Statistician
William M. Briggs is beginning a series of posts on my book The
Last Superstition. In the first installment he considers
the polemical tone of the book and tells his readers to get any remarks on that
subject out of their systems now so that he can move on to more substantive
matters in future posts. Briggs writes:
Feser gives us a manly Christianity,
in muscular language. His words oft have
the tone of a teacher who is exasperated by students who have, yet again, not
done their homework. The exasperation is
justifiable…
Feser… does not suffer (arrogant)
fools well—or at all. This perplexes
some readers who undoubtedly expect theists to be soft-spoken, meek, and humble
to the point of willing to concede miles to gain an inch. Feser is more of a theological Patton: he is
advancing, always advancing, and is not interested in holding on to anything
except the enemy’s territory. This
stance has startled some reviewers.
Typical is [one reviewer] who ignores the meat of the book and whines
about “ad hominems.”
And of my characterization of certain New Atheist writers as ill-informed, incompetent, intellectually dishonest, etc., Briggs says:
And of my characterization of certain New Atheist writers as ill-informed, incompetent, intellectually dishonest, etc., Briggs says:
Keep in mind… that these are all
questions of fact, not metaphysics. If
Feser can prove them—I say he can—this is fine.
This is something that people who complain about the tone of the book should keep in mind. If a critic haughtily dismisses arguments of the caliber of Aquinas’s while at the same time showing that he has got his basic facts about the arguments wrong, then to point out that such a critic is either incompetent or intellectually dishonest is just to make a straightforward statement of fact, and one that is highly relevant to evaluating the critic’s work. If you think it commits an ad hominem fallacy to call attention to unpleasant but relevant truths about a writer’s knowledge of his subject (or lack thereof), then you don’t know what an ad hominem fallacy is. (By the way, it would be an ad hominem fallacy to dismiss my own arguments simply because you don’t like my tone. Just sayin’.)
This is something that people who complain about the tone of the book should keep in mind. If a critic haughtily dismisses arguments of the caliber of Aquinas’s while at the same time showing that he has got his basic facts about the arguments wrong, then to point out that such a critic is either incompetent or intellectually dishonest is just to make a straightforward statement of fact, and one that is highly relevant to evaluating the critic’s work. If you think it commits an ad hominem fallacy to call attention to unpleasant but relevant truths about a writer’s knowledge of his subject (or lack thereof), then you don’t know what an ad hominem fallacy is. (By the way, it would be an ad hominem fallacy to dismiss my own arguments simply because you don’t like my tone. Just sayin’.)
You also
don’t understand Christian morality if you think it forbids ever rhetorically taking
the hide off of an opponent. Former
atheist Leah Libresco recently
objected to the tone of The Last
Superstition, and even
implied that it was contrary to “put[ting] on Christ.” As I
wrote in response:
Re: the polemical tone of my book The
Last Superstition, I understand that it is not to everyone’s taste. That’s
fine. However, I must object to the suggestion that the tone of the book is
contrary to Christian morality. That is not true. Those who suppose that
polemics are always wrong are like those who suppose that violence is always
wrong in failing to make some morally crucial distinctions. I’ve defended the
appropriateness of polemics under some (by no means all, but some)
circumstances in several blog posts, which interested readers can find here:
Nor is a polemical approach to
adversaries by any means unusual in biblical and Church history. Christ’s harsh
words against the Pharisees are well known. Elijah was sarcastic with the
priests of Baal, and God with Job. Many saints have engaged in harsh polemics
over the centuries. You’ll find examples in chapter 20 of a 19th century book
called Liberalism is a Sin by Fr. Felix Sarda y Salvany, and a theological
defense of the appropriateness of polemics under certain circumstances both in
that chapter and in chapter 21. You can find the book online here:
As the title alone indicates, that
book too is bound to be offensive to some. (As the reader will discover from
the introductory material, a critic of the book at the time it appeared tried
to get the Vatican to condemn it. The Vatican responded by praising it.) But
whatever one thinks of the overall book, the points made in the chapters I’ve
referred to are sound.
And in
response to one of Libresco’s readers, who suggested that an aggressive tone
was counterproductive even if not strictly contrary to Christian morality, I
wrote:
Re: the… tone of [The Last
Superstition], please keep in mind that no single book can reach every reader
at the same time, and not all potential readers are gentle, fair-minded
atheists like the pre-conversion Leah Libresco. There are, first of all and
most importantly, a lot of people both on the religious side and on the fence who
are so impressed by the absurdly self-confident rhetoric and apparent prestige
of the New Atheists that they suppose there must be something powerful in their arguments, and this supposition will remain even after
one has patiently explained the defects in their books. Sometimes, “breaking
the spell” of a powerful rhetorical illusion requires equal and opposite
rhetorical force (if I can borrow Dennett’s phrase). When you treat an ignorant
bully arguing in bad faith as if he were a serious thinker worthy to be engaged
respectfully, you only reinforce his prestige and
maintain the illusion that he might be onto something. You thereby make it
easier for people to fall into the errors the bully is peddling. Again, see the
blog posts I linked to and the chapters from Fr. Sarda y Salvany for more on
the reasons why polemics are sometimes not merely allowable but called for.
I also think people overstate the
extent to which atheist readers will be put off. Some atheist readers, sure. But there are also atheists whose confidence in
atheism is largely sustained by the vigor and self-confidence of the people on
their side coupled with the timidity, defensiveness, and halfway-apologetic
responses of some people on the other, religious side. To see people from the
religious side hitting back with equal force and exposing certain prominent
atheists not merely as mistaken, but as ignorant and foolish, can shock some of
these atheist readers out of their complacency.
Finally, not all atheists are that sensitive. They can read a book like The Last Superstition with a sense of humor and realize (as I have made it clear in that book
and elsewhere) that the polemics and sarcasm are directed not at all atheists
but rather at (a) certain ideas (and a reasonable
atheist should be able to carry out the intellectual exercise of separating
himself from his ideas so as to look at the latter objectively) and (b) at obnoxious,
puffed up atheists like Dawkins and Co. (and a reasonable
atheist should be willing to admit that Dawkins and Co. are asking for it). If
the shoe doesn’t fit some particular atheist, I’m not forcing him to wear it.
Finally, if
that special atheist someone you are trying to reach simply doesn’t like
polemics, there is of course always the respectably genteel Aquinas. Something for everyone!
You are completely avoiding answering my questions, and you are quasi-insulting me in the process.
ReplyDeleteThat bugs me, man...
Of course the term "better human being" is only used in the moral sense.
ReplyDeleteI am not a worst human being because I have bad eyesight. I am a worst human being because I am often a total bastard to people on the internet.
The term "real" and "being" unqualified is used in the ordinary sense of exists vs not.
We need the experts to chime in hint hint.
Joe, I think some posts were "eaten;" I no longer see Dguller's earlier reply to me, for whatever reason.
ReplyDeleteI think one source of confusion/conflict might be in understanding what "real" means. Existence to me is an either/or proposition, things either exist or they don't. Now, they can exist solely in the mind, or in reality, and it is those things that exist outside the mind that we call real, to distinguish. Thus a real $50 opposed to $50 existing in the imagination.
They both exist, but in different ways. And the $50 existing outside the mind has (dare I say it) more being, because it exists of itself and is not dependent on thought. In this, I think I agree with Dguller.
Joe:
ReplyDeleteYou are completely avoiding answering my questions, and you are quasi-insulting me in the process. That bugs me, man...
First, I think I already answered your question. In the comment that I directed you to, I wrote:
“In Thomist metaphysics, goodness = actual being = truth. The general idea is that every thing has an essence, which serves as a blueprint for what would count as an ideal exemplification of that type of thing it is. Naturally, not every thing is an ideal and perfect instantiation of an essence, and so different things differ in terms of how closely they approximate the ideal type in actual reality. The more closely they approach the ideal exemplification of the essence, the more actually real that ideal becomes in actual reality, and thus the more true a thing is to its ideal exemplification, the more good a thing it is considered to be. That is why goodness = actual being = truth, in the sense of individual beings striving to actualize the potential contained in their essence to be a true and good example of the blueprint, i.e. their essence.
“If you take the essence of “triangle”, the ideal triangle has perfectly straight lines, perfectly intersecting corners, and internal angles adding up to 180 degrees exactly. No actually real triangle that we observe or create could possibly have all these perfections, but we recognize a triangle with straight lines as more close to an ideal triangle than a triangle with curvy lines, and thus the former is more true an instantiation of its triangular essence, and is more good an example of a triangle, and all because it actualizes its triangular essence more in actual reality than the latter, which still has the potential to have straight lines.”
Maybe you could be specific about which part of this explanation puzzles you. I’ve read it again, and it seems pretty good. Maybe someone else could pipe in and explain where it goes wrong.
Second, I am not insulting you. You said that you converted to Catholicism, partly because of your admiration for Aquinas and an understanding of his system.
Well, if you understand his system, then you must understand that, according to him – not me! – goodness, truth, perfection and actual being are all coextensive. They refer to the same thing, but appear differently to our minds. Different senses, same referent, kind of deal, as Feser says. And if you understand that, then you must also understand that if something is more good, then it is also metaphysically and necessarily, have more actual being.
Like I said, if you find this idea absurd, then your beef is with Aquinas, not me. It’s his doctrine, and one that is quite central to his system, actually. That’s all I meant, and it wasn’t supposed to be an insult. It was supposed to let you know who you should be upset at when it comes to your difficulties for these positions.
No. Read the passage you cited.
ReplyDeleteI did.
With regards to unforeseen consequences, there are two types: (a) those actions that typically result in a good or evil consequence in the majority of cases, and (b) those actions that accidentally or incidentally result in a good or evil consequence. He says that (a), even if unforeseen, can count as a good or evil action, if it is part of the nature of the action to have a good or bad consequence in the majority of cases.
You know why that is? Guess. Go on.
It's because, if I shoot myself--thinking, "Well, maybe I won't die"--, then it's still a sin. The nature of the action is evil right off the bat. Why? Because I should and in some sense do know that it will result in suicide. The effect may be deduced from the cause via simple syllogism. On the other hand, if I shoot a metal wall and the bullet ricochets into my head and kills me, then it is not necessarily a sin. Why? Because the nature of the action was not evil: it was neutral. The evil that came of it was accidental, and did not necessarily follow from the action.
Aquinas also gives us the example that a man who sleeps with a woman who he thinks is his wife is not necessarily sinning. On the other hand, if he sleeps with someone else's wife, then it's a sin. Why? Because, by its nature, the action of sleeping with your wife is not sinful--the sin in scenario 1 is accidental. On the other hand, sleeping with someone else's wife is sinful by nature--and the man should know this--, and so the nature of the action is evil. Consider: if I light someone's house on fire, but then people inside die without my intending it, then I'm still responsible. My own stupidity and negligence do not excuse my evil actions. That's all Aquinas is saying.
Throw in the relevant caveats about the person's ability to wilfully decide to do these things. It isn't sinful if the person is an undiagnosed schizophrenic, for instance. The actions remain bad but not in a moral sense.
Notice that his discussion of (a) in the passage makes your entire account false.
ReplyDeleteSadly, your ideas regarding virtue ethics are wrong. You clearly have done very little reading in this field. The wise choice would be to accept defeat instead of digging your hole deeper.
And remember that it is in the nature of the action to have those consequences, which means that even if you want to just focus upon the nature of the action, you necessarily have to include the consequences, because they are part of the nature of the action.
The only relevant part is the person's action (will + execution). This is why Symington can make his ruthless comments regarding Sophie's Choice. And, in case you're wondering about his truthfulness to Aquinas, I should tell you that I got that article from a Feser link round-up.
Cite Aquinas. Perhaps Anscombe shoehorned Aquinas into an ethical theory that she pioneered. It’s not like that has ever happened before, i.e. a great thinker forced into taking positions that do not accurately represent their true views.
I have. You insist on misreading him. Go read Feser, Foot, Anscombe, Aquinas--any of them. You'll get the same answers. Your understanding of virtue ethics is almost non-existent, and yet you seem to believe that my analysis--forget that, the analysis of one of the most major virtue ethicists ever--is completely wrong.
As for the rest of this debate:
Welp. I just discovered where dguller went wrong--and where the rest of us (or at least I) got confused. Actuality is not being. Being is something more fundamental than any actuality. Both actuality and potentiality are only potential when considered against being, to paraphrase Wikipedia. God is beyond actuality, being instead Being Itself. Because of this, there is a difference between something's existence--even prime matter exists--and its actuality or potentiality. Being encompasses and exceeds both categories. However, unlike actuality, being is only analogous. If things existed (read: had being) univocally, then they would all be the same things. Rather, their actuality is univocal, but their being is not. As a result, dguller's objection vanishes. Someone can fail to actualize potentialities without fading from existence. Further, you cannot say that someone has "more being" than someone else. This would only be possible if being was univocal like actuality; but it is not univocal. I hope this clears up the debate. At the very least, I learned something new: I finally understand why the Second Way is so important.
Also: I'd like to apologize for my mistakes here. Several of my earlier points were wrong, because, like dguller, I misunderstood what exactly "being" meant. I hadn't yet realized that it was considered higher than any of the other categories. Again, apologies.
ReplyDeleteTo explain dguller's confusion in more concrete terms.
ReplyDeleteWell, if you understand his system, then you must understand that, according to him – not me! – goodness, truth, perfection and actual being are all coextensive.
Being is not actuality. It's higher up. Being is truth, goodness, perfection and so forth, but it is not possible to talk about being (existence) in the sense of having "more" or "less". The opposite of existence is not potentiality, but rather non-existence--nothing. While it is true that actuality is more perfect that potentiality, neither would exist without being. Further, actuality and potentiality are univocal ideas, while being is only analogical. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about something having "more being", because nothing exists in exactly the same sense. My distinction between reality--being--and actuality still stands, albeit in a slightly altered form.
One last post.
ReplyDeleteHowever, the three points to which dguller must agree still stand. There are as follows.
1. Something either has being or does not.
2. Nothing can have "more being" (more "reality") than anything else.
3. Humans and their moral actions are not identical under Thomistic virtue ethics.
The ideas of "more being", "more human" and "less human" are clearly incoherent under Aquinas's understanding of existence. Existence simply is--full stop. Either it exists or it doesn't. The same goes for all kinds of being, whether potential, actual, logical or any other kind.
I kind of wish that someone had realized this on page 2. Page 3, at the very least. It would have saved a few days of being at each other's throats.
Human, person, human being, man, people... I've seen these used in a loose and interchangeable way during the discussion.
ReplyDeleteHuman being is not the same as person. dguller accused Crude (and all Thomists) of being committed to a metaphysics which determines homosexuals as less human. He was wrong, and in my opinion he aggravated his error by doubling down and demanding we sign up to his many misreadings or somehow forfeit the argument.
A person is a subject with intellect and free will and, as such, I would say that in committing homosexual acts a homosexual is not as morally good a person as a married man having intercourse with his wife. Why? Because morality is precisely the place where intellect and will intersect. A good person is not slave to his appetites.
Human beings, as many have said over and over, are animals with a unique capacity for rationality. That is their essence. A property, such as the power of laughing, is a note that results so necessarily from an essence that the essence cannot exist without it and the note never exists but in such an essence. So angels, being rational, may abstract the comedy from reality but lack the bodies of animals to make the noise (dguller's chimps can make the noise but, lacking the rationality, don't see comedy). dguller seems to want to make sex, or having sex, an "essential property" (whatever he means by that) of being human, but it's not in the definition that he claims to accept.
Whether or not sex has a pleasurable of unitive purpose, it clearly has a procreative end. The continued existence of mankind depends on it. If evil is the privation of a thing where that thing properly should be, choosing sexual activity that frustrates the procreative end is a moral action (intellect vs. will) not essential.
Temporal accidents aside a foetus is a human being as much as Dr Feser and an acorn is as much an oak as an oak tree is. dguller rejects this while insisting he has a better grasp of Aquinas and Stump on the issue. Is Dr Feser a better, more true philosopher than a foetus? Undoubtedly. A better human being? No.
If we shaved dguller's head would he be less human? A better thinker? Or merely a better skinhead, and worse emo?
I've previously accused dguller of lapsing into extreme realism, and we see a symptom here again as he, like Plato (that's pretty good company, mind!), reifies the ideal as "more real". If by more real, he means more true or genuine I don't think anyone has a problem. But more real as in more being? Nope - being or non-being are your options.
ReplyDeleteSo a one-armed man has an inferior human body not an inferior human being. A blind man has inferior sight, or even inferior eyes, but is no worse a human being.
Dr Feser warns in Aquinas that the doctrine of convertibility is, for modern readers anyway, hardest to understand in the cases of true and good. This certainly seems to have been borne out in this discussion, no matter how adamantly dguller insists he has definitively expressed the Thomist understanding. For the avoidance of any doubt: I don't disagree with any of dguller's Stump or Aquinas quotes but believe he has conflated being with actual being - and, most importantly, actualizing this or that common accident makes no difference to a thing's essence.
I rate dguller very highly (for what that's worth), and have always enjoyed conversing with him or reading others do so. But his comments in this thread have lacked humility and, as Joe K pointed out, simply begged the question: "judging is bad unless you're judging bad things," he seems to be saying, "and homosexuality isn't bad."
Well buggery or whatever is choosing a wrong (depriving sex of the procreative end proper to its nature), and so morally bad; but that's got nothing to do with the human essence or convertibility of transcendentals as far as I can see.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteI have. You insist on misreading him. Go read Feser, Foot, Anscombe, Aquinas--any of them. You'll get the same answers. Your understanding of virtue ethics is almost non-existent, and yet you seem to believe that my analysis--forget that, the analysis of one of the most major virtue ethicists ever--is completely wrong.
You know what. I’m just gonna admit I’m wrong. :)
Both actuality and potentiality are only potential when considered against being, to paraphrase Wikipedia.
How can actuality be potential? It actually exists. It does not potentially exist. Certainly, before it actually existed it only potentially existed, but once it actually exists, it actually exists.
God is beyond actuality, being instead Being Itself.
How can God be beyond actuality when he is Pure Actuality?
Because of this, there is a difference between something's existence--even prime matter exists--and its actuality or potentiality.
But even prime matter exists, but only potentially. It does not exist actually.
Being encompasses and exceeds both categories.
I don’t think actuality and potentiality are categories at all. Actually, I don’t know where they would fit in an A-T system at all.
However, unlike actuality, being is only analogous. If things existed (read: had being) univocally, then they would all be the same things. Rather, their actuality is univocal, but their being is not. As a result, dguller's objection vanishes.
So, it is impossible to say that there are degrees of being, even in an analaogous sense?
Someone can fail to actualize potentialities without fading from existence.
But that is only because they actually exist to begin with in order to have any potentialities whatsoever. Potentiality is dependent upon actuality.
Further, you cannot say that someone has "more being" than someone else.
First, my argument has always stated that there are degrees of actual being, and so I’m not too sure what the relevance is of bringing in being in general.
Second, it still seems to be that actual being is the only being that matters, and even potential being, which is the only other kind of being in the dichotomy, can be understood as an imperfect kind of actuality, i.e. as a kind of actuality that has not been fully actualized (yet), and that “(yet)” is the element of non-being contained within potential being that makes it imperfect as actual being.
Third, if the transcendentals all refer to the same thing, then how can that same thing be more or less in one sense, all-or-nothing in another sense, and yet refer to the same thing? I mean, that referent either admits degrees or is dichotomous in reality. How can it be both at the same time? And if it is only dichotomous, then where does the more-or-less come from?
Rank:
ReplyDeleteFor me, it made more sense to think that Aquinas was specifically referring to actual being in the transcendentals, and not being in general. That’s why he writes: “everything is perfect so far as it is actual” and “being properly signifies that something actually is” (ST Ia 5.1). And that is why even having a potentiality is considered good, but only insofar as one actually has that potentiality, and even better if that potentiality itself is actualized. Furthermore, since we all agree that actual being can admit of degrees, then it also fits in nicely into the transcendentals, which all also admit of degrees.
But I honestly can’t understand how it’s supposed to work with just being itself rather than actual being. Help me out here?
The opposite of existence is not potentiality, but rather non-existence--nothing.
But that’s just because existence = actual being + potential being. Once you negate those two kinds of being, then you are left with non-being. Being itself can be understood by all that actually exists or could actually exist. And since actuality and potentiality can admit of degrees, then it seems that being itself could also admit of degrees, no?
While it is true that actuality is more perfect that potentiality, neither would exist without being.
That is why they are called actual being and potential being. They are both kinds of being, but if potentiality is a kind of actuality, then really they can be understood as a perfect kind of actual being and an imperfect kind of actual being, and thus maybe have a univocal meaning between the two?
Therefore, it is impossible to talk about something having "more being", because nothing exists in exactly the same sense.
So, when I say that a dog exists and a cat exists, then they don’t exist in the same sense? What about John exists and Mary exists. Do they exist in the same sense? Or do you mean something in particular by “nothing exists in exactly the same sense”?
Jack:
ReplyDeleteHuman beings, as many have said over and over, are animals with a unique capacity for rationality. That is their essence … dguller seems to want to make sex, or having sex, an "essential property" (whatever he means by that) of being human, but it's not in the definition that he claims to accept.
Humans are still animals, and animality is constituted by procreation. A good animal is one that can and does procreate. Since human beings are part of the genus animal, and good human beings should also exemplify good animality, and good animality requires procreation as the end of all sexual activity. If you want to say that our animality is irrelevant to what makes us good human beings, then homosexually is no longer objectionable, because it is part of our animality, which is now irrelevant. However, our animality is relevant, and it should be relevant for a number of good reasons.
Is Dr Feser a better, more true philosopher than a foetus? Undoubtedly. A better human being? No.
A human being who actually uses their intellect properly is not a better instantiation of a human being than a human being who uses their intellect improperly and mistakenly? Is it part of the essence of humanity just to have the power to use our intellect, but it does not matter how one uses that intellect, or even if one uses it at all?
dguller,
ReplyDeleteThink about it this way. Something cannot be in potency or in act before it simply exists. Something must be before it can be anything. And here there is only being and not-being. Even a substantial form must receive its existence--its being--from something else. Once something exists, one may consider it in terms of actuality and potentiality. Therefore, one cannot talk about something having more or less existence--only more or less actuality.
Further, because being is not a genus, but rather appears in everything that is (anything that exists), it makes no sense to say that something could have "more being". For something to "have more" means that it participates in one of Aristotle's ten categories: the category quantity must be predicable of it. Yet, being already exists within all of the ten categories in different ways. Quantity is already "being-in-quantity", for instance--so how can quantity differentiate itself? It's impossible.
It follows that every that exists just does have being. Hence, humans just do exist, after which point we pay consider the extent of their actualization.
Edit: "after which point we may consider".
ReplyDeleteOne last link: http://realityreflectionsonbeingandexistence.blogspot.com/2009/01/thomistic-metaphysics-lecture-notes-1.html
ReplyDeleteRank:
ReplyDeleteThink about it this way. Something cannot be in potency or in act before it simply exists. Something must be before it can be anything. And here there is only being and not-being.
And that is where I just think things don’t make any sense. To exist is to actually exist. As Aquinas says, “being properly signifies that something actually is” (ST Ia 5.1). To say that something must exist before it actually exists is like saying that something must be somewhere before it can be somewhere. I just don’t know what that means. It is like saying that God can exist atemporally in a state whereby everything is present at once in an eternal present. How can something be simultaneously present and yet atemporal. Simultaneity is only meaningful in a temporal context, i.e. at the same time (and even with relativity, you have to make reference to the same frame of reference). Similarly, to say that something must exist before it actually exists just makes no sense to me. If something exists, then it actually exists to some degree. Either it actually exists as actuality (with or without some admixture of potentiality), or it actually exists as potentiality. To say otherwise just turns into gobbledygook, at least to me.
Even a substantial form must receive its existence--its being--from something else. Once something exists, one may consider it in terms of actuality and potentiality. Therefore, one cannot talk about something having more or less existence--only more or less actuality.
What has being, but is neither actual nor potential? Not God, who is Pure Actuality. Not prime matter, which is pure potentiality. Not any angelic or created being, which is an admixture of actuality and potentiality. Can you point to anything that justifies your position? Everything that exists in any sense of the word must have actuality and/or potentiality.
Further, because being is not a genus, but rather appears in everything that is (anything that exists), it makes no sense to say that something could have "more being". For something to "have more" means that it participates in one of Aristotle's ten categories: the category quantity must be predicable of it. Yet, being already exists within all of the ten categories in different ways. Quantity is already "being-in-quantity", for instance--so how can quantity differentiate itself? It's impossible.
Now, that is an excellent point.
A few points in response.
First, God is Pure Actuality, which just means Maximal Actuality, i.e. the maximum amount of actuality without any potentiality remaining. If degrees of actual being required the category of quantity, then the category of quantity would have to be applicable to God in the sense of having the most possible actuality, which is total or maximal actuality. However, “quantity” is an accident, and God admits of no accidents, which means that either God can have accidents, God is not Pure Actuality, or there is a conception of degrees that does not require the category of quantity.
Second, if we say that being must be actual being, then perhaps being could be a genus after all. There is nothing outside of being, because being is the totality of all that exists, and if being can be defined as actual being, then the division within being is between perfect actuality and imperfect actuality. Perfect actuality is actuality without any admixture of non-being, whereas imperfect actuality is actuality with an admixture of non-being, which is what potential being can be understood to be. After all, non-being is not something that affects being, either from without or within. It is nothing at all. However, if there is non-being in actual being, then you have potential being, which is an imperfect kind of actual being, and if there is no non-being in actual being, then you have actual being per se. Does that work?
>First, God is Pure Actuality, which just means Maximal Actuality, i.e. the maximum amount of actuality without any potentiality remaining.
ReplyDelete100% false! You should know by now God is NOT a being alongside other beings only more uber.
That violates Classic Theism 101.
You need to go back to the drawing board.
dguller my spider senses tell me you are thinking about this in reductionist terms.
ReplyDeleteGod is not maximal anything. What God is is radically different than what we are
http://payingattentiontothesky.com/2011/02/14/aquinas-proves-atheists-are-closer-to-god-than-they-think/
Ben:
ReplyDelete100% false! You should know by now God is NOT a being alongside other beings only more uber
Well, I think that is debatable. There is God, and then there is what God has created. So, there is a sense in which God exists alongside his creation in the sense that he is separate from it, and observed from eternity all at once, even though his creation depends at every instant for its existence upon God. He is both the efficient and final cause of creation, which also implies some degree of separation, and thus existence “alongside” his creation. And anyway, I never said that God was a being. I just said that he is Pure Actuality, which is just actuality without any potentiality whatsoever.
God is not maximal anything. What God is is radically different than what we are
I thought that there is a scale of actual being in which God exists at the top by being Pure Actuality, prime matter occurs at the opposite end as pure potentiality, and everything else exists somewhere in between as admixtures of differing degrees of actuality and potentiality. That is all I meant by saying that God is “maximally actual”, i.e. on that scale, he is at the top. But maybe that makes no sense.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteAnd here’s one more quote, this time from Feser: “what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all” (Aquinas, p. 14). That seems to be consistent with my position, as well.
Here is a though I think dguller is also confusing Substance with being.
ReplyDeleteThings don't have more being they have more substance. Substance in created things is an irreducible combination of being and essence.
Actualizing additional accidental properties makes more substance but not more being or reality.
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteAnd here’s one more quote, this time from Feser: “what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all” (Aquinas, p. 14).
In that quote (I don't have my book with me at the office), what does the context show that the term 'exist' mean in that sentence? Real being or cognitional being, or both?
Josh:
ReplyDeleteIn that quote (I don't have my book with me at the office), what does the context show that the term 'exist' mean in that sentence? Real being or cognitional being, or both?
It is in chapter 2, and is in the section on hylemorphism that discusses prime matter and pure potentiality as having no form, and since form is the actualizing element in any hylemorphic being, because whatever exists must exist as something, and thus must have a form to define it as something at all, and thus, anything without form also does not have actual existence, which Feser says also means that it cannot be said to exist “at all”. I take that to mean that true existence is actual existence, and potential existence is an inferior and imperfect kind of actuality, i.e. one that is actually directed towards the actualization of some state of affairs as defined by the final end of the thing’s essence. It is like actual being with elements of non-being within it, because there is an potentiality for something that is not actually existing, and thus can be construed as not existing at all at that present moment in time.
But maybe Feser was just casually speaking. It just seems that intuitively, actual being is the perfect and genuine kind of being, and that potency necessarily is an imperfect kind of actuality that includes elements of non-being within itself. And under that construal, it certainly makes sense that a being can acquire more being as it actualizes its potencies, and perhaps even that being can be understood as a genus, but that will have to be debated further on this thread.
Ben:
ReplyDeleteHere is a though I think dguller is also confusing Substance with being.
Things don't have more being they have more substance. Substance in created things is an irreducible combination of being and essence.
Actualizing additional accidental properties makes more substance but not more being or reality.
No, I am not talking about substances or accidents at all. I’m focusing upon actual and potential being. Substances and accidents are also either actual or actually potential, and thus are subsumed under the act-potency division in reality, which I’m arguing is actually a division within actual being itself, as perfect actual being and imperfect actual being, i.e. actual being that is fully actual and actual being that is not fully actual.
Any thoughts?
dguller
ReplyDeleteHumans are still animals, and animality is constituted by procreation. A good animal is one that can and does procreate.
That animality is constituted by procreation, I deny. Animals, because, they include all the vegetative powers along with their own sensitive and locomotive powers, do have the power of reproduction. This may be an essential power. But an animal exercising that power (or actualizing that potential as you seem to have put it) is no better qua animality than one that is eating (or exercising its nutritive powers). Nor is it better than a third animal that is simply standing there. All animal substances have the same powers and whether they are being exercised, or are accidentally frustrated (due to age, illness, injury, or whatever) makes no difference.
A human being who actually uses their intellect properly is not a better instantiation of a human being than a human being who uses their intellect improperly and mistakenly?
Qua human being, the two are identical. As a thinker, the former is better and, given a strict definition of person, the former also makes a better person. But these two human substances (men) both have the identical essence of rational animal and all associated powers.
Once again, whether the powers are being exercised, or accidentally frustrated, makes no difference.
Is it part of the essence of humanity just to have the power to use our intellect, but it does not matter how one uses that intellect, or even if one uses it at all?
With respect to that subject's humanity it does not matter.
Is dguller no more than an animal when he's asleep? After all he's not acting rationally at all in those hours.
ReplyDeleteIt seems as though dguller has convinced himself that he is.
>No, I am not talking about substances or accidents at all.
ReplyDeleteI have no doubt that is your intention but you are confusing the issue never the less.
A substance is an irreducible combination of being & essence. True or False?
Your arguments it seems applies to substance more that it does too being.
Something can be more substansive but it doesn't per say have more being. Someone with 20-20 vision has more substansive vision then I do but obviously is no more or less real than I.
Yeh I think you are confusing substance with being here much like I confused attributes with accidences.
You could even say 20-20 vision dude has more substansive being than moi but that has nothing to do with being real vs not.
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteIt just seems that intuitively, actual being is the perfect and genuine kind of being, and that potency necessarily is an imperfect kind of actuality that includes elements of non-being within itself.
I'm afraid I still don't follow. Are you saying there is no real distinction between actuality and potentiality, but only a conceptual distinction?
Jack:
ReplyDeleteThat animality is constituted by procreation, I deny. Animals, because, they include all the vegetative powers along with their own sensitive and locomotive powers, do have the power of reproduction. This may be an essential power. But an animal exercising that power (or actualizing that potential as you seem to have put it) is no better qua animality than one that is eating (or exercising its nutritive powers). Nor is it better than a third animal that is simply standing there. All animal substances have the same powers and whether they are being exercised, or are accidentally frustrated (due to age, illness, injury, or whatever) makes no difference.
In other words, simply by having an essential power makes all such beings equal, and nothing can possibly make any difference in regards their degree of goodness or perfection. They are all equally good and perfect. So a sick and injured animal is just as good as a healthy and active animal, and it is literally false to say that the former is a poorer and deficient example of what an animal is supposed to be than the latter.
Qua human being, the two are identical. As a thinker, the former is better and, given a strict definition of person, the former also makes a better person. But these two human substances (men) both have the identical essence of rational animal and all associated powers.
But the former cannot be a better human being by virtue of actualizing their power of intellect. They are equally good and perfect simply by having the power of intellect. It does not matter if it is actualized to its ideal capacity, or if it is used in a perverted way, or if it is never used at all. None of this matters when we are trying to figure out whether a human being is good or bad.
Once again, whether the powers are being exercised, or accidentally frustrated, makes no difference.
Got it. The saints are all as perfect and good as the worst sinners. There is no difference whatsoever between them.
With respect to that subject's humanity it does not matter.
Right. A triangle with straight lines and internal angles that almost adds up to 175 degrees is just as good as a triangle with wavy lines and internal angles that add up to 150 degrees. After all, with respect to their triangularity, it does not matter, and thus it makes no sense to say that the former is a better triangle than the latter, which also means that it is a more good example of a triangle, a more perfect example of a triangle, and a more true example of a triangle. All of this has to be cast aside in the same of a radical equality that brooks no difference whatsoever.
Needless to say, this all strikes me as odd. I think that a being that is actualizing an essential power is more in conformity with the ideal set forth in its nature than a being that is not actualizing the same essential power. The former is making an ideal become actually real in reality, and the closer it approximates that ideal, the more good, the more true, and the more perfect it is. Your account would make all of this impossible. All beings with the same essence are exactly the same as beings with that nature, and nothing could possibly allow you to rank them as better or worse, more good or less good, more perfect or less perfect, more true or less true, which strikes me as very odd.
Is dguller no more than an animal when he's asleep? After all he's not acting rationally at all in those hours.
I would be less a rational animal, because I am not actualizing my locomotion, sensation or rationality at that time. My powers are all remaining in potency, and it would be better if they were in act, because act is associated with perfection, goodness, and truth. As a human being, I am necessarily an admixture of actuality and potentiality, and thus it is always the case that some power is remaining potential, but that is not the ideal, but rather is part of the limitations that come with being a finite being.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteI'm afraid I still don't follow. Are you saying there is no real distinction between actuality and potentiality, but only a conceptual distinction?
No, there is a real distinction between perfect actuality and imperfect actuality. Perfect actuality has no non-being present whatsoever, and imperfect actuality has non-being present. The former would conform to actual being, and the latter would conform to potential being. This is real in the sense that it refers to the actual configuration and behavior of actual being, which is all that reality is.
Dguller,
ReplyDeletePerfect actuality has no non-being present whatsoever, and imperfect actuality has non-being present.
It seems like you're treating potential beings as things in themselves, with just less actuality. It's like saying accidents are substances, but just less so, instead of saying that accidents depend for their being on substances. Or, potentialities are actualities, just less so, instead of depending for their being on actualities. In your formulation, I don't see the basis for a real distinction, unless you are treating non-being as a thing with actuality itself, which is surely absurd.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteIt seems like you're treating potential beings as things in themselves, with just less actuality. It's like saying accidents are substances, but just less so, instead of saying that accidents depend for their being on substances. Or, potentialities are actualities, just less so, instead of depending for their being on actualities. In your formulation, I don't see the basis for a real distinction, unless you are treating non-being as a thing with actuality itself, which is surely absurd.
I don’t think so. I think it makes sense to say that a being has an actual potentiality, i.e. that potentiality is actually present in the being, as opposed to a potentiality that is not present. For example, there is the potentiality to become an oak. This potentiality is actually present in an acorn, but it is not actually present in a human being. So, the potentialities that matter are the actual potentialities.
And what is a potentiality? It is something that (a) is not actually the case in the present, but (b) should be the case in the future. Both (a) and (b) signify non-being, because neither (a) nor (b) is actually present. However, what is actually present is the teleological direction towards the actualization of that potentiality. The teleology is actually present, which is the actually real part of potentiality, but it also includes the non-being of the final end not actually existing in the present, but existing as a goal to be realized in the future. So, potency is a combination of act and non-being, which is also why it exists as an intermediate between act and non-being.
And there is a distinction between an actuality that is fully actual and an actuality that is partially actual, i.e. contains unactualized potentialities, i.e. contains an element of non-being. And of course, you cannot have an actuality that is not actual at all. That would be contradictory.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteIt's like saying accidents are substances, but just less so, instead of saying that accidents depend for their being on substances
Also, a substance is just something that does not depend upon anything else for its existence, and an accident is just something that does depend upon something else for its existence. The difference is that with regards to substances and accidents, there are no degrees. Here, I would agree that it is an all-or-nothing affair. A thing either depends upon something else for its existence, or it does not. There is no partial dependence. I would argue that this differs from actual being, which does come in degrees of actuality.
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteSo, the potentialities that matter are the actual potentialities.
What you're saying is interesting, and I really want to understand it. I need to make sure I understand what you mean by 'actual' here. You don't mean that the potentialities are in act themselves, by and through themselves?
Here, I would agree that it is an all-or-nothing affair. A thing either depends upon something else for its existence, or it does not. There is no partial dependence. I would argue that this differs from actual being, which does come in degrees of actuality.
How can I square this with Feser, TLS, pg. 55:
"While actuality and potentiality are fully intelligible only in relation to each other, there is an asymmetry between them, with actuality having metaphysical priority. A potential is always a potential for a certain kind of actuality...Furthermore, potentiality cannot exist on its own, but only in combination with actuality--hence there is no such thing as potential gooeyness all by itself, but only in something like an actual rubber ball."
Josh:
ReplyDeleteYou don't mean that the potentialities are in act themselves, by and through themselves?
I mean that there is a difference between an acorn having the actual potential to become an oak, and a rabbit not actually having the potential to become an oak. In the acorn, that potentiality is actually present as a teleological directedness towards actualizing the potentiality in the future as a final end. And that teleological directedness is actually real. But, you cannot have teleological directedness unless there is an actually existing being that is being directed, which means that this is yet another reason why potency can only exist in act.
How can I square this with Feser, TLS, pg. 55
Where is the contradiction? Potency depends entirely upon act for its existence, and cannot exist without it as a free-floating potency. However, actuality can come in degrees. For example, there is the actual reality that occurs with a primary actuality plus potential secondary actuality, and there is the actual reality that occurs with a primary actuality plus actual secondary actuality. In other words, there is a difference between a human being with the power of intellect (= primary actuality), which is not utilized (= potential secondary actuality), and a human being with the power of intellect (= primary actuality), which is utilized (= actualized secondary actuality). I would argue that the latter has more actual being than the former, because the form still has potency whereas the latter has converted that potency into act.
So, potency depends entirely upon act for its existence, but actual being and potential being can come in degrees.
Does that help?
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteAh I see now.
I mean that there is a difference between an acorn having the actual potential to become an oak, and a rabbit not actually having the potential to become an oak.
Remove the words 'actual' and 'actually,' and this sentence means the same thing. That's what I figured was going on.
Where is the contradiction? Potency depends entirely upon act for its existence
As accidents depend entirely upon substances for theirs? That's the point you denied in the comparison:
A thing either depends upon something else for its existence, or it does not. There is no partial dependence.
I take that back; I see you only meant to make the distinction based on degrees of actuality vs. degrees of substantiality, which I don't have a problem with.
ReplyDeleteI will stick to the first point though: you aren't adding anything meaningful by saying 'actual potential' in those sentences; just leads to unnecessary confusion.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteI will stick to the first point though: you aren't adding anything meaningful by saying 'actual potential' in those sentences; just leads to unnecessary confusion.
You may be right. I only wanted to emphasize that potentiality must be actually present in a particular being for that being to have the teleological directedness towards a final end. It cannot be potentially potential, in other words, but rather actually potential. But again, the teleological directedness is actually present, but the final end is not, and remains potential until it is actualized in the future. At least, that’s my understanding of this stuff.
dguller
ReplyDeleteBut again, the teleological directedness is actually present, but the final end is not, and remains potential until it is actualized in the future. At least, that’s my understanding of this stuff.
You understand this wrong. And you do it because, even after Dr Feser explained what an intellect is to you, you are pre-committed to God not "having" His Intellect. The final end (of an acorn, or whatever) is not potential but actual. Potentials cannot actualize potential, and in this case the final end is ideally actual (ie, it exists in God's intellect as an idea or form - the principle of act)
Jack:
ReplyDeleteYou understand this wrong. And you do it because, even after Dr Feser explained what an intellect is to you, you are pre-committed to God not "having" His Intellect.
Nope. I’m actually okay with God having an Intellect, as Feser construed it, i.e. as an immaterial activity that can assume forms without becoming an instantiation of the form. No problem there. I just wondered why that particular property of the human mind was selected as the most important one over others. I don’t recall an answer being given, but I might have been wrong.
The final end (of an acorn, or whatever) is not potential but actual. Potentials cannot actualize potential, and in this case the final end is ideally actual (ie, it exists in God's intellect as an idea or form - the principle of act)
Let’s break this down.
An acorn has an essence that contains a teleological directedness towards becoming an oak in the future. While the acorn is an acorn is not also an oak. That comes in the future if the acorn is allowed to develop naturally with minimal interference. Once the acorn has become an oak, then there is no longer a potential to become an oak, but rather only the actuality of being an oak. And that is because a thing cannot be potential and actual at the same time, i.e. a thing cannot be an actual oak and a potential oak at the same time.
Now, you can certainly say that because all forms exist in the divine Intellect, and since all forms necessarily imply final causes, then final causes also exist in the divine Intellect, and thus exist actually and not potentially. So, it is a matter of perspective. In other words, from the divine perspective, everything is actual, because God sees the entirety of space-time all at once in an atemporal setting – whatever that means – and thus from God’s Eye View From Nowhere, there is no potentiality whatsoever. And thus, from that perspective the acorn is also an oak, because there is a continuous line from acorn to oak within that chunk of space-time, which God can see all at once.
However, from within space-time, which is where we happen to exist, potentiality does exist, and it exists in the way that I have been describing it. It is an actually present directedness towards the actualization of a potential final cause. I say, “potential final cause”, because that final cause has not been actualized yet. The acorn has not become the oak yet. At the present, it exists as an actual acorn, and not an actual oak, but rather a potential oak. Otherwise, it would be a contradiction to say that an acorn is an oak, because they are clearly different substances. From the divine perspective outside of space-time, it makes sense to say that the acorn is an oak, but from the created perspective within space-time, it cannot make sense to say that.
dguller
ReplyDeleteRight. A triangle with straight lines and internal angles that almost adds up to 175 degrees is just as good as a triangle with wavy lines and internal angles that add up to 150 degrees.
I don't believe the essence of a triangle has ever been described as the "power to have three straight lines enclose a shape with internal angles summing 180 degrees" - it is "three straight lines enclosing a shape with internal angles summing 180 degrees."
With humanity the essence is not "Adonis's adult body acting perfectly rationally," but "animal with the capacity for rationality."
I would be less a rational animal, because I am not actualizing my locomotion, sensation or rationality at that time. And this is you avoiding the question and trying to have it both ways. If your understanding is correct, and actualizing something to a lesser degree makes it less real, then when you are asleep (ie, not actualizing your rationality at all) then you stop being human and become merely an animal. If sleep isn't sufficient, let us say drugged unconscious, say by general anaesthetic.
You've got this as badly wrong as when you were trying to distinguish two types of non-being along the same lines as act and potency.
On this line about oak trees and acorns, an acorn is an oak - it's just not an oak tree. A foetus is a human being - it's just not a toddler, or an adolescent, or an adult.
ReplyDeleteI think you're right to distinguish between potentiality and possibility, which is what I take you to mean when you talk about actual potential and not-actual potential.
All potentials are a potential towards something; a rubber ball has a potential to gooeyness when heated, but it's not more perfectly a ball when it's actualizing that potential gooeyness - in fact it ceases to be a ball at all! This contradicts your belief that a maximally perfect thing actualizes all its potential, surely?
By gooeyness above I mean a puddle of rubbery goo. Not just a gooey ball. Sorry for that slip.
ReplyDeleteJack:
ReplyDeleteI don't believe the essence of a triangle has ever been described as the "power to have three straight lines enclose a shape with internal angles summing 180 degrees" - it is "three straight lines enclosing a shape with internal angles summing 180 degrees."
You are describing the ideal triangle. No actual triangle meets that description, but they all aspire to, and the closer they meet that description of the ideal triangle, the more good, the more perfect, and the more true examples of a triangle they are. So, every time a triangle is created, it is done with a teleological directedness towards actualizing the ideal triangle contained in the essence of triangularity. I don’t think that you could call that a power, because a triangle is inanimate and inert, but I think that all powers are rooted in this teleological directedness, which is common to all beings.
With humanity the essence is not "Adonis's adult body acting perfectly rationally," but "animal with the capacity for rationality."
But the intellect depends upon the body for its ability to function optimally. It requires a body with sensation and locomotion to interact with the world and expose the intellect to phantasms from which it can then extract essences and forms. A human being with brain damage is less able to be perfectly rational than a human being with an intact brain. So, the intellect depends upon the body to function optimally and according to its ideal activity.
Furthermore, the body is something that mind can have phantasms about, and thus have the intellect abstract essences and forms from, which means that the intellect can understand the body’s nature, and also understand the final causes of the body, and the need to actualize them. A deficient body means less actualization of final causes, and thus a less good body.
Certainly, a human being cannot be judged morally by being unable to fulfill a defective body’s final ends, but only for correct apprehending the body’s final ends as true and good, and then trying to actualize them as much as possible, given their limitations. However, I don’t think it is unreasonable to say that a human being with a healthy body and sound intellect is just as good as a human being with an unhealthy and diseased body and sound intellect. The former more conforms to our ideal of humanity than the latter, I think, and thus can be considered more good, as well.
And this is you avoiding the question and trying to have it both ways. If your understanding is correct, and actualizing something to a lesser degree makes it less real, then when you are asleep (ie, not actualizing your rationality at all) then you stop being human and become merely an animal. If sleep isn't sufficient, let us say drugged unconscious, say by general anaesthetic.
No. I still have the primary actuality, even if I do not have the secondary actuality. So, even though I may not have the secondary actuality of locomotion (because I am asleep), I still have the primary actuality of locomotion (as a potentiality, if I were awake). Remember, just because you are less good a human being, you are still a human being. So, I never said that if a human being fails to actualize the potentialities contained in its human essence, then it was not a human, but only a deficient human compared to one that was actualizing those potentialities.
Jack:
ReplyDeleteOn this line about oak trees and acorns, an acorn is an oak - it's just not an oak tree. A foetus is a human being - it's just not a toddler, or an adolescent, or an adult.
Okay. That’s fine. I was talking about oak tree then. The final cause of the acorn is to become an oak tree, even though it remains an oak throughout that process of development. The final cause of the human being is to be a rational animal, even though it remains a human being throughout its development from a fetus that is incapable of the secondary actuality of intellect to an adult that is capable of the secondary actuality of intellect.
This contradicts your belief that a maximally perfect thing actualizes all its potential, surely?
No. I’m talking specifically about potentials to actualize final causes as consistent with a thing’s essence, and not just any kind of potency. An acorn has the final cause to become an oak tree. While it is an acorn, it is not an oak tree, but it could become one under the right circumstances. Once the acorn has become the oak tree, then it is not longer potentially an oak tree, but rather is actually an oak tree. Once that has happened, it has achieved its final end, has no potentiality with regards to its final end, and is considered good, true, and perfect.
I've a few minutes to spare (well, okay, I'm 'pilfering' them (and a lot more than a few)).
ReplyDeletePART I of III
1. Refinement is what characterizes our intellectualist philosophies. -- William James
Someone said of Stump that "..her text is quite clear, but maybe there's some nuances..." Well, the Stump quotation was truncated, and if we undo the truncation of the Stump quotation, then an important nuance will come to light. Here's Stump again (with the truncation reattached):
"It may be right to say of existence that it is all or nothing; and, for Aquinas, the ordinary sense of 'being' is existence simpliciter. But every instance of existence is existence as something or other, and existence as something or other typically admits of degrees. A thing can be a more or less fully developed actualized specimen of its kind; it can have actualized its specifying potentiality to a greater or lesser degree. The ordinary sense of 'goodness', however, has to do with this actualization of the specifying potentiality. And so it is by no means clear that being in general is all or nothing. On Aquinas' view, there is more to being than just existence; the actualization of the specifying potentiality of a thing is also being of a sort." (Aquinas, p. 73).
Stump isn't saying of "the actualization of the specifying potentiality of a thing" merely that it is also being, but that it is also being of a sort. In other words, Stump is letting her readers know that it is not "being" as existence simpliciter, but as something else. She's letting her readers know this for the reason that she knows her Aquinas far too well to say that the two are one and the same. And she lets her readers know that the two are not one and the same, i.e., are not equivalent, by tacking on (without the shouting) OF A SORT.
This appears to be the crux of the debate--what to call this being OF A SORT.
On one side of the debate we have, "Even though there is a noticeable and actual distinction between the two things, we are obligated by Thomist metaphysics to call them by the same name. I've already said that actual being refers to what is the case, and potential being refers to what could be or ought to be the case, and that that's the only distinction I need for my argument. So, as has been said a thousand time already, this 'being of a sort' is 'actual being'. And since this 'being of a sort' can vary from one individual to another, it follows that 'actual being' varies from one individual to another. Therefore, one human can have more actual being, and another human less actual being. You must acknowledge the truth of this. If you do not, then you are rejecting and tossing out chunks of Thomist metaphysics, and disagreeing with the likes of Feser, Stump, etc. You don't think you know Thomist metaphysics better than Feser or Stump, do you? You don't presume to know what Aquinas was saying better than he himself did, do you? Of course not. Therefore, I am right."
And on the other side of the debate we have, "It is for the very reason that there is a noticeable and actual difference between the two things that we are obligated by Thomist metaphysics not to call them by the same name. We acknowledge that what you point to is legitimate and valid. However, we do not acknowledge--indeed we do deny--that this thing which is pointed to is to be called "actual being". If you do call it "actual being", then you breed contradictions."
(cont)
PART II of III
ReplyDelete3. Just then the Dumb Ox lumbered into the room, and, with a snort, did say,
"What, pray tell, art thou bickering about? Have ye moderns not read your William James? Or have ye forgotten his once having mentioned the 'scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction'?
"Think ye that I was unaware of that adage? That I had not foreseen the point presently in dispute? Or that I had, despite having foreseen the point presently in dispute, failed to make the distinction necessary to avoid this... this... this blooming, buzzing confusion now spinning so many heads round and round? For shame, for shame.
4. "Here, move over... No, mercy me, I need room to sit. Keep going. ...Ah, good lad, good lad.
"Now, what is this thing called?"
"It's called a mouse."
"A mouse???" (He picks up the mouse, and peers at it from different angels [sic], turning it this way and that.) "Doesn't look like any of the mice we used to have scurrying about the library. Why is it called a mouse?"
"I honestly don't know. But I always keep a hunk of cheese nearby just in case."
"Hmm. Well, me lad, things should be called what they are. And you need to come up with a new name for this...contraption. Now, as I understand it, I can use this contraption to snip and glue, right?"
"If you mean what I think you mean, then the correct terminology is 'cut and paste'."
"Ah. You're right to correct me, boy. Things should be called what they are. And if it's to be called 'cut and paste', then 'cut and paste' it is. Although... oh, never mind. We've more pertinent things to attend to at the moment, so let's move along."
I was amazed! Surely this was his first experience with a computer. Yet he displayed an aptitude, a facility, dexterity and skill you'd think it would have taken him a lifetime to cultivate and develop.
"I heard that, boy. Thank you for the compliment, but all I've done is click on the bookmark. Bookmark? Hmm. Anyway, what does it say on the screen here?"
"It says, The Summa Theologica."
"The lad can read; very good. Now, what do you think is going to happen if I click on FIRST PART (QQ. 1-119)?"
"The first part of The Summa Theologica will show up on the screen?"
"Will wonders never cease? He can reason, too. Let's click on 5. Of Goodness in General... then scroll down to my reply to the first objection... here. Now, what do you make of that?"
With a lump in my throat, I moved closer to the screen. "It says, 'which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's...'"
(cont)
PART III of III
ReplyDelete"Oh, sorry. Stubby finger, you know. Allow me to adjust. Now what can you read?"
"It says, 'Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being...'"
"Stop! What do you think I'm saying here? I mean, in terms of the debate that's been going on here, what do you think it is that I am saying?"
The lump in my throat disappeared, and I straightened up. Of course. It's so simple!
"Why, you're saying that actual being is 100% actual being, and never more and never less. But any further actuality, which further actuality is being OF A SORT, is relative being."
"'Whoa--no need to shout. But, yes, that's it exactly, my friend. And if it is relative being, what do you think might be a good name to attach to it so as to avoid the contradictions that arise when referring to it by a name used to designate something else?"
"Relative being, of course."
"Absolutely," he said with a smile. "I'm glad you get it. Now that that has been resolved, something must be done with that name you assign to this contraption. Calling it a mouse just doesn't snip it. I'm sure you can work out a better name. But I leave that to you, as I must go now." And he waved goodbye as he disappeared.
Wow... There just are not that many people alive today who get to say that Thomas Aquinas waved goodbye to them. How fortunate I am! How privileged I feel!
But then it dawned on me--maybe he wasn't waving goodbye; maybe it was the hunk of Limburger cheese I keep next to the thingamajiggy whatchamacallit.
5. Thomas Aquinas: Moral Philosophy:
- - - - -
...members of the same species can enjoy different grades of maturity or completeness. As Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump explain, something may be "a more or less fully developed actualized specimen" (Kretzmann and Stump, 1988: 292).
For example, a healthy adult dog is more developed--that is, more actualized--than a puppy, whose fledgling state prevents it from participating in those activities characteristic of more mature dogs (e.g., reproduction, nurturing their young, etc.).
The actuality referred to here is what Aquinas calls relative being. He says: "by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively" (ST Ia 5.1 ad 1).
The idea of "relative being" refers to the quality that accrues when a living thing exercises its species-defining capacities and, in turn, becomes a more perfect. Again, by "more perfect" Aquinas simply means "more actual." For "anything whatever is perfect to the extent that it is in actuality, since potentiality without actuality is imperfect" (ST IaIIae 3.2).
And just as a thing's relative being is a matter of degree, so there is a kind of goodness--"relative goodness"--that corresponds to the degree of actuality a thing has. For "goodness [in the current sense] is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality"--the kind of actuality that goes beyond a thing's mere substantial being (ST Ia 5.1 ad 3; ST IaIIae 18.1; SCG III 3, 4).
- - - - -
So, if non-superadded actuality is "actual being", and superadded actuality is "relative being", then "actual being" (non-superadded actuality) is always 100%, while "relative being" (superadded actuality) can be less than 100%. Thus no human being can have more or less "actual being" than any other human being. But one human being can have more or less "relative being" than some other human being(s).
Interesting there Glenn.
ReplyDeleteVery interesting.
Thoughts peanut gallery?
Glenn and The O Floinn, my favorite posters of the century. Be safe in travels, and come back quickly!
ReplyDeleteHowever, I don’t think it is unreasonable to say that a human being with a healthy body and sound intellect is just as good as a human being with an unhealthy and diseased body and sound intellect. The former more conforms to our ideal of humanity than the latter, I think, and thus can be considered more good, as well.
Well which is it? Just as good or more good? One leads to securing the weak, the other to Eugenics!
Glenn,
ReplyDeleteThus no human being can have more or less "actual being" than any other human being. But one human being can have more or less "relative being" than some other human being(s).
And this reiterates what I said earlier about saying 'more human' when you really mean 'better human,' i.e., having more "relative being" actualized with respect to your substance/actual being/humanity.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteSo, if non-superadded actuality is "actual being", and superadded actuality is "relative being", then "actual being" (non-superadded actuality) is always 100%, while "relative being" (superadded actuality) can be less than 100%. Thus no human being can have more or less "actual being" than any other human being. But one human being can have more or less "relative being" than some other human being(s).
First of all, I greatly enjoyed your post. :)
Second, thank you for the additional Aquinas quotes. They really helped to clarify my thinking.
Third, let me tell you what I think.
I agree that substantial being is either all or nothing, because substantial being occurs when a substantial form is present to define what kind of type a thing is, whether it is material or immaterial. The fact that two things share the same substantial form, or essence, means that they are both the same kind of thing. This is the all-or-nothing part, or “being simply”. You can say that every thing that shares the same essence has the same amount of actual being, and thus goodness, simply because it actually exists to some extent. Maybe say that they all have 50 units of actual being. You need this minimal amount of actual being to even get into the game, as it were. Without it, you are sitting on the sidelines of non-being.
The other part is “relative being”, which what is over and above this “being simply”, in the sense that “being simply” sets the stage, the foundation of essence that contains the ideal that all beings of the same kind aspire to actualize in reality. This form of actual being is relative to how well that being actualizes the ideal contained in its essence. The more it actualizes that potentiality, the more actual being it has. The less it actualizes that potentiality, the less actual being it has. Say X actualizes that potentiality to add 25 units of actual being, and Y actualizes that potentiality to add only 5 units of actual being. So, we can say that X has 75 units of actual being, and Y has 55 units of actual being. Thus, X is more good, more perfect and more true than Y on the basis of having more actual being.
The former can be analogous to primary actuality and the latter can be analogous to secondary actuality. All beings of a particular kind have the same primary actuality, which is just the potential to have secondary actuality. Just by having primary actuality, each being has a minimal amount of actual being, because you need the primary actuality to even have the secondary actuality And thus, all beings that have the same primary actuality have the same amount of actual being, and thus the same amount of goodness, perfection, and so on. However, this is just the baseline. Once they differentially acquire a secondary actuality, then there are different amounts of extra actual being, which can be added to the baseline amount of actual being. The more total actual being a being has, the more good, perfect, and so on, that being is, compared to others.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteWell which is it? Just as good or more good? One leads to securing the weak, the other to Eugenics!
Sorry, I meant to write: “However, I don’t think it is unreasonable to say that a human being with a healthy body and sound intellect is less good as a human being with an unhealthy and diseased body and sound intellect.”
The moral implications of the doctrine are a secondary issue. I just want to be clear about the metaphysical implications first.
Dguller,
ReplyDeleteThe moral implications of the doctrine are a secondary issue. I just want to be clear about the metaphysical implications first.
Even supposing that were true, both the clear logical line to Eugenics and the universal lack of Thomists holding to such a doctrine would seem to be an inductive proof against your interpretations, separate from the theoretical points.
But all that aside, I had agreed with you earlier when by "more human" you assented that the phrase was synonymous with "better human."
ReplyDeleteAnd if this is the case, I really don't see what the beef is. If Dguller wants to use technical language in a way that confuses people at first glance, like 'actual potential,' then I'm fine with it if it's clarified.
Josh:
ReplyDeleteEven supposing that were true, both the clear logical line to Eugenics and the universal lack of Thomists holding to such a doctrine would seem to be an inductive proof against your interpretations, separate from the theoretical points.
I’m leaving emotion aside, and just looking at the logic. We’ll see where the discussion ends to see if my interpretation has any validity or not. I think that we are reaching some kind of consensus here. :)
But all that aside, I had agreed with you earlier when by "more human" you assented that the phrase was synonymous with "better human."
See? :)
First...
ReplyDeleteThank you.
Second...
You're welcome.
Third, let me tell you what I think... This form of actual being is relative to how well that being actualizes the ideal contained in its essence. The more it actualizes that potentiality, the more actual being it has. The less it actualizes that potentiality, the less actual being it has.
Although I disagree with the terminology employed (or, rather, with the particular way in which it is being employed (this is a Thomist-centric blog, after all)), I see the non-terminological something it is being used to point at. Clear as daylight. And while I haven't any problem with the non-terminological something being point at, I also haven't any problem with Thomists insisting on the employment of correct Thomistic terminology on a Thomist-centric blog. If fact, it would be extremely disappointing if they didn't.
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteAlthough I disagree with the terminology employed (or, rather, with the particular way in which it is being employed (this is a Thomist-centric blog, after all)), I see the non-terminological something it is being used to point at. Clear as daylight. And while I haven't any problem with the non-terminological something being point at, I also haven't any problem with Thomists insisting on the employment of correct Thomistic terminology on a Thomist-centric blog. If fact, it would be extremely disappointing if they didn't.
No problem there.
And that is where I just think things don’t make any sense. To exist is to actually exist.
ReplyDeleteNow that I'm more clear-headed, let me try to put into words what I've been reading, one more time.
There are two senses of being. One is "esse", which is an act of existence. Aquinas calls this the "actuality of actualities": it is above all other conceptions of actuality. The other is "ens", which is "being"--a combination between essence and esse. Whatever is ens must have esse to exist. While esse is not subject to the analogy of being, ens is. As a result, a blind eye might have "less esse"--less existence--in one sense, but this does not mean that the ens of a dog is the same as the ens of a human.
As a result, it makes no sense to say that something has "less ens"--"less being", "less reality". Ens transcends Aristotle's ten categories, and so applies to all of them in different ways. As quantity is one of the categories, this makes it impossible to divide ens by it. Everything that is in quantity is already an ens.
First, God is Pure Actuality, which just means Maximal Actuality, i.e. the maximum amount of actuality without any potentiality remaining. If degrees of actual being required the category of quantity, then the category of quantity would have to be applicable to God in the sense of having the most possible actuality, which is total or maximal actuality.
God is considered to be above the ten categories by Aquinas. Further, his essence and existence--two of Aquinas's above-the-ten-cateogories concepts--are identical. In beings, they are necessarily separate; but in God, who is being itself, this is not the case. Otherwise, he would be merely another being among beings.
Second, if we say that being must be actual being, then perhaps being could be a genus after all.
Oderberg trashes every potential argument for this position in Real Essentialism. I really don't think there's any hope of taking it.
Perfect actuality is actuality without any admixture of non-being, whereas imperfect actuality is actuality with an admixture of non-being, which is what potential being can be understood to be.
Non-being is merely privation, which, as Oderberg says, would have to be a genus itself. Yet, it cannot be said to be a genus, because it is not "something or other". Rather, it is nothing. Nothing cannot divide something, seeing as it does not exist. To say that it could is to say that "nothing" is really "more like something", only different.
Once they differentially acquire a secondary actuality, then there are different amounts of extra actual being, which can be added to the baseline amount of actual being. The more total actual being a being has, the more good, perfect, and so on, that being is, compared to others.
Yes. However, you are now incapable of slipping in the distinction between "real" and "less real", because real-ness (being-ness) relates to ens.
dguller,
ReplyDelete- - - - -
Glenn:
Although I disagree with the terminology employed (or, rather, with the particular way in which it is being employed (this is a Thomist-centric blog, after all)), I see the non-terminological something it is being used to point at. Clear as daylight. And while I haven't any problem with the non-terminological something being point at, I also haven't any problem with Thomists insisting on the employment of correct Thomistic terminology on a Thomist-centric blog. If fact, it would be extremely disappointing if they didn't.
No problem there.
- - - - -
Shake on it (on both points of view)?
Rank:
ReplyDeleteThere are two senses of being. One is "esse", which is an act of existence. Aquinas calls this the "actuality of actualities": it is above all other conceptions of actuality. The other is "ens", which is "being"--a combination between essence and esse. Whatever is ens must have esse to exist. While esse is not subject to the analogy of being, ens is.
So, esse is actual existence, and ens is actually existing as something. After all, ens is a combination of essence (i.e. what something is) and existence (i.e. that something is), and esse is just the latter part of ens, i.e. actual being.
As a result, a blind eye might have "less esse"--less existence--in one sense, but this does not mean that the ens of a dog is the same as the ens of a human.
I agree with the former, and never asserted the latter. So, we’re good so far.
As a result, it makes no sense to say that something has "less ens"--"less being", "less reality". Ens transcends Aristotle's ten categories, and so applies to all of them in different ways. As quantity is one of the categories, this makes it impossible to divide ens by it. Everything that is in quantity is already an ens.
This is where I disagree. I think that if you can meaningfully say that an ens can have more or less esse, then you can say that an ens can be more or less actually real.
Look at it this way:
Say that you could measure the amount of esse in units of esse. So, an ens can have 2 units of esse, and another ens can have 6 units of esse. After all, you agreed that something can have more or less esse. Now, say you have ens X and ens Y, each of which share essence E. X has 10 units of esse and Y has 5 units of esse. Thus:
(1) X = E + 10 units of esse
(2) Y = E + 5 units of esse
Are you really telling me that it is impossible to say that X is more of a good example of E than Y on the basis of its having more units of esse than Y? Also, if esse also transcends the categories, then how can you have more or less esse after all? And if esse does not transcend the categories, then which category does it fit under?
God is considered to be above the ten categories by Aquinas. Further, his essence and existence--two of Aquinas's above-the-ten-cateogories concepts--are identical. In beings, they are necessarily separate; but in God, who is being itself, this is not the case. Otherwise, he would be merely another being among beings.
Ben already corrected me on this score. Thanks, Ben.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteNon-being is merely privation, which, as Oderberg says, would have to be a genus itself. Yet, it cannot be said to be a genus, because it is not "something or other". Rather, it is nothing. Nothing cannot divide something, seeing as it does not exist. To say that it could is to say that "nothing" is really "more like something", only different.
How does that apply to my conception of being as actual being? You have actual being without non-being and actual being with non-being, which corresponds to actual being that is full of actual being (i.e. contains no privation) and actual being that is not full of actual being (i.e. contains some privation). Why would non-being have to be a genus? The genus is actuality, and the species are full of actual being and not full of actual being.
Oh, and can you cite the pages of Real Essentialism, so that I can check it out? Thanks.
Yes. However, you are now incapable of slipping in the distinction between "real" and "less real", because real-ness (being-ness) relates to ens.
I think I already did above. Let me know what you think. Also, could you have a look at what I wrote at August 14, 2012 12:25 PM in response to the quotations that Glenn cited by Aquinas. Do you disagree with what we have agreed upon?
Glenn:
ReplyDeleteShake on it (on both points of view)?
Agreed. Now, can you please enjoy your vacation?!
>Shake on it (on both points of view)?
ReplyDeleteSure.
@dguller,
Even thought it did get heated at times. That unfortunate stuff between you and Crude and the like etc.
I really enjoyed the discussion.
Unlike the Gnus who are nothing more than fundamentalist without god-belief you have put in the man hours to try to understand Thomistic philosophy. Which is why we all take your criticism and arguments seriously.
Keep up the good work my son.
Cheers.
All my best.
till next time.
Yikes! That last was the 666th post!!!!
ReplyDeleteOh no! Call the exorcist!
Help! Help! I'm being possessed!
Or is it oppressed?
Monty Python....
This is where I disagree. I think that if you can meaningfully say that an ens can have more or less esse, then you can say that an ens can be more or less actually real.
ReplyDeleteThe idea of "less esse" relates to privation--that is, to not-being. This is not to say that there can be quantities of esse--after doing some reading, it doesn't seem like Aquinas thought that esse could be considered quantitatively. (You'll have to forgive my ignorance. I'm only just now coming to understand a lot of this stuff.) As Oderberg says, "Existence is indeed something that is true of existing things. It is arguably incapable of being defined, not because, like being, it is too general and so analogous, but because it is a simple notion not susceptible of analysis into constituents (this applies well to the concept of identity).)"
How does that apply to my conception of being as actual being? You have actual being without non-being and actual being with non-being, which corresponds to actual being that is full of actual being (i.e. contains no privation) and actual being that is not full of actual being (i.e. contains some privation).
There is no such thing as "actual being with non-being", is what I'm saying. Non-being is not being. It's nothing at all. Aquinas calls non-being a "being of reason": something that is only "real" by virtue of consideration. In the world, there is only being, and all "non-beings" (such as, in Oderberg's example, holes) must be analyzed in terms of being.
Oh, and can you cite the pages of Real Essentialism, so that I can check it out? Thanks.
105-108, 121-125.
Do you disagree with what we have agreed upon?
After doing some more reading: no. Your idea relies on quantifying esse, which appears to be impossible.
Wait:
ReplyDelete"After doing some more reading: yes. Your idea relies on quantifying esse, which appears to be impossible."
So is dguller correct that homosexuals and blind people are less human than others? Is that the AT position?
ReplyDeleteAnon,
ReplyDeleteThe A-T position is that to be human means to exist as a human. In that sense, there is only being and not-being. Even sin does not destroy someone's "being human"--and this level of "being human" cannot be quantified. One simply is human, full stop. On the other hand, humans who engage in virtue are more good, more perfect and so on than those who do not.
In conclusion, homosexual behavior and blindness make people "less perfect"--no one is perfect in their entirety--, but not "less human" or "less real". There is a distinction between someone's existence, which is like an on-off switch, and their degrees of actuality. Degrees of actuality are all constituted by existence, but existence cannot be split into degrees--if that makes sense.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteIt should be clarified, however, that Aquinas does believe in degrees of being. But he does so in a sense alien to the one you're discussing. To quote:
"We should know that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four. For one of them, which is the weakest, is only in reason, namely, negation and privation, which we say are in reason because reason considers them as if they were some beings, when it affirms or denies of them something. [...] Another [mode of being], which is the closest to this one in weakness, is according to which generation and corruption and motions are said to be beings. For they have some privation and negation mixed with them. For motion is imperfect actuality, as is said in book 3 of the Physics. [A being] in the third sense has nothing of non-being mixed with it, but it has a weak existence [habet esse debile], for [it has existence] not by itself, but in something else, as [do] qualities, quantities and properties of substance. The fourth kind is which is the most perfect, namely, which has existence in nature without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid existence, as it exists by itself, as do substances. And it is to this [last one], as primary and principal, that all the others are related. For qualities and quantities are said to be insofar as they are in a substance; motions and generations are said to be insofar as they tend to substance or to some other of the above-said [beings]; and privations and negations are said to be insofar as they remove some of the above-said three."
In other words, all substances (the fourth type) just do exist, while the lower levels of being rely on the substance. However, substances further rely on something that gives them esse, because they do not have it by nature.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteThere is a distinction between someone's existence, which is like an on-off switch, and their degrees of actuality. Degrees of actuality are all constituted by existence, but existence cannot be split into degrees--if that makes sense.
My contention is that it does not make sense.
It makes sense to talk about more or less actual being. Look at ST 1a 5.1, Objection 3: “Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.” Remember, this is an objection that Aquinas rejects. And what is Aquinas’ reply to Objection 3: “Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.” This is exactly what I have been saying. X’s goodness is proportionate to the degree to which it actualizes the potentialities contained within its essence, and this is by virtue of the doctrine of transcendental interconvertibility.
And look at that “superadded actuality”. I wonder, how can you have “superadded actuality” unless you could add actuality according to increasing amounts? I have offered my interpretation of this passage at August 14, 2012 12:25 PM in light of the passages cited by Glenn above. The “superadded actuality” is best understood as secondary actuality, and the baseline amount of actuality is the primary actuality, which also contains a teleological directedness towards the actualization of the potentiality of that primary actuality, e.g. intellect. He finds my interpretation appropriate, and no-one else involved on this thread has objected to it, which means that it can’t be so far off base as to be unworthy of consideration.
Also, in the Encyclopedia of Christian Theology, Volume 1, under the heading of “Good”, we find:
“The natural-teleology account defines a hierarchy of goods in terms of degrees of actuality. Different substances belonging to the same species possess more or less actuality depending on the extent to which they have actualized their specifying potentialities. Moreover, substantial forms (the first actualities, in virtue of which things are the kinds of things they are) vary in their degrees of actuality insofar as they constitute kinds whose activities are more or less rich, full, and complex” (p. 634).
That is exactly what I have been saying.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteFinally, regarding my contention that the only genuine kind of being is actual being, here is the Catholic Encyclopedia:
“Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things. St. Thomas describes it as the first or primary act of the essence as contrasted with its secondary act or operation (I Sent., dist. xxxiii, Q. i, a. 1, ad 1); and again, as "the actuality of all form or nature" (Summa, I, Q. iii, a. 4). Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality.” (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05543b.htm)
Notice the bold quotes. That is exactly what I have been saying.
And here’s Robert Pasnau in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature:
“On this deeper picture, all there is is actuality of various kinds. Material beings are not composites of actuality plus some kind of elusive stuff known as matter, they are instead just composites of certain sorts of actuality. Reality is actuality all the way down, and substances are bundles of actuality, unified by organization around a substantial form” (p. 131).
Again, consistent with my position.
It makes sense to talk about more or less actual being.
ReplyDeleteNo, it doesn't. Existence either is or is not, as Anthony Kenny says in Aquinas on Being: http://books.google.com/books?id=B4xQTK_vUa4C&pg=PA140&lpg=PA140&dq=degrees+of+esse+anthony+kenny&source=bl&ots=PMOFGjhmHa&sig=QYDQV_QUwGxzQgDEr70TnbAEfxA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0PgqUJejNOPkywGmuID4DQ&ved=0CE4Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=degrees%20of%20esse%20anthony%20kenny&f=false
Look at ST 1a 5.1, Objection 3: “Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.” Remember, this is an objection that Aquinas rejects.
Aquinas does not reject that esse cannot be more or less--it is on these grounds that he makes the objection to his own argument. And he doesn't disagree with that part, even in his rebuttal. What you don't seem to realize is that esse only appears when conjoined to essence. Esse is all-good, all-truth and so forth, with no limitation. When combined with essence, though, it is squeezed into individual substances that manifest Aristotle's ten categories. These categories make privation possible. This does not mean that esse is variable among substances, since esse is above mere actuality. This is why Aquinas calls it the actuality of actuality and the perfection of perfections.
And what is Aquinas’ reply to Objection 3: “Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.”
What he means is that something simply exists--flat, unquantifiable--, but that it may then possess actualities that are not strictly esse. Esse has no degrees, as he affirms here; but regular, secondary actuality does. So it is not comparable to something having "50% actuality" (base line) and something else having "55% actuality".
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteActually, here is the correct link: http://books.google.com/books?id=B4xQTK_vUa4C&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=degrees+of+esse+anthony+kenny&source=bl&ots=PMOFGjioH7&sig=0bk7Et9zXHzR74KNApWkIQsC2qE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ff0qUNLhLMWFyQGcvoEI&ved=0CEoQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=degrees%20of%20esse%20anthony%20kenny&f=false
ReplyDeleteRank:
ReplyDeleteAquinas does not reject that esse cannot be more or less--it is on these grounds that he makes the objection to his own argument. And he doesn't disagree with that part, even in his rebuttal.
I don’t see that at all. In the objection, he has two premises:
(1) Goodness admits of degrees
(2) Being does not admit of degrees
(3) Therefore, goodness and being cannot be coextensive.
In his reply to the objection, he still accepts that goodness admits of degrees: “goodness is spoken of as more or less”. So, he accepts (1) above as true. Since he rejects the conclusion in (3), he must also be rejecting (2) above, otherwise what exactly is different in the reply from the objection itself?
In fact, he clarifies the issue by saying that “goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality”. What is this “superadded actuality”? He explains in the response to objection 2: “by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively”. In other words, every thing with an essence exists as a substance simply by virtue of the combination of essence and actual existence. However, this is not the maximum amount of actuality, because there is the possibility of “further actuality”, and then it has “being relatively”. The question is relative to what?
He answers by writing: “viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.”
Here’s how I understand this.
When you are just looking at a thing’s basic level of actual existence, which occurs whenever an essence is combined to existence, then you have a primary actuality. This primary actuality remains the same in every thing that exists and has the same essence. It is an all-or-nothing affair. Once an essence is combined to existence, you have a substance, which is a primary actuality. Thus, when you look at the “primal (i.e. substantial) being” you say that the thing “is said to be simply”, i.e. absolutely without any admission of degree, and is good “relatively”, i.e. relative to the sheer fact that it has primary actuality.
However, if that same being takes the next step and actualizes its secondary actualities, then it has “further actuality” and “superadded actuality”. And if it fully actualizes a secondary actuality, then that secondary actuality “is said to be relatively”, because it is relative to the primary actuality, and “to be good simply”, because it has fully actualized an end, which no longer has any potentiality in it, and thus is good absolutely and without admission of degree, because it has achieved maximal goodness with respect to that secondary actuality.
How do you explain the “further actuality” and “superadded actuality”?
What you don't seem to realize is that esse only appears when conjoined to essence.
I do understand that. To exist is to exist as something, i.e. have a substantial form. That is why my entire discussion has revolved around actuality and potentiality in beings.
This does not mean that esse is variable among substances, since esse is above mere actuality. This is why Aquinas calls it the actuality of actuality and the perfection of perfections.
What is the difference between esse and actuality? I thought they were the same thing. Oh, and “actuality of actuality” is still actuality.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteWhat he means is that something simply exists--flat, unquantifiable--, but that it may then possess actualities that are not strictly esse. Esse has no degrees, as he affirms here; but regular, secondary actuality does. So it is not comparable to something having "50% actuality" (base line) and something else having "55% actuality".
Something actually exists at a basic level, i.e. “primal (i.e. substantial) being”, or primary actuality, which can then have “further actuality” and “superadded actuality” on top of that, i.e. secondary actuality. The former is all-or-nothing, but the latter admits of degrees. (Although I’ve also read that the former can have degrees when comparing beings with different essences, i.e. a rock has less actual being than a human being.) Again, that makes sense to me.
Furthermore, I don’t even see why this is relevant.
Say that I grant to you that there is a difference between (1) primary actuality, which is an all-or-nothing affair where you combine essence plus esse into an ens, which involves a unique kind of actuality called A1 (or esse, as you call it), and (2) secondary actuality, which involves its own unique kind of actuality that admits of degrees, called A2. Both A1 and A2 are kinds of actual being, the former an all-or-nothing kind and the latter an admits of degrees kind.
Now, what are we debating? Whether we can say that if X and Y share the same E, and X is more good than Y, then X is also more actually real than Y.
You say that we cannot say this, because both X and Y necessarily have the same A1, and thus one cannot be more actually real than the other. It is also the case that one cannot be more good than the other, either. Thus, A1 is useless when comparing X and Y. From this point of view, X and Y are identical.
But when you include A2 into the equation, then you see that any difference in goodness between X and Y must be by virtue of different degrees of A2. Now, we have already agreed that A2 is a kind of actual being, which means that if X has more A2 than Y, then X is both more good and more actually real than Y, even if you totally ignore A1. After all, A2 is a kind of actual being, and is the only relevant kind of actual being when comparing degrees of goodness and perfection amongst beings sharing a common essence. Thus, it is the only relevant kind of actual being involved when comparing human beings, which is what this entire discussion started off with.
So, even under your own terms, it seems that my conclusion follows.
Any thoughts?
dguller,
ReplyDeleteYou continue to conflate esse with actuality. They are not only different, but different in kind. This is why Aquinas calls it the "actuality of actuality": it is beyond all other categories, distinctions, substances, quantities and so on. Esse is so fundamental that Aquinas usually identifies God as "esse" rather than as "ens". God is not mere actuality as Aristotle conceived it, but rather beyond it. Esse can still be called an "actuality", as long as one is careful not to equivocate.
Aquinas does not reject premise 2 in your syllogism, but rather undermines the entire argument. Esse does not exist in degrees, because it simply is--always. This means that it is always infinitely good, true and beautiful. The Fourth Way shows that all degrees in secondary actuality must obtain their goodness from something higher still, which eventually brings us to esse--that which is infinite goodness. The goodness of every "superadded actuality" is merely a diffusion of esse, and must not be understood as "esse proper". If they were identical, then, as Kenny said, it would follow that esse was totally different than existence--a conclusion that Aquinas denies.
As a result, it makes no sense to say that something can be more real than something else. Existence and "superadded actuality" are not the same thing at all. Esse is not part of the nature of any substance, and so it must be poured in directly by God at all times. If esse was the same as actuality, then it would follow that it was within substances by nature. This leads us to the absurd conclusion that an ens can give esse to another ens, which makes the essence-existence distinction pointless.
Actually, further reading seems to indicate that esse is not primary actuality. Primary actuality is form. This means that esse is more fundamental than primary actuality: it is the metaphysically simple act of existence behind it.
ReplyDeleteThe only caution that I care to say about reading TLS is that it is not good reading when you're tired and about to sleep. I tried this last night and it engaged my mind and kept me awake. I have already read it in its entirety at least 3 times already and I come back to it from time to time. It gets better with each rereading. The particular parts where Dr Feser discusses the apparent problem of evil and the attending discussions on the relationship of faith and reason are worth more than what I paid for this book. Of course, there is his book on Aquinas, too, which makes an excellent companion book for TLS. ~ Mark
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ReplyDeleteYou continue to conflate esse with actuality. They are not only different, but different in kind.
I’m confused. If esse is not actuality, then there is a difference between something having esse and something having actuality. My argument in this entire thread has had to do with actuality. I never once brought up esse, and so if you are correct and they are completely different kinds of being, then my argument does not even require esse at all, only actuality. So, I can happily admit that esse is an all-or-nothing kind of actual being, which I called A1 above, and my argument focuses upon the kind of actuality that does admit of degrees, which I called A2 above.
Aquinas does not reject premise 2 in your syllogism, but rather undermines the entire argument. Esse does not exist in degrees, because it simply is--always. This means that it is always infinitely good, true and beautiful.
But why is it perfect, good, and true? Because it has no potentiality. There is nothing that should be actual that is not actual, because it is Pure Act.
The Fourth Way shows that all degrees in secondary actuality must obtain their goodness from something higher still, which eventually brings us to esse--that which is infinite goodness. The goodness of every "superadded actuality" is merely a diffusion of esse, and must not be understood as "esse proper".
So, now you admit that there can be “degrees in secondary actuality”? Great! Sure, they ultimately trace their actuality to Pure Act, but so what? It does not follow that secondary actuality is not actuality, and thus if X has more degrees of secondary actuality, then X has more actual reality, because secondary actuality is a kind of actual reality, even if it is not the more fundamental kind. So, my argument still stands.
As a result, it makes no sense to say that something can be more real than something else. Existence and "superadded actuality" are not the same thing at all.
Esse and actuality are different kinds of actual being in which esse is the primary kind of actual being – the actuality of actuality – and actuality is the secondary kind of actual being – the actuality of actuality. In that case, then there is no logical contradiction to say that esse is all-or-nothing actual being and actuality (or “superadded actuality”) is actual being that admits of degrees. Unless you want to say that secondary actuality is not actually at all, then my argument stands and there is such a thing as different degrees of actual being. Furthermore, it is the different degrees of secondary actuality that actually allow us to compare the goodness of individuals that share the same essence. Without it, we could not say that one individual is more good than another, which I mentioned in my argument above.
So, do you agree that secondary actuality admits of degrees, and that secondary actuality is a kind of actual being? And so if a thing has more secondary actuality, then it necessarily has more actual being?
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ReplyDeleteEsse has no degrees, as he affirms here; but regular, secondary actuality does
It’s quite simple.
If X has more secondary actuality than Y, then does X have more actuality than Y? And note, I’m not asking if X has more esse than Y, because we are not talking about esse at all, only secondary actuality.
If you agree, then we are in agreement, and the discussion is done.
If you disagree, then you have to explain how one can have more secondary actuality, but not more actuality. And I don’t think that bringing up esse helps at all, because if you are correct, and esse is the actuality of actuality, then esse is just a more fundamental kind of actuality, and is the source of all other kinds of actuality that exist. But we are still talking about actuality, which sometimes is an all-or-nothing affair and sometimes admits of degrees. When it is an all-or-nothing affair, then there is no more or less involved, only present or absent, i.e. dichotomous. When it admits of degrees, then there is more or less involved, and thus it makes sense to say that X has more actuality than Y, when talking about this kind of actuality that admits of degrees.
So, either secondary actuality is a kind of actuality, or it is not. If it is a kind of actuality, then if X has more secondary actuality than Y, then X has more actuality than Y. If it is not a kind of actuality, then why call it “secondary actuality” at all? Furthermore, it would then have to be either potentiality or non-being. Both options to absurdities, as I’m sure you’ll agree.
Finally, if you refuse to admit that it is possible for there to be degrees of actual being, even if this has nothing to do with esse, then you also make it impossible to compare beings that share the same essence, because from the standpoint of esse, they are all necessarily the same. It is only when you bring in the “superadded actuality” that differences in goodness emerge. If you want to deny that these differences are real, then you have the conclusion that all things that share an essence are equally good as examples of their kind. So, a well drawn triangle is equal to a poorly drawn triangle, for example. In fact, you can’t even say “well drawn” or “poorly drawn”, because that is not a real distinction. I think you’ll agree that this is absurd.
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ReplyDeleteIf esse was the same as actuality, then it would follow that it was within substances by nature. This leads us to the absurd conclusion that an ens can give esse to another ens, which makes the essence-existence distinction pointless.
Sorry, one last thing.
I don’t understand this argument at all. Why would it follow that if esse was the same as actuality, then it would be the case that esse would be within substances by nature? A substance is an ens composed of esse and essence. If essence was actuality, then a substance would be an ens composed of actuality and essence. How is that absurd? Actuality just refers to what is actually existing in the world, and no as a potential and not as non-being. It is truly there and acting upon other ens in the world.
Also, why is it absurd if an ens can give esse to another ens? Only a being with actuality can cause another potentiality to become actual. Remember, whatever changes from potency to act is changed by an actual other. What does that mean, other than an ens has given esse to another ens, to change a potency in that ens into an actuality? I don’t see that as absurd, but I might be misunderstanding things.
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ReplyDeleteAquinas does not reject premise 2 in your syllogism, but rather undermines the entire argument. Esse does not exist in degrees, because it simply is--always.
Oh, and one more thing. If Aquinas says that esse does not exist in degrees, then he is actually embracing premise 2, which simply says, “Being does not admit of degrees”, and thus the conclusion follows, which is a problem for him.
Nothing in your post undermines this argument. After all, there is the underlying assumption that if X and Y are coextensive, then fundamental changes in X must have corresponding changes in Y. If X fundamentally changes, and Y remains the same, then X and Y cannot be coextensive. To say that “water” and “H2O” are coextensive means that if I pour water into a glass from a container, then H2O also goes into the glass. If I poured the water into a glass, but H2O remained in the container, then they could not be coextensive. So, if goodness goes up, but being remained the same, then how could they be coextensive?
I think it is more reasonable that he actually rejects premise 2, because he talks about “superadded actuality” and “further actuality”, which tacitly implies a kind of actuality that admits of degrees, which you agree with by saying that secondary actuality admits of degrees, and it is this kind of actuality that is coextensive with degrees of goodness, such that more of it results in more goodness, and less of it results in less goodness.
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ReplyDeleteHere’s another thought.
What is the difference between Pure Actuality and esse? If esse is God and Pure Act is God, and God is simple, then Pure Act is esse, no? And so, esse, rather than being something other than actuality is actually coextensive with Pure Actuality, i.e. the ultimate kind of actuality, in that it admits of no potentiality whatsoever. That is why it is all-or-nothing, because something with no potentiality, either actually exists, or it does not exist at all.
All other actuality is derived from Pure Act, which primarily involves substances, i.e. actual beings with substantial form, i.e. esse plus essence to form an ens. That is why Pure Act, or esse, is the actuality of actuality, i.e. it is the actuality of primary actuality. Once you have an ens, then you have a primary actuality, i.e. it either actually exists or it does not actually exist, because there is no potentiality in a primary actuality. However, you can have degrees of actuality with the secondary actualities that the primary actualities are teleologically directed towards as future potential actualizations, because these have potentiality, and once you include potentiality, then you include degrees of actuality and degrees of potentiality. The more actuality, the less potentiality, the more good. The more potentiality, the less actuality, the less good.
So, goodness is associated with actuality, because goodness is coextensive with being, because they are both transcendentals. Pure Act is good, period, because there is no potentiality. Primary actuality is good, period, because there is no potentiality. Secondary actuality is good relatively, because there is potentiality that has to be actualized to a maximal degree.
Is that a fair account?
Oh, and anyone else is free to chip in to show where I have made a mistake.
ReplyDeleteThanks.
I’m confused. If esse is not actuality, then there is a difference between something having esse and something having actuality.
ReplyDeleteThere is. Actuality relates to modes of being, while esse relates to being full stop. Something's existence--its reality, its being--is predicated on esse. As a result, no being's reality can have degrees. Anthony Kenny is quite right that this would be an absurd, impossible state of affairs, since existence (reality) is one way or the other. There is "no half-way house between existence and non-existence", in his words.
But why is it perfect, good, and true? Because it has no potentiality. There is nothing that should be actual that is not actual, because it is Pure Act.
Actually, I'd look at it the other way around. Being is good--full stop--, and actuality is good because it is being. I think that's more of what Aquinas has in mind.
So, now you admit that there can be “degrees in secondary actuality”? Great! Sure, they ultimately trace their actuality to Pure Act, but so what? It does not follow that secondary actuality is not actuality, and thus if X has more degrees of secondary actuality, then X has more actual reality, because secondary actuality is a kind of actual reality, even if it is not the more fundamental kind.
This is wrong, though. Reality = existence. The existence of a substance comes from esse. Even if the substance changes parts of itself from potency to act, these changes are accidental. They do not at all alter the reality of the substance, which is sustained by esse. A man is still a substance sustained by esse even if he has no arms--and, because existence has no degrees, a lack of arms does not change his level of existence. The only change is that his arms go from existence to non-existence.
In that case, then there is no logical contradiction to say that esse is all-or-nothing actual being and actuality (or “superadded actuality”) is actual being that admits of degrees. Unless you want to say that secondary actuality is not actually at all, then my argument stands and there is such a thing as different degrees of actual being.
Never denied it. I denied that there could be differing degrees of reality (existence), which is an outrageous claim.
So, do you agree that secondary actuality admits of degrees, and that secondary actuality is a kind of actual being? And so if a thing has more secondary actuality, then it necessarily has more actual being?
It has more superadded actuality, certainly. If this is what you mean by "actual being", then yes. But this is wholly unrelated to something's reality or existence, which is given by esse.
Let's look at it this way. A substance only exists at all because of esse, and its esse cannot have degrees. Its identity comes from the combination of esse and essence, and from prime matter and substantial form. None of the first three have degrees. This in turn means that something's existence and species are beyond degree, which means that there cannot be humans who are "less human" or "less real". However, there can be humans who possess degrees of goodness and perfection qua superadded actuality. This, again, is unrelated to their reality or species.
If we agree that something can possess degrees of perfection in terms of superadded actuality, but that it cannot possess degrees of "being human" or "being real", then I think we've finally concluded this argument.
Pardon me: esse, essence and substantial form do not have degrees. Matter can change.
ReplyDeleteI don’t understand this argument at all. Why would it follow that if esse was the same as actuality, then it would be the case that esse would be within substances by nature? A substance is an ens composed of esse and essence. If essence was actuality, then a substance would be an ens composed of actuality and essence. How is that absurd? Actuality just refers to what is actually existing in the world, and no as a potential and not as non-being. It is truly there and acting upon other ens in the world.
ReplyDeleteAlso, why is it absurd if an ens can give esse to another ens? Only a being with actuality can cause another potentiality to become actual. Remember, whatever changes from potency to act is changed by an actual other. What does that mean, other than an ens has given esse to another ens, to change a potency in that ens into an actuality? I don’t see that as absurd, but I might be misunderstanding things.
Aquinas applied the essence-existence distinction because he found that existence was not part of the nature of anything. Further, no substance could provide any other substance with existence. One substance can only actualize another through Aristotelian change. This is not the same as giving it existence ex nihilo, which is what esse is. Using this train of reasoning, Aquinas was able to show that God sustains all substances via esse at all times. No substance has esse by its nature, and, again, it cannot be passed between substances. Hence, there must necessarily be a difference in kind between esse and actuality.
Oh, and one more thing. If Aquinas says that esse does not exist in degrees, then he is actually embracing premise 2, which simply says, “Being does not admit of degrees”, and thus the conclusion follows, which is a problem for him.
I know that he's embracing it. That's why I said that he didn't reject it--he rather showed why the entire argument was off-base.
I think it is more reasonable that he actually rejects premise 2, because he talks about “superadded actuality” and “further actuality”, which tacitly implies a kind of actuality that admits of degrees, which you agree with by saying that secondary actuality admits of degrees, and it is this kind of actuality that is coextensive with degrees of goodness, such that more of it results in more goodness, and less of it results in less goodness.
ReplyDeleteHe can't reject premise 2, because his entire philosophy is built on the idea that esse is infinite goodness without degree. Again, actuality is esse diffused. Something can be actual in one sense without being actual in another. For example, someone can be good at swimming, while someone else can be good at cooking. Even someone who fully actualizes their cooking ability is not going to be left with esse, because esse is simple: it is not "goodness at cooking" or "goodness at swimming", but goodness full stop.
What is the difference between Pure Actuality and esse? If esse is God and Pure Act is God, and God is simple, then Pure Act is esse, no?
Esse is not exactly God. God is the divine esse, while everything else participates in esse commune, as it's called. Also, as I said above, it's better to say that esse is esse and that Pure Act is another way of looking at it. Pure Act is pure goodness because it is esse: esse is not pure goodness just because it is Pure Act. The separation between esse commune and the divine esse is actually much greater than the one between act/potency and Pure Act, from what I can tell.
Once you have an ens, then you have a primary actuality, i.e. it either actually exists or it does not actually exist, because there is no potentiality in a primary actuality.
Primary actuality refers to the form. Esse is beyond even that.
So, goodness is associated with actuality, because goodness is coextensive with being, because they are both transcendentals. Pure Act is good, period, because there is no potentiality. Primary actuality is good, period, because there is no potentiality. Secondary actuality is good relatively, because there is potentiality that has to be actualized to a maximal degree.
Is that a fair account?
Close. Secondary actuality is good relatively because its goodness is not simple. It is a goodness at something, and as a result it necessarily cannot be esse proper. It is sustained by esse, certainly; but even a human who magically actualizes all of their potentials will still have their actuality in parts, while esse has no parts. If a human became one with esse, they would vanish.
Holy freaking, um, whatever.
ReplyDeleteI typed something about tone way back when, went away a couple of days, typed something else in response, forgot about the blog for awhile (real life, ya know, kind of intruded) and then come back just now and, well, nevermind.
I was going to see if Prof Feser or someone responded, but I'd have to hire a private detective to find it if he did.
Donald
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ReplyDeleteThere is. Actuality relates to modes of being, while esse relates to being full stop. Something's existence--its reality, its being--is predicated on esse. As a result, no being's reality can have degrees. Anthony Kenny is quite right that this would be an absurd, impossible state of affairs, since existence (reality) is one way or the other. There is "no half-way house between existence and non-existence", in his words.
Except that Kenny is wrong here. Stump argues the opposite position, based upon the points that I’m raising. Perhaps this is a matter of Kenny reading analytic philosophical assumptions into Aquinas’ system? Feser has said that Kenny “simply refuses even to try to understand Aquinas’s notion of existence in logical terms Aquinas himself would have accepted, instead of in post-Fregean terms” (Feser, Aquinas, p. 58), specifically in the section on “being” in Aquinas. So, I’m not too sure that Kenny is a good person to cite here.
Also, actuality is existence. To exist is to be capable of action and activity and activating underlying potentialities. And remember, if Pure Actuality is esse by the doctrine of divine simplicity, then there is no real distinction between actuality and esse, but rather that there are different kinds of actuality, and thus different kinds of esse, some of which are all-or-nothing phenomena, and others admit of degrees of actual being.
Actually, I'd look at it the other way around. Being is good--full stop--, and actuality is good because it is being. I think that's more of what Aquinas has in mind.
I don’t think so. I like Feser’s explanation in Aquinas that ties together truth, goodness, perfection and actuality.
You start with an essence, which defines what an ideal kind of thing that has that essence is supposed to be. You then add esse to that essence to have an ens. The question is how well that ens matches the ideal contained in the essence of the ens in actual reality. The more that ens matches the ideal in actual reality, the more good that ens is as an example of the ideal, and the more true that ens is to the ideal. And the only reason why that ens matches the ideal more is because it has actualized the potentialities associated with the ideal to a greater extent, which is why you have to admit degrees of actuality. The more something actually conforms to the ideal implies that it actually exists to a greater extent compared to another ens with the same essence that conforms less to the ideal in actual reality, because it has actualized the same potentialities to a less extent.
What this means is that “good” and “true” are just relative terms to our appetitive and intellectual natures when we are talking about reality. “Good” is being filtered through our appetites, and “true” is being filtered through our intellect. What is actually happening is different actual beings striving to maximally actualize the potentialities contained in the ideal as present in their essence, and “good” and “true” is just how we talk about this process and evaluate it, according to our human appetites and intellect, respectively.
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ReplyDeleteThis is wrong, though. Reality = existence. The existence of a substance comes from esse. Even if the substance changes parts of itself from potency to act, these changes are accidental. They do not at all alter the reality of the substance, which is sustained by esse. A man is still a substance sustained by esse even if he has no arms--and, because existence has no degrees, a lack of arms does not change his level of existence. The only change is that his arms go from existence to non-existence.
But this is just paradoxical. How can a human being with actually existing arms have the same degree of actual being as a human being without actually existing arms? The former has the extra actuality of the arms, and the latter lacks that extra actuality of the arms, and has a privation of actual being. I mean, how can the former have an actual pair of arms that the latter does not have, and yet they have the same amount of actual being?
You would be arguing that:
Actual human plus actual arms = Actual human plus potential arms
Which is the same as arguing that:
1 + 1 = 1 + 0
I mean, does the actuality of the arms not count at all? Where did that extra actuality go? Was there no extra actuality? And if so, then how can you say that those arms actually exist at all?
It is irrelevant that the substance remains the same throughout its existence, because even if the accidents are the only properties that are changing, then they change according to actualizing potentialities, which is what all change is. So, the same substance with actualized accidents has more actuality than the same substance with potential accidents. Unless you want to argue that actualized accidents have the same actuality as potential accidents, which is absurd.
It has more superadded actuality, certainly. If this is what you mean by "actual being", then yes. But this is wholly unrelated to something's reality or existence, which is given by esse.
No. Are you saying that esse has nothing to do with accidents? When an accident actually exists, then it is not by virtue of esse? What is it by virtue of? Actuality? Actuality is esse, because in God, Pure Actuality = esse, and thus they have to be the same thing. Plus, I provided quotes from Pasnau and the Catholic Encyclopedia that reality and existence necessarily refer to actuality, because there is only actuality, potentiality and non-being. It is absurd to say that existence and reality is potentiality or non-being, and thus it must be actuality.
Let's look at it this way. A substance only exists at all because of esse, and its esse cannot have degrees. Its identity comes from the combination of esse and essence, and from prime matter and substantial form. None of the first three have degrees. This in turn means that something's existence and species are beyond degree, which means that there cannot be humans who are "less human" or "less real". However, there can be humans who possess degrees of goodness and perfection qua superadded actuality. This, again, is unrelated to their reality or species.
It is not related to their essence, substantial form, or actual existence as a substance. But you are ignoring accidents. All humans have the same esse and essence, which is where human equality comes from. However, that combination of esse and essence results in an ens, which has both a single substantial form, which means that it actually exists in an all-or-nothing fashion, but is also has multiple accidental forms, which are either potentially real or actually real. It is the accidents, plus the particular space-time location of the informed matter, that defines this particular substance.
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ReplyDeleteSo, when you want to know how much actual being this particular substance has, then you have to take into consideration the actuality of its substantial form, which is all-or-nothing, and the actuality and potentiality of its accidental forms, because they are all necessarily present. After all, a substance cannot exist without any accidents, unless that substance is God. Every other being must have accidents, either in actuality or potentiality, and thus you have to take into consideration the degree of actuality of the accidents when deciding how much actuality a particular being has, because each accident has an accidental form that contains the ideal of the accident, which the substance’s accidents are striving to actualize, and they can do so in varying degrees of conformity, and not in an all-or-nothing fashion.
So, the actuality of substantial being is all-or-nothing and the actuality of accidental being admits of varying degrees. The total actuality of that particular being is the actuality its substantial form, which is all-or-nothing, plus the actuality of its accidental forms, which admits of degrees. You cannot exclude the latter unless you want to also argue that the actuality of accidental forms is not actual being, which is absurd.
Aquinas applied the essence-existence distinction because he found that existence was not part of the nature of anything. Further, no substance could provide any other substance with existence. One substance can only actualize another through Aristotelian change. This is not the same as giving it existence ex nihilo, which is what esse is. Using this train of reasoning, Aquinas was able to show that God sustains all substances via esse at all times. No substance has esse by its nature, and, again, it cannot be passed between substances. Hence, there must necessarily be a difference in kind between esse and actuality.
Then I think there’s a contradiction. On the one hand, Pure Actuality = esse, and thus esse must be actuality. On the other hand, if esse is supposed to be existence from non-being, then esse must encompass both actual being and potential being, because both types of being come into existence from non-being. So, esse both is only actuality and is actuality plus potentiality.
He can't reject premise 2, because his entire philosophy is built on the idea that esse is infinite goodness without degree. Again, actuality is esse diffused. Something can be actual in one sense without being actual in another. For example, someone can be good at swimming, while someone else can be good at cooking. Even someone who fully actualizes their cooking ability is not going to be left with esse, because esse is simple: it is not "goodness at cooking" or "goodness at swimming", but goodness full stop.
But it is only goodness, because to be a good X is to be an X that fully actualizes the ideal contained in its form or essence. So, the more X actualizes the ideal, the more good X is. That is why they are coextensive. When one goes up, the other goes up. When one goes down, the other goes down. The same thing with truth and perfection. It would be odd that if perfection increases, then goodness increases, then truth increases, but actual being remains the same. Then what is being even doing there? There are explanations for why goodness = perfection = truth, but being would not even fit anymore. For it to fit, it must admit of degrees, like the rest of the transcendentals.
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ReplyDeleteEsse is not exactly God. God is the divine esse, while everything else participates in esse commune, as it's called. Also, as I said above, it's better to say that esse is esse and that Pure Act is another way of looking at it. Pure Act is pure goodness because it is esse: esse is not pure goodness just because it is Pure Act. The separation between esse commune and the divine esse is actually much greater than the one between act/potency and Pure Act, from what I can tell.
First, you say the “esse is not exactly God”, and then you say that Pure Act is esse. I don’t know what you are talking about.
Second, how can esse commune be more distant from divine esse, if esse commune = actual + potential being, and divine esse = Pure Actuality? So, either esse is actuality or it isn’t. If esse is actuality, then esse can admit of degrees. If esse is not actuality, then it is either potential being or non-being, because those are the only options left.
Primary actuality refers to the form. Esse is beyond even that.
Then esse is also beyond God. God is his form, because God is his essence, and so if esse is beyond the form, then esse is beyond God who is his form.
Close. Secondary actuality is good relatively because its goodness is not simple. It is a goodness at something, and as a result it necessarily cannot be esse proper. It is sustained by esse, certainly; but even a human who magically actualizes all of their potentials will still have their actuality in parts, while esse has no parts. If a human became one with esse, they would vanish.
But why does simplicity versus composition matter when it comes to actuality? You can have an actually simple being or an actually composite being, and they both actually exist. Like I said, if you want to say that esse is not actuality, then let’s not talk about esse, because I’m talking about actuality, and it is clear that actuality admits of degrees. Unless you want to say that actual being is not being, then I don’t understand how you can argue that more actual being is not more being.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteYou have missed roughly all of my points.
First, if Stump really argues for that as you say, then she's a terrible Aquinas scholar. And that's all there is to it. Why? First, because existence = esse = simple. Esse is pure, unadulterated, infinite goodness, and as such is incapable of containing degrees. If it wasn't, then how could Aquinas call existence wholly good in itself? Esse is an actuality to which there is no corresponding potentiality. Its only counterpart is non-existence, which does not exist. Esse calls things to being ex nihilo. Second, Stump would be proposing a violation of the law of the excluded middle, which would have been as ludicrous to Aquinas as it was to Kenny.
It is for these reasons that Aquinas could not have been rejecting premise 2. Indeed, Kenny uses that very same passage to prove that Aquinas does think of esse as lacking degrees. Aquinas's entire theology would crumble if esse had degrees, not least of which because it would mean that God's power had degrees. As David Bentley Hart has written, people get confused about what, exactly, Aquinas means when he talks about "actus purus". Most think of it in the sense that Aristotle used it--but this is theologically unacceptable. It would mean that God could only interact with the world via media, only through something that was less than pure actuality, only by admitting degrees to his power. Aquinas shows that Aristotle's pure actuality is less than God, and he repurposes talk of God as Pure Act to his own ends. Pure Act for Aquinas just is God's esse. It's a power without degree that is always everywhere, with no mediation.
There must necessarily be a difference between existence (reality, "actual being") and mere actuality. Actuality is stuck against potentiality, and it's never simple. Rather, it's always the actuality of some particular goodness to some particular degree. Esse is all goodness in simple form and as such it is infinite. Because esse is existence, and because it is that by which substances exist, and because humans are substances, it results that humans cannot have degrees of existence. They can only exist or not exist. This further means that, as long as they remain a substance, they have the same amount of existence. (That is, an infinite amount of existence. Simply: ∞ -∞ = ∞.) So, yes: the man with no arms exists just as much as does Michael Phelps. The differences lie in superadded actuality--the realm of act and potency.
Wow, this thread is still going. I have to admit, I've only skimmed the recent comments, but it seems to me there is a continuing difficulty about terminology. I don't think Dguller is crazy to want to say things like "more real", but it is not something Thomists say. Actually, they do say things like "God is more real than anything else"; and in ordinary English, "really" and "actually" can be synonyms; you can even talk about a "really big tree", or a "really really big tree". And maybe if that same idiom existed in Latin, "real" would have been one of the interconvertible transcendentals… but it isn't. (Unum is bonum is verum, but not realitas.) So I don't think talking about degrees of reality is horrible, just impractical, because you would have to explain what you mean by it every time.
ReplyDeleteThe different words for "being" likewise have technical meanings: since Aquinas obviously did not mean to be redundant in saying that things are "an essence conjoined to an act of existence", then "essence" and "existence" must have different meanings, even though "to be" and "to exists" are synonyms in general terms. "Existence" is the word we use for being when we are concerned with whether something has it or not. "Essence" is the kind of being something has. "Actuality" is the degree of being something has. It won't do to say "there are degrees of being, and existence means being, so there are degrees of existence", because as soon as you use the word "existence" you are signalling that the mode of being under consideration is "whether" not "how much". (And these distinction break down when we get to God, because there are no distinctions in God, but in everything else there is, so we cannot say "essence = existence for God, so they mean the same thing".)
I'll also comment on "judging", since in this case there are two different but related meanings of the same word. "To judge" can mean to evaluate, to distinguish, to determine: "I judged him to be ten yards away". (This usage is becoming somewhat rarer, I think, though it is still popular in phrases like "judgement-call".) "To judge" can also mean to sentence, to pass judgement, to vindicate or condemn. We can and should judge-evaluate both people and actions; we should not judge-condemn people (and of course it's impossible to judge actions in that sense). (Actually, we should judge people in that sense too — it is God's prerogative to judge us that way, but He delegates authority to us in certain circumstances, such as parents who have to judge their children, or judges, who have to judge the accused. But precisely because to do this is to act in the place of God, we must be very prudent in exercising such a grave responsibility.)
Anyway, this might be not really/actually help since I'm behind on the details, but I figured it wouldn't hurt.
Thanks for the comment, Mr. Green. I agree that I was sloppy with the word "judge" earlier on. It seems like you agree, though that dguller has misunderstood the distinctions between actuality and being. In the last page or so, the debate has focused on that part in particular.
ReplyDeleteRank:
ReplyDeleteFirst, if Stump really argues for that as you say, then she's a terrible Aquinas scholar. And that's all there is to it.
Sure thing, buddy. Even Feser cites the book I cited. And he says, “Stump's book is excellent.” (http://edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2009/07/summer-reading.html) What would Feser know about a good Aquinas scholar?
First, because existence = esse = simple. Esse is pure, unadulterated, infinite goodness, and as such is incapable of containing degrees. If it wasn't, then how could Aquinas call existence wholly good in itself? Esse is an actuality to which there is no corresponding potentiality. Its only counterpart is non-existence, which does not exist.
I’ve already made that very point earlier:
“If esse is God and Pure Act is God, and God is simple, then Pure Act is esse, no? And so, esse, rather than being something other than actuality is actually coextensive with Pure Actuality, i.e. the ultimate kind of actuality, in that it admits of no potentiality whatsoever. That is why it is all-or-nothing, because something with no potentiality, either actually exists, or it does not exist at all.” (August 15, 2012 5:52 AM)
Second, Stump would be proposing a violation of the law of the excluded middle, which would have been as ludicrous to Aquinas as it was to Kenny.
Check out the following statements:
(1) A light is either on or off
(2) A light has degrees of brightness once it is on
According to you, (1) is in accordance with the law of the excluded middle, but (2) violates it. I mean, how can a light be both either on or off and admit of degrees of brightness? It’s just not possible!
Aquinas's entire theology would crumble if esse had degrees, not least of which because it would mean that God's power had degrees.
First, that would not follow, because God is simple, and thus does not admit a mixture of actuality and potency, which means that he is Pure Actuality without any potentiality whatsoever.
Second, the real issue is whether an actual being has potentiality or does not have potentiality. Both are actual beings in the sense that they both really exist and can act upon other really existing beings. The only difference is that the former can either exist or not exist, and the latter can differ in terms of degrees of actuality. So, Pure Actuality and the actuality existing in composite beings are both actuality, i.e. the kind of reality that can act upon other beings, but the former has no potency and the latter has potency. That is the only difference. They both are actually being, the former either on or off, the latter admitting of degrees.
So, yes: the man with no arms exists just as much as does Michael Phelps. The differences lie in superadded actuality--the realm of act and potency.
But, according to you, the “superadded actuality” is not really actual being. Because if it was, then you would have a kind of actual being that can admit of degrees, which you claim is impossible. So, I’m confused. If the only kind of being is esse, and goodness is related to esse, then how can X be more good than Y if X and Y share the same essence? They have the same esse, and thus the same goodness. And that’s all there is to it. So, everything is equally good, which is ridiculous. Furthermore, if actual arms have the same being as potential arms, then actuality has the same being as potentiality, which is ridiculous.
Mr. Green:
ReplyDelete"Existence" is the word we use for being when we are concerned with whether something has it or not. "Essence" is the kind of being something has.
I don’t think that’s quite right. “Existence” is the word we use to say that something is, and “essence” is the word we use to say what something is. In other words, “existence” just refers to whether something actually is real, i.e. is capable of activity and acting upon other actual beings, and “essence” is just what kind of being it is.
But I am sure that the problem is one of terminology. It’s likely that Rank and I mean the same thing, but we are saying it in different ways, and thus are talking passed one another.
I just think that my interpretation has less paradoxes than his does. For example, his interpretation requires that actual being have the same being as potential being, which I think is absurd. Furthermore, it implies that actual being is not real or considered to be being in some situations, which again, I think is absurd. Finally, it implies that you can have a thing that has actual being, but does not actually exist, which is absurd. Existence is actuality.
The only distinction that matters is actuality without potentiality and actuality with potentiality. The former is an all-or-nothing phenomenon, and the latter admits of degrees. However, they are both the same actuality, irrespective of whether they have potentiality or not, and whether they are simple or compound, or whatever other distinction you want to make. They both are the kind of being that something has if that thing is going to do anything, or act upon other things at all. That is what actuality means, and as far as I can tell, is what all kinds of actuality share in common.
Doctor Feser, where are you hiding? Utilize your expertise and settle this debate!
ReplyDeleteSure thing, buddy. Even Feser cites the book I cited. And he says, “Stump's book is excellent.” (http://edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2009/07/summer-reading.html) What would Feser know about a good Aquinas scholar?
ReplyDeleteIf she's arguing for what you say she's arguing, then she's terrible. But I don't believe that she's really arguing it, because otherwise she likely would not have a job. That's how absurd this position is.
Check out the following statements:
(1) A light is either on or off
(2) A light has degrees of brightness once it is on
According to you, (1) is in accordance with the law of the excluded middle, but (2) violates it. I mean, how can a light be both either on or off and admit of degrees of brightness? It’s just not possible!
Mr. Green said it best:
The different words for "being" likewise have technical meanings: since Aquinas obviously did not mean to be redundant in saying that things are "an essence conjoined to an act of existence", then "essence" and "existence" must have different meanings, even though "to be" and "to exists" are synonyms in general terms. "Existence" is the word we use for being when we are concerned with whether something has it or not. "Essence" is the kind of being something has. "Actuality" is the degree of being something has. It won't do to say "there are degrees of being, and existence means being, so there are degrees of existence", because as soon as you use the word "existence" you are signalling that the mode of being under consideration is "whether" not "how much". (And these distinction break down when we get to God, because there are no distinctions in God, but in everything else there is, so we cannot say "essence = existence for God, so they mean the same thing".)
Your argument does not work. There is no such thing as more or less existence or reality.
First, that would not follow, because God is simple, and thus does not admit a mixture of actuality and potency, which means that he is Pure Actuality without any potentiality whatsoever.
Esse commune is not esse divinum. Esse divinum is God in himself, while esse commune is his power, on whose account we exist. Neither possesses degrees.
But, according to you, the “superadded actuality” is not really actual being.
Superadded actuality is not esse. That's all I'm saying. Everything that exists simply does exist, and no substance can exist more than another, no matter how much "being" it adds to itself. Again, adding infinity to infinity is still infinity. Hence, reality cannot possess degrees.
Because if it was, then you would have a kind of actual being that can admit of degrees, which you claim is impossible. So, I’m confused. If the only kind of being is esse, and goodness is related to esse, then how can X be more good than Y if X and Y share the same essence?
I don't think that the only kind of being is esse. See Mr. Green's post. Esse is the most fundamental act of existence that underlies any substance. Once something is a substance, though, it is part of Aristotle's ten categories, which means that it can take part in lower actuality. In this realm, actuality can have degrees. This is the realm in which Aristotle's God remains: it is merely the "maximal" act in opposition to the "minimal" act of prime matter.
Furthermore, if actual arms have the same being as potential arms, then actuality has the same being as potentiality, which is ridiculous.
Actual arms and potential arms are part of the lower idea of actuality. According to esse, either there are arms or there are not arms. There are no "potential arms" in this sense.
I don’t think that’s quite right. “Existence” is the word we use to say that something is, and “essence” is the word we use to say what something is. In other words, “existence” just refers to whether something actually is real, i.e. is capable of activity and acting upon other actual beings, and “essence” is just what kind of being it is.
ReplyDeleteNo. Listen to Mr. Green. You are wrong and he is very, very right.
For example, his interpretation requires that actual being have the same being as potential being, which I think is absurd.
Potential being only is insofar as it relates to the actual being of a substance, but the actual being of a substance only is insofar as it possesses esse. Esse is what actualizes actuality. Yet, actuality remains different from esse, and esse should not be thought of as "actuality without potentiality": it just is.
Furthermore, it implies that actual being is not real or considered to be being in some situations, which again, I think is absurd.
Actuality does not exist unless it is actualized by esse. Because of this, one can coherently say that all substances simply exist, but at the same possess degrees.
Finally, it implies that you can have a thing that has actual being, but does not actually exist, which is absurd. Existence is actuality.
Esse does not appear outside of actual substances, but this does not mean that it's reducible to actuality.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteIf she's arguing for what you say she's arguing, then she's terrible. But I don't believe that she's really arguing it, because otherwise she likely would not have a job. That's how absurd this position is.
Here’s Stump:
"It may be right to say of existence that it is all or nothing; and, for Aquinas, the ordinary sense of 'being' is existence simpliciter. But every instance of existence is existence as something or other, and existence as something or other typically admits of degrees. A thing can be a more or less fully developed actualized specimen of its kind; it can have actualized its specifying potentiality to a greater or lesser degree. The ordinary sense of 'goodness', however, has to do with this actualization of the specifying potentiality. And so it is by no means clear that being in general is all or nothing. On Aquinas' view, there is more to being than just existence; the actualization of the specifying potentiality of a thing is also being of a sort." (Aquinas, p. 73).
It’s pretty clear what she means, and if she’s such a terrible Aquinas scholar, then why is she the co-editor of the Cambridge Companion to Aquinas? Why was she asked to write the Routledge Arguments of the Philosophers book on Aquinas? Why did Wippel use her for an approving blurb on the back of his book, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas? I mean, if she is such a horrible Aquinas scholar, any real Aquinas scholar would see her name on the back of his book, and flee! Also, why was her article on goodness, which repeats the same arguments in Aquinas included in Brian Davies’ Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Perspectives? And why does Feser endorse the book? I suppose they are all morons for believing that she may have an argument to make about this very issue, but only you have the truth.
Your argument does not work. There is no such thing as more or less existence or reality.
Assertion is not an argument.
Esse commune is not esse divinum. Esse divinum is God in himself, while esse commune is his power, on whose account we exist. Neither possesses degrees.
Because each is actuality without potentiality. Without potentiality, there are no degrees of being. With potentiality, there are degrees of being.
Superadded actuality is not esse. That's all I'm saying. Everything that exists simply does exist, and no substance can exist more than another, no matter how much "being" it adds to itself. Again, adding infinity to infinity is still infinity. Hence, reality cannot possess degrees.
Sure, it can. If that reality is an admixture of actuality and potentiality, then it admits of degrees of being.
Esse is the most fundamental act of existence that underlies any substance.
What do you mean act of existence? Doesn’t that imply actuality? How can you have an act without actuality? That is incoherent.
Once something is a substance, though, it is part of Aristotle's ten categories, which means that it can take part in lower actuality. In this realm, actuality can have degrees.
First, you are still stuck with the paradox that actuality has the same reality as potentiality.
Second, you are still stuck with the paradox that something can actually exist, but not be real.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteThird, you are still stuck with the necessity of all beings with the same essence being equally good without any differentiation in terms of perfection and imperfection between them. There are no good and bad human beings, because all human beings have the same esse, and esse = goodness, and thus they have the same goodness. Human beings with more or less actuality do not have more or less goodness, because actuality is not esse, and only esse matters.
Actual arms and potential arms are part of the lower idea of actuality. According to esse, either there are arms or there are not arms. There are no "potential arms" in this sense.
Really? So, what if human scientists discover a way to regrow an arm from a shoulder stump? This is impossible, because there is no arm there, and thus that is the end of that. Where did the arm come from, unless there was the potential for there to be an arm?
Also, if each ens is just esse and essence, then where does potentiality come from? Esse has no potentiality, after all. So, where does the potentiality that exists in all material beings come from? After all, from the standpoint of esse, we are back to Parmenides’ paradoxes of Being versus non-Being, which are the only real categories.
No. Listen to Mr. Green. You are wrong and he is very, very right.
Wow. I just quoted the same explanation of essence and esse that Feser uses. I guess Feser is wrong, too.
Potential being only is insofar as it relates to the actual being of a substance, but the actual being of a substance only is insofar as it possesses esse. Esse is what actualizes actuality. Yet, actuality remains different from esse, and esse should not be thought of as "actuality without potentiality": it just is.
How can something actualize something else without being actual? That’s what “actual” means, i.e. it is acting, or doing something. And this is opposed to potency, which doesn’t do anything, but is passive.
Oh, and if esse “just is”, then it is actual without potency, because that is what “just is” means. I mean, seriously. Pure Actuality is just actuality without potentiality. As Aquinas says, “The first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality” (ST Ia 3.1). So, if Pure Actuality is esse, and Pure Actuality is “in no way in potentiality”, then esse is also “in act, and in no way in potentiality”.
Actuality does not exist unless it is actualized by esse. Because of this, one can coherently say that all substances simply exist, but at the same possess degrees.
And esse could not actualize anything unless it was actual. Only something actual can actualize anything. That is what actual means.
It may be right to say of existence that it is all or nothing; and, for Aquinas, the ordinary sense of 'being' is existence simpliciter.
ReplyDeleteHere, she is referring to esse.
But every instance of existence is existence as something or other, and existence as something or other typically admits of degrees. A thing can be a more or less fully developed actualized specimen of its kind; it can have actualized its specifying potentiality to a greater or lesser degree. The ordinary sense of 'goodness', however, has to do with this actualization of the specifying potentiality.
Here, she is discussing superadded actuality.
And so it is by no means clear that being in general is all or nothing. On Aquinas' view, there is more to being than just existence; the actualization of the specifying potentiality of a thing is also being of a sort.
Here, she says that Aquinas considers superadded actuality to be important, even though it is not esse.
In other words, you've been misreading her, as I said from the beginning.
Assertion is not an argument.
ReplyDeleteIt wasn't an assertion. I was merely following up Mr. Green's post.
First, you are still stuck with the paradox that actuality has the same reality as potentiality.
How is that a paradox? Aquinas holds that substances are the fundamental kind of being. Potentiality follows from actuality, and actuality follows from substances: and so potency and act are only as real as substance. But substances are only real because of esse. Therefore, esse is neither potentiality nor actuality, but rather is the actuality of both. It is a higher kind of actuality. And, no, this is not because it has "no potentiality mixed in". It's because it's metaphysically simple and therefore infinite, while regular actuality is not. Also, esse is not God, while Aristotle's Pure Act is God. Aquinas's God is esse divinum, which is (infinitely) separate from the esse that gives us being.
Second, you are still stuck with the paradox that something can actually exist, but not be real.
No, I'm not. Nothing actual or potential can exist without substance, and substance cannot exist without esse.
Third, you are still stuck with the necessity of all beings with the same essence being equally good without any differentiation in terms of perfection and imperfection between them. There are no good and bad human beings, because all human beings have the same esse, and esse = goodness, and thus they have the same goodness. Human beings with more or less actuality do not have more or less goodness, because actuality is not esse, and only esse matters.
Esse is existence. Existence is not superadded actuality. Differences in superadded actuality do not equate to differences in existence, except in terms of being and not-being. They do equate to differences in goodness.
Really? So, what if human scientists discover a way to regrow an arm from a shoulder stump? This is impossible, because there is no arm there, and thus that is the end of that. Where did the arm come from, unless there was the potential for there to be an arm?
The arm is part of a substance, and thus has potentiality and actuality. But, from the perspective of esse, it is either there or not there. When is this going to sink in?
Oh, and if esse “just is”, then it is actual without potency, because that is what “just is” means. I mean, seriously. Pure Actuality is just actuality without potentiality.
ReplyDeleteI never denied that esse was a kind of actuality. I merely said that it was a different kind than the one you keep discussing. This is why Aquinas calls it the actuality of actuality.
Also, if each ens is just esse and essence, then where does potentiality come from?
ReplyDeletePotentiality comes in when esse and essence are combined as a substance. Whenever a substance is, potentiality and actuality follow. This does not mean that esse is actuality or potentiality.
The Wikipedia article on "Actus Essendi" (esse) explains it pretty well:
ReplyDeleteAristotle didn’t have the notion of actus essendi. In fact, the contribution of Aquinas to the philosophy of being is precisely this, that he discovered that all Aristotelian acts were in reality ‘potency’ with respect to the actus essendi.
Aquinas saw that the metaphysical principle of actus essendi is the “act of all acts, the perfection of all perfections,” and “a proper effect of God.” The metaphysics of Aristotle did not reach that far.
Seldom have so many words been spilled over so little substance. Oh well, it keeps you people busy farting around with each other rather than bothering those with real work to do, real problems to solve, and the real world to understand. So that's good.
ReplyDeleteGIP, those people clearly do not include yourself, seeing as you're here. Not to mention that you don't even understand what we're talking about. Run along, Gnu.
ReplyDelete@gip
ReplyDeleteLike the pseudo-scientists of evo psych, who like to tell us that rape is ok because it helped in the survival of some ancient ancestor? Or perhaps those that try to rationalize racism based on darwinian assumptions? Or perhaps peter singer who again based on some ridiculous darwinian musing tells us it's ok to have sex with animals so long as the animal is not harmed?
Or the "zookeepers" of this newfound jungle known as modern cosmology, who do "real work" construction sci-fi fantasies about infinite, yet unobservable universes that magically popped into existence? Or better yet the theoretic physicists who wasted millions of dollar developing hypothesis about strings and branes and drums and trumpets, that in 20+ years have yet to provide a single experimental result, let along a use to solve an actual problem in the world?
You're already a joke around here, don't make it worse on yourself. Either try to pull yourself up to the level of the discourse or just be quiet and observe.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteIn other words, you've been misreading her, as I said from the beginning.
No. I’ve said from the beginning, that being can be understood in two ways, either as all-or-nothing (or esse), or as admitting of degrees (or superadded actuality). Our debate is no longer about this, but about about whether esse and superadded actuality are both different kinds of actual being, or not. I say they are, you say there are, but really aren’t.
How is that a paradox? Aquinas holds that substances are the fundamental kind of being. Potentiality follows from actuality, and actuality follows from substances: and so potency and act are only as real as substance. But substances are only real because of esse. Therefore, esse is neither potentiality nor actuality, but rather is the actuality of both. It is a higher kind of actuality. And, no, this is not because it has "no potentiality mixed in". It's because it's metaphysically simple and therefore infinite, while regular actuality is not.
First, this is yet another example of where you get me confused. Esse is “neither potentiality nor actuality”, which means that it isn’t actuality, but is “the actuality of both”. Explain that one to me. How can it be not-actuality and actuality, at the same time? Doesn’t that violate the law of excluded middle?
Second, “simple” just means “no parts”, and that includes having only actuality and not potentiality, because if it had both actuality and potentiality, then it would have parts. It is like saying that X is immaterial, but you can’t say that it has no matter. What else does “immaterial” mean? I mean, Aquinas himself describes Pure Actuality has having “no potentiality”, and thus this is not some radical suggestion on my part.
Third, even esse is super duper awesome actuality and a compound substance is just “regular” actuality, it still follows that they both are actuality. A super awesome human and a super shitty human are both still human. So, either they are both kinds of actuality, and then my argument follows. Or they are not both kinds of actuality, which means that one must be either potentiality or non-being, which are the only remaining options, neither of which makes any sense.
Fourth, it is still a paradox for your position that an actual arm has the same being as a potential arm.
Esse is existence. Existence is not superadded actuality. Differences in superadded actuality do not equate to differences in existence, except in terms of being and not-being. They do equate to differences in goodness.
“Goodness” is coextensive with “ actual being”. Now, this can either mean “esse” or “superadded actuality”. I would say that, since both are kinds of actual being, then “goodness” can refer to both esse and superadded actuality, much like “animal” can refer to both a human and a dog. However, you would have to disagree, because you keep saying that esse and superadded actuality are totally different. That is the main reason you have to say that extra superadded actuality does not mean extra actual being. If you agree with me, then what reason is there to deny that extra superadded actuality counts as extra actual being?
The arm is part of a substance, and thus has potentiality and actuality. But, from the perspective of esse, it is either there or not there. When is this going to sink in?
Because from the perspective of esse, you are stuck with Parmenides’ paradoxes, and if you want to say that esse is reality and existence, then you are stuck with only Being and Non-Being as legitimate categories of reality.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteI never denied that esse was a kind of actuality. I merely said that it was a different kind than the one you keep discussing. This is why Aquinas calls it the actuality of actuality.
Okay. So, esse is a kind of actuality. Superadded actuality is a kind of actuality. They are both actual being. To say that X has esse means “X has actual being”. To say that X has superadded actuality means “X has actual being”. So, why is it that extra superadded actuality is not actually real? Just because its not the super awesome kind of actuality that esse is? That would be like saying that because John is a less perfect kind of human than Peter, then John is not human and only Peter is, which was exactly the inference that people here thought I was making at the beginning, and rejected vehemently.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteHere’s another way to look at it.
From the standpoint of esse, you are correct that being is all-or-nothing. However, from the standpoint of esse, change is impossible (via Parmenides), something that is there has the same being as something that isn’t there, and comparative evaluations are impossible (because everything with esse is equally good, including a dog and a human). So, you can remain in that standpoint if you want, but it has weird implications that I don’t think you appreciate.
From the standpoint of actuality, as in the kind of being that both esse and superadded actuality are both supposed to be kinds of, none of these paradoxes and problems exists. And from this standpoint, my argument follows, because it just assumes that, whatever their differences, esse and superadded actuality are both kinds of actual being, and you cannot say that one is not actually real, but the other is actually real. They are both actually real.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteOn the plus side, I think we're coming closer to a shared position, and just ironing out a few details, which is reassuring.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteHere’s another thought.
We are trying to find a difference between the actuality of esse and the actuality of superadded actuality. My contention is that the former has no potentiality and the latter has potentiality. That is the only significant difference, but you seem to deny this.
You mentioned another possibility, which is that esse is the actuality that brings something ex nihilo, and sustains its being from disappearing into nothingness altogether. In that sense, God as Pure Act and esse, and he is constantly sustaining all existing things at every moment of their existence. However, that wouldn’t work with say the existence of a human being once a sperm and ovum unite into a zygote. At that moment, a human substance comes into existence, and it is an all-or-nothing affair, which means that it should involve esse. But, if esse is just bringing something into existence from non-being, then that wouldn’t apply to a zygote’s coming into being, because it came into being from other existing things, i.e. a sperm and zygote, both within a female reproductive apparatus, which is within a female, which is within a family, which is within a community, and so on. So, esse cannot be the bringing of something into existence from non-being in this case, because something has come from something else.
I still think that my construal is the most promising.
So, you start with Pure Actuality, which has no potentiality, and its essence is esse itself, which we can call Actuality1 or Esse1. Then you get the actuality without potentiality that depends upon Pure Actuality to sustain its actuality, which we can call Actuality2 or Esse2. This would be existence of individual substances, i.e. beings with a substantial form that has Actuality2 or Esse2 to bring it into actual existence. That is why Pure Actuality is the Actuality1 of Actuality2, and thus this kind of actuality is a derivative kind of actuality, while still remaining a kind of actuality. Note that both Actuality1/Esse1 and Actuality2/Esse2 are all-or-nothing affairs, because both have no potentiality whatsoever. You can then add a third kind of actuality, or Actuality3, which does admit of potentiality, and thus admits of degrees. What you have is Actuality3 depends upon Actuality2, which depends upon Actuality1. However, all of them are kinds of actuality, and all actually exist, but in different ways. So, it does not make sense to say that Actuality1 is actually real, but Actuality3 is not actually real, because they are both actually real, but in different ways.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteJust to clarify.
First, Actuality3 (= actuality plus potentiality), which depends upon Actuality2 (= actuality without potentiality, and actuality distinct from essence), which depends upon Actuality1 (= actuality without potentiality, and actuality identical with essence).
Second, Actuality = Actuality1 + Actuality2 + Actuality3.
Under this framework, although it makes sense to say that a being that is Actual3 is not Actual1, it would make no sense to say that a being that is Actual3 is not Actual, because Actuality3 is just a kind of Actuality.
That might lead us to final consensus: I agree that you cannot say that Actual3 is the same as Actual1, but you can say that Actual3 is Actual.
Would you agree?
Does that clear things up?
Rank:
ReplyDeleteAnd finally, here are our statements, translated into my framework:
(1) A good human being is more Actual3 than a bad human being
(2) A good human being is more Actual than a bad human being
(3) A good human being is just as Actual1 as a bad human being
(4) A good human being is just as Actual2 as a bad human being
Can you agree with (1) to (4)?
If you do, then we are done.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteCrap. Forget (3) above. Actuality1 only applies to God, and not to human beings. Only Actuality2 and Actuality3 apply to human beings.
So, you have:
(1) A good human being is more Actual3 than a bad human being
(2) A good human being is more Actual than a bad human being
-----------------------------
(4) A good human being is just as Actual2 as a bad human being
I would imagine the only statement of contention would be (2), me endorsing it, and you possibly rejecting it, but I just want to have our terms clear.
My position is that (2) is true, because a human being's Actuality is a combination of its Actuality2 and Actuality3. Although all human beings have the same Actuality2, they differ in their degree of Actuality3, and a human being with more Actuality3 would necessarily have more Actuality than a human being with less Actuality3. That is because Actuality3 is still a kind of Actuality.
However, that wouldn’t work with say the existence of a human being once a sperm and ovum unite into a zygote. At that moment, a human substance comes into existence, and it is an all-or-nothing affair, which means that it should involve esse. But, if esse is just bringing something into existence from non-being, then that wouldn’t apply to a zygote’s coming into being, because it came into being from other existing things, i.e. a sperm and zygote, both within a female reproductive apparatus, which is within a female, which is within a family, which is within a community, and so on. So, esse cannot be the bringing of something into existence from non-being in this case, because something has come from something else.
ReplyDeleteEach individual sperm is a substance, as is the zygote. They have substantial forms, after all. This means that they all rely at every moment on "Actuality2", as you call it.
The thing that gets Aquinas's being out of Parmenides' paradox is that Aquinas doesn't discount "Actuality3". Everything that has Actuality2 also has Actuality3. (As Stump said, "every instance of existence is existence as something or other".) Because of this, change is possible. However, every being with "Actuality3" either is or relies on a substance, which means that it relies on Actuality2 at all times.
(1) A good human being is more Actual3 than a bad human being
(2) A good human being is more Actual than a bad human being
-----------------------------
(4) A good human being is just as Actual2 as a bad human being
I agree--with the caveat, as always, that this system makes the question of "whether or not something is real" an all-or-nothing affair. Someone can be a worse human or a better human, but never a less real (less existent) human or a "less human" human. These last two would violate the law of the excluded middle. If we can agree on these points below, expanded from your edition, then we're good.
1. A good human being is more Actual3 than a bad human being.
2. A good human being is more actual than a bad human being.
3. A bad human being is not less existent (real) than a good human being. (This is essentially your (4).)
4. A bad human being is not less of a human being (less "this kind of substance") than a good human being.
If you find "4." confusing, remember that I am merely talking about substantial forms, which have no degrees. Anything that is human has a human substantial form--and, because "human is human", there cannot be a middle ground between "human" and "not human". This says nothing about the Actuality3 of any particularly human, because, in order to have Actuality3, a human must first be a substance with a form.
One last thing: while I agree that a good human is "more actual", I don't mean to collapse the difference in kind between Actuality2 and Actuality3. Again, a human is not "50% actual" when it has Actuality2, say, and then "55% actual" when it continuously adds Actuality3 on top. They are different types of actuality--both legitimate--, and one does not add to the other. To paraphrase Mr. Green, Actuality2 tells us whether something is real, and Actuality3 tells us how good something is (ignoring the stuff about Actuality2's infinite goodness). If you're cool with that, then I think we're finally done.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteEach individual sperm is a substance, as is the zygote. They have substantial forms, after all. This means that they all rely at every moment on "Actuality2", as you call it.
Yup.
The thing that gets Aquinas's being out of Parmenides' paradox is that Aquinas doesn't discount "Actuality3". Everything that has Actuality2 also has Actuality3. (As Stump said, "every instance of existence is existence as something or other".) Because of this, change is possible. However, every being with "Actuality3" either is or relies on a substance, which means that it relies on Actuality2 at all times.
Yup, but I would add that if you say that the only real and genuine Actuality is either Actuality1 or Actuality2, which are both kinds of Esse, then change is unreal, because change depends upon Actuality3, which would have to be real for change to be real.
1. A good human being is more Actual3 than a bad human being.
Yup.
2. A good human being is more actual than a bad human being.
I think this is confusing, because I think that we should be clear about what we mean by “actual”. In other words, do you mean Actual (i.e. Actual1, Actual2 and/or Actual3), Actual1, Actual2, or Actual3?
3. A bad human being is not less existent (real) than a good human being. (This is essentially your (4).)
Again, I think it is best not to use words like “real”, “existent”, “actual”, because they can be confusing. That’s why I like Actual1, Actual2 and Actual3, because the kinds of Actuality that we are talking about are perfectly clear without equivocation. But if this is essentially my (4), then I’d agree.
4. A bad human being is not less of a human being (less "this kind of substance") than a good human being.
By this, I think you mean my (4), again, which specifically uses Actuality2, because Actuality2 is an all-or-nothing affair since it is a compound of essence and Actuality2, and does not admit of potentiality. So, if X has an Actualized2 essence E and X has an Actualized2 essence E, then X and Y are both equally Actual2 individuals with essence E. However, they may differ in the degree of Actuality3, because Actuality3 occurs when a being with Actuality2 admits of potentiality.
One last thing: while I agree that a good human is "more actual", I don't mean to collapse the difference in kind between Actuality2 and Actuality3. Again, a human is not "50% actual" when it has Actuality2, say, and then "55% actual" when it continuously adds Actuality3 on top. They are different types of actuality--both legitimate--, and one does not add to the other. To paraphrase Mr. Green, Actuality2 tells us whether something is real, and Actuality3 tells us how good something is (ignoring the stuff about Actuality2's infinite goodness). If you're cool with that, then I think we're finally done.
First, I don’t understand how a being with Actuality2 has “infinite goodness”. Only a being with Actuality1 has “infinite goodness”, no? Anyway, this is a minor point. The major point is the following.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteSecond, I think we have come down to the core of our dispute. I think that when Actuality2 is added to an essence E, then an ens with Actuality2 and essence E comes into Being2 (= Actuality2). It is like a light switch turning on, and so now you can say that there is light, as opposed to saying that there is no light. That is the all-or-nothing part of this scenario. However, with light, you can also have different degrees of light, i.e. brighter or darker. And that would correspond to more or less Actuality3. So, you need Actuality2 to turn on the light, but then need Actuality3 to admit degrees of brightness, as it were.
Now, Actuality is just the totality of Actuality1 and Actuality2 and Actuality3. So, if you have an X with the same essence E and Actuality2 as Y, but X has more Actuality3 than Y, then X has more Actuality than Y. To use the light analogy, it is like X and Y are both lights that have been turned on, but X has more brightness than Y, which means that X has more light than Y. And that is because both Actuality2 and Actuality3 are Actuality.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteOne more thing.
It is like saying that John the human and Fido the dog are both Animals, but John is an Animal1 (i.e. a rational animal) and Fido is an Animal2 (i.e. a non-rational animal). In this group, there is one Animal1, one Animal2, but two Animals. It wouldn’t make sense that there is one Animal, because both John and Fido are Animals. In the same way, both Actuality2 and Actuality3 are Actuality, and so if Actuality2 remains constant between X and Y, but X has more Actuality3 than Y, then X has more Actuality, because more Actuality3 means more Actuality, just like more Animals2 means more Animals.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteAnd one last thing.
Here’s the way I see the relationships between the different kinds of Actuality:
Actuality1 < Actuality1 + Actuality2 < Actuality1 + Actuality2 + Actuality3
First, I don’t understand how a being with Actuality2 has “infinite goodness”. Only a being with Actuality1 has “infinite goodness”, no? Anyway, this is a minor point. The major point is the following.
ReplyDeleteA being with Actuality2 doesn't have infinite goodness. Rather, Actuality2 ("esse", "to be") is metaphysically simple and therefore infinite. Any being with Actuality2 is a combination of Actuality2 and essence, and so it is separate from Actuality2 proper.
As an aside, Actuality2 is the expression of Actuality1's power, and so it entirely relies on Actuality1; but, as the expression of Actuality1's power, Actuality2 must be infinite (and infinitely good) as well.
Second, I think we have come down to the core of our dispute. I think that when Actuality2 is added to an essence E, then an ens with Actuality2 and essence E comes into Being2 (= Actuality2).
This might be where you've gotten confused. If an ens with Actuality2 and essence comes into being, this does not mean that it is composed of Actuality2. Nothing has Actuality2 by its nature. When Actuality2 and essence are combined, a substance composed of Actuality3 appears. All aspects of this substance are Actuality3, and none of them are Actuality2--nor can they ever be. However, the substance remains sustained by Actuality2, and it only exists because of Actuality2.
That is the all-or-nothing part of this scenario. However, with light, you can also have different degrees of light, i.e. brighter or darker. And that would correspond to more or less Actuality3. So, you need Actuality2 to turn on the light, but then need Actuality3 to admit degrees of brightness, as it were.
Actuality2 underlies and sustains all of the degrees as well, though. In fact, every degree is Actuality3 trying and failing to imitate Actuality2, in a sense. This is where Aquinas's Fourth Way comes from.
Now, Actuality is just the totality of Actuality1 and Actuality2 and Actuality3.
This is, right here, is the root of our disagreement. Aquinas uses the terms "esse" and "Actus Essendi" to describe Actuality2, and the term "superadded actuality" to describe Actuality3. There is clearly a sharp difference between the two. For Aquinas, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover would be merely the "totality", as you say, of superadded actuality. It is an actuality that admits no potentiality--a "maximal being"--, from which all other superadded actuality derives. However, Aquinas says that no actuality can be actual unless it first exists. Existence is not part of actuality, and so it cannot be discussed in the same sense. Even the Unmoved Mover, perhaps, would have required Aquinas's God.
So, if you have an X with the same essence E and Actuality2 as Y, but X has more Actuality3 than Y, then X has more Actuality than Y.
This is only the case if Actuality2 exists in the same sense that Actuality3 exists. But this is not correct.
It wouldn’t make sense that there is one Animal, because both John and Fido are Animals.
Actuality2 would not be the category "animal", but would rather be the existence of that category. Remember, substantial form is "primary actuality", but substantial form is not Actuality2. Therefore, neither is Actuality2 primary actuality. The "animal category" in your comparison might be thought of as primary actuality, while Actuality2 would be located higher still, as the very existence of primary actuality at all.
Actuality1 < Actuality1 + Actuality2 < Actuality1 + Actuality2 + Actuality3
ReplyDeleteThis can't be correct. First, it would mean that God, God's power and humans all exist in the same sense. Second, it would mean that God's power is superior to God, and that humans are superior to both.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteRank:
ReplyDeleteA being with Actuality2 doesn't have infinite goodness. Rather, Actuality2 ("esse", "to be") is metaphysically simple and therefore infinite. Any being with Actuality2 is a combination of Actuality2 and essence, and so it is separate from Actuality2 proper.
Okay. It’s just that you mentioned “infinite goodness” when talking about Actuality2, and I got confused. Anyway, it’s a minor quibble.
As an aside, Actuality2 is the expression of Actuality1's power, and so it entirely relies on Actuality1; but, as the expression of Actuality1's power, Actuality2 must be infinite (and infinitely good) as well.
But does that mean that an ens with essence E and Actuality2 has infinite goodness, too? I don’t think you’ll agree, and so what happened to Actuality2 when it combined with essence E that shrunk the degree of goodness into a finite amount? And you can’t have Actuality2 by itself, but it can only Exist2 as part of an ens. After all, to Exist it to Exist as something, and thus although we can separate essence from existence conceptually, in Reality, they are necessarily connected into a unity. So, I don’t think it makes sense to say that Actuality2 has infinite goodness. Actuality2 by itself cannot exist at all.
This might be where you've gotten confused. If an ens with Actuality2 and essence comes into being, this does not mean that it is composed of Actuality2. Nothing has Actuality2 by its nature. When Actuality2 and essence are combined, a substance composed of Actuality3 appears. All aspects of this substance are Actuality3, and none of them are Actuality2--nor can they ever be. However, the substance remains sustained by Actuality2, and it only exists because of Actuality2.
This is confusing!
What kind of Actuality does a substance have? I think it has both Actuality2, which accounts for its all-or-nothing kind of Actuality, and Actuality3, which accounts for its varying degrees of Actuality. If Actuality2 is distinct from substance, then why does substance have an all-or-nothing quality? Furthermore, if a substance is fundamentally Actuality3, then substances do admit of varying degrees, which would confirm my conclusion. So, if Actuality2 sustains substance, but remains distinct from substance, much like Actuality1 sustains Actuality2, and yet remains distinct from it, then substance is, in fact, composed of Actuality3, and my conclusion is vindicated.
Actuality2 underlies and sustains all of the degrees as well, though. In fact, every degree is Actuality3 trying and failing to imitate Actuality2, in a sense. This is where Aquinas's Fourth Way comes from.
Yes, but if Actuality2 is distinct from substance, much like Actuality1 is distinct from Actuality2, then you cannot say that a substance is Actual2 at all, much like you cannot say that Actuality2 is Actuality1. And if you cannot say that a substance is Actual2, then you cannot say that it is an all-or-nothing event, especially if a substance necessarily must be Actual3, which admits of degrees.
This is, right here, is the root of our disagreement. Aquinas uses the terms "esse" and "Actus Essendi" to describe Actuality2, and the term "superadded actuality" to describe Actuality3. There is clearly a sharp difference between the two. For Aquinas, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover would be merely the "totality", as you say, of superadded actuality. It is an actuality that admits no potentiality--a "maximal being"--, from which all other superadded actuality derives. However, Aquinas says that no actuality can be actual unless it first exists. Existence is not part of actuality, and so it cannot be discussed in the same sense. Even the Unmoved Mover, perhaps, would have required Aquinas's God.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteYup, that is our disagreement. I don’t think saying that something exists, but is not actual, makes any sense at all. To say that “no actuality can be actual unless it first exists” is just incoherent, unless you are smuggling in actuality into your concept of “existence” without being clear about it. That is why I prefer to label all the different kinds of being, Actual1, Actual2 and Actual3, or whatever. That way it is clear that there are simply different kinds of Actuality. Even the Catholic Encyclopedia agrees that to exist is to be actual. In fact, there are only two kinds of being, actual and potential, and only the former is considered truly existing, and the latter being an intermediate between actuality and non-being.
Actuality2 would not be the category "animal", but would rather be the existence of that category. Remember, substantial form is "primary actuality", but substantial form is not Actuality2. Therefore, neither is Actuality2 primary actuality. The "animal category" in your comparison might be thought of as primary actuality, while Actuality2 would be located higher still, as the very existence of primary actuality at all.
But you agreed that Actuality1, Actuality2 and Actuality3 are different kinds of Actuality. They must have something in common in order for this to be the case, or else why say that they are kinds of Actuality at all? Even if you say that they are analogous would require sameness at some point to ground the analogy, and so you can’t escape this necessity, as far as I can tell. This point becomes relevant below.
This can't be correct. First, it would mean that God, God's power and humans all exist in the same sense. Second, it would mean that God's power is superior to God, and that humans are superior to both.
Not at all. Actuality1 > Actuality2 > Actuality3, which means that God’s Actuality1 is superior to the Actuality2 of substances, which is superior to the Actuality3 of accidents. I was talking about the totality of Actuality. In that case, there is more Actuality when you combine Actuality1 and Actuality2 than if there only exists Actuality1, unless you want to say that Actuality2 does not Actually Exist, which is absurd, because it is a kind of Actuality. Furthermore, if you include the Actuality3 of accidents, then there is more Actuality in Actuality1 + Actuality2 + Actuality3 than there is in Actuality1 + Actuality2. Again, because Actuality3 is a kind of Actuality. I mean, there is more Actuality in existence with God plus his creation than with God alone.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteJust so you know, I'm taking my wife and kids camping over the weekend, and so I might not be able to reply to your next comment, if there is one, until early next week.
Wish me luck!
dguller
ReplyDeleteEven the Catholic Encyclopedia agrees that to exist is to be actual.
That's not true. The Catholic Encyclopaedia gives an excellent account of actus et potentia that disagrees with your understanding.
Specifically, "[...] the same reality may be considered as actuality or potentiality, according as we take a retrospective or a prospective point of view. In man, skill and science are actualities if we compare them to human nature, which they presuppose. But if we compare them to the actions themselves, or to the actual recall of acquired knowledge to consciousness, they are powers, or potentiae."
I don’t think saying that something exists, but is not actual, makes any sense at all.
It continues: "Aristotle and St. Thomas explain this theory by many illustrations, one of which will suffice. The statue exists potentially in the block of marble, because marble has an aptitude to receive the shape of a statue. This aptitude is something real in the marble, since many other substances are deprived of it. It is a receptive potentiality. With regard to the same statue, the sculptor has the power, by his action, to carve the marble into the form of a statue. His is an active power, a real skill or ability which is lacking in many other persons. In order to have the actual statue (actus), it is necessary for the sculptor to exercise (actus) his real skill (potentia) on a substance which is not yet a statue, but which has a real aptitude (potentia) to become one. I can form no idea either of the marble's potentiality or of the sculptor's skill unless I first know what is meant by an actual statue. In the same manner, the man born blind is unable to understand what is meant by the faculty of vision. In general, potentia has no meaning, and cannot be defined except through the corresponding actus." (bold emphasis mine)
So, the statue exists potentially in the marble - what doesn't make sense?
dguller
ReplyDeleteAnd, regarding the human essence specifically, I think we see here why Josh is right to note: Even supposing [your understanding of actuality implying better] were true, both the clear logical line to Eugenics and the universal lack of Thomists holding to such a doctrine would seem to be an inductive proof against your interpretations, separate from the theoretical points.
Just as with skill and science as quoted above, the intellect and will of Crude's gay friends presuppose their humanity, and the powers should be considered actualities from the view of their human natures. When considering their actions as moral persons, those actions might be considered more or less (really, actually?) human to the degree that the power of intellect is actualized (or not). The actions, though, not the human beings.
Anyway, good luck with the camping. I hope you enjoy(ed) your weekend away!
Jack:
ReplyDeleteHere's the Catholic Encyclopedia:
“Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things. St. Thomas describes it as the first or primary act of the essence as contrasted with its secondary act or operation (I Sent., dist. xxxiii, Q. i, a. 1, ad 1); and again, as "the actuality of all form or nature" (Summa, I, Q. iii, a. 4). Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality.” (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05543b.htm)
dguller
ReplyDeleteThanks for pointing that out.
Now leaving aside whether there is a nuanced difference between "to exist" (what you said), and "essential existence" (what the article discusses), I think that very section cuts against what you've been insisting regarding how this person can be more or less human than that one.
“Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things. St. Thomas describes it as the first or primary act of the essence as contrasted with its secondary act or operation (I Sent., dist. xxxiii, Q. i, a. 1, ad 1); and again, as "the actuality of all form or nature" (Summa, I, Q. iii, a. 4). Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality.”
The existence of a thing's essence is an affirmation or denial, not a measure admitting degrees.
Now, I do think there's a nuanced difference you're ignoring: "to exist" as you put it has, I think, greater extension that the "existence of an essence." eg, evil is real (it exists), but it is not a substance (essentially existing).
That said, I'm actually more interested in your response to the Thomas's and Aristotle's example of the statue existing potentially in the statue (and why you consider it nonsense).
In the comment above, where I wrote "The existence of a thing's essence" I guess I really meant "A thing's substantial existence."
ReplyDeleteSorry about that.
- - - - -
ReplyDeleteJack "Vaughn" Bodie writes,
It continues: "Aristotle and St. Thomas explain this theory by many illustrations, one of which will suffice. The statue exists potentially in the block of marble [2], because marble has an aptitude to receive the shape of a statue. This aptitude is something real in the marble, since many other substances are deprived of it. It is a receptive potentiality. With regard to the same statue, the sculptor has the power, by his action, to carve the marble into the form of a statue [1]. His is an active power, a real skill or ability which is lacking in many other persons. In order to have the actual statue (actus), it is necessary for the sculptor to exercise (actus) his real skill (potentia) on a substance which is not yet a statue, but which has a real aptitude (potentia) to become one..." (bold emphasis mine)
So, the statue exists potentially in the marble - what doesn't make sense?
- - - - -
[1] With regard to the same statue, the sculptor has the power, by his action, to carve the marble into the form of a statue.
Rodin writes, "Till the end of his task, it is necessary for him [the sculptor] to maintain energetically, in the full light of his consciousness, his global idea, so as to reconduct unceasingly to it and closely connect with it the smallest details of his work." -- Hadamard, Jacques, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, NY, 1954
(When Anonymous (August 15, 2012 2:19 PM) wrote, "Holy freaking, um, whatever," possibly he was expressing just how floored he was by the ability of commenters to reconduct unceasingly to their global ideas, as well as by their efforts to closely connect those global ideas with the smallest details.)
[2] The statue exists potentially in the block of marble
"In 1890, several papers reported on a rather paradoxical artistic theory: Rodin claims that there is a statue in each block of marble. It is just a question of divining it and bringing it out by removing all that is excessive (Le Temps, 21 December 1890, La Nouvelliste, 29 December, 1890)." -- Le Normand-Romain, Antoinette, THE MARBLE SCULPTURES
- - - - -
A. This is a (picture of a) block of actual Carrera marble.
B. If what Aristotle and Aquinas say is correct, and if Rodin's 'paradoxical artistic theory' is not off the mark, then there is a potential statue in that there actual block of Carrera marble.
C. One of Michelangelo actualizations of the 'receptive potential' of Carrera marble is known as the Pieta.
D. Is the Carrera marble of Michelangelo's Pieta (C.) more CarreraMarble than the Carrera marble of the block (A.)?
(cont)
E. One answer might be: "Given, a) the formula Actuality2 < (Actuality2 + Actuality3); and, b) the proffered axiom that it is the total actuality (i.e., the summation of actualities) which determines whether one chunk is more CarreraMarble then another, it follows that the answer must be, 'Yes.'"
ReplyDeleteF. Another answer might be, "The relation between what may have been made (or not made) of the two blocks of Carrera marble has no bearing on the question of whether one may be more or less CarreraMarble than the other.
"It is the same as if you had two light bulbs, each of which has the potential of being on--that one might be off and the other on says nothing about whether one is more or less a light bulb than the other. Though when contrasted with the on-lightbulb the off-lightbulb likely will not help you to read in a dark room at night, the off-lightbulb is no less a lightbulb than the on-lightbulb. To say otherwise is to speak from a Platonic point of view (a light bulb that doesn't provide light to see by, when light to see by is needed, isn't really a light bulb).
"Since to say otherwise is to speak from a Platonic point of view, and not from the A-T point of view which is regnant here, it follows that the answer must be, 'No.'"
Glenn,
ReplyDeleteI think your comment of August 17, 2012 11:11 AM has it exactly right.
Response should be coming today or tomorrow, dguller. I'm trying to make it thorough, since I have time. With any luck, it'll finally end this debate.
ReplyDeleteTo say otherwise is to speak from a Platonic point of view (a light bulb that doesn't provide light to see by, when light to see by is needed, isn't really a light bulb).
ReplyDelete"Since to say otherwise is to speak from a Platonic point of view, and not from the A-T point of view which is regnant here, it follows that the answer must be, 'No.'
You have this right, with one minor detail. Aquinas was a Neo-Platonist no less than were his predecessors, like Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius and the rest. My next post elaborates on this, with various proofs of its truth.
You have this right, with one minor detail. Aquinas was a Neo-Platonist no less than were his predecessors, like Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius and the rest. My next post elaborates on this, with various proofs of its truth.
ReplyDeleteNo problem; corrections, adjustments and refinements are always welcomed.
Looking forward to your next response.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteIn case you are in the habit of commenting as you read (as I am), I recommend that you suspend the practice for this post. Read it all, then respond. This will help to keep confusion to a minimum--this post is massive, and certain points are mentioned early on with context provided only much later.
But does that mean that an ens with essence E and Actuality2 has infinite goodness, too?
No. Aquinas's essence-existence doctrine is analogous to an act/potency relationship, certainly; but it is not the same. In developing his philosophy, Aquinas borrowed heavily from the Christian Neo-Platonist tradition. Most people don't realize this because of his strong Aristotelianism. However, arguably the greatest of the Christian Neo-Platonists, Pseudo-Dionysius, gets cited by Aquinas over 1,700 times. As a result, while the Neo-Platonist idea of being-as-participation was foreign to Aristotle, but it massively influenced Aquinas.
Being-as-participation means that nothing exists unless it participates in the existence of God, in a way. This is not to say that beings participate in God's being itself, of course, as that would be a heretical claim. Rather, it's the notion that existence-as-such (Actuality2) is distinct from the actions of beings (Actuality3). Aristotle only thought of "being" in terms of substance, and never went beyond it. This allowed him to talk of the Unmoved Mover as a "maximal actualizer", from which all motion derived. The Unmoved Mover was pure act, but it was locked in an opposition with prime matter: it could do nothing without it.
For Aquinas, as for many of the Neo-Platonists, Actuality2 is totally free from necessity or opposition (Aquinas even says that God generated prime matter from nothing), and they also consider Actuality2 infinitely good, beautiful, true and so forth. An entire book (The Beauty of the Infinite) by David Bentley Hart, who is a fairly legendary contemporary theologian, was dedicated to this topic. In it, he refutes, among other things, the claim that Aquinas's Ipsum Esse Subsistens (God) is in any way Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, in contrast to many modern interpretations. Ipsum Esse Subsistens is not merely "pure actuality" in the Aristotelian sense. Likewise, Actuality2 is not merely "pure actuality". Observe this comment from Aquinas:
"Esse itself is the most perfect of all things, since it is related to all things as their actuality. [Note: "given to all things in their creation from nothing".] For nothing has actuality except insofar as it exists; hence, esse itself is the actuality of all things [Note: the "actuality of their existence"] and especially of their forms. For this reason, esse is related to other things not in the way that what receives is related to what is received, but rather in the way that what is received is related to what receives. For when I talk about the esse of a man or the esse of a horse or the esse of anything else, it is the esse itself that is being thought of as formal and received, and not that to which the esse belongs."
Actuality3 is merely an imitation of Actuality2, a lesser form of something absolutely simple, infinite and perfect. This is not just because Actuality2 is purely actual. Remember, Actuality3 imitates Actuality2, and not the other way around. A pure Actuality3 can still only create from prime matter, while Actuality2 generates things from nothing at every moment. Aquinas Online has another good breakdown: http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/essencex.html:
"Esse is logically prior to all other actuality because a thing cannot be in a certain way unless it simply is. So, because of this logical priority of existence, Thomas calls it 'the most formal of all.' 'It is the actuality of all acts' since a thing is in virtue of esse and 'acts are of supposits.'"
According to Stump, a "supposit" is an individual within the category "substance": http://books.google.com/books?id=1GvL3eKhoM8C&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=supposit+aquinas&source=bl&ots=mq0vRm92gH&sig=f45Iitz7BysBfHWKK9Qec8LxR1w&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9IMuUKP0JMa36gGJooDQCQ&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=supposit%20aquinas&f=false. In other words, "act" is not something that can be used to described God or Actuality2, because it is only something done by "supposits". The "act" of Actuality2, then, is an act that is only analogously similar to Actuality3. On the other hand, the "act" of the Unmoved Mover is actual in the same sense as Actuality3: it is actuality without potentiality, which must yet use prime matter to do anything. Aquinas's God gives things existence, which is higher than any motion. Motion presupposes existence.
ReplyDeleteI don’t think you’ll agree, and so what happened to Actuality2 when it combined with essence E that shrunk the degree of goodness into a finite amount?
According Aquinas's being-as-participation, existence (Actuality2) would have to be limited from infinite to finite form. This occurs, it seems, when Actuality2 is channeled through essence to form a substance. However, it's important to remember that Actuality2 must constantly be poured into essence, because, unlike form to matter, it doesn't "stick". This is because there is nothing at all that has Actuality2 by its nature: it comes directly, constantly, at all times from God.
And you can’t have Actuality2 by itself, but it can only Exist2 as part of an ens. After all, to Exist it to Exist as something, and thus although we can separate essence from existence conceptually, in Reality, they are necessarily connected into a unity.
This is false. Aquinas tells us that the distinction is not merely conceptual, but real. Even though we do not see Actuality2 "on its own", this does not mean that the distinction is not real. This is why he differentiates between "esse divinum", "esse commune" and "superadded actuality".
So, I don’t think it makes sense to say that Actuality2 has infinite goodness. Actuality2 by itself cannot exist at all.
This would be a heretical statement to Aquinas. Actuality2 necessarily has infinite goodness, because it is the infinite expression of God's power. Further, Actuality2 cannot be thought of as "necessarily connected" to substance, because this too is heretical. Actuality2 is totally free and it is not in any way determined by substance: rather, it determines substance, as Aquinas says above. It is not actual in the same sense that anything else is actual. It is not just pure act-without-potency.
This is confusing!
What kind of Actuality does a substance have? I think it has both Actuality2, which accounts for its all-or-nothing kind of Actuality, and Actuality3, which accounts for its varying degrees of Actuality.
A substance cannot "have" Actuality2, because it only participates in Actuality2. It has absolutely no control over it, nor does it determine it in any way. You're comparing the finite to the infinite. Everything that is actual presupposes existence, and so Actuality2 is wholly separate from Actuality3.
If Actuality2 is distinct from substance, then why does substance have an all-or-nothing quality?
ReplyDeleteBecause it can either exist or not exist. It is by Actuality2 that it exists.
Furthermore, if a substance is fundamentally Actuality3, then substances do admit of varying degrees, which would confirm my conclusion.
Substances admit varying degrees, but not of existence--so no. Existence (Actuality2) is infinite. Every single thing aside from God participates in Actuality2. And, because Actuality2 is infinite, everything that participates in it has an infinite amount of existence. This does not mean that everything participating in Actuality2 is itself infinite, because it is being held over a precipice of utter non-being. Even angels participate in Actuality2. This article seems pretty solid: http://philosophy.cua.edu/res/docs/faculty/rss/The%20Science%20of%20Being%20as%20Being%20in%20Aristotle%20Aquinas%20and%20Wippel.pdf. A few quotes:
"The Prime Mover of Aristotle is like a super angel for Aquinas. It is the highest and best thing that can be."
"If Thomas were to discuss The Loyalty Angel or The Musical Angel, for example, he would admit that such beings exhaust the potential of what they are, they exhaust their own form, they are all that they could be, but he would also point out that they still are not altogether simple. They might be 'necessary angels' [...] but they still depend on something beyond themselves for what they are and for the fact that they are. Why are they not purely simple and radically necessary? Because it does not follow from what they are that they have to be."
So, if Actuality2 sustains substance, but remains distinct from substance, much like Actuality1 sustains Actuality2, and yet remains distinct from it, then substance is, in fact, composed of Actuality3, and my conclusion is vindicated.
Everything here is correct except for the ending. Substances are composed of Actuality3, but Actuality3 itself is impossible without Actuality2. Everything that is Actual3 is only that way because it is given being by Actuality2 at all times. Nothing could be actual if it did not first exist.
Yes, but if Actuality2 is distinct from substance, much like Actuality1 is distinct from Actuality2, then you cannot say that a substance is Actual2 at all, much like you cannot say that Actuality2 is Actuality1.
I don't deny it. But Actuality2 cannot exist without Actuality1, and neither can Actuality3 exist without Actuality2.
And if you cannot say that a substance is Actual2, then you cannot say that it is an all-or-nothing event, especially if a substance necessarily must be Actual3, which admits of degrees.
I can still say it, though. Again, something is only actual insofar as it exists, but nothing about Actuality3 implies existence. Therefore, everything Actual3 is given being by Actuality2.
Yup, that is our disagreement. I don’t think saying that something exists, but is not actual, makes any sense at all.
How? "Acts are of supposits", remember. God is not trapped in the idea of "actuality" as Aristotle conceived it. One may call him actual, but he is not the Unmoved Mover.
To say that “no actuality can be actual unless it first exists” is just incoherent, unless you are smuggling in actuality into your concept of “existence” without being clear about it.
ReplyDeleteIt's not incoherent. It was Aquinas's main argument for his essence-existence distinction. We can fully grasp a substance--form, matter, act, potency and all--without its ever having existed. Therefore, existence must be something more fundamental and metaphysically simple. Something must simply be before it can be actual--even angels, even the Unmoved Mover.
That is why I prefer to label all the different kinds of being, Actual1, Actual2 and Actual3, or whatever. That way it is clear that there are simply different kinds of Actuality.
They aren't univocal kinds of actuality, though. Actuality3 could be fully actual and it still could never be Actuality2.
Even the Catholic Encyclopedia agrees that to exist is to be actual. In fact, there are only two kinds of being, actual and potential, and only the former is considered truly existing, and the latter being an intermediate between actuality and non-being.
This is false. It traps God in the dialectic between actuality and potentiality, just like the Unmoved Mover. Existence is separate from plain old actuality--this is why Aquinas felt the need to make such a distinction in the first place.
But you agreed that Actuality1, Actuality2 and Actuality3 are different kinds of Actuality.
I still do. But they aren't univocal.
They must have something in common in order for this to be the case, or else why say that they are kinds of Actuality at all? Even if you say that they are analogous would require sameness at some point to ground the analogy, and so you can’t escape this necessity, as far as I can tell.
Certainly they're analogous. Actuality2 is analogous to Actuality1, and Actuality3 is analogous to Actuality2. Self-subsisting existence -> existence -> superadded actuality.
Not at all. Actuality1 > Actuality2 > Actuality3, which means that God’s Actuality1 is superior to the Actuality2 of substances, which is superior to the Actuality3 of accidents. I was talking about the totality of Actuality. In that case, there is more Actuality when you combine Actuality1 and Actuality2 than if there only exists Actuality1, unless you want to say that Actuality2 does not Actually Exist, which is absurd, because it is a kind of Actuality. Furthermore, if you include the Actuality3 of accidents, then there is more Actuality in Actuality1 + Actuality2 + Actuality3 than there is in Actuality1 + Actuality2. Again, because Actuality3 is a kind of Actuality. I mean, there is more Actuality in existence with God plus his creation than with God alone.
ReplyDeleteThis would have been outrageously heretical to Aquinas. To return to Hart again, it is of critical importance that our existence--the existence of anything besides God--adds absolutely nothing. There is no difference at all between God alone and God plus creation. This would make God reliant upon creation, which is theologically unacceptable. Further, the idea that the infinite perfection of esse could somehow be "added to" by finite, separate, limited perfection (Actuality3) strikes me as kind of strange. Here's Hart:
"One might even say--as alarming as it may sound--that God does not even need us to be 'our' God; all we are, all we can ever become, is already infinitely and fully present in the inexhaustible beauty, liveliness, and "virtue" of the Logos, where--as the infinitely perfect reflection of the divine essence that flows forth from the Father, fully enjoyed in the light of the Spirit--it is present already as responsiveness and communion; thus God indeed loved us when we were not, and that he then called us to be (Rom. 4:17)."
In case you're concerned that Hart is presenting some "modern" view, don't be. His entire project is a return to classical theism as discussed by the Church Fathers. It is from this vantage that he occasionally discusses Aquinas, who he finds largely in accord with people like Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Denys and the rest.
In summary, Aquinas's Christianized Neo-Platonist tendencies save him from the conclusions of Aristotle. You might be right that it's possible to "exist less" under Aristotle's system, but this is not the case for Aquinas. Existence and actuality are separate: is one simple, infinitely perfect, wholly given; the other is finite, incomplete in itself, wholly dependent.
As a result, there is no "total actuality" equation. Everything from humans to angels relies on esse commune. Angels are more perfect than humans ever can be--since humans can't fully actualize their essential potencies--, but even they do not "exist more". In the end, this means that no one can "exist-as-a-human" more than than anyone else. The infinity of existence puts everyone on even ground, while superadded actuality allows them to chase after some semblance of that infinity, and in that way become more perfect-as-a-human.
@Rank Sophist
ReplyDeleteVery informative analysis. I really enjoyed it!
Thanks, Anon. I just hope it clears things up with dguller.
ReplyDeleteFeser is far from manly. A manly person wouldn't have felt threatened when I pointed out his natural law papers support totalitarianism. His "manly" response was to ban me. I think of that as cowardice and intellectual weakness.
ReplyDeleteRank:
ReplyDeleteThank you for your lengthy response. To the chagrin of my wife, I read it while camping, but perhaps as evidence of cosmic justice, I have a wicked bad sun burn from the beach with my kids. And as you recommended, I read the entire thing before composing my response.
Being-as-participation means that nothing exists unless it participates in the existence of God, in a way. This is not to say that beings participate in God's being itself, of course, as that would be a heretical claim. Rather, it's the notion that existence-as-such (Actuality2) is distinct from the actions of beings (Actuality3). Aristotle only thought of "being" in terms of substance, and never went beyond it. This allowed him to talk of the Unmoved Mover as a "maximal actualizer", from which all motion derived. The Unmoved Mover was pure act, but it was locked in an opposition with prime matter: it could do nothing without it.
First, it might make better sense to divide Actuality1 into Actuality1a and Actuality1b. Actuality1a is esse divinum and Actuality1a is esse commune. In other words, Actuality1a is esse as it occurs in God, and Actuality1b is esse as it actualizes Actuality2, which is the Actuality of finite beings. In other words, when Actuality1b is added to essence E, then you get an ens with essence E and Actuality2. (Remember, Actuality2 is the kind of Actuality you get when you have no potentiality and a composite formed from essence and Actuality1b. This is distinct from the two types of Actuality1, where you have no potentiality and you have a simple Being where essence = Actuality1.) You do not get an ens with essence E and Actuality1b, for all the reasons that you stated, more prominently, Actuality1b is perfect goodness, because it is a kind of Actuality1, while Actuality2 is not perfect goodness, although it is goodness simpliciter.
Just want the terms to be clear, because so much of this discussion is muddied by different senses of “being”, “existence”, “actuality”, and so on. I prefer to use Actuality1a, Actuality1b, Actuality2 and Actuality3, because the senses are always clear. And these terms can have corresponding versions of the other terms, too, i.e. Actuality1a corresponds to Being1a, Existence1a, and so on. That way, we can avoid paradoxical statements, like “nothing can be actual unless it exists”, which ultimately means “nothing can be actual2 unless it is has actuality1a”, which is clear.
An entire book (The Beauty of the Infinite) by David Bentley Hart, who is a fairly legendary contemporary theologian, was dedicated to this topic. In it, he refutes, among other things, the claim that Aquinas's Ipsum Esse Subsistens (God) is in any way Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, in contrast to many modern interpretations. Ipsum Esse Subsistens is not merely "pure actuality" in the Aristotelian sense.
I wonder what your account says about the First Way, which concludes: “Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” Apparently, Aquinas argued that the Unmoved Mover is God, but your position is that the Unmoved Mover is not God at all, but some kind of perfect angel, which is not what the First Way argues at all. So, this is quite strange.
This is not just because Actuality2 is purely actual. Remember, Actuality3 imitates Actuality2, and not the other way around. A pure Actuality3 can still only create from prime matter, while Actuality2 generates things from nothing at every moment.
I would say something different. Actuality2 is purely actual in the sense that it has no potentiality, but it is not the same as Actuality1, because it is a composite being, and not a simple being. So, composite beings that have pure actuality have Actuality2 and simple beings that have pure actuality have Actuality1. And just to be clear, Actuality2 is the actuality of substances, whereas Actuality1 is the actuality of God, and Actuality3 is the actuality of accidents.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteAquinas's God gives things existence, which is higher than any motion. Motion presupposes existence.
Yes, that is why God shares his Actuality1a through Actuality1b in order to create a composite being with Actuality2. And Actuality2 has no motion, because it is pure actuality lacking any potentiality, which means that it either exists2 or does not exist2, and thus its existence2 is binary. Without Actuality1a, a composite being lacks Actuality2, and thus does not exist2, which is in keeping with what you are saying, but with a bit more precision, I think.
This is false. Aquinas tells us that the distinction is not merely conceptual, but real. Even though we do not see Actuality2 "on its own", this does not mean that the distinction is not real. This is why he differentiates between "esse divinum", "esse commune" and "superadded actuality".
I find this strange. Only in God does essence = existence1a. In everything else, essence and existence1a are necessarily interconnected in reality. One actuality1a starts causing the existence2 of composite beings (i.e. composed of a combination of essence and actuality1a), then these beings, or ens, must have both actuality1a and essence in order to exist2 at all! That is why everything that exists2 must exist2 as some kind of being2, i.e. every thing2 is some kind of thing2.
A substance cannot "have" Actuality2, because it only participates in Actuality2. It has absolutely no control over it, nor does it determine it in any way. You're comparing the finite to the infinite. Everything that is actual presupposes existence, and so Actuality2 is wholly separate from Actuality3.
I have a question. If the existence2 of particular beings2 depends upon participation in actuality1b for their existence2, then what exactly is our status with respect to God? I mean, we are either inside God or outside God. We cannot be outside God, because (1) nothing can exist outside of God, and (2) we participate in God’s existence1b, and thus are utterly dependent upon him for our existence2. However, we cannot be inside God, because God is simple and if we were inside God, then he would be a composite being, which is impossible. So, we are neither inside nor outside God, which seems strange. Any suggested solutions?
It's not incoherent. It was Aquinas's main argument for his essence-existence distinction. We can fully grasp a substance--form, matter, act, potency and all--without its ever having existed. Therefore, existence must be something more fundamental and metaphysically simple. Something must simply be before it can be actual--even angels, even the Unmoved Mover.
Well, there are two senses here.
First, something must be as a potentiality before it can be actual. The Thomist solution here would presumably be each being’s actual existence as a divine idea in the divine mind prior to its actualization2 by actuality1b. That sense makes sense to me.
Second, if you mean that something must exist, i.e “simply be” before it can be actual, then what exact kind of existence are you talking about? You can’t mean that it must exist1b before it can be actual2, because once existence1b has been poured into an essence, then you necessarily have an ens with actuality2. You also can’t mean that it must exist1a before it can be actual2, because existence1a is only for God. You also can’t mean that it must exist2 before it can be actual2, because that is absurd. So, I don’t know that this is supposed to mean, when we tease out the different senses of “actual” and “exist”. Help me out here.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteThey aren't univocal kinds of actuality, though. Actuality3 could be fully actual and it still could never be Actuality2.
They don’t have to be univocal. Like I said, even if they are analogous, then they must share something in common, which is the common thread of “actuality” present in all the different kinds of actuality. We may not even be able to discuss it or have words or concepts for it, but reason says it must be present in all of them. That common “something” is what I am talking about.
This is false. It traps God in the dialectic between actuality and potentiality, just like the Unmoved Mover. Existence is separate from plain old actuality--this is why Aquinas felt the need to make such a distinction in the first place.
So, existence1 is separate from plain old actuality2. That’s fine. My only point is that whatever you use to talk about it, i.e. being, existence, actuality, it is all opposed to both potentiality and non-being. But since non-being cannot be coherently be described a kind of being, then if you are talking about a kind of being, then you are stuck with something that actually exists, or something that could actually exist, i.e. what actually exists in the present, and what could actually exist in the future. So, all kinds of being must involve actuality, even if it is actuality1a, actuality1b, actuality2 or actuality3.
To return to Hart again, it is of critical importance that our existence--the existence of anything besides God--adds absolutely nothing. There is no difference at all between God alone and God plus creation. This would make God reliant upon creation, which is theologically unacceptable.
Why would that be the case? He can still be utterly independent of creation, and yet the totality of actuality is greater with creation than without it. God plus Rank is more actuality than God alone. Unless you want to say that you do not exist?
Further, the idea that the infinite perfection of esse could somehow be "added to" by finite, separate, limited perfection (Actuality3) strikes me as kind of strange.
I am not saying that God’s existence1 is being added to by anything with existence2 or existence3. The amount of existence1 remains the same, and that is the only kind of existence that matters for God. I am saying that the totality of actuality is greater with existence1 plus existence2 than it is with only existence1.
As a result, there is no "total actuality" equation. Everything from humans to angels relies on esse commune. Angels are more perfect than humans ever can be--since humans can't fully actualize their essential potencies--, but even they do not "exist more". In the end, this means that no one can "exist-as-a-human" more than than anyone else. The infinity of existence puts everyone on even ground, while superadded actuality allows them to chase after some semblance of that infinity, and in that way become more perfect-as-a-human.
If you want to say that actuality1 is analogous to actuality2 and actuality3, then there must be something that all three kinds of actuality share in common. Otherwise, they are either identical or completely different, neither of which would be coherent or helpful to Thomism. So, if you focus upon the actuality that they share in common, then I think it makes sense that this actuality is greater with actuality1 and actuality2 than with just actuality1. And if that is valid, the a being with actuality2 and actuality3 has more actuality than a being with just actuality2.
Any thoughts?
Good to see you back, dguller. Sorry to hear about that sunburn.
ReplyDeleteAnyway, I'll have to re-read your post a few times to get the terminology clear in my head. In the meantime, you might want to check out these articles from the Summa contra Gentiles, in which Aquinas addresses subjects very similar to the ones we're discussing.
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_15.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_16.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_19.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_17.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_11.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_12.htm
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_22.htm
First, it might make better sense to divide Actuality1 into Actuality1a and Actuality1b. Actuality1a is esse divinum and Actuality1a is esse commune. In other words, Actuality1a is esse as it occurs in God, and Actuality1b is esse as it actualizes Actuality2, which is the Actuality of finite beings. In other words, when Actuality1b is added to essence E, then you get an ens with essence E and Actuality2.
ReplyDeleteMakes sense to me. It sounds clearer than what we were using before, since it makes it more obvious that "Actuality2" (now "Actuality1b") is not totally independent of God.
(Remember, Actuality2 is the kind of Actuality you get when you have no potentiality and a composite formed from essence and Actuality1b. This is distinct from the two types of Actuality1, where you have no potentiality and you have a simple Being where essence = Actuality1.) You do not get an ens with essence E and Actuality1b, for all the reasons that you stated, more prominently, Actuality1b is perfect goodness, because it is a kind of Actuality1, while Actuality2 is not perfect goodness, although it is goodness simpliciter.
Seems like we're on the same page, so far.
Just want the terms to be clear, because so much of this discussion is muddied by different senses of “being”, “existence”, “actuality”, and so on. I prefer to use Actuality1a, Actuality1b, Actuality2 and Actuality3, because the senses are always clear. And these terms can have corresponding versions of the other terms, too, i.e. Actuality1a corresponds to Being1a, Existence1a, and so on. That way, we can avoid paradoxical statements, like “nothing can be actual unless it exists”, which ultimately means “nothing can be actual2 unless it is has actuality1a”, which is clear.
True. Now, down to brass tacks.
I wonder what your account says about the First Way, which concludes: “Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” Apparently, Aquinas argued that the Unmoved Mover is God, but your position is that the Unmoved Mover is not God at all, but some kind of perfect angel, which is not what the First Way argues at all. So, this is quite strange.
I'm not entirely sure how to reconcile the two, but Aquinas must have done it somehow. Perhaps it could be done by saying that Actuality1b, being the source of all Actuality2, is ultimately responsible for the motions that Actuality2 carries out? I find it a bit confusing myself. In any case, Aquinas does refer to God as the "Unmoved Mover"; but, as is common, he takes Aristotle's words and gives them new definitions. He didn't believe that the cause of motion was a "super angel"--the author of that piece was merely telling us that Aristotle's Unmoved Mover would have been a super angel to Aquinas. The Unmoved Mover of Aquinas is, somehow, the same as Ipsum Esse Subsistens. However, I agree that this needs clarification.
I would say something different. Actuality2 is purely actual in the sense that it has no potentiality, but it is not the same as Actuality1, because it is a composite being, and not a simple being. So, composite beings that have pure actuality have Actuality2 and simple beings that have pure actuality have Actuality1. And just to be clear, Actuality2 is the actuality of substances, whereas Actuality1 is the actuality of God, and Actuality3 is the actuality of accidents.
ReplyDeleteWorks for me. Actuality2 would be "primary actuality", then, and Actuality3 would be "secondary actuality".
Yes, that is why God shares his Actuality1a through Actuality1b in order to create a composite being with Actuality2. And Actuality2 has no motion, because it is pure actuality lacking any potentiality, which means that it either exists2 or does not exist2, and thus its existence2 is binary. Without Actuality1a, a composite being lacks Actuality2, and thus does not exist2, which is in keeping with what you are saying, but with a bit more precision, I think.
Yeah, that sounds about right.
I find this strange. Only in God does essence = existence1a. In everything else, essence and existence1a are necessarily interconnected in reality. One actuality1a starts causing the existence2 of composite beings (i.e. composed of a combination of essence and actuality1a), then these beings, or ens, must have both actuality1a and essence in order to exist2 at all! That is why everything that exists2 must exist2 as some kind of being2, i.e. every thing2 is some kind of thing2.
Although something cannot exist2 without essence and Actuality1b, it by no means necessarily exists2 in the first place. Nothing necessarily exists2. The only necessary kind of existence is existence1. This is why Aquinas talks about being able to consider the essence of a phoenix, for instance, without thinking of it as existing2. As a result, there is a real distinction between essence and existence.
However, you're hardly the first to debate this point. From what I've read, there was a big fight in the Middle Ages over whether the essence-existence distinction was real or conceptual. It's tangential to our debate, though, so let's not dwell on it.
I have a question. If the existence2 of particular beings2 depends upon participation in actuality1b for their existence2, then what exactly is our status with respect to God? I mean, we are either inside God or outside God. We cannot be outside God, because (1) nothing can exist outside of God, and (2) we participate in God’s existence1b, and thus are utterly dependent upon him for our existence2. However, we cannot be inside God, because God is simple and if we were inside God, then he would be a composite being, which is impossible. So, we are neither inside nor outside God, which seems strange. Any suggested solutions?
The general idea is that God is both immanent and infinitely (literally, not hyperbolically) transcendent. So, in a sense, we are simultaneously "inside" and "outside" God. Because of the way Aquinas and his predecessors set up this relationship, I don't believe that it results in a violation of the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity or the law of the excluded middle.
If you need a comparison, it's worth noting that this is basically panentheism (not pantheism). Many Hindus (particularly Vaishnavists) hold similar views, although it is not uncommon for them to state also that God is the material cause of the universe, which Aquinas argues against in the Summa contra Gentiles. The general point is that there are precedents for Aquinas's system.
Well, there are two senses here.
ReplyDeleteFirst, something must be as a potentiality before it can be actual. The Thomist solution here would presumably be each being’s actual existence as a divine idea in the divine mind prior to its actualization2 by actuality1b. That sense makes sense to me.
I'm not entirely sure if that's how it works. All I know is that Aquinas says that creation (read: actualization of a being2 by Actuality1b) does not come from a potentiality: http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_17.htm
Second, if you mean that something must exist, i.e “simply be” before it can be actual, then what exact kind of existence are you talking about? You can’t mean that it must exist1b before it can be actual2, because once existence1b has been poured into an essence, then you necessarily have an ens with actuality2. You also can’t mean that it must exist1a before it can be actual2, because existence1a is only for God. You also can’t mean that it must exist2 before it can be actual2, because that is absurd. So, I don’t know that this is supposed to mean, when we tease out the different senses of “actual” and “exist”. Help me out here.
It's a matter of logical rather than temporal priority. Something cannot be Actual2 unless it exists2--by definition--, and something cannot exist2 unless it participates in Actuality1b.
They don’t have to be univocal. Like I said, even if they are analogous, then they must share something in common, which is the common thread of “actuality” present in all the different kinds of actuality. We may not even be able to discuss it or have words or concepts for it, but reason says it must be present in all of them. That common “something” is what I am talking about.
True enough.
So, existence1 is separate from plain old actuality2. That’s fine. My only point is that whatever you use to talk about it, i.e. being, existence, actuality, it is all opposed to both potentiality and non-being. But since non-being cannot be coherently be described a kind of being, then if you are talking about a kind of being, then you are stuck with something that actually exists, or something that could actually exist, i.e. what actually exists in the present, and what could actually exist in the future. So, all kinds of being must involve actuality, even if it is actuality1a, actuality1b, actuality2 or actuality3.
This is mostly correct. A critical point is that there is no "past" or "future" for existence1. It's infinite, and so it already fully encompasses everything. For this same reason, Aquinas tells us that God "wills from eternity", and so cannot "change" his will.
Why would that be the case? He can still be utterly independent of creation, and yet the totality of actuality is greater with creation than without it. God plus Rank is more actuality than God alone. Unless you want to say that you do not exist?
ReplyDeleteHere's the problem. This is the equation you're suggesting, in effect:
∞ + 1 = ∞ + 1
However, this is not possible. When one adds to infinity, this is the result:
∞ + 1 = ∞
Likewise for all other dealings with the infinite. There's no way to add or to take away from it.
I am not saying that God’s existence1 is being added to by anything with existence2 or existence3. The amount of existence1 remains the same, and that is the only kind of existence that matters for God. I am saying that the totality of actuality is greater with existence1 plus existence2 than it is with only existence1.
The totality of actuality would be infinite, since it would have to take into account Actuality1. As a result, it's impossible for even the entirety of Actuality2 to have any effect at all.
If you want to say that actuality1 is analogous to actuality2 and actuality3, then there must be something that all three kinds of actuality share in common. Otherwise, they are either identical or completely different, neither of which would be coherent or helpful to Thomism. So, if you focus upon the actuality that they share in common, then I think it makes sense that this actuality is greater with actuality1 and actuality2 than with just actuality1. And if that is valid, the a being with actuality2 and actuality3 has more actuality than a being with just actuality2.
Any thoughts?
They are all similar in a way, but, as a result of the infinity of Actuality1, it's impossible to formulate an equation of "total actuality" that is not also infinite.
With any luck, our debate is finally at an end.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteI’ll skip the parts that we agree, and focus upon where we disagree.
I'm not entirely sure if that's how it works. All I know is that Aquinas says that creation (read: actualization of a being2 by Actuality1b) does not come from a potentiality
What I meant was that even if God creates ex nihilo, he must have the idea first, and that idea exists1a as potentially actualizable2. In other words, God did not have to actualize1b that being2, but he could have done so. However, this raises an interesting issue, i.e. how can Pure Actuality1a have mental states that are potentially actualizable2?
It's a matter of logical rather than temporal priority. Something cannot be Actual2 unless it exists2--by definition--, and something cannot exist2 unless it participates in Actuality1b.
Right, but once it participates in actuality1b, then it necessarily must exist2. Otherwise, what exactly is going on? An essence E is combined with actuality1b, and … nothing? No existing2 ens with essence E? How does that work? Is the essence E able to block the actuality1b from becoming a reality2? How does that work?
This is mostly correct. A critical point is that there is no "past" or "future" for existence1. It's infinite, and so it already fully encompasses everything. For this same reason, Aquinas tells us that God "wills from eternity", and so cannot "change" his will.
Right, but that is because there is an eternal and atemporal present from the divine standpoint in which all of reality2 and reality3 is “seen” “at once”. Whether this is even coherent is another issue, but the point is that actuality of any kind is necessarily related to some kind of present, which is why continental philosophers make such a fuss over the the metaphysics of presence, i.e. the privileging in the Western tradition of actuality with presence.
The totality of actuality would be infinite, since it would have to take into account Actuality1. As a result, it's impossible for even the entirety of Actuality2 to have any effect at all.
But here’s the rub, and I think this will get down to how well our intuitions about these issues converge or diverge.
I have been focusing upon individual beings in reality and the degree of actuality that they have. You have already agreed that an individual composite being cannot have infinite actuality1, because that is solely limited to God. Yes, that individual composite being relies upon the infinite actuality1 of God in order to exist2 at all, but that individual composite being does not have infinite actuality, and thus your objections to adding or subtracting from infinity are irrelevant. When you focus upon an individual composite being, then there are only two actualities that are important here, i.e. actuality2 and actuality3, when attempting to ascertain how much actuality that being has.
When I say that a good human being has more actuality than a bad human being, I am talking about actuality2 and actuality3, which are both finite kinds of actuality. I am not saying that a good human being or a bad human being have infinite actuality1, and are somehow a part of God. No, they are just human beings, and the question should focus upon whether a good human being has more actuality2 and actuality3 than a bad human being. Again, bringing in actuality1 is irrelevant to this question, because a finite being does not have infinite actuality1, as we agreed.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteMoving on, we have already agreed that they must have the same actuality2, which is either present or absent, i.e. the human being either exists2 or does not exist2. So, this is irrelevant, as well. The only relevant kind of actuality to this question is actuality3, and you have already agreed that a good human being has more actuality3 than a bad human being. However, you refused, at the time, to make the further inference that, therefore, a good human being has more actuality than a bad human being, because you kept including actuality1 into the question as the sustaining actuality that kept the being’s actuality2 in existence. I hope that you now see that this objection is irrelevant, because we are talking about a finite composite being, not an infinite simple being.
So, at this point, I do not understand why you cannot make that above inference. After all, we agree that actuality3 is a kind of actuality, and thus having more actuality3 means that a being has more actuality, period. Your only move to block this is to deny that actuality3 is not a kind of actuality at all, which is absurd. The reason why I took such pains to clarify the terminology was that I didn’t want you to equivocate between actuality and actuality1, which is what I suspected your objection mainly consisted of, i.e. a being with more actuality3 does not have more actuality2 or actuality1, which is all true, but again, irrelevant to this particular question. However, now that the terms are clear and without equivocation, I hope that you can see that saying that X has more actuality3 than Y -- despite having the same actuality2, and both depending upon the infinite actuality1 of God -- means that X necessarily must have more actuality than Y.
With any luck, our debate is finally at an end.
I hope so!
What I meant was that even if God creates ex nihilo, he must have the idea first, and that idea exists1a as potentially actualizable2. In other words, God did not have to actualize1b that being2, but he could have done so. However, this raises an interesting issue, i.e. how can Pure Actuality1a have mental states that are potentially actualizable2?
ReplyDeleteGod wills from eternity, again. It isn't possible for him to "make a decision"--in the sense of actualizing a potential--in the same way that we do it. He doesn't actualize mental states, and he contains no potentials--nor is anything potential to him. Aquinas goes on for articles and articles about this in the Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica, but, since it's not really connected to the central argument, I'd rather not debate it.
Right, but once it participates in actuality1b, then it necessarily must exist2.
More like "participation in Actuality1b = existence2", but yeah, basically. Remember: Actuality1b does not exist on its own, so, whenever I'm referring to Actuality1b, it means the same thing as existence2. There are only two kinds of existence, both infinite: that of Actuality1a and that of Actuality1b. Anything that exists2 is Actual1b, and anything that is Actual1b is, in turn, Actual2 (that is, it has a substantial form).
Right, but that is because there is an eternal and atemporal present from the divine standpoint in which all of reality2 and reality3 is “seen” “at once”. Whether this is even coherent is another issue, but the point is that actuality of any kind is necessarily related to some kind of present, which is why continental philosophers make such a fuss over the the metaphysics of presence, i.e. the privileging in the Western tradition of actuality with presence.
ReplyDeleteYeah, I'm familiar with that. Hart pretty much tears those guys to shreds in The Beauty of the Infinite, which is funny to see.
So, at this point, I do not understand why you cannot make that above inference. After all, we agree that actuality3 is a kind of actuality, and thus having more actuality3 means that a being has more actuality, period.
Important: "more quantifiable actuality".
Your only move to block this is to deny that actuality3 is not a kind of actuality at all, which is absurd. The reason why I took such pains to clarify the terminology was that I didn’t want you to equivocate between actuality and actuality1, which is what I suspected your objection mainly consisted of, i.e. a being with more actuality3 does not have more actuality2 or actuality1, which is all true, but again, irrelevant to this particular question. However, now that the terms are clear and without equivocation, I hope that you can see that saying that X has more actuality3 than Y -- despite having the same actuality2, and both depending upon the infinite actuality1 of God -- means that X necessarily must have more actuality than Y.
Anything that is Actual2 exists2, which means that it is also Actual1b. Actuality1b is infinite, and so all things that are Actual2 have an infinite amount of existence2. They do not have infinite amounts of Actuality2 or Actuality3, and so we can consider them on those grounds. However, as reality = existence2, and existence2 is infinite, it follows that nothing can be more real than anything else. It also follows that the man with no arms does not have less existence2 than the man with five arms, since infinity cannot be divided.
What we're left with is the conclusion that humans with varying amounts of Actuality3 all exist2 to the same (infinite) degree. Actuality3 does not relate to a man's reality (he has an infinite amount of that). Use of secondary actuality can perfect a human, but it cannot make a human more real.
Worth noting: if the man's arms went out of existence, they would lose all of their existence, but his total existence would not decrease. Seemingly paradoxical, but I'm pretty sure it's what Aquinas believed.
ReplyDeleteTo summarize:
ReplyDeleteI believe that humans can be more actual than one another. (Not sure I ever denied this.)
I do not believe that this makes humans subject to scaling levels of "reality", since reality = existence, and existence is unmeasurable and indivisible.
I believe that humans can be better and worse than one another.
I do not believe that anyone can possess "less human identity" than anyone else.
Here's an article by Richard Fitzgibbons that might help clear up the issue: "Marriage, essentially"
ReplyDeleteA philosophical reflection on what's wrong with the concept of same-sex marriage.
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/marriage_essentially
~ Mark
Rank:
ReplyDeleteGod wills from eternity, again. It isn't possible for him to "make a decision"--in the sense of actualizing a potential--in the same way that we do it. He doesn't actualize mental states, and he contains no potentials--nor is anything potential to him. Aquinas goes on for articles and articles about this in the Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica, but, since it's not really connected to the central argument, I'd rather not debate it.
I know, but then his free will seems compromised. To say that “he could not have created the universe, if he didn’t want to” would be to say something false, because there is no “could not have” or “could have” with regards to God. I mean, Aquinas says that he can do anything that is not logically impossible, and yet he did not create all possible worlds, only this one, which means that there are possible worlds that he could have created, but did not. What exactly is their status? Probably, they are actual1 ideas in his mind that he did not actualize2 in reality2, but which exist in reality1 in himself. But then what sense is there to any “possible worlds that God could have created” if there is no potentiality in God? In fact, he could not have created other than he did, and it is not true that God can do anything that is not logically impossible. In fact, he can only do what he did, which compromises his free will.
But again, that’s a whole other thing. Let’s resolve one issue before moving on to another. :)
More like "participation in Actuality1b = existence2", but yeah, basically. Remember: Actuality1b does not exist on its own, so, whenever I'm referring to Actuality1b, it means the same thing as existence2. There are only two kinds of existence, both infinite: that of Actuality1a and that of Actuality1b. Anything that exists2 is Actual1b, and anything that is Actual1b is, in turn, Actual2 (that is, it has a substantial form).
Agreed. It’s just that when you said it was a matter of “logical rather than temporal priority”, I thought you meant that it was logically possible for something to have existence1b, but not exist2, which I thought was wrong. And if we agree on this point, then I still don’t know which sense of “actual” or “exist” you are referring to when you say that “something has to exist before it is actual”. In no sense of “exist” does this make sense, at least to me.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteYeah, I'm familiar with that. Hart pretty much tears those guys to shreds in The Beauty of the Infinite, which is funny to see.
*Sigh* Another Thomist book to read. Just for consideration, but does Hart equivocate in his book to make his conclusion? I mean, the only thing that I can see as making the metaphysics of presence incomplete – I won’t say “false”, because I think there is a lot of truth to it – is that there are aspects of reality that are real, but (a) exist as potentiality, and (b) exist outside of our awareness, and thus are not fully “present” to our consciousness. However, both of these can be accounted for in a modified metaphysics of presence, still keeping the core idea, which I think is true, that all actuality must involve some kind of presence.
What happened yesterday is not actually real. It was actually real, but now it is in the past, and gone, away from any kind of causal efficacy in the present. It only actually exists as frozen within space-time as seen in a four-dimensional totality, which presumably is what God sees in his eternal present. Again, in order to be actual, a thing has to be present to some perspective.
Important: "more quantifiable actuality".
First, even an infinite actuality is quantifiable. “Infinite” is a quantity, although an unlimited kind. After all, we can easily recognize that an infinite X is more X than a finite X.
Second, even binary existence2 can be quantified by using digits 0 or 1.
Third, perhaps it would be best to divide actuality into infinite actuality (i.e. actuality1) and finite actuality (i.e. actuality2 and actuality3). Would you be agreeable to say that finite actuality can be quantified, even if infinite actuality is not? And if you are agreeable, then would you agree that if X and Y have the same actuality2 (by sharing essence E), but X has more actuality3 than Y, then X has more finite actuality than Y? In other words, X has more (actuality2 + actuality3) than Y does?
Anything that is Actual2 exists2, which means that it is also Actual1b. Actuality1b is infinite, and so all things that are Actual2 have an infinite amount of existence2. They do not have infinite amounts of Actuality2 or Actuality3, and so we can consider them on those grounds. However, as reality = existence2, and existence2 is infinite, it follows that nothing can be more real than anything else. It also follows that the man with no arms does not have less existence2 than the man with five arms, since infinity cannot be divided.
I’m confused.
First, how can you say that “all things that are Actual2 have an infinite amount of existence2” but “they do not have infinite amounts of actuality2”? Remember, “existence2” is the same thing as “actual2”, which you accept by saying that “Anything that is Actual2 exists2”, and so what you said is a contradiction.
Second, if you are correct that all beings with actuality2 have infinite actuality, then a rock is as good as a human being, because they both exist2 and thus have infinite actuality, and thus infinite goodness. That seems strange. Stump writes that a human being matters more than a dog, because the human being has more capabilities, i.e. rational capabilities, which also gives that human being more being, probably being2, than a dog.
Rank:
ReplyDeleteWhat we're left with is the conclusion that humans with varying amounts of Actuality3 all exist2 to the same (infinite) degree. Actuality3 does not relate to a man's reality (he has an infinite amount of that). Use of secondary actuality can perfect a human, but it cannot make a human more real.
I don’t see how that is possible. I agree that esse, of actuality1, is infinite, because it comes from God, but once that actuality1b is added to an essence, then you have an ens with actuality2, which is finite, not infinite. Otherwise, you have the bizarre conclusion that a human being has an infinite actuality, and is thus like God in this respect, because God has infinite actuality, as well. And then how can you say that a human being is a finite being at all? It doesn’t seem that you can.
Worth noting: if the man's arms went out of existence, they would lose all of their existence, but his total existence would not decrease. Seemingly paradoxical, but I'm pretty sure it's what Aquinas believed.
Again, it makes sense that if a man’s arms went out of existence3 than the man would have the same amount of existence2 as before, because having an arm is an accident, and thus partakes of actuality3.
I believe that humans can be more actual than one another. (Not sure I ever denied this.)
You mean actual3, but yeah.
I do not believe that this makes humans subject to scaling levels of "reality", since reality = existence, and existence is unmeasurable and indivisible.
Again, now you are talking about existence1.
I do not believe that anyone can possess "less human identity" than anyone else.
I never said that they did. My position is that actuality1 is infinite and actuality2 and actuality3 is finite. And if X has the same actuality2 as Y by sharing the same essence E, but X has more actuality3 by actualizing more of its accidents, then X has more actuality than Y. This is because actuality3 is a kind of actuality, and thus something with more actuality3 has more (finite) actuality, period, which means that it is more (finitely) real than Y. And thus, X is more E than Y in the sense of being a more (finitely) real specimen of E than Y.
Naturally, X cannot be said to have more actuality1 than Y, because of the reasons that you cited, but I disagree that actuality1 is the only kind of actuality that exists. We have agreed that there are different kinds of actuality, of which actuality1 is only one kind, albeit the most important kind.
I know, but then his free will seems compromised. To say that “he could not have created the universe, if he didn’t want to” would be to say something false, because there is no “could not have” or “could have” with regards to God. I mean, Aquinas says that he can do anything that is not logically impossible, and yet he did not create all possible worlds, only this one, which means that there are possible worlds that he could have created, but did not. What exactly is their status? Probably, they are actual1 ideas in his mind that he did not actualize2 in reality2, but which exist in reality1 in himself. But then what sense is there to any “possible worlds that God could have created” if there is no potentiality in God? In fact, he could not have created other than he did, and it is not true that God can do anything that is not logically impossible. In fact, he can only do what he did, which compromises his free will.
ReplyDeleteBut again, that’s a whole other thing. Let’s resolve one issue before moving on to another. :)
Aquinas attacks these very statements. Further, the alternative is voluntarism, which results in Heidegger's onto-theology. (Now that I know that you're familiar with continental philosophy, it suddenly makes sense to me why you keep tossing around the word "totality".)
Agreed. It’s just that when you said it was a matter of “logical rather than temporal priority”, I thought you meant that it was logically possible for something to have existence1b, but not exist2, which I thought was wrong. And if we agree on this point, then I still don’t know which sense of “actual” or “exist” you are referring to when you say that “something has to exist before it is actual”. In no sense of “exist” does this make sense, at least to me.
Actuality1b is an analogous form of actuality, even though it's still a type of actuality. It's existence. To be Actual1b is to exist as something or other. As existence is a prerequisite to being Actual2, anything that is Actual2 must be exist--that is, it must be Actual1b.
There are only two types of existence: existence1 and existence2. There is no "existence1b", because this makes no sense whatsoever. There is also no "existence3". What you might call "existence3"--that is, the Actuality1b present in accidents--is not really a different kind of existence. Accidents differ in their being because they have a "weak existence", in that they rely on a substance. However, they still have Actuality1b.
*Sigh* Another Thomist book to read. Just for consideration, but does Hart equivocate in his book to make his conclusion?
No. He takes on Heidegger, Foucault, Levinas, Derrida and the rest, for hundreds of pages, and systematically guts them. Also, he's not a Thomist per se--he's an Eastern Orthodox theologian with an interest in Aquinas. He spends most of his time talking about Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Denys, but he occasionally brings in Aquinas to show that he's pretty much identical to those earlier thinkers. That is, he isn't an "onto-theologian".
I mean, the only thing that I can see as making the metaphysics of presence incomplete – I won’t say “false”, because I think there is a lot of truth to it – is that there are aspects of reality that are real, but (a) exist as potentiality, and (b) exist outside of our awareness, and thus are not fully “present” to our consciousness. However, both of these can be accounted for in a modified metaphysics of presence, still keeping the core idea, which I think is true, that all actuality must involve some kind of presence.
ReplyDeleteAs Hart says, because esse is infinite, it is also impossible for it to be fully present. There is literally no end to it. It's an "infinite distance" that is also "infinite beauty". Further, he argues that God's esse is outside of any dialectic--including the one between existence and non-existence.
What happened yesterday is not actually real. It was actually real, but now it is in the past, and gone, away from any kind of causal efficacy in the present. It only actually exists as frozen within space-time as seen in a four-dimensional totality, which presumably is what God sees in his eternal present. Again, in order to be actual, a thing has to be present to some perspective.
God doesn't view a "four-dimensional totality", because God is infinite. There is no end to him. Infinity includes both "yesterday" and "tomorrow"--not because it's a "timeless void", but because it's infinite distance that fully contains all possibilities, all difference and so forth. Since it can't ever be encompassed or exhausted, it's completely impossible for it to be a totality of presence. Nothing could ever reach outside of it, nor could anything ever see the end of it.
First, even an infinite actuality is quantifiable. “Infinite” is a quantity, although an unlimited kind. After all, we can easily recognize that an infinite X is more X than a finite X.
ReplyDeleteIn a certain sense, yes.
Second, even binary existence2 can be quantified by using digits 0 or 1.
True enough.
Third, perhaps it would be best to divide actuality into infinite actuality (i.e. actuality1) and finite actuality (i.e. actuality2 and actuality3). Would you be agreeable to say that finite actuality can be quantified, even if infinite actuality is not? And if you are agreeable, then would you agree that if X and Y have the same actuality2 (by sharing essence E), but X has more actuality3 than Y, then X has more finite actuality than Y? In other words, X has more (actuality2 + actuality3) than Y does?
That might work. It's important to remember, though, that while nothing is "composed" of Actuality1b, Actuality1b is "true of" every composition. Here's Oderberg:
"Existence, though neither a property nor an accident, is true of existing things and a fact about them. Just as form actualizes potentiality to produce a substance, so existence can be thought of as actualizing form itself. Form actualizes matter; existence actualizes form. These are not really separable, since when the former happens the latter by that very fact obtains, and vice versa. But they should be thought of as really distinct acts, and existence should be described (not defined) as, using the medieval jargon, the last actuality of a substance. (For non-substances, existence is had derivatively from the actualization of the forms of the substances on which the non-substances are ontologically dependent.) Hence existence is not a part of essence, nor identical with essence, nor a characteristic of existing things. Yet it is still true of them. This explanation brings into focus the way in which contemporary ontology has lost the conceptual resources to explicate fundamental features of reality."
Note how careful Oderberg is not to call existence "actuality full stop". In any case, I hope this clarifies the issue.
I’m confused.
First, how can you say that “all things that are Actual2 have an infinite amount of existence2” but “they do not have infinite amounts of actuality2”? Remember, “existence2” is the same thing as “actual2”, which you accept by saying that “Anything that is Actual2 exists2”, and so what you said is a contradiction.
The Oderberg quote above should take care of this.
Second, if you are correct that all beings with actuality2 have infinite actuality, then a rock is as good as a human being, because they both exist2 and thus have infinite actuality, and thus infinite goodness.
Existence is not the same thing as actuality, dguller. It's analogous to actuality. You need to realize this sooner or later. I consented to calling it "Actuality1b" because it is, in some sense, a type of actuality. However, it is in no way "Actuality2 but better", and it is not convertible with lower levels of actuality. It is that by which lower levels of actuality may obtain.
That seems strange. Stump writes that a human being matters more than a dog, because the human being has more capabilities, i.e. rational capabilities, which also gives that human being more being, probably being2, than a dog.
ReplyDeleteShe's referring to the form, which was considered by Aquinas to be a set of actualities and potentialities. There's more to humans by virtue of their forms--not by virtue of their existence2.
I don’t see how that is possible. I agree that esse, of actuality1, is infinite, because it comes from God, but once that actuality1b is added to an essence, then you have an ens with actuality2, which is finite, not infinite. Otherwise, you have the bizarre conclusion that a human being has an infinite actuality, and is thus like God in this respect, because God has infinite actuality, as well.
Only if "existence" and "actuality" are equivocated. With analogy, it makes perfect sense.
Again, it makes sense that if a man’s arms went out of existence3 than the man would have the same amount of existence2 as before, because having an arm is an accident, and thus partakes of actuality3.
There are only two kinds of existence: 1 and 2. 1 is possessed by God, and it is without binary oppositions. 2 has the binary opposite of "non-being". Nothing that is not God can have a type of existence other than 2. This applies to accidents as well.
You mean actual3, but yeah.
Since Actuality1b is only analogous to actuality, when I say "actual", I'm talking about Actuality2 and Actuality3.
Again, now you are talking about existence1.
I would then be talking about God.
I never said that they did. My position is that actuality1 is infinite and actuality2 and actuality3 is finite. And if X has the same actuality2 as Y by sharing the same essence E, but X has more actuality3 by actualizing more of its accidents, then X has more actuality than Y. This is because actuality3 is a kind of actuality, and thus something with more actuality3 has more (finite) actuality, period, which means that it is more (finitely) real than Y.
There is no such thing as "finite reality" compared to "infinite reality". This makes absolutely no sense.
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ReplyDeleteAquinas attacks these very statements. Further, the alternative is voluntarism, which results in Heidegger's onto-theology. (Now that I know that you're familiar with continental philosophy, it suddenly makes sense to me why you keep tossing around the word "totality".)
I know that Aquinas disagrees with these statements. I just don’t find his counter-arguments compelling, at least as far as I understand them. I don’t understand how God could have willed not to create, and yet there is no unactualized potentiality in God by virtue of this possible world in which only God existed. I don’t understand what “could have willed otherwise” means without potentiality. To me, it is incoherent. And if the alternative is voluntarism, then that has huge problems, as well. So, it’s a wash, because both options have severe consequences.
Actuality1b is an analogous form of actuality, even though it's still a type of actuality. It's existence. To be Actual1b is to exist as something or other. As existence is a prerequisite to being Actual2, anything that is Actual2 must be exist--that is, it must be Actual1b.
I’m confused, again. I thought actuality1b was the kind of esse that is combined to essence to cause a substance that is actual2. The actuality1b is the underlying divine existence that brings something into existence2 and keeps it in existence2 at all times. However, actuality1b is not the same as actuality2, because the former is infinite and the latter is finite. The latter is what is left after actuality1b is squeezed through an essence, and results in a finite actual2 substance. So, actuality2 is the finite result of infinite actuality1b being combined with an essence. They are connected, but different kinds of actuality.
There are only two types of existence: existence1 and existence2. There is no "existence1b", because this makes no sense whatsoever. There is also no "existence3". What you might call "existence3"--that is, the Actuality1b present in accidents--is not really a different kind of existence. Accidents differ in their being because they have a "weak existence", in that they rely on a substance. However, they still have Actuality1b.
Again, actuality1b is what sustains actuality2 (= substantial form + actuality1b) and actuality3 (= accidental form + actuality1b). There must be a distinction, because the former is all-or-nothing actuality2, because there is no potentiality, and the latter is actuality3 that admits of degrees, because there is potentiality. And existence3 is a different kind of existence. It is the kind of existence that occurs in composite beings that include potentiality, and thus degrees of existence3.
I know that, for you, existence = actuality1, and no other use of the word “existence” is permissible. That gets confusing, because you can say that a potentiality exists in a substance, and people know what you mean. However, if you stick with my terminology, then you avoid equivocation altogether, because all the terms have precise meanings, and there is no possible confusion. So, I know that you are saying, but I don’t like the reversion to words capable of equivocation.
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ReplyDeleteAs Hart says, because esse is infinite, it is also impossible for it to be fully present. There is literally no end to it. It's an "infinite distance" that is also "infinite beauty". Further, he argues that God's esse is outside of any dialectic--including the one between existence and non-existence.
But esse must be fully present to God, no? As Stump writes: “Aquinas tends to emphasize presentness and simultaneity (or “all-at-onceness”) in talking of eternity” (Aquinas, p. 137) and that “the eternal, pastless, futureless present is not instantaneous but extended, because eternity, as Aquinas understands it, includes duration. The temporal present is a durationless instant, a present that cannot be extended without falling apart entirely into past and future intervals. The eternal present, on the other hand, is by definition an infinitely extended, pastless, futureless duration” (Ibid., p. 137). Whether any of this makes sense is another matter. I happen to think that an atemporal present is equivalent to a square circle. I don’t think “all at once” makes any sense without “at the same time”, and thus simultaneity depends upon temporality for its sense.
God doesn't view a "four-dimensional totality", because God is infinite. There is no end to him. Infinity includes both "yesterday" and "tomorrow"--not because it's a "timeless void", but because it's infinite distance that fully contains all possibilities, all difference and so forth. Since it can't ever be encompassed or exhausted, it's completely impossible for it to be a totality of presence. Nothing could ever reach outside of it, nor could anything ever see the end of it.
That doesn’t matter. In his eternal perspective, it makes sense to say that he “sees” all of creation all at once in an atemporal present that extends forever. As Stump writes: “it looks very much as if Aquinas takes God to be in epistemic contact with creatures in virtue of metaphorically or analogously “seeing” them” (Ibid., p. 185). So, actuality depends upon presence to some perspective, whether God’s perspective in the atemporal present of eternity, or a creature’s perspective in the present temporal moment. I really don’t see how you could argue against this, except how I outlined above, and that’s really not a refutation of the metaphysics of presence, but rather an elaboration and revision of it to incorporate potentiality of some kind.
That might work. It's important to remember, though, that while nothing is "composed" of Actuality1b, Actuality1b is "true of" every composition.
So, then you agree that if X and Y have the same actuality2 (by sharing essence E), but X has more actuality3 than Y, then X has more finite actuality than Y? In other words, X has more (actuality2 + actuality3) than Y does? Just want to make sure.
Existence is not the same thing as actuality, dguller. It's analogous to actuality. You need to realize this sooner or later. I consented to calling it "Actuality1b" because it is, in some sense, a type of actuality. However, it is in no way "Actuality2 but better", and it is not convertible with lower levels of actuality. It is that by which lower levels of actuality may obtain.
And that is fine. I understand that actuality1 is not the same thing as actuality2 or actuality3, which is why I use different numbers to distinguish them. I also agree that these different kinds of actuality are all analogous to one another, being identical in some ways, but different in others. For my argument, they just don’t have to be totally different. Whether they are identical or analogous is irrelevant, as long as they have something in common to ground the comparison.
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ReplyDeleteAnd you did not response to my point that if actuality2 is infinite, then you have a bizarre consequence that even the most simplest and basic of substances, such as a rock, would have the same amount of actuality2 as a complex substance, such as a human being. Thus, from the standpoint of goodness2 (i.e. the kind of goodness associated with actuality2), a rock as equally good2 as a human being, and since both have the same actuality1b that sustains them, then they are also equally good1! Thus, if a rock is in danger, and a human being is in danger, then I have grounds for hesitation about which to save, under this system, which is patently absurd.
She's referring to the form, which was considered by Aquinas to be a set of actualities and potentialities. There's more to humans by virtue of their forms--not by virtue of their existence2.
Right. What she writes is: “because of the supervenience of goodness on being, a species or genus with more capacities of the sort that show up in the differentiae will have potentially more goodness than one with fewer. So, other things being equal, the goodness of a human life is greater than that of a dog’s just because of rationality, the incremental capacity” (Ibid., p. 75). The problem is that we agreed that the actualization1b of a substantial form results in a substance with actuality2, which necessarily includes powers.
For example, once a human being comes into existence2, it necessarily has the power of rationality, even if it does not actualize that potentiality, including ever, and thus the actual2 presence of a power to actualize an underlying potentiality is a necessary part of what a substance is. So, a human matters more than a dog, because the human has an actual2 power that a dog lacks, and thus has more actuality2 than a dog, and thus more goodness2. However, this seems to contradict our earlier agreement that actuality2 does not admit of degrees. So, how to reconcile this contradiction? Perhaps actuality2 does admit of degrees such that the actuality2 of a human being is more than the actuality2 of a dog by virtue of the actual2 presence of the power of rationality in the human being?
Only if "existence" and "actuality" are equivocated. With analogy, it makes perfect sense.
I don’t think that helps. Actuality1 is infinite, and actuality2 is finite. That’s how I understand these terms. There is no equivocation there. However, you seem to reject this. You wrote: “humans with varying amounts of Actuality3 all exist2 to the same (infinite) degree”, which implies that actuality2 is also infinite. So, if actuality2 is infinite, then, again, a finite human being is infinite, which is absurd, and it puts actuality2 on a similar footing to actuality1 by virtue of both being infinite, which is also absurd. Better to avoid the whole problem by saying that actuality2 is finite and actuality1 is infinite, no?
There is no such thing as "finite reality" compared to "infinite reality". This makes absolutely no sense.
It does when the terms are kept clear. Finite reality = actuality2 + actuality3, and infinite reality = actuality1. So, when I am comparing finite reality to infinite reality, I am comparing actuality2/actuality3 and actuality1, which I don’t think is nonsensical. You yourself say that you can compare them analogously, and thus comparison is certainly possible.
Anyway, none of this is relevant, since you seem to agree that if X and Y have the same actuality2 (by sharing essence E), but X has more actuality3 than Y, then X has more finite actuality than Y. In other words, X has more (actuality2 + actuality3) than Y does.
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ReplyDeleteAlso, if something can "exist2 to the same (infinite" degree", then you are now admitting degree to actuality2, which is supposed to be impossible.
I know that Aquinas disagrees with these statements. I just don’t find his counter-arguments compelling, at least as far as I understand them. I don’t understand how God could have willed not to create, and yet there is no unactualized potentiality in God by virtue of this possible world in which only God existed. I don’t understand what “could have willed otherwise” means without potentiality. To me, it is incoherent. And if the alternative is voluntarism, then that has huge problems, as well. So, it’s a wash, because both options have severe consequences.
ReplyDeleteThis is way, way off topic, so I'm just going to drop it. Maybe we can argue about the coherence of eternity some other time.
But esse must be fully present to God, no?
Esse is God. There is nothing to which esse is present.
That doesn’t matter. In his eternal perspective, it makes sense to say that he “sees” all of creation all at once in an atemporal present that extends forever. As Stump writes: “it looks very much as if Aquinas takes God to be in epistemic contact with creatures in virtue of metaphorically or analogously “seeing” them” (Ibid., p. 185). So, actuality depends upon presence to some perspective, whether God’s perspective in the atemporal present of eternity, or a creature’s perspective in the present temporal moment. I really don’t see how you could argue against this, except how I outlined above, and that’s really not a refutation of the metaphysics of presence, but rather an elaboration and revision of it to incorporate potentiality of some kind.
Like I said, Hart guts the entire structure of the "metaphysics of presence" attack. I doubt Stump is particularly educated in this brand of philosophy, so I wouldn't expect her to bring up the infamous Heideggerian critique of Aquinas. Suffice it to say that Hart does, in detail, and he takes it apart, shows it to be incoherent and frees Aquinas from its accusations. Hart himself is a post-modernist of sorts, and he rejects "metaphysics", as he calls them, while affirming the truth of Thomism. But this is absolutely off-topic, so let's just drop it.
I’m confused, again. I thought actuality1b was the kind of esse that is combined to essence to cause a substance that is actual2. The actuality1b is the underlying divine existence that brings something into existence2 and keeps it in existence2 at all times. However, actuality1b is not the same as actuality2, because the former is infinite and the latter is finite. The latter is what is left after actuality1b is squeezed through an essence, and results in a finite actual2 substance. So, actuality2 is the finite result of infinite actuality1b being combined with an essence. They are connected, but different kinds of actuality.
ReplyDeleteI think I may have just realized one of your points of confusion. Are you aware that essence is not form? It's actually above form, and a form can only come into being through a combination of essence and existence. It works like this:
Existence -> Essence -> Form -> Matter
This is why Aquinas is able to refer to angels as composite beings, even though they are pure substantial forms. The form is Actuality2, primary actuality: a set of actualities and potentialities that actualize prime matter. Because everything in our world is a substance or reliant upon a substance, everything in our world is reliant upon substantial forms. However, the essence of something is not the substantial form, but rather the combination of substantial form and prime matter. Essence is the "totality" of a being. This article seems solid: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/mcm/ph/ph_01philosophyyouth19.html
So, the term "essence" is almost synonymous with "substance", except that it is not limited to combinations of form and matter. This is why Oderberg tells us, "These are not really separable, since when the former happens the latter by that very fact obtains, and vice versa. But they should be thought of as really distinct acts, and existence should be described (not defined) as, using the medieval jargon, the last actuality of a substance."
My earlier comment about existence being "squeezed through" essence was only partly accurate--apologies. It would be more proper to say that essence "limits" existence--it delineates it.
Again, actuality1b is what sustains actuality2 (= substantial form + actuality1b) and actuality3 (= accidental form + actuality1b). There must be a distinction, because the former is all-or-nothing actuality2, because there is no potentiality, and the latter is actuality3 that admits of degrees, because there is potentiality. And existence3 is a different kind of existence. It is the kind of existence that occurs in composite beings that include potentiality, and thus degrees of existence3.
Actuality2 is not a kind of existence, and neither is Actuality3. Both are below essence--the total "whatness" of something--, which is made to exist by Actuality1b. The distinction needs to be made that form is the primary actuality in a substance, but that it is not the total description of that substance. For that, we need essence, which encompasses both substantial and accidental forms. As this article (http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-meta/#H4) says: "Within Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, substances can be both material (cats, dogs, humans) and immaterial (angels)". A substance is an essence, and not a form-matter composite only. Aquinas himself goes on for quite a bit about it here: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-esse.asp. Quote:
"Moreover, reason supports this view, for the existence of a composite substance is neither form alone nor matter alone but is rather composed of these. The essence is that according to which the thing is said to exist; hence, it is right that the essence by which a thing is denominated a being is neither form alone nor matter alone but both, albeit that existence of this kind is caused by the form and not by the matter."
Note that none of the uses of "existence" here mean "esse".
So, then you agree that if X and Y have the same actuality2 (by sharing essence E), but X has more actuality3 than Y, then X has more finite actuality than Y? In other words, X has more (actuality2 + actuality3) than Y does? Just want to make sure.
ReplyDeleteUntil the confusion above is sorted out, I'm not sure.
And you did not response to my point that if actuality2 is infinite, then you have a bizarre consequence that even the most simplest and basic of substances, such as a rock, would have the same amount of actuality2 as a complex substance, such as a human being.
A substance is an essence, and all essences receive an infinite amount of Actuality1b. However, an essence divides into lower elements, such as a substantial form and prime matter.
Therefore, it is coherent to say that a human and a rock exist (have esse) to the same degree (infinite), even though the human is superior by virtue of its essence (quiddity) qua human.
This argument has massively helped me clarify my ideas. I hadn't realized exactly how large the separation between essence and form was.
So, a human matters more than a dog, because the human has an actual2 power that a dog lacks, and thus has more actuality2 than a dog, and thus more goodness2. However, this seems to contradict our earlier agreement that actuality2 does not admit of degrees. So, how to reconcile this contradiction? Perhaps actuality2 does admit of degrees such that the actuality2 of a human being is more than the actuality2 of a dog by virtue of the actual2 presence of the power of rationality in the human being?
I'm not even sure what "Actuality2" designates anymore, honestly. This applies for your further comments as well. Tell me if the above distinction between essence and form makes anything clearer. I sure hope it does, because all of these term changes are starting to confuse me.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteapologies for not responding. my hands were tied for some time and when i checked back, the discussion here of the issue had developed considerably enough for me to leave our exchange for perhaps another day. the little that we discussed was pleasant for me though, so thanks for that.
oh and the exchange here so far between you and RS is great. it has been clarificatory in important ways i think.
ReplyDeletedisprei 457Rank:
ReplyDeleteEsse is God. There is nothing to which esse is present.
But God knows his essence, which is esse, right? So, shouldn’t his essence be fully present to him in his knowledge? And if it is not present to him as knowledge, then how can he know it?
Also, Aquinas writes: “as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."” (ST Ia 15.3). It seems here that Aquinas is saying that he is fully present to himself, which must mean that his esse is fully present, as well. The infinity of esse is no restriction upon God.
Are you aware that essence is not form? It's actually above form, and a form can only come into being through a combination of essence and existence.
Okay.
This is why Aquinas is able to refer to angels as composite beings, even though they are pure substantial forms. The form is Actuality2, primary actuality: a set of actualities and potentialities that actualize prime matter. Because everything in our world is a substance or reliant upon a substance, everything in our world is reliant upon substantial forms. However, the essence of something is not the substantial form, but rather the combination of substantial form and prime matter. Essence is the "totality" of a being.
ReplyDeleteI sort of get what you are talking about, but there seems to be a problem.
If the intellect abstracts the essence of a particular thing, then it must abstract “the combination of substantial form and prime matter”, because that is what you said essence is. However, if that is true, then the intellect has included prime matter in the abstraction, which means that there is prime matter in the immaterial intellect, which is absurd, because the immaterial intellect only deals with immaterial abstractions.
So, that means that the intellect abstracts the form of a particular thing. But the problem with that is how exactly the intellect abstracts the form of an angel. After all, an angel just is a substantial form, and thus the angel itself would have to exist in the intellect, which is absurd. So, the account seems to be quite odd.
But maybe I’m misunderstanding things.
So, the term "essence" is almost synonymous with "substance", except that it is not limited to combinations of form and matter.
Again, I’m confused. A substance is a particular being, whereas essence is supposed to be a universal, right? I mean, two humans share the essence of humanity, and what differentiates them is their matter, which is the principle of individuation. So, how can essence be both a universal and a particular?
The distinction needs to be made that form is the primary actuality in a substance, but that it is not the total description of that substance. For that, we need essence, which encompasses both substantial and accidental forms.
I still don’t understand the difference between a form and an essence. They seem to be two sides to the same coin. They both characterize the whatness or quiddity of a being, i.e. are organizational principles that define what kind of thing a particular thing is. Saying that essence encompasses both substantial form and accidental form doesn’t help, because all substantial forms include accidental forms, because all substances necessarily have accidents (except God).
A substance is an essence, and all essences receive an infinite amount of Actuality1b. However, an essence divides into lower elements, such as a substantial form and prime matter.
ReplyDeleteI don’t understand this. It seems like you start with a straightforward idea of individual substances that have a specific essence that defines the type of thing it is, and then you end up stretching concepts to the point that the substance is the essence, which just seems incoherent to me.
I'm not even sure what "Actuality2" designates anymore, honestly. This applies for your further comments as well. Tell me if the above distinction between essence and form makes anything clearer. I sure hope it does, because all of these term changes are starting to confuse me.
I’ll tell you what. Let’s take a break. I’ve got a lot of reading to do to better understand some of the concepts that you’ve introduced. I don’t really understand them, and want to before we can proceed. So, I’ll let this discussion end for now, but I appreciate your engagement, because I think I’ve learned a lot.
Take care.
I’ll tell you what. Let’s take a break. I’ve got a lot of reading to do to better understand some of the concepts that you’ve introduced. I don’t really understand them, and want to before we can proceed. So, I’ll let this discussion end for now, but I appreciate your engagement, because I think I’ve learned a lot.
ReplyDeleteTake care.
I've learned a ridiculous amount, too. Definitely worth it. Perhaps the issue can be resolved in a future combox. Good luck in your research.
As to the tone of the book, TLS: Yes, it is harsh at times - but I must admit I felt that finally someone had dared to say what needed to be said in a tone (outrage) that at least expressed how much serious damage to civilization these so-called arrogant geniuses have caused. The kicker is having the prickly points supported by thorough rational argument, refuting the garbage that is aired and written every day in our culture, way too often unchallenged or uncontested by the ignorant who think they are so smart. And the amount of murder and immorality caused, supported, and rationalized by these (im)moralists for so long now is just awful, damaging so many lives. It reminded me of Jesus at the Temple fed up with the moneychangers using the Temple as a business zone. Enough is enough. Our culture is going down the tubes daily with hate mongers calling those who support traditional morality every pejorative they can think of, but most frequently using the b(igot) word as a battering ram. That's my take. (But I do understand the point of the other side.) Thanks for the book, Dr.Feser; it affected me deeply.
ReplyDeleteWilliam M. Briggs writes:“Jumping in front of a train”, “I was hoping to hear you were dead”,“Hey! This is cheating. Every time I see you sent an email, I am happy.
ReplyDeleteAnd when I see there is an attachment. I am happier.
And then it turns out not to be a picture of you, and I am sad! (But still happy!)”
https://fate779.wordpress.com/2017/09/13/it-was-more-my-pleasure-than-yours-to-meet-you-i-am-glad-we-can-talk-to-each-other/