAT. But Persons and Essences are not distinct as same or different WHO's since Essence is not a WHO but a WHAT and a Person who is a subsistence in the WHAT is identical to that WHAT as WHAT it is being The One God.
As long as you keep in mind the sense are not the same there is no way to produce a logical contradiction.
>You still get a contradiction, once you keep the referents clear.
Only if you pretend the Referent is something who positive properties are known(like Venus) & treat it like another physical object(like Venus). When the referent is an unknown(Like God) which has no positive properties knowable by reason and only negative ones(like God) then the contradiction is non-existent.
It is just wishful thinking and word gamest to justify what has been from the beginning an illegal move.
>Yes, the senses are different, but the question is whether the referents are the same or different.
The referent is an equivocal(What is God) not unequivocal(What is Venus? A planet & Physical object).
Since the referent is an equivocal you can't produce a contradiction because you don't know if it's unknown positive non material non physical properties exclude it from being Three Who's in One What. Also there is no such a thing as a Partially God so all that nonsense on partial referents was a red herring. God in essence is indivisible. So if God is One Person, Three or Ten Thousand they are all fully the One WHAT even if they are distinct Who's.
>If the referents are both about the totality of the referent, then you have a contradiction, because the totality of R cannot have contradictory properties.
But how is being Three Who's and One What contradictory? Who's and What's are different senses and the thing they are(the referent God) has unknown and unknowable if not inconceivable positive properties?
So this sophisticated attempt to save the straw man is a bust.
>If the referents are each a partial aspect of the totality of R, then as long as each referent is a different partial aspect of the totality of R, then you avoid a logical contradiction.
In physical objects whose positive properties are known yes & we know the nature of physical objects to know what is physically impossible. But since when is God either physical or known?
BUSTED!
>So, the only way to avoid a logical contradiction is if R(E) is different from R(P), but if that is true, then R(P) is a creature or non-Being, which is absurd.
ReplyDeleteIn semantics a referent is a person or thing to which a linguistic expression refers,[1] a discursive entity, the subject of speech. That is the definition. One that refers or is referred to; especially : the thing that a symbol (as a word or sign) stands for.
In this case the referent is the word "God". You haven't really explained how the Positive properties of God preclude God being both Three Persons and One Nature. Three Who's and One What. The only properties we can know of God are negative ones that tell us something about the WHAT but they can't tell us the WHAT can't be subsistent in Three Who's nor vice versa. You have to assume "God" is just another physical thing and his properties are positive ones that can be contrasted with each other. That is not the case.
>Both measure the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules, but in different scales. And notice that “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” means the exact same thing in “298 degrees F” and “298 degrees K”.
Kinetic energy is the identical referent between different senses of measurement scales & we know what kinetic energy is & what it's positive properties happen to be. But God is unknown in his positive properties and undefined so my point stands. Also 298 degrees F” and “298 degrees K” are different senses of scale not identical. So my point still stands.
>Again, your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything included in the meaning of S(X) must be completely different from everything included in the meaning of S(Y).
But I never argued Three Divine Persons is completely different from One Divine Nature. More Straw man! I said they where both identical in being the One God. God is the Referent between Three Persons and One Nature and Persons and Nature are still different senses. You tried to remove reference to "God" as a common referent because the equivocal term destroyed your argument for "logical contradiction". Now you want to smuggle it back in by pretending things with known positive properties can be compared unequivocally to God who has unknown & unknowable positive properties.
Silly!
>Here, part of the meaning of “298 degrees F” is “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” and part of the meaning of “298 degrees K” is “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules”, and “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules” means the same thing in both. So, your example fails as a counter-example to my claim.
ReplyDeleteIt's not a literal analogy. God can not be part anything. God is an indivisible WHAT whose positive properties if any are inconceivable and unknowable. God you are thick! The point is you can't say just because they both say 298 degrees that they must be the identical temperature sense. They are not because of the different senses of scale between F and K. Just as you can't say real relations Person to Person as Persons is the same as real relations Persons to Essence or between Persons threw essence. You have to follow your sense qualifiers not come up with elaborate ways to ignore them.
>Also, you failed to even address my point.
ReplyDeleteYou have no point just a straw man!
>Say that there are different kinds of real distinction, i.e. RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on. Furthermore, say that the divine persons/relations involve only RD1, and that the divine essence does not involve RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on. That means that the divine persons/relations must involve RD1, and the divine essence cannot involve RD1 (because the divine essence cannot involve RD1, RD2, RD3, and so on). And also notice that “RD1” means the exact same thing in the divine essence and the divine persons/relations.
Word salad! If RD1 only applies to Persons/Relations in one sense by definition it can't be applied to divine essence in the same sense .
>The logical contradiction does exist, if “RD1” means the same in the divine essence (i.e. “not-RD1”) and in the divine persons (i.e. “RD1”),
But you just admitted RDI involve only divine persons/relation and that the divine essence does not involve RD1,? So which is it? If RD1 means the same then it means One Who is really distinct from another WHO as distinct WHO's but if applied to an indivisible WHAT it would divide what cannot be divided which is a contradiction and why RDI can involve divine persons/relations only and not divine essence.
Try again. No don't! No matter how hard you try dguller 2+2 cannot be made to equal 5.
>and if S(E) and S(P) both refer either to (a) the same referent in totality, or to (b) the same partial aspect of that common referent. The logical contradiction is only avoided if (c) S(E) refers to R(E) and S(P) refers to R(P) and R(E) is not the same as R(P). But then you have absurd conclusions that you must reject.
The Three Persons subsist in the One Nature and the One Nature subsists in the Three Persons so I don't know why you keep bringing up this partial mishigas? Stop pettifogging the issue!
>So, you are saying that “the divine intellect” has the same sense as “the divine power”? Even Aquinas disagrees with you. He says that they differ “in mind”, and thus must have different senses.
Still pettifogging. That just means they have different logical senses but they are still attributes compared logically to one another as WHAT. The Attributes of Divine Nature are negative properties & are thus only logically distinct. Persons are "Centers of Attribution in a Rational Nature" that fully possess & operate Nature. They are logically identical to the Nature in being the One WHAT but in the different sense of WHO "Center of Attribution in a Rational Nature" as compared to other WHO's they are distinctly different as WHO's even thought they are all One What.
>>The Divine Attributes have the Divine Essence as their same referent.
>Which has no bearing upon whether they have the same sense or different senses.
Yes it does they are both negative attributes of Essence. They are given the nature of the Divine Essence identical senses of logical relations. There is no limit to how far you will go to save this straw man is there?
>But the question is whether their common referent is the same totality of God, the same partial aspect of the totality of God, or different partial aspects of the totality of God. All of these options are problematic.
ReplyDeleteThat assumes the referent "God" is not an equivocal term here which it is. God is the referent the semantic word symbol for the great unknowable whose positive attributes if any are beyond comprehension & beyond the limits of created things. Still creating straw men ignoring senses & being an idiot in the process.
>Then you admit that it is a valid question, as long as it is pursued analogically.
I could but your straw man remains & you don't want to give him up no matter how irrational it makes you look or how tortured your "arguments" become to justify it.
>So, what do the theologians say they mean?
Why Not read them for yourself? Or do you intend to stay ignorant so you may continue to push this straw man?
>It is a problem, because it means that they have the same sense of “real distinction”, and that means that your claim that I was equivocating on “real distinction” is invalid.
No because "real distinction" can't be applied to the sense of Essence/Nature only logical distinction. A hypothetical "real distinction" in essence would divide what cannot be divided which is a contradiction. So therefore any real distinction between Persons must be between Person only as Persons and not in essence. Even if you make "real distinction" identical in both senses the senses are still different as Who's and What. Real distinction can only multiply the WHO's and not the One WHAT. Who's' and WHAT remain different senses and not identical ones and you can't make them identical senses or make them behave as identical senses.
>Also, I’m not saying anything about “someone” versus “something”.
Of course! I already know you are not debating the doctrine of the Trinity but your own Straw Man version of "trinity" in which you find a "logical contradiction"! If you where talking about “someone” versus “something” you would see you can' t produce a contradiction since they are still different senses.
>That is completely irrelevant to my argument. All that I need is that part of S(P) is the presence of a kind of real distinction, and part of S(E) is the absence of any kind of real distinction, which necessarily must include the absence of the kind of real distinction in S(P). Similarly, when I am arguing geometry, it is irrelevant what color the shapes are, even though they must be some kind of color.
Then you are all but admitting you have been arguing a Straw Man. Since Sheed, G-L, Feser, Sullivan, G of Nyssa, & the whole X-ian world understand the Trinity to be that and you have been arguing everything else but that in your insane quest to build this straw man.
>Actually, your analogy makes no sense.
ReplyDeleteWhich is the point since I am arguing your analogy makes no sense so I produce something that makes no sense and compare it too your original argument. You are beyond thick at this point.
>All I’m saying is that to say that God is immaterial, you must first have a sense of “material”, and then negate that sense. If you say that “material” in material beings versus God is equivocal, then you cannot say that God is immaterial.
But we can positively say what a material being is & what are it's positive properties. God can only be conceived with negative properties which renders him in the positive sense as unknowable. To know a contradiction in God exists you need to know what His Positive Properties are & how they would contradict.
But we can't know that! We can only know negative properties which tell us about WHAT God is via perfections minus compositions but it can't tell us if God is a WHO or THREE WHO's which are a different sense then a WHAT.
>To say that the sense of “distinction” changes means that you cannot meaningfully say that God is simple at all. Once again, your charge of equivocation is completely bogus.
Well you can't have a real distinction in the One Divine Something/WHAT. But a WHO is a different sense of the Principle of Action so logically a real distinction between WHo's does not equal a real distinction in WHAT. No matter how you slice it no real distinction of WHO's add's up to any real distinction of WHAT. Just like 298 degrees F doesn't equal burning your Ship when you turn her 298 degrees from her original course. Different senses that can never be made identical save in the equivocal referent of the One Unknowable God.
>Sure, it does. If the divine persons/relations “have only a notional distinction with the divine essence”, then in reality, the divine persons/relations are completely identical to the divine essence.
Yes they are all the same WHAT? So what? It still doesn't add up to their having an inability to be distinct WHO's.
>It is the exact same scenario in which the Morning Star and the Evening Star are really just the planet Venus.
No it isn't since we can know Venus Positive Physical Properties but we cannot know God's Positive Divine Properties if any. But I can know when Venus is in the Morning Sky she can't in that sense be the Evening Star till Evening even thought she is still Venus. But I don't know What God is so I can't in principle Know if He can or cannot be Three Who's in One What. I can know by reason alone.God can only be One What that can have no real distinctions in that What and cannot be more than One What.
But reason can't affirm or deny God is even One Who or Many or Not any Who.
Tough break!
>It is the exact same scenario in which the divine power and the divine intellect are really just the divine essence. That is what it means for notional distinction to be operative, i.e. any distinction is only in the human mind, and not in reality.
Power and intellect are negative properties in the Simple WHAT they are not WHO's nor is a WHO a negative Property or attribute. dguller's method pretend at all costs different senses don't matter & ignore the POC and just make shit up off the top of his head. What a dick!
>So, if that is true, then you cannot have a common underlying reality that both involves real distinction and does not involve real distinction,
Only if you keep pretending there aren't different senses united in that common underlying reality of which we have no sense there are any identifiable positive properties that might negate the two different senses existing in said reality. But obviously we can have real distinction and no distinction exist in even an unknowable reality at the same time(being that reality) and in the same sense.
Fail!
>unless that common underlying reality is a composite entity in which one part involves real distinction (i.e. the divine persons/relations) and another part does not involve real distinction (i.e. the divine essence).
ReplyDeleteWe are familiar with the positive properties of material and composite realities to know that is the case but since we cannot in principle know an unknown reality whose positive properties cannot be known like material things can might contain two differing things in different senses but have the same ultimate reality in an unknown third referent sense.
Those are the breaks.
Really would it fucking kill you to do some reading instead of making shit up?
>The only way for your case to work is by equivocating between terms every chance you can get.
Of course which I can do since God cannot be conceived as having any rationally knowable positive properties. We can only know he is a negative WHAT with perfections & Universals whose composition is abstracted away. But we can't know what he is positively. So we can't know if it is possible or impossible for God to be not wholly positively absolute in the Divine substance (like a material thing made out of one element might be) or wholly relative (like material things of which there is more than one of).
So I am quite justified in equivocating. You however are not justified in arguing a Straw man.
>You have to equivocate between “the same in reality”, “notional distinction”, “real distinction”, “God”, and so on, to the point that these terms actually end up meaning nothing at all.
No I just have to accept two different senses Divine Persons(Who's) which can not be rationally deduced to exist and Nature(which can be deduced to exist philosophically and only described negatively with created perfections having their composition abstracted away a One WHAT) and put them together in an unknown recent thing called God which I must admit is beyond positive material properties and their limits.
>And you have to stop confusing the senses with the referents.
A referent is a semantic linguistic expression which refers, a discursive entity, the subject of speech.
In this case it is the thing referred too, the thing the word stands for, specifically the One Incomprehensible God. If we knew what God's positive properties where we would be able to figure out if the two senses really where contradictory. But you aren't using referent according to it's definition you are pretending it's some magical woo that allows you to treat two different senses as an identical sense.
>So, when G-L writes that “in God there is but one formal nature or reason”, he does not mean that there is a formal identity between the divine essence in each divine person/relation? What does he mean then?
He is simply saying there is One WHAT and everything in that WHAT is that One identical WHAT. So what? He is not saying there can't be different WHO's who are all the same WHAT but different as WHo's. Really it's not hard when you do the reading and refuse to create a straw man.
>You haven’t addressed my argument at all. If I see X, when the reality is not-X, then I see falsely. If I see God as having distinction, and God actually lacks distinction, then I am seeing God falsely.
ReplyDeleteYou are equivocating between False vs incomplete. If I look at an Infinite Wall that goes in two directions infinitely & by definition well beyond the range of my sight in either direction I can't claim my viewing of the wall is "false". Rather given the nature of the Wall I can only see what My eyes are capable of viewing. If I put a pencil in a glass of water and look at it from the side & see it "cut" in half I am not really seeing something false. Rather I am seeing what my eyes truly see when light is refracted threw water. Even in Heaven "seeing" God we can't comprehend how God can be Three Who's in One What?
So what? We can't comprehend infinity so stop ya bitching & get me a beer!
>>Sure I can agree The Three Persons and the One Divine Nature are the same thing that being God.
ReplyDelete>So, you are saying that R(E) = R(P)? And furthermore, are you saying that R(E) and R(P) each refer to the totality of God in his entirety, or are they each referring to only a partial aspect of God himself?
I'd like to answer yes but you seem oblivious to the brute fact Referent is a term of semantics & I know you want to confuse the semantics just enough to identify the different senses as the same sense and then turn around and claim you are still using different senses to manufacture your straw man contradiction.
You have already admitted to not arguing against God being Three Who's in One What. For you it is all an argument about a single "what" because you are too much of a lazy fuck to do the reading.
>Then we cannot say that God is immaterial, immutable, infinite, pure act, simple, and so on, because all of those terms are negations of creaturely affirmations.
Yes we can because you still can't grasp the difference between saying WHO God is (Three Persons) which can't be known by reason vs WHAT GOD IS in the negative perfections sense immaterial, immutable, infinite, pure act, simple, and so on etc known by reason etc. You keep identifying God in the sense of the later but you falsely equate the former literally with creatures whose positive properties we can known but we can't know God's positive properties if any. You are addicted to sense confusion it's like Heroine to you.
>If you want to say that when I negate X, then the sense of “X” changes, then you have destroyed any ability to negate any affirmative proposition.
If you want to keep pretending the sense of WHAT is the same sense as WHO you will keep making this mistake.
>Nope. If the divine essence lacks any kind of real distinction, and the divine persons have one kind of real distinction, then it follows that the divine essence must lack the kind of real distinction that the divine persons have, because it must lack all kinds of real distinction.
Only if you keep pretending divine essence and Persons are both the same sense specifically that of WHAT. But they aren't WHAT vs WHAT. They are WHO's vs WHAT. If a divine WHAT lacks any kind of real distinction then that means the WHAT can not be divided and there cannot be more then one WHAT in existence. But WHO's are a different sense of the Referent One Thing whose positive Properties cannot be conceived. Thus a real distinction of WHO merely multiplies WHO's not WHAT's.
Live with it.
>There is no arguing against this, and so you cannot use this equivocation to save the Trinity.
ReplyDeleteYour not arguing against the Trinity. You admitted it yourself when you claimed you where not arguing against WHO's vs WHAT's and tried to use the common "referent" as an excuse to confuse the senses.
>Once again, I’m talking about the referents. And you have just agreed that the referents are exactly the same in reality.
The referent is the semantic term for a thing in this case the thing we call God which is Unknowable and by definition beyond our reality and has no rationally conceivable positive properties. We would have to know what if any positive properties God has to know God can't be both Three Who's in One What.
>The question is how the same underlying reality can present in different ways to the human mind.
This proves you have done no significant reading. We can only Know if we accept the doctrine God exists and God is One God in Three Persons. That is it! It can't be present in our minds in any way except a few crude analogies, metaphors and by negation. We can't know what God is the mystics say we can only love him if you believe that sort of thing.
>Say you have X and Y, where X is a planet and Y is a sandwich.
It is something like that but we can know the positive properties of Planets and sandwiches. We can't know what God's positive properties are and we can't claim because it like comparing a planet and sandwich God must literally be both a Planet and Sandwich & be composite like them into parts.
>Say that someone comes along and says that X is the same as Y in reality. You will naturally say that this is impossible, because S(X) contradicts S(Y) in fundamental respects.
Well duh I know the positive properties of Planets and Sandwiches but somehow fucking idiots like you think we can apply this to a God whose positive properties can't be known even in principle.
>This does not help. Either the divine essence is fully identical to the divine persons,
They are fully identical in that the essence is ONE WHAT & Persons & everything else subsisting in that essence is fully the One WHAT. Any division of the WHAT is impossible as is any multiplication of the WHAT. But Divine Persons are WHO's that subsist in the ONE WHAT & their multiplication as WHO's doesn't divide the WHAT but EACH WHO is a distinct WHO from another WHO but they are all identical without any distinction as WHAT. What the fuck would it kill ya to learn the difference between Persons and Nature instead of pretending they are the same sense of the same thing?
>The distinction between WHO and WHAT does not help here, because you still have the same problems.
ReplyDeleteThis will end badly….for you.
>Either WHO is fully identical to WHAT,
Rather the WHO is fully identical to the WHAT as a WHAT without distinction as a WHAT. Also comparing WHO in the sense of WHAT shows different WHO's are fully identical without distinction to each other as the same identical One WHAT. But WHO's I'm afraid are still not other WHO's as who's.
Get the fuck over it.
>Each of these options leads to inconsistencies and contradictions. Just labeling things differently does not change the underlying logical dynamics involved in this issue.
But none of those options you gave me are a description of the doctrine of Trinity. So who cares if your straw man options leads to inconsistencies and contradictions? You have yet after 700 posts or more to attack the Trinity.
>Haha. Go ahead, and good luck.
Well your loser straw man argument here has disabused me of any notion you know what you are talking about so I look forward to crushing you in the future on analogy like I did here.
>I’ll take that as you just don’t know and are blustering here. Nice.
No it's just pure spite.
>Except that WHAT and WHO are supposed to be God. And as I said, that means only one of the following:
ReplyDeleteOf course in your examples as per your MO you drop senses and necessary qualifiers for the definition & at no time apply the Principle of Contradiction.
See what I mean look at this shit?
>(1) God = WHAT = WHO WRONG
It's God = One What = Three Who's. Who's and What are different senses and God is the equivocal referent because God's positive properties can't be known. CORRECT Wow even with simple definitions you make straw men. Pathetic!
>(2) God = WHAT & WHO WRONG
God=Three Who's in One What. That is the correct simple definition of Trinity. The shit you wrote above is not the definition Trinity. It is a straw man & you are an idiot.CORRECT
>Both (1) and (2) lead to huge problems. Simply relabeling the divine essence as WHAT and the divine persons as WHO does not change the logical dynamics of the issue at all. You can call them “John” and “Frank”, if you like, as well.
Rather you can make a logical argument from a Straw man but at the end of the day it is still a straw man. I don't dispute your logic I dispute your claim to know how to define the Trinity in a manner an X-ian would recognize. Even now you can't do it.
>Yes, but the further question is whether one is referring to the totality of that same thing, or to different partial aspects of that same thing.
No the referent by definition can't be conceived of as having any positive properties so statements like totally and partially can have no applicable meaning. It is just an excuse to pretend the senses are identical. But as we saw your whole argument is Straw.
> If one is referring to the totality of God, then the totality of God cannot be both really distinct and not really distinct. If one is referring to different partial aspects of that same thing, then as long as the referents are distinct in some sense, then the contradiction can be avoided.
Here you are arguing Three Persons(One sense)= One Nature(another different sense) = Same Referent God thus both are now the same sense.WRONG
Here is your problem. Three Persons(One sense)= One Nature(another different sense) = Same Referent God(third equivocal sense). Good luck applying the POC and getting a logical contradiction from that sunshine.
>But the question, as I’ve asked multiple times, is whether S(E) is referring to the totality of God or a partial aspect of God, and whether S(P) is referring to the totality of God or a partial aspect of God.
Nice dodge. A referent is a semantic term for a Thing. The thing being God & that is used as a third sense equivocal here no as something that magically mass two different senses the same sense. It's is part of the definition of the Trinity. Go back and re-read Feser on the Trinity. on this very blog.
>We must be clear, because otherwise one would equivocate on “referring to the same thing”. After all, one can talk about a dog’s legs and a dog’s tail. In one sense, each is referring to something different, i.e. different aspects of the dog, but in another sense, each is referring to the same thing, i.e. the dog itself.
Dog's are composite not simple & Dog's have known positive physical properties. They are not non-physical with negative properties only and unknowable positive ones if any and dogs are beings alongside other beings not Being Itself.
>But here’s the problem. There is formally and numerically only one divine essence. WRONG
ReplyDeleteNo rather given that it is infinite & the negative properties of the divine essence we know via reason it is not coherently possible to speak of it being a composite WHAT or of there being more than one Infinite WHAT at the same time and in the same sense.
>In God, this does not work, because the divine essence is not instantiated in three distinct individuals.
Of course not since that is not the definition used. The divine essence is subsistent in the Three Persons and the Persons are subsistent in the Essence. The Persons are by virtue of being Persons distinct subsistent Persons from one another as subsistent Persons but they are not distinct from the Essence nor from one another in Essence.
Really would your nut sack fall off if you actually read G-L? Or are you going to keep making up your shit?
You clearly haven't a clue what a straw man is do you?
Your straw man can be summed up as follows.
ReplyDeleteIgnore formal definitions of Trinity and any and old professional explanations of definition.
Ignore Principle of Contradiciotn. Invent Straw man definition (example God=Nature=Person all in the same sense ignore equivocal third sense of referent etc).
God is understood solely in terms of Natural Theology & solely defined in those terms and all expressions of revolted theology are treated as literal examples of material things.
I'm sorry but your "argument" is still a straw man & cannot be anything else. It can never produce a "logical contradiction". You can't get blood from a turnip and trying to dip this turnip in blood does not constitute really getting blood from it. Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
The Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition that treats Persons and Nature as two different senses. These different senses includes everything including the different senses of "distinctions".
The logic is consistent & your special pleading can't make it otherwise. You can't make 2+2=5 by merely redefining the symbol "5" to mean four objects and then act like you are really referring to five objects.
You can't redefine the Trinity to make Persons and Nature one identical sense. If you do so then all you are doing is finding a contradiction in the doctrine of irrational modalism or irrational Tri-MonoTheism. You are not addressing the Trinity.
You must accept it.
A "distinction" between Persons merely means One Person is not WHO Another Person is. That's it. There is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person . Both Persons are the exact same single WHAT & there is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person.
You must accept it.
Since the Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition you can't argue with it as such by redefining it without committing the Straw Man fallacy.
It is really that simple and in this cold godless universe the only human persons who can accept your "argument" are irrational dogmatics. Either extremist Atheists or anti-Trinitarian Theists with an agenda & both have an aversion to reason.
Rational Atheists and non-Trinitarian Theists will see the Trinity as formally defined contains no logical contradictions. At best they might argue such a Mysterious doctrine is meaningless(the rational Atheist) or it is not the conclusion of their accepted revelations or interpretations of common revelation & therefore wrong.
But that is all you can do.
@Mr green
ReplyDelete>But at least he hasn't been hurling invective like that which has been most unfairly aimed at Dguller. I think he deserves another apology by now, don't you?
No I don't & It wouldn't do any good anyway he has not acknowledged a single apology given here to him or extended forgiveness to anyone here who has offered such an apology for calling him names.
So I can only conclude he doesn't really care if someone insults him or apologizes for it. So why should I care?
I don't.
I mean look at the dishonest shit I have to work with.
ReplyDeleteWell since they are different senses(SOMEONE's vs SOMETHING, WHO's vs WHAT) it is not a problem. When you are saying there is a real distinction in the Persons you are merely saying they are distinct SOMEONE's but you are still not saying the indivisible SOMETHING is now divided or that there is now more than one SOMETHING.
dguller replies
Also, I’m not saying anything about “someone” versus “something”. That is completely irrelevant to my argument.
Conclusion then whatever his argument is it is not an argument against the Trinity!
>It is a problem, because it means that they have the same sense of “real distinction”, and that means that your claim that I was equivocating on “real distinction” is invalid.
Nope!
Not having the same sense of "real distinction" merely means to people who read English that saying this Someone is really distinct from that other Someone is not the same identical sense as saying this Something is really composite or there is more than one single Something which are really distinct Something from another Something.
You are still confusing the different senses of Someone vs Something.
>The only remaining question is whether the referents are the same total referent, or the same (or different) partial referents. But your charge of equivocation is completely rebutted.
Here he pretends the referent which is nothing more than a semantic term for the thing called "God" somehow has this magical ability to turn different senses into the same identical sense so he can claim logical contradiction. Accept he ignores the brute fact the referent here is nothing more than an equivocal third sense in that God is identified has an Unknown with no conceivable positive properties.
So we have no way of knowing if the Something can even be one Someone or more or not.
It is not difficult but dguller insists on arguing a Straw man.
Let us face reality.
ReplyDeleteThe argument is nothing but a Straw man. That is it is by no objective standard does it contain an accurate representation of the doctrine of the Trinity only a superficially similar yet inequivalent proposition.
example:God=Who=What (without qualifications or senses or even use of traditional Trinitarian terminology).
The argument ignores the Principle of Contradiction. A=A and A can't not equal ~A at the same time in the same sense.
The Trinity is defined as Three Persons equal One Nature at the same time (both being the One God) in different senses of Persons and Nature. Thus It can't ever according to the laws of logic ever be a logical contradiction because of the different senses.
The common identical referent between Persons and Nature does not help you reduce the senses to one sense either.
A referent is by definition(look it up) is "A person or thing to which a linguistic expression refers." The common referent here is the thing known as "One God". It is an equivocal term not an unequivocal one. You can only create a contradiction if you made it an unequivocal term but it is not defined as such.
Contain appeals to the divine simplicity fail since divine simplicity is merely a negative feature of the Divine Nature/WHAT being unable to be divided and or multiplied given it's nature deduced negatively by reason. It has little to do with the number of Divne Persons/Who's who operate that Nature other then the Divine Persons fully possess the One Simple Nature and thus are by definition Simple in Nature an without composite nor does their One Nature multiply nor does it exclude being operated by more then one person.
This ship won't sail because it is a skateboard.
Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
ReplyDeleteThat’s right. To avoid a contradiction, the contradictory qualities or properties must be separated and kept distinct somehow. There are only three ways to separate them. First, you can separate them only in the mind, but not in reality. Second, you can separate them by putting each in a different part or aspect of the referent. Third, you can separate them by putting one in the whole and another in the part. That’s it. Those are the only three ways that you can avoid a logical contradiction. Unfortunately, each of these options leads to the rejection of either the Trinity or divine simplicity.
The Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition that treats Persons and Nature as two different senses. These different senses includes everything including the different senses of "distinctions".
But this is logically impossible. If the divine essence lacks all distinctions, then that must include the particular kind of distinction that exists in the divine persons/relations. Otherwise, the divine essence does not lack all distinctions, but only some distinctions, and that would mean that the divine essence is not absolutely simple, but only relatively simple, which is not a claim that Aquinas ever makes.
You can't redefine the Trinity to make Persons and Nature one identical sense. If you do so then all you are doing is finding a contradiction in the doctrine of irrational modalism or irrational Tri-MonoTheism. You are not addressing the Trinity.
I’m not redefining the Trinity. I’m taking your definition at face value, and trying to see how it could possibly make sense. To say that X and Y must be taken in different senses must mean that those different senses either only exist in the mind, or exist in reality by virtue of the referents also being distinct from one another. If the referents are not distinct from one another in reality, then they are exactly the same in reality. It’s really that simple.
So, to say that the S(P) is different from S(E), and that this difference is not limited only to the human mind, then it must be the case that R(P) is also different from R(E). But that leads to absurd conclusions, and so must be rejected, which also leads to absurdity, and so you are stuck.
A "distinction" between Persons merely means One Person is not WHO Another Person is. That's it. There is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person . Both Persons are the exact same single WHAT & there is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person.
That is not my argument. My argument presupposes that there is a difference between WHO and WHAT. If there is a difference, then WHO is either a creature or non-Being, both of which destroys the Trinity. If there is no difference, then you have a logical contradiction, because WHO involves distinction and WHAT does not involve distinction, and WHO = WHAT = X, which means that X involves and does not involve distinction, which is a logical contradiction. And you cannot say that there are different senses, because we just saw that the only way for that to make sense is for R(WHO) to be different from R(WHAT), which destroys the Trinity.
Since the Doctrine of the Trinity is a given formulated definition you can't argue with it as such by redefining it without committing the Straw Man fallacy.
I am trying to show you that your formulated definition is logically impossible. You cannot just say that the definition presupposes that it is logically possible, and so my analysis must be incorrect.
>>Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
ReplyDelete>That’s right. To avoid a contradiction, the contradictory qualities or properties must be separated and kept distinct somehow.
Therefore you admit the actual definition of the Trinity contains no logical contradiction.
>There are only three ways to separate them. First, you can separate them only in the mind, but not in reality.
We must separate in our minds everything we say about God since he is incomprehensible. So what?
Also we cannot positively say what God is in reality. So all this talk about the distinctions in the Trinity only existing in our minds and not reality ignores that they do exist in the Divine Reality which be cannot conceive of at a lll & we must accept this. We take it on faith & there is no logical way we can know it can't be true.
>Second, you can separate them by putting each in a different part or aspect of the referent.
The reverent is simply the word "God" which is a third sense equivocal whose positive properties cannot be known by us. So all you can say is The Divine Nature is fully God and The Three Persons are God and you can't ever even in principle positively know what that is so you can't know if it is or is not a contradiction.
>Third, you can separate them by putting one in the whole and another in the part. That’s it. Those are the only three ways that you can avoid a logical contradiction. Unfortunately, each of these options leads to the rejection of either the Trinity or divine simplicity.
Sorry but these are all just excuses to pretend the different senses can be treated as the same sense so you can claim Three of the Same Sense =One of the Same Sense which is a contradiction. It's Three of One Sense=One of another Sense= an Unknowable Third Sense.
That is it live with it.
>But this is logically impossible. If the divine essence lacks all distinctions, then that must include the particular kind of distinction that exists in the divine persons/relations.
Now you are pretending Nature is the only sense here. You are pretending there is no distinction between being One What vs being Three Who's! AGAIN!!! Get a new Straw Man.
>Otherwise, the divine essence does not lack all distinctions, but only some distinctions, and that would mean that the divine essence is not absolutely simple, but only relatively simple, which is not a claim that Aquinas ever makes.
You have now regressed back to pretending Persons and Nature are the same sense. You are not even trying to defend your straw man.
>I’m not redefining the Trinity. I’m taking your definition at face value, and trying to see how it could possibly make sense.
ReplyDeleteNo you are giving lip service to taking it at face value then you employ all these arguments from special pleading trying to define the different senses of Persons and Nature as one sense after all.
It's a fail move on.
>To say that X and Y must be taken in different senses must mean that those different senses either only exist in the mind,
No they exist objectively in the Divine Reality it's just we can't positively conceive how that might be possible so we hold it negatively on faith.
> or exist in reality by virtue of the referents also being distinct from one another.
The only reality they exist in is the Divine Reality not our created reality where no physical object can given what we positively know about it's positive properties exist in the fashion of the Trinity without contradiction.
> If the referents are not distinct from one another in reality, then they are exactly the same in reality. It’s really that simple.
The referents are distinct in that One Who is not another Who or another but all three Who's are the same WHAT & as the same WHAT have no distinction as the WHAT. Confusing the senses yet again. Repeating the same straw man again. Giving lip service to the definition again.
Give up you are either too stupid or too proud to admit it or both.
>So, to say that the S(P) is different from S(E), and that this difference is not limited only to the human mind, then it must be the case that R(P) is also different from R(E).
That doesn't logically follow. The referent is merely the equivocal term for the Unknowable God. What part of "unknowable" is not clear? Also it's R(3P) = R(1E) with R as as the equivocal term God. NOT R( P) = R( E) . Enough of your modalism straw men.
> But that leads to absurd conclusions, and so must be rejected, which also leads to absurdity, and so you are stuck.
Only if I believed your straw man was the actual doctrine of the Trinity. It's not. Live with it.
A "distinction" between Persons merely means One Person is not WHO Another Person is. That's it. There is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person . Both Persons are the exact same single WHAT & there is no distinction between WHAT One Person is to Another Person.
>That is not my argument.
No it is the explanation of what the difference is between distinctions between PERSONS vs impossible distinctions in Essence. You are ignoring it to justify your straw man.
>My argument presupposes that there is a difference between WHO and WHAT.
It is the difference between being predicated as a WHO vs being predicated as a WHAT.
Nothing more.
I>f there is a difference, then WHO is either a creature or non-Being, both of which destroys the Trinity.
Nope!
No the WHO is either the One WHAT or a creature or non-Being. SInce the WHO subsists in the One WHAT and is not distinct from the WHAT as a WHAT or other WHO's as far as they are also the same WHAT then the divine simplicity is upheld. The subsisting WHO's are only distinct from other WHO's as WHO not the WHAT.
> If there is no difference, then you have a logical contradiction, because WHO involves distinction and WHAT does not involve distinction,
ReplyDeleteIn different senses. Still doing back flips to keep the straw man from burring down.
>and WHO = WHAT = X, which means that X involves and does not involve distinction,
which is a logical contradiction. And you cannot say that there are different senses, because we just saw that the only way for that to make sense is for R(WHO) to be different from R(WHAT), which destroys the Trinity.
Nope!
Only because your insist on treating the Referent as anything other then an equivocal term which symbolizes God's absolute unknowability in regards to having any positively knowable properties.
>I am trying to show you that your formulated definition is logically impossible.
You are "showing me" by redefining it as you go along while giving lip service to the formulated definition.
Your still treating the Referent as anything other then an equivocal.
>You cannot just say that the definition presupposes that it is logically possible, and so my analysis must be incorrect.
I didn't say that at all. I am saying as it is objectively defined it contains no logical contradiction since it in no way or at no time asserts that A=A and does not equal ~A at the same time in the same sense.
You whole "argument" is one of special pleading trying to down play the different senses and claiming the referent is something other then an equivocal term.
You can never justify this Straw man.
It's Three of One Sense=One of another Sense= an Unknowable equivocal Third Sense.
ReplyDeleteOtherwise known as:
Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
Or to quote Feser "if the doctrine “appears contradictory” to you, you have by that very fact misunderstood it and are not really entertaining it at all. The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”
strict mystery, a truth so far exceeding the capacities of human reason that its full meaning cannot be comprehended by us nor a natural proof of its truth be discovered even after God has revealed that truth to men.
What does it mean for the Three Persons sense to be the One Simple Nature different sense and both are the third sense of being the Unknowable One God?
I can only say given the POC I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.
Your whole Straw Mans argument has bee to try to figure out what they are clearly saying in the first place!
Wrong on so many levels & like I said Straw Man.
There is no logical contradiction. Get over it or tell me how you can apply the POC to the bold sentence at the beginning.
Guys,
ReplyDeleteThis is getting too overheated, going on too long, and you're posting too often. Wind it up, and civilly.
They are the same WHAT. So what? The Persons are still distinct from each other as WHO's not distinct from WHAT they are in the essence or threw the essence. Wow you are thick!
ReplyDeleteThe question is whether WHAT is distinct from WHO. Are they exactly the same thing, i.e. all the properties of WHAT are identical to the properties of WHO? Or are they not exactly the same thing, i.e. it is false that all the properties of WHAT are identical to the properties of WHO? It seems clear that they must be different, because one of the properties of WHAT is indivisibility and one of the properties of WHO is divisibility, and thus they cannot be exactly the same thing. But, if they are not the same thing, then they are different, and that means that WHO is not the same as WHAT. And since WHAT is Being itself, then WHO is either creation or non-Being, both of which destroy the Trinity.
The referent is both are the One Mysterious God and that is a third sense.
But the question is whether they are referring to the entirety of God or to a partial aspect of God. Which is it? If they are both referring to the entirety of God, then you have a logical contradiction, because the entirety of God cannot involve real distinction and not involve real distinction. If they are each referring to a different partial aspect of God, then WHAT is one partial aspect of God and WHO is a different partial aspect of God, and that means that WHAT is not identical to WHO, and that leads to huge problems for the Trinity, as I’ve already demonstrated.
How do you know? You haven't read it! If you did you would see that is exactly what he says & of course he doesn't deny Persons are relations but they are still distinct from each other as relations?But not divided in the essence. Distance WHO's but the same identical WHAT.
I have read it: “not, be it known, to relations of or between divine persons, but to persons as being nothing but relations” (Denys Turner, Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait, p. 126).
The relations are indivisibly the same WHAT as the divine essence. But the relations are still different WHO's from each other. We are of course not saying the relations/persons are different WHO's from the essence because the Essence is not a WHO but a WHAT. Different senses no contradiction go have a good cry about it .
This won’t work, either. You say that “the Essence is not a WHO”, which means that the essence is different from a person/relation. After all, there is a difference between a WHO and a WHAT. The question is whether that difference occurs only in the mind, or also occurs in reality. Either way, the Trinity is compromised, as I’ve shown many times. Your only solution is to keep equivocating and shifting meaning in a shell game, and resolutely refusing to define your terms properly, keeping everything vague and insubstantial.
Same referent merely means the same identical thing.
Great. That means that S(E) → R(E) and S(P) → R(P), and R(E) = R(P) = R. R(E) involves the absence of any real distinction, and R(P) involves the presence of a kind of real distinction. It is impossible for R to involve contradictory properties, and thus it is impossible for R(E) and R(P) both to be either about the totality of R or about the same partial aspect of R. That is because it would follow that either the totality of R involved contradictory properties or the same partial aspect of R involved contradictory properties. The only way for R(E) and R(P) to both be about R is if they each refer to different partial aspects of R, which would avoid the logical contradiction. However, the only way for that to be possible is if R(E) and R(P) are different, which leads to absurd conclusions that severely compromise the Trinity.
Again, simply saying that I’m ignoring the different senses does not work, because I’m taking them into consideration. After all, I’m explicitly stating the S(E) is different from S(P), which is the definition of different senses. I’m just taking the analysis one step further to ask what it means to say that S(E) is different from S(P). It just turns out that every possible explanation of S(E) being different from S(P) compromises the Trinity.
ReplyDeleteThe referent in regards to the Trinity is just a third sense that is undefined & unknown. But since it is undefined and unknown one can't say Three Who's can be the same identical WHAT. So you are just wasting time with more straw man bullshit! Gnutard!
Wait, the referent is a “third sense”? What does that even mean? You’re talking nonsense, my friend. Maybe you need to define “sense”, because I really don’t know what you mean by it. To me, a “sense” is the cognitive and linguistic presentation of a referent to the human mind. In other words, it is how a referent shows up within the human cognitive and linguistic perspective. A referent can have different senses, because it can show up to our minds in different ways, depending upon which aspects of the referent we are focusing upon. So, what do you mean by “sense”?
Accept we know what the Planet Venus is & we know it's positive properties. We don't know what God is & we only know by reason alone negative properties of God. And the negative properties tell us God is an indistinct WHAT but there is no way we can know what He is to know if it is or is not possible for that WHAT to contain Three distinct WHO's whose distinction is WHO based not WHAT based.
First, it is false that we only have negative knowledge of God. We do have some positive knowledge of God, which actually is the basis for the apophatic negations. For example, we know that God is pure actuality, is ipsum esse subsistens, is the first cause of creation, has all perfections in an eminent fashion by virtue of his sublimity and transcendence, and so on.
Second, all that you say is irrelevant. Either your senses refer to the totality of God or a partial aspect of God or not to God at all. If your senses both refer to the totality of God, then you have a logical contradiction. If your senses both refer to the same partial aspect of God then you have a logical contradiction. If your senses both refer to different aspects of God, then there is a difference in God between the divine essence and the divine persons/relations, which leads to the falsity of the Trinity and/or divine simplicity. If your senses both do not refer to God at all, then the Trinity and/or divine simplicity is false. No matter what, you lose.
They can only have contradictory properties if they are identical senses but they are different senses so there can be no contradiction. It all comes back to elaborate ways for you to pretend different senses don't exist in the definition of the Trinity and your need to make a straw man.
They can have contradictory properties if their different senses each refer either to the totality of God or to the same partial aspect of God.
Accept you are arguing from a known referent who positive properties and nature are known to an unknown referent & you are still ignoring the different senses. After all the Morning Star is Venus but it isn't the Evening Star when Venus appears in the Morning. Morning and evening are different senses of time. You can't argue from them having the same referent to Morning and Evening being the same time in the same sense.
ReplyDeleteYou are correct, but that is only possible, because Venus has different partial aspects, i.e. how Venus appears in the morning and how Venus appears in the evening. So, the different senses are about the same planet, but appearing differently at different times of the day and night. And again, this is only possible, because Venus is a composite entity that has different partial aspects, each of which is part of the identity of Venus itself. If the sense of the Morning Star and the sense of the Evening Star each referred to the totality of Venus itself, or to the same partial aspect of Venus, then you would have a contradiction. However, the fact that each refers to a different partial aspect of Venus resolves the contradiction nicely.
As a WHAT it is incoherent to talk about God as a WHAT that can be subdivided into different parts of WHAT or multiplied into more than one WHAT.
Why not? You and I have have a formally identical human essence that is numerically multiple, and thus it is possible for an essence to be multiplied in different instantiations of itself.
But WHO's is a different sense then WHAT & you have thus far given no logical reason why Three Who's each being the same WHAT but not WHO the others are as WHO's is a contradiction. You are just looking for fancy ways to pretend Sense doesn't matter.
I have, but you refuse to see it. The only way for your account to work is if the referent of WHO is a different partial aspect of the same underlying reality than the referent of WHAT. If the referent of WHO and the referent of WHAT are each the totality of the underlying reality, then if WHO and WHAT have contradictory properties, then the totality of the underlying reality has contradictory properties, which is impossible. If the referent of WHO and the referent of WHAT are each the same partial aspect of that common underlying reality, then the same partial aspect of that common underlying reality has contradictory properties, which is impossible. The only solution is to say that the referent of WHO and the referent of WHAT are different partial aspects of the same underlying reality. But if that is true, then WHO is not the same as WHAT, which means the Trinity is false.
Says Who? A Who can be indistinct from a WHAT in the sense of WHAT it is.
That makes absolutely no sense. You are talking gibberish.
Sorry but there is no distinction between Persons and Essence in that they are the same WHAT.the same WHAT. But Persons and Essences are not distinct as same or different WHO's since Essence is not a WHO but a WHAT and a Person who is a subsistence in the WHAT is identical to that WHAT as WHAT it is being The One God.
Here’s an analogous claim: “There is no distinction between a human and a human essence in that they are the same human essence”. Obviously, there is a distinction between a whole (i.e. a human) and a part (i.e. a human essence). It makes no sense to say that the whole is the same as the part, which is what you are basically trying to say here.
I mean, can’t you see that you are just equivocating all over the place? You say that persons and essence are distinct, and thus cannot be compared in the same way – a WHO is not a WHAT! – but you also say that they are exactly the same thing in reality, but can’t be the same thing, because they cannot be compared in the same way, but also say that they are exactly the same thing in reality, and on and on.
Only if you pretend the Referent is something who positive properties are known(like Venus) & treat it like another physical object(like Venus). When the referent is an unknown(Like God) which has no positive properties knowable by reason and only negative ones(like God) then the contradiction is non-existent.
ReplyDeleteNo. Here’s all I need for my argument, and I certainly do not need a comprehensive knowledge of God.
(1) R(E) is either the totality of God or a partial aspect of God.
(2) R(P) is either the totality of God or a partial aspect of God.
(3) R(E) involves no real distinction of any kind.
(4) R(P) involves real distinction of some kind.
That’s it. Do you deny (1) to (4)?
Also there is no such a thing as a Partially God so all that nonsense on partial referents was a red herring. God in essence is indivisible. So if God is One Person, Three or Ten Thousand they are all fully the One WHAT even if they are distinct Who's.
That is helpful. So, you are denying that God has partial aspects that different senses could be referring to. That means that any sense, if it is truly about God, could only be about the totality and entirety of God, and not about any parts or components of God. Then I’m afraid that you have a logical contradiction, because it would follow that the totality of God involves real distinction of some kind and the totality of God does not involve real distinction of any kind. You have eliminated the different aspects that could have grounded and justified your segregation of the contradictory properties. Nice.
But how is being Three Who's and One What contradictory? Who's and What's are different senses and the thing they are(the referent God) has unknown and unknowable if not inconceivable positive properties?
Because if the different senses are only notional or conceptual, then the reality is that they both refer to the entirety and totality of God. You cannot separate and segregate the contradictory properties into different partial aspects of God, because you have denied that this is possible. So, whatever properties the essence has, the entirety and totality of God has, and whatever properties the persons/relations have, the entirety and totality of God has. And that means that if both S(E) and S(P) both refer to the totality of God, then the totality and entirety of God involves real distinction of one kind and cannot involve real distinction of any kind, which is a logical contradiction.
In physical objects whose positive properties are known yes & we know the nature of physical objects to know what is physically impossible. But since when is God either physical or known?
Irrelevant. It is false that we know nothing about God. The negations are based upon prior affirmations.
In this case the referent is the word "God".
False. You are not talking about the word “God”, but about God. Or is everything just about semantics, and not about the reality that the semantics purports to be about?
You haven't really explained how the Positive properties of God preclude God being both Three Persons and One Nature. Three Who's and One What. The only properties we can know of God are negative ones that tell us something about the WHAT but they can't tell us the WHAT can't be subsistent in Three Who's nor vice versa. You have to assume "God" is just another physical thing and his properties are positive ones that can be contrasted with each other. That is not the case.
I’ve already explained why this is wrong, and barely coherent.
Kinetic energy is the identical referent between different senses of measurement scales & we know what kinetic energy is & what it's positive properties happen to be. But God is unknown in his positive properties and undefined so my point stands. Also 298 degrees F” and “298 degrees K” are different senses of scale not identical. So my point still stands.
ReplyDeleteThat wasn’t your point at all, and now you are moving the goalposts. You were originally trying to defend your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything contained in the meaning of S(X) is necessarily completely different from everything contained in the meaning of S(Y). You used the example of “298 degrees F” and “298 degrees K” to try to show that they must differ in meaning in every way, but I showed that this is false, because they have the same meaning of “kinetic energy of atoms and molecules”, which you are now admitting is true. So, again, you have absolutely no basis to support your claim that if S(X) is different from S(Y), then everything contained in the meaning of S(X) is necessarily completely different from everything contained in the meaning of S(Y).
But I never argued Three Divine Persons is completely different from One Divine Nature.
Read more carefully. I said that the meaning is completely different. When you talk about different senses, then you are talking about meaning. Your claim is that the meaning of “real distinction” in “divine essence” is completely different from the meaning of “real distinction” in “divine persons”. I have shown that this is false. They mean the exact same thing, and thus there is a logical contradiction between saying that X involves real distinction of some kind and X does not involve real distinction of any kind. The only way to avoid the logical contradiction is segregate the contradictory properties either into different partial aspects of X.
God can not be part anything.
So, God is not partly the Father, partly the Son, and partly the Holy Spirit?
God is an indivisible WHAT whose positive properties if any are inconceivable and unknowable.
Irrelevant.
God you are thick! The point is you can't say just because they both say 298 degrees that they must be the identical temperature sense. They are not because of the different senses of scale between F and K.
Of course, but that is irrelevant. The more important question is not whether they differ in some way, but whether they differ in every way. If the only differ in some way, then they must be identical in some other way, and if they are identical in some way, then they have senses that are identical in common, and your argument collapses.
Just as you can't say real relations Person to Person as Persons is the same as real relations Persons to Essence or between Persons threw essence. You have to follow your sense qualifiers not come up with elaborate ways to ignore them.
Sure, I can. I can say:
(1) The divine essence does not involve real distinction of any kind
(2) The divine persons involve real distinction of some kind
Part of the meaning of “real distinction of any kind” includes “real distinction of some kind”. Similarly, part of the meaning of “all dogs” is “a dog”, because “a dog” is a member of the class of “all dogs”. Similarly, “real distinction of some kind” is part of the class “real distinction of any kind”. I’m sorry, but you are totally wrong here, and thus this will not help avoid a logical contradiction.
Word salad! If RD1 only applies to Persons/Relations in one sense by definition it can't be applied to divine essence in the same sense .
ReplyDeleteSure it can, if part of the sense of the divine essence is “not-RD1, not-RD2, not-RD3, and so on”. This is just basic logic. Say you have dogs and cats. Part of the meaning of “dog” is “not-cat”. If you are correct, then it would follow that the meaning of “cat” in “not-cat” in “dog” is different from the meaning of “cat” in “cat”, which is absurd. Otherwise, what exactly are you denying when you say “not-cat”?
But you just admitted RDI involve only divine persons/relation and that the divine essence does not involve RD1,? So which is it?
But the meaning of RD1 is the same. Do you deny that the meaning of “dog” in not-dog and dog is the same? Seriously, think about it. If you are correct, then all the negative qualities of God are meaningless, because the affirmation that is negated changes its meaning entirely. So, saying that God is immaterial changes the meaning of “material” into something equivocal, which means that I have no idea what one is denying when one says that God is not “material”. Come on, this argument just won’t work. You have better ones.
If RD1 means the same then it means One Who is really distinct from another WHO as distinct WHO's but if applied to an indivisible WHAT it would divide what cannot be divided which is a contradiction and why RDI can involve divine persons/relations only and not divine essence.
But if WHAT and WHO both refer to the exact same totality and entirety of God in reality, then you do have a contradiction.
The Three Persons subsist in the One Nature and the One Nature subsists in the Three Persons so I don't know why you keep bringing up this partial mishigas? Stop pettifogging the issue!
That’s fine. Then you have the following propositions that you have to resolve:
(1) The totality and entirety of God himself in reality involves no real distinction of any kind
(2) The totality and entirety of God himself in reality involves real distinction of some kind
(1) and (2) clearly contradict one another. And you cannot say that (1) has a different sense from (2) in that (1) is a WHAT and (2) is a WHO, because you have already admitted that God himself lacks any partial aspects, which means that you cannot segregate and separate the contradictory properties into different partial aspects. And that means that they can only be properties of the entirety and totality of God, which leads to a logical contradiction.
Why Not read them for yourself? Or do you intend to stay ignorant so you may continue to push this straw man?
LOL.
No because "real distinction" can't be applied to the sense of Essence/Nature only logical distinction. A hypothetical "real distinction" in essence would divide what cannot be divided which is a contradiction.
ReplyDeleteWow. You really can’t read, can you? I said that real distinction cannot be applied to the divine essence. What I am saying is:
(1) No kind of real distinction can be applied to the divine essence
(2) One kind of real distinction can be applied to the divine persons/relations
If the divine essence and the divine persons/relations both ultimately refer to the totality and entirety of God himself, then it follows that:
(3) No kind of real distinction can be applied to the totality and entirety of God himself
(4) One kind of real distinction can be applied to the totality and entirety of God himself
(3) and (4) contradict one another. You have attempted to resolve this contradiction by saying that the meaning of “real distinction” in (3) is different form the meaning of “real distinction” in (4). Unfortunately, you have provided absolutely no justification for this claim. They clearly mean the same thing, because (3) is the absolute negation of any kind of real distinction, which must include the kind of real distinction in (4). And that means that (3) and (4), despite your equivocations and nonsensical non sequiters, are logically contradictory after all.
Even if you make "real distinction" identical in both senses the senses are still different as Who's and What.
That is irrelevant. Just because a square is blue and a triangle is yellow does not mean that I cannot conclude that a square cannot be a triangle, even though they differ in terms of color.
Think about it this way. Say that you have the following definitions:
(A) Divine essence =df (a) the absence of any kind of real distinction, and (b) X
(B) Divine persons/relations =df (c) the presence of a kind of real distinction, and (d) Y
What that means is that part of the definition of “divine essence” is (a) and (b), where (b) can be whatever you want, including an unknown X, and part of the definition of “divine persons/relations” is (c) and (d), where (d) can be whatever you want, including a completely unknown Y. So, even if we have no idea what X and Y are, we can still know that (a) is true of the divine essence, and (c) is true of the divine persons/relations. As you can see, it is completely irrelevant what X and Y are, and all that matters is that if the divine essence and the divine persons/relations each refer to the totality and the entirety of God himself in reality, then you have a logical contradiction between (a) and (c).
Then you are all but admitting you have been arguing a Straw Man. Since Sheed, G-L, Feser, Sullivan, G of Nyssa, & the whole X-ian world understand the Trinity to be that and you have been arguing everything else but that in your insane quest to build this straw man.
Nope. I’m just focusing upon one particular aspect of the Trinity, and it leads to a logical contradiction. I’ll grant you that the rest of the Trinity is logically sound and proper.
Which is the point since I am arguing your analogy makes no sense so I produce something that makes no sense and compare it too your original argument. You are beyond thick at this point.
That’s hilarious.
But we can positively say what a material being is & what are it's positive properties. God can only be conceived with negative properties which renders him in the positive sense as unknowable. To know a contradiction in God exists you need to know what His Positive Properties are & how they would contradict.
ReplyDeleteThat is false. God is pure act. That is a positive affirmation about God, and it is the basis for the negative conclusion that God is not material. Why? Because matter involves potency, and since God cannot involve potency, God cannot be material. See how a negative conclusion is derived from a positive claim about God? See how the sense of “material” in “immaterial” remains the same, because otherwise we could not even argue that God is immaterial?
Well you can't have a real distinction in the One Divine Something/WHAT. But a WHO is a different sense of the Principle of Action so logically a real distinction between WHo's does not equal a real distinction in WHAT. No matter how you slice it no real distinction of WHO's add's up to any real distinction of WHAT. Just like 298 degrees F doesn't equal burning your Ship when you turn her 298 degrees from her original course. Different senses that can never be made identical save in the equivocal referent of the One Unknowable God.
Blah blah blah.
Yes they are all the same WHAT? So what? It still doesn't add up to their having an inability to be distinct WHO's.
That isn’t what a notional distinction even means. If the WHAT is distinct from the WHO, which they would have to be, because the WHAT does not involve real distinction of any kind and the WHO involves real distinction of some kind, then the distinction cannot just be in our minds. Get the terminology right.
Power and intellect are negative properties in the Simple WHAT they are not WHO's nor is a WHO a negative Property or attribute.
How is power and intellect, a “negative property”? What is being negated?
We are familiar with the positive properties of material and composite realities to know that is the case but since we cannot in principle know an unknown reality whose positive properties cannot be known like material things can might contain two differing things in different senses but have the same ultimate reality in an unknown third referent sense.
But according to you, when I negate “positive properties”, I subsequently end up equivocating on them. So, when I say that God is not material or not composite, the meaning of “material” and “composite” has changed, and thus I haven’t even negated them at all! Yet another reason why your claim is absurd.
Really would it fucking kill you to do some reading instead of making shit up?
I don’t know why you’re swearing. Do you really think that it bothers me one bit? It only makes you look like a complete buffoon, which maybe you are.
He is simply saying there is One WHAT and everything in that WHAT is that One identical WHAT. So what? He is not saying there can't be different WHO's who are all the same WHAT but different as WHo's. Really it's not hard when you do the reading and refuse to create a straw man.
That is what “formal identity” means. Thanks for agreeing with me.
You are equivocating between False vs incomplete. If I look at an Infinite Wall that goes in two directions infinitely & by definition well beyond the range of my sight in either direction I can't claim my viewing of the wall is "false". Rather given the nature of the Wall I can only see what My eyes are capable of viewing.
ReplyDeleteIf I claim that the wall is finite when the wall is infinite, then I am asserting a falsehood. I am not saying that “all I can see is a finite wall”, which is an epistemological claim about my knowledge and perception, but rather am making an ontological claim about the wall itself. Unless you are claiming that truth is relative?
Yes we can because you still can't grasp the difference between saying WHO God is (Three Persons) which can't be known by reason vs WHAT GOD IS in the negative perfections sense immaterial, immutable, infinite, pure act, simple, and so on etc known by reason etc. You keep identifying God in the sense of the later but you falsely equate the former literally with creatures whose positive properties we can known but we can't know God's positive properties if any. You are addicted to sense confusion it's like Heroine to you.
No, you cannot. You claim that the meaning of X changes when we affirm the negation not-X. That means that the meaning of “material” changes when we affirm that God is “immaterial”, which means that “immaterial” ends up not being a negation at all, and thus is reduced to complete meaninglessness. You must reject your claim, because it would condemn many divine attributes to incoherent meaninglessness, but by rejecting your claim, then you have no basis to reject the charge of logical contradiction.
If you want to keep pretending the sense of WHAT is the same sense as WHO you will keep making this mistake.
Complete non sequiter. You seem to be a fan.
Only if you keep pretending divine essence and Persons are both the same sense specifically that of WHAT. But they aren't WHAT vs WHAT. They are WHO's vs WHAT. If a divine WHAT lacks any kind of real distinction then that means the WHAT can not be divided and there cannot be more then one WHAT in existence. But WHO's are a different sense of the Referent One Thing whose positive Properties cannot be conceived. Thus a real distinction of WHO merely multiplies WHO's not WHAT's.
I’ve already addressed this many times. I agree that the sense of S(WHO) is different from the sense of S(WHAT). The referent of S(WHO) is R(WHO), and the referent of S(WHAT) is R(WHAT). I would further claim that part of the meaning of S(WHAT) is “the absence of real distinction of any kind” and part of the meaning of S(WHO) is “the presence of real distinction of some kind”. I will concede that there are other differences between S(WHO) and S(WHAT) that add to the parts of their meaning that I just mentioned. The problem begins when you claim that R(WHO) and R(WHAT) both refer to the entirety and totality of God himself in reality, which means that the properties of R(WHO) and R(WHAT) both apply to the entirety and totality of God himself in reality. However, since “the absence of real distinction of any kind” contradicts “the presence of real distinction of some kind”, then it follows that the totality and entirety of God himself has contradictory properties.
Simply saying that I am confusing the senses does not help, because my account presupposes that the senses are different, and so that objection is actually part of my argument. You seem to think that just magically saying that they are different senses prevents any claims from being made about the referents of those different senses. And the reality is that once you denied that God can have different partial aspects in which to segregate and separate the contradictory properties, then you have shut the door to the only route to save God from logical contradiction. The only other option is to try to show that the terms involved in the logical contradiction are equivocal, but you have also failed to do this. So, all you have left is to repeat the same debunked claim, ignoring the fact that it has been addressed and refuted on several occasions.
ReplyDeleteOnce again, the fact that S(WHO) differs from S(WHAT) does not necessarily protect against logical contradiction. After all, the sense of “triangle” is different from the sense of “square”, and yet saying that X is a triangle and X is a square, such that X is identical in both propositions, necessarily results in a logical contradiction, because X cannot be a three-sided shape and a four-sided shape at the same time. Therefore, just because S(X) is different from S(Y) does not necessarily mean that a logical contradiction between X and Y is impossible. Sometimes it is possible, and sometimes it is impossible. So, you have to do more work to show that this is one instance where different senses does not involve a logical contradiction, and you have not done the work at all. I believe that I have shown that the only two options that you have to avoid logical contradiction are closed to you, and thus you have no option left but to admit of logical contradiction.
I know, I know. “But, but … DIFFERENT SENSES!”
Rather the WHO is fully identical to the WHAT as a WHAT without distinction as a WHAT. Also comparing WHO in the sense of WHAT shows different WHO's are fully identical without distinction to each other as the same identical One WHAT. But WHO's I'm afraid are still not other WHO's as who's.
Compare: “John is fully identical to his essence as an essence”. That is not what “fully identical” means. At best, John is partially identical to his essence in that part of John is his essence. “Fully identical” means that they cannot differ in any way. If they differ in some way, then they cannot be fully identical, but rather are partly identical. See what I mean about equivocating?
Well your loser straw man argument here has disabused me of any notion you know what you are talking about so I look forward to crushing you in the future on analogy like I did here.
Haha. You’re actually quite funny.
No it's just pure spite.
Still blustering! I love it!
It's God = One What = Three Who's. Who's and What are different senses and God is the equivocal referent because God's positive properties can't be known. CORRECT Wow even with simple definitions you make straw men. Pathetic!
This is very simple.
Is the divine essence identical to the divine persons/relations in every single way? If the divine essence is not identical to the divine persons/relations in every single way, then they cannot be fully or totally identical to one another, which means that they are either partly identical and partly different or totally different.
If they are partly identical and partly different, then that presupposes that the divine essence has parts and the divine persons/relations have parts. Some of those parts are the same in each, and some of those parts are different in each. Unfortunately, this is impossible, because the divine essence has no parts, and thus cannot be partially identical to anything, but only totally identical or totally different.
Another way that this could work is if the divine essence has no parts, but the divine persons/relations have parts, one of which must be the divine essence, which means that the divine persons/relations are composed of the divine essence E and something else, call it X. In other words, P = E & X. The problem is that X must be different from E, because otherwise you would have P = E = X, which would mean that P and E are totally identical, which we just saw was impossible, if they differ in some way. And if X is different from E, then X is either a creature or non-Being, both of which lead to absurd conclusions for P. So, not even this analysis will work.
ReplyDeleteAnd what this means is that if the divine essence is identical to the divine persons/relations in every single way, then they cannot differ in any way, which means that it cannot be the case that the divine essence involves no real distinction of any kind while the divine persons/relations involve real distinction of some kind, because that would be a difference in some way. To avoid contradiction, we must say that the divine essence is not totally identical to the divine persons/relations, but that means that they are either partially identical or totally different. Both of these options leads to the falsity of the Trinity, as I’ve argued on many occasions.
No the referent by definition can't be conceived of as having any positive properties so statements like totally and partially can have no applicable meaning. It is just an excuse to pretend the senses are identical. But as we saw your whole argument is Straw.
Then the entire doctrine is completely incoherent. If you “totally” and “partially” have no application to God himself, then you cannot say that the divine essence is indistinct, because absolute simplicity just means that there is a total absence of any kind of composition. In fact, you cannot even say that the Trinity has three divine persons, because that means that there is in total only three divine persons. Also, if you want to say that the Trinity involves three distinct persons, then each distinct person is a part of the Trinity, because if X involves the distinction between A and B, then A and B are parts of X. Finally, you cannot use the concepts of “identity” and “difference” in God, because to say that X is identical to Y means that the properties of X are totally the same as the properties of Y.
In addition, if you want to deny those terms of God, then what on earth do you mean when you say that the divine essence is “fully God” and the divine persons/relations are “fully God”. “Fully” makes no sense without “totally”. Once again, you are using words, and then stripping them of any coherent meaning in order to save this doctrine. Unfortunately, you end up destroying it completely in order to save it.
Here you are arguing Three Persons(One sense)= One Nature(another different sense) = Same Referent God thus both are now the same sense.WRONG
Nope. You keep missing the argument I’m making. You keep wanting to hide behind the senses when I want to look at the referents. The question is what grounds or justifies the different senses. It is my claim that the different senses get their justification from having different referents, unless you are claiming that their difference is merely notional or conceptual, which just means that they have the exact same referent. What that means is that S(E) refers to R(E) and S(P) refers to R(P), and that R(E) =/ R(P). R(E) and R(P) can both ultimately be about some common underlying reality R, but they must either refer to R in total, or refer to a partial aspect of R. Otherwise, there is absolutely no basis for their having different senses at all, and your entire account is undermined. This really isn’t so hard.
Here is your problem. Three Persons(One sense)= One Nature(another different sense) = Same Referent God(third equivocal sense). Good luck applying the POC and getting a logical contradiction from that sunshine.
ReplyDeleteHere is an analogous problem: three chickens = one planet. Someone understandably asks, “What could this possibly mean?” You then reply, “Three chickens is one sense, and one planet is another sense.” There. Doesn’t it all make perfect sense now? No, it does not. Unless you have a way to translate the two senses into one another within a coherent framework involving a common referent of some kind, then your description of two senses is completely empty.
So, you would have to show a way to translate three persons into one nature, and vice versa. Otherwise, you have no basis to claim that those two senses are both about the same thing at all. For example, when I say that one square is identical to four lines, it is only because one square is made of four lines that the different senses can be about the same thing in reality, but differ in highlighting different aspects of that same thing. But remember that this only works for referents that have different aspects to begin with in which each sense can correspond either to the totality of the referent or to different partial aspects of the referent. Without this framework, it makes absolutely no sense to say that different senses are about the same thing.
Nice dodge. A referent is a semantic term for a Thing. The thing being God & that is used as a third sense equivocal here no as something that magically mass two different senses the same sense. It's is part of the definition of the Trinity. Go back and re-read Feser on the Trinity. on this very blog.
It’s not a dodge at all, and you have no idea what you are talking about. The referent is not another sense. The referent is what the sense is referring to. Sometimes one sense can refer to another sense, but that is only when one is talking about thoughts and language, and not about what those thoughts and language are about outside of thoughts and language, i.e. external reality. I doubt that you mean that God is just another sense within our language, and thus is confined to our language itself. In fact, God exists independently of our language.
No rather given that it is infinite & the negative properties of the divine essence we know via reason it is not coherently possible to speak of it being a composite WHAT or of there being more than one Infinite WHAT at the same time and in the same sense.
First, that is just gibberish.
Second, even G-L has said that the divine essence is formally and numerically identical. He said that “the nature remains numerically the same” and he also said that “in God there is but one formal nature or reason”. So, once again, you have no idea what you are talking about.
Of course not since that is not the definition used. The divine essence is subsistent in the Three Persons and the Persons are subsistent in the Essence.
What do you mean by “in” here? Are you saying that the divine essence is contained within the divine persons/relations? Are you saying that the divine persons/relations are contained within the divine essence?
The Persons are by virtue of being Persons distinct subsistent Persons from one another as subsistent Persons but they are not distinct from the Essence nor from one another in Essence.
ReplyDeleteBut this simply continues to confuse the issue. It is clear that the divine persons cannot be derived from the divine essence. After all, the divine essence is formally and numerically the same in God. Furthermore, the divine essence is fully actualized with nothing unactualized left over by virtue of the fact that it is pure act. That means that it is false that the divine essence involves paternity and filiation such that the former is actualized in the Father while the latter is actualized in the Son. That would leave something unactualized in the divine essence in the Father and something unactualized in the divine essence in the Son, which is impossible. Therefore, it must be the case that the relations cannot come from the divine essence at all. However, if that is true, then the divine persons must be derived from other-than-the-divine-essence. And since the divine essence is Being itself (i.e. and ipsum esse subsistens), then the divine persons must be derived from other-than-Being-itself (i.e. other-than-ipsum-esse-subsistens). That means that the divine persons must be either creatures or non-Being, both of which destroys the Trinity.
And what this ultimately comes down to is that if at any point in your argument the Trinity involves anything other than the divine essence, then the Trinity is false. That is because anything other than the divine essence is necessarily other than Being itself, or ipsum esse subsistens, which also means that it is either a creation or non-Being. And since the Trinity cannot be either a creation of God or non-Being, then it follows that if the Trinity is true, then there cannot be anything in God other than the divine essence in any sense. However, since saying that God only involves the divine essence means that there is nowhere for the divine relations to come from, which means that they cannot exist in God.
You haven’t even come close to refuting this argument. And before you claim that I am pulling this argument out of thin air in a straw man fashion, here’s some quotes from Gilles Emery’s The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: 2010).
I claim that the relations must be distinct from the divine essence, because the divine essence is formally and numerically identical in each divine person, and thus cannot be the source of any difference or distinction between them. Emery writes that “the essential attributes are incapable of giving an account of personal distinction. Because they are essential attributes, understanding and will cannot create such a distinction. St Thomas rigorously forbids us to conceive the personal plurality as if it were a derivative of the divine essence: this leads to Sabellianism” (p. 122). He also says that the “alterity of persons [is] based on a relation-distinction, but not an alterity of essence, nature or substance” (p. 133), and that “the essence does no engendering” (p. 148). So, Emery agrees with me that the source of distinction between the persons cannot possibly be due to the divine essence.
However, he also writes that the distinction between the persons cannot be due to a “difference between the nature and the concrete subject in possession of this nature, since each person is the divine nature” (p. 123), and that “the being of the relation is the being of the nature” (p. 129). That means that there is actually no distinction at all between the divine persons and the divine essence, because they are exactly the same in reality.
So, what this means is that the difference cannot come from the divine essence, because it is formally and numerically the same in each person, and only that which is different in each can account for their distinction. However, it is also the case that “each person is the divine nature”, which makes absolutely no sense. If each person is identical to the divine nature, and the distinction between relations cannot come from the divine nature, then the distinction between the relations cannot come from each person. But then where do the different relations come from? They cannot come from the divine nature or the divine persons. Is there something else in God? If there isn’t, then the entire account is logically impossible.
ReplyDeleteTherefore you admit the actual definition of the Trinity contains no logical contradiction.
I continue to admire your reading comprehension skills. I said that if the contradictory properties can be segregated or kept separate in different partial aspects of the common referent, then the contradiction can be avoided. Unfortunately, you said that this was impossible in God, and thus there is no way to avoid the logical contradiction. Nice job!
We must separate in our minds everything we say about God since he is incomprehensible. So what?
Because if the separation is only in our minds, then there is no separation in reality, and the referents of the different senses are exactly the same in every way, meaning that there is no sense in which they are the same and another sense in which they are different, because then they would not be exactly the same in every way.
Also we cannot positively say what God is in reality.
Then we cannot say that the divine power is the divine intellect. Nice, you’ve completely undermined the identity of the divine attributes, which undermines divine simplicity.
So all this talk about the distinctions in the Trinity only existing in our minds and not reality ignores that they do exist in the Divine Reality which be cannot conceive of at a lll & we must accept this.
I’m sorry, but if we cannot conceive of the Divine Reality “at all”, then how can you conceive of distinctions in the Trinity “exist in the Divine Reality”? I thought we couldn’t conceive anything of the Divine Reality?
The reverent is simply the word "God" which is a third sense equivocal whose positive properties cannot be known by us. So all you can say is The Divine Nature is fully God and The Three Persons are God and you can't ever even in principle positively know what that is so you can't know if it is or is not a contradiction.
First, the referent is not a word, unless God is a word. The referent is God, who is not confined to language. Unless that is Catholic orthodoxy?
Second, you completely missed the point, as usual.
Sorry but these are all just excuses to pretend the different senses can be treated as the same sense so you can claim Three of the Same Sense =One of the Same Sense which is a contradiction. It's Three of One Sense=One of another Sense= an Unknowable Third Sense.
ReplyDeleteNope. They’re trying to explain how different senses can avoid logical contradiction. Or maybe you think it all happens by magic? Sometimes different senses result in contradiction, and sometimes different senses do not result in contradiction. That means that it is not enough just to say that the senses are different, and therefore a contradiction is avoided. That is like saying that because John is a human, then John must be dead. No, some humans are alive and some humans are dead, and it does not follow that just because John is a human, then John must be dead. So, you need an account of when different senses result in logical contradiction and when they do not. I’ve given one, and it completely falsifies your claims. You’ve just refused to believe mine without offering any compelling reasons whatsoever.
Now you are pretending Nature is the only sense here. You are pretending there is no distinction between being One What vs being Three Who's! AGAIN!!! Get a new Straw Man.
Nope. You’ve missed the point, again. Do you really not understand that if X cannot have any real distinction of any kind, then it is impossible for X to have a real distinction of some kind? It is like saying that if X cannot be any color of any kind, then X cannot be a color of some kind. Do you see it now? Or are you impervious to basic logic?
You have now regressed back to pretending Persons and Nature are the same sense. You are not even trying to defend your straw man.
Nope. Just trying to teach you basic logic.
No they exist objectively in the Divine Reality it's just we can't positively conceive how that might be possible so we hold it negatively on faith.
If the differences exist in the divine reality, then that means that the difference between the divine essence and the divine persons exists objectively in the divine reality. But that means that there is a difference between them, which means that the divine persons are different from the divine essence. Otherwise, what do you mean that the differences “exist objectively in the Divine Reality”? And if there is a difference between the divine essence and the divine persons, then the Trinity is false.
The referents are distinct in that One Who is not another Who or another but all three Who's are the same WHAT & as the same WHAT have no distinction as the WHAT. Confusing the senses yet again. Repeating the same straw man again. Giving lip service to the definition again.
Nope. Unless you can give an account of how to translate three persons and one essence, or three WHO’s and one WHAT, then your account is incoherent and meaningless. It is like saying that three dogs is one star, and then stating that the three dogs is in the sense of animal and the one star is in the sense of an astronomical object, and pretending as if that solves everything. It solves nothing, and leads to the conclusion that the comparison is completely baseless. Similarly, saying that there are three persons in the sense of WHO and one nature in the sense of WHAT means nothing unless you can give some account of the relationship between WHO and WHAT. And either WHO is identical to WHAT in reality, which means that they cannot differ in any way in reality, or WHO is not identical to WHAT in reality, which means that they do differ in some way in reality. Both of these options is fatal to the Trinity.
Give up you are either too stupid or too proud to admit it or both.
It’s like you’re reading my mind!
That doesn't logically follow.
ReplyDeleteOf course, it does. If the difference between X and Y does not only occur in the human mind, then the difference between X and Y must also occur in reality. You just don’t understand the difference between a notional or conceptual distinction and a real distinction. The former is a distinction that only exists in the mind, and the latter is a distinction that also exists in reality. Those are what those terms mean.
The referent is merely the equivocal term for the Unknowable God. What part of "unknowable" is not clear? Also it's R(3P) = R(1E) with R as as the equivocal term God. NOT R( P) = R( E) . Enough of your modalism straw men.
Completely irrelevant.
It is the difference between being predicated as a WHO vs being predicated as a WHAT. Nothing more.
So, is the difference between WHO and WHAT real or is it just in our minds? If it is real, then WHO is a creature or non-Being, which refutes the Trinity. If it is just in our minds, then WHO is identical to WHAT in every respect in reality, which leads to a logical contradiction, which refutes the Trinity.
No the WHO is either the One WHAT or a creature or non-Being. SInce the WHO subsists in the One WHAT and is not distinct from the WHAT as a WHAT or other WHO's as far as they are also the same WHAT then the divine simplicity is upheld. The subsisting WHO's are only distinct from other WHO's as WHO not the WHAT.
Only you could think this word salad is convincing. Sad, really.
Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
But the three persons cannot be “in” the one divine essence. How could they be? If the three persons are distinct, and if they exist in the divine essence, then composition exists in the divine essence, which is impossible due to divine simplicity. So, what do you mean by “three who’s in one what”? What do you mean by “in”? It cannot mean “containment”, because that would falsify the simplicity of the divine nature. So, what does it mean?
See, this is how you get by. You pretend to use words in a meaningful fashion, but end up completely equivocating them into meaninglessness. You use words, such as “the same as”, “in”, “identical”, and yet you do not use these words in a meaningful way. It makes no sense to say that a human is identical to human nature, because they are not identical. A human is partly composed of a human nature, but that is not what anyone would mean by identity. But you want to say that the divine persons are identical to the divine nature, except you do not mean “identical” at all. I actually have no idea what you mean by “identical” here, because you cannot provide any kind of translation between the divine persons and the divine essence at all, which means that the entire account is unjustified and ad hoc.
Ed:
ReplyDeleteSorry about that last batch of comments. I just finished and then I saw your comment. That will be my last set on this thread, which has gone on way too long.
Benonymous:
Shame, dude. Shame. You can post whatever you want, but I won't be replying.
@dguller
ReplyDelete>Shame, dude. Shame. You can post whatever you want, but I won't be replying.
Good I will hold you too that. But as a courtesy I will refrain from any personal abuse out of respect for Prof Feser. But not because I don't think you deserve it.
>The question is whether WHAT is distinct from WHO.
ReplyDeleteIf you actually did the reading you would know Aquinas says in the SUMMA PT I Q39 that the Persons are NOT distinct from the essence. The Who is not distinct from the WHAT as a WHAT.
>Are they exactly the same thing, i.e. all the properties of WHAT are identical to the properties of WHO?
Now you are confusing the senses again. The WHAT is Nature the Principle of Action by which something acts . A Person is a "Center of Attribution" that acts with his nature. You are treating the Persons like attributes & you are still stubbornly confusing the senses to create your straw man.
>Or are they not exactly the same thing, i.e. it is false that all the properties of WHAT are identical to the properties of WHO?
Any join properties they would have would be whatever unknowable positive properties God has as God and they would be beyond our comprehension.
>It seems clear that they must be different, because one of the properties of WHAT is indivisibility and one of the properties of WHO is divisibility, and thus they cannot be exactly the same thing.
G-L says rather clearly the Persons are not divisible because of their unity in the essence merely distinct.
I really wish you would have simply done the reading it would have saved my blood pressure. & it would have been a more pleasant conversation. See G-L commentary on Q30, Q31 & Q39 in THE TRINITY and GOD THE CREATOR. google it you can find it online.
The Three Persons and One Nature are the same thing they are both the same identical Unknowable God.. The key word is unknowable.
>But the question is whether they are referring to the entirety of God or to a partial aspect of God. Which is it?
This question is infuriating! I mean every historic formulation of the Trinity says the three persons are fully God both by themselves and together! Every orthodox theological gets that? Why have you not read that & why do you keep bringing up this non-sequitoer? In my response I am just going to erase
every reference or question you have about the Persons & nature being "partially God". They are unworthy of response and are just distractions. The Three Persons and One Nature are fully God get over it and enough of your straw men.
>>How do you know? You haven't read it! If you did you would see that is exactly what he says & of course he doesn't deny Persons are relations but they are still distinct from each other as relations?But not divided in the essence. Distance WHO's but the same identical WHAT.
>I have read it: “not, be it known, to relations of or between divine persons, but to persons as being nothing but relations” (Denys Turner, Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait, p. 126).
Your quoting so far has failed to impress me when I have had a copy of the book in question and can look it up in context. That is why I wasn't impressed with your quote from Aquinas' treatise on power as some kind of proof only the divine nature was the Principle of Action. As for your quote it seems to match what I am saying above.
>This won’t work, either. You say that “the Essence is not a WHO”, which means that the essence is different from a person/relation.
If the essence is a WHO then you are in effect saying they are not different senses & thus you are not arguing against the Trinity but a Straw Man.. This is why I don't believe you when you claim you are following the definition of the Trinity. The Trinity defines the essence/nature as a WHAT only Persons can be WHO's. No argument no discussion. Argue the doctrine in front of you not the one you wish was in front of you.
>After all, there is a difference between a WHO and a WHAT. The question is whether that difference occurs only in the mind, or also occurs in reality.
You have never explained why not both? The difference is in our minds and in the divine reality but how to conceive how it could be is beyond our comprehension.
>Either way, the Trinity is compromised, as I’ve shown many times. Your only solution is to keep equivocating and shifting meaning in a shell game, and resolutely refusing to define your terms properly, keeping everything vague and insubstantial.
ReplyDeleteNo everything is spelled out rather neatly if you had bothered to read & learn the terminology instead of making your own. But the thing is as I quote FESER we aren't meant to say "I see clearly what that means only to say I see no logical contradiction." Mystery is part of the definition of the Trinity. One you have gone out of your way to ignore.
> It is impossible for R to involve contradictory properties, and thus it is impossible for R(E) and R(P) both to be either about the totality of R .
It doesn't have contradictory properties. It could only have contradictory properties if R was Three Persons in One Persons or Three indivisible Natures in One Nature. The senses are still different and R constitutes a third unknowable equivocal sense.
>Again, simply saying that I’m ignoring the different senses does not work, because I’m taking them into consideration.
Yet you objected before to my statement that an "ESSENCE can't be a WHO"? How is that taking what I said into consideration.? It isn't, you are merely giving lip service to the definition of the Trinity & you are not considering it at all as Feser noted in his BLOG POST on the Trinity in regards to people who claim the Trinity contains logical contradiction.
>Wait, the referent is a “third sense”? What does that even mean? You’re talking nonsense, my friend.
No I am sticking with the definition. Feser, Sheed G-L etc all talked about mystery and how God is an unknown and Sheed said you can only know something is a contradiction if you understand it completely. We can't understand What God is & that is why ultimately we can't call Three Persons in One Nature being the One God a contradiction. It is a mystery and one part of your straw man is your downplay of mystery in addition to confusing the senses and paying lip service to the definition.
> Maybe you need to define “sense”, because I really don’t know what you mean by it. To me, a “sense” is the cognitive and linguistic presentation of a referent to the human mind.
ReplyDeleteIt is but it refers to a mysterious divine reality outside our minds. As best as we can grasp there is One God who is Three Who' s in One What. If you want to throw out any form of realism and embrace idealism then go for it but you are having the wrong argument. three senses. One the other and what they both are together.
>So, what do you mean by “sense”?
IT is how we grasp God in out intellects. There are real relations in God which distinct the WHO's in the One Simple WHAT. They are revealed to us as different sense that reflect an actual unknowable reality outside ourselves. Why is that hard?
>First, it is false that we only have negative knowledge of God.
Sorry but you said it yourself we take perfections in creatures and universals and abstract away composition. As G-L says these attributes exist formally and eminently in God but they don't tell us what God is as God. No positive attributes.
>We do have some positive knowledge of God, which actually is the basis for the apophatic negations. For example, we know that God is pure actuality, is ipsum esse subsistens, is the first cause of creation, has all perfections in an eminent fashion by virtue of his sublimity and transcendence, and so on.
Yes we can know his negative attributes & that is some positive knowledge we can have but that is not the same as saying we can positively know what God is as God. That is unknowable.
>They can have contradictory properties if their different senses each refer either to the totality of God or to the same partial aspect of God.
No because when you put them together you have a third equivocal sense. I tried to bring Rocca into this & cite Aquinas on the use of the word God to referent God's unknowability but you wanted to drop the use of the term "God" because it hurt your straw man & you acknowledged the equivocal uses of the term God did away with the contradiction.
>>As a WHAT it is incoherent to talk about God as a WHAT that can be subdivided into different parts of WHAT or multiplied into more than one WHAT.
>Why not? You and I have have a formally identical human essence that is numerically multiple, and thus it is possible for an essence to be multiplied in different instantiations of itself.
So what about the Divine Simplicity again? That is why you can't do it.
> I have, but you refuse to see it.
No I merely rejected your straw man misrepresentation of the Trinity. If that was the Trinity I would be the first to call it a contradiction. You IMHO refuse to apply the POC to the actual doctrine of the Trinity and keep smuggling a straw man in. I mean even in your last reply you claim you are following the definition yet you balked at me saying "Essence is not a WHO".?
Add to this the refusal to even engage to doctrine and try to throw out early on the equivocal use of the term "God" in the definition. It is a straw man & I would be quite comfortable saying we live in a godless universe where lived a false religion that taught a strange doctrine that appeared contradictory but formally wasn't upon close examination.
>That makes absolutely no sense. You are talking gibberish.
ReplyDeleteIt makes perfect sense if you realize WHO means Person and WHAT means Nature. The Three Persons have the same One Nature so each is WHAT the other is without distinction. Each person is God & indistinguishable as God. But the Persons as Persons are distinct from one another. The Person of the Father is not the Person of the Son etc.
>Here’s an analogous claim: “There is no distinction between a human and a human essence in that they are the same human essence”.
For it to be a true analogy to what I just said it would have to say "There is no distinction between Fred and His human essence in that they are the same human essence." But obviously Fred is not dguller.
Of course human essence is not singular or simple and non-composite. Fred and dguller are both human but if there was only one human nature that was indivisible and simple & the person know as Fred was human and so was dguller then both of them would be the same Being of course since they are persons they would not be each other as persons. It's not hard.
>I mean, can’t you see that you are just equivocating all over the place?
No I am using the correct terms in the correct way to spell out the mystery which has an equivocal sense in the end. You OTOH are looking to figure out what God is & that is your mistake one of many.
>You say that persons and essence are distinct, and thus cannot be compared in the same way – a WHO is not a WHAT! – but you also say that they are exactly the same thing in reality, but can’t be the same thing, because they cannot be compared in the same way, but also say that they are exactly the same thing in reality, and on and on.
ReplyDeleteQUOTE"The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”
As a hat for your Straw Man you have been wasting time trying to put this all together to get a clear picture of what God is as Three Persons in One Nature being the One God. There is none but given they are all different senses there can be no logical contradiction.
It's God = One What = Three Who's. Who's and What are different senses and God is the equivocal referent because God's positive properties can't be known.
The rest of your posts are just repeats of your same errors with some questionable statements…..
Like this:
>So, God is not partly the Father, partly the Son, and partly the Holy Spirit?
No He is not for the 500th time! Oy vey!
>because X cannot be a three-sided shape and a four-sided shape at the same time.
Go look up the term Tetrahedron..
It's Three of One Sense=One of another Sense= an Unknowable equivocal Third Sense.
Otherwise known as:
Three Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature at the same time(both being The One God) but in different senses(Three Who's in One What). To get a contradiction you need to make the senses one identical sense in order to apply the Principle of Contradiction but the Trinity is not defined that way.
Or to quote Feser "if the doctrine “appears contradictory” to you, you have by that very fact misunderstood it and are not really entertaining it at all. The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”
strict mystery, a truth so far exceeding the capacities of human reason that its full meaning cannot be comprehended by us nor a natural proof of its truth be discovered even after God has revealed that truth to men.
What does it mean for the Three Persons sense to be the One Simple Nature different sense and both are the third sense of being the Unknowable One God?
I can only say given the POC I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.
Now toward the end it looked like you where beginning to bring up a new objection about the coherence of the doctrine in that you can't grasp what it is saying. Well that is the argument you should have gone with. If you want to say "I don't see how it is coherent to say Three Divine Persons in One God?" That would have been a better conversation then your deathless defense of an obvious straw man critique of the Trinity.
Dear Mr. Feser,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, congratulations on your blog.
I was wondering whether you are familiar with Corbin's criticism of what seems to be what you agree to call "theistic personalism".
http://henrycorbinproject.blogspot.com.br/2009/09/corbin-on-monotheism-polytheism.html
"If, in effect, God is solely Being [Etre], then he could not himself properly be a being or an ens [Etant], not even a "Supreme Being" (ens supremum). By confusing Being with a supreme being (ens supremum), that is, by making of Esse an ens supremum, monotheism perishes in its triumph. It elevates an idol just at the point where it denounces such in a polytheism it poorly understands...
By confusing the uniqueness of Divinity (Theotes) with a singular God (theos) which excludes all other gods (theoi), unique Being with a singular being, monotheistic theology has itself prepared the way for precisely what your book shows so well, "the death of God," just as the confusion between Being and beings entails the "death of Being," leaving a place only for a totalitarian sense of the existent [etant]."
>he has not acknowledged a single apology given here to him or extended forgiveness to anyone here who has offered such an apology for calling him names. So I can only conclude he doesn't really care if someone insults him or apologizes for it. So why should I care?
ReplyDeleteI take DGuller's tactful heedlessness towards such remarks to be an implicit sort of forgiveness. But regardless, you should care because (a) it's simply rude not to, and (b) it's a startling lack of Christian charity. You cannot expect anyone to take your claims about Christianity seriously if in practice you show no respect for its most basic principles.
@Mr. Green
ReplyDeleteDrop it! It's over! Get lost!
>(b) it's a startling lack of Christian charity. You cannot expect anyone to take your claims about Christianity seriously if in practice you show no respect for its most basic principles.
My whole argument presupposes there is no God & that the doctrine of the Trinity as formally defined contains no logical contradiction & that dguller has attacked a straw man.
Agree or disagree you be the judge.
Now go away.
Mr. Green:
ReplyDeleteI appreciate your kind words of support.
I’d be even more appreciative of your feedback on the argument that I’ve been making on this thread against the Trinity, from a Thomist perspective. The argument in brief is that in order for the distinction between the divine relations to be real, there must be something other than the divine essence within God. That is because if there is only the divine essence, then any real distinction becomes impossible on the basis of divine simplicity. After all, if each divine relation comes from the divine person, then they must be identical, because they are all totally identical to the divine essence. Therefore, there must be something other than the divine essence in God to justify the real distinction between the divine relations. However, because the divine essence is identical to Being itself, then anything other than the divine essence must be either creation or non-Being, which would mean that the Trinity is either partly created or partly non-Being, both of which falsify the Trinity altogether. So, it is impossible for divine simplicity and the Trinity to be both true.
To cite the wiki on Straw men and informal fallacy.
ReplyDeleteA straw man is a type of argument and is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position. To "attack a straw man" is to create the illusion of having refuted a proposition by replacing it with a superficially similar yet inequivalent proposition (the "straw man" in this case-the identifying of Persons and Nature as both being God in the same sense and not different senses in order to invent a contradiction that the Trinity claims Three Gods = One God or Three Persons = One Person or Three Natures = One Nature or distinctions between Persons =distinctions in Nature or the Divine Simplicity of the One Nature precludes distinction between the Persons only sans Nature...etc), and to refute it, without ever having actually refuted the original position. But of course any careful following of the way the doctrine of the Trinity is formulated will show it is not possible for there to be a logical contradiction in the Trinity unless one claims to know What God Is.
An informal fallacy is an argument whose stated premises fail to support its proposed conclusion. The problem with an informal fallacy often stems from a flaw in reasoning that renders the conclusion unpersuasive. In contrast to a formal fallacy of deduction, the error is not merely a flaw in logic.
The Divine Simplicity is a feature of the One Divine Nature & it only refers to the Divine Persons in the sense as G-L clearly says "No real distinction exists between the essence and the persons, but a real distinction exists between the persons among themselves."[42]. Belonging to the sense of Nature it cannot be invoked to claim there can be no real distinction between the Persons among themselves. Since each Person is fully God therefore each Person processes the One Simple Nature and in that Nature there is no division. But as G-L says distinction between Persons should not be identified as division but as distinction in the sense they have real relations between themselves Person to Person.
ReplyDeleteNature and Person are both the same principle of action(God) but in different senses(3 Divine Persons equals One Divine Nature)--the Person being that which acts, the Nature being that by which He acts.
So they have the same principle in identity as the Unknowable God but in different senses in their Trinity belief.
Speaking in general Persons have a nature and operate a nature and have all the attributes of that nature but Persons are not natures in themselves. A Person is not an attribute but operates a nature with attributes. The Divine Persons thought distinct from each other as Persons are not divided or separate each fully has the One Simple Divine Nature which contains no distinctions or divisions. Part of the Straw Man here since the beginning as been to treat Persons as Attributes by confusing the different senses. That and ad hoc redefinitions (dropping the word "God" in comparing Persons and Nature because the equivocal comparison renders the argument null and void. Well that is the point…..)
There is no logical contradiction here & there can be none since Persons and Nature are different senses of the One Principle of Action being God.
In order to contradict they must be identical l in sense. They are not defined as such. dguller's argument from the beginning has been nothing but an argument from special pleading trying to re-define the doctrine of Trinity in such a way as to produce an artificial contradiction not a natural one in the doctrine original qualified formulations.
The argument is a failure & divine simplicity cannot be invoked to support it. Persons and Nature are different categories of senses. You can only compare the relations in those different categories in reference to a third category or sense they have in common. But the only sense category the Three Divine Persons and the One Divine Simple Nature have in common is in both being the One Incomprehensible God. Since we cannot know What God Is we cannot Know that God can't be Three Divine Persons in One Divine Nature so we are stuck with a Mystery.
The logical contradiction charge is a fantasy. You either accept reality or you don't.
To quote BenYachov who said it simply:
ReplyDeleteQUOTE "No orthodox definition or formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinctions between Persons is any type of real distinction in essence!"
To violate the divine simplicity we have to say there is a real distinction in the divine essence.
Since by definition the doctrine of the Trinity assumes the real distinction between Persons is NOT any type of real distinction in essence then by definition the divine simplicity can't be violated!
We don't have to say what the real distinction between Persons is or what it means we only have to say IT IS NOT a distinction in essence!END QUOTE
QUOTE"The Trinitarian does not say: “I clearly see what the propositions are saying, and they seem contradictory” but rather “I do not see any contradiction between them, but then I do not see clearly what they are saying in the first place.”
To continue to pretend distinctions between Persons are the same as a distinction in essence shows dguller refuses to give up his Straw man and absolutely refuses to engage the doctrine of the Trinity.
If this isn't arguing in bad faith I don't know what is & dguller owes everyone here an apology for it.
dguller, this is not Ben-onymous.
ReplyDeleteNot to speak for Mr. Green, but he mentioned earlier that he wasn't wading into the discussion because he is not an expert. He did say, however, that he thinks your questions are valid
Greetings Dr. Feser
ReplyDeleteWhy does God have to be characterized with qualities of Life, Knowledge, Power, Eternity, Goodness,etc.?
Aren't these attributes also anthropomorphic - because they have analogical similarity with creatures?
Why not hold that God, by virtue of being purely simple, transcends these kind of qualities - just as He transcends the genus of person and attributes in the normal sense?
DavidM:
ReplyDeleteguller, you can’t just randomly choose to *disbelieve* stuff that you actually *believe*! The ONLY way this could be possible would be in the trivial case, as I said, where you didn’t *actually* believe anything. Otherwise, you do believe certain things, and you cannot by a mere act of will arbitrarily cease to actually believe that which you do in fact actually believe. Considering the *possibility* that what one believes might be untrue is not the same as *ceasing to believe* what one believes.
First, of course, it is possible. You are suspending your belief in order to open the possibility that you may be incorrect. If you firmly believed, then you have no doubt, and without doubt, there cannot be possibility of reconsidering one’s opinion. You are merely engaging in apologetics that suffers from confirmation bias.
Second, it is not random at all. One can choose which belief to doubt in order to apply a skeptical analysis to see if there are solid grounds to believe it to begin with. This does not have to be haphazard at all. Perhaps one is having a dialogue with an interlocutor who has raised issues about your beliefs, and you have decided to suspend your belief in them to examine them thoroughly.
Third, there is a wide variability between absolute certainty and absolute doubt. One cannot believe something with absolute certainty and admit any doubt that one is wrong. If there is any doubt at all, then one cannot have absolute certainty. Say that there is a scale from 100% certainty to 0% certainty, and one has a belief at 75% certainty. That leaves 25% doubt, which one can use to examine whether 75% certainty for that belief is warranted. Perhaps after the examination, one’s certainty will drop to 50%, or maybe it will rise to 95% certainty.
If you seek the truth with a pure heart, you will not need to pretend that you *disbelieve* what you do believe in order to consider the *possibility* that what you believe is false.
The question is how one knows if one’s heart is “pure”. Human psychology has shown a significant capability of self-deception and self-distortion when it comes to belief assertion, and one is often completely oblivious to the underlying psychological mechanisms that are biasing and distorting one’s thought processes. It is not enough that one feels that one is right, but rather that one takes precautions to control for these well-known cognitive biases and distortions.
One way to control for them is to imagine that some of one’s beliefs are actually not held by oneself, but are held by someone else, and then examine them in that context. This can be helpful to bypass and avoid some cognitive biases and distortions, and I have personally found it helpful in that way.
If you need to actually pretend that you don’t believe P in order to even consider the possibility that P is false, this can only be because you find it psychologically impossible to accept that WHAT YOU BELIEVE might be false; the only possible psychological state you can bear contemplating is one wherein WHAT SOMEONE ELSE BELIEVES is false. This sort of makes sense insofar as you *must* believe (for now) whatever it is you (now) believe, so that as soon as you come to believe that your prior belief was false, that belief is no longer yours, so no longer ‘your’ *false* belief. But it still *was* your false belief and as long as you hold some belief that is *possibly* false, there is no more reason to pretend that it is *not* your (current) belief than there is to believe that your former belief was *never* your belief.
ReplyDeleteLike I said, psychological studies have shown that one tends to have less strict epistemic standards for one’s beliefs and more strict epistemic standards for other’s beliefs. That is what confirmation bias is. One way of dealing with this is to pretend or imagine that one’s beliefs are actually not one’s beliefs, but rather are someone else’s beliefs, and that can increase the strictness of one’s epistemic standards, and thus increase the likelihood of discovering the truth of the matter. If you are someone who has the same epistemic standards when judging your beliefs and the beliefs of others, then obviously you will not need something like the OTF to control for these biases, because you do not even have these biases to begin with. However, someone like myself who is prone to them has to protect myself from them, as much as possible.
You have to have the purity of heart to accept yourself as you are, a fallible human being, then you can pursue the truth and forget about this nonsensical business of pretending that you can disbelieve what you believe (and producing silly red herrings in order to justify that claim).
Part of being a “fallible human being” is being prone to a variety of well-known cognitive biases and distortions that are effectively invisible during our reasoning processes, and thus must be controlled for in some way. I don’t think “purity of heart” is enough, because that feeling of purity may itself distort one’s reasoning processes on the basis of one’s emotions. But perhaps I misunderstand what you mean by “purity of heart”. What is it? How does one know when one is in such a state?
So question, guller: do you believe that the common standard for evaluating all beliefs is to use straw man arguments (like the one above) in order to defend your own beliefs?
I do not. If I misrepresented your position, then I apologize. Thank you for the correction.
Or do you equally defend ALL beliefs (your own and those you disagree with) using straw man arguments?
I certainly try not to, but alas, I do fail occasionally.
But since there are more or less infinite possible permutations of straw man responses to any given argument, how can you ever get anywhere using this kind of 'epistemic standard'?
I would get nowhere, which is why I try to avoid it. Unfortunately, there are times that I fail, and it is most helpful to have my interlocutors correct me.
That seems plainly wrong. A1 and A2can both refer to 'the entirety of God' (i.e., *God*) but they obviously do not both refer *in the same way*. Each 'A' designates a *mode of referring*, not the referent itself. If the referent of A is R(A), then R(A1)=R(A2); but it does not follow that A1 = A2.
ReplyDeleteLet’s just be clear here. There are terms, there are senses of those terms, and there are referents for those senses. Let us call terms T, senses S, and referents R. It seems to me that your “mode of referring” is just a sense, which I have defined as a cognitive and linguistic representation or construct in the human mind that is directed towards a referent of some kind.
Say that you have the term, “the entirety of God”. This term has two senses, S1 and S2. This would correspond to your “mode of referring”. Each sense has a particular referent, S1 → R1 and S2 → R2.
There are a number of questions for this scheme.
First, say that you have the term, “the entirety of God”. This term has two senses, S1 and S2, according to you, which would correspond to your “mode of referring”. Furthermore, each sense has a particular referent, S1 → R1 and S2 → R2.
If R1 is the entirety of God in the sense of referring to God in his fullness without leaving anything residual out, then what on earth is R2? If R1 is not the entirety of God, then it can only be a part of God, which means that it encompasses some of God, while leaving the rest of God out. (Or, R2 could be none of God, but then it wouldn’t be a referent about God at all.) But then only R1 could conceivably be the entirety of God and R2 would have to be a part of God. It would be a strain of meaning to say that “the entirety of God” in one sense, or “mode of referring”, means a part of God. That would be a gross equivocation that is quite deceptive.
Second, say that you have the terms, “the divine persons” and “the divine essence”. Furthermore, say that the sense of the former is S(P) and the sense of the latter is S(E), and that S(P) refers to R(P) and S(E) refers to R(E). It is certainly true that S(P) is different from S(E), because S(P) involves real distinction of some kind and S(E) involves real distinction of no kind, which means that they have contradictory predicates that cannot simultaneously be predicated of the same subject. My big question is whether R(P) is totally identical to R(E) or not.
ReplyDeleteIf R(P) is totally identical to R(E), then there are not two distinct referents at all, but rather they both are one and the same in reality. In other words, R(P) = R(E) = R. The problem is that if S(P) refers to R and S(E) refers to R, and that the distinction and difference between them is only in our minds via the senses, then R must have contradictory predicates. In other words, R is simultaneously really distinct in some way and no really distinct in any way, which is a logical contradiction. The contradictory predicates are not segregated or separated via some difference in R to avoid the logical contradiction in this scenario. The only way to avoid a logical contradiction is to affirm either (a) that the divine relations are not really distinct in any way, which falsifies the Trinity, or (b) that the divine essence is really distinct in some way, which falsifies divine simplicity. Therefore, if R(P) = R(E), then one must reject either the Trinity or divine simplicity, or embrace a logical contradiction.
If R(P) is not totally identical to R(E), then R(P) is distinct and different from R(E). Given divine simplicity, R(E) must be Being itself, i.e. ipsum esse subsistens, because the divine essence is Being itself. That means that R(P) must be other than Being itself, because R(P) is different from R(E). Aquinas has written that ““[e]verything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST Ia, Q28, A2), and thus R(P) must be a creature, given that R(P) is other than R(E). However, this would completely falsify the Trinity, because according to the Trinity the divine persons are God and not creatures. The only way to avoid this problem is to reject the proposition that R(E) is identical to Being itself, which would mean rejecting divine simplicity. Therefore, if R(P) is different from R(E), then one must either reject the Trinity or divine simplicity, or embrace a logical contradiction.
Therefore, if R(E) is totally identical to R(P), then one must either reject the Trinity or divine simplicity, or embrace a logical contradiction, and if R(E) is not totally identical to R(P), then one must either reject the Trinity or divine simplicity, or embrace a logical contradiction.
Any thoughts?
dguller, I must say I continue to admire and be amused by your sangfroid. Now if we can just work on (actually) overcoming your confirmation bias...!
ReplyDeletePingback: "How Anthropomorphic is your G-O-D" (http://goo.gl/L723sJ)
ReplyDeleteI'm a Catholic classical theist like Dr. Feser. I'm a Thomist, too. So my question for Dr. Craig is, "Are you implying that the Trinity is a person when you say that that God is a person? Or are you talking about God the Father? Does it make sense to say that one person consists of three persons?"
ReplyDelete