Friday, April 12, 2013

Craig on theistic personalism


Someone posted the following clip at YouTube, in which William Lane Craig is asked about me and about his view of the dispute between classical theism and theistic personalism:



Craig kindly cites my series of posts on Alex Rosenberg’s The Atheist’s Guide to Reality as having been useful to him in preparing for his debate with Rosenberg.  (I’m gratified that the posts were helpful to him.  I’ve long admired Craig and his work, and as I’ve noted before, his excellent book The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz was very helpful to me in coming to see how shallow the usual characterizations and criticisms of the argument are, and played a role in my abandoning atheism.) 

Regarding the discussion of theistic personalism in the clip, some clarification is in order.  First of all, the expression “theistic personalism” is not in fact my own.  As far as I know, it was introduced by Brian Davies, who uses it in his book An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion to refer to a family of contemporary views he contrasts with the classical theism of thinkers like Augustine, Maimonides, Avicenna, and Aquinas.  (Also relevant is Davies’ discussion in his book The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil of the issue of whether God is “a person.”)  Davies indicates that “theistic personalism” is the same sort of thing referred to by Norman Geisler as “neotheism” in his book Creating God in the Image of Man?  (See also The Battle for God by Geisler and H. Wayne House.) 

As examples of thinkers who take positions characteristic of theistic personalism, Davies cites Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, John Lucas, Richard Creel, Charles Hartshorne, and Stephen T. Davis.  As examples of thinkers who take positions characteristic of neotheism, Geisler and House cite Plantinga, Davis, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Linda Zagzebski, and (especially) proponents of “open theism” like Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger.  I don’t think Davies, Geisler, or House would claim that these writers are in agreement on all the relevant theological issues.  But there is a family resemblance between their views that sets them all off from classical theism.  I have also suggested that William Paley and contemporary “Intelligent Design” theorists work at least implicitly with an essentially theistic personalist rather than classical theist conception of God.

Contrary to the impression given by the discussion in the YouTube clip, the main issue here is not whether God is subject to a standard of goodness external to him.  The difference instead concerns more general differences in how classical theists on the one hand and theistic personalists or neotheists on the other conceive of God.  The classical theist tends to start from the idea that whatever else God is, he is essentially that reality which is absolutely ultimate or fundamental, and the source of all other reality.  He not only does not depend in any way on anything outside him, but could not even in principle have depended on anything outside him.  Nothing less than this would be God, so that to say that there is no being who is absolutely ultimate in this way is in effect to say that there is no God.  Different classical theists might spell this basic idea out in different ways.  The Aristotelian will emphasize the thesis that unlike everything else that exists, God is not a mixture of actuality and potentiality but is instead pure actuality or actus purus.  Neoplatonism emphasizes that unlike everything else in reality, God is in no way composed of parts, either physical or metaphysical, but is absolutely One, simple, or non-composite.  Thomists will emphasize that God is not “a being” alongside other beings, and does not merely “have” existence; rather his essence just is existence, he just is Subsistent Being Itself or ipsum esse subsistens.  Followers of Anselm will emphasize that God is not merely the highest reality that there happens to be, but is that than which no greater can even be conceived.  And of course, many classical theists will incorporate all of these notions into their account of what it is to be the ultimate reality and the source of all other reality.

Theistic personalists, by contrast, tend to begin with the idea that God is “a person” just as we are persons, only without our corporeal and other limitations.  Like us, he has attributes like power, knowledge, and moral goodness; unlike us, he has these features to the maximum possible degree.  The theistic personalist thus arrives at an essentially anthropomorphic conception of God.  To be sure, the anthropomorphism is not the crude sort operative in traditional stories about the gods of the various pagan pantheons.  The theistic personalist does not think of God as having a corporeal nature, but instead perhaps along the lines of something like an infinite Cartesian res cogitans.  Nor do classical theists deny that God is personal in the sense of having the key personal attributes of intellect and will.  However, classical theists would deny that God stands alongside us in the genus “person.”  He is not “a person” alongside other persons any more than he is “a being” alongside other beings.  He is not an instance of any kind, the way we are instances of a kind.  He does not “have” intellect and will, as we do, but rather just is infinite intellect and will.  He is not “a person,” not because he is less than a person but because he is more than merely a person.

The difference between classical theism and theistic personalism shows up in their respective attitudes toward some of the traditional divine attributes.  Classical theists insist that God is absolutely simple or without parts; theistic personalists tend to reject the doctrine of divine simplicity.  Classical theists also insist that God is immutable, impassible, and eternal in the sense of outside time altogether, while theistic personalists tend to reject these claims as well.  These differences also affect how the two views interpret claims about God’s omniscience, will, goodness, and sovereignty, with theistic personalists tending to interpret these in a more anthropomorphic way.

I have said a lot more about this subject in a number of posts, links to which interested readers can find collected here.  The question of where Craig’s own views fit is a tricky one.  On the one hand, the kalām cosmological argument, of which Craig is famously a champion, seems (as Geisler points out) clearly to entail that God is eternal or non-temporal.  On the other hand, Craig suggests in his book The Kalām Cosmological Argument that “God is timeless prior to creation and in time subsequent to creation” (p. 152).  (But as Geisler and House point out, this statement can be read in different ways, and while on one reading it is incompatible with classical theism, it is not necessarily incompatible with it on another reading.)  Craig has also been critical of the doctrine of divine simplicity.  I have responded to his criticisms here.

765 comments:

  1. @dguller

    IF YOU ARE READING THIS.......

    Now that I am back at work and can do some printing I think before we proceed we need to make a DEAL!

    We need to both read the Summa Theologica PART ONE questions 27 to 32 AND QUESTIONS 39 to 43.

    (The questions on the individual PERSONS being optional.)

    see here
    http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm

    Then we can continue this discussion without confusion.

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  2. I am going to read them all at least twice by tonight then maybe we can clear a lot of this up.

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  3. Ben:

    No he literally says"But when something proceeds from a PRINCIPLE of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other

Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q[27], AA[2],4),"END QUOTE I 
think you might be misreading something here?

    Read the argument in ST 1.28.1. He distinguishes between two kinds of relations, real and logical. Real relations occur when it is part of the nature of the related entities to be ordered in that relationship, and logical relations do not require that the ordered relationship be part of the nature of the related entities. If the divine relations are derived from the divine nature such that they necessarily occur, given that nature, then they are real relations, but that means that there is no distinction between the divine relations and the divine nature, which is consistent with what Aquinas writes elsewhere. And that means that your attempt to make a distinction between the divine nature/attributes and the divine relations is false.

    You can't absolutely explain it & I have already told you that. At best you can have a few imperfect analogies to explain it but you can't fully understand it otherwise it is not a mystery.

    I’d settle for partial and imperfect understanding here. Where does the difference between the persons come from if not from the divine nature or divine attributes? What else is there in God that could provide the space between divine persons?

    This is a fallacy of equivocation. You can't positively show God is a Trinity with philosophy. You can't start with a philosophical argument like "whatever is moved is moved by another etc" and conclude "Therefore God is a Trinity". Of course you can used the language of philosophical theology to explain the Trinity and show there is no prima facia contradiction.

    But you can provide an argument to support your claim that there are real relations within God. You can explain what you mean by a “real relation”, and then explain how this real relation can apply to God. Aquinas’ argument is rooted in the claim that a real relation between X and Y must be derived from the nature of X and the nature of Y such that they are naturally ordered in a particular relationship to one another. That is his claim in the passage I cited.

    They are identical in Nature but not in relation to each other.

    That is just word salad, though. Aquinas clearly states that the relations occurring in God are identical to his essence, and if they are identical to his essence, then they cannot simultaneously be distinct from his essence. Otherwise, you contradict yourself by saying that X is identical to Y and X is different from Y. And you cannot say that X is identical to Y in one respect, but X is different from Y in another respect, because that would imply partial identity and partial difference between X and Y.

    I have long argued here that God cannot be partially identical and partially different, because that would imply parts, which cannot exist in metaphysical simplicity. And if that is true, then either the divine persons are completely identical to one another, which would negate their distinctions by different relations, or they are completely different from one another, which would negate their shared divine nature. They cannot be partly identical (by having the same nature) and partly different (by having different relations), because there would then be a real distinction in God between the divine nature and the divine relations, which would imply composition, and thus compromise his simplicity. So, no matter what, you lose a key component of the Trinity.

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  4. No I am saying Divine Relations are not Divine Attibutes and you have yet to produce a quote or argument from Aquinas that says that they are. I am not saying the Divine Persons and Relations aren't by Nature Fully God.

    Do you disagree with: “You are claiming that the divine nature is identical to the divine attributes (due to divine simplicity), but that the divine relations is different from the divine nature and attributes, and cannot be identical to them”?

    The intellect and the divine will as taught to us by our natural knowledge as attributes are the same WHAT but neither are WHO's in the WHAT so their mode of intelligibility isn't a real distinction. The Persons & relations are different WHO's that are the same identical single WHAT but not the same WHOS to each other thus they are really distinct in they really are different WHO's & we can only know this by revelation not natural knowledge.

    It seems that by “who” you mean the instantiation of a universal nature (i.e. the “what”) as a particular entity. Let’s say that this instantiation necessarily involves the actualization of specific attributes and/or relations. So, if you have two distinct individuals, X and Y, that share the same nature, then their distinction must be rooted in having different attributes and/or relations. If distinct divine persons P1 and P2 have the same nature and the same attributes, then their distinction must be based upon their different relations.

    But then you are right back where we started from, i.e. trying to explain how one can have a real relation between X and Y without simultaneously having a real distinction between X and Y. And if there is a real distinction between X and Y, then the totality that involves X and Y cannot be metaphysically simple, but rather is composite. I’m willing to entertain the possibility that the multiplicity of virtual ideas in the divine intellect does not compromise divine simplicity, but the multiplicity of divine persons is supposed to be a real multiplicity, and that must involve a real distinction between the divine individuals.

    Rather they are concieved as different Hypostasis that differ in relation to one another & thus can't be the same hypostasis.
The different relations are not divine attibutes since they cannot be known via natural reason like the attributes. Aquinas reject the claim "essence differs from relation" in that they aren't fully God not that they are the same hypostasis.

    But if the different relations are just “conceived as different”, then that would mean that they are “logical” relations and not “real” relations. I mean, either the relations really occur, or they are simply our mind’s way of conceptualizing the situation, but does not actually occur. And if they really occur, then there must really be two distinct entities that are in a relationship with one another, and that would destroy divine simplicity.

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  5. The Pesons and relations are the same in essence & are fully God that is not denied but relations are still not divine attributes and there is no way they can be.

    This strikes me as bizarre. Here are the options:

    (1) The Trinity is fully God
    (2) Each person of the Trinity is fully God

    What I understand by “fully” is that there is nothing left over or residual. For example, if the glass is full of water, then there is no residual space left for more water in the glass. So, to say that X is fully P means that there is no way for X to be more P.

    Is it possible for (1) and (2) to both be true? I don’t think so. If (1) is true, then God necessarily involves all three persons of the Trinity, which means that if there was one person lacking, then it would not be God at all. If (2) is true, each person is fully God, and thus there is nothing left over in terms of the degree to which each person is God. But there is something left over, i.e. the other persons of the Trinity! And if (1) is true, then to be fully God requires the presence of all members of the Trinity. But that contradicts (2), which says that each member of the Trinity is fully sufficient to be God, and does not require anything else to fill in the gaps. So, (1) and (2) cannot be true at the same time.

    There is no logical reason why three WHO's can't be the same identical WHAT but differ in one WHO not being the other via relation.

    There is a logical problem when that WHO is a metaphysically simple being. Simplicity messes everything up, because simplicity implies the absence of composition or parts, and yet distinction between persons implies the presence of composition or parts.

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  6. >Read the argument in ST 1.28.1. He distinguishes between two kinds of relations, real and logical.

    Read the replies and respond to them directly & read questions 27 all the way threw question 32 & 39 to 42.

    (Reading about the individual Divine Persons is optional.)

    Otherwise we will talk past each other all night & my back is killing me.

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  7. @dguller-Lets work backwards.

    >This strikes me as bizarre. Here are the options:
    (1) The Trinity is fully God

    No, the word Trinity is used to signify the multiplicity of Persons who are
    one in Nature but distinct in real relation to each other. This formulation you have given me implies there is an additional relation in the Godhead called the "Trinity". Ah no! This is not an option

    >(2) Each person of the Trinity is fully God.

    >What I understand by “fully” is that there is nothing left over or residual. For example, if the glass is full of water, then there is no residual space left for more water in the glass. So, to say that X is fully P means that there is no way for X to be more P.

    You are going to have to replace P with N for this too work.;-) In terms of Nature and the Divine Attributes each Person is fully God yes. But in terms of real mysterious relation to each other then one is not the other.

    >There is a logical problem when that WHO is a metaphysically simple being.

    Only if you treat the WHO as a Divine Attribute that can be deduced by natural knowledge not a mysterious Focal Point of Attribution or a relation subsisting in the Divine nature. The Divine Attributes have no opposition between them and don't Proceed from each other thus they can't have a real distinction. The Persons are in opposition to each other but not the Nature.

    >Simplicity messes everything up, because simplicity implies the absence of composition or parts, and yet distinction between persons implies the presence of composition or parts.

    From the Catholic Encylopedia:
    For the constitution of a person it is required that a reality be subsistent and absolutely distinct, i.e. incommunicable. The three Divine realities are relations, each identified with the Divine Essence. A finite relation has reality only in so far as it is an accident; it has the reality of inherence. The Divine relations, however, are in the nature not by inherence but by identity. The reality they have, therefore, is not that of an accident, but that of a subsistence. They are one with ipsum esse subsistens. Again every relation, by its very nature, implies opposition and so distinction. In the finite relation this distinction is between subject and term. In the infinite relations there is no subject as distinct from the relation itself; the Paternity is the Father--and no term as distinct from the opposing relation; the Filiation is the Son. The Divine realities are therefore distinct and mutually incommunicable through this relative opposition; they are subsistent as being identified with the subsistence of the Godhead, i.e. they are persons. The use of the word persona to denote them, however, led to controversy between East and West. The precise Greek equivalent was prosopon, likewise used originally of the actor's mask and then of the character he represented, but the meaning of the word had not passed on, as had that of persona, to the general signification of individual. Consequently tres personae, tria prosopa, savoured of Sabellianism to the Greeks. On the other hand their word hypostasis, from hypo-histemi, was taken to correspond to the Latin substantia, from sub-stare. Tres hypostases therefore appeared to conflict with the Nicaean doctrine of unity of substance in the Trinity. This difference was a maincause of the Antiochene schism of the fourth century (see MELETIUS OF ANTIOCH). Eventually in the West, it was recognized that the true equivalent of hypostasis was notsubstantia but subsistentia, and in the East that to understand prosopon in the sense of the Latin persona precluded the possibility of a interpretation. By the First Council of Constantinople, therefore, it was recognized that the words hypostasis, prosopon, and persona were equally applicable to the three Divine realities. END QUOTE

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  8. @dguller

    Because of dogma any argument that assumes the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 3 divine attributes like the Divine Intellect, Goodness and Will are 3 Divine Attributes is wrong. Any argument that assumes the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not in opposition by relation is wrong. Any argument that says relation is not the same as essence in that the relations are not fully God is wrong.

    >Do you disagree with: “You are claiming that the divine nature is identical to the divine attributes (due to divine simplicity), but that the divine relations is ifferent from the divine nature and attributes, and cannot be identical to them”?

    I would agree with any interpretation given to the above words that affirms the basic Catholic dogma on the Trinity & I would disagree with any interpretation of the above words used to affirm the heresy of Sabellianism or deny the Divine Simplicity and that the Persons are not real relations that each fully possess the Divine Essence but are distinct from one another.

    >It seems that by “who” you mean the instantiation of a universal nature (i.e. the “what”) as a particular entity.

    No I mean a reality that is subsistent and absolutely distinct, incommunicable in the Divine Substance.

    > Let’s say that this instantiation necessarily involves the actualization of specific attributes and/or relations.

    One you start describing the relations as the products of actualizations you
    fail. I already said the Father generating the Son is not the actualization of a potency.

    >So, if you have two distinct individuals, X and Y, that share the same nature, then their distinction must be rooted in having different attributes and/or relations.

    No. To continue with the old CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (since it ws obviously compelled by Scholastics & the bias make useful substitution for Aquinas) continue next post....

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  9. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15047a.htm#VI

    QUOTE"The transition to the Latin theology of the Trinity was the work of St. Augustine. Western theologians have never departed from the main lines which he laid down, although in the Golden Age of Scholasticism his system was developed, its details completed, and its terminology perfected.
    It received its final and classical form from St. Thomas Aquinas. But it is necessary first to indicate in what consisted the transition effected by St. Augustine. This may be summed up in three points:
    He views the Divine Nature as prior to the Personalities. Deus is for him not God the Father, but the Trinity. This was a step of the first importance, safeguarding as it did alike the unity of God and the equality of the Persons in a manner which the Greek system could never do. As we have seen, one at least of the Greeks, Didymus, had adopted this standpoint and it is possible that Augustine may have derived this method of viewing the mystery from him. But to make it the basis for the whole treatment of the doctrine was the work of Augustine's genius.
    He insists that every external operation of God is due to the whole Trinity, and cannot be attributed to one Person alone, save by appropriation (see HOLY GHOST). The GreekFathers had, as we have seen, been led to affirm that the action (energeia) of the Three Persons was one, and one alone. But the doctrine of appropriation was unknown to them, and thus the value of this conclusion was obscured by a traditional theology implying the distinct activities of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
    By indicating the analogy between the two processions within the Godhead and the internal acts of thought and will in the human mind (On the Trinity IX.3.3 and X.11.17), he became the founder of the psychological theory of the Trinity, which, with a very few exceptions, was accepted by every subsequent Latin writer.
    In the following exposition of the Latin doctrines, we shall follow St. Thomas Aquinas, whose treatment of the doctrine is now universally accepted by Catholic theologians. It should be observed, however, that this is not the only form in which the psychological theory has been proposed. Thus Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure, while adhering in the main to Western tradition, were more influenced by Greek thought, and give us a system differing somewhat from that of St. Thomas.END QUOTE.

    See whole article here.
    http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15047a.htm

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  10. >But if the different relations are just “conceived as different”, then that would mean that they are “logical” relations and not “real” relations. I mean, either the relations really occur, or they are simply our mind’s way of conceptualizing the situation, but does not actually occur.

    Or there is the third alternative our minds have this conception that in the Godhead there are these different relations that are real distinctions between themselves not just logical ones because that is what has been revealed by Divine Revelation in the Bible and Tradition and the dogmas formulated by the Church from these sources protected by the Holy Spirit.

    >And if they really occur, then there must really be two distinct entities that are in a relationship with one another, and that would destroy divine simplicity.

    Rather they call them realities and that is delved into in Question 30.

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  11. >Read the argument in ST 1.28.1. He distinguishes between two kinds of relations, real and logical.

    Read the WHOLE argument not just the separate parts.

    QUOTE"On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.

    I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (27, 2, 4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.END QUOTE

    Hint at this point you should have consulted Q27 art 2 & 4. since they are referenced.

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  12. Then there are the replies to the objections.
    QUOTE"Reply to Objection 1. Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.

    Reply to Objection 2. The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.END QUOTE

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  13. QUOTE"Reply to Objection 3. As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (14, 3 and 4; 19, 8). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

    Reply to Objection 4. Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.
    END QUOTE

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  14. >I’d settle for partial and imperfect understanding here. Where does the difference between the persons come from if not from the divine nature or divine attributes? What else is there in God that could provide the space between divine persons?

    I reply: Well for an imperfect understanding I offer the following quote""St. Thomas likens the procession of the Word in God to our act of self-awareness when the mind is both naturally and objectively identified with itself. So it is as if in thinking of himself that God begets God. He is pure intelligibility, and his act of understanding issuing in his Word is identical with his very being."
    - Ceslaus Velecky, as quoted in The Thought of Thomas Aquinas by Brian Davies, p.196END QUOTE

    For some popular expositions online

    A MAPS OF LIFE BY FRANK SHEED
    http://www.ewtn.com/library/SPIRIT/MAPLIF.TXT

    See Chapters V and VIII.

    the relevant from THEOLOGY AND SANITY
    http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2011/fsheed_trinityts_may2011.asp

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  15. @dguller

    >>They are identical in Nature but not in relation to each other.

    >That is just word salad, though.

    No that is the Heart of the Divine Mystery.

    >Aquinas clearly states that the relations occurring in God are identical to his essence, and if they are identical to his essence, then they cannot simultaneously be distinct from his essence.

    QUOTE Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.etc

    I answer that etc……..Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.
    Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.END QUOTE

    Reply to Objection 1. These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.

    Reply to Objection 2. As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (Q13, 2), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.END QUOTE

    I reply: Bro do I have to do everything? Why didn't you just move on to Q28 Ar 3 Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

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  16. QUOTE"Article 3. Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

    Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

    Objection 2. Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.

    Objection 3. Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

    On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.

    I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (1), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is relative.

    Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

    Reply to Objection 2. Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

    Reply to Objection 3. Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another.END QUOTE

    ReplyDelete
  17. @dguller
    Finally I must close all these many many postings by saying my purpose for them was NOT to overwhelm you or beat you down to "win" an argument by mere volume.

    I have too much respect for you & a fellow dude to treat you like some foul Gnu Troll who has been getting on my last nerve.

    But I do want you to have all the information & with dealing with my physical therapy & my back I haven't had time to give you the answers I thought you really needed.

    So read the Summa Theologica PART ONE questions 27 to 32 AND QUESTIONS 39 to 43.

    (The questions on the individual PERSONS being optional.)

    see here
    http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm

    read the CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA on the Trinity

    http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15047a.htm

    Some Frank Sheen
    http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2011/fsheed_trinityts_may2011.asp

    A MAP OF LIFE
    http://www.ewtn.com/library/SPIRIT/MAPLIF.TXT

    I'll leave you with this QUOTE"First of mystery. As used by theologians the word does not mean a truth of which we cannot know anything: it means a truth of which we cannot know everything. Mystery there must be once we touch the nature of God. He is the Infinite, the Immeasurable, the Limitless. We are finite, measured, limited on all sides. It is impossible that we should totally contain God in our minds so as totally to comprehend Him. But by His loving kindness we are endowed with a nature that can know something of Him-some little by its own powers, vastly more by what He tells us of Himself in the mysteries He has revealed.

    But a mystery is not merely a truth about God which we cannot discover for ourselves and can know only if God reveals it. If it were only that, the subject would present no difficulties. There is the further fact already suggested: that, even when God has revealed it to us, it remains a truth about an infinite being and is therefore not fully comprehensible by us.........For to call a doctrine a mystery is not to warn men's minds off it, as though it were something on which thought cannot profitably be employed. It is not to be conceived as a blank
    wall barring further progress: it is to be thought of rather as an endless gallery, into which we can advance ever deeper, to the great enrichment of our minds, but to the end of which we shall never come. Or better still think of it as an inexhaustible well of truth--a well from which for all eternity we can drink our fill yet which in all eternity we shall never drink to the last drop--so that we shall never know thirst. This infiniteness of truth is the most splendid
    assurance we can have of eternal happiness: for it means that the mind can for ever progress, that it will for ever be enriched by new draughts of truth, yet that it will never reach the end of truth. This inexhaustibility of truth is our guarantee against stagnation of the mind: it guarantees to our minds the possibility of progress through all eternity.

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  18. You know now that I read them Q33 to Q38 really do merit a read.

    But I didn't want to give too much homework I can nearly keep up.

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  19. Can't resist sharing this.

    Here is what looks like dguller's actual objection to the Trinity being impossible made by Aquinas himself.

    From Summa Contra Gentiles Book 4

    Chapter X-ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION AND PROCESSION

    http://www.saintwiki.com/index.php?title=SCG_4.10


    Now here is Aquinas answer to Himself and by extension dguller on the Trinity.

    CHAPTER XIV: SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION

    http://www.saintwiki.com/index.php?title=SCG_4.14


    I'll add these for good measure.

    The Holy Spirit is True God

    http://www.saintwiki.com/index.php?title=SCG_4.17

    THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON

    http://www.saintwiki.com/index.php?title=SCG_4.18

    Enjoy.

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  20. Ben:

    Either the relation is inside the divine essence or outside of the divine essence. If the relation is inside the divine essence, then it is identical to the divine essence by virtue of metaphysical simplicity. If the relation is outside the divine essence, then (a) the relation is also outside of ipsum esse subsistens, which is identical to the divine essence, which means that God would be outside of God, which is absurd, and (b) the relation is really distinct from the divine essence, and implies composition in God between his divine essence and his divine relations, which negates metaphysical simplicity.

    That is why Aquinas repeats on many occasions that “this relation is not really distinct from the essence”, that “the divine essence is identical with the relations of paternity or sonship”, and that “nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both paternity and sonship”, that “even the being of relation is the being of His substance” (SCG 4.14). The clear implication of this position is that there cannot be any real distinction between the divine persons, given that they all have the same essence and attributes, and since the relation is identical to the divine essence, they must have the same relations, as well.

    However, this is obviously problematic in that it destroys the doctrine of the Trinity, and so Aquinas also has to show that there is still a real distinction between the persons. Well, it cannot be based upon the divine essence and the divine attributes, as you agree. But it also cannot be based upon the divine relations, because he has said in many places in ST and SCG that they are identical with the divine essence, and thus should be identical, because the divine essence is identical in each divine person. His solution is to argue that because the definition of “paternity” necessarily opposes that of “filiation”, it follows that they cannot be identical, and thus must be distinct. But this conclusion completely contradicts his earlier argument that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence. I know that he endorses both positions, and so it does not good to cite him approving both claims, becuase they clearly contradict one another, and thus cannot be held simultaneously.

    You would have to explain how it is possible for two divine persons to have the same essence, and thus the same attributes and relations, because they are all ultimately identical to each other by virtue of divine simplicity, which implies the absence of real distinction, and yet still have different relations, which implies the presence of real distinction. You cannot simultaneously have the presence and absence of real distinction within God, because that is a logical contradiction.

    So, the ultimately question is whether there is or there is not real distinction in God. If there is real distinction, then God is not metaphysically simple. If there is not real distinction, then God is not a Trinity. From what I’ve read, Aquinas does nothing to resolve this dilemma, but offers good reasons for each contradictory position, and simply asserting that they must simultaneously be true.

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  21. >If the relation is inside the divine essence, then it is identical to the divine essence by virtue of metaphysical simplicity.

    Yes they are One in Nature.

    >Aquinas also has to show that there is still a real distinction between the persons. Well, it cannot be based upon the divine essence and the divine attributes, as you agree.

    I reply: Well we must accept the brute facts given by divine revelation & not see the Persons as mere divine Attributes like the divine goodness or divine Will etc. We can threw philosophical argument know God exists & that He has these attributes we cannot know God is Father, Word & Spirit save by revelation alone. Thus we can't treat the Persons as anything other then three Incommunicables that are in real relation to each Other but identical to the divine essence.

    I see no prima facia contradiction unless one forces the idea the Persons are nothing more than mere Attribute which by definition are communicable & can be know via Natural reason.

    The fact they are identical to the Divine Essence does not prevent them from being real relations from each other.

    >His solution is to argue that because the definition of “paternity” necessarily opposes that of “filiation”, it follows that they cannot be identical, and thus must be distinct. But this conclusion completely contradicts his earlier argument that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence

    Rather the only logical conclusion given the brute facts of divine Revelation is the Father & the Son is each fully(not merely participating) identical with the divine essence but distinct from each other as individual substances.

    This is a mystery but there is no way to prima facia prove it false unless you keep violating Aquinas by treating the Persons as communicable attributes in kneejerk fashion,

    It's like your insistance the Incarnation must be the divine nature of the Word changing itself into a human nauture. It fails.

    >I know that he endorses both positions, and so it does not good to cite him approving both claims, becuase they clearly contradict one another, and thus cannot be held simultaneously.

    Logically given the grammer of the Trinity they do not contradict they simply have no real example in creation or experience but if they did we could know the Trinity by mere nautural knowledge & that would overthrow the faith.

    >You would have to explain how it is possible for two divine persons to have the same essence, and thus the same attributes and relations, because they are all ultimately identical to each other by virtue of divine simplicity,

    I reply: I reject any formula that equates relations with attributes. I can say any real relaion is identical to the essence & threw essence is indentical to another real relation but as a real relation is incommunicable to another real reation.

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  22. >which implies the absence of real distinction, and yet still have different relations, which implies the presence of real distinction. You cannot simultaneously have the presence and absence of real distinction within God, because that is a logical contradiction.

    I reply: Yes it can imply it that mere natural interpretation is as possible as Aquinas' but the Church has already under the protection of the Holy Spirit Infallibly indorced Aquinas so you can no more be right on this then you can define the Incarnation as a chance of nature instead of a union of two natures.

    >So, the ultimately question is whether there is or there is not real distinction in God. If there is real distinction, then God is not metaphysically simple. If there is not real distinction, then God is not a Trinity.

    Sorry no, a real distinction cannot exist between communicable attributes but there is no logical reason why incommunicable individual subsistances can't have a real relation if they each fully possess the same essence. The grammer of the Trinity allows it and it is a mystery.


    >From what I’ve read, Aquinas does nothing to resolve this dilemma, but offers good reasons for each contradictory position, and simply asserting that they must simultaneously be true.

    This is mostly true except for your unfortunate tendency to equate and equivocate between communicable attributes that can be known by natural reason and individual subsistances that are incommunicable with each other but not threw the essence. Change that block and you have the Trinity. If Aquinas could "resolve" the delemma asd you have put it (with my corrections) that would overthrow the faith by killing the Mystery.

    Now would be a good time for you to employ some Mystical Theology here. The Trinity has affinity for it.

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  23. This is what it comes down too.

    dguller's definition of the Incarnation.

    "God the Word changes His Divine Nature into human nature and somehow keeps it divine even though it is no longer divine thus violating the doctrine of the divine immutablity".

    The Catholic Teaching on the Trinity.

    "The incarnation is a union of two natures divine and human who never mix but are united in the One Divine Perons of the Word".

    dguller's objections non-starters.

    dguller's definition of the trinity.

    "In God there are divine persons to have the same essence, and thus the same attributes and relations, because they are all ultimately identical to each other by virtue of divine simplicity, which implies the absence of real distinction, and yet still have different relations, but that is not possible since ralations like attributes are communicable & thus this doctrine contradicts inself".


    The Catholic teaching on the Trinity.

    God is One Simple Divine Essence without parts or passions & thus all naturally knowable attributes of that essence are communicable. However divne revelation tells us instansiated in God are three subsistances who each fully possess the Divine Essence and are identical with the that essence and each other threw that essence but are in real relation with each other & thus as subsistances are really distinct & to be a subsistance is to be incomunicable with any other even if three subsistances each fully possess the same one divine essence. Thus we do not divine the nature or confuse the subsistances. This is a mystery since there is no natural example of this being possible but given the grammer of the Trinity is not prima facia a contradiction.

    Again non-starter.

    Peace.

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  24. I don't want to crow but the fact dguller you are using the adjective "implies" shows that your argument can't be definitive & thus the Trinity is not impossible merely inconceivable.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Ben:

    Well we must accept the brute facts given by divine revelation & not see the Persons as mere divine Attributes like the divine goodness or divine Will etc. We can threw philosophical argument know God exists & that He has these attributes we cannot know God is Father, Word & Spirit save by revelation alone. Thus we can't treat the Persons as anything other then three Incommunicables that are in real relation to each Other but identical to the divine essence.

    At the very least, divine revelation should not be logically contradictory. To assert simultaneously that God has real distinctions and cannot have real distinctions is logically contradictory, and if that is the implication of a divine revelation, then all the more reason to reject that revelation, at least in that particular claim.

    I see no prima facia contradiction unless one forces the idea the Persons are nothing more than mere Attribute which by definition are communicable & can be know via Natural reason.

    There is a contradiction.

    (1) Either God is simple or God is composite
    (2) God is simple iff God lacks any real distinction within himself
    (3) God is simple (by argumentation of the ST, SCG, etc.)
    (4) There cannot be any real distinction within God (by (2), (3))
    (5) The Trinity is true (by divine revelation)
    (6) If the Trinity is true, then there must be a real distinction between divine persons within God
    (7) There must be a real distinction between divine persons within God (by (5), (6))
    (8) If there is a real distinction within God, then God cannot be simple (by (2))
    (9) God cannot be simple (by (7), (8))
    (10) (3) contradicts (9) and (4) contradicts (7)

    The fact they are identical to the Divine Essence does not prevent them from being real relations from each other.

    It does prevent them. If they are identical to the divine essence, then there cannot be any real distinction between them, because that would imply composition in the divine essence, which violates simplicity.

    I reject any formula that equates relations with attributes. I can say any real relaion is identical to the essence & threw essence is indentical to another real relation but as a real relation is incommunicable to another real reation.

    You can reject it all you want, but it is the implication of saying that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence. To say that X is identical to the divine essence means that X is identical to the divine attributes.

    Yes it can imply it that mere natural interpretation is as possible as Aquinas' but the Church has already under the protection of the Holy Spirit Infallibly indorced Aquinas so you can no more be right on this then you can define the Incarnation as a chance of nature instead of a union of two natures.

    This is just logic, my friend. If you want to endorse the position that the Church can endorse logically incoherent positions based upon divine sanction, then you are welcome to do so, but I don’t think you want to open that door.

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  26. Ben:

    The whole issue is pretty simple. You just have to answer the following questions:

    (1) Is there a real distinction within God?
    (2) Does simplicity preclude real distinction?

    What do you say?

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  27. You are just repeating yourself dguller without addressing what I said.

    >To assert simultaneously that God has real distinctions and cannot have real distinctions is logically contradictory,

    Agreed but there is no reason why God who is One Simple Essence cannot have real distinctions in terms of communicable attributes instantiate in that essence and can have multi-Subsistances that by definition are individual and thus incommunicable but because they have the same essence can only be distinct by real relation and because they being incommunicable are opposite these relations are real not merely logical.

    You are repeating yourself at this point and your argument is the Fallacy of a False Alternative.

    >It does prevent them. If they are identical to the divine essence, then there cannot be any real distinction between them.

    Aquinas has already make this objection and answered it. You have not dealt with his specific responses and have set up this Sabellian straw man just as on the incarnation you set up a monophysite one.

    >You can reject it all you want, but it is the implication of saying that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence.

    But it is not mandated and until you show other wise it's your interpretation vs Aquinas.

    It's not logic it's a straw man.

    You whole argument at this point is just another way of saying the Trinity is three persons in one person or three natures in one nature or three gods in one god.

    That is how you a prori concieve the Trinity. I started with Sheed and from the beginning I did not think of the Trinity in that manner.

    So I'm sorry there is nothing more to say.

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  28. >The whole issue is pretty simple. You just have to answer the following questions:

    (1) Is there a real distinction within God?

    Yes!

    >(2) Does simplicity preclude real distinction?

    In terms of communicable attributes yes in terms of multi subsistant Persons no.


    >What do you say?

    That is the nub but then you have to ask yourself if there are differing levels of divine simplicity or concepts of divine simplicity?

    If we believe in a total absolute super strong simplicity on any level of the divine reality then we can preclude the Trinity & maybe even the reality of creation as well since & are reduced to a super Pantheistic Monism where only God exists and we have no real existence just a logical existence.

    Fun isn't it?

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  29. Objection:Father, Word & Spirit are communicable Divine Attributes.

    Catholic response in terms of Negative Theology: No they are not whatever they are they are in the absolute sense not that.

    Truth: God is absolutely One Simple Essence as such any attribute we can concieve via our natural powers are absolutely identical with the essence & each other with no real distinction.

    Truth:God has divinely revealed to us in his naturally unknowable One simple essence are three inconceivable realities that are identical to the essence & threw the essence identical to each other but have real relations with each other by virtue of being incommunicable individuals and thus are really distinct on the level of real relation.

    Seems internally coherence to me.

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  30. Ben:

    Agreed but there is no reason why God who is One Simple Essence cannot have real distinctions in terms of communicable attributes instantiate in that essence and can have multi-Subsistances that by definition are individual and thus incommunicable but because they have the same essence can only be distinct by real relation and because they being incommunicable are opposite these relations are real not merely logical.

    Why does that make a difference? If there is a real distinction in God between different instantiations of the divine essence, then there is composition in God, which means that God is not simple. At the very least, there is a real distinction between communicable attributes and incommunicable relations, which means that God is partly made up of communicable attributes, which are identical to the divine essence, and partly made up of incommunicable relations, which are also identical to the divine essence, but somehow not identical to the communicable attributes, despite the fact that if A = B and B = C, then A = C.

    Aquinas has already make this objection and answered it. You have not dealt with his specific responses and have set up this Sabellian straw man just as on the incarnation you set up a monophysite one.

    The problem is that if A is identical to B, and B is identical to C, then A is identical to C, which ultimately just means that A = B = C. If the divine essence is identical to the divine attributes (i.e. A = B) and if the divine essence is identical to the divine relations (i.e. B = C), then it necessarily follows that the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, because both are identical to the divine essence.

    You whole argument at this point is just another way of saying the Trinity is three persons in one person or three natures in one nature or three gods in one god.

    That’s not the argument at all.

    In terms of communicable attributes yes in terms of multi subsistant Persons no.

    If there is a real distinction within God, then how can God remain simple? Simple just means the absence of real distinction in the form of real composition. To assert the presence of real distinction is to necessarily negate simplicity and affirm composition of God. Saying that God is simple with respect to communicable attributes but composite with respect to incommunicable relations is ultimately to say that God is not simple at all, because God is partly composed of communicable attributes and partly composed of incommunicable relations, which means that he is composite. And that is fine, but then you have to answer Aquinas’ arguments for divine simplicity.

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  31. dguller, although I normally disagree with you, you make valid observations (in the humble opinion of this lurker).

    It is for the reasons that you've elucidated that I've come to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity is rationally indefensible.

    ReplyDelete
  32. @dguller

    For me it is reduced to this.

    In the Divine Essence which is Simple, attributes are indentical to each other and only differ in logical realationship and not in real relationships & what the Divine Essence is happens to be Ultimaly beyond our comprehention.

    Question: Could there be in the Simple Divine Essence an incomprehensible Something or many incomprehensible Something's that whatever they are they are absolutelty not mere attributes so whatever they are the strick rules of understanding attributes do not apply?

    Question: If such incomprehensible Somethings exist in the simple One Divine Essence could we know of them threw natural reason if they are absolutely not attributes?

    Logically we could not know if they exist or not in God.

    Could we know if the simple One Divine Essence told us? Obviously!

    Can we know what they absolutely are? Heck no we can't even ultimatly know what the simple Divine Essence is so how could we then know what these incomprehensible somethings are?

    But if the Simple One Divine Essence told us that He was Them could he give to us a grammer to express the truth of the Somethings in some fashion?

    I don't see why not?

    Thus I still fail to see a prima facia contradiction.


    At the end of the day dguller's argument is Father, Word and Spirit are Divine Attributes like any other.

    My response: Whatever Father, Word & Spirit are in the Simple Divine Essence they are absolutely not that.

    So no matter how may times you restate your argument "they are still not that".

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  33. Ben:

    Could there be in the Simple Divine Essence an incomprehensible Something or many incomprehensible Something's that whatever they are they are absolutelty not mere attributes so whatever they are the strick rules of understanding attributes do not apply?

    But then there is a real distinction within God between (a) comprehensible something(s) and incomprehensible something(s), and (b) attributes and relations, both of which would compromise divine simplicity. You cannot maintain divine simplicity and real distinction within God without contradicting yourself, no matter how many times you say “square circle, square circle, square circle”.

    If such incomprehensible Somethings exist in the simple One Divine Essence could we know of them threw natural reason if they are absolutely not attributes?

    It is irrelevant how we know them. If that knowledge comes from reason or revelation, if the assertion is that God can be simple and yet admit real distinction, then the assertion is logically incoherent, because logically contradictory.

    Can we know what they absolutely are? Heck no we can't even ultimatly know what the simple Divine Essence is so how could we then know what these incomprehensible somethings are?

    You don’t have to know what they absolutely are. You just have to know that they are “really distinct” from one another, and that is enough to negate divine simplicity.

    At the end of the day dguller's argument is Father, Word and Spirit are Divine Attributes like any other.

    My argument is that:

    (1) If the divine attributes and the divine relations are both identical to the divine nature, then the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, by virtue of divine simplicity.
    (2) If God admits of real distinction within himself of any kind and no matter how we learn about it, then God cannot be simple, but rather must be composite.

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  34. Anonymous:

    Thanks for that. I'm glad someone is reading and doesn't think I'm nuts!

    ReplyDelete
  35. God is not Simple if his attributes are distinct but whatever Father, Word & Spirit are in God they are absolutely not attributes.

    Can we via our natural reason alone know there is anything instantiated in God other than attributes?

    No!

    Can these NOT-ATRRIBUTES if they are real be the same as the divine essence? Sure why not?

    Can they have real distinction with other NOT-ATTRIBUTES? There is no reason why they cannot since they are not attributes thus the rules governing divine attributes having no real distinction don't apply.

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  36. >Thanks for that. I'm glad someone is reading and doesn't think I'm nuts!

    I don't think you are nuts I just think you what it easy so you concieve of the Trinity solely in Sabellian terms not in Catholic ones.

    Like your obstinate insistence the Incarnation meant Christ changed the unchangeable divine nature to human nature.

    But not being Catholic who can blame you?

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  37. At the end of the day dguller's argument is Father, Word and Spirit are Divine Attributes like any other.

    My response: Whatever Father, Word & Spirit are in the Simple Divine Essence they are absolutely not that.

    Dguller's response? Ignore the brute fact that whatever they are they are absolutely not that.

    >You cannot maintain divine simplicity and real distinction within God without contradicting yourself, no matter how many times you say “square circle, square circle, square circle”.

    Circles and Squares are things. We can go from things to an analogical knowledge of the existence of God. We cannot go from things to a trinity so the example is not valid.

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  38. I hope that didn't come off as too heated.

    At the end of the day I will agree dguller is worth arguing with & debating.

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  39. dguller,

    Interestingly, Craig (since this thread is about him) himself thinks that Aquinas' version of the Trinity reduces to Modalism.

    As an aside, I don't think Craig's version is any better. His view either reduces to tritheism, his protestations notwithstanding, or it "unGods" God.

    ReplyDelete
  40. @dguller

    >1) If the divine attributes and the divine relations are both identical to the divine nature, then the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, by virtue of divine simplicity.

    Unanswered questions. Are the divine attributes the same in as the divine relations and if so in what sense? Are they absolutely the same? Are they merely different in reason or is there a real difference in what they are?

    How do we know we can equivocate between attributes we can know from reason from realities in the Divine nature which cannot be known by reason?

    So no dguller your argument is in fact Father, Word and Spirt are divine attribute completely unequivocally the same as the Divine Will, Goodness or Divine Intellect etc..

    I maintain whatever Father, Word & Spirit are they are not that & the revealed grammer shows there is no prima facia contradiction.

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  41. Craig rejects most of Aquinas' views on God so no big surprise.

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  42. Ben:

    I don’t know what else to say. If you cannot understand that simplicity precludes real distinction, then I don’t think you understand what simplicity is about.

    Also, if you accept the logical principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C, then there is no way that the divine relations are not identical to the divine attributes, and thus they cannot be distinct. The key piece here is Aquinas’ claim that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence, which he clearly states in both ST and SCG. Now, if you want to reject that logical principle, then you cannot argue that the divine attributes are identical to one another, because that argument presupposes the validity of that logical principle. So, if you accept the principle, the Trinity is false, and if you reject the principle, then important truths about God are false.

    Unanswered questions. Are the divine attributes the same in as the divine relations and if so in what sense? Are they absolutely the same? Are they merely different in reason or is there a real difference in what they are?

    The divine attributes are the same in reality, but conceptually distinct, and thus would be logical distinctions, not real distinctions. As Feser writes: “Though we distinguish between them in thought, there is no distinction at all between them in reality” (Aquinas, p. 127). And they are identical on the basis of divine simplicity, meaning that there is no real distinction of any kind in God, including between divine attributes, such as intellect and will, but rather that the intellect is identical to the will, for example.

    How do we know we can equivocate between attributes we can know from reason from realities in the Divine nature which cannot be known by reason?

    Irrelevant. Either there is real distinction in God, or there is no real distinction in God. If the former, then God is not simple. If the latter, then God is not a Trinity.

    So no dguller your argument is in fact Father, Word and Spirt are divine attribute completely unequivocally the same as the Divine Will, Goodness or Divine Intellect etc..

    Right, by virtue of the transitive properties of identical relationships. The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature, which you endorse. The divine relations are identical to the divine nature, which Aquinas endorses. Therefore, the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, by virtue of the logical principle I mentioned above. Unless you reject that principle, this conclusion is deductively valid, whether you like it or not.

    I maintain whatever Father, Word & Spirit are they are not that & the revealed grammer shows there is no prima facia contradiction.

    There is a clear contradiction, if you open your eyes.

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  43. To reduce Aquinas' argument to modalism one has to treat the Divine Persons as Divine Attributes & unequivocally understand them to be the same as the Divine Will or Divine Intellect are understood to be Divine Attributes.

    This and add the category mistake of treating the Trinity as something that can be practically deduced by mere nature dicursive reason & bam modalism or Tritheism or Patheistic Monism can result.

    I won't go there.

    Father, Word & Spirit are absolutely not Divine Attributes.

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  44. Ben:

    To reduce Aquinas' argument to modalism one has to treat the Divine Persons as Divine Attributes & unequivocally understand them to be the same as the Divine Will or Divine Intellect are understood to be Divine Attributes.

    Do you reject the logical principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C?

    This and add the category mistake of treating the Trinity as something that can be practically deduced by mere nature dicursive reason & bam modalism or Tritheism or Patheistic Monism can result.

    I don’t know how many times I have to say that this is a complete red herring that has nothing to do with my argument. I agree that the Trinity is not rationally deducible via the principles of natural theology, and can only be disclosed by revelation. However, once the Trinity is disclosed, then it can be rationally evaluated for internal and external consistency. It just turns out that the Trinity cannot be true if God is simple.

    Father, Word & Spirit are absolutely not Divine Attributes.

    Then you have to reject the logical principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C and/or the doctrine of divine simplicity. If that is the price that you are willing to pay to preserve the Trinity, then that’s your choice, but it leads to a series of consequences that you won’t like.


    not what is happening.

    I’m not deducing anything. I’m starting with the claims that (1) God is simple and thus necessarily devoid of real distinction (by reason), and (2) God is a Trinity of really distinct persons (by revelation). It just turns out that (1) and (2) contradict one another.

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  45. dguller you are still repeating objections Aquinas directly answers & you are refusing to deal specifically with them.

    Your entire argument is confined to two sentences in at most two questions & on the practical level you are treating the Trinity as something that can be known by natural reason & downplaying the significances.

    >I don’t know what else to say. If you cannot understand that simplicity precludes real distinction, then I don’t think you understand what simplicity is about.

    If we we can't qualify why & how simplicity precludes real distinction & what real distinctions it precludes then why not simply deny creation is distinct from un-creation and deny anything exists at all in any sense except God?

    >The divine attributes are the same in reality, but conceptually distinct,

    Really so they must be able for us to know analogously using our natural reason! But what about something that is not that?

    >>How do we know we can equivocate between attributes we can know from reason from realities in the Divine nature which cannot be known by reason?

    >Irrelevant. Either there is real distinction in God, or there is no real distinction in God. If the former, then God is not simple. If the latter, then God is not a Trinity.

    So you refuse to engage the argument & ad hoc claim Divine Simplicity = No Trinity?

    Pretty weak for you.

    This is so you can maintain your Fatheer, Word & Spirit are Attributes in the unequivocal sense the Divine Will etc is an attribute.

    I'm not buying it.

    >Right, by virtue of the transitive properties of identical relationships.

    So you concede that you think the Father for example is a Divine Attribute unequivocally the same as the Divine Will being an attribute in the same unequivocal sense!

    Good with that at the risk of sounding self-serving ends the debate.

    Since my response is whatever the Father is He/It is absolutely NOT THAT!

    Since that is a purely negative statement you can't logically make a positive critique of it now can you?

    Just like if you claim the Incarnation is the changing of the unchanging divine nature into a human nature & I respond it is not that then I don't even have to invoke Chalcedon or Pope Leo.

    >The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature, which you endorse. The divine relations are identical to the divine nature, which Aquinas endorses. Therefore, the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations,

    In what sense are they indentical?

    >by virtue of the logical principle I mentioned above. Unless you reject that principle, this conclusion is deductively valid, whether you like it or not.

    But deductively, if I reject your idea the Father is a divine attribute unequivocally no different then the Divine Will being an Attribute, then logically no positive case you might make against making a divine attribute really distinct from another can be applied here.

    So in the end your whole argument logically is a non-starter and always has been.

    >There is a clear contradiction, if you open your eyes.

    Physician heal thyself.

    Cheers.

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  46. >>Father, Word & Spirit are absolutely not Divine Attributes.

    >Then you have to reject the logical principle that if A = B and B = C, then A = C and/or the doctrine of divine simplicity.

    Then can I say the symbol "A" is identical in every respect to the symbol "B" without qualification?

    But that is only true in the same relationship.

    What if I have another relationship where A does not equal b & does not equal C?

    Then there is no contradiction.

    Sorry but the Word is not a Divine Attribute and cannot be made so.

    So any argument you make here is a non-starter.




    If that is the price that you are willing to pay to preserve the Trinity, then that’s your choice, but it leads to a series of consequences that you won’t like.

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  47. >If that is the price that you are willing to pay to preserve the Trinity, then that’s your choice, but it leads to a series of consequences that you won’t like.

    The price I pay is this. Revelation says the Father is not a mere attribute.

    So whatever He is I can't ever concieve of thinking of Him as I would the Divine Will & I don't have to give up the divine simplicity to do so since I only have to do that if I try to concieve of God having attributes that are really distinct instead of logically so.

    Negative Theology strikes again.

    You read THE DARKNESS OF GOD so run with it here & leave it out of mere natural theology.

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  48. >I’m not deducing anything. I’m starting with the claims that (1) God is simple and thus necessarily devoid of real distinction (by reason),

    Something you can positively know by reason but you can't positively know the Trinity by reason so the non-starter objections persist.

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  49. >God is a Trinity of really distinct persons (by revelation).

    What you are saying here is a Person is unequivocally the absolute exact same thing as a divine attribute except it's only real difference it it's revealed to exist not reasoned.

    A Divine Person is absolutely not that either. Also logically if a Divine Person was unequivocally the absolutely exactly the same thing as a divine attribute then logically by your own argument you could know it exists by mere natural reason thus you could understand everything about God using reason alone and God would contain no mystery.

    How it that even Aristotle's God much less Aquinas?

    That is Q from Star Trek not God.

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  52. So a Divine Person in dguller's reasoning is absolutely in every sense of the word no different from a divine attribute except the only real difference is a person is an attribute that has been supernaturally revealed verses one deduced to exist in God by natural reason?

    Then how can a Divine Person not be knowable by reason alone except by divine revelation?

    So there are no mysteries in God atall & all of the attributes of God can be known by reason alone & god can be then completely understood by reason alone like any other natural object?

    That doesn't work I might as well believe in a Theistic Personalist "god" and be done with it.

    Now just because there are mysteries in God that can't be know by mere natural reason doesn't mean a Divine Person is one of them.

    I really have to stop now and eat.

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  53. Ben:

    dguller you are still repeating objections Aquinas directly answers & you are refusing to deal specifically with them.

    The problem is that he does not deal with these objections. He asserts two contradictory positions, and just leaves it there. Where does he resolve the contradiction between the utter absence of real distinction in God by virtue of divine simplicity and the necessity of real distinction in God by virtue of the Trinity? He just says both, and moves on to something else.

    Your entire argument is confined to two sentences in at most two questions & on the practical level you are treating the Trinity as something that can be known by natural reason & downplaying the significances.

    Do you even understand my argument?

    If we we can't qualify why & how simplicity precludes real distinction & what real distinctions it precludes then why not simply deny creation is distinct from un-creation and deny anything exists at all in any sense except God?

    There is a difference between there being no real distinction in God himself and there being a real distinction between God and creation. You are confusing the two.

    Really so they must be able for us to know analogously using our natural reason! But what about something that is not that?

    Are you saying that we cannot understand anything about the Trinity? That when the Church says there are three persons, we have no idea or thought in mind associated with that claim? And if we do have something in mind, then that necessarily involves concepts and ideas, which either correspond to what is reality itself or are just projections from our minds upon reality.

    So you refuse to engage the argument & ad hoc claim Divine Simplicity = No Trinity?

    Are you saying that the real distinction that is absent in God by virtue of divine simplicity is different from the real distinction that is presenting God by virtue of the Trinity? Okay. Let’s call the former real distinction1 (or RD1) and the latter real distinction2 (or RD2). So, divine simplicity means the absence of RD1, but allows the presence of RD2.

    What I would like to know is whether RD1 and RD2 are univocal, analogous or equivocal. If they are univocal, then my argument stands, because RD1 = RD2. If they are equivocal, then although they share the same term “RD”, they actually mean totally different things, which cannot be true, because at the very least they are both real in some sense, and a distinction of some kind, and thus cannot be totally different. If they are analogous, then they should be partly identical and partly different. What part is identical? What part is different?

    So you concede that you think the Father for example is a Divine Attribute unequivocally the same as the Divine Will being an attribute in the same unequivocal sense!

    It follows from the logical principle of transitive identity. Do you reject that principle? It’s a simple question, Ben.

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  54. Since that is a purely negative statement you can't logically make a positive critique of it now can you?

    So, now the divine relation is a “purely negative statement”? How does that work?

    In what sense are they indentical?

    Because Aquinas says that they are the same as the divine nature. When someone says that X is the same as Y, or that X is identical to Y, I think that they mean that there is no difference between X and Y. What do you think they mean?

    But deductively, if I reject your idea the Father is a divine attribute unequivocally no different then the Divine Will being an Attribute, then logically no positive case you might make against making a divine attribute really distinct from another can be applied here.

    First, there is no real distinction between the divine attributes.

    Second, for your position to be logically possible, you would have to reject the law of transitive identity. Do you really want to do that?

    Then can I say the symbol "A" is identical in every respect to the symbol "B" without qualification?

    Yes, that is what “identical” means.

    

But that is only true in the same relationship.

    Yup.

    What if I have another relationship where A does not equal b & does not equal C? 

Then there is no contradiction.

    That is true, but does not work here. Remember, you agree that the divine nature is identical to the divine attributes. Aquinas says many times that the divine relations are identical to the divine nature. Perhaps he meant that the divine relations are similar to the divine nature? If that is true, then the divine relations are partly identical to and partly different from the divine nature. Since the divine nature is identical to God himself, because God himself is ipsum esse subsistens, it would follow that the part of the divine relations that is different from the divine nature is also different from God himself, and thus there is a part of the divine relations that is outside of God, which means that God is outside of himself, which is absurd.

    What you are saying here is a Person is unequivocally the absolute exact same thing as a divine attribute except it's only real difference it it's revealed to exist not reasoned.

    Our knowledge of X does not affect X. In having knowledge of X, we are changed, but X is not necessarily changed or affected by our knowledge of X. So, just because our knowledge about God sometimes comes from reason and sometimes comes from revelation does not affect the truth about God himself. But even if it did, this would be yet another real distinction within God, i.e. part of God is knowable by reason and another part of God is unknowable by reason but only by revelation, which would imply composition in God, which compromises divine simplicity.

    A Divine Person is absolutely not that either. Also logically if a Divine Person was unequivocally the absolutely exactly the same thing as a divine attribute then logically by your own argument you could know it exists by mere natural reason thus you could understand everything about God using reason alone and God would contain no mystery.

    Except that all our knowledge about God falls infinitely short of his reality, and so even the truths of natural theology fail to adequately encompass the truth about God by virtue of our created limitations. I mean, look at the divine intellect and the divine will. Natural theology concludes, if Aquinas is correct, that there is no real distinction between the divine intellect and the divine will, and that they are identical in reality. Do you understand how this is true, or how this is possible? Of course not, but does that affect the reasoning involved? Nope.

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  55. So a Divine Person in dguller's reasoning is absolutely in every sense no different from a divine attribute except the only real difference is a person is an attribute that has been revealed verses on arrived at by natural reason?

    That is what follows from Aquinas’ claim that the divine relations are identical to the divine nature. The solution is to say that the divine relations are not identical to the divine nature, but then what exactly is their relation to the divine nature? Are they totally different from the divine nature? That’s not possible, because then they would be totally different from God himself. Are they partially different from the divine nature? That’s not possible either, because then part of the divine relation would be outside of God himself. So, the only solution, as Aquinas likely recognized, is to say that the divine relations are fully within God, which means that they must be identical to the divine nature, as everything that is within God is, by virtue of divine simplicity. However, by virtue of the law of transitive identity, it necessarily would follow that the divine relations are identical to the divine attributes, which completely falsifies your position.

    Then how can a Divine Person not be knowable by reason alone except by divine revelation?

    Because how we know something is different from that thing itself. But say that you are correct, then that would be even worse for your position as I have explained above, because it would mean yet another real distinction within God, which negates divine simplicity, and thus just compounds the problems associated with it.

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  56. @dguller

    By your own admission you believe the Divine Person of the Father is absolutely in every sense no different from a divine attribute except the only real difference is a person is an attribute that has been revealed verses on arrived at by natural reason.

    That is the assumption you keep coming back too & it is one I outright reject.

    I can no more accept that is the case then I can define the Incarnation as God "changing" his "unchanging" divine nature into a human nature.

    I am afraid your argument must be dismissed as a misunderstanding of the Catholic teaching on the Trinity & thus a very wordy non-starter.

    There is no need to keep addressing errors you insist on repeating.

    The argument fails & I am so rationally certain of this after reading both Summa's on the subject & the relevant commentaries if I denied God in any fashion existed tomorrow I would reject your argument as a valid Criticism of the Catholic teaching on the Trinity since you will not give up your belief a Divine Person is absolutely identical to an attribute.

    Sorry.

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  57. HOLD THE PHONE!

    @dguller

    >Are you saying that the real distinction that is absent in God by virtue of divine simplicity is different from the real distinction that is present in God by virtue of the Trinity?

    PROGRESS!!!!!!!! YES!!!

    >Okay. Let’s call the former real distinction1 (or RD1) and the latter real distinction2 (or RD2). So, divine simplicity means the absence of RD1, but allows the presence of RD2.

    Works for me!

    >What I would like to know is whether RD1 and RD2 are univocal, analogous or equivocal.

    So what you are saying is you would like to use the methodogy of Natural Theology to examine concepts that are not arrived at my that methodology?

    No! Bad dguller! Not!

    Well there is some major progress at least.

    Sorry but I don't have the strength to discuss it anymore.

    But you where awesome in getting me to revisit all

    Bye.

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  58. Corollary:

    I wrote:
    >>So you concede that you think the Father for example is a Divine Attribute unequivocally the same as the Divine Will being an attribute in the same unequivocal sense!

    dguller replied:
    >It follows from the logical principle of transitive identity. Do you reject that principle? It’s a simple question, Ben.

    I respond: What about the third alternative you didn't give me?

    The logical principle of transitive identity doesn't apply in comparing a divine person with a divine attribute since one is RD2 & the other is RD1 in reference to the divine simplicity.

    Cheers.

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  59. additional:

    >>dguller you are still repeating objections Aquinas directly answers & you are refusing to deal specifically with them.

    >The problem is that he does not deal with these objections. He asserts two contradictory positions, and just leaves it there. Where does he resolve the contradiction between the utter absence of real distinction in God by virtue of divine simplicity and the necessity of real distinction in God by virtue of the Trinity? He just says both, and moves on to something else.

    You sure about that? Because based on everything I have ever read about the Trinity from Orthodox & Catholic sources both popular and scholarly you seem to have come up with the Angelic Doctor's solution quite by accident.

    QUOTE"Are you saying that the real distinction that is absent in God by virtue of divine simplicity is different from the real distinction that is present in God by virtue of the Trinity?(GOD YES!!!!) Okay. Let’s call the former real distinction1 (or RD1) and the latter real distinction2 (or RD2). So, divine simplicity means the absence of RD1, but allows the presence of RD2."END QUOTE

    Now go back and re-read Aquinas Q27 threw Q43 & the relevant parts of SCG Bk4, what you have written above is what he presumes when he explains how there is no prima facia contradiction in the Trinity. If what you have just stumbled on is correct you have just articulated the actual doctrine of the Trinity now just add to that the brute unarguable fact a Divine Person is not just another Divine attribute & for the first tme e can have an actual discussion on the Trinity.

    Nothing else need be said.

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  60. I should warn you dguller if you insist on going back to your former argument dguller insisting a divine person is just another attribute then would it make sense to say the Divine Will has the attribute of the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit?

    What then is an attribute of the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit?

    I mean I know what a will is. I can articulate what a human will is & I am sure I can articulate what a divine will is since will is an attribute.

    But given your personal dogma that a Divine Person is just another attribute then what is the attribute of the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit?

    Whatever a Divine Person is it is not a divine attribute and cannot unequivocally be treated as if it where one.

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  61. >There is a contradiction.

    (1) Either God is simple or God is composite
    (2) God is simple if God lacks any real distinction within himself
    (3) God is simple (by argumentation of the ST, SCG, etc.)
    (4) There cannot be any real distinction within God (by (2), (3))
    (5) The Trinity is true (by divine revelation)
    (6) If the Trinity is true, then there must be a real distinction between divine persons within God
    (7) There must be a real distinction between divine persons within God (by (5), (6))
    (8) If there is a real distinction within God, then God cannot be simple (by (2))
    (9) God cannot be simple (by (7), (8))
    (10) (3) contradicts (9) and (4) contradicts (7)


    I reply: (2) is not the correct formulation of the DS. thus the argument is invalid.
    In fact many of them are not the correct doctrinal formulations thus materially render all argument automatically invalid stamen.

    (4) is wrong. There are real distinctions in God between the Divine Persons of the Trinity there is no distinction in the divine essence.
    (8) is wrong too since only if there is a real distinction between the divine attributes is the DS overthrow or if there is any distinction in God's essence then the DS is overthrown.

    Verdict dgullers arguments are straw men and not accurate formulations of doctrine of the Trinity and related doctrines.

    I

    My counter Argument.
    (1)God is simple & thus lacks real relations between the divine attributes.
    (2) Thus if it where true there was any real distinction in God between attributes then the divine simplicity would be false and (2) would contradict (1)
    (3) God is simple therefore anything that is really in God's essence lacks any real distinction in said divine essence.
    (4) The Divine Persons are absolutely not in any sense the same as logically distinct divine attributes.
    (5) Therefore any real distinction between opposing Divine Persons cannot be the same as real distinctions between the divine attributes.
    (6) Thus real distinctions between Persons do not violate the DS in (1).
    (7) Because of (3) we must say there is no real distinction between Persons in essence.
    (8)Divine Persons by virtue of being Persons are really distinct One from another in that there is a real relation between One and Another Divine Person.
    (9) The real relation between Divine Persons is between said Persons only and not between the Persons and the Divine Essence.
    (10 Divine relations are identical in essence but not one to another.
    (11) Thus (9) & (10) do not contradict the DS in (3).
    (12) Thus there is no real contradiction in the Trinity.

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  62. Ben:

    So what you are saying is you would like to use the methodogy of Natural Theology to examine concepts that are not arrived at my that methodology?

    So, it is illegitimate to use Aquinas’ discussion of analogy in the context of divine names when it comes to the Trinity? Then what exactly does a “person” mean when you say that there are three persons in God? Is “person” to be understood neither univocally, analogically, nor equivocally? How is it to be understood then?

    It must be the case that “person” is understood analogically, which means that the doctrine of analogy also applies to the Trinity. In fact, Aquinas says that “this name "person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God” (ST 1.29.3). It is pretty clear that Aquinas endorses the necessity of analogy when attempting to understand the Trinity of divine persons, especially involving paternity and filiation, which are either to be understood analogically, or are empty of content whatsoever.

    With regards to divine relations, if you want to say that RD1 is applicable to divine simplicity and RD2 is applicable to divine relations, then one can ask how RD1 is related to RD2. There are only three possibilities here:

    (1) RD1 is totally identical to RD2, in which case my argument follows.
    (2) RD1 is totally different from RD2, which is impossible, because at the very least both RD1 and RD2 are real in some sense and relations of some kind, and thus have something in common, meaning that they cannot be totally different.
    (3) RD1 is partially identical to and partially different from RD2.

    Let’s focus upon (3). We would have to have a sense of what is partially identical and partially different between RD1 and RD2. Both are real distinctions of some kind. Are they both the same in terms of the kind of reality involved, but differ in terms of the kind of distinction? Are they both the same in terms of the kind of distinction, but differ in terms of the kind of reality involved? The only thing that makes sense to me, at least, is that they are the same in that they are the same in terms of being distinctions, but differ in terms of the kind of reality involved. But the problem here is that you are postulated different levels of reality within God, which would violate God’s status as pure actuality. There are no degrees or kinds of reality within God. He is just pure act, and nothing else. Otherwise, he would not be “pure” act, but “mixed” act and this other kind of reality that accounts for another level of reality. So, (3) is a no-go, too.

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  64. I respond: What about the third alternative you didn't give me?

The logical principle of transitive identity doesn't apply in comparing a divine person with a divine attribute since one is RD2 & the other is RD1 in reference to the divine simplicity.

    The distinction between RD1 and RD2 has nothing to do with whether a divine person is identical to a divine attribute, and so does not help you here. Look, it’s simple. First, you agree that the divine nature is identical to the divine attributes, and any distinction between the divine nature and the divine attributes, as well as between the attributes themselves, is a logical distinction in our minds that does not exist in reality. Second, Aquinas has clearly stated on a number of occasions in ST 1.28.2 and SCG 4.14 that the divine relations are identical to the divine nature.

    By the logical principle of transitive identity -- which you seem to accept since you keep rejecting the option of dismissing it as false -- if the divine attributes are identical to the divine nature, and the divine relations are also identical to the divine nature, then the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, and thus any distinction between them cannot be real, but only logical. And if there is no real distinction between divine relations, then the Trinity is false. The distinction between RD1 and RD2, even if valid, would be useless in this argument, because if the distinctions between the divine attributes are logical, and if the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, then the distinctions between the divine relations must also be merely logical, and not real. There are no different kinds of real distinction here, but the complete absence of any kind of real distinction.

    You sure about that? Because based on everything I have ever read about the Trinity from Orthodox & Catholic sources both popular and scholarly you seem to have come up with the Angelic Doctor's solution quite by accident.

    Yes, I’m sure about that, because in ST 1.28.2, he clearly says that the divine relations are identical to the divine nature, which necessarily implies, as I showed above, unless you want to reject the logical principle of transitive identity, that the divine relations cannot be really distinct, but only logically distinct. But then in ST 1.28.3, he argues that the divine relations must be really distinct, because “if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity”. Since the Trinity must be true, there must be real relations between different persons, and that necessarily implies that they are really distinct from each other. That’s what his argument ultimately comes down to. But the assumption is false, because the Trinity must be false, despite what revelation says.

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  66. Ben:

    Here’s the argument, ignoring divine simplicity as an unnecessary complication.

    (1) X is identical to Y iff X is the same as Y iff X has everything in common with Y iff X has nothing different or distinct from Y (principle of identity)
    (2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)
    (3) The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature (by divine simplicity)
    (4) The distinction between the divine attributes is a logical distinction
    (5) The divine relations are identical to the divine nature (by ST 1.28.2, SCG 4.14)
    (6) The divine relations are identical to the divine attributes (by (2), (3), (5))
    (7) The distinction between the divine relations is a logical distinction (by (1), (4), (6))
    (8) The Trinity is true (by revelation)
    (9) If the Trinity is true, then the distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by ST 1.28.3)
    (10) The distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by (8), (9))
    (11) A distinction between X and Y cannot be a real distinction and a logical distinction at the same time
    (12) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (7) and (10) (by (7), (10), (11))

    Notice that this argument is deductively valid even if the distinction between RD1 and RD2 is valid, and thus that particular distinction cannot save your position.

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  67. >So, it is illegitimate to use Aquinas’ discussion of analogy in the context of divine names when it comes to the Trinity?

    I don't know or care. If you wish to argue analogy then talk to The O'Flynn or Rank or whoever. It's not my dept. I suspect you are taking a page from my playbook & switching targets because you sense this one is a loser(if you recall I couldn't figure out how to answer you on analogy so I switch to the incarnation) considering you have already did my work for me with the RD1 & RD2 distinction.

    Sorry but a) You do NOT understand the doctrine of the DS & have given an ambiguously ill defined version of it quite alien to Aquinas. b) You still identify the Persons as the absolute equivalent to the Attributes another naughty thing.

    So in the end of the day your argument can't get off the ground. At the end of the day you are attacking the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity with the not the Cathoic view of the Trinity & not the Catholic view of the nature of Person vs Attributes.

    So what is the point then?

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  68. BTW divine relations are the divine persons so these are interchangeable. But Person/relations and attributes are not.

    A real relation between attributes overthrows the DS.

    A real relation between the Persons and the Essence overthrows the DS.

    But the nature of a real relation between Persons is such that it don't overthrow the DS. Since it is concieved as between the Persons/Relations not the Essence.

    BTW equating Relations with Attributes via theTransitive Principle of identify is the same mistake as equating Persons with Attributes.

    Cut it out dude.

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  69. >Notice that this argument is deductively valid even if the distinction between RD1 and RD2 is valid, and thus that particular distinction cannot save your position.

    Nope. You're making the same mistakes & equivocations. You're now pretending that the divine relations are not the same as the Divine Persons & equating the relations with the attributes. It doesn't work. You can't critique Aquinas from just reading Questions 28 & 29 only. What you've written here violates everything I've ever read about the Trinity & as smart as you are dguller, I know more than you about doctrine.

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  70. Ben:

    I don't know or care. If you wish to argue analogy then talk to The O'Flynn or Rank or whoever. It's not my dept. I suspect you are taking a page from my playbook & switching targets because you sense this one is a loser(if you recall I couldn't figure out how to answer you on analogy so I switch to the incarnation) considering you have already did my work for me with the RD1 & RD2 distinction.

    How can you not care? When you talk about the Trinity, you are using words with meaning and reference. Aquinas has a particular theory of language that purports to allow one to meaningfully and truthfully talk about God, and that theory necessarily involves the doctrine of analogy. If you are saying that the doctrine of analogy does not apply when discussing doctrines of revelation, such as the Trinity, then what other theory of language do you have to account for how those words can possibly be meaningful and true? Aquinas even references his discussion of the divine names in the passage I cited, meaning that his claims in that section of the ST are equally applicable when discussing the Trinity.

    Sorry but a) You do NOT understand the doctrine of the DS & have given an ambiguously ill defined version of it quite alien to Aquinas.

    I do understand the doctrine of divine simplicity. It is the absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever, because whatever is in God is identical to the divine essence, and allows no distinction, other than a logical and conceptual kind.

    b) You still identify the Persons as the absolute equivalent to the Attributes another naughty thing.

    In case you haven’t noticed, I actually have a deductive argument that demonstrates that claim. I’m not just asserting it in an ad hoc fashion. I’m taking logical and Thomist principles are using them to derive my conclusion. You claimed that the alleged distinction between RD1 and RD2 stops my argument, but as you can see in the above argument, it plays no role whatsoever, and all the work is done on the basis of the principle of identity and the principle of transitive identity, and the Thomist principles that the divine attributes and the divine relations are identical to the divine nature. Once you admit those premises, the conclusion deductively follows.

    BTW divine relations are the divine persons so these are interchangeable. But Person/relations and attributes are not.

    They are. Respond to the argument, other than by just rejecting the conclusion. Show where I go wrong in my argument. I’m genuinely interested.

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  71. But the nature of a real relation between Persons is such that it don't overthrow the DS. Since it is concieved as between the Persons/Relations not the Essence.

    Again, if there is a real distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence, then you have the bizarre conclusion that God is outside of God. After all, God is identical to the divine essence, which is identical to ipsum esse subsistens. If the divine persons are not identical to the divine nature, then they are distinct from it, and thus the divine persons are distinct from ipsum esse subsistens, and thus you have the absurd conclusion that God is distinct from God.

    Also, why does the real distinction between divine persons not negate divine simplicity, but the real distinction between divine attributes does negate divine simplicity? What is the difference between those real distinctions that would explain why they affect divine simplicity in a different way? It seems completely ad hoc to me. In other words, you just make an arbitrary distinction between RD1 and RD2 and say that the former would destroy simplicity, but the latter would not.

    That is like saying that ordinarily squareness1 would negate triangularity, but in the case of squareness2, triangularity is preserved. What is it about squareness2 that is different from squareness1 such that triangularity is preserved in the former, but not in the latter? Why, the sheer fact that triangularity is preserved in the former, but not in the latter! Can’t you see that this account is completely circular and ad hoc?

    BTW equating Relations with Attributes via theTransitive Principle of identify is the same mistake as equating Persons with Attributes.

    That would make sense, because both claims are based upon the same principle. If you accept that principle, which I assume that you must, because you have not rejected it throughout this discussion, then the conclusion deductively follows, irrespective of whether you like it or not, or whether it violates a core Christian dogma. If you want to preserve the Trinity as true, then you have to reject something else important. What do you want to reject?

    Nope. You're making the same mistakes & equivocations. You're now pretending that the divine relations are not the same as the Divine Persons & equating the relations with the attributes. It doesn't work. You can't critique Aquinas from just reading Questions 28 & 29 only. What you've written here violates everything I've ever read about the Trinity & as smart as you are dguller, I know more than you about doctrine.

    Ben, it’s easy. Which premises in my argument at May 1, 2013 at 5:56 AM are false? Choose which one to reject. I’m really interested here. And I’m not “pretending that the divine relations are not the same as the Divine persons”. They are the same, because everything in God is the same. That’s the problem!

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  72. Also, Aquinas says: “Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST 1.28.2). If the divine relations are distinct from the divine essence, then they are also not the divine essence, and thus would be “a creature”, which is absurd. That’s one of the reasons why he says “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2).

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  73. @dguller

    >I do understand the doctrine of divine simplicity. It is the absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever,....

    No it is not & Aquinas nowhere says that or argues it. Yes you read that concept into it but a plain reading of his words doesn't explicity mandate that interpretation & I can garentee no orthodox Catholic Thomist endorces your view or reading.

    >Ben, it’s easy. Which premises in my argument at May 1, 2013 at 5:56 AM are false?

    Did you even read my argument? I explicitly said 2,4 & 8 where wrong.

    Where does (ST 1.28.2) explicitly say or argue "There is an absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever"?

    Nowhere!


    It says "relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence" & "in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” but it doesn't say anywhere there is absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever in the sense that means One Person can't be Really distinct from another in God.

    Attributes can't be really distinct with other Attributes in God not Persons.

    The "Father being really distinct from the Son" is the same as God's essence. That type of real relation can be in the essence since it is between the Father & Son only not the essence.

    >You claimed that the alleged distinction between RD1 and RD2 stops my argument, but as you can see in the above argument, it plays no role whatsoever,

    dguller you CAN equate Persons with relations but you cannot equate Persons/relations with attributes!

    You insist on doing so & thus your whole argument is a straw man.

    You cannot equate the relations between Persons with the relations between attributes.

    That is the concept you are missing.

    >That is like saying that ordinarily squareness1 would negate triangularity, but in the case of squareness2, triangularity is preserved.


    Rather a pentagrahm negates a twelve sided object but in the case of a Dodecahedron both 5 sidedness and twelve sideness are preserved in one and the same thing since we are comparing a 2d object with a 3d one not 2d with 2d.

    You are comparing 2d logical relations in the DS with the real relations in a 3d Trinity.

    So your RD1 & RD2 distinction undermines your argument. It undermines you use of the Trinsitive Principle and it undermines you attempts to make a case against the Trinity using the doctrine of the DS.

    Sorry.

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  74. @dguller

    >>BTW divine relations are the divine persons so these are interchangeable. But Person/relations and attributes are not.

    >They are. Respond to the argument,

    No they are not.

    As you have already admitted you believe in effect the Person of the Word is just another divine attribute like the Divine Intellect & I already told you I reject that based on everything I have ever read about the Trinity from Catholic sources over 25 years or more. Just as I reject the understanding that the Incarnation is the changing of the unchangeable divine nature into a human nature. Whatever the incarnation is it is not that according to Catholic doctrine. Whatever a Divine Person is it is not a Divine Attribute. It is not that according to Catholic doctrine. We can talk coherently about what a Divine Will being an Attribute is & that the Divine Person of the Word has the Divine Will and is a Divine Will & even that the Divine Will is the Divine Person of the Word in essence. But can we coherently talk about the Divine Will having the attribute of the Divine Person of the Word? No that makes no logical sense thus the relationship between the Divine Person of the Word and the Divine Will can't be a logical one like let us say the Divine Will and the Divine Intellect since they are both divine attributes & thus comparable but the Word is a divine person and not comparable as an attribute.

    Conclusion: Divine relations are the divine persons so these are interchangeable. But Person/relations and attributes are not.

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  75. Ben:

    Did you even read my argument? I explicitly said 2,4 & 8 where wrong.

    So, you reject the following:

    (2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)

    (4) The distinction between the divine attributes is a logical distinction

    (8) The Trinity is true (by revelation)

    Are you sure? I think you’re still responding to my earlier argument. I’d appreciate your response to my most recent on at May 1, 2013 at 5:56 AM.

    It says "relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence" & "in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” but it doesn't say anywhere there is absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever in the sense that means One Person can't be Really distinct from another in God.

    Ben, this is really simple.

    If you accept the principle of transitive identity, then if the divine attributes are identical to the divine nature, the divine relations are identical to the divine nature, then the divine attributes are identical to the divine relations, and so if the divine attributes are logically distinct from one another, then the divine relations must also be logically distinct from one another, and thus cannot be really distinct from one another.

    dguller you CAN equate Persons with relations but you cannot equate Persons/relations with attributes!

    I have a deductive argument that purports to prove that very position, and argument that you refuse to actually engage in, other than by just rejecting the conclusion, and saying that it just can’t be true. Honestly, tell me which premises from my argument at May 1, 2013 at 5:56 AM that you reject.

    So your RD1 & RD2 distinction undermines your argument. It undermines you use of the Trinsitive Principle and it undermines you attempts to make a case against the Trinity using the doctrine of the DS.

    How? I don’t appeal to that distinction anywhere in my argument. It is completely irrelevant. Could you tell me what premises in my argument appeal to that distinction? I can’t see where I use it at all. And if it isn’t relevant to my argument, then how can it so severely undermine it?

    As you have already admitted you believe in effect the Person of the Word is just another divine attribute like the Divine Intellect & I already told you I reject that based on everything I have ever read about the Trinity from Catholic sources over 25 years or more.

    So, your response to my deductive argument is that the Catholic church rejects the conclusion? That’s it? Wow. I guess I can just reject all of Aquinas’ arguments, because my atheist intuitions and peers say it can’t be true. What a wonderful tool to use in future debates!

    But can we coherently talk about the Divine Will having the attribute of the Divine Person of the Word? No that makes no logical sense thus the relationship between the Divine Person of the Word and the Divine Will can't be a logical one like let us say the Divine Will and the Divine Intellect since they are both divine attributes & thus comparable but the Word is a divine person and not comparable as an attribute.

    This is very simple. Just tell me which premises and principles in my argument are false, please. No more hand waving and appeal to authority.

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  76. dguller if we can equate Persons with Attributes then which makes more sense?

    The Person of the Father has the attribute of Will.

    The divine will has the attribute of the Person of the Father.

    What is an "attribute of the Person of the Father"

    A person is a subject not an attribute.

    Your whole argument reduces to Subjects being Attributes.

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  77. >>Did you even read my argument? I explicitly said 2,4 & 8 where wrong.

    >So, you reject the following:

    (2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)

    No I rejected "2) God is simple if God lacks any real distinction" as an incorrect ambiguous formulation of the DS.

    Get with the program.

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  78. >This is very simple. Just tell me which premises and principles in my argument are false, please. No more hand waving and appeal to authority.

    The doctrine of the Trinity is from authority not philosophical argument!

    Oy vey it's like pulling teeth.

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  79. >So, your response to my deductive argument is that the Catholic church rejects the conclusion? That’s it? Wow. I guess I can just reject all of Aquinas’ arguments, because my atheist intuitions and peers say it can’t be true. What a wonderful tool to use in future debates!

    No you can reject your conclusion because your understanding of the Trinity, Aquinas and DS are not the Catholic understanding.

    Accept it.

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  80. No it is not & Aquinas nowhere says that or argues it.

    Aquinas: “He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple” (ST 1.11.4)

    Your whole argument reduces to Subjects being Attributes.

    And why is this more absurd than the claim that in God, essence = existence = intellect = will = power = goodness, such that they are all ultimately the same thing, but differ only in our conception of them? I’m open to bizarre conclusions on the basis of divine simplicity. Why aren’t you?

    Get with the program.

    I asked you to respond to my argument from earlier today, and you responded to my argument from yesterday. Please respond to my argument from today. Thanks.

    The doctrine of the Trinity is from authority not philosophical argument!

    First, you really don’t want to tell me which premises from my argument are wrong, do you? Why is this so hard?

    Second, I explicitly accounted for your claim in premise (8): “The Trinity is true (by revelation)”. So, how can you object to my argument on the basis of a claim that is part of the argument itself?

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  81. Ben:

    No you can reject your conclusion because your understanding of the Trinity, Aquinas and DS are not the Catholic understanding.

    Which premise in my argument violates “the Catholic understanding”? I understand that the conclusion does so, but which premises do so? Thanks.

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  82. You can disagree with our understanding & even one day argue against it. But you can't substitute your understanding for ours and call it ours.

    Our. is what counts. You have to debate the views we hold not the one you wish we held.

    BTW yes I caught that you meant another earlier list of arguments but I didn't address it I addressed your latest.

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  83. Ben:

    You can disagree with our understanding & even one day argue against it. But you can't substitute your understanding for ours and call it ours.

Our. is what counts. You have to debate the views we hold not the one you wish we held.

    What premises violate your Catholic understanding? Pick one, just one, and explain to me why any Catholic should reject it. If you cannot identify a false premise, and cannot find a fault in the logical deduction from those premises, then you must – on pain of logical contradiction – accept the conclusion. It really has come down to this.

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  84. Just to be helpful, here's the argument again:

    (1) X is identical to Y iff X is the same as Y iff X has everything in common with Y iff X has nothing different or distinct from Y (principle of identity)
    (2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)
    (3) The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature (by divine simplicity)
    (4) The distinction between the divine attributes is a logical distinction
    (5) The divine relations are identical to the divine nature (by ST 1.28.2, SCG 4.14)
    (6) The divine relations are identical to the divine attributes (by (2), (3), (5))
    (7) The distinction between the divine relations is a logical distinction (by (1), (4), (6))
    (8) The Trinity is true (by revelation)
    (9) If the Trinity is true, then the distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by ST 1.28.3)
    (10) The distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by (8), (9))
    (11) A distinction between X and Y cannot be a real distinction and a logical distinction at the same time
    (12) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (7) and (10) (by (7), (10), (11))

    What premises to you reject?

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  85. >Which premise in my argument violates “the Catholic understanding”? I understand that the conclusion does so, but which premises do so? Thanks.

    dguller you do realize by now at least, for example, the doctrine of the incarnation does not teach the Divine nature changes into a human, right? Because when you first argued against the Incarnation that was you assumption & it was wrong.

    How do you know you understanding of either the DS, Trinity, Attributes, Subjects, Persons is also the same as my understanding?

    How do you know that? Since it is plain to me you don't.

    I am not repeating myself at least not now. I have work to do.

    We will stop here till tonight & re-set.

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  86. Ben:

    I don't think you can identify any false premises or problems with my deductive reasoning, but you also don't want to accept the conclusion that the Trinity cannot possibly be true. I can appreciate how stuck you feel. I felt it many a time when discussing other matters at this website, but at some point, you just have to accept the argument's conclusion, much like I did with respect to the reality of teleology, formal and final causes, and other fundamentals of Thomist principles.

    Or, maybe I'm wrong, and you have identified something wrong with my premises and argument. But then why not just tell me, so that I can correct my understanding. Ultimately, what you have been arguing is that the conclusion of my argument violates Catholic doctrine, and thus must be rejected, but you cannot also reject any other premises, which means that you must be open to logically contradictory positions in your theology, which would kind of undermine all your theology, because one can prove anything on the basis of a logical contradiction.

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  87. >May 1, 2013 at 10:15 AM

    1 & 2 are still ambiguous and leave themselves open to equivocation & the argument still equates relations with attributes and I reject any such equivocations.

    Since Persons are relations and Persons are subjects but attributes are not relations nor subjects.

    A Person/relation is not an Attribute.

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  88. >I don't think you can identify any false premises or problems with my deductive reasoning.


    So when I say A Person/relation is not an Attribute & argue it May 1, 2013 at 9:49 AM I am just talking to the wall?

    You say in response to RD1 & RD2
    >That is like saying that ordinarily squareness1 would negate triangularity, but in the case of squareness2, triangularity is preserved.

    I respond:
    Rather a pentagrahm negates a twelve sided object but in the case of a Dodecahedron both 5 sidedness and twelve sideness are preserved in one and the same thing since we are comparing a 2d object with a 3d one not 2d with 2d.

    You are comparing 2d logical relations in the DS with the real relations in a 3d Trinity.

    Yet I am not arguing?

    I don't know what to say.

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  89. Ben:

    1 & 2 are still ambiguous and leave themselves open to equivocation

    What is equivocal about (1) and (2)? They are basic principles of logic. What are the different senses of the terms involved in (1) and (2) that would result in equivocation?

    & the argument still equates relations with attributes and I reject any such equivocations.

    That is a conclusion of a deductive argument. I can appreciate that you dislike the conclusion, but your dislike and refusal to accept it does not falsify it in the least. If your only objection is to fundamental principles of logic, then I’m afraid you’re not in a good position here. The law of identity and the law of transitive identity are quite clear here, and if you want to reject them, then so be it.

    So when I say A Person/relation is not an Attribute & argue it May 1, 2013 at 9:49 AM I am just talking to the wall?

    You are not arguing it, but just asserting it. I have provided an argument for why they necessarily must be identical, and you are just saying that I am wrong without explaining where my argument goes wrong. That’s not good enough, and you wouldn’t accept it from anyone else.

    So, just to be clear, the only premises that you reject in my argument are the law of identity and the law of transitive identity? All my other assumptions and premises are correct?

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  90. dguller, with all due respect, you are repeating yourself unnecessarily. It appears obvious to me that Ben doesn't understand your argument. You have done more than enough to make yourself clear. You don't have to be a "last word Johnny" here. Unless Ben or somebody else wants to actually engage your argument, your conclusion stands:

    The doctrine of the Trinity is rationally indefensible.

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  91. tonight I will answer

    May 1, 2013 at 10:15 AM

    Stand bye.

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  92. >You are not arguing it, but just asserting it.

    I can play this game.

    Where am I just asserting it and not arguing it?

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  93. Anonymous:

    I appreciate your feedback. We'll see what Ben says tonight, and whether it is worth replying to.

    Ben:

    Just to be clear, the only thing that I will respond to is either (a) a clear statement of which premises of my argument that you reject and an explanation of why, and/or (b) an explanation of how my argument is formally invalid from a deductive standpoint. If you just keep asserting that my conclusion must be false for Catholicism to be true, then I will not respond, because Anonymous is correct that it is a waste of time to continue, because you have already accepted that nothing could possibly change your mind, including a deductively sound argument.

    I look forward to what you will post tonight.

    Take care.

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  94. >Just to be clear, the only thing that I will respond to is either (a) a clear statement of which premises of my argument that you reject and an explanation of why, and/or (b) an explanation of how my argument is formally invalid from a deductive standpoint

    I did that here May 1, 2013 at 12:55 AM & you failed to answer & I made a lot of argument you completely ignored, skipped over or just asserted where wrong.

    So how about some common courtesy?

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  95. @dguller

    >>No it is not & Aquinas nowhere says that or argues it.


    >Aquinas: “He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple” (ST 1.11.4)


    Where here in (ST 1.11.4)is Aquinas arguing that there can be no divisions in Persons? He is merely saying God is pure Act and contains no potency.


    I wasresponding to (ST 1.28.2) & said It says "relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence" & "in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” but it doesn't say anywhere there is absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever in the sense that means One Person can't be Really distinct from another in God.

    Where in (ST 1.11.4) does it say or is it argued & concluded "there is absence of any kind of real distinction whatsoever in the sense that means One Person can't be Really distinct from another in God?"

    Where is your "a) a clear statement of which premises of my argument that you reject and an explanation of why, and/or (b) an explanation of how my argument is formally invalid from a deductive standpoint"?


    You are not being fair.

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  97. > the only thing that I will respond to is either (a) a clear statement of which premises of my argument that you reject and an explanation of why, and/or

    I have done that a few times but you ignored it & you have not returned the favor!

    It's a comments box dguller. Brevity is the soul of whit.

    >b) an explanation of how my argument is formally invalid from a deductive standpoint.

    The problem with this phony demand is you can by valid deductive argument, argue that if the Incarnation is a change of the divine nature to a human nature it violates the divine immutability.

    But the fact remains that is still not the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation.

    >If you just keep asserting that my conclusion must be false for Catholicism to be true, then I will not respond,

    So what you are telling me is you claim an unlimited right to construct any staw man you like at will?

    No dice!

    >because Anonymous is correct that it is a waste of time to continue, because you have already accepted that nothing could possibly change your mind, including a deductively sound argument.

    But as I already explained in this very post above a deductively sound argument has no meaning if your understanding of the argumentative warrant is wrong.

    The incarnation is not A. So it doesn't matter if A=B & B=C then A=c.

    >I look forward to what you will post tonight.

    I will give it one more shot you are very obstinate here & your arguments have not been sound in spite of what your cheerleader thinks with all due respect to him or her.

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  98. Ben:

    This is actually pretty simple. For an argument to be sound, it requires (a) true premises, and (b) deductive validity. If you want to refute my argument, then you must either show that the premises are false, and/or show that the formal structure of my argument is deductively invalid.

    The only premises that you have rejected are the law of identity and the law of transitive identity. You reject them, because you claim that my explication of them is ambiguous and equivocal. I asked you to specify where I have equivocated and where my language is ambiguous. You have not done so, which makes me wonder if you actually have any such explanation at all. And without such an explanation, I’m afraid that you are rejecting perfectly valid logical principles for no good reason whatsoever, and your accusations of ambiguity and equivocation are bluffs.

    Other than that, you have done nothing but declare my conclusions false on the basis of the infallibility of the Catholic Church, as well as huff and puff about how you’ve already answered my argument without being able to specify exactly what your answers are or where you have written them.

    It’s pretty clear that you cannot directly engage in my argument, either because you simply do not understand it, as Anonymous has stated, or because you do understand it, and are being willfully obfuscating and blowing nothing much smoke my way, because you simply cannot directly respond to it. In either case, this is clearly a waste of time, and so unless your next comment clearly identifies which premises in my argument are false, and/or how my argument is deductively invalid, I will withdraw from this discussion.

    So, will you directly engage the argument, or is it to be more smoke and mirrors, huffing and puffing, and bold accusations of Catholic heterodoxy?

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  99. >This is actually pretty simple. For an argument to be sound, it requires (a) true premises, and (b) deductive validity. If you want to refute my argument, then you must either show that the premises are false, and/or show that the formal structure of my argument is deductively invalid.

    I have done this you have simply ignored & or dismissed it.

    >The only premises that you have rejected are the law of identity and the law of transitive identity.

    I accept both principles & have accepted them & have explain why your application of them does not apply.

    >You reject them, because you claim that my explication of them is ambiguous and equivocal.

    How does it logically follow I reject both principles just because I believe you misused them?

    >I’m afraid that you are rejecting perfectly valid logical principles for no good reason whatsoever, and your accusations of ambiguity and equivocation are bluffs.

    You have not established I reject these principles merely because I believe you misused & misapplied them.
    At best you can say I have not shown you misused & misapplied these principles either at all or too your satisfaction them but you can't then logically say I reject them.


    Other than that, you have done nothing but declare my conclusions false on the basis of the infallibility of the Catholic Church, as well as huff and puff about how you’ve already answered my argument without being able to specify exactly what your answers are or where you have written them.

    My claim is modest. You have not given me the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. You have either attacked the heresy of Tri-Theism by asserting Sabellianism or attacked the heresy of Sabellianism by asserting Tri-tehism. But you have not addressed the Trinity.

    >t’s pretty clear that you cannot directly engage in my argument, either because you simply do not understand it,

    I do understand it. You believe a Person is some type of Attribute.
    You have treated what a Person is in essence as if it where the same thing as what an Attribute is in essence.

    A Person is not the same as an Attribute & you have not proven otherwise.

    >Anonymous has stated, or because you do understand it, and are being willfully obfuscating and blowing nothing much smoke my way,

    I no more care what he thinks then you cared I thought Rank Sophist had the better argument over you.

    >because you simply cannot directly respond to it. In either case, this is clearly a waste of time, and so unless your next comment clearly identifies which premises in my argument are false, and/or how my argument is deductively invalid, I will withdraw from this discussion.

    dguller in May 1, 2013 at 11:19 AM I did specifically address one of your arguments you made in May 1, 2013 at 10:10 AM.

    What is your response? Silence or charges that I am "just making assertions".

    Also I have been gushing at you to try to make this discussion friendly and light. Do I get any friendly praise back? Where is the love?

    I have read the whole argument over and I am confident it is spoo.

    Tonight I will argue in detail why & where you when wrong.

    Thought the fact you think I reject the two Principles merely because I think you have misused them doesn't fill me with confidence.

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  101. Ben:

    I have done this you have simply ignored & or dismissed it.

    Ben, can you just tell me what premises you reject? Don’t tell me that you already have. It should be easy. Just say, “dguller, I reject premises …” and then just list them. No problem.

    I accept both principles & have accepted them & have explain why your application of them does not apply.

    You said that they do not apply, because they are ambiguous and equivocal. I asked you to explain how they are ambiguous and equivocal, and you have not explained this yet. Could you please explain how my explication of the law of identity and the law of transitive identity are ambiguous and equivocal?

    My claim is modest. You have not given me the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. You have either attacked the heresy of Tri-Theism by asserting Sabellianism or attacked the heresy of Sabellianism by asserting Tri-tehism. But you have not addressed the Trinity.

    I believe that I have shown that it is logically impossible for there to be real relations in the Trinity on the basis of Thomist principles. At most, there can be logical relations in the Trinity, but that is not the Trinity at all, which means that the Trinity is false.

    A Person is not the same as an Attribute & you have not proven otherwise.

    I have proven it in my argument:

    “(2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)

    (3) The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature (by divine simplicity)

    (4) The distinction between the divine attributes is a logical distinction

    (5) The divine relations are identical to the divine nature (by ST 1.28.2, SCG 4.14)

    (6) The divine relations are identical to the divine attributes (by (2), (3), (5))”

    Please explain to me how (6) does not follow from (2) to (5).

    dguller in May 1, 2013 at 11:19 AM I did specifically address one of your arguments you made in May 1, 2013 at 10:10 AM.

    Let’s look at what you wrote at 11:19 AM. In that comment, you responded to my comments about divine simplicity necessarily meaning the absence of real distinction. That is fine, except that that has nothing to do with my argument at 10:10 AM. It is irrelevant. You have not pointed to anywhere in that argument where I require the strong claim that divine simplicity negates all forms of real distinction. In fact, my argument does not require that claim at all, and proceeds without it, and so even if I am wrong about that claim, then my argument is not affected in the least.

    Tonight I will argue in detail why & where you when wrong.

    I’m looking forward to it.

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  102. Here is a foretaste.


    >>But the nature of a real relation between Persons is such that it don't overthrow the DS. Since it is concieved as between the Persons/Relations not the Essence.

    > A=Again, if there is a real distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence, then you have the bizarre conclusion that God is outside of God.

    1)The Real Relation is for example "the Father begets the Son".

    2)In reference to the Divine Essence. "the Father begets the Son" is logically what God is in essence & thus there is a logical relation between "the Father begets the Son" and what is the Divine Essence.

    3)To say "Father begets the Son" is not What God is in the Divine Essence, is what it would be for there to be a real relation between the Divine Persons and Divine Essence and thus be outside of God.

    4) Because of 1,2 & 3, A is False since a real distinction between really relating divine persons is not equivalent to divine person having a real relation to the divine essence and thus violating the DS.

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  103. >You have not pointed to anywhere in that argument where I require the strong claim that divine simplicity negates all forms of real distinction.

    If you are in fact not making that argument then how are you arguing against the Trinity? Since it requires such a strong claim of divine simplicity?

    This will not end well.

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  104. 2)In reference to the Divine Essence. "the Father begets the Son" is logically what God is in essence & thus there is a logical relation between "the Father begets the Son" and what is the Divine Essence.

    What does it mean to say that the divine relation is logically related to the divine essence? What is the logical relation? According to Aquinas, the logical relation is that of identity such that the divine relation is identical to the divine essence. But perhaps you mean a different logical relation, and if so, then I’m very curious what logical relation you are referring to.

    3)To say "Father begets the Son" is not What God is in the Divine Essence, is what it would be for there to be a real relation between the Divine Persons and Divine Essence and thus be outside of God.

    No. To say that the divine relation is really distinct from the divine essence means that they are not identical in reality. Otherwise, there would be a logical distinction between the divine relation and the divine essence, not a real distinction. Since Aquinas has stated that “[e]verything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST 1.28.2), it would follow that the divine relation is a creature, which would mean that the persons of the Trinity are creatures, and thus cannot possibly be God. Furthermore, since the divine essence is identical to ipsum esse subsistens, which is identical to God himself, it would follow that the divine relation, being really distinct from God himself, is not identical to God himself. And if the divine relation is God, then the conclusion would be that God is not God himself, which is absurd. Those are some of the reasons why Aquinas says “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2).

    If you are in fact not making that argument then how are you arguing against the Trinity? Since it requires such a strong claim of divine simplicity?

    Where in my recent argument do I cite such a strong claim? It is irrelevant to my argument from earlier this morning. Honestly, Ben, unless you can show me where in my argument I rely upon that strong claim as a premise, just give up the idea that refuting this strong claim necessarily refutes my argument.

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  105. 2)In reference to the Divine Essence. "the Father begets the Son" is logically what God is in essence & thus there is a logical relation between "the Father begets the Son" and what is the Divine Essence.

    Also, you chastised me earlier for using philosophical logic upon the Trinity, because it is not known by natural reason, and only by revelation. And yet now you are claiming that “there is a logical relation” between the divine relations and the divine essence. Well, if there is a logical relation, then presumably reason could follow the logical implications from the divine essence to the divine relations, meaning that one can use natural reason to know the Trinity of divine persons after all!

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  106. >What does it mean to say that the divine relation is logically related to the divine essence?

    Law of Identity: "Whatever is A is A and not~A" What-ever is God is God and has God's essence things that have the same essence are the same thing,

    Example: The Father is what God is and has God's essence. The Word is what God is and has God's essence. The Word & the Father are what each other are in essence & identical in essence. The Father is what the Son is. If I want to make a logical comparison between Persons & Attributes in essence I must say The Divine Persons of The Word & the Father & the Attribute of the Divine Will are what each other are in essence & identical in essence. Simply put The Word is what the Divine Intellect is whatThe Farther is what God is. All of these are what God is

    >What is the logical relation? According to Aquinas, the logical relation is that of identity such that the divine relation is identical to the divine essence.

    Which I just endured above and I enforce the Persons are identical to the Attributes in essence in that what the Person are is what the attributes are in that they are all God and in essence only logically distinct.

    >But perhaps you mean a different logical relation, and if so, then I’m very curious what logical relation you are referring to.

    Clearly I don't based on what I just now plainly said.

    To say "Father begets the Son" is not What God is in the Divine Essence, is what it would be for there to be a real relation between the Divine Persons and Divine Essence and thus be outside of God.

    duller says: No. To say that the divine relation is really distinct from the divine essence means that they are not identical in reality.

    I reply: Question: What is the difference if any between being identical or not in "reality" vs being identical or not in "essence"? Assuming for the sake of argument they are not alike in "really" then what "reality" are we talking about? Could it be the "reality" of being God or not? In which case you just said what I just said because saying "Father begets the Son" is not What God is in the Divine Essence," is no different then saying "the divine relation is really distinct from the divine essence since saying that affirms a real relation in that it affirms a real distinction between Divine Persons/"Father Begets the Son" and the divine essence or reality and says the subject "Divine Persons/`Father Begets the Son'" is not really God and thus is distinct from God and therefore a creature.

    The rest of what you have written is predicated on the idea that I deny the Persons have logical relations to the essence & as I have said above I do not.

    But as interesting as it is for me to clarify for you what I mean and how I do in fact believe there is a logical relation between the Persons and the Essence this has little to do with the claims of the Trinity.

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  107. >Where in my recent argument do I cite such a strong claim?

    In my response I meant to take you at your word and turned it around & to express my belief you need a stronger claim of what the Divine Simplicity is then enforced by Aquinas in Summa up to Q26 in order to deny the Trinity.
    But we will deal with that in your so called "argument" Stand by.

    >Also, you chastised me earlier for using philosophical logic upon the Trinity, because it is not known by natural reason, and only by revelation.

    dguller I used a sarcastic analogy very early in this whole mess about how there is no philosophical argument you can use to conclude God is a Trinity(i.e. Whatever is moved, moved by another blah blah God is a Trinity) but I then went on to explain you can used the terms of philosophical theology to explain the particulars of how the Persons operate in the Godhead.

    >And yet now you are claiming that “there is a logical relation” between the divine relations and the divine essence. Well, if there is a logical relation, then presumably reason could follow the logical implications from the divine essence to the divine relations,

    Yes you can using natural reason know the Persons are what God is but you still cannot use natural reason to know there are Persons in God only Divine Revelation can tell you there are Divine Persons in God.

    > meaning that one can use natural reason to know the Trinity of divine persons after all!

    Natural Reason can tell me (after having been informed by Revelation of the existence of Persons in God) The Person of the Father is what the Person of the Son is in essence given the naturally knowable premise what-ever is in the Divine Essence is God. & (when compared to a Divine Attribute) is what the Divine Intellect is and all of them are the Divine essence & thus are God.

    But the Trinity is the belief that there are Three really distinct Persons in God & this means Who the Father is, is not Who the Son is Who is not Who the Holy Spirit is etc...as Persons only.

    But what all Three Persons are in essence is the One Simple Divine Essence. the One God, & or God.

    Natural reason cannot tell me what is really means to be for example The Father Who is not the same Person as the Son but is in brute fact what the Son is in essence and thus is the One God.

    If I accept by revelation that what is stated above exists & that the predicates expressed there are true that is all I can do and can make no definitive assertion of identity beyond that for the rest is Mystery.

    NOW STAND BACK THE NEXT POST WILL DEAL WITH YOUR ARGUMENT.

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  108. And here’s another thing to keep in mind.

    Look at what Aquinas says about being and goodness. He writes that “Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea”. How do they “differ only in idea”? Because “goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present” (ST 1.5.1). So, although being and goodness are actually identical in reality, they differ in our conception of them such that our conception of goodness has “the aspect of desireableness”, which is absent from our conception of being.

    He applies the same idea to divine relation and the divine essence. He writes that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). What this means is that the divine relations and the divine essence are “really the same”, “do not differ from one another”, and “are one and the same”, but they differ in their “mode of intelligibility”, which is exactly like how being and goodness differ “only in idea”. And how do our conceptions of divine relations differ from our conception of divine essence? Our idea of divine relations includes the concept of “its opposite” (e.g. fatherhood pointing towards filiation) whereas our idea of divine essence lacks such a concept. It would appear on this analysis that the distinction between the divine persons, if it is analogous to the transcendentals, must be logical and not real, especially since his accounts of both are so similar in important respects.

    And to Aquinas’ credit he anticipates this very objection in objection 1 at ST 1.28.3: “It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.” That is my argument in a nutshell.

    How does Aquinas refute this argument?

    He says that “whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other”, which is basically the law of transitive identity. However, he adds a restriction to when the law of transitive identity is applicable. Say that A is identical to B and C is identical to B. A can only be identical to C if “the identity be real and logical”, but not if “they differ logically”. So, the key distinction here is whether there is logical identity or logical difference. When the former occurs, then the law of transitive identity is operative, and when the latter occurs, then the law of transitive identity is inoperative. The problem is that he does not state what is supposed to be identical to what, nor what is supposed to be different from what.

    Perhaps looking at his examples would be helpful.

    As an example of “the identity” being “real and logical”, he cites a garment and a tunic. This is a terrible example, because “garment” is a broader category than “tunic”, because “garment” just means “an item of clothing”, and not all items of clothing are tunics. So, there is neither real nor logical identity between garments and tunics. But that is hardly important.

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  109. As an example of two things that “differ logically”, he cites action and passion. He claims that “action is the same as motion, and likewise passion”, meaning that action is identical to motion, and passion is identical to motion, which is true, because any motion necessarily involves both action and passion, i.e. an actual agent causing the transition from potency to actuality in a receiver. However, because action has different features than passion, action cannot be identical to passion, even though they both occur simultaneously in all motion. Therefore, although both action and passion are really identical in all motion, they are logically distinct from one another by virtue of their different aspects.

    So, with regards to his distinction earlier between logical identity and logical difference, it seems that the relation would be between A (e.g. action) and C (e.g. passion), both of which are identical to B (e.g. motion). That means that if A is logically identical to C, then the law of transitive identity is applicable, but if A is logically distinct from C, then the law of transitive identity is inapplicable. One big problem with this account is that if the law of transitive identity is inapplicable if there is a logical distinction, then that destroys the doctrine of transcendentals, such that we cannot say that goodness is identical to being, because they are logically distinct, and thus the law of transitive identity does not apply, and without it, there is no basis upon which one can argue that the transcendentals are all really identical, despite being logically distinct.

    He then uses this analysis to justify the real distinction between paternity and filiation, which you can tell, because he says “likewise”. He writes that “although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.” Just as action and passion are “really the same as” motion, and yet are logically distinct from one another, it follows that even though paternity and filiation are “really the same as the divine essence”, they are logically distinct from one another.

    Two points to note here.

    First, it does not follow that the divine relations are really distinct from one another, on the basis of this analysis, because if the relationship between the divine relations and the divine essence is analogous to the relationship between action/passion and motion, then they must be logically distinct and not really distinct. So, this analysis does not help Aquinas at all.

    Second, and more significantly, recall that Aquinas wants to deny the applicability of the law of transitive identity with respect to the divine relations, because if the law of transitive relations is applicable, then the divine relations cannot be really distinct from one another, but rather are really identical, but logically distinct, much like the transcendentals. However, the only way for the law of transitive relations to be inapplicable is if the divine relations are logically distinct, i.e. “differ logically”! In other words, the only way to avoid logical distinction by avoiding the law of transitive identity is to presuppose logical distinction in the first place. Here is another way of stating this problem: if the law of transitive identity applies, then the distinction must be logical, and if the law of transitive identity does not apply, then the distinction must be logical. Either way, according to Aquinas’ own account, the distinction must be logical.

    So, his response to my objection, which is nicely summarized in objection 1, is completely inadequate on a number of levels, and actually totally undermines his own position.

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  110. Which I just endured above and I enforce the Persons are identical to the Attributes in essence in that what the Person are is what the attributes are in that they are all God and in essence only logically distinct.

    But in God, there is no distinction between his essence and anything else, because Aquinas says that anything that is not identical to the divine essence is a creature, and thus if the divine persons are not identical to the divine essence, then they are creatures and cannot possibly be God. And if the divine persons are identical to the divine essence, then the divine persons must be identical to the divine attributes by virtue of the law of transitive identity, and since the divine attributes are logically distinct, the divine persons must also be logically distinct. After all, the divine attributes are identical to the divine persons, and thus must not be different in any way.

    Question: What is the difference if any between being identical or not in "reality" vs being identical or not in "essence"?

    With regards to creatures, two beings can be different in reality, but identical in essence, but that is only because there is a real distinction between essence and existence. In God, where there is no such distinction, everything is identical and the same, and thus what is the same in essence is the same in reality.

    Assuming for the sake of argument they are not alike in "really" then what "reality" are we talking about? Could it be the "reality" of being God or not? In which case you just said what I just said because saying "Father begets the Son" is not What God is in the Divine Essence," is no different then saying "the divine relation is really distinct from the divine essence since saying that affirms a real relation in that it affirms a real distinction between Divine Persons/"Father Begets the Son" and the divine essence or reality and says the subject "Divine Persons/`Father Begets the Son'" is not really God and thus is distinct from God and therefore a creature.

    If the divine relation is not the divine essence, then you are correct that there is a real distinction between the divine relation and the divine essence, but it comes at the cost of necessarily implying that the divine relation cannot be God, but rather must be a creature. It further has the implication that the divine persons are really distinct from ipsum esse subsistens, which is identical to God himself, and thus the divine persons are not identical to God himself who is identical to his essence. It seems that you agree with this when you write that the divine persons “is not really God and thus is distinct from God and therefore a creature”. Are you really destroy the Trinity in order to save it?

    NOW STAND BACK THE NEXT POST WILL DEAL WITH YOUR ARGUMENT.

    Yay.

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  111. Anonymous: It is for the reasons that you've elucidated that I've come to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity is rationally indefensible.

    Not at all. It can be defended with very simple and straightforward reason:

    (1) If God says something, then it's true.
    (2) God says He's a Trinity.
    (3) Therefore the doctrine of the Trinity is true.

    You can't get more reasonable than (1). Of course, (2) is not so obvious; reasonable men may disagree on this point. However, there are rational defences for that as well: I don't know anyone who came to believe in the Trinity by direct philosophical argumentation, but there are many people who believe in God because the arguments can be rationally defended, and who believe in Christianity likewise. And if you accept Christianity in other respects, then that gives you good reason to believe in this particular claim which comes along with the rest.

    Now that obviously is not to say that we can't inquire into the direct philosophical reasoning. Dguller is certainly not nuts for asking these perfectly legitimate questions, and it is good to study them as far as we can manage. But it's not as though human beings could ever expect to understand God fully regardless. And if the indirect argument doesn't work for you, say, because you don't believe God even exists, then it's a moot point anyway.

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  112. Mr. Green,

    You think that the doctrine of the Trinity is rationally defensible and offer the following as proof:

    (1) If God says something, then it's true.
    (2) God says He's a Trinity.
    (3) Therefore the doctrine of the Trinity is true.


    Sorry, but that doesn't work and demonstrates that you don't at all understand what I was saying.

    Let's modify your "defense"--

    a) If God says something, then it's true.
    b) God says that logical contradictions are true.
    c) Therefore, logical contradictions are true.

    dguller's arguments are not new. They are standard objections to the doctrine of the Trinity. The term "Trinity," in order to be accepted by rational persons, must be defined in a logically coherent manner. Since it is not logically coherent, rational persons should not accept it. One can object that said doctrine comes by revelation, but once revelation is bestowed, it is either understood in some coherent fashion or it is not. If the former, then what part is coherent? If the latter, then just simply say that it is beyond the realm of reason and quit trying to logically defend something that cannot be logically defended.

    As you note, rational persons may argue whether or not God ever stated that the doctrine of the Trinity is true, but that isn't the ultimate issue. As Bill Vallicella stated, one has to know what one is affirming before it can be affirmed. As the above discussion demonstrates, the affirmations of said doctrine directly contradict the DDS.

    By the way, I am not an atheist.

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  113. MY RESPONSE TO DGULLER May 1, 2013 at 10:15 AM

    >(1) X is identical to Y iff X is the same as Y iff X has everything in common with Y iff X has nothing different or distinct from Y (principle of identity)

    I reply: If I might expand on this by citing the Wiki QUOTE"In logic, the law of identity is the first of the three classical laws of thought. It states that: “each thing is the same with itself and different from another”: “A is A and not ~A”. By this it is meant that each thing (be it a universal or a particular) comprises it own unique set of characteristic qualities or features, which the ancient Greeks called its essence. Consequently, things that have the same essence are the same thing, while things that have different essences are different things.[1]In its symbolic representation:(“A is A”), the first element of the proposition represents the subject (thing) and the second element, the predicate (its essence), with the copula “is” signifying the relation of “identity”.[2] Further, since a definition is an expression of the essence of that thing with which the linguistic term is associated, it follows that it is through its definition that the identity of a thing is established.[3]

    Accepted! Practical expression: Therefore What-ever is God is God.
    Or we might say What-ever is God is God in essence. We can also say Who-ever is God is what God is in essence.

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  114. >(2) If A is identical to B and C is identical to B, then A is identical to C (principle of transitive identity)

    I reply: Practical expression if the Word is God(A) & the Divine Intellect is God(B) then both the Word and the Divine Intellect are whatthe other are (C)which is God. Accepted!

    > (3) The divine attributes are identical to the divine nature (by divine simplicity)

    Practical Expression: As an attribute in God; The Divine Will is identical to whatthe Intellect is by nature. Accepted.

    >(4) The distinction between the divine attributes is a logical distinction

    Practical expression. Because their relationship is what to what it is proper to predicate the Divine intellect is the Divine Will in God in that they are what the other is in essence. Accepted

    >(5) The divine relations are identical to the divine nature (by ST 1.28.2, SCG 4.14)

    Practical expression:The Father is God, The Word is God & The Spirit is God.
    Father,Son & Holy Spirit together are God & each by themselves or all together are what the divine essence is and thus are God or are identical in essence. Accepted.

    (6) The divine relations are identical to the divine attributes (by (2), (3), (5))

    Practical expression:If so (by (2), (3), (5)) then the divine relations are identical to the attributes in that both are what the other are which is God and what-ever is God is God in essence. Accepted.

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  115. (7) The distinction between the divine relations is a logical distinction (by (1), (4), (6))

    It is unstated & unclear how (4) mandates a logical distinction between relations since it refers to attributes not to relations/persons. Thus (4) is
    rejected as a justification for (7)

    By (1) &(6) Practical expression: duller says in May 1, 2013 at 3:52 PM QUOTE"According to Aquinas, the logical relation is that of identity such that the divine relation is identical to the divine essence. "END thus each individual divine relation toward another individual divine relation shares the same identify of having the same divine essence. Since whatever is God is God in Essence Thus the Practical expression which replies to (5) obtains here. Accepted (1)(6) and further clarification given May 1, 2013 at 3:52 PM Technically accepted overall (4) as justification for (7) rejected for reasons already stated.

    For Practical purposes: Accepted sans (4) as a justification for (7)

    >(8) The Trinity is true (by revelation)

    BenYachov explanation of the Trinity in
    May 1, 2013 at 6:53 PM obtains here. Accepted

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  116. >(9) If the Trinity is true, then the distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by ST 1.28.3)

    Practical Application:But the Trinity is the belief that there are Three really distinct Persons in God & this means Who the Father is, is not Who the Son is Who is not Who the Holy Spirit is etc…as Persons to Persons only. Aquinas cites Boethius in ST 1.28.3 the substance contains the unity and relation multiplies the Trinity. So as in God there is a real relation but according to ST1.28.1, Aquinas goes on to say "The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is relative." Thus the reality of the relation is between the Persons only and the reality consists of predicating that one named Person is not another named Person as Persons compared to one another but not as one person may be compared to another by essence the later being a logical comparison of Persons the former a real one. Aquinas argues in ST1.28.3 reply to Obj 1 that a relational identity may be both real and logical such as a tunic & a garment.
    Accepted.

    >(10) The distinction between the divine relations is a real distinction (by (8), (9))

    Practical Application: In so much that One Divine Person is not Another Divine Person in the nature of being opposing Divine Persons there is a real distinction between said Divine Persons. In so much as one Divine Persons is compared to another in being identical in essence to another Person the distinction between them is not real &is logical only. The Predication that compares Person to Person logically is the essence. The predication that compares Person to Person in reality is Personhood. Accepted.

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  117. >(11) A distinction between X and Y cannot be a real distinction and a logical distinction at the same time.

    Rejected. They can if there is more then one distinction between X and Y
    under two different predicates that have one reality in common via real distinction and another reality in common via logical distinction.

    For example the Father is God & the Son is God. Both are God & the Father can logically be said to be what the Son is because they are both identical in essence. duller said "According to Aquinas, the logical relation is that of identity such that the divine relation is identical to the divine essence." Both are identical in essence both are logically related.

    However the Divine Person of the Father is not logically the Same Divine Person as the Son as cited in the responses to (8) and (9). Divine Persons are not really identical to other divine Persons as Persons & thus have a real relation one to another in opposition.

    Practical example: The Father is not who the Son is as a Divine Person. The Father is what the Son is in essence. Thus between the Father(X) and Son(Y) there is a real and logical relation at the same time. Note "same time" is a figure of speech since there is no time in God- SCG BK 15 but we can substitute Time with Reality.

    Simple formula. The Father is God. The Son is God. Both are God. The Father is not the same Divine Person as the Son even though both are God in having the same identical essence.

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  118. >(12) Therefore, there is a contradiction between (7) and (10) (by (7), (10), (11))

    Rejected. Since (11) is not correct as explained in my response therein and as per my responses to (10) & (7) neither lead to the conclusion of (12).

    Practical observation: Premises 1-7 establish clearly that whatever is identical to the essence of God is God by nature & in the divine essence there is no real distinctions between different divine realities identified as being identical to the divine essence and one can safely conclude all the divine realities(Persons. Relations Attributes) identified as God by essence are logically distinct per .

    Premises (8) threw (10) show that Divine Persons are really distinct from other Divine Persons & offer no arguments from this conclusion to deny that realities (Divine - Persons, Relations, Attributes) identified as God by essence are logically distinct. Nor do they offer arguments that lead to the conclusions of (11) & (12)

    >What premises to you reject?

    I reject premises (11) and (12) see my responses.

    Overall Conclusion. Wither the Trinity is true or not and or wither there really is a contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity or not, dguller's argument cannot in my rational judgment and for reasons stated there in lead to the conclusion there is a contradiction in the Trinity. No Thomist Principles referenced in the arguments was shown to lead to that conclusion & a case can be made it show the opposite IMHO.

    END.

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  119. Ben:

    (6) The divine relations are identical to the divine attributes (by (2), (3), (5)) 

Practical expression:If so (by (2), (3), (5)) then the divine relations are identical to the attributes in that both are what the other are which is God and what-ever is God is God in essence. Accepted.

    Wrong. If the divine relations are identical to the divine attributes, then the divine relations cannot be different or distinct from the divine attributes in any way. If they are different or distinct, then the relation is not one of identity, but rather one of similarity. So, if you want to say that the divine relations are partly identical to the divine attributes in that they all have the same divine essence, but the divine relations are partly different in that the divine relations are different instantiations of the divine essence, then you no longer have a relation of identity at all, which violates (1), which you said you accepted.

    (7) The distinction between the divine relations is a logical distinction (by (1), (4), (6)) 

It is unstated & unclear how (4) mandates a logical distinction between relations since it refers to attributes not to relations/persons. Thus (4) is 
rejected as a justification for (7)

    It is quite clear, and based upon the fact that there is a logical relation of identity between divine relations and divine attributes, and if X is identical to Y, then there can be no differences between them. If the divine relations are really distinct while the divine attributes are logically distinct, then there is a difference between them in terms of a difference of kinds of distinction, which means that they cannot be identical, which violates (6), which you said you accepted.

    By (1) &(6) Practical expression: duller says in May 1, 2013 at 3:52 PM QUOTE"According to Aquinas, the logical relation is that of identity such that the divine relation is identical to the divine essence. "END thus each individual divine relation toward another individual divine relation shares the same identify of having the same divine essence. Since whatever is God is God in Essence Thus the Practical expression which replies to (5) obtains here. Accepted (1)(6) and further clarification given May 1, 2013 at 3:52 PM Technically accepted overall (4) as justification for (7) rejected for reasons already stated.

    No. You and I have the same essence, but we are not identical. I am not you. You are not me. We are unique individuals. Neither of us is identical to our essence, because we are a conjunction of that essence and its actual instantiation in existence. At most, we are similar to one another, i.e. partly identical in that we have a shared human nature and partly different in that the instantiation of that share human nature occurs in a different region of space-time. You are equivocating between identity and similarity. Furthermore, similarity is only possible in composite entities, because of the necessity of partial identity and partial difference. Similarity is impossible for a metaphysically simple being, such as God. In God, there is no distinction between what he is and who he is, because that would presume a distinction between his essence and his existence, which are identical.

    Aquinas argues in ST1.28.3 reply to Obj 1 that a relational identity may be both real and logical such as a tunic & a garment.

    I’ve already written about Aquinas’ response to that objection, and how it is completely inadequate, which means that the objection stands.

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  120. In so much that One Divine Person is not Another Divine Person in the nature of being opposing Divine Persons there is a real distinction between said Divine Persons. In so much as one Divine Persons is compared to another in being identical in essence to another Person the distinction between them is not real &is logical only. The Predication that compares Person to Person logically is the essence. The predication that compares Person to Person in reality is Personhood. Accepted.

    Again, you are equivocating between identity and similarity.

    Rejected. They can if there is more then one distinction between X and Y
under two different predicates that have one reality in common via real distinction and another reality in common via logical distinction.

    First, that would mean that X and Y are not identical, but rather are similar. However, if X is identical to Y, then they cannot differ in terms of predicates, or else X is not identical to Y at all, which violates (1) and (6), both of which you claim to accept.

    Second, if you want to say that the divine relations are partly identical and partly different from one another, then you have introduced composition into God, which is impossible, given divine simplicity. You can say that the parts are only logically distinct, and still preserve divine simplicity, because the composition is a projection of our minds, but once you say that the parts are really distinct, then you have compromised divine simplicity.

    Third, I don’t see how this doesn’t lead to the conclusion that there are three separate Gods, each sharing a common divine nature, but instantiating it in really distinct ways. It would be like there being three human beings, each sharing a common nature, but expressing it in really distinct ways. And that would mean that polytheism is true.

    However the Divine Person of the Father is not logically the Same Divine Person as the Son as cited in the responses to (8) and (9). Divine Persons are not really identical to other divine Persons as Persons & thus have a real relation one to another in opposition.

    Then that violates (6).

    So, your objection to my argument is to simply equivocate between identity and similarity, which necessarily ends up smuggling composition of some kind into God.

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  121. How does Aquinas refute this argument?

    1)Well for one thing when he is answering here doesn't just skip over "On the Contrary" & "I answer that" and just skips over to ".reply to Obj 1" while leaving these glaring blanks.

    2)The Second thing is he assumes his reader has read threw Q1 threw Q27 (which begins arguing the Trinity BTW) and accepts their arguments & conclusions & refutations of errors and has them in mind while reading Q28.

    3)Also the SUMMA THEOLOGICA is intended as a manual for beginners in theology & it is assumed those beginners have been taught the preliminaries of the Catholic Faith like a basic formulation of doctrine.

    4)Like most text books this would be used by a learnedteacher who would read from it aloud to students and based on his own learning of the Faith explain the meaning of what he just read to His students.

    For example when Aquinas says "On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius."

    He can take the time to explain "what is supposed to be identical to what," & "what is supposed to be different from what."in telling his young bright eyed charges anything directly identified as what is the same as the essence/substance/nature must be absolutely identical (including Persons identified & compared threw the Essence)to each other(& thus be logical relations). While explaining Persons identified with Persons via the predicate of distinct personhood not making comparisons to essence or each other threw essence are supposed to be really different.

    As an example of “the identity” being “real and logical”, he cites a garment and a tunic.

    You complaint is why does this 12th century man write and argue the manner of someone from 12th century instead of clearly and crisply like 21 century man like Edward Feser or Brian Davies then my strong advice if for you to stop reading the regular Summa & get a copy of Dominican Editor Timothy McDermont's St. Thomas Aquinas SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: A CONCISE TRANSLATION. it being a dynamic equivalent paraphrase of the Summa rewritten in a modern style for the modern man. It has a Nihil obstat & Imprimatur form Westminster & they don't fool around there. So it is orthodox correct and you will save me from dying of a heart attack.

    Do a dude a solid.

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  123. I am sorry I yelled & cursed at at you dguller.

    That was wrong and
    I am sorry.

    But I am going to have to ask you stop responding right now as I need a few days to catch up with my work & heal from my bad back & get some sleep.

    So this discussion is suspended for now.

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  125. now to complain in a civilized manner.



    TWO-It is quite clear, and based upon the fact that there is a logical relation of identity between divine relations and divine attributes, and if X is identical to Y, then there can be no differences between them. If the divine relations are really distinct while the divine attributes are logically distinct, then there is a difference between them in terms of a difference of kinds of distinction, which means that they cannot be identical, which violates (6), which you said you accepted.

    THREE-No. You and I have the same essence, but we are not identical. I am not you. You are not me. We are unique individuals. Neither of us is identical to our essence, because we are a conjunction of that essence and its actual instantiation in existence. At most, we are similar to one another, i.e. partly identical in that we have a shared human nature and partly different in that the instantiation of that share human nature occurs in a different region of space-time. You are equivocating between identity and similarity. Furthermore, similarity is only possible in composite entities, because of the necessity of partial identity and partial difference. Similarity is impossible for a metaphysically simple being, such as God. In God, there is no distinction between what he is and who he is, because that would presume a distinction between his essence and his existence, which are identical. I’ve already written about Aquinas’ response to that objection, and how it is completely inadequate, which means that the objection stands.

    FOUR-First, that would mean that X and Y are not identical, but rather are similar. However, if X is identical to Y, then they cannot differ in terms of predicates, or else X is not identical to Y at all, which violates (1) and (6), both of which you claim to accept.

    FIVE--Second, if you want to say that the divine relations are partly identical and partly different from one another, then you have introduced composition into God, which is impossible, given divine simplicity. You can say that the parts are only logically distinct, and still preserve divine simplicity, because the composition is a projection of our minds, but once you say that the parts are really distinct, then you have compromised divine simplicity.

    SIX---Third, I don’t see how this doesn’t lead to the conclusion that there are three separate Gods, each sharing a common divine nature, but instantiating it in really distinct ways. It would be like there being three human beings, each sharing a common nature, but expressing it in really distinct ways. And that would mean that polytheism is true.

    SEVENThen that violates (6). So, your objection to my argument is to simply equivocate between identity and similarity, which necessarily ends up smuggling composition of some kind into God.

    So ONE TO SEVEN above are your real clearly stated arguments as opposed to the ones you stated May 1, 2013 at 10:15 AM?
    I would not have or guessed in a million years reading your original 12 that anything you have said in 1 to 12 is what you had really meant above?
    So how are we suppose to have a fair discussion? I guess we can't.

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  126. Ben:

    I am sorry I yelled & cursed at at you dguller.

    I’m sorry that your reading comprehension is poor, Ben. The very first premise of my argument clearly stated that “X is identical to Y iff X is the same as Y iff X has everything in common with Y iff X has nothing different or distinct from Y”. That is what is meant by “identity”. I made it a detailed biconditional premise with the specific intention to avoid ambiguity. The fact that you simply ignored it is not my problem.

    So ONE TO SEVEN above are your real clearly stated arguments as opposed to the ones you stated May 1, 2013 at 10:15 AM?
I would not have or guessed in a million years reading your original 12 that anything you have said in 1 to 12 is what you had really meant above?
So how are we suppose to have a fair discussion? I guess we can't.

    Ben, I’ve been perfectly clear in my argument. It is you who have equivocated between “similarity” and “identical”. For me, when Aquinas says that X and Y are “really the same”, “do not differ from one another”, and “are one and the same”, then he means that they are really identical, but you claim that what he really means is that they are similar, and that he is simply speaking casually and imprecisely, which would be very surprising, given how carefully constructed and precise his texts usually are.

    It’s pretty simple. X and Y can be identical in reality, but distinct in our conceptions of them, which results in real identity but logical distinction. However, X and Y cannot be identical in reality, and yet be really distinct, because “real distinction” means that they are different in reality, and thus cannot be identical in reality. With regards to the divine relations, Aquinas says that they are identical in reality, but different in our conception of them. That is the definition of a logical distinction.

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  127. And one more thing. You endorsed the following statement: “things that have the same essence are the same thing, while things that have different essences are different things”. That is your definition of “identity”. X and Y are identical iff X and Y have the same essence. But this trades upon an ambiguity in the term “the same thing”, which could either mean “the same kind of thing”, or “the same particular thing”. Obviously, X and Y are the same kind of thing iff X and Y have the same essence, but it is not true that X and Y are the same thing iff X and Y have the same essence. Say person A robs a bank and person B gets arrested for it. Would you say that since A is identical to B, because they share the same essence, that B should go to jail? After all, if A is identical to B, then B must have robbed the bank, too. Clearly, A and B are not identical, despite the fact that they share a human nature.

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  128. And one more thing.

    Say that you are correct that when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence, what he really means is that the divine relations are similar to the divine essence. That would mean that the divine relations are partly identical to the divine essence and partly different from the divine essence. Since the divine essence is identical to ipsum esse subsistens, which is identical to God himself, it would follow that the part of the divine relations that is identical to the divine essence is also identical to God himself by the law of transitive identity. However, the part that is different from the divine essence would have to be a creature, as Aquinas has stated that ““[e]verything which is not the divine essence is a creature” (ST 1.28.2). So, it would follow that the divine relation is partly God and partly a creature, which is absurd.

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  129. @dguller

    >I’m sorry that your reading comprehension is poor, Ben.

    I'm sorry you can't plainly state your actual arguments up front & I am sorry you insist on objectively arguing a subject matter that is objectively not the doctrine of the Trinity.

    I also don't believe any of the positions you have attributed to me & have never once said I did.

    ONE LAST CHANCE FOR YOU DGULLER

    For example:

    You last wrote:
    -It is quite clear, and based upon the fact that there is a logical relation of identity between divine relations and divine attributes,and if X is identical to Y, then there can be no differences between them.

    Question Why do you insist on leaving out the qualifier in Essence ?

    The fuller & more detailed definition of the Principle that I cited adds that and many other qualifiers you omitted in Premise (1)?

    If you are now insisting what you wrote in Premise (1) is the sole definition of the Principle of Identity then I must reject Premise (1) not because I don't believe in the Principle of Identity. I absolutely do but because I don't believe you have formulated it completely there for not correctly enough for fruitful discussion the Trinity between.

    Do you have the moral courage to answer my questions?

    Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition?

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  130. >Say that you are correct that when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence, what he really means is that the divine relations are similar to the divine essence.

    I reply: So what you are really saying to me is when we Catholics say "God became man" what we really mean is God changed his unchangeable divine nature into a human one & ceased to be divine & we should pay no attention to the Council of Chalcadon & Pope St Leo?

    Good to know! Where would we be without you to interpret what our Saints & Church really means?

    BTW

    Do you have the moral courage to answer my questions?

    Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?

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  131. BTW dguller is lying I do not believe
    "when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence, what he really means is that the divine relations are similar to the divine essence."

    I believe when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence he they are fully identical to the essence thus in the essence they are logically related to one another.

    But dguller's definition of the Principle of identity omits reference to essence.

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  132. I BenYachov believe when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence what he means is they are fully identical to the essence thus in the essence they are logically related to one another & to attribute and other possible unqualified divine reality.

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  133. @dguller

    Do you have the moral courage to answer my questions?

    Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?

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  134. Ben:

    BTW dguller is lying I do not believe
"when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence, what he really means is that the divine relations are similar to the divine essence."



    I believe when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence he they are fully identical to the essence thus in the essence they are logically related to one another.



    But dguller's definition of the Principle of identity omits reference to essence.


    There are three logical possibilities here:

    (1) The divine relations are totally the same as the divine essence. If this is true, then my conclusion follows.
    (2) The divine relations are partially the same as and partially different from the divine essence. If that is true, then God himself is partly God and partly a creature, as argued above, which is absurd.
    (3) The divine relations are totally different from the divine essence. If that is true, then the divine relations are creatures, and not God at all.

    It seems to me that the best option would be (1). If the divine relations are totally the same as the divine essence, then there can be no real distinction or difference between the divine relations and the divine attributes. After all, if there was a real distinction between them, then they could not really be identical at all, but rather would be two really different and distinct “things” rather than one single “thing”.

    Now, you claim that (a) the divine relations involve a real distinction between the different relations, and (b) the divine attributes involve a logical distinction between the different attributes. It is pretty clear that it is impossible for (a) to be identical to (b), because (a) involves real distinction, which implies that there are two “things”, and (b) involves logical distinction, which implies that there is only one “thing”. Either there is just one “thing” or there are more than one “thing”. You cannot have both, unless you want to say that the multiple “things” are parts of the single “thing”, but then you introduce composition into a metaphysically simple being, which is impossible.

    Since (a) and (b) cannot be identical, the only way to preserve the identity between the divine relations and the divine attributes is to say that either (c) there is a logical distinction between the divine relations and a logical distinction between the divine attributes, which would destroy the Trinity, or (d) there is a real distinction between the divine relations and a real distinction between the divine attributes, which would destroy divine simplicity.

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  135. I BenYachov believe when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence what he means is they are fully identical to the essence thus in the essence they are logically related to one another & to attribute and other possible unqualified divine reality.

    If the divine relations are fully identical to the divine essence, then they are exactly the same as the divine essence. There is no difference between the divine relations and the divine essence, except possibly a logical distinction. In reality, they are exactly the same thing, and thus the properties of one must be identical to the properties of the other. If the divine relations have a property that the divine essence lacks, then they cannot be identical, but rather must be different. The divine relations have the property of involving real distinction, whereas the divine essence has the property of lacking real distinction. Since the divine relations have a property that the divine essence lacks, it follows that they cannot be identical, which means that the divine relations are not God at all, but rather are creatures of God, which destroys the Trinity. To avoid this conclusion, you have to say that either the divine relations have a logical distinction, which destroys the Trinity, or that the divine attributes have a real distinction, which destroys divine simplicity.

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  136. dguller there is no point in discussing this with me since your give definition of the Principle of Identity omits the qualifier "in essence" as well as other qualifiers given in the professional definition.

    My understanding of the Trinity relies on those omitted qualifiers.

    By omitting them and examining my argument sans them you concluded I believe Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence & what I really means is that the divine relations are similar to the divine essence. I do not believe this nor have I said so nor do my conclusions follow from this with the qualifier.


    Stop blowing smoke and answer my question.

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  137. Ben:

    I believe when Aquinas says that the divine relations are identical to the divine essence he they are fully identical to the essence thus in the essence they are logically related to one another.

    Say you have divine persons P1 and P2. P1 and P2 have the same divine essence. P1 and P2 are really distinct from one another. It follows that any real distinction between P1 and P2 cannot be due to the divine essence, because the divine essence is identical in P1 and P2. If the real distinction cannot be accounted for by the divine essence, then it must be accounted for by something that is not the divine essence. However, according to Aquinas, whatever is not the divine essence is necessarily a creature, and thus the real distinction between P1 and P2 would depend upon a creature. That would mean that God himself depends upon a creature, which is impossible, because God does not depend upon anything.

    The only solution is that say that in God, there is nothing other than the divine essence. And if there is nothing other than the divine essence, and the divine essence is identical between P1 and P2, then there cannot be a real distinction between P1 and P2, because there is nothing to account for the difference between P1 and P2, which means that P1 is really identical to P2. It follows from this that the Trinity is false.

    dguller there is no point in discussing this with me since your give definition of the Principle of Identity omits the qualifier "in essence" as well as other qualifiers given in the professional definition.

    That qualifier does not help your case, though. Saying that X is identical to Y by virtue of X and Y having the same essence still allows X and Y to be really distinct only if X and Y are composite entities, because in addition to the same essence, there is something else that is different from that essence, such as their acts of existence (i.e. esse), their matter (if they are material entities), and so on. Those other parts of those composite entities are what allow the real distinctions to occur despite identical essences. You are using an argument that only works for composite entities and trying to shoehorn it into an argument about a metaphysically simple being. In God, there is not the divine essence and something else, because anything that is not the divine essence is not God, and is a creature instead, as Aquinas explicitly says. That is why there can only be logical distinctions involving God, because real distinctions imply real parts and divisions, which are impossible in a metaphysically simple being.

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  138. >That qualifier does not help your case, though.

    A Non-answer after I in good faith went out of my way to answer you.

    Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?

    It doesn't help my case? It lead you to wrongly conclude I believe Aquinas teaches X when I affirm Not-X?

    What other wrong conclusions might you have such as non-existent "contradictions"?

    We cannot have a rational discussion if you don't give me unqualified or insufficiently qualified definitions.

    So why are you still trying you can't even answer a straightforward why question.

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  139. Of course taking your weird view to it's logical extreme since God is absolutely simple there can not even be logical relations in God since logical relations are a type of distinction and there should be no distinction in God therefore there are no relations at all in God of any type or properties of any type not even the property of not having any properties.

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  140. Ben:

    Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?

    I already told you. Including the qualifier does not help your case. In God, it is not the case that there is the divine essence and something else. There is only the divine essence. And if the divine persons have the same divine essence, and there is nothing else that can account for or explain the real distinction between them, then there cannot be any real distinction between them, meaning that they are all really identical. In order for you to be correct, there must be something other than the divine essence in God to explain the real distinction. Since anything other than the divine essence is a creature, and a creature cannot affect God who is impassable and independent of creation, it follows that there cannot be anything to justify the existence of the real distinction, and thus there is no real distinction at all.

    Of course taking your weird view to it's logical extreme since God is absolutely simple there can not even be logical relations in God since logical relations are a type of distinction and there should be no distinction in God therefore there are no relations at all in God of any type or properties of any type not even the property of not having any properties.

    No. A logical distinction is a distinction in our minds that does not exist in reality. So, in reality, God lacks any distinction, but in our minds, there are distinctions when we think about God.

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  141. Ben:

    Let’s break this down as simply as possible.

    (1) Do the divine persons have the same divine essence?

    (2) Are the divine persons really distinct from one another?

    (3) Is there anything other than the divine essence in God?

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  142. >I already told you. Including the qualifier does not help your case.

    Yes you are right now answer my question "Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?"

    >No. A logical distinction is a distinction in our minds that does not exist in reality. So, in reality, God lacks any distinction, but in our minds, there are distinctions when we think about God.

    Sounds like your adding qualifies to my argument Benguller!

    But I dyachov response.

    Including the qualifier "A logical distinction is a distinction in our minds" does not help your case.

    Since in God there are no distinctions. A logical distinction is a type of distinction therefore there is no logical distinction in God.

    If X cannot have any Y then there can not be found no Y in X.

    If X=God and Y=a distinction then no distinction can be found in God.

    If a logical distinction =a distinction then by the Transitive Property.....we you know the rest thank you for playing.

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  143. Ben:

    Since in God there are no distinctions. A logical distinction is a type of distinction therefore there is no logical distinction in God.

    Ben, pay attention. A logical distinction is not in God. A logical distinction is in the human mind. You do understand a difference between a distinction in the human mind and a distinction in God? Unless you want to say that the human mind is God?

    Now, what do you say you answer my three questions above. I think it would help us figure this out.

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  144. Let’s break this down as simply as possible.

    (1) In god there are absolutely no distinctions?

    (2) A logical distinction is said to be in God?

    (3) A logical distinction is a distinction.

    (4) Therefore 3 contradicts 1

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  145. >Ben, pay attention. A logical distinction is not in God. A logical distinction is in the human mind.

    Then it is not in God but then there are no attributes or properties that are distinguished by logical distinction since it would have to be in God to distinguish one from the other.

    This doesn't help you.

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  146. Ben:

    Yes you are right now answer my question "Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1))

    Wait, if I am right in my claim that adding the qualifier in essence does not help your argument, then why are you further asking me why I did not include it? My answer, which you say that I am “right” in, is that it is completely unhelpful to your argument. I’ve even explained why it is unhelpful, because if P1 and P2 have the same divine essence, and there is nothing else in God but the divine essence, then there is nothing else in God that could account for any differences between P1 and P2, and thus there cannot be any real differences between P1 and P2.

    & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?"

    Which one? The one that you got from Wikipedia? I told you why it was wrong at May 2, 2013 at 4:28 AM. There is an ambiguity in saying that X is the same thing as Y, because “the same thing” could either mean “the same kind of thing” or “the same particular thing”.

    Let’s break this down as simply as possible.



    (1) In god there are absolutely no distinctions?



    (2) A logical distinction is said to be in God?



    (3) A logical distinction is a distinction.



    (4) Therefore 2 contradicts 1


    (2) is false. A logical distinction is not in God. It is in the human mind.

    Then it is not in God but then there are no attributes or properties that are distinguished by logical distinction since it would have to be in God to distinguish one from the other.

    No. The divine intellect is really identical to the divine will. They only seem to be distinct in the human mind when it reflects upon them. In reality, they are one and the same, but in our mind’s conceptualization, they appear distinct. And when a distinction only occurs in the mind, but not in reality, then we call it a logical distinction.

    What do you say you answer the three questions? They're not hard.

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  147. thus there are no properties in God or attributes or persons also God doesn't have the property of not having property.

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  148. >Wait, if I am right in my claim that adding the qualifier in essence does not help your argument.

    Yes you are since I am now using it to show that it doesn't help your weird argument that God contains distinction, properties, attributes including the property of having no properties.

    BTW you still didn't answer "Why...".

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  149. >(2) is false. A logical distinction is not in God. It is in the human mind.

    That is correct since there are no distinctions in God.

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  150. But if 2 is false then it agrees with my claim there are no distinctions in God?

    So you agree there are no distinctions in God.

    A logical distinction is a distinction via the Transitive property therefore it is not in God therefore there are no distinctions in god thus there are no logical distinctions in god between the attributes.

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  151. I can do this all night till you cry uncle.

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  152. There can not be any and all distinctions in God.

    There are logical distinctions between the Attributes in God.

    The divine attributes are in God but they are distinct from one another logically. But then that means they are in God but if they are in God then how are they in the human mind....

    ....

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  153. So dguller the moral of the story is learn to abstract in the proper category when you think about something.

    Like the Mind to the Divine Nature to the Trinity.

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  154. Yes you are since I am now using it to show that it doesn't help your weird argument that God contains distinction, properties, attributes including the property of having no properties.

    I never said that God contains any distinctions. My argument has always been that God has no distinction whatsoever by virtue of his divine simplicity. God is esse indistinctum, as Eckhart said. Any distinction that we conceive of God must be solely in the human mind as a logical distinction.

    BTW you still didn't answer "Why...".

    I did. The answer is that it does not help your argument at all, and so it is irrelevant to bring up.

    So you agree there are no distinctions in God.

    Of course, I agree.

    Now that we both agree that there are no distinctions in God, can you explain to me how there can be a distinction between divine persons in God?

    A logical distinction is a distinction via the Transitive property therefore it is not in God therefore there are no distinctions in god thus there are no logical distinctions in god between the attributes.

    Right. There are no logical distinctions and no real distinctions in God, but there are logical distinctions in the human mind. All the divine attributes are ultimately the same thing, i.e. the divine essence, and any distinction between them is solely in the human mind as a logical distinction.

    There are logical distinctions between the Attributes in God.

    No, there are logical distinctions between the divine attributes of God. The logical distinctions are not in God, but rather are in the human mind.

    The divine attributes are in God but they are distinct from one another logically. But then that means they are in God but if they are in God then how are they in the human mind....

    That makes no sense. There is a difference between what we conceive about God and God himself. Just because we conceive of distinction in God does not mean that there is distinction in God. In fact, since we know that God is absolutely simple, there cannot be any real distinction in God, and thus whatever distinction we conceive must be in our minds. When this occurs, we call the distinction a logical distinction.

    So dguller the moral of the story is learn to abstract in the proper category when you think about something.

    Irony is not dead. :)

    Now, can you please answer my three questions? Thanks!

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  155. The Person of the Father is really not the Person of the Son. They only seem to be alike in the human mind when it reflects upon them via the divine essence. In reality, they are one to the other, but in our mind’s conceptualization, they appear the same. And when a identifying of a real distinction only occurs in the mind, but not in reality as we concieve it in our mind, then we call it a Divine Mystery.

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  156. I will repeat myself.

    And when a identifying of a real distinction only occurs in the mind, but not in reality as we concieve it in our limited fallible minds", then we call it a Divine Mystery.

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  157. >I never said that God contains any distinctions.

    I never said the divine persons where only partly in the divine nature.....

    You you see yet?

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  158. >Now, can you please answer my three questions? Thanks!

    No I won't you didn't answer my "Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?" question you just dodged it.

    Meditate on this discussion.

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  159. Plus I don't trust if I try to answer them you won't do to me what you have been doing all a long what I just gave you a taste of you own medicine for.

    Go back and relearn the doctrine of the Trinity & when you understand our claims for it and what we don't claim we can discuss it better.

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  160. The Person of the Father is really not the Person of the Son. They only seem to be alike in the human mind when it reflects upon them via the divine essence. In reality, they are one to the other, but in our mind’s conceptualization, they appear the same. And when a identifying of a real distinction only occurs in the mind, but not in reality as we concieve it in our mind, then we call it a Divine Mystery.

    How can the person of the Father be really distinct from the person of the Son if (a) they have the exact same divine nature, and (b) there is nothing else other than the divine nature in God to account for the distinction between divine persons?

    And when a identifying of a real distinction only occurs in the mind, but not in reality as we concieve it in our limited fallible minds", then we call it a Divine Mystery.

    But a real distinction cannot only occur in the mind. A real distinction must occur in reality. You are confusing a real distinction with a logical distinction. If your argument is that the divine persons can only be logically distinct, then I agree with you, but this also means that the divine persons are not different from one another in reality, but only appear to be different to the human mind. Thus, the Trinity does not exist in reality, but only in the human mind.

    I never said the divine persons where only partly in the divine nature.....

You you see yet?

    I know that. You said that they were totally identical to the divine nature. And since there is nothing other than the divine nature in God himself, it follows that there is nothing that could account for the differences between the divine persons, which means that they cannot be really different at all. At the most, they can appear to be different to the human mind, but are totally identical in reality.

    No I won't you didn't answer my "Why did you leave out the qualifier in essence (from the definition you gave me of the Principle of Identity in Premise (1)) & what is wrong with the traditional professional definition you omitted?" question you just dodged it.

    I answered you at May 2, 2013 at 12:47 PM, May 2, 2013 at 1:18 PM, May 2, 2013 at 1:38 PM, and May 2, 2013 at 1:58 PM. I’m sorry if you refuse to accept my answer, but my answer is there, if you want to read it. Again, I left out the qualifier, because including it does not advance your argument. And that is because saying that the divine persons have the exact same divine nature, plus the fact that there is nothing other than the divine essence in God, means that there is nothing that can explain why the divine persons are different from one another, and thus they must be really identical.

    Plus I don't trust if I try to answer them you won't do to me what you have been doing all a long what I just gave you a taste of you own medicine for.

    That’s too bad. I think that if you clearly answered them, then we could resolve this issue pretty quickly. Anyway, it’s your call.

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  161. >So you agree there are no distinctions in God.

    Of course, I agree.

    then you really do agree there are no logical distinction in God.;)

    See this is what awaits me if I try to answer you on the Trinity.

    Catagory mistakes galor!!!!

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  162. Go back to the drawing board dguller.

    Start by reading some of the books I recommended.

    You find them on this thread you wore me out.

    BTW I am really sorry for yelling and cursing.

    Friends again?

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  163. then you really do agree there are no logical distinction in God.;)

See this is what awaits me if I try to answer you on the Trinity.

    Of course I agree that there is no logical distinction in God. There is no distinction of any kind in God, whether it is logical or real. How does this conclusion help your case? You are trying to argue that there is a real distinction in God between the divine persons. We agree that there is no logical distinction in God. Do you think that this necessarily proves that there must be a real distinction in God? That would be the case if God must have distinction of some kind, and there are only two kinds of distinction, but that is not the case. God has no distinction whatsoever due to divine simplicity.

    Now, why not just answer the questions? I get the sense that you’re a little frightened …

    Anyway, going home now. I'll respond to whatever you write afterwards later.

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  164. >Of course I agree that there is no logical distinction in God. There is no distinction of any kind in God, whether it is logical or real. How does this conclusion help your case?

    I reply: Of course I agree that there is no logical distinction in God. There is no distinction of any kind in God, whether it is logical or realin regards to divine essence!

    That includes comparing the Persons with there real relations to each other to the essence then all relation goes away.

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  165. I reply: Of course I agree that there is no logical distinction in God. There is no distinction of any kind in God, whether it is logical or realin regards to divine essence!



    So, is there anything else in God other than the divine essence? If there is nothing else in God other than the divine essence, then all the divine persons must be really identical to one another, because there is nothing other than the divine essence, which they share in common, to account for their differences. In other words, in order for there to be real differences between the divine persons, there must be something other than the divine essence in God to explain those differences. But, if there is something else in God other than the divine essence, then there is a creature in God, which is impossible.

    That includes comparing the Persons with there real relations to each other to the essence then all relation goes away.

    Exactly. If the divine persons are identical to the divine essence, and there is nothing in God but the divine essence, then any distinction between the divine persons cannot be real, and then “all relation goes away”. I’m glad we agree.

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  166. >So, is there anything else in God other than the divine essence?

    The Trinity but we can only know that if God tells us.

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  167. >So, is there anything else in God other than the divine essence?

The Trinity but we can only know that if God tells us.

    So, in God, there is the divine essence and the Trinity? According to Aquinas, the Trinity would have to be a creature, because anything that isn’t the divine essence is a creature.

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  168. >Exactly. If the divine persons are identical to the divine essence, and there is nothing in God but the divine essence, then any distinction between the divine persons cannot be real, and then “all relation goes away”. I’m glad we agree.

    Now we are back to dropping the essence distinction & mixing the catagories?

    Do I have to now argue God is not in the Divine Essence since there is noting in the Divine Essence before you get it?

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  169. Weird because you have been reading THE DARKNESS OF GOD & yet it hasn't sinked in?

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  170. 

Do I have to now argue God is not in the Divine Essence since there is noting in the Divine Essence before you get it?

    Ben, it’s simple. If there is nothing but the divine essence in God, then that means that there is nothing else in God but the divine essence. And if each divine person has the same divine essence, and there is nothing else other than the divine essence in God, then they must be really identical to one another. If they are different, but have the same divine essence, then what is different between them, particularly if all that exists in God is the divine essence? There has to be something different to account for the difference between divine persons.

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  171. >If they are different, but have the same divine essence, then what is different between them,

    When we contemplate Persons' real relationship we abstract away the essence & focus on the persons as persons.

    Now what is the nature of the really of the real relation in the Trinity?

    We can't know we can only know it is there because God told us.

    We can not by any type of reasoning conclude it is there or that a real relation exists between the persons.

    For the 1,000 time it's a Mytery treat it as such.

    Disbelieve in it if that comforts you but don't tell us who believe that is is what we know it is in fact not.

    Savey?

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  172. When we contemplate Persons' real relationship we abstract away the essence & focus on the persons as persons.

    But since God is identical to the divine essence, to abstract away the divine essence is to abstract away God himself. And once you have abstracted God himself away, what is left in the divine persons? Furthermore, if it is possible to abstract away the divine essence, and the divine persons remain, then the divine persons are distinct from the divine essence, and since Aquinas has stated that anything that is other than the divine essence is a creature, it follows that the divine persons are creatures. So, this will not work, either.

    Now what is the nature of the really of the real relation in the Trinity?

    All I need for my argument is that the divine persons are distinct from the divine essence, which you seem to endorse above when you say that it is possible to completely eliminate the divine essence, and yet the divine persons remain. And if that is possible, then it follows that the divine persons are creatures, which means that they cannot be God. That would destroy the Trinity, I think.

    We can not by any type of reasoning conclude it is there or that a real relation exists between the persons.

    That is irrelevant. I’m not saying that one can deduce that the Trinity is true. I’m saying that if the Trinity is true, then Thomist principles must be false, and vice versa, because they contradict one another.

    Disbelieve in it if that comforts you but don't tell us who believe that is is what we know it is in fact not.

    That’s fine. If you want to believe a logical contradiction, then you can totally do that, but know that once you admit a logical contradiction into your belief system, you can prove anything by it, making it useless to determine whether something is true or not. If that comforts you, then that’s actually kind of scary for someone who takes truth seriously as you purport to do.

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  173. Give that the real relations that is between the Persons only and not the essence can be called some type of "property" in the Trinity then given the nature of the doctrine of the Trinity it could not be called a "property" in the same sense as a property in the divine essence and it would not exist as a property that existed in the same relation as a property in the divine essence.

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  174. Give that the real relations that is between the Persons only and not the essence can be called some type of "property" in the Trinity then given the nature of the doctrine of the Trinity it could not be called a "property" in the same sense as a property in the divine essence and it would not exist as a property that existed in the same relation as a property in the divine essence.

    If the real relations between the divine persons is “not the essence”, then the real relations between the divine persons are necessarily creatures, and not God, according to Aquinas. So, this will not work, either.

    Try again.

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  175. >But since God is identical to the divine essence, to abstract away the divine essence is to abstract away God himself.

    No since as Brian Davies said Aquinas understood the Trinity to be the Divine Essence & since we would be contemplating the Trinity we would still be contemplating God.

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  176. >If the real relations between the divine persons is “not the essence”,

    Abstracting away the essence when contemplating the real relation in the Trinity is not the same as saying
    real relations between the divine persons is “not the essence”.

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  177. Abstracting away the essence is not logically the same as saying there is no essence.

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  178. No since as Brian Davies said Aquinas understood the Trinity to be the Divine Essence & since we would be contemplating the Trinity we would still be contemplating God.

    If the Trinity is the divine essence, then abstracting the divine essence away would also abstract away the Trinity. The bottom line is that there is no way to abstract away the divine essence, and still have God remain. God is identical to the divine essence, after all. And if the Trinity is identical to the divine essence, then it would also disappear if the divine essence is removed from the picture. So, this won’t work, either.

    Try again.

    Abstracting away the essence when contemplating the real relation in the Trinity is not the same as saying
real relations between the divine persons is “not the essence”.

    Of course it is. If the essence is gone but the real relations remain, then the real relations cannot be the essence. After all, the essence is not there anymore since it is abstracted away. What is left is necessarily not the essence. Just like if you remove $100 from your wallet, what is left in your wallet is necessarily not that $100.

    Abstracting away the essence is not logically the same as saying there is no essence.

    It is, when the essence is identical to God himself. To abstract away the divine nature is to abstract away God himself, meaning that whatever is left cannot be God, and so if the divine persons remain after the divine essence is removed, then they cannot be identical to God.

    Try again.

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  179. Just as saying there are logical relations in the divine essence does not violate the divine simplicity & we can still say there are no relations in the divine essence.

    Stay in category.

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  180. >If the Trinity is the divine essence, then abstracting the divine essence away would also abstract away the Trinity.

    Only if I where thinking about the Trinity in relation to it's essence as God.

    :-)

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  181. If I think about the Divine Will I am thinking about something that is the divine essence but does it follow thinking about a will is the same as thinking about an essence as an essence?

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  182. If I am thinking about the Divine Will I am thinking about it as a Divine Will even thought the Will is also the Essence but it doesn't logically follow if I am thinking about the Divine Will I am also thinking about the Divine Essence as a Divine Essence?

    Or is it now impossible to think about a divine essence as a divine essence since to do so I must abstact everything else away attributes, logical relations, and even that God is the Divine Essence & thus when I think about the Divine Essence as a Divine Essence I abstract away that essence because I have already abtracted away other things that are the divine essence?

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  183. I think I found the paradox of thought?

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  184. Just as saying there are logical relations in the divine essence does not violate the divine simplicity & we can still say there are no relations in the divine essence.

Stay in category.

    If “there are no relations in the divine essence”, and we agree that the divine relations are relations, then the divine relations, as relations, cannot be in the divine essence, which means that the divine relations are other than the divine essence, which means that the divine relations are creatures.

    Try again.

    If I think about the Divine Will I am thinking about something that is the divine essence but does it follow thinking about a will is the same as thinking about an essence as an essence?

    You are right that in our minds, we can make a logical distinction between the divine will and the divine essence, because our minds operate according to principles of composite entities, and in composite entities, there is a distinction between the will and the essence, for example, in rational entities. However, when it comes to God, if we think that our logical distinction between the divine will and the divine essence corresponds to a real distinction between the divine will and the divine essence, then we would be wrong.

    If I am thinking about the Divine Will I am thinking about it as a Divine Will even thought the Will is also the Essence but it doesn't logically follow if I am thinking about the Divine Will I am also thinking about the Divine Essence as a Divine Essence?

    Let me ask you this. If you abstract rationality away from human nature, then are you still left with human nature? Of course not. You have abstracted away an essential aspect of human nature, leaving just non-rational animality, which is not humanity at all. Or another example, say that you abstract the human essence from a particular human being, then are you still left with that particular human being? Of course not. Similarly, if you abstract the divine nature from God, then you are not still left with God, because God is identical to divine nature, and thus you have removed God himself from the equation.

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  186. Or is it now impossible to think about a divine essence as a divine essence since to do so I must abstact everything else away attributes, logical relations, and even that God is the Divine Essence & thus when I think about the Divine Essence as a Divine Essence I abstract away that essence because I have already abtracted away other things that are the divine essence?

    You are confusing our thoughts about God with God himself. Even if you could abstract away the concept of divine nature from our concept of God and still retain the concept of divine personhood, then either this is due to a real distinction between the divine nature and divine personhood in God or a logical distinction in the human mind between our concept of divine nature and our concept of divine personhood.

    If it is due to a real distinction in God, then that means that it is really possible for a divine person to exist without the divine essence, which would mean that the divine person is other than the divine essence, and that means that the divine person is a creature. Thus, the Trinity is false, because the divine persons must be God, and not creatures.

    If it is due to a logical distinction in the human mind, then that necessarily implies the absence of a real distinction in God between the divine persons and the divine essence, which means that they are identical. And since they are identical, and the divine attributes are identical to the divine nature, it follows that the divine persons must not differ in any way from the divine attributes. Thus, the divine persons cannot involve real distinction while the divine attributes involve no real distinction, because that would be a difference, which is impossible in two things that are exactly identical. In that case, either the divine persons are only logically distinct, which destroys the Trinity, or the divine attributes are really distinct, which destroys divine simplicity.

    Try again.

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  187. @dguller

    No matter how many times you use you faulty methodology I can turn it around & then turn it against you. I've done it & I've done again & I can keep on doing but it is become tiresome & I bore easily.

    I just have to take a proposition you know from Natural Theology take a simple formulation of it & then run with it to created a contradiction without including the necessary elements to a more qualified formulation. Add a category mistake or two & BAM there are no logical relations in the Divine Nature because that would violate the divine simplicity.

    When you move to correct with a more qualified formulation I just glibly dismiss it then repeat my original argument. Back and fort back and forth rinse repeat 400 post later you will curse me out or leave or maybe look at me as your mirror see yourself.

    Time to give it up now and actually learn about how Catholics think about the Trinity.

    We don't confuse theThree Divine Persons & we don't divide the One Simple Divine Essence.

    And any thinking of it that violates the above is thinking about it wrong.

    The Trinity is the Divine Essence since as the higher mystery it is more fundamental then the Single Divine Essence that can be known to exist by mere reason.

    OTOH the Divine Essence emphasizes the Darkness of God which is needed in mysticism because ultimately God can't be captured by the intellect only by love.

    So enough of the phony "contradiction" in the doctrine.

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  188. Oh and the Persons are individual Subsistances of a rational nature not logical relations like the attributes.

    Two distinct categories so pretending they are not is no different then me pretending two different categories of relations don't matter & that they are all in the same category and then I can still claim logical relations in God violate the divine simplify. Much like you do pretending Divine Persons are just Three additional Divine Attributes.

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  189. dguller,

    You should consider actually reading the sources on this. Check out the Cappadocian Fathers, in particular. Arguing with non-experts about the Trinity and then declaring your own victory is a bit absurd, to say the least.

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  190. God has not in the history of Christianity if we believe Brian Davies (and we do) ever been called a Person till the Reformation and the first human person to do that was a Unitarian heretic.

    The Godhead has been called Meta or Trans-Personal & we might us the adjective who to address the Godhead in that the Godhead contains Will and Intellect but not because the Godhead is ever conceived of by any philosophical argument to be an Individual Subsistance of a Rational Nature.

    You can call both "who" or "He" but not for the same reason and not in the same category.

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  191. Rank is right. Of course the problem is Thomas Natural view of God came from his Aristotelian philosophy with a couple of Plato highlights.

    But his view of the Trinity came from His Catholic Faith not his philosophy. Which is why it is ironic when dguller spoke disparagingly about listening to what the Popes and Theologians say about the Trinity.

    You might as well try to talk about Natural Theology in Thomism without Aristotle.

    So may mistakes

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  192. OTOH Rank I have to disagree with you.

    His mistakes come from reading Aquinas without guidance so I don't know what might happen if you let him near the Eastern Fathers? He needs a modern but faithful exposition of Thomism on the Trinity. Like G-L or whatever.

    But hey if you want to potche him for an Eastern view knock yourself out.

    It's all good.

    BenYachov is out.

    Peace!!!!!

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  193. Ben:

    No matter how many times you use you faulty methodology I can turn it around & then turn it against you. I've done it & I've done again & I can keep on doing but it is become tiresome & I bore easily.

    First, what “faulty methodology”?

    Second, the entire argument hinges upon whether the distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence is a real distinction or a logical distinction. If it is a real distinction, then the divine persons and the divine essence are really different from one another, and that means that the divine persons are creatures, which destroys the Trinity. If it is a logical distinction, then the divine persons and the divine essence are really identical, which means that the divine persons must also be identical to the divine attributes, which means that they cannot differ in any way. If they do differ in some way, then they are not identical, and thus they cannot be logically distinct, but rather must be really distinct.

    I just have to take a proposition you know from Natural Theology take a simple formulation of it & then run with it to created a contradiction without including the necessary elements to a more qualified formulation. Add a category mistake or two & BAM there are no logical relations in the Divine Nature because that would violate the divine simplicity.

    What “necessary elements” am I missing from my account? The only “qualified formulation” that you have mentioned is one that makes a distinction between the divine essence and the divine persons, but that is the very premise of the argument I just made above, and so I cannot understand how you can claim that I simply ignore your claims. If there is a distinction between them, then it is either a logical distinction or a real distinction. Both options lead to huge problems for their divine simplicity or the Trinity.

    When you move to correct with a more qualified formulation I just glibly dismiss it then repeat my original argument. Back and fort back and forth rinse repeat 400 post later you will curse me out or leave or maybe look at me as your mirror see yourself.

    Except that I do not “glibly dismiss it”. I actually use your formulation in my argument. You claimed that it is possible to make a distinction between the divine persons and the divine nature. Assuming that this is true, then my argument above follows. Despite what you think, Ben, I do take your formulations seriously, and am trying to show that no matter how you formulate the matter, something seriously goes wrong with your theology such that you have to give up something significant, i.e. the Trinity or divine simplicity, for example.

    We don't confuse theThree Divine Persons & we don't divide the One Simple Divine Essence.

    The question is how you can consistently maintain those positions:

    (1) There is a real distinction between the divine persons
    (2) There is no real distinction in the divine essence

    I contend that (1) and (2) cannot both be true. Either the divine persons are identical to the divine essence, or the divine persons are different from the divine essence. On the one hand, if the divine persons are identical to the divine essence, then if there is no real distinction in the divine essence, then there cannot be real distinction in the divine persons, because they are identical, and thus cannot differ in any way. If that is true, then (1) and (2) cannot both be true. On the other hand, if the divine persons are different from the divine essence, then the divine persons are creatures, and cannot possibly be God, which means that the divine persons must be identical to the divine essence, which leads to the conclusion that (1) and (2) cannot both be true. So, in either case, you cannot affirm (1) and (2) at the same time without a contradiction occurring somewhere.

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  194. And any thinking of it that violates the above is thinking about it wrong.

    Show me where in the above reasoning I have gone wrong.

    The Trinity is the Divine Essence since as the higher mystery it is more fundamental then the Single Divine Essence that can be known to exist by mere reason.

    Again, if the Trinity is identical to the divine essence, then they cannot differ from one another in any way. Imagine I tell you that John Smith and John Jones are actually the exact same person, but John Smith is black and John Jones is white. Would you really think I was still justified in saying that John Smith is identical to John Jones? Of course, you would say that they couldn’t be identical, because they differ in some way. Similarly, if the Trinity is identical to the divine essence, then they cannot differ in any way, and since the Trinity involves real distinction between divine persons whereas the divine essence involves no real distinction, it follows that either the Trinity must be different from the divine essence, which leads to absurdities, or the distinctions in the Trinity must be logical distinctions, which falsifies the Trinity, or the distinctions in the divine essence must be real distinctions, which negates divine simplicity.

    OTOH the Divine Essence emphasizes the Darkness of God which is needed in mysticism because ultimately God can't be captured by the intellect only by love.

    I can respect the mystical approach of apophatic silence much more than the attempt to make logical sense of something fundamentally incoherent.

    Oh and the Persons are individual Subsistances of a rational nature not logical relations like the attributes.

    I have built that into my argument when I assume that the divine persons involve real distinction whereas the divine attributes involve logical distinction. So, repeating it does not alter my argument, because that claim is part of my argument to begin with.

    Two distinct categories so pretending they are not is no different then me pretending two different categories of relations don't matter & that they are all in the same category and then I can still claim logical relations in God violate the divine simplify. Much like you do pretending Divine Persons are just Three additional Divine Attributes.

    But if the divine persons utilize one category of relations and the divine attributes utilize a different category of relations, then the divine persons cannot be identical to the divine attributes. After all, they differ in which categories are appropriately applied to them. The conclusion would then be that either the divine persons are not identical to the divine essence or the divine attributes are not identical to the divine essence. It would then follow that either the divine persons are creatures or the divine attributes are creatures, because whatever is not the divine essence is a creature, according to Aquinas.

    So, no matter which of your positions we start from, we seem to inevitably lead to conclusions that are huge problems for key Christian doctrines. And just repeating your positions without addressing the logical implications of them that I believe I have deduced is simply a waste of time.

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  195. Parting point.

    >You are right that in our minds, we can make a logical distinction between the divine will and the divine essence, because our minds operate according to principles of composite entities, and in composite entities, there is a distinction between the will and the essence, for example, in rational entities. However, when it comes to God, if we think that our logical distinction between the divine will and the divine essence corresponds to a real distinction between the divine will and the divine essence, then we would be wrong.

    Yes we would but of course we know about the Divine Nature threw reason alone & thus reason tells us it is true.

    Revelation tells us a higher mysteryof Trinity we must accept it as brute fact if we believe in the revelation then turn around show how it harmonizes.

    And this is how we harmonize it.

    We don't confuse the Persons and we don't divine the essence & we put those concepts together which is not hard since we treat the Persons as Individual subsistances of a rational nature and not logical relations which is how a Sabelianist is born.

    It has nothing to do with boy meets girl.

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  196. Rank:

    Thanks for the feedback. I keep hoping that someone most knowledgeable will step in and point out where I am going wrong. This is the first time I've ever thought about these matters, and I wouldn't be surprised if I'm getting something wrong.

    Can you be more specific about which of their works I should read? Is there a summary somewhere?

    Thanks!

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