EvolutionBlog’s
Jason Rosenhouse tells us in a
recent post that he hasn’t read philosopher Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos. And it seems obvious enough from his remarks
that he also hasn’t read the commentary of any of the professional philosophers
and theologians who have written about Nagel sympathetically -- such as my own
series of posts on Nagel and his critics, or Bill
Vallicella’s, or Alvin
Plantinga’s review of Nagel, or Alva
Noë’s, or John
Haldane’s, or William
Carroll’s, or J.
P. Moreland’s. What he has read is a critical review of Nagel’s
book written by a non-philosopher, and a couple of sympathetic journalistic pieces about Nagel and some of his defenders. And on that
basis he concludes that “Nagel needs better defenders.”
This is like
failing to read serious, detailed defenses of Darwinism like Dawkins’ The Blind Watchmaker, Coyne’s Why Evolution is True, or Kitcher’s Abusing Science -- and then, on the sole
basis of what some non-biologist has said in criticism of Darwinism, together
with a journalistic article summarizing the views of some Darwinians, concluding
that “Darwinism needs better defenders.”
But never
mind Nagel’s defenders. Not having read Mind and Cosmos doesn’t stop Rosenhouse
from criticizing it too. He writes:
[H]ere is part of a quote from Nagel,
as presented by [reviewer H. Allen] Orr:
I would like
to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the reductionist
neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life
as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with
the mechanism of natural selection. We
are expected to abandon this naïve response, not in favor of a fully worked out
physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative that is really a
schema for explanation, supported by some examples.
From what I understand, the level of
argument in the book never gets much beyond this. But these sentences are
absurd. On what possible basis does
Nagel decide that it is “prima facie” highly implausible that life as we know
it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents?
End
quote. Now Rosenhouse says that “from
what [he] understand[s], the level of argument in the book never gets much
beyond this.” But Nagel isn’t giving any
argument in the passage in question
in the first place; he’s just telling the reader, in the book’s Introduction, what he will argue for in the book. (That’s what book Introductions are for.)
Nor does Nagel simply assert in
the book that the materialist neo-Darwinian account of the world is prima facie
implausible, full stop. He holds that it
is implausible as an explanation of
certain specific aspects of the world, such as consciousness, rationality,
and moral value; and he gives reasons
for thinking it cannot account for these phenomena. Nor does Nagel claim that the materialist
neo-Darwinian account of the world is false merely because it seems prima facie implausible as an explanation of these
phenomena. He isn’t using the claim
about what is prima facie implausible as a premise.
He isn’t saying: “It’s prima facie
implausible, therefore it is wrong.”
Rather, he’s saying: “It’s wrong for these independent reasons that I
will spell out in the book; and it turns out that these independent reasons
vindicate the judgment of common sense about what is prima facie
plausible.” What are these independent
reasons? What is the “possible basis”
Rosenhouse demands to know? Well, you
need to, you know, actually read the book
to find out, which is why Nagel wrote it.
Awful luck for guys like Rosenhouse, who apparently thinks you should be
able to say everything in a single short paragraph in the Introduction to a
book, but there it is.
Rosenhouse
goes on to cite Andrew Ferguson’s citation of me in Ferguson’s
Weekly Standard article on Nagel. Here is how he responds:
Almost all of that is wrong, starting
with Feser’s caricature of materialist thinking. What materialists actually say
is that if you are going to hypothesize into existence something immaterial, it
is on you to provide evidence for your hypothesis. Of course it’s possible that there are
immaterial entities that influence matter in ways that are undetectable by
science, but can you do anything more that [sic] just assert their possible
existence? Given some phenomenon you
assert to be incomprehensible under materialism, can you show how it becomes
comprehensible under immaterialism? Ferguson
tells us that science just ignores “everything else” beyond the material
aspects of reality, but the very point at issue is whether there is anything
else to ignore.
It seems like all the immaterialists
ever do is make assertions!
End
quote. Well, yes, I suppose it could well “seem” that way if you don’t bother to read what they
actually wrote. For starters, what
Rosenhouse dismisses as a “caricature of materialist thinking” was not directed
at materialists in general in the first place, but rather at a certain specific
line of argument put forward by Nagel critics Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg
-- as Rosenhouse would have known had he bothered to read the
post of mine that Ferguson was citing.
For another
thing, the suggestion that the difference between materialists and their
critics is that the former give arguments and the latter merely make assertions
is, well, simply too preposterous for words, and cannot possibly have been made
by someone who both (a) has a shred of intellectual honesty, and (b) knows what
the hell he is talking about. Say what
you will about books like John Foster’s The
Immaterial Self, W. D. Hart’s The
Engines of the Soul, David Chalmers’ The
Conscious Mind, William Hasker’s The
Emergent Self, Robert Koons’ and George Bealer’s The Waning of Materialism, or Richard Swinburne’s The Evolution of the Soul, to name only the first few things that happen to
pop into my mind -- not to mention my own books,
articles,
and blog
posts -- they are absolutely brimming with arguments. You may or may not agree with those
arguments, but they are there.
Some of
Nagel’s critics have criticized him without reading him charitably. Rosenhouse goes
them one better: He’s happy to criticize Nagel and his defenders without reading them. And he has the brass to go on to accuse others of “intellectual silliness”!
But Rosenhouse
is a paragon of scholarship compared to Prof. Jeffrey Shallit, who makes
the following remark in Rosenhouse’s combox:
The funniest part [of Ferguson’s
article] was the bit about Feser’s “dazzling six-part tour de force”. I almost spit out my coffee when I read that
part.
And what, exactly,
is the reason for Shallit’s nearly self-soiling merriment? We are not told, but we can be morally
certain that it had nothing to do with his having actually read the six-part series of posts in question, at least if history
is any guide. Consider some previous
remarks Shallit made about me not too long ago at his
blog Recursivity. Commenting on a
colloquium to which he was calling his readers’ attention, Shallit says:
One thing I can guarantee you won't hear [at the colloquium] is
nonsense like this, from Ed Feser:
"Thoughts
and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like
ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent
meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be
identified with brain processes."
Only a creationist could be so
utterly moronic. While Feser and his
friends are declaring it impossible, real neuroscientists and neurophilosophers
are busy figuring it out.
End
quote. Now I know what my longtime
readers are thinking: “Creationist? What the hell
is Shallit talking about?” But you
haven’t plumbed the subtleties of Shallit’s reasoning. For you see, Shallit was quoting from a
website devoted to Intelligent Design, which had in turn quoted something I
had written in a
blog post. “Hence,” Shallit seems to
have inferred, “since Feser was quoted favorably by an ID website, therefore he is an ID proponent, and therefore he is a Creationist!”
Never mind
that I am in fact not only not a
Creationist, but have been (rather famously, for anyone who’s read this blog
for ten minutes) extremely
critical of ID. And never mind that
Shallit has provided a textbook example of the fallacy of guilt by
association.
And what
exactly was “moronic” or “nonsensical” about what I had written, anyway? It was, after all, part of an argument -- to which Shallit offers no
response at all. But here again we see Prof.
Shallit’s unique intellect in action. His
implicit counter-argument seems to be:
1. Here is a sentence quoted, without
any context whatsoever, from a blog post, which quoted it from a blog post
written by someone else, which blog post summarized an actual line of argument,
which line of argument was in turn defended at greater length elsewhere -- almost
none of which I have bothered to read.
2. I disagree with that sentence and
I know all three of my readers can be relied upon to disagree with it too.
3. Therefore it is moronic. Q.E.D.
Shallit, as
you’ll see from his post, is the sort of guy who likes to accuse others of
ignorance. Well, there’s ignorance --
you know, the sort of thing you exhibit when you don’t know what someone has
actually written. Then there’s meta-ignorance -- ignorance of your
ignorance. And then there’s what we might
call, in Prof. Shallit’s honor, recursive
meta-ignorance -- the sort of thing on regular display in the posts and
comboxes at sites like Coyne’s blog, EvolutionBlog, Recursivity, Dawkins
Foundation discussion boards, etc. The
argumentational thrust of every “criticism” of non-materialist writers that you’ll
find at these intellectual slums goes something like this:
I know it’s not worth reading because
its conclusions are so moronic; and I know it’s moronic because the arguments
for it are too silly to be worth reading; and I know the arguments for it are
too silly to be worth reading because the conclusion itself is so moronic; and
I know it’s moronic because the arguments for it are, of course, too silly to
be worth reading…
Repeat as
desired, click “Publish,” and begin a round of combox mutual
self-congratulation!
This is Feser's characterization of materialist explanations of intentionality. Yea or Nay?
ReplyDeleteYea, more or less. All these philosophical terms are extremely ungrounded in my view. "Explanation" sort of implies "causal" to me in any case -- what other kinds of explanations are there?
Okay, so causal, minus the jargon.
ReplyDeleteThere might be no explanations XD...
ReplyDeleteStatistical explanations!!! don't have to be causal.
Hayek vs Popper:
ReplyDeletehttp://books.google.com/books?id=j7bx6IUu2SsC&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=%22hayek+popper+and+the+causal+theory+of+the+mind%22&source=bl&ots=VlKS7m-HGy&sig=FLVU80Le1A4TEE5mc7e1SSVgx1U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QEVHT-HbOOOViALpkdWKAw&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22hayek%20popp&f=false
Wait, doesn't the turing test presuppose an observer?
ReplyDelete"Some thing is intelligent if it is observed to act in an intelligent manner."