Sunday, August 14, 2011

Argumentum ad Himmlerum

Want to be a New Atheist blogger?  It’s easy!  Here’s how it works:

Step 1: Launch an unhinged, fallacious attack on your opponent, focusing your attention on arguments he has never given.

Step 2: Studiously ignore the arguments he actually has given.

Step 3: Declare victory and exchange high fives with your fellow New Atheists, as they congratulate you for your brilliance and erudition.

Step 4: When your opponent calls attention to this farcical procedure, accuse him of making unhinged, fallacious attacks on you.  Throw in the Myers Shuffle for good measure. 

Step 5: Exchange further high fives with your fellow New Atheists.

Step 6: Repeat 1 - 5 until your disconnect from reality is complete.

If you’re looking for a model, we’ve had reason of late to look at some examples (here, here, here, and here).   And then there are Eric MacDonald’s most recent remarks on my book The Last Superstition over at his blog Choice in Dying, and Jerry Coyne’s high five.

As anyone who has actually read it knows, I do not rely on arguments from authority in The Last Superstition.  Nowhere do I say anything of the form “Authority A says P; therefore, you should believe P.”  I do not rest my case on the Bible, or tradition, or the Church, or the personal authority of any philosopher or theologian.  It is true that I refer to the decree of the first Vatican Council to the effect that the existence of God can be proved through philosophical arguments.  But I do not do so to show that there really are such arguments; naturally, I am well aware that no atheist would be impressed by that.  The point of the citation was rather simply to note that the Catholic Church rejects fideism.  It is also true that I say a little in passing about how Christian theologians would defend the veracity of Christ and thus the reliability of His teaching.  I also express the opinion that the problem of evil is most satisfactorily dealt with in the context of Christian theology.  But I explicitly declined to pursue these matters there, because they are beyond the scope of the book.  The Last Superstition is fundamentally about natural theology and natural law rather than Christianity per se.  The arguments for God, the soul, and traditional morality are all philosophical in character, intended to stand on their own, apart from any appeal to theological authority.  Again, all of this is obvious to anyone who has actually read the book. 

Nevertheless, to hear MacDonald tell it, the book is really just one long argumentum ad verecundiam.  How can he make such an absurd accusation?  New Atheist blogger style, that’s how.  He simply ignores the arguments I actually gave in the book and attacks some figments of his own fevered imagination instead.  MacDonald has it absolutely on the brain that no one who believes in God (or, perhaps, at least no Catholic) can have genuine rational grounds for doing so.  The believer simply must be in thrall to some authority, unable to think for himself.  So, like Don Quixote, that is the windmill MacDonald is going to attack, the facts be damned.   

Exhibit A: Daniel Dennett is referred to many times in my book.  At pages 250-54 I set out some philosophical criticisms of Dennett’s account of biological function.  Elsewhere I explain how Dennett misrepresents the cosmological argument and point out some difficulties with the “meme” theory he adopts from Richard Dawkins.  MacDonald ignores all of this.  Instead he fixates on some remarks made about Dennett by Tadeusz Zawidzki and Michael Ruse that I quoted in some throwaway lines in the book, and insinuates that my “critique of Dennett” lay entirely in an appeal to the authority of Zawidzki and Ruse.  Since MacDonald doesn’t bother to respond to my own actual arguments against Dennett, I’m tempted to call this a straw man fallacy.  But that may be too generous, since he doesn’t really distort my arguments against Dennett.  He just pretends they don’t exist.   

Exhibit B: I devote many pages of the book to giving careful expositions of three of Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of God and defending them against objections.  I devote even more pages to setting out and defending the metaphysical background theses on which the arguments rest.  In none of these arguments do I appeal either to Aquinas’s authority or that of the Catholic Church; I try to show that the arguments are entirely defensible on philosophical grounds that could and should be accepted even by someone who is neither a Catholic nor otherwise impressed by Aquinas.  And what does MacDonald have to say by way of rational criticism of all of this?  Nothing at all.  His “reply” consists, first, in insisting that, since I am a Catholic and Aquinas has great prestige within Catholicism, my position simply must be a mere argument from authority; and second, in a long, bizarre rant about priests who molest children, ecclesiastical bureaucracy, gays, abortion, evolution, the emperor Theodosius, and Heinrich Himmler.  (Yes, Heinrich Himmler.  No, I don’t know when MacDonald started smoking crack.)

In short, MacDonald’s response to the argumentum ad verecundiam I never gave is a shameless circumstantial ad hominem fallacy coupled with a battery of red herrings and an especially crude argumentum ad Hitlerum.  Though I guess MacDonald thinks substituting Himmler for Hitler somehow makes him less than a complete hack.

Perhaps Choice in Lying would be a better title for MacDonald’s blog.  But maybe not, because MacDonald, like the other New Atheist types we’ve been discussing recently, appears to be so very far lost in his Quixotic battle with phantoms that he may really be unaware just how disconnected from reality he is.  Perhaps his eyes just don’t register what’s there on the page in front of him; all he can ever see are the clichés he, Coyne, and other New Atheist psychotics bat around their echo chamber like Harding’s cigarette in Cuckoo’s Nest.  (Language warning on that YouTube clip for any underage readers out there.)

At least MacDonald’s screed is intelligible as the ravings of an embittered ex-believer.  Jerry Coyne’s gushing over it defies explanation.  To be sure, Coyne is not above some sophomoric fibbing of his own.  He seems awful keen on establishing a meme to the effect that I am “notorious for claiming that one can’t truly understand [the cosmological] argument without reading at least six books and seven articles, two of which of course, are by Feser himself.”  But I never said any such thing.  What I said was that “to understand the Five Ways, the modern reader needs to read something that makes [the metaphysical] background clear, that explains how modern Thomists would reply to the stock objections to the arguments, and so forth.”  And I gave my book Aquinas as an example of the sort of thing that did this job -- just as Coyne would no doubt recommend his own recent book on evolution to someone who asked him to recommend a good general introduction to that subject.  I then went on to offer some further suggestions for anyone who wanted to pursue the subject of the cosmological argument in greater depth.  But I never said one had to read all of these things before he could even understand the argument.

Still, one would think that even Coyne -- who is, as we have seen, at least a notch higher than Dawkins, Myers et al. on the intellectual honesty scale -- would be embarrassed by so pathetic a resort to the Hitler card.  Yet Coyne regards MacDonald’s multiply fallacious blather as “serious arguments” by a “serious man,” indeed “a treasure” who is “worth dozens of Fesers.”  Because, you know, a really serious reply to the Aristotelian argument from motion (say) is to compare someone who defends it to Heinrich Himmler.

Well, I don’t know what to say to that.  But I do know what to hum.

378 comments:

  1. Anonymous,

    RH, I'm not going to be as belligerent as BenYachov

    Much obliged.

    Yes, I have been given the line about how many pages Aquinas uses to make his argument.

    But I've also pointed out that is no barrier to discussion of ultimately complex issues, in of itself.

    The appeal to complexity can be said of almost any philosophy, or moral theory, or scientific theory. And yet it's quite possible to defend certain propositions central to a theory in shorter form (or should be).

    I keep giving the example of Evolution. If someone makes some claim against evolution, I could say "Look at how many pages Darwin took to carefully build his case! I'm hardly in a position to answer your challenge here."

    Or I could say "There are MOUNTAINS of carefully built justifications within biology that make the case for evolution...so I'm sorry that means it's just too overwhelming a subject for me to even produce any rebuttal to you."

    Yet, it simply doesn't take adducing the whole theory and every bit of justification in order to indicate the worth of evolution theory. Some simple propositions, with indications of how evolution theory would approach the explanation, are a good start.

    Let's say some creationist took that hoary old route of producing a quote from Darwin:

    To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree.

    And they said "Doesn't that clearly indicate the contradiction in Darwinism? Darwin himself says it is absurd!"

    I could respond: You just know nothing about evolution or what Darwin wrote. Go read his book.

    Sure I could say that.

    But being familiar with the book in question, and evolution in general, I could also more charitably say: Actually, what you are missing is that Darwin follows that quote by saying: "Yet reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a perfect and complex eye to one very imperfect and simple, each grade being useful to its possessor, can be shown to exist; if further, the eye does vary ever so slightly, and the variations be inherited, which is certainly the case; and if any variation or modification in the organ be ever useful to an animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insuperable by our imagination, can hardly be considered real."

    And I could easily provide some more justifications for taking Darwin seriously. No problem.

    So this appeal to "There's just sooo much justification by Aquinas...too much to even bother begin answering your challenges...so just go read the books" is neither charitable nor indicative that anyone here knows good answers to the questions I am posing. It is not unreasonable for me to be asking "Show me even an INDICATION that your moral or teleological theories have anything to recommend them." If people can't step up with ANY good answers, I'm sorry, it gives the appearance that the bluff has been called and people are more interested in casting aspersions at new atheists, vs defending their claims directly to an atheist.

    I really am interested in dialogue
    to see if the aspersions on atheism can be sustained when "face to face" with an atheist like myself.

    Like I said: it's easier to always say "Go read the book" rather than start defending beliefs in the presence of a critic who will point out the missteps as you make them.
    People apparently want to reserve the right to be self-satisfied, calling folks like me unreasonable, without earning it when they have the chance to do so.

    RH

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  2. Fr. Baker in his review wrote: "According to Feser, secularism is...." (and I posted the whole descriptive paragraph). Now, did Fr. Baker misrepresent Feser's claim or not? Or was Baker accurate when he explained that Feser claims atheists actually reject God "willfully" on the basis of the consequences for our behaviour (instead of on the reasons for our disbelief)?

    If Baker's summation is inaccurate, why don't you or Feser say so? If it's not, then my critique of Feser's claim is relevant and no one has answered me. Unlike your post which was mere assertion, I provided an argument for why Feser's claim did not comport with my actual epistemological behavior as an atheist and hence has no basis. Show me how Feser would still be right about my motivations, and I'm wrong, please.


    Apparently I'm just going to have to repost things until you acknowledge I've said them. Once again, I have Feser's book and while he certainly levels this accusation at some atheists (particularly new atheists), he also recognizes other forms of atheism as much more respectable. His main salvo against atheism/naturalism is more along the lines that it leads to so many weird philosophical positions.

    I'll even make it clearer this time around- one of the main points of the book, if not the main point of the book, is how modern philosophy, and thus secularist philosophy, is anti-Aristotelian, and this anti-Aristotelianism undermines any basis for objective morality, personal identity, and free will (to name a few things)

    When Baker says "For, if there is no Creator God who is the First Mover of all things, then there is no purpose to the universe, no immortality of the soul, no natural moral law, no final judgment or accountability for how one lives one’s life.", he's referring to this anti-Aristotelianism.

    Besides, Feser has mentioned on this blog that he does have respect for certain atheists- Mackie and Nagel, for example. The book is polemical, but is polemical against certain kinds of atheists, not all.
    Your accusation about him is wrong.

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  3. @RH

    >You finally made a half-hearted attempt to defend the Natural Law argument for the Final Cause of our sex organs...and got burned.

    I actually made no attempt because I don't see the logic in engaging someone who can't even plainly answer a straight foward question like "Did you read the TLS or anything about Natural Law outside of sound bites"?

    >I don't care WHAT you call Feser's reasoning, Paley-like, Thomistic, whatever...

    Because you don't know the difference between Paley & Aquinas on Final Causality. That is why your drama queen rants have no objective meaning.

    The insults come because you are not honest & can't answer simple questions like "Did you read TLS etc" also your assumption that I can explain Natural Law too you in 50 words or less or it's untrue begs for insult because it is clearly irrational.

    Them's the breaks.


    BTW I note captainzman has answered you. It's a good answer. Is that why your running here? Too hot on the other thread?

    @Anon the Atheist

    Your tangents on Geocentracism and Slavery are interesting & I've delt with them before. But it's clear you are only trying to run interference for RH or Steersman. We both know you aren't really interested in an answer so I decline to give any.

    Live with it. Or cry about it. I care not.

    @Steersman

    >The proof is in the observation of the observation of the observation of the observation …. It’s an infinite regress, the terminus of which is the process of observation itself.

    "I don't know how to answer that?" would have been a more respectable response. This response clearly isn't an empirical answer. It makes no sense.

    Fail!

    >And seems to me that you are in fact being a F**** A****; several people – myself included –

    Well that just goes to show you that you Gnu's can dish it out but you can't take it.

    Your hypocrisy is noted but if perhaps you where a little more polite, less condescending, hostel and forthcoming you would find I would be a gem of a person to dialog with.

    >myself included – have asked for a little more detail, some analysis of your own, which you respond to with snarky insistence on reading some book.

    Why do you want the opinion of an amateur over the knowledge of an expert?
    That makes no sense but so far that is par for the course with you Gnu's.

    >If you don’t understand the concepts well enough yourself to explain them then say so because, absent anything further, that would seem to be a reasonable conclusion.

    I do lack the articulation to explain them. Sorry I thought everyone knew that? Now what is your excuse for refusing to read experts on the matter?

    OTOH why should I do your homework for you? Do you own damn homework!

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  4. Anon the Reasonable wrote:
    >RH, I'm not going to be as belligerent as BenYachov (honestly, I think he needs to drape a wet washcloth over his forehead right now),

    I reply: You try being patience with idiots during the dog days of summer in NYC. I can't do it.


    >but you must realize that a proper presentation of Thomistic thought requires a prolonged, extremely nuanced build-up, which is not the sort of thing that a combox discussion lends itself well to. It would be like asking Jerry Coyne to give a robust, knock-down defense of Darwinian evolution in a combox. It is not practical, and it has been done elsewhere.

    That's common sense & rational.

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  5. captainzman,

    Thank you. I'd waited for quite a while for your response on the other thread, but after a while presumed it went dead.

    You are under the impression you can only use things for their final cause, but natural law theory only condemns something for using it in a means contrary to its natural function

    Is "natural function" the same as "Final Cause?" How do you determine the Final Cause/Natural Function?

    Since I am questioning the move from "it is the case that X has Y biological features"
    to "it OUGHT to be the case as to how you use them," then you can not beg the question in producing any answer in which it is assumed "X does Y, therefore we ought to use X only for Y."

    Feser's example of the "Final Cause" of sexual organs goes from descriptive statements (how sex organs are shaped, how they react) to prescriptive statements (therefore we ought only to use sex organs such that they react in the ways described). I can provide a bunch of descriptive statements about how mouths operate or react under various circumstances, but such descriptive statements do not in of themselves tell me what one "ought" to do. And I do not see how you are distinguishing the Final Cause of a mouth. One could make an argument that the Final Cause is to play the saxophone - "look how perfectly it fits the mouthpiece. Note how blowing creates music. See how the tongue modulates the pitch." So why isn't THAT the Final Cause for mouths? Might you want to say that there are other aspects of mouths that go unfulfilled in playing an instrument? Well, that's the case when we are only speaking, or only eating, or doing neither, as well.

    "(something that is clearly incompatible, not something that is different from), and even if kissing is not a final cause of lips, there is nothing about kissing that interferes with or frustrates the final cause of lips.",

    Yet Feser wrote of final causes:

    "It cannot possibly be good for us to use them in any other way, whether an individual person thinks it is or not."

    So why is this true for sexual organs, but not lips as you want to say? Because using lips to kiss is using them in a way OTHER than their (on your account) Final Cause.

    (On your account) Mouths have the Final Cause of eating and speaking. Yet people have found that using their mouth in another way - KISSING - gives mutual pleasure. And this seems ok with you.

    Sex organs (purportedly) have the Final Cause of procreation. Yet many people have found other ways to use their sex organs for mutual pleasure - masturbation, oral sex, safe forms of gay sex etc. Yet in THIS instance you want to condemn these (or some of) practices.

    You do not in fact offer any cogent reason why. To the extent you want to condemn gay sex but preserve kissing, you imply that the mutual pleasure of gay sex is "clearly incompatible"
    with their final cause. But you offer no grounds. If gay sex uses the sex organs in a way that is generally safe and provides mutual pleasure, why is this in principle any different from our using our mouths for non-Final Cause purposes because we get pleasure from kissing?

    The only reason is a people are "ignoring" this objection is because it's a very poor one.


    Yes, I keep getting those dismissals. Yet when it comes to put up or shut up time, the answers I receive are not actually very cogent. Which is why I can ignore the haughty replies, and point out the problems when someone actually steps up and tries to make their case.

    RH

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  6. >Like I said: it's easier to always say "Go read the book" rather than start defending beliefs in the presence of a critic who will point out the missteps as you make them.

    Why should any critic who refuses to read the back round material provided by experts be taken seriously just because they hector a bunch of amateurs for not explaining in 50 words or less a "proof" to their shifting goal posts of satisfaction?

    Is this guy or gal for real?

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  7. Ben Yachov said: I do lack the articulation to explain them. Sorry I thought everyone knew that?

    Short of you adding that information in your profile how would I know that?

    Now what is your excuse for refusing to read experts on the matter?

    You mean like experts in astrology and alchemy? If the discipline the teacher – or assistants – is presenting hasn’t been shown to hold any water – tangible facts and consequences – then I can’t see there’s much point in doing much study or homework in the topic.

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  8. captainzman,

    Once again, I have Feser's book and while he certainly levels this accusation at some atheists (particularly new atheists),

    Ah, so Baker's summation wasn't that accurate, since Baker reports Feser as saying "According to Feser, secularism is an “anti-religion” religion.."

    Feser or someone else could have cleared up that fallacious broad indictment earlier, I think.

    But even if Feser's indictment is not that broad, you say he levels that accusation at New Atheists. Well, that's just as bad, because I'm quite familiar with the New Atheists (and I could reasonably describe myself in sympathy with the movement), and Feser's assertion is still B.S.

    The exact same defense I gave for why Feser's claim is B.S. as applied to my Atheism goes for
    Dawkins, Harris etc. It is clear THEY TOO are quite willing to believe any number of uncomfortable and horrible truths, and are willing to constrain their behaviors in light of consequences that have evidence in their favor.
    So claim like Feser's that suggests they behave otherwise - that these New Atheists are apt to reject a belief on it's consequences rather than on consideration of the evidence - is simply unsupported.

    So even your own response indicates my criticism is still valid.

    Does Feser aim other "salvo's" at atheists, or New Atheists? I bet he does. But I'm talking about a Specific Salvo, a specific claim that you acknowledge Feser makes. If this is not defensible, why don't you just admit it? (Or show why my arguments against it do not undermine Feser's claim).

    When Baker says "For, if there is no Creator God who is the First Mover of all things, then there is no purpose to the universe, no immortality of the soul, no natural moral law, no final judgment or accountability for how one lives one’s life.", he's referring to this anti-Aristotelianism.

    Yes. I know that. Except that apparently Feser ALSO conjoins that to the claim that atheists WILLFULLY reject belief in God - and presumably the Aristotelianism that supports Natural Law - BECAUSE we don't like the consequences of Theism (or Natural Law etc) being true. Which is bullshit and I've explained why it's bullshit.

    Your accusation about him is wrong.

    No, your own post, saying he levels that accusation at New Atheists, indicate I'm right in criticizing Feser.

    RH

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  9. Ben,

    Your tangents on Geocentracism and Slavery are interesting & I've delt with them before. But it's clear you are only trying to run interference for RH or Steersman. We both know you aren't really interested in an answer so I decline to give any.

    Live with it. Or cry about it. I care not.


    Tangents? You're as hyperbolic as you accuse the Gnus of being. Look, we're all in search of answers here. It is precisely these kinds of issues that lead me to believe that the Bible is not the inspired word of god. Not revealed wisdom. I won't bore you with how I might have written The Ten Commandments differently had I been the creator of the universe. Suffice it to say, I would have chosen more carefully The Ten. Among other problematic issues.

    I'm not running interference despite what the voices in your head may be saying. I come here on my own to see if there is anything there there.

    It might surprise you to know I ordered Loux's Metaphysics through Amazon. I purchased Feser's Aquinas last week. However, I'm having trouble even with the second chapter. How does anyone know what potential and actual are for any given situation? Among other things. I'll keep at it.

    Too bad you're so hot headed.

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  10. "You mean like experts in astrology and alchemy?"

    More like experts in pure mathematics, applied mathematics, economics, political science, Greek, Hebrew, history, and so on. Subjects that have a well-respected pedigree and are not mere blips on the historical timeline.

    Comparing theistic metaphysics, let alone realist metaphysics as a whole, to astrology and alchemy is too inane for words. The fact that the most brilliant mathematicians, philosophers, scientists, and writers over the past three millennia have been metaphysical realists of a theistic stripe ought to have suggested to you that, "Hey, maybe the topic of God's nature and existence is an issue of sufficient complexity that it doesn't warrant dismissive treatment. It doesn't warrant such a priori, subjective comparisons to astrology and alchemy."


    Color me an intellectual coward, but I cannot dream of running my mouth extensively on properly academic topics on which I haven't read a sufficient introduction.

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  11. @Steersman

    >Short of you adding that information in your profile how would I know that?

    They wouldn't but that still doesn't explain why you spurn seeking the knowledge of experts? If only to get the strongest argument in the strongest terms.

    >You mean like experts in astrology and alchemy?

    I am telling you to learn philosophy. I am telling you empiricism alone is not the only means of natural knowledge.
    Knowing what I know I would believe this even if I rejected the existence of God or gods.
    Positivism and Popperism is irrational. I learned that from both Theistic and Atheistic philosophers.

    You seem to be contented to the simple minded pablum of the Dawkins, Macdonald Myers low brow fundie Atheism.

    Fine that is your choice. But it's a stupid irrational one.

    You equate philosophy with astrology and alchemy? Morally & intellectually there is no difference between you sir and a YEC fundie!

    None at all.

    I suggest you reexamine your presuppositions.

    Reason and logic are learned skills you don't get them automatically just because you deny gods.

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  12. @Anon the Atheist

    So go read AQUINAS and stop bitching about irrelevant tangents.

    You are at least that much more respectable then either RH or Steersman who are hopelessly anti-intellectual and refuse to do their homework.

    >Tangents? You're as hyperbolic as you accuse the Gnus of being.

    No I pounded them with reason & the hyperbolic speech was mere icing on the cake.

    >Look, we're all in search of answers here. It is precisely these kinds of issues that lead me to believe that the Bible is not the inspired word of god. Not revealed wisdom.

    So you rejected some heterodox Protestant nonsense I don't believe in the first place? Not my problem & not my experience.

    Your tribal desire to defend your fellow Atheists right to act like jerks & not be vexed by a Theistic Jerk is noted.

    But at least you are reading metaphysics and philosophy. For that you deserve praise!

    Now if you have any questions at all about what you are reading or need help....go ask someone else!

    I have GAMING & MODDING to do.

    Do your own homework!

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  13. Anon the Rational writes:

    >Color me an intellectual coward, but I cannot dream of running my mouth extensively on properly academic topics on which I haven't read a sufficient introduction.

    Amen! But it is good to know Anon the Atheist shares this view on the practical level in that he/she is reading metaphysics and philosophy.

    But for irrationalists like RH & Steersman there is no excuse.

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  14. The internet ate my last post, so I’ll try again.

    Is "natural function" the same as "Final Cause?" How do you determine the Final Cause/Natural Function?

    The same you determine legs are for walking, eyes for seeing, and the heart for pumping blood.

    Since I am questioning the move from "it is the case that X has Y biological features"
    to "it OUGHT to be the case as to how you use them," then you can not beg the question in producing any answer in which it is assumed "X does Y, therefore we ought to use X only for Y."


    Ah, the is/ought problem. It’s only a problem if you reject formal and final causes, which A-t does not. Briefly, the “good” is when a thing conforms to its nature, and if you accept that man has a certain nature, the values come right after it.

    I would instead question how you can have any notion of objective morality without some sort of Aristotelian or Platonic philosophy.

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  15. Steersman: If that is the case then do please tell me how you can actually do mathematics without sense experience.

    Whether we can do math without sense experience has no bearing on whether mathematical truths depend upon sense experience. I might only be able to know that London is the capital of England by reading it in a book. My belief in this case depends upon what is written in the book. But the book's saying that "London is the capital of England" isn't what makes London the capital of England. How I acquire a belief is distinct from what makes the belief true. This isn't a very hard conceptual distinction to grasp, quite frankly, and I think the inability to grasp it should serve as a litmus test for being unable to think philosophically.

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  16. Ben said:

    "I suggest you reexamine your presuppositions."

    This from the guy who can't figure out why Christ didn't condemn slavery.

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  17. He also didn't condemn abortion and euthanasia. Guess that means he approved of it.

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  18. @anon 5:46 and others:

    I am so sick of this stupid "Jesus never explictly condemned slavery, therefore Christianity is committed to the moral rightness of slavery" meme. For the record: Jesus didn't explicitly condemn rape, or alcoholism, or bulemia, or polyamory, or bestiality, or suicide, or homosexuality, or abortion, or racism, or sticking a corn cob into your inner ear, or any number of other obvious moral failings. But this shows absolutely nothing. Jesus wasn't a moral teacher who purported to exhaust the content of morality with his recorded teachings in the gospels. His teachings presupposed an unarticulated moral background, and this background can be culled from reading the Gospels and the Wisdome literature of the Old testament and the writings of the New Testament. This morality finds its fullest expression in the articulated teachings of the Natural Law theory, which condemns all of the moral faults listed above. Consequently, it is just puerile to continue to argue "Jesus didn't explictly (condemn/condone) X, therfore Christianity must either (condemn/condone) X. Please, put this stupid argument to rest.

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  19. @Tursunov

    Thanks for the recommendations. The survey by Lowe and the Aristotelian/quantum-mechanics book are exactly the sorts of books I've been looking for lately.

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  20. One could make an argument that the Final Cause is to play the saxophone - "look how perfectly it fits the mouthpiece. Note how blowing creates music. See how the tongue modulates the pitch." So why isn't THAT the Final Cause for mouths? Might you want to say that there are other aspects of mouths that go unfulfilled in playing an instrument? Well, that's the case when we are only speaking, or only eating, or doing neither, as well.

    First of all, there is no “one” final cause for mouths. Clearly, different parts of the body can serve multiple functions, and we can figure out what these functions are. In this case, using the mouth for eating, speaking, and breathing is clearly “good” in the sense that it allows us to survive. However, using your mouth to for something other than eating, breathing, speaking, etc. does not equal using it for something immoral, nor does it mean that you are only doing “good” when you are using it for its intended function. The only prohibition is if I use it in a manner contrary to its function.

    An example- I used my mouth to eat breakfast this morning, which is good, because I need to eat in order to survive. However, it would be wrong if I ate breakfast and then threw it up in order to lose weight.

    There is nothing immoral about playing the saxophone or kissing because none of these interfere with the final cause of the mouth. Plus, I’m open to arguments that another final cause of the mouth is kissing or making music.

    Yet Feser wrote of final causes:

    "It cannot possibly be good for us to use them in any other way, whether an individual person thinks it is or not."

    So why is this true for sexual organs, but not lips as you want to say? Because using lips to kiss is using them in a way OTHER than their (on your account) Final Cause.


    This is what happens when you do not read a book that you are criticizing. Feser is referring to matters of consistency, or as it were, it’s okay to use something a certain way so long as it is contrary to the final cause. “Not good” does not mean immoral, but immoral does mean “not good”.

    Sex, on the other hand, is directed towards procreation. Anyone with a working knowledge of biology recognizes this. Pleasure is nature’s way of getting us to do this. Now this does not mean it is wrong to have sex for pleasure, only that it is wrong to have sex while trying to avoid procreation.


    You do not in fact offer any cogent reason why. To the extent you want to condemn gay sex but preserve kissing, you imply that the mutual pleasure of gay sex is "clearly incompatible"
    with their final cause. But you offer no grounds. If gay sex uses the sex organs in a way that is generally safe and provides mutual pleasure, why is this in principle any different from our using our mouths for non-Final Cause purposes because we get pleasure from kissing?



    Show me how kissing frustrates the final cause of the mouth. You can’t. Furthermore, any references to some sort of pleasure principle are nonsense.

    ReplyDelete
  21. >This from the guy who can't figure out why Christ didn't condemn slavery.


    I can or rather others have already done so it's just that it's off topic and clearly a tangent designed to put more on my plate than I can handle.

    Live with it.

    ReplyDelete
  22. captainzman,

    I'm asking "how" you determine Final Cause. Saying you use the same method in other cases does not tell me what that method is. So when you answer:

    The same you determine legs are for walking,

    It's a non-answer.

    How do you determine legs are for walking and not for playing soccer, football, skating, ballet etc? Certainly legs *can* locomote humans. They can also kick someone's ass quite efficiently as well. The problem is you can't start with what they "ought" to do, since that begs the question. So you have to start by observing what they DO, or can do, or can facilitate...and THEN move to "ought." But the problem is legs CAN facilitate any number of options. Same with lips. Same with sex organs.

    What you keep failing to do is indicate a non-question-begging, non- arbitrary method of being sure of any Final Cause.

    Ah, the is/ought problem. It’s only a problem if you reject formal and final causes, which A-t does not. Briefly, the “good” is when a thing conforms to its nature, and if you accept that man has a certain nature, the values come right after it.

    That just begs the question. I'm asking questions about moral actions - how you get ought from is statements. To say "the good is when a thing conforms to it's nature" is essentially to assume the move from "it is a thing's nature" to "a thing OUGHT to conform to it's nature."
    It still leaves the question hanging in the air "how do you get from one type of statement to the other." I'm not interested if you are simply going to assume the answers to the questions.

    Also, I hold that it makes no sense to speak of "natures" as you do. A thing's "nature" is what it does, or is capable of doing. This makes more sense of our experience, and makes our system of inference more intelligeable than indicated by your use of the term "natures."

    When we determine anything's nature in our experience, we observe what it does/seems capable of doing and THAT is what we describe as it's "nature."
    This applies to people as well. Say "Tom" our next door neighbor seems to have the nature of a friendly helpful guy from what we've observed. Then, later on, police start finding bodies of dead tortured women in Tom's back yard, with evidence clearly showing Tom tortured and killed them. Does it make sense to say "Well, that's not possible, it's not Tom's nature" or "Tom was clearly acting against his nature." No. What makes more sense is that you were wrong about Tom's nature if you thought Tom's nature did not include the proclivity for killing women. In fact, you've learned something new about Tom's nature.

    (The same goes for investigating the nature of anything).

    In this way, since a nature is more reasonably understood as "whatever any X is/does" it makes no sense to to say anything "acts against it's nature." NOTHING can act against it's nature, because whatever a thing CAN DO is subsumed in it's nature.

    Therefore it also makes no sense to say something "ought" to conform to it's nature, given it's impossible to do otherwise. These are some of the reasons I find Final Cause type explications of "nature" and morality so uncompelling, and seeing how muddled the results are in practice (e.g. seeing the rationalizations of people like Prof. Feser and other Catholics) only support my suspicions.

    I would instead question how you can have any notion of objective morality without some sort of Aristotelian or Platonic philosophy.

    Well, since it seems you don't get it with Aristotelian or Platonic philosophy, at least it leaves the possibility other theories may give it to you ;-)

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  23. "only that it is wrong to have sex while trying to avoid procreation."

    Would this render natural family planning within marriage immoral? I mean, if or when I get married, I would like to get intimate with my wife on a somewhat regular basis in the hopes of solidifying our marital bond, but I can easily imagine scenarios wherein having a child or having more children at a particular moment would be the height of financial irresponsibility.

    For instance, I plan on going into a relatively lucrative field (medicine), but I don't think I'll ever be able to accommodate more than 5 children. Does this mean that I should stop making love to my fertile wife after she gives birth to our 5th child, lest I suffer the pangs of immorality?

    ReplyDelete
  24. @Anon the Atheist

    FYI

    The Catholic rejects Sola Scriptura.

    Thus any objection that starts with the praise "The Bible/Jesus/YHWH doesn't mention X" is a non-starter.

    You are using Scripture in a manner that it was never meant to be used according to Church teaching and Tradition.

    You may want to read Newman on the Development of Doctrine.

    Projecting the errors of your former sect (which could what at best be less than 100 years old a reform of a reform of a reform etc) on to the 2,000 year old church is not produtive.

    It's also more work correcting your latent Protestant presuppositions and teaching you Catholicism.

    Sorry I don't have the Stomach. Go bug Jimmy Akin or Catholic Answers.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Untenured said:

    "I am so sick of this stupid "Jesus never explictly condemned slavery, therefore Christianity is committed to the moral rightness of slavery" meme. For the record: Jesus didn't explicitly condemn rape, or alcoholism, or bulemia, or polyamory, or bestiality, or suicide, or homosexuality, or abortion, or racism, or sticking a corn cob into your inner ear, or any number of other obvious moral failings."

    You should be sick of it. To expect so little from your Christ? You're angry with me? He didn't say any of that was important. If it was so effing important don't ya think he should have? And you try to equate all the other nonsense to owning a human being. He could have spared 2,000 years of misery for so many with such a simple statement.

    I'm sorry but it's you that is bankrupt.

    Why doesnt he have a second volume written for him. Maybe an update to clarify for the dolts like me who would think such stupid things.

    Once again the apologies boggle the mind.

    ReplyDelete
  26. The exact same defense I gave for why Feser's claim is B.S. as applied to my Atheism goes for
    Dawkins, Harris etc. It is clear THEY TOO are quite willing to believe any number of uncomfortable and horrible truths, and are willing to constrain their behaviors in light of consequences that have evidence in their favor.
    So claim like Feser's that suggests they behave otherwise - that these New Atheists are apt to reject a belief on it's consequences rather than on consideration of the evidence - is simply unsupported.


    And yet I've found that New Atheists hold a number of beliefs can border on conspiracy theories. They are always the ones who make reference to conflict between science and religion throughout history, even though any historian of science will tell you that the conflict theory is nonsense. The New Atheists peddle the Christ-myth theory, which again, is nonsense. Harris' book against Christianity is so bad that I briefly thought it was satire when I read it. Dawkins' ignorance when it comes to theology and philosophy in general is staggering.

    Yes. I know that. Except that apparently Feser ALSO conjoins that to the claim that atheists WILLFULLY reject belief in God - and presumably the Aristotelianism that supports Natural Law - BECAUSE we don't like the consequences of Theism (or Natural Law etc) being true. Which is bullshit and I've explained why it's bullshit.

    He conjoins it to the claim that certain atheists do so, and as far as I can remember, it barely merits a couple of paragraphs. The actual argument being made is that the early modern philosophers rejected A-T because they didn't like the consequences, and the passage of history has left modern philosophers thinking they rejected A-T because of good, compelling arguments. Modern atheists are more confused than anything else.

    Anyways, it is certainly true that certain atheists reject arguments contrary to their position simply out of a desire to maintain their current beliefs. This is also true for Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Democrats, Republicans, etc. Naturalism is a belief system, and like any belief system, it gives a person a sense of identity, and people react irrationally when their personal identities are threatened. Now it may not be true for you, but it is certainly true for some atheists.

    ReplyDelete
  27. "You are using Scripture in a manner that it was never meant to be used according to Church teaching and Tradition."

    Thanks Ben. With all due respect we've already been here before with the 'tradition' that the chuch doctrine has gotten wrong.

    I thought you were Gaming and Moding?

    ReplyDelete
  28. Would this render natural family planning within marriage immoral? I mean, if or when I get married, I would like to get intimate with my wife on a somewhat regular basis in the hopes of solidifying our marital bond, but I can easily imagine scenarios wherein having a child or having more children at a particular moment would be the height of financial irresponsibility.

    For instance, I plan on going into a relatively lucrative field (medicine), but I don't think I'll ever be able to accommodate more than 5 children. Does this mean that I should stop making love to my fertile wife after she gives birth to our 5th child, lest I suffer the pangs of immorality?


    There's nothing wrong with natural family planning. Natural law doesn't mean that if you have an impulse, you should act on it. But once you start to have sex, it has to end a certain way.

    ReplyDelete
  29. captainzman,

    As above, you keep making assertions that do not in fact answer my questions, or get at the fundamental issues I keep raising.

    In this case, using the mouth for eating, speaking, and breathing is clearly “good” in the sense that it allows us to survive.

    So "allows us to survive" is now the measure of "good?" This "good" of yours is a moving target.

    Also, it's not "clear" that those things are "good." At least not why one ought to accept a Final Cause explanation...that's the point! I'm asking you to ARGUE for why they are good...so I can see if your method if inference is consistent with your calling other things (e.g. gay sex) "bad."

    Further, why can't I say "gay oral sex is clearly 'good' in the sense it allows mutual pleasure."

    Right now that sits as justified as anything you keep asserting.

    Re mouths used for things other than eating/talking:

    The only prohibition is if I use it in a manner contrary to its function.

    But I keep asking for your method of discerning "proper function/Final Cause" and you don't give it. You just keep asserting things are "obvious" without the method. It is in the details of your method that I suggest we'll see the problems.

    There is nothing immoral about playing the saxophone or kissing because none of these interfere with the final cause of the mouth. Plus, I’m open to arguments that another final cause of the mouth is kissing or making music.

    In which you keep begging the question against the issue, which is HOW have you determined the mouth's Final Cause in the first place!!!

    Sex, on the other hand, is directed towards procreation. Anyone with a working knowledge of biology recognizes this.

    Sex organs ARE used for procreation. Sex organs CAN be used for procreation. And sex organs ARE and CAN also be used for non-procreation pleasure. Anyone with a working knowledge of sex organs knows this.

    Pleasure is nature’s way of getting us to do this.

    And why can't we say that pleasure is ALSO nature's way of getting us to have oral sex?
    You have provided NO reasons or method by which to accept your assertions over this one.

    Now this does not mean it is wrong to have sex for pleasure, only that it is wrong to have sex while trying to avoid procreation.

    And again, begging the question. You just keep making assertions about purpose and Final Cause without answering the questions about HOW you establish Final Cause. It is in that area that your arbitrariness, lack of consistency and non-sequiturs (e.g. naturalistic fallacy) will be brought to light.

    Which, they already have been to some degree.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  30. BTW reading RH's lame arse responses to captainzman is like reading someone whose only knowledge of Evolution comes from ANSWERS IN GENESIS debate a College Senior Biology major.

    The pathological ignorance is astounding.

    But in my experience YEC's think they win all debates because of their simplistic knowledge of science.

    Eyre if you ask me.
    Geez read a book and enough of the Drama Queen nonsense!

    http://www.aodonline.org/aodonline-sqlimages/shms/faculty/SmithJanet/Publications/MoralPhilosophy/ThomisticNaturalLaw.pdf

    http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/may/homosex.htm

    http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/illinois-professor-fired-for-giving-catholic-teaching-on-homosexuality/

    http://www.catholicplanet.com/information/Catholic-Teaching-on-homosexuality.pdf

    ReplyDelete
  31. Untenured,

    "How I acquire a belief is distinct from what makes the belief true."

    Now, for consistency's sake, let's apply this principle to Natural Law theory.

    ReplyDelete
  32. @captainzman,

    I think I should give you a heads up buddy. It's clear to me RH is implicitly perhaps subconsciously employing an Utilitarian moral ethic here.

    He is judging Natural Law based on utilitarian presuppositions. He is assuming Natural Law theorists would form moral judgements the way a Utilitarian believes one should form moral judgements.

    It's like trying to explain Hume to someone who has never studied Kant or Locke. Or reading Aquinas but interpreting him via the methods of Descartes.

    Shit happens!

    So don't be cowed by his thuggery & sophistry.

    Keep up the good work I admire your patience. I wish I had half of it.

    ReplyDelete
  33. captainzman,

    Re Feser's claim on why secularism/Atheism/New Atheists reject belief in God:

    "He conjoins it to the claim that certain atheists do so, and as far as I can remember, it barely merits a couple of paragraphs."

    Doesn't matter if it's only a couple of paragraphs. It's a big, foundational claim about our very motivations. By analogy, it wouldn't matter if Feser had only spent two sentences claiming current Judaic religious culture is simply a cover for a money making scheme, despite that Jews may profess otherwise. That would be enough to slander and impugn the dignity, morality and honesty of modern Jews. Same with his claim about "secularism" - that our disbelief in God is not for the reasons we claim, but ultimately is motivated by our immoral desires.

    It should not stand. It shouldn't stand if he accuses ANYONE falsely. And given his book is an attack on the New Atheists, it follows he would, as you already indicated earlier, be making this accusation of the New Atheists.

    Now you seem to be further retreating from the claim (it suggests you know it's a creaky, unsustainable claim).

    Anyways, it is certainly true that certain atheists reject arguments contrary to their position simply out of a desire to maintain their current beliefs.

    But Feser's book is supposed to be a critique of the New Atheists. It's absolutely clear from Fr. Baker's review that Feser means to lob this charge at the New Atheists.

    Can you stick his claim about any of the New Atheists "willfully rejecting God" on the basis of the consequences, rather than on lack of evidence/argument? Can you pin this on the obvious names in the New Atheist movement? Dawkins. Or Harris. Or Dennett? Or Hitchens? Or even P.Z. Myers?

    No. You can't. (But be my guest if you want to try, we'll see how that goes).

    And if Feser does not in fact make this accusation against the New Atheists mentioned, then Fr. Baker produced a very confused account of Feser's book, given that's exactly how he portrays Feser's argument. Funny that Prof. Feser would not mention just how confused Baker was in his review when he linked to it.

    But...it's obvious Feser wants to lay this claim on the New Atheists anyway...and it won't stick.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  34. >Thanks Ben. With all due respect we've already been here before with the 'tradition' that the chuch doctrine has gotten wrong.

    No we haven't. I dismissed you till I foun out you where learning philosophy.

    On what basis should I(a person who has seriously studied Catholic doctrine) believe an ex-Protestant Fundamentalist understands Catholic Tradition?

    You have only just now started reading AQUINAS & Philosophy have you read Newman? Or St Vincint of Lerins? So how can any claim on your part "tradition went wrong" be of any meaning? You don't know what Catholic Tradition is or how moral or theological Dogma is formulated.

    So your challenges mean nothing.

    But you must learn to crawl before you can fly. Read AQUINAS start with Natural Theology and Philosphy.

    Revealed Theology will come later.

    ReplyDelete
  35. How do you determine legs are for walking and not for playing soccer, football, skating, ballet etc? Certainly legs *can* locomote humans. They can also kick someone's ass quite efficiently as well. The problem is you can't start with what they "ought" to do, since that begs the question. So you have to start by observing what they DO, or can do, or can facilitate...and THEN move to "ought." But the problem is legs CAN facilitate any number of options. Same with lips. Same with sex organs.

    If you can't look at legs and determine that they are for walking, then I honestly don't know how I can help you. And once again- things can have multiple final causes. If you want to show me how this is flawed, point out how these other options conflict with any of its final causes.

    That just begs the question. I'm asking questions about moral actions - how you get ought from is statements. To say "the good is when a thing conforms to it's nature" is essentially to assume the move from "it is a thing's nature" to "a thing OUGHT to conform to it's nature."
    It still leaves the question hanging in the air "how do you get from one type of statement to the other." I'm not interested if you are simply going to assume the answers to the questions.


    Look at what happens when things don’t conform to their natures. What happens if we don’t eat, sleep, or breathe? It’s an objective fact that various behaviors are conducive to our well-being and others are not, and human beings act in a way so that they achieve what they think is good.

    Also, I hold that it makes no sense to speak of "natures" as you do. A thing's "nature" is what it does, or is capable of doing. This makes more sense of our experience, and makes our system of inference more intelligeable than indicated by your use of the term "natures.

    This sounds remarkably Aristotelian, with the act/potency distinction. Good. If it confuses you, substitute “essence” for “nature” or “form”, all of which entail certain final causes. The essence of a triangle, for instance, is that it has three sides, has a total of 180 degrees, etc.

    When we determine anything's nature in our experience, we observe what it does/seems capable of doing and THAT is what we describe as it's "nature."
    This applies to people as well. Say "Tom" our next door neighbor seems to have the nature of a friendly helpful guy from what we've observed. Then, later on, police start finding bodies of dead tortured women in Tom's back yard, with evidence clearly showing Tom tortured and killed them. Does it make sense to say "Well, that's not possible, it's not Tom's nature" or "Tom was clearly acting against his nature." No. What makes more sense is that you were wrong about Tom's nature if you thought Tom's nature did not include the proclivity for killing women. In fact, you've learned something new about Tom's nature.


    I’m not referring to individual nature, like Tom’s nature. I’m referring to it in a universal sense, as in the nature of man. Tom’s nature is flawed, yes, but we know that because we compare it to the nature of man in general.

    In this way, since a nature is more reasonably understood as "whatever any X is/does" it makes no sense to to say anything "acts against it's nature." NOTHING can act against it's nature, because whatever a thing CAN DO is subsumed in it's nature.

    But we have free will, and we can choose certain ends over others, and these ends can in fact be bad for us. It is in the nature of a person to eat, but that person can choose not to.

    ReplyDelete
  36. Steersman,

    "If that is the case then do please tell me how you can actually do mathematics without sense experience."

    See my post with the mathematical proof, again. Where in that proof do we use 'sense experience'? If you mean I had to be able to write it with a pencil which required sense of touch and sight I guess you got me. Though I could reason vocally without pencil and paper...but then I need my voice. I'm just not understanding your point, perhaps. Mathematics is not done empirically, check out other proofs for more information. If you want to argue with a philosophical proposition (like arguments for God's existence) or a mathematical proposition, you argue against the premises. You can not hold it to some other standard that it makes no sense to hold it to.

    RH,

    captainzman has given you some answers but you can look more in depth in The Last Superstition sDr. Feser answers it starting on page 133, and elsewhere on this very site.

    In general,

    I'm not being a smartass but I'm waiting on someone to give us some empirical evidence that all knowledge can only be known empirically. We've seen this statement in this very thread and I want to know what one makes of it even if they don't have a good answer. Is it not a contradiction? Does it get your wheels turning at least? As someone pointed out, we really need to address this question before we can talk about anything else. Otherwise, it would be a waste of everyone's time.

    ReplyDelete
  37. >And you try to equate all the other nonsense to owning a human being. He could have spared 2,000 years of misery for so many with such a simple statement.

    Unlikely. If people believed & accepted "Love others as I have loved you" then there would be no need to take other human beings &put them in bondage to do the work you are to lazy to do or too cheap to hire others to do.

    People rejected this simple teaching and other teachings about oppressing the poor you live in a dream world to think the explicit condemnation of slavery would have made any difference.

    OTOH I suggest you are really objecting to the PROBLEM OF EVIL.

    Go read THE REALITY OF GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL by Brian Davies. Disabuse yourself of the Theistic Personalist Idol you worshiped as a Protestant and learn something of the True God.

    Now I am going to go modding.

    ReplyDelete
  38. One last dig/

    Natural Family is unnatural? How can the choice not to have sex at a certain time be sexually immoral? You are not having sex?

    That is like calling not giving secret information to our country's enemies treason!

    Silly!

    ReplyDelete
  39. So "allows us to survive" is now the measure of "good?" This "good" of yours is a moving target.

    In some sense, it is. A full account of the good in virtue ethics, at least in regards to the individual person, is eudaimonia, which roughly translates to "human flourishing". See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia

    But I keep asking for your method of discerning "proper function/Final Cause" and you don't give it. You just keep asserting things are "obvious" without the method. It is in the details of your method that I suggest we'll see the problems.

    It's "obvious," because its built into the very way we think. It's impossible to think non-teleologically; how the human mind works is one of the biggest examples of teleology we have, for we always act towards certain ends as opposed to others.

    And why can't we say that pleasure is ALSO nature's way of getting us to have oral sex?
    You have provided NO reasons or method by which to accept your assertions over this one.


    You can if you show me why nature would do this, but pleasure principles are notoriously incoherent.

    ReplyDelete
  40. "Exhibit A: ... At pages 250-54 I set out some philosophical criticisms of Dennett’s account of biological function."

    This section is a rant for the supposed "final cause" in evolution. This is how Feser characterizes the Darwinian theory of cause: "To say that an organ's function (now) is to do X is therefore shorthand for saying that it was selected for by evolution because its earliest ancestors did X." This supposedly leads to the "absurd implication" that "you can't really know what the function of an organ is until you know something about its evolutionary history."

    How many Darwinians actually reach that absurd conclusion? Or is Feser merely failing to understand Darwinians like he claims they fail to understand him?

    But since the red herring is out there, let's propose an alternative view. "Final cause" when inserted into evolution leads to the absurd implication that nothing can evolve unless the lower forms know something about how they want to evolve. Or maybe another absurd implication: No evolution can take place unless the environment knows something about what kind of life makes it most happy.

    ReplyDelete
  41. Doesn't matter if it's only a couple of paragraphs. It's a big, foundational claim about our very motivations. By analogy, it wouldn't matter if Feser had only spent two sentences claiming current Judaic religious culture is simply a cover for a money making scheme, despite that Jews may profess otherwise. That would be enough to slander and impugn the dignity, morality and honesty of modern Jews. Same with his claim about "secularism" - that our disbelief in God is not for the reasons we claim, but ultimately is motivated by our immoral desires.

    I am at a complete loss as to how you can compare anti-semitism to a simple, trivially true claim like this. Moreover, its makes you a massive hypocrite because you made the exact same sort of claims against Christians- that we'll do anything to justify our beliefs. I guess you are just as bad as all those Jew-haters too, eh?

    Now you seem to be further retreating from the claim (it suggests you know it's a creaky, unsustainable claim).

    No. I said it was a very limited claim and not at all integral to the main arguments of his book.

    Can you stick his claim about any of the New Atheists "willfully rejecting God" on the basis of the consequences, rather than on lack of evidence/argument? Can you pin this on the obvious names in the New Atheist movement? Dawkins. Or Harris. Or Dennett? Or Hitchens? Or even P.Z. Myers?

    Sure, but I'm guessing it won't do me any good.

    Funny that Prof. Feser would not mention just how confused Baker was in his review when he linked to it.

    He is under no obligation to do so

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  42. >Funny that Prof. Feser would not mention just how confused Baker was in his review when he linked to it.

    >He is under no obligation to do so.

    From where I'm sitting Fr Baker merely gave a short terse half a page summery of his impressions of a 299 page book.

    All this hysteria from RH over a half a page review of a 299 page book he has never read himself.

    Weird.

    ReplyDelete
  43. Untenured said...

    "I am so sick of this stupid "Jesus never explicitly condemned slavery, therefore Christianity is committed to the moral rightness of slavery" meme."

    Uhm...no atheist I know of makes the argument as you just put it. You guys continually accuse atheists of strawmaning theistic arguments, yet I continually see strawmannirg of atheist arguments.

    The arguments about Slavery and the Bible generally go:

    1. The Old Testament God clearly expected people to have slaves, even told how to regulate it, and included explicit rules (e.g. that you can beat your slave almost to death and not be punished if the slave doesn't die) that we would recognize as immoral, cruel. Apologists often like to claim that slavery was "different, not so bad" in those days, but God's actual commands on the issue depict otherwise.

    ALSO: there is a direct connection to Jesus because Jesus and the God of the OT are held by many Christians to be aspects of the same Being. So if Jesus was indeed an aspect of the OT God, then Jesus is culpable for whatever was commanded by God in the Bad old Days as well.

    God apparently had time to tell people the tiniest details about what types of clothing to wear etc, but apparently didn't have the presence of mind to mention that slavery was immoral.
    Which calls into question any sense of Divine Intelligence or Wisdom.

    2. Jesus did not condemn slavery when he had the chance to do so.

    The problem with this is that slavery has been a huge feature of human interaction, historically, and thus has been the cause of great amounts of suffering. Jesus found the time to say so many other things, and one would think if He was God, He would know the suffering that would happen via slavery, that Jesus could have explicitly condemned it. And when Jesus did mention slavery, it was only to illustrate a parable, not to condemn it. Given Jesus as God ought to know his message was going to be recorded for posterity as a guide for humankind, that's like knowing your kid is going to want to be a drug pusher, but when the opportunity comes to condemn drug pushing, you only use drug pushers in a parable that does not indicate that it's wrong. And then...say no more about it.

    Which, again, speaks to a lack of wisdom and is more indicative that this is the creation of the mores of the tribe writing this story, rather than any source of Divine Wisdom or moral foresight.

    His teachings presupposed an unarticulated moral background, and this background can be culled from reading the Gospels and the Wisdom literature of the Old testament and the writings of the New Testament.

    Ah yes, and we've seen how well that has gone. Tens of thousands of splintering Christian sects with their own "understanding" and counting. Again, not exactly indicative of any All Knowing Wisdom. More indicative of people making things up, and having no good way of converging on truth claims about God's will.

    This morality finds its fullest expression in the articulated teachings of the Natural Law theory, which condemns all of the moral faults listed above.

    Again, you have disagreements resulting in tens of thousands of competing claims for Christianity, including disagreements even within Catholicism. This makes it hardly obvious that one would take your claim seriously. The take home point is that it's absurd to infer that The Most Intelligent Being In The Universe is behind a method of "revelation" that is so utterly, disastrously inefficient for allowing humans to understand His Will and message.

    Consequently, it is just puerile to continue to argue "Jesus didn't explictly (condemn/condone) X, therfore Christianity must either (condemn/condone) X. Please, put this stupid argument to rest.

    So now that you have that straw-man off your chest, why don't you look at the real arguments?

    RH

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  44. captainzman: There's nothing wrong with natural family planning. Natural law doesn't mean that if you have an impulse, you should act on it. But once you start to have sex, it has to end a certain way.

    BenYachov: Natural Family is unnatural? How can the choice not to have sex at a certain time be sexually immoral? You are not having sex?


    Oh, then I'm probably misunderstanding what Christian natural family planning allows vis-a-vis morality.

    What I mean is, if you already know with approximately or exactly 100% certainty that your wife will not become pregnant if you have sex with her at time X, would it then be morally wrong to have sex with her at time X, even if (1)you fully intend on having children with her one day, you know that it would be financially irresponsible to have a child 9 months after time X, and/or some other comparable scenario, and (2) having sex with her at time X is done in the service of solidifying the marital bond of love between you and her?

    If "yes," then that's a pretty hard pill to swallow, especially in light of the apparent financial and emotional complexity of married life.

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  45. equesatrum,

    "Proposition: A subset E of the real numbers is connected with respect to the Euclidean metric if and only if E is an interval."

    Try to imagine a person with no sense experience. How would this person deal with concepts like real numbers, subsets, two dimensions, straight lines, and planes? If you tried to explain, why would he think you were telling him true things rather than fables? All mathematical proofs start with human experience (that is, observation) of the world. That's the only reason we commit ourselves to believing those proofs at all.

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  46. captainzman,

    It's hard to continue if, no matter how many times I point it out, you are just going to keep on begging the question in terms of what I'm asking you to justify.

    If you can't look at legs and determine that they are for walking, then I honestly don't know how I can help you.

    What you don't seem to grasp is that, yes of course I can say that "legs are for walking" IN A SENSE. But we need to be ready to keep our conceptual clarity, otherwise we can be fooled by sloppy usage or inferences, and I suggest this is just the problem in your use of Final Cause ideas.

    So yes I can use "legs are for walking"as a sort of advised short hand. They fulfill my desire to walk. I use them for walking. They are such as to fulfill my desire to walk. In these ways I use my legs "for" walking. ("for" implying a purpose, and I hold that strictly speaking, for conceptual clarity so we don't start making ontological errors, "purpose" relates to the desires of an agent rationalizing about how to achieve it's desires. Yes, I KNOW that Aristotle/Thomism thinks we can apply teleological/purposeful terms differently. The POINT is that
    it seems much of the ontological mistakes you theists are making - ultimately inferring a purposing God - seem to derive from mistakes you are making in buying into Aristotelian/Thomistic teleological concepts. That is what this conversation is meant to uncover).

    I can also say they have the "purpose for walking" in the sense that the evolution of legs aided
    in fulfilling certain desires (to get to food, to flee from predators, to locomote to fulfill my other desires).

    And I can also note reasons why we, as purposeful creatures, surrounded by other purposeful minds (other humans or other possible animals with "intent"), would have a proclivity to think in terms of "purpose."

    BUT...evolution theory reminds me (and ought to remind you) to be very cautious about the teleological inferences and assumptions we make. This is because the origin of biological features can be understood to be arising from blind, non-sentient processes, in which "purpose" plays no role. To start saying "well there's a purpose to EVERYTHING," even if you start by making a distinction between human, mindful purpose and "natural" purpose, this appears to nonetheless lead people to unjustified inferences toward a Purposeful Mega Mind (God).

    So the point about "what are legs for/what are legs final cause?" is to tease out the difference between how I'd use those terms, and the Natural Law style in which you'd use those terms.
    I suggest YOUR approach to establishing the "purpose" of legs is going to have dubious assumptions which get you into trouble, as you have assumed a moral theory into your method as well.

    Given you have conjoined morality to Final Cause in Natural Law theory, the question "How do you conclude legs are for walking (their Final Cause)" is to ask "How do you infer this final cause in a way that let's me know your moral conclusions are not arbitrary, or inconsistent, or are not question -begging?"

    Do you think all these questions are answered in Thomist theory? No doubt. The question is "is that actually the case" and "can you give me reason to think so?"

    RH.

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  47. Djindra said: All mathematical proofs start with human experience (that is, observation) of the world.

    By George, I think someone got it! The sane stay mainly in the plane of observation! :-)

    Although I think I might go a little further than the way you phrased it and suggest that with no sense experience – no consciousness – there wouldn’t even be a discrimination between “true things” and fables.

    But that is also the point I was trying to make with Mr. Yachov who seems to have found some way of acquiring knowledge other than “sense experience”, other than observation. Apropos of which I noted a relevant comment in the Wikipedia article on metaphysics:

    If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, “Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.” Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. [David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]

    Interesting that by that token Hume would, apparently, also consider "abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number" within the purview of empiricism.

    Although I expect that statement of Hume's might be going a tad too far as even illusion is still based on observation, albeit ones that are inconsistent with “reality” – someone said that word should always be in quotes – which means recourse to concepts of consistency which is, of course, still based on observation – aka empiricism. IMHO.

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  48. By George, I think someone got it! The sane stay mainly in the plane of observation!

    It's pretty clear that neither of you get anything at this point. Merely repeating canards will never make them true. The nebulous "math starts with observation!!!" schtick doesn't work. It starts with reasoning.

    And you may want to avoid calling one of the nuttier posters here "sane". It makes your terrible arguments look even worse.

    To your earlier point, you're being intellectually dishonest. Hyperbolic and elliptical geometry had zero need of "empirical confirmation" which was your actual initial claim. Einstein's theory of relativity was in need of empirical confirmation, and once it was confirmed physicists found use for the other geometries. But they were always true, and the arguments over them had zero to do with "reality". Because that's not how math is done. If you have any doubts here, ask an actual mathematician.

    And Ben is very easily able to learn and know things non-empirically. Deductive reasoning, for example, is a perfectly valid way of "knowing" and isn't empirical. Sola Empirica! can never work as a standard because it can never be proved empirically. It's a metaphysical claim, and assuming that it can be "tested" is a category error.

    And as a parting thought, I only felt compelled to post now because when I loaded the page the captcha was the phrase "belchoi" and you can't waste those sorts of opportunities.

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  49. @Steersman,

    You are still confusing the source/premises of an argument with the form of the argument itself. Let me go ahead and grant what Djindra said regarding mathematics (that it "starts with sense-experience" -- I do not agree with this, but I'll grant it for the sake of our discussion), and show you that such a thing doesn't make mathematics empirical.

    Consider these two propositions:

    I. My biceps are the biggest
    II. a+b = b+a

    How do we prove proposition I? Well, we'll have to measure everyone's broceps and make sure that they are all smaller than mine (*). It is an empirical argument and the examination of the natural world is a necessity for determining its truth or falsity. Now, compare it to proposition II. You might be tempted to think that someone who found out that 5+3 = 3+5 immediately thought about the possibility of such a statement applying to every other number, but this doesn't make the whole thing empirical, because 1. It isn't a necessary step; and 2. It doesn't serve as a proof of generality.

    This is precisely what Kant was getting at when he said that our knowledge started with our sense of time and space, but that such a thing didn't undermine the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Hell, even when Quine went on his tirade against it he didn't dare to call mathematics empirical, but quasi-empirical.

    (*): This is actually true and I know it from pure reason ;)

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  50. equesatrum said: Though I could reason vocally without pencil and paper...but then I need my voice. I'm just not understanding your point, perhaps. Mathematics is not done empirically ….

    As djindra noted above the proof process still is based on human experience – observation. And as I noted in my response Hume apparently sees “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number” – a fairly reasonable definition of mathematics, I would think, at least to a first approximation – as being within the scope or purview of empiricism. Seems to me that that “abstract reasoning” is still based on “observation” which is the core of the definition – at least one denotation – for the word “empirical”. Hence, presumably, Hume’s inclusion of that process in that philosophy.

    But your misunderstanding my point would seem to be based on a narrow definition of empirical, on only one of Hume’s methods or processes that he apparently includes in the empirical philosophy, i.e. “any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” – with or without the use of ANOVA statistics and confidence levels.

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  51. Anonymous said (or should I say RH?): Let me go ahead and grant what Djindra said regarding mathematics (that it "starts with sense-experience" -- I do not agree with this, but I'll grant it for the sake of our discussion), and show you that such a thing doesn't make mathematics empirical.

    Well then maybe you had better provide a definition for “empirical” as the one I quoted – “verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment” – seems perfectly valid and entirely consistent with the position that I’ve been arguing.

    This is precisely what Kant was getting at when he said that our knowledge started with our sense of time and space, but that such a thing didn't undermine the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Hell, even when Quine went on his tirade against it he didn't dare to call mathematics empirical, but quasi-empirical.

    And what would be that distinction, particularly within the context of this discussion, of those propositions? And what was the basis for Quine’s distinction between empirical and quasi-empirical? [In 25 words or less – or at least that many paragraphs.]

    And don’t tell me I have to read 6 or 7 books – one of which is written by you – before I’m to be allowed to even hint at suggesting that I might want to ask those questions … ;-)

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  52. “Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.” Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. [David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]"

    Hume's statement looks to be a re-dressing of the contradictory statement, "You can only gain knowledge through empirical evidence. Though I have no empirical evidence for this
    claim."

    Observing that a mathematical property holds in nature is not an argument for that proposition. We define terms and reason logically from those definitions. For a conditional statement, we suppose the first clause and through our use of definitions and premises we try to draw out the conclusion. 'Human observation' has nothing to do with it. The person without sense experience only needs to understand the definitions to follow it.

    Take a classic metaphysical question: Your friend Steve has never seen a dog. You point out a poodle, a golden retriever, and other kinds of dogs. Steve says, "Ok, those are well and good, but I just want to see dog. Show me dog." Where do you go to show him this? What is 'dog'? In what sense does 'dog' exist? These are metaphysical questions, and though they started from our observation of dog, we would not argue about the nature of 'dog' empirically. You wouldn't look at a poodle and say, 'Ok 'dog' has curly hair.' Not all dogs have curly hair. And so on.

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  53. E.H. Munroe said: The nebulous "math starts with observation!!!" schtick doesn't work. It starts with reasoning.

    And do tell me how you can reason without observing the process of reasoning. How do you know that the process of reasoning is valid? That there are no errors and inconsistencies? You might say that a computer can reason but only because some human observed the process to begin with and programmed it into the computer.

    To your earlier point, you're being intellectually dishonest. Hyperbolic and elliptical geometry had zero need of "empirical confirmation" which was your actual initial claim.

    Do please quote exactly where I made that claim. As I have noted, several times now, all I said was that the tests of general relativity proved that space was non-Euclidean; diddly squat about the need for empirical confirmation of “hyperbolic and elliptical geometry”.

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  54. "1+1=2" is not established by empirical verification, as "empirical verification" is traditionally understood. It follows solely and necessarily from the axioms of Peano arithmetic.

    http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html


    This is so well-established in mathematics and in the philosophy of mathematics that it defies explanation that one can suggest that it's truth is established via empirical verification.


    Steersman, if you still think that that's how it's established, then you're flat-out equivocating on the phrase "empirical verification."

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  55. equesatrum said: Observing that a mathematical property holds in nature is not an argument for that proposition.

    I didn’t say that it did. But the process of fashioning that argument – “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number” - is empirical – by Hume’s definition – which, by definition, is “relying on or derived from observation or experiment”.

    What is 'dog'? In what sense does 'dog' exist? These are metaphysical questions, and though they started from our observation of dog, we would not argue about the nature of 'dog' empirically.

    I wouldn’t have thought of that as a metaphysical question and would have said that, for example, “dog” is a set. But if you want to define it as metaphysical I’ll accept that for the sake of argument. But, in any case, if we’re talking about the “nature of ‘dog’” then presumably we would be using “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number” which is, in fact, by Hume’s definition empirical.

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  56. Xerces said: This is so well-established in mathematics and in the philosophy of mathematics that it defies explanation that one can suggest that its truth is established via empirical verification.

    My mistake – mea culpa. I’ve been using another dictionary definition – Relying on or derived from observation or experiment – and copied the other one – verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment – in by error.

    But, from the view of the former, I would then say that the axioms of Peano arithmetic are relying on or derived from observation, hence empirical. Particularly as axioms are, by definition, not provable within the field or by the theorems therein – though my terminology may be a little rusty – sort of like my Latin.

    But time to call it a night – ciao.

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  57. Captainzman:

    And once again- things can have multiple final causes.

    If things can have multiple final causes, then sex is not necessarily ultimately about procreation.

    I think that you have resolved this difficulty altogether, which only emerges if there is supposed to be a single final cause for everything.

    Thanks!

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  58. BenYachov,

    "Then using the same concept of verifiability how can he prove his own metaphysical belief in anti-metaphysics true?"

    This question is of itself a presupposition that there must be a root of truth that is outside of experience. It presupposes the need for a fundamental (and mystical) certainty. That kind of demand is irrational. Certainty is impossible. Like it or not, the "concept of verifiability" you sneer at is the best we have. Outside, empirical feedback (verifiability) is required to corroborate any metaphysical belief. You want free-floating revelations. You and Feser and company require prophets.

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  59. E.H. Munro,

    "Deductive reasoning, for example, is a perfectly valid way of "knowing" and isn't empirical."

    Deductive truth relies on empirically observed (and true) premises.

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  60. dguller,

    You got it!

    Except I see no reason to grant Final Cause/Natural Law doctrine any credence whatsoever.
    It hopelessly muddles morality and teleology with explanations about how things work.

    The difference that occurs when I am talking about "purpose," for instance of legs, and Thomists like Captainzman, is that I would argue that "purpose" is best understood as a subjective phenomenon, whereas Captainzman wants it to be an objective phenomenon, and that is why he, and his fellow Catholics, get so muddled.

    Yes we can use "purpose" as a shorthand for reasons I've already given. And biologists generally understand their use of the term "purpose" as a short hand, but strictly speaking they use the term advisedly, because in strict scientific terms it is gratuitous (vis Evolution Theory) to the explanation of how any biological feature arose.

    So when we are looking at our concepts strictly, not casually, for conceptual clarity it makes the most sense to keep the term "purpose" as tied to the subjective desires of an agent - it describes actions that fulfill an agent's desire. To talk of the "purpose" of a rock, or a rock forming, or being blown by wind, does not make sense given it can have no desire or intent to form a purpose. (That's not begging the question against Thomistic notions of purpose: I argue that it is a BETTER use of the term purpose that keeps us from ending in the type of arbitrariness and inconsistency etc one sees in Catholics employing Thomistic thinking).

    So when it comes to the "purpose" of my legs, I can talk of the purpose in terms of my subjective desires - the purposes for which I use my legs are many: walking, running, jumping, playing soccer etc. One needn't get into this tied-in-knots question-begging confusion of the search for a "Final Cause" that I see from the Thomists here.

    If I want to know whether it would be advisable to use my legs for X purpose, I can look to their structure, how they operate to see if they would be suitable for that purpose of mine. And I can look to evolutionary explanations for how my legs came to have the features they do. But
    while the features and historical explanation for my legs are "objective" descriptions, if we are going to talk "purpose" I'm going to ask "Whose purpose?' In this case it will be my purposes for how I employ my legs, thus purpose being properly tied to subjective desires. So "purpose" is not some objective phenomenon I have to divine...how!??? Purpose is related to my desires. I can KNOW my conscious desires and intent so purpose is not (in principle) an inscrutable mystery, nor does it lend itself to disagreements over any number of possible Final Causes. (With a caveat that I'll get into later if need be).

    Cont'd...

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  61. dguller...

    (cont'd)

    But when you try to make "purpose" ALSO an objective phenomenon, some objective quality you have to somehow uncover in any entity, then you get into all the conceptual trouble one sees from Thomists here. As I said, if one is to INFER the Final Cause/Purpose of an entity via observation, then you've got a real problem. You can't start assuming the final cause. You can't START with your "ought" because that would be assuming what you are supposed to be inferring.

    Rather, it appears you have to start with a bunch of descriptions: The leg is shaped this way. It moves that way and not this way. It's bones and tendons allow it to move this way. Etc. And then...whoa...you get a value claim: "therefore it OUGHT to be used only X way." And no one is providing why one ought to accept that leap. Further, descriptive statements can be given for any number of things a leg can do:

    A leg can facilitate walking.
    A leg can facilitate kicking a ball.
    A leg can facilitate kicking someone in the face.

    Etc.

    How does one go from any PARTICULAR descriptive sentence to which one describes the Final Cause and hence on to the value statement of what one "ought" to do? WHICH description is the Final Cause and what is the method for deciding?

    This is a basic question such a theory SHOULD be able to answer. Yet when I ask these questions, I get really, really poor answers that clearly fail to demonstrate the Thomist isn't being arbitrary, special pleading or question-begging, or saying "it's obvious."

    Replies in the form of "go away and read a book on it" or "you don't understand Thomistic theory" amount only to admissions of defeat. I'm asking not "Tell me EVERYTHING about Thomistic theory." If that were the case, yes I'd read tomes on Thomism. Rather, since the world is full of competing religious claims, most of which suck that I've looked at, I'm asking "Can you give me an INDICATION as to why I ought to think there is anything of worth in Thomistic arguments for God, morality etc?" As I keep pointing out, this question can be answered for many very complex theories, so the complexity of a theory is not in of itself a barrier to being able to give SOME argument for it's value. Yet looking at how a Thomist answers some basic questions can bring to light the reasoning involved, and illuminate whether it looks promising or not. So far, and even from examples I've seen from Feser, the answer is a resounding NO. In fact, it's getting pretty clear just how a Thomist can come to believe absurdities. But...I'm still in the middle of the dialogue so....

    Do you agree/disagree with any of this?

    Cheers.

    RH.

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  62. I didn’t say that it did. But the process of fashioning that argument – “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number” - is empirical – by Hume’s definition – which, by definition, is “relying on or derived from observation or experiment”.

    Hume's attempt to place math amidst the empirical sciences does not make math empirical. You are, by your very nature, making an argument from authority here (i.e. "Hume says so, so there!!!!"), and you would need to prove that Hume was some sort of universally acknowledged expert on mathematics uniquely qualified to change its classification.

    Unfortunately for you, he wasn't even a leading mathematical authority in his day, so you need to give us something more than "Hume! Hume! There is a way out!" (major bonus points for anyone that can work that reference out) for your argument to have any merit.

    As for the second part, merely trying to create an infinite regress by claiming "But how can you reason without observing your reasoning, it must be empirical!!!" is not really any better. Because you've essentially either defined empiricism out of existence, or created a new empirical standard where scientific verification isn't necessary (which amounts to the same thing). Because math needs no scientific confirmation, and if "empiricism" needs no scientific confirmation, what's the point?

    Claiming that math is somehow unique in this Empiricalverse is just special pleading, because you would need to make a metaphysical argument to support the notion, which by your own claims can't ever be true.

    What's really at stake here is the uselessness of Hume's proposition and its even more rigid adoption by the gnu herd. If even the smallest point of philosophy is granted, then you'd all need to get better educated, which defeats the point of gnu's anti-rationalism.

    Lastly, is it that fucking difficult to spell Munro. Not only is that the proper, and original, spelling of the name, it's the easist bloody way to spell it. It's not like I'm using the Gaelic version of my surname (Mac An Rhothaich), that'd be a tough one even for me to get right all the time. But Munro? Even a gnu should be able to manage that.

    Oh, and this time the captcha is pierlogi. Awesome.

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  63. RH,

    You seem to be hung up on the word "purpose", and on the definition of "good". From the Thomisitic viewpoint "purpose" just means "directedness", a tendency of a thing to naturally behave in a certain way. One can see this, actually, within a purely naturalistic framework. Two particles having mass will naturally tend to be attracted toward one another; likewise two particles having opposite charges. This is a "directedness", a tendency "toward"something. This is what is meant by final causation. Now, a theist will also see this as a "purpose", in the sense that God created the world to be this way, but this is putting the cart before the horse; one must accept the existence of God before seeing these tendencies or final causes as being purposes.

    If one accepts essentialism (and there are no good arguments against it IMHO), then everything has a nature, and tends to act in accordance to that nature. The Thomist would say that the "good" is simply things acting according to their nature, which it does by final causation.

    Now, you ask, how do we know what the nature of a thing is (its final cause or causes)? The answer is: by simple empirical observation. It is the nature of cats to hunt for prey, for example, which we can discern by observing cats in the wild. This is not that hard to figure out in many cases.

    I do have to say that I share your concerns about natural law ethics. As I understand it, the Thomist would argue that anything that thwarts the final cause or nature of a thing is wrong. Perhaps some of the Thomists here can correct me, but if this is so then it seems to lead to nonsensical results. Is it wrong for me to mow my lawn, since the final cause of grass involves flowering and producing seeds, which I am preventing by mowing it? Is it wrong for me to shave, since the final cause of the hair follicles on my face is to grow a beard, which I am thwarting by shaving my face? I suspect Thomists would say no, but I’m not sure the justification for this through natural law. Perhaps someone here could help me with this.

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  64. Jake:

    Now, you ask, how do we know what the nature of a thing is (its final cause or causes)? The answer is: by simple empirical observation. It is the nature of cats to hunt for prey, for example, which we can discern by observing cats in the wild. This is not that hard to figure out in many cases.

    But what you are calling “the nature” of something is just a single type of behavior that a being can perform. It would also be the nature of cats to sleep, lick themselves, meow, mate, and so on. No-one objects to the idea that there are a number of possible behavioral outcomes that a cat can perform. The issue is picking just one as THE final end of the cat to which all others are subservient.

    Perhaps some of the Thomists here can correct me, but if this is so then it seems to lead to nonsensical results.

    I agree with you there. We inevitably thwart the final ends of many beings in the course of satisfying our own ends, and this includes other human beings. That was one of the critiques that Kierkegaard offered against Kant’s categorical imperative, which ultimately made it impossible to follow, i.e. because we are inevitably and constantly violating it no matter how hard we try.

    I suppose that a Thomist could reply that some ends are higher than others, and so it is okay for a human being to put their needs above the needs of grass, for example, or hair follicles. I’m not too sure how one could argue this, especially since human beings are utterly dependent upon a complex and interconnected web of interactions with “lower” organisms, and could not exist without them, which kind of makes us inferior to them. In other words, there are always senses in which we are superior to other organisms, but other senses in which we are inferior to them. Another example is how resilient cockroaches are to annihilation, or how rapidly bacteria reproduce a population that has been devastated. Who is to say who is superior or inferior here?

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  65. Jake,

    As I've said before here, I am aware that a Thomist will make distinctions between the "purpose/directedness" of non-sentient entities, vs purpose of agents. I'm still saying that they ultimately import teleologogy in a way that messes everything up.

    First:

    If one accepts essentialism (and there are no good arguments against it IMHO), then everything has a nature, and tends to act in accordance to that nature.

    Yes, that is what I have said of natures. But as I mentioned also, a nature is ANYTHING an entity does/can do, and any of our concepts of an entity's nature will be descriptive (and open to revision) not prescriptive. So the point is an entity's nature is ALL that it does, not some arbitrary selection of one or several of it's characteristics.

    So....

    "Two particles having mass will naturally tend to be attracted toward one another; likewise two particles having opposite charges. This is a "directedness", a tendency "toward"something. This is what is meant by final causation."

    The problem is that the Thomist apparently wants to SELECT a PARTICULAR description from among many possible as the Final Cause, rather than view something's nature holistically.

    A particle may have the tendency of being attracted in situation A, but may have the tendency of being repelled in situation B. So which is it's "final cause?" And the more descriptive statements of behavior you can give, the greater the variety of ways in which any entity "behaves," makes it al the more difficult for selecting ONE or only SOME of those descriptive statements as it's "nature/purpose/final cause."

    This is why I gave the example of mouths and legs. I would say that the nature of a leg comprises ALL the things a leg is or can do. To say "it is not the nature of a leg that it can be used for kicking" would be ridiculous. But the Thomist wants only SOME descriptive statements to count toward inferring the nature/purpose of a leg. I supplied a bunch of descriptive statements about legs: I want the Thomist to show his non-arbitrary, cogent method of selecting from from descriptive statements you get a thing's Nature/Final Cause and also hence a virtue.

    So what you've just written isn't helpful in getting such answers, as much as I appreciate it.

    The Thomist would say that the "good" is simply things acting according to their nature, which it does by final causation.

    Yup. And I've explained why that doesn't make sense, given that it makes more sense (both conceptually and in explaining human experience) to think of a nature as ANYTHING an entity does/can do, it therefore is impossible that anything "could" act against it's nature.
    Hence to say anything "ought" to act in accordance with it's nature is incoherent, and derives from conceptual confusion.

    RH

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  66. captainzman said, quoting ...

    " 'How do you determine legs are for walking and not for playing soccer, football, skating, ballet etc? Certainly legs *can* locomote humans. They can also kick someone's ass quite efficiently as well. The problem is you can't start with what they "ought" to do, since that begs the question. So you have to start by observing what they DO, or can do, or can facilitate...and THEN move to "ought." But the problem is legs CAN facilitate any number of options. Same with lips. Same with sex organs.'

    If you can't look at legs and determine that they are for walking, then I honestly don't know how I can help you. ..."


    It's the character of remarks such as Captainzman is quoting and then replying to, that make me doubt the seriousness of the person originally posting them.

    Whatever one thinks of the concept of teleology, or even Mayr's teleonomy, to suggest that the game of soccer and walking are logically equivalent when it comes to an analysis of the "function" of legs, is to suggest a patent absurdity; since the former example of a capacity involving legs is contingent upon the latter. The examples of ballet and soccer are simply exercises - wise or unwise, ordinate or not - of a more fundamental capacity.


    To suggest otherwise is the equivalent of denying that the olfactory sense is "for", at least proximately, registering odors because to assert that it is so (this view assumes), would be the logical equivalent of saying its function was for the purpose of enjoying flower gardens.

    According to that line of reasoning since the organism does not have a sense of smell in order to enjoy the scent of roses, it does not have a sense of smell in order to detect scents and ultimately preserve the organism.

    Guess it's all just a matter of flows, eh?

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  67. @E. H. Munro (correct spelling):

    The crank talk of mathematics being at bottom an empirical discipline is necessary to support the irrational adherence to scientism. The argument (and I am being generous here) is a version of the argument from incredulity and nothing more than an empiricist prejudice.

    I dare say that none of the gnu atheists here, has even the faintest idea of what mathematicians do, has ever read a research paper much less published one, has ever read a book on modern mathematics (functional analysis, topology, differential geometry, what have you), or attended a mathematical seminar. Their "argument" is an "argument" from ignorance, which doing any of the above would dispel as the nonsense that it really is.

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  68. RH, if I was attacking a straw man, then the real man must be a scarecrow. These criticisms are inept, because they betray a fundamental misunderstanding of what Christians believe. We do not believe that Jesus is some kind of "moral teacher" like Confucius. His primary significance is not his moral teaching, and the purpose of the incarnation was not to set humanity straight about ethics. Thus, any argument to the effect that He was a sub-optimal moral teacher is just irrelevant to the question of whether Christianity is true. His chief mission was not instructional but redemptive, and so it matters very little whether he is "on record" condemning slavery, or necrophilia, or any of the other moral pathologies that humans succumb to. So to point out that he "could have" condemned slavery but didn't is simply irrelevant to whether Christianity is true. The only way these criticisms could have any force is if Christians were committed to the belief that Jesus's primary mission was to teach us about morals. If that were the case, then the objection would have some force. But the overwhelming majority of Christians do not believe this. This is why it is such a frustrating objection. It projects an arbitrary claim onto Christianity, argues that this arbitrary claim is false, and concludes that Christianity must not be true.

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  69. @grodrigues:

    Absolutely. As I said earlier, if you seriously believe that mathematical truths are dependent upon sense experience, then this is knock down, irrefutable proof that you can't think philosophically and that you probably don't know much about math. I can't think of a single prominent philosopher, with the possible exception of J.S. Mill, who defends this naive, stupid-undergraduate-mistake conception of mathematics that these new atheists are defending. And what is so comical is that they don't even have to defend it in order to secure their position.

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  70. RH:

    To talk of the "purpose" of a rock, or a rock forming, or being blown by wind, does not make sense given it can have no desire or intent to form a purpose.

    But that is not the way that purpose is being used here. Purpose is being used in the sense of a particular directedness towards a specific outcome. For example, when you bang two metal balls together, the consequent outcome is for them to ricochet off one another into particular directions. That is the end of that interaction. They do not subsequently turn into flowers and puppies after colliding with one another. And that is the core point about final causes; namely, that there are specific possible outcomes that can be the result of the activity of beings. To say that there are no final causes would be to equally say that anything can happen, which would mean that we should be seeing chaos and anarchy all around us, and not the regularity and order that we do, in fact, observe.

    How does one go from any PARTICULAR descriptive sentence to which one describes the Final Cause and hence on to the value statement of what one "ought" to do? WHICH description is the Final Cause and what is the method for deciding?

    That is a fair criticism, and one that I find compelling. I have no problem with there a being’s nature being such that it has a limited number of possible behavioral outcomes, and that those possible outcomes are essentially its final ends. In that sense, they are certainly objective, and you have only to observe beings in the world to see what their possible behavioral outcomes are, and then you can conclude that they are part of their final ends.

    But you are correct that when we make the assumption that all of those final ends must be secondary to one Final End to rule them all, then you are stuck introducing subjective value judgments that compromise whatever objectivity your account began with.

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  71. DNW:

    to suggest that the game of soccer and walking are logically equivalent when it comes to an analysis of the "function" of legs, is to suggest a patent absurdity; since the former example of a capacity involving legs is contingent upon the latter. The examples of ballet and soccer are simply exercises - wise or unwise, ordinate or not - of a more fundamental capacity.

    To stick with legs for a moment, it is quite clear that there are a number of possible activities that legs are capable of, and that some activities presuppose others, as you have rightfully stated. When legs are immobile, then they can be used to support standing upright. When they are mobile, then they facilitate bodily movement, which can be for walking, running, and each of these can be for sports, ballet, and so on. I think that we can all agree upon that.

    I think that the problem arises when you face up to the fact that legs can be either mobile or immobile. So, if one was to choose just one final cause for legs, then it would have to be either one or the other category. Certainly, one cannot choose both at once, because they contradict one another, and that means that by actualizing one end (i.e. mobility), then one is necessarily thwarting the other (i.e. immobility).

    And I think that RH’s point is that choosing one end over another is ultimately a value judgment, and not based upon objective analysis of the situation. A case can be made for either end to be vital and useful, because there are circumstances where mobility is better than immobility (e.g. if being assaulted), and there are circumstances where immobility is better than mobility (e.g. meditation). How can one possibly decide which end is always to be preferred to the other, and thus be the Final End?

    I actually have no idea.

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  72. The crank talk of mathematics being at bottom an empirical discipline is necessary to support the irrational adherence to scientism. The argument (and I am being generous here) is a version of the argument from incredulity and nothing more than an empiricist prejudice.

    I've always found it funny that the gnus favourite philosopher was an anti-rationalist at heart. Funnier still given their pretensions of über-rationality. The funniest part is that since other atheists have turned on them for their intellectual philistinism they've been busy trying to craft unique new definitions of words so that they can declare a Webster's Win in every debate.

    That and, of course, seeing the continued misapplication of logical fallacies. For you gnus out there, what Ben has been doing is not making ad hominem fallacies, he's just been making fun of you. Let me give you an example of a proper ad hominem fallacy. "Don Jindra is a lunatic, so therefore his arguments about math are wrong." Because his lunacy isn't what makes him wrong about math.

    Now, if I were to say "Don Jindra's extreme fundamentalist nominalism tends to make him a little nutty when discussing certain subjects, like mathematics." I would not be committing an ad hominem fallacy but making an observation based on the sorts of things that he's written here.

    Lastly, were I to say something like "Don Jindra is attempting the intellectual equivalent of trying to shoehorn a square peg into a round hole by attempting to force mathematics into empirical science," I am simply making a statement of fact. Anyway, for your own sake, please, try to learn how to apply logical fallacies correctly. It's another one of those irritating habits that makes you look even worse.

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  73. @E.H. Munro

    Thank you.

    Sometimes I do go overboard (just ask poor dguller, sorry again BTW) BTW dguller is an Atheist RH & Steersman should listen too so they will be less Gnu & more rational.

    Of course I have completely written off djindra the man is a nut.

    Cheers all.

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  74. E.H. Munro said: Hume's attempt to place math amidst the empirical sciences does not make math empirical. You are, by your very nature, making an argument from authority here.

    Actually, I’m basing it on a number of very credible authorities as well as my own observations in turn based on having read more than a few books in modern mathematics. But one very important authority is simply one dictionary definition of empirical: Relying on or derived from observation or experiment. Hard to see how anything that humans – at least – do, think, say, or see that is not derived from observation. One well-known contributor to quantum physics – Eugene Wigner – went so far as to argue that "It was not possible to formulate the laws (of quantum theory) in a fully consistent way without reference to consciousness" – that is, to an observer. You may wish to argue that Platonic ideals have some independent reality, but it seems to me that absent some observer their value is pretty close if not identically equal to zero.

    And, more specifically:

    Mill's empiricism went a significant step beyond Hume in still another respect: in maintaining that induction is necessary for all meaningful knowledge including mathematics.

    And suggesting some deficiencies with Aristotle’s logic on which Thomism is apparently based as well as indicating the contributions of one credible mathematician to at least one version of empiricism:

    It is frequently noted that Aristotle's logic is unable to represent even the most elementary inferences in Euclid's geometry, but Frege's "conceptual notation" can represent inferences involving indefinitely complex mathematical statements.

    And as for Hume himself, one might suggest that he is likely to be a better horse than anything you have in your rather impoverished kingdom.

    ... which defeats the point of gnu's anti-rationalism.

    That’s a bit of a joke coming from someone who apparently stands on the dogmatic assertion as to the existence of some entity for which there is not a single solitary shred of solid, tangible, incontrovertible, unambiguous evidence. Nor much in the way of credible reason, all of which might reasonably be construed as irrational.

    Lastly, is it that fucking difficult to spell Munro. [sic]

    For a guy who apparently can’t talk about atheists without every second reference being “gnutard” you seem remarkably sensitive – overly sensitive, one might suggest – to an inadvertent misspelling of your name. You might want to reflect on the aphorism about glass houses. Particularly in light of your inability to acknowledge a rather more odious error on your part, i.e. your assertion that I was claiming that “Hyperbolic and elliptical geometry had ... need of empirical confirmation” – or to provide evidence of that claim even when specifically asked for it.

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  75. Steersman that we can know things by observation is not in dispute. That what we can know only by observation is the issue. One you have been dodging since you got here.

    Hume has been dismembered by ex-Atheists like Feser and Ascombie and Atheists like Stove.

    Get over it.

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  76. RH writes: "Hard to see how anything that humans – at least – do, think, say, or see that is not derived from observation."

    Tell me, then, what you observed that verified the infinity of the primes, or the truth of Fermat's Conjecture, or Godel's two incompleteness proofs, or that naive set theory is vulnerable to Russell's paradox. Put up or shut up: tell us what kind of experience would suffice to demonstrate that these mathematical propositions are true. And if you describe an "experience" of consciously performing the mental operations that are constitutive of the relevant deductions, then you deserve to be laughed out of the discussion, whether you realize it or not.

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  77. BTW Steersman have you even read the Scientism articles by Feser yet?

    Your arguments might be less of a joke if you would take the time to get informed.

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  78. grodrigues said: The crank talk of mathematics being at bottom an empirical discipline is necessary to support the irrational adherence to scientism.

    In your opinion. What chain of logic do you have to adduce that conclusion?

    I dare say that none of the gnu atheists here, has even the faintest idea of what mathematicians do …

    Seems like rather a large categorical statement, but as it seems to be a consequence of my various comments on empiricism and to provide a point of reference I am neither a gnu atheist – as I have taken pains to indicate – nor totally ignorant of “what mathematicians do”.

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  79. dguller,

    But that is not the way that purpose is being used here. Purpose is being used in the sense of a particular directedness towards a specific outcome.

    Yes I know that (excepting for the fact Thomists apparently believe God actually gives purpose to all things). The part you quoted was depicting MY concept of purpose. I already acknowledge that the Thomist has different applications. But the point is that the way Thomism approaches teleology seems to end in arbitrariness and conceptual incoherence or confusion, which seems traceable can back to it's initial assumptions (purpose/final cause/natural law).

    dguller,

    That is a fair criticism,

    Yup. And yet we are continually treated to the spectacle of Feser and his Thomistic followers (and many other theists) going on and on about New Atheist naivete, philosophical shallowness etc. You don't necessarily have to be a professional philosopher to tease out the liabilities of theistic concepts. Asking some basic questions can begin to show holes in a dubious system of reasoning.

    I've lost count how many times I've encountered theists who carry a great air of sophistication and erudition and who spend most of their time casting aspersions about atheist naivete. But when you pin these people down and actually get them to defend their beliefs, every time in my experience the bluff is called and they fair poorly. Reading each side's books is definitely one way to compare how we justify our beliefs. But more "real time" interaction where each of us can point out the fallacies as they are being made is also instructive. (That includes any poor arguments I might make, of course!)

    Is that the case here? Maybe. Maybe not. But the arrows are pointing that way at this time.

    RH

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  80. @RH
    >I've lost count how many times I've encountered theists who carry a great air of sophistication and erudition and who spend most of their time casting aspersions about atheist naivete.

    You refuse to read anything on the subject matter but sound bites and a one page review of 300 pages of material why shouldn't we treat such willful anti-intellectuality with naked contempt?

    You misunderstood what we mean by "purpose" and dguller corrected you. Instead of admitting your mistake your are clearly backtracking.

    dguller unlike you has read the material. He still has more to learn & read which no doubt he would be the first to own up to but he is open to learn. Unlike you he doesn't approach this with a Ready! Fire! Aim! mentality.

    That you can't admit this is madding.

    Grow up will ya!

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  81. dguller said...

    " DNW:

    ' ... to suggest that the game of soccer and walking are logically equivalent when it comes to an analysis of the "function" of legs, is to suggest a patent absurdity; since the former example of a capacity involving legs is contingent upon the latter. The examples of ballet and soccer are simply exercises - wise or unwise, ordinate or not - of a more fundamental capacity.'

    To stick with legs for a moment, it is quite clear that there are a number of possible activities that legs are capable of, and that some activities presuppose others, as you have rightfully stated. When legs are immobile, then they can be used to support standing upright."

    The organic function or use of healthy legs in an animal of our kind is mobility. They "can" only be used to stand up if they have the muscular capacity that healthy normally functioning legs have; otherwise they are mere anchors for mechanical braces or other devices intended to reproduce or mimic some secondary capacity. FDR had legs that he could not naturally walk with. Nor could he alternatively use these useless-for-walking legs for standing unaided.


    Destroy the muscles that make locomotion possible and your other "activity" disappears.

    The notion that human legs have an intrinsically table leg like function which is conceptually exclusive of, rather than resultant from, their normal ambulatory function, is to take an analogy predicated of an artifact and work backwards.

    "When they are mobile,"

    When aren't they? When they are restrained, disused, or malfunctioning?


    " then they facilitate bodily movement, which can be for walking, running, and each of these can be for sports, ballet, and so on. I think that we can all agree upon that.

    I think that the problem arises when you face up to the fact that legs can be either mobile or immobile."

    When they are truly immobile it is because of a defect.

    If you reflect on it for a moment you will recall that human legs cannot be used as immobile pedestals - the human being will simply collapse. Their function is movement, and walking and running are the words we most often apply to the manner of use.

    Healthy men can walk day in and day out for miles on their legs. Special precautions must be taken so that, machinists for example, do not suffer damage to their legs from subjecting them to hours of use as pedestals.


    " So, if one was to choose just one final cause for legs, then it would have to be either one or the other category. Certainly, one cannot choose both at once, because they contradict one another, and that means that by actualizing one end (i.e. mobility), then one is necessarily thwarting the other (i.e. immobility)."

    As you saw, my view is that they are not conceptually distinct functions. One follows, and its potential is predicated upon, the other function.

    " And I think that RH’s point is that choosing one end over another is ultimately a value judgment, and not based upon objective analysis of the situation. A case can be made for either end to be vital and useful, because there are circumstances where mobility is better than immobility (e.g. if being assaulted), and there are circumstances where immobility is better than mobility (e.g. meditation). How can one possibly decide which end is always to be preferred to the other, and thus be the Final End?

    I actually have no idea."


    Let's place the validity of the so-called fact-value dichotomy aside for a moment.

    And simply observe that if you wish to take that line of argument you are free to do so.

    Moral concepts though, then become nothing more than expressions of will in the service of fundamentally inexplicable or unjustifiable appetites or preferences.

    These are preferences which ex hypothesi cannot be themselves grounded on any basis other than their mere occurrences.

    The implications of that line of reasoning are rather interesting in themselves.

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  82. steersman: But, from the view of the former, I would then say that the axioms of Peano arithmetic are relying on or derived from observation, hence empirical.

    grodrigues: The crank talk of mathematics being at bottom an empirical discipline is necessary to support the irrational adherence to scientism.





    Steersman and the others seem to be saying that taking in the physical world by way of our senses is a necessary and sufficient condition for the development and formalization of concepts - "successor," "line," "point," "circle," "dimensionless," "object," "If P, then Q," "language," "being," etc. If we never had our five senses, we couldn't understand those concepts, and academic ventures such as mathematics wouldn't be able to get off the ground. Hence, the project of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics (and perhaps metaphysics in general) is bunk.


    Ok. Suppose that that's a fair representation. But then they have failed to take several essentials into account. One, they simply ignore the reality of the intellect, which is said to function in joint operation with the senses to produce concepts.

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/02/aristotle-and-frege-on-thought.html

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/11/andersons-pure.html (In the 9th paragraph or so is where he states the following:

    "To be sure, for Aristotle and the Scholastics there is nothing in the intellect that did not arise from the senses. But this does not entail the British empiricists’ thesis that concepts just are faint copies of sensations." )




    Secondly, and more to the point, once a sufficient set of basic concepts has been engendered within us, mathematics can proceed without any more concept-forming input from our senses. The five Peano axioms, which serve as the foundation of arithmetic, illustrate this:

    1. Zero is a number.

    2. If a is a number, the successor of a is a number.

    3. zero is not the successor of a number.

    4. Two numbers of which the successors are equal are themselves equal.

    5. (induction axiom.) If a set S of numbers contains zero and also the successor of every number in S, then every number is in S.

    Euclidean geometry is another particularly apt example. Reading Euclid's Elements would be a sure-fire way to see the total irrelevance of further concept-forming sensory input to the demonstration of more elaborate geometrical truths.


    Third, the view that all knowledge derives from the senses is not inimical to the project of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, but is in fact a tenet of it.

    As Dr. Feser has stated in the past,

    ...as an Aristotelian, Aquinas is committed to the view that all our knowledge, including knowledge of God, must derive from the senses.

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/11/anselms-ontological-argument.html


    Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God are not undermined in the least by the idea that all knowledge is derived from the senses.

    ---
    ---



    And lastly, the most egregious error: The failure to make a crucial distinction. Nothing within this subject - the subject of concept-formation - makes or implies any claims about or has anything whatsoever to do with the subject of whether the truths of mathematics are established by empirical verification. On that subject, there is no issue. The idea that empirical verification is what is being employed in a formal, elaborate mathematical demonstration is simply nonsense of the highest order. See Untenured's recent comments.

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  83. Bravo, Xerces. That was well-stated.

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  84. DNW,

    It's the character of remarks such as Captainzman is quoting and then replying to, that make me doubt the seriousness of the person originally posting them.

    That is the type of remark one sees from someone so beholden to his assumptions that he has trouble questioning them. So you don't seem to have grasped what is going on here.

    We both may converge on what legs are "for" in some sense. Just as we may converge on a moral premise like "one ought not rape" or whatever. One of the main issues is HOW ARE WE GETTING THERE? Breaking issues down to question basic assumptions is how this is done philosophically - which may look like "playing dumb" if you don't understand what is going on. And your dismissal of my questioning "obvious" inferences suggests you don't get this. Right now you are stuck on the obviousness of your assumptions and inferences. The question is whether you can defend how you got there, without liabilities springing into view.

    You are trying to get there in a way different from me.

    Your remark did nothing to answer the challenges I offered. As I keep pointing out, to infer a Final Cause/Nature/Purpose to an entity or object (e.g. human legs) you are stuck starting with descriptive statements. There are many descriptive statements that can be applied to legs. The question is WHAT IS YOUR non-arbitrary, non-question-begging method of selecting WHICH descriptive statements amount to the Final Cause/Purpose of a leg.

    You have not answered this.

    Whatever one thinks of the concept of teleology, or even Mayr's teleonomy, to suggest that the game of soccer and walking are logically equivalent

    You are smudging the question posed.

    "Legs facilitate walking"

    and

    "Legs facilitate playing soccer"

    Are equivalent in the respect that they are both DESCRIPTIVE of what legs can do. The question is what precisely is your method for selecting one descriptive statement as being a Final Cause and ultimately normative, over the other? No one has supplied an answer.
    MY system of inference doesn't suffer these problems; YOURS does, which is why I keep pressing the problem.

    RH

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  85. DNW,

    cont'd...

    when it comes to an analysis of the "function" of legs, is to suggest a patent absurdity; since the former example of a capacity involving legs is contingent upon the latter.

    So if X is contingent on Y, then X can not be the purpose/Final Cause?

    Uh-oh. Turns out the leg's ability to walk, or even move, is contingent on other things, such as
    the flow of blood, metabolic activity, and many other biological descriptions that are necessary to be in place for a leg to walk. So inferring from the reasoning you just supplied, it's a patent absurdity to suggest that walking could be confused as a final cause, given walking can be depicted as being contingent upon pumping blood/exhibiting metabolic activity in a leg.

    The examples of ballet and soccer are simply exercises - wise or unwise, ordinate or not - of a more fundamental capacity.

    But one can always appeal to other capacities so it begs the question to say one is "fundamental," as dguller has also pointed out to you. A leg has the capacity of playing soccer or doing a karate kick. But this is not a "fundamental capacity" according to you. So apparently a leg is not being used fundamentally when moved that way. But what are you going to choose? "Running?' Well, why isn't THAT just an exercise, contingent on the more fundamental capacity of walking. Will you choose "walking" as fundamental? Why isn't THAT just contingent on more fundamental features of the leg, like twitching, or crossing your legs, or even just standing. And then, on to further sub-questions raised above about all those capacities being contingent on further phenomena of our biology.

    You may THINK all this is obvious; what you can't seem to do is provide the reasoning that gets you there non-arbitrarily, especially if you are also importing value into the mix.

    You still have not answered the fundamental question of how you select from a series of descriptive statements, which ones are Final Cause and suddenly bring value judgements with them.

    RH

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  86. Ben Yachov said: Steersman, that we can know things by observation is not in dispute. That what we can know only by observation is the issue. One you have been dodging since you got here.

    I hardly think I’ve been doing any dodging since I think I’ve been very forthright in presenting why I think that observation is central, seminal, in the process of knowing – something you seem to have conceded with your earlier “After all Aristotle/Aquinas start their metaphysics and First Principles by trusting their senses and interpreting Being from there”.

    In addition “know” is “To perceive directly; grasp in the mind with clarity or certainty”, “To have experience of”. Seems to me that you’re trying to assert that it is possible to “grasp in the mind” without having a mind to grasp, that there is something other than “grasping in the mind”. And when I ask for an example of something that you know without that you ignore me or evade the question.

    Hume has been dismembered by ex-Atheists like Feser and Ascombie and Atheists like Stove.

    I ran across Stove awhile back and thought he had some interesting perspectives, although I remember being skeptical about his references to and support of Catholicism – though I also recollect wanting to read more of him which I may eventually do. But I also recollect thinking that ultimately his spleen got the better of him.

    BTW Steersman, have you even read the Scientism articles by Feser yet?

    Took a look at the page though haven’t had a chance to more than glance at it. But I did take a brief look at the Wikipedia article on the topic for an “unbiased” point of reference and can quite agree that science can become an ideology which can be problematic.Though I hardly think Feser’s arguments are likely to lead me to embrace Aristotelism, but I will take a look at them.

    Your arguments might be less of a joke if you would take the time to get informed.

    I’m working on it so quit bugging me; I'll let you know if and when I read sufficient to comment.

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  87. @Steersman:

    In a response to E. H. Munro you write:

    "But one very important authority is simply one dictionary definition of empirical: Relying on or derived from observation or experiment. Hard to see how anything that humans – at least – do, think, say, or see that is not derived from observation."

    Untenured directed his response to RH, by mistake I presume, so I will channel him and paste his questions here:

    "Tell me, then, what you observed that verified the infinity of the primes, or the truth of Fermat's Conjecture, or Godel's two incompleteness proofs, or that naive set theory is vulnerable to Russell's paradox. Put up or shut up: tell us what kind of experience would suffice to demonstrate that these mathematical propositions are true. And if you describe an "experience" of consciously performing the mental operations that are constitutive of the relevant deductions, then you deserve to be laughed out of the discussion, whether you realize it or not."

    "One well-known contributor to quantum physics – Eugene Wigner – went so far as to argue that "It was not possible to formulate the laws (of quantum theory) in a fully consistent way without reference to consciousness" – that is, to an observer."

    Pray, tell us, how is Wigner's observation related to the supposed empirical status of mathematics? Are you even aware of what he is in fact referring to?

    "You may wish to argue that Platonic ideals have some independent reality, but it seems to me that absent some observer their value is pretty close if not identically equal to zero."

    I am not a Platonist and most people here are neither. That you think we are Platonists is telling of your ignorance. That you think you can dismiss Platonism by an appeal to an empirical argument is laughable. Even if I were a staunch Formalist (which I am not), I would still call your talk as nothing but ignorance in display.

    To repeat Untenured, put up or shut up.

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  88. DNW,

    Let's make sure you are not begging the question and importing what you are supposed to be arguing for. I'm looking for the move from a descriptive statement to "that is it's nature/final cause...and what it OUGHT to do."

    The organic function or use of healthy legs in an animal of our kind is mobility.

    Now, if you mean by "function" something purely descriptive, then that's fine; you aren't begging the question. In other words we can say: That is how legs CAN be used. That is how they often ARE used. Descriptive statements.

    They "can" only be used to stand up if they have the muscular capacity that healthy normally functioning legs have; otherwise they are mere anchors for mechanical braces or other devices intended to reproduce or mimic some secondary capacity. FDR had legs that he could not naturally walk with. Nor could he alternatively use these useless-for-walking legs for standing unaided.

    Actually, all the rest from you are descriptive statements. I can supply some too:
    It's also descriptive to say that legs "CAN be used to kick someone to death."


    re legs being immobile:

    When aren't they? When they are restrained, disused, or malfunctioning?

    Careful. Again, to make sure you are not question-begging, we have to be clear that by "malfunctioning" you are not suggesting they are failing for a purpose - that's question begging. Rather, it would be another descriptive statement, for instance, "a leg whose nerve connection to the brain has been obstructed will not move in response to brain signals."

    Again...how are you selecting from all the possible descriptive statements to any particular final cause/purpose...let alone to a value?

    Their function is movement, and walking and running are the words we most often apply to the manner of use.

    They are also used for line dancing, soccer, fidgeting, and kicking people to death. How do we get from any of these descriptions of their use or capacity to THE purpose/final cause? Still waiting...

    Nowhere did your post resolve this issue.

    Cheers, and thanks for the discussion, sincerely!

    RH

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  89. @Xerces:

    In complete agreement. I would just add an extra tiny bit to make your points even more forceful: even though concepts can and are developed by way of our sense, there are also numerous concepts that are not so formed -- and while they can be codified or formalized with the aid of more basic concepts like numbers or sets, which are indeed informed by our experiences with the physical world, it is not necessary to do such reduction. As the set-theorist Mostowski remarked once in response to the extreme set-theoretical reductionism, "after all, I am not a set!". Even more, such primitive concepts as numbers and sets, can themselves be subject to refinement and reconceptualization by further mathematical work.

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  90. @Steersman,

    I'm the Anon who has been posting at you during the last two days. Sometimes I forgot to put my pseudonym. My apologies.
    Now, to your post:

    >Well then maybe you had better provide a definition for “empirical” as the one I quoted – “verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment” – seems perfectly valid and entirely consistent with the position that I’ve been arguing.

    Good, let's agree to that definition. It still doesn't make mathematics empirical, even if one grants that all of our knowledge begins with experience (check out the links below). That our conception of triangles could begin with observing triangular shapes in the natural world doesn't imply that everything we know about them is derived from observing particulars. We form an abstract concept of them and derive conclusions by putting things together in our heads without having to go out to the natural world for verification. To prove Pythagoras' theorem, knowing the general formulas for the areas of triangles and squares (which can be proven from pure reason) suffices. It is not necessary to go out observing or experimenting with particular triangles. Math is like this.


    >And what would be that distinction, particularly within the context of this discussion, of those propositions?

    Only in its relationship with a-priori/a-posteriori knowledge as introduced by Kant.

    Consider these propositions:

    1. All mothers are women
    2. All women are mothers

    You know that (1) is true because 'women' is entailed by 'mother'; propositions of that type are analytic. The second one is synthetic, because it requires knowing a state of affairs outside the subject of the proposition. Now, a-priori knowledge is the type of conceptual knowledge that is independent of any experience besides the language related to it, while a-posteriori isn't. Think about the four combinations (minus analytic a-posteriori, which is impossible) and you have Kant's blanda upp of rationalism and empiricism (he was trying to reconcile Hume with Leibniz). For Kant, mathematics is synthetic a-priori: the truth/falsity of its proposition doesn't depend on anything beyond the concepts of mathematics.

    (Clarification: I am not a Kantian, lol.)

    >And what was the basis for Quine’s distinction between empirical and quasi-empirical? [In 25 words or less – or at least that many paragraphs.]

    In reality it wasn't him (my bad), but Putnam following Quine's 'holistic' idea of knowledge. For him, mathematical discovery resembles empiricism as a source of knowledge before generalization. For example, before Fermat's last theorem was proved a decade ago, a lot of people had already tested the proposition with certain individual cases before the proof of generality was achieved. But empirical science is not like that, so its relationship with mathematics is merely a resemblance, hence the 'quasi'.

    >And don’t tell me I have to read 6 or 7 books – one of which is written by you – before I’m to be allowed to even hint at suggesting that I might want to ask those questions … ;-)

    Nah, man. I don't like doing that. But if you're up for reading something (it's all short!), Kant's notes on pure vs. empirical knowledge are great, and Quine's paper is nice. Cheers.

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  91. Untenured,

    First, you have misattributed a quote to me in one of your posts. No biggie.

    hese criticisms are inept, because they betray a fundamental misunderstanding of what Christians believe.

    Sorry, but you can't speak for what "Christians Believe" because there are tens of thousands of sects with conflicting beliefs and competing claims about the nature of Christianity, God and God's word.

    YOU may not look to Christ for moral guidance, but to suggest that "Christians" don't look to Jesus for moral instruction is patently absurd. I've seen Christians do it all the time. "Christ said we ought to treat the poor like this," "Christ said we ought to treat one another like that"
    "Christ's behavior gives us this example to lead."

    Further, many, many Christians I've talked to like to disavow the morality of the OT God by appealing to Christ as their moral example - as the "fullest expression" of God's moral teachings.

    Not everyone is a Thomist, and many Christians DO look to Christ as exemplifying moral "goods" that are "good" in the way most of us understand and use the word (vs some abstraction born of Final Cause arguments).

    So...speak for yourself. A lot of Christians will speak for themselves.

    "The only way these criticisms could have any force is if Christians were committed to the belief that Jesus's primary mission was to teach us about morals."

    No, they have force insofar as a Christian wants to claim God to be a Good, Compassionate and Rational Being in any way analogous to how we normally understand those concepts. And despite what some Thomistic proponents might say, MUCH if not MOST of Christianity does so, including Catholics that I've seen in their non Thomistic-apologetic moments. (I've been discussing these issues with Christians of all stripes for decades, and this has been a consistent theme, whether YOU tow that line or not).

    This is why it is such a frustrating objection. It projects an arbitrary claim onto Christianity, argues that this arbitrary claim is false, and concludes that Christianity must not be true.

    It's not arbitrary - it follows from the ways many Christians themselves talk of God, and how they offer "evidence" of God's "goodness," compassion etc, which is almost always clearly supposed to be consonant with how we use those terms with each other.

    Now, YOU may want to believe in a God that is irrational or evil or simply amoral...if that's a way to say "this doesn't apply to my beliefs." But that brings with it it's own problems we could discuss. (Yes, I know you would still want to call God "good" ...I don't think you can make it a defensible proposition).

    So it's not a straw man when the argument does in fact pertain to the God many Christians actually believe in - A Rational, Good, Compassionate God. And those virtues imply actions - and what God both includes in his moral commands, and excludes are grounds to say "This does not indicate we are in the presence of a rational, moral Being, let alone the The Most Rational, Moral Being."

    RH

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  92. @RH & @grodrigues:

    Sorry, RH. My rant about math wasn't supposed to be directed at you. But that is what I wrote, whether I really meant it or not, and so I give you my apology. You didn't say the stupid thing I accused you of saying.

    I'll say something in response to your counterarguments when I have time, which I do not have at the moment.

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  93. @Steersman

    >I’m working on it so quit bugging me; I'll let you know if and when I read sufficient to comment.

    Quit putzing around about it. Both article are about 6 pages and straight forward. Plus they have nothing to do with treating science as a religion.

    Stop guessing and make an empirical observation for once.

    Read them! Geez!!! It's like pulling teeth.

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  94. @RH
    >Sorry, but you can't speak for what "Christians Believe" because there are tens of thousands of sects with conflicting beliefs and competing claims about the nature of Christianity, God and God's word.

    But Catholics don't believe any of the other sects are true. There is only One True Church. The words you just wrote above I myself have written to many a Protestant.

    Besides if Untenured can't speak for Christianity you can't speak neither can you thus by definition any interpretation you give is equally meaningless.

    Jesus didn't come primary as a Mortal Teacher. I agree 100%. He taught us morals of course but the bulk of Tradition teaches us he was sent primarily to redeem mankind.

    Even if I denied God I would find your argument lame.

    >No, they have force insofar as a Christian wants to claim God to be a Good, Compassionate and Rational Being in any way analogous to how we normally understand those concepts.

    Only if you believe in a false Theistic Personalist "god" who doesn't exist in the first place and we Classic Theists laugh at loudly and with great cruelty.

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  95. What I mean is, if you already know with approximately or exactly 100% certainty that your wife will not become pregnant if you have sex with her at time X, would it then be morally wrong to have sex with her at time X, even if (1)you fully intend on having children with her one day, you know that it would be financially irresponsible to have a child 9 months after time X, and/or some other comparable scenario, and (2) having sex with her at time X is done in the service of solidifying the marital bond of love between you and her?

    My apologies if I was unclear, but no, it is not morally wrong to have sex with you wife in either case.

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  96. "That’s a bit of a joke coming from someone who apparently stands on the dogmatic assertion as to the existence of some entity for which there is not a single solitary shred of solid, tangible, incontrovertible, unambiguous evidence. Nor much in the way of credible reason, all of which might reasonably be construed as irrational."

    I see we're back at square one, with still no answer to the question that's been posed multiple times. Do you have "solid, tangible, incontrovertible, unambiguous evidence" for your claim that all knowledge can only be known empirically?

    BTW My word verification is 'sabity'. I win.

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  97. Actually, I’m basing it on a number of very credible authorities as well as my own observations in turn based on having read more than a few books in modern mathematics.

    So far your credible authorities have been non-mathematicians who couldn't begin to understand modern math. And their attempts to recast mathematics as empirical sciences are scoffed at by actual mathematicians, so appealing to Mill and Hume is actually a fallacious argument from authority.

    But one very important authority is simply one dictionary definition of empirical: Relying on or derived from observation or experiment. Hard to see how anything that humans – at least – do, think, say, or see that is not derived from observation.

    The problem is that you're using "observe" in two distinct fashions, if you're going to claim math as empirical based on the precept that one needs to observe ones own logic then you can't go back and insist on the standard, accepted usage of empirical. If math is empirical based on this claim, then everything is empirical and you can no longer demand that claims be tested, because math can't be tested.

    You can't have this both ways, you need to pick one. If math is empirical, then so is classical theology, and you can't demand that the claims be "tested empirically" because you can't do it in the traditional sense of the term with math either. Your only other option is to make a special pleading for math being unique, but you're making a metaphysical argument which is impossible by your very own standards.

    And as for Hume himself, one might suggest that he is likely to be a better horse than anything you have in your rather impoverished kingdom.

    You're making some assumptions here, combined with the usual lame insults. I'm not actually a thomist, I started coming here to learn about it, and did so after reading neuroscientist Walter Freeman's paper Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas. That was how my interest in Aquinas was piqued.

    That’s a bit of a joke coming from someone who apparently stands on the dogmatic assertion as to the existence of some entity for which there is not a single solitary shred of solid, tangible, incontrovertible, unambiguous evidence. Nor much in the way of credible reason, all of which might reasonably be construed as irrational.

    Could you point out an instance of this "dogmatism"? As you haven't even bothered to check you're obviously unaware just how hilarious you sound about now (hint, though I was indeed born a Catholic, I am not actually a Catholic).

    I would hold in scorn anyone that thought they had empirical proof of a metaphysical proposition, just as I hold in scorn people that can't differentiate between metaphysical and empirical claims. So the first part of your claim is nonsense. As is the second part, because there are actually are logical reasons to think that god exists, just as there are logical reasons to think that god doesn't. People of good conscience can actually engage in logical arguments and disagree with each other's conclusions without resorting to the "UR IRATIONAL!!!!" (sic) nonsense. I don't think you're anti-rational because you're an atheist, I think you're anti-rational because you've continuously expressed contempt for knowledge in this very thread.

    For a guy who apparently can’t talk about atheists without every second reference being “gnutard” you seem remarkably sensitive – overly sensitive, one might suggest – to an inadvertent misspelling of your name.

    Could you find the word "gnutard" in this thread? I do use the term for the people that deserve it, but certainly not every second sentence. And as you've spelled my name in a few different ways, none of them correct, I can certainly infer that your empirical skills, by your own expressed standards, aren't very good.

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  98. Ben Yachov said: But Catholics don't believe any of the other sects are true.

    What a freaking joke, a bloody thigh slapper. And each of the other some 38,000 sects says virtually the same thing about the other 37,000 odd sects – including Catholicism. So you – and every other one – are outnumbered 37,999 to 1.

    Each having the “one and only true, divine, inspired, fundamental, literal, real, one-dollar-the-bottle elixir of sweet-and-bleeding Jesus Christ” [and none genuine without this signature].

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  99. If things can have multiple final causes, then sex is not necessarily ultimately about procreation.

    I think that you have resolved this difficulty altogether, which only emerges if there is supposed to be a single final cause for everything.

    Thanks!


    Well, the problem with this is that everything we know about biology points towards procreation as the final cause. It also seems to be problematic to me on account that even if you grant, let's say, exchange of affection as another final cause, there's no reason why you shouldn't satisfy both final causes. Procreation does not preclude affection, but something like sodomy does preclude procreation.

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  100. BenYachov,

    But Catholics don't believe any of the other sects are true. There is only One True Church. The words you just wrote above I myself have written to many a Protestant.

    Unfortunately for you, whether you believe your sect to be true or not, you don't get to define the word "Christian." Whether you look to dictionary definitions or common parlance, or the use of the term by the other sects, the term is beyond your reach to redefine as only pertaining to Thomistic Catholics. Argue about doctrine, God's message, God's nature or what have you.
    But you don't own the word.

    Therefore you can't speak for all Christians to define what Christianity "is" if that excludes all the other Christians.

    Besides if Untenured can't speak for Christianity you can't speak neither can you thus by definition any interpretation you give is equally meaningless.

    Untenured can reasonably speak for HIS Christian beliefs and those who may share them.
    But not for all of Christianity on the behalf of "Christianity" to the extent he makes claims other Christians don't accept.

    I can speak of MY secular beliefs and those who may share them. But not for all secular people to the extent I would be making claims on behalf of "secularism" other secular people don't accept.

    That's why I don't claim to speak for secularism, but I represent my beliefs and can speak for anyone else who happens to share the particular view I'm defending.

    I already pointed out that the argument rejected by Untenured pertained to those Christians who held to a certain conception of God, hence it is no straw-man. There IS good reason why the argument exists and circulates.
    Thomism is not the whole world.

    To the extent the Thomist claims to reject a God morally, rationally analogous to our use of moral and rational concepts, that only introduces other problems.

    RH

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  101. dguller:

    I suppose that a Thomist could reply that some ends are higher than others, and so it is okay for a human being to put their needs above the needs of grass, for example, or hair follicles. I’m not too sure how one could argue this, especially since human beings are utterly dependent upon a complex and interconnected web of interactions with “lower” organisms, and could not exist without them, which kind of makes us inferior to them. In other words, there are always senses in which we are superior to other organisms, but other senses in which we are inferior to them. Another example is how resilient cockroaches are to annihilation, or how rapidly bacteria reproduce a population that has been devastated. Who is to say who is superior or inferior here?

    This is where the soul comes into play. Different kinds of things have different kinds of souls. Trees, for instance, are only capable of reproduction and growth. Animals do this as well, but have mobility and sensation. Humans have all of this as well, plus the intellect. Natural rights, or limitations on we interact with others, only applies to other rational beings. Grass, for instance, does not have the right to be left alone. This is not to say that we can do whatever we want, like torture animals or stick them in factory farms, only that animals don't have rights.

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  102. >What a freaking joke, a bloody thigh slapper. And each of the other some 38,000 sects says virtually the same thing.

    And if you want engage them individually that is fine but this blog is run by a Catholic. Most of the people here are Catholic (with some exceptions) and St Thomas was a Catholic. So deal with Catholicism and enough of the one size fits all simple mind Gnu anti-Fundamentalist Protestant polemics.

    Kay?

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  103. Thomism is not the whole world.

    No it isn't. So what? It's the philosophy espoused on this site. Criticize it. And if someone claims something in general about Christianity, once it's understood that someone is looking through a Thomistic lens at revelation, get past it, and criticize it on that basis.

    If he can't define the word "Christian," then you don't get to define the word "atheist."

    This is all a red herring. The moment you allow that you can speak for someone else, you've allowed that anyone else can speak for someone else. Just like Untenured. It's completely irrelevant how many people hold a position if your opponent doesn't hold to it.

    So quit playing games and deal with a particular argument, so some real argumentation can take place.

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  104. Steersman,

    All of those 30,000+ sects - except the ones located on the extreme fringe - affirm the Apostle's Creed.

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  105. Captainzman,

    (Sorry if this is butting in, but since it's the same topic).

    Well, the problem with this is that everything we know about biology points towards procreation as the final cause.

    Ok. Maybe it's time for a game of "doing shots" every time someone here begs the question :-)

    It also seems to be problematic to me on account that even if you grant, let's say, exchange of affection as another final cause, there's no reason why you shouldn't satisfy both final causes.

    No Thomist here has established even why you "should" do X, let alone why you "shouldn't"
    do both X and Y.

    Procreation does not preclude affection,

    But it precludes many, many other things when you are doing it. Like walking, running, often standing or any number of final causes that will be frustrated/precluded during Procreation.
    Or..is it ok to satisfy one desire at a time?

    but something like sodomy does preclude procreation.

    But not affection. If affection is a final cause, why can't it be reached by non-procreation
    activities? Surely you are fine with any numbers of displays of affection that do not
    happen during, or imply procreation.
    And when we are engaging in various acts of affection, we can surely point to other Final Causes that are being restricted. Very often we have to choose between which of various possible Final Causes we will fulfill.

    So saying sodomy may be frusterating another Final Cause doesn't seem to be an answer.

    Further, you could follow sodomy with procreation. Then sodomy no more "precludes" procreation than procreation is "precluded" when preceded by a massage, or kiss, or ball room dancing, or...

    But, again, even this is all skipping ahead, when no one has shown me a viable method for how you select which descriptive statements are to be a purpose/final cause.

    RH

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  106. RH said: Whether you look to dictionary definitions or common parlance, or the use of the term by the other sects, the term is beyond your reach to redefine as only pertaining to Thomistic Catholics. Argue about doctrine, God's message, God's nature or what have you. But you don't own the word.

    Good points. That would be like a poodle arguing it wasn’t a dog because it couldn’t herd sheep like a collie.

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  107. RH:

    Unfortunately for you, whether you believe your sect to be true or not, you don't get to define the word "Christian."

    Wait, why not? The Catholic Church is not just another denomination, it is the original Christian institution from which all those denominations originated through separation. What you are saying is kind of like saying the United States government cannot define who is or who is not a citizen. We have very precise definitions for who is a "Christian" or a "Catholic."

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  108. Anonymous said: Steersman, All of those 30,000+ sects - except the ones located on the extreme fringe - affirm the Apostle's Creed.

    And by some indications many of those sects seem to subscribe to “Theistic Personalism” – which I’ve been informed has been virtually anathematized as heresy in the Catholic Church – makes the question of the interpretation of the Apostle’s Creed of some relevancy. But it seems one might be forgiven for being skeptical of how serious the Church is about that position.

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  109. @Rh

    First I will always follow Catholic rules. As to your personal rules as to how I should define my religion or how Christianity gets defined I say Get lost! Your not my boss, Father Confessor or Pope. So there.

    What insulting arrogance!

    You are so irrational and emotional at this point you are contradicting yourself.

    You wrote:
    >Unfortunately for you, whether you believe your sect to be true or not, you don't get to define the word "Christian."

    and you also wrote:
    >Untenured can reasonably speak for HIS Christian beliefs and those who may share them.

    So which is it? Untenured can't speak for his beliefs if they contradict your interpretation because not every Christian agrees with him but I can't say God set up a single church that speaks for Christianity because that is wrong because Untenured can speak for his own beliefs?

    Huh? WTF?

    >But not for all of Christianity on the behalf of "Christianity" to the extent he makes claims other Christians don't accept.

    RH logically you have to deal with what people objectively believe not what you wish they believed to make your lame arguments successful Ad Hoc. Your one size fits all approach to anti-religious polemics is irrational.

    Now historically the bulk of Tradition agrees with Untenured. Jesus came primarily to redeem mankind not to give us moral guidance.

    If you doubt this then the burden of proof is on you to show us historically that this is what Christianity taught. We are the Christians we know our religion. You are the outsider & clearly don't know shit.

    But all the Church Fathers, the Eastern Fathers and even the so called Reformers said what Untenured has said.

    Your arrogant ignorant nonsense to the contrary not withstanding.

    >I already pointed out that the argument rejected by Untenured pertained to those Christians who held to a certain conception of God, hence it is no straw-man.

    But then by definition you are admitting your argument is trivial since it doesn't by your own admission address all of Christian thought or all the beliefs of Christians. It's certainly isn't an argument for Atheism or Secularism since if successful a Christian can adopt a more orthodox form of Christianity. It doesn't entail Atheism.

    It's not hard genius.

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  110. Good call Josh!

    RH you are clueless!

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  111. DNW:

    The notion that human legs have an intrinsically table leg like function which is conceptually exclusive of, rather than resultant from, their normal ambulatory function, is to take an analogy predicated of an artifact and work backwards.

    You may be right, but have not demonstrated this. The fact that whether one is standing still or moving requires muscular contraction is not a particularly salient point unless you are trying to say that the final cause of the legs is to contract their muscles, whether to stay at rest or to move?

    If you reflect on it for a moment you will recall that human legs cannot be used as immobile pedestals - the human being will simply collapse. Their function is movement, and walking and running are the words we most often apply to the manner of use.

    Not at all. All I said was that the legs are immobile. As I mentioned above, leg immobility is due to muscular contraction of leg muscles. I was not claiming that they are pedestals at all.

    All your points are salient for leg muscles and not for legs per se. I was talking about legs, though.

    The implications of that line of reasoning are rather interesting in themselves.

    I actually concede the possibility that a natural law framework is plausible. What I think does not follow from this is whether we can actually decipher what the final causes of things are.

    Here’s an analogous situation. Take the three body problem and Newtonian mechanics. The mechanics is correct, but we cannot calculate the motion of three bodies interacting with one another with much precision, because of multiple complicating factors in the situation. But, the framework is still correct, though.

    Similarly, maybe a natural law framework is correct. It may still be impossible to use it in a pragmatic fashion, because of our cognitive limitations.

    Any thoughts?

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  112. Captainzman:

    Well, the problem with this is that everything we know about biology points towards procreation as the final cause.

    Actually, evolutionary biology is more about the hereditary transmission of genes, and not necessarily about procreation. Self-sacrificing behavior to save one’s family, even if one has no children, will increase the probability of gene transmission, even if the sacrificed individual had no children of their own.

    It also seems to be problematic to me on account that even if you grant, let's say, exchange of affection as another final cause, there's no reason why you shouldn't satisfy both final causes. Procreation does not preclude affection, but something like sodomy does preclude procreation.

    Fair enough. But maybe it is all about affection? Why should procreation take priority over affection?

    This is where the soul comes into play. Different kinds of things have different kinds of souls. Trees, for instance, are only capable of reproduction and growth. Animals do this as well, but have mobility and sensation. Humans have all of this as well, plus the intellect. Natural rights, or limitations on we interact with others, only applies to other rational beings. Grass, for instance, does not have the right to be left alone. This is not to say that we can do whatever we want, like torture animals or stick them in factory farms, only that animals don't have rights.

    First, why does having a rational intellect make humans superior to animals, for example? Why is having understanding such an important thing? What if our capacity for understanding results in our annihilation by nuclear war or climate change? Is it still so amazing?

    Second, why shouldn’t we torture animals if they do not have rights?

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  113. Ben Yachov said: And if you want engage them individually that is fine but this blog is run by a Catholic. Most of the people here are Catholic (with some exceptions) and St Thomas was a Catholic. So deal with Catholicism and enough of the one size fits all simple mind Gnu anti-Fundamentalist Protestant polemics. Kay?

    That would be fine and dandy were it not for the problematic nature and consequences of religion in general. Apropos of which I noticed in the Pew Forum report [Q.39c] that some 34% of the US population agree or mostly agree with the assertion that “religion causes more problems in society than it solves”.

    And if “Christians” can’t show more unanimity and coherence then, for one thing, that calls into question the credibility of all of them and, for another, suggests the reason why that large a percentage sees religion as they do – and why that is quite likely the case.

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  114. Josh,

    No it isn't. So what? It's the philosophy espoused on this site. Criticize it. And if someone claims something in general about Christianity, once it's understood that someone is looking through a Thomistic lens at revelation, get past it, and criticize it on that basis.

    If untenured simply made the claim "This argument does not pertain to THOMISTIC CHRISTIANITY for X reasons" then that would be fine, and we could discuss it.

    But he didn't say that: he made the same brazen proclamation we see from every other Christian Sect: He kept giving the impression he spoke for "Christianity" to let me know what "Christians really believe."

    E.g:

    "These criticisms are inept, because they betray a fundamental misunderstanding of what Christians believe...."

    Yet another version of "That's Not Christianity" as if his sect is to represent "what Christians believe." And Untenured used this to insinuate that the "meme" that circulates, the argument from the bible/slavery, is a mere straw-man, as if there were no actual existing Christian target hit by the argument. That's a very typical, slippery, disingenuous move to make it look like atheists are just making shit up to attack.

    You can represent what SOME Christians believe. Say that isn't what Thomist Christians believe or whatever. But don't fudge with language and say "Christians believe...", with the implication that the atheist's just have no idea what Christians believe, and that the argument doesn't address any Christian beliefs.

    If he can't define the word "Christian," then you don't get to define the word "atheist."

    As I replied to another person: I never claim to speak for all atheists. I don't make proclamations like "Atheists believe X" because I know atheists have different beliefs. I'll talk about my beliefs, and what I know to be the beliefs of certain groups of atheists. But I won't play disingenuous games by co-opting the term. If someone says Atheist's use a crazy argument that teaching your child your religion is child abuse" I'm not going to be disingenuous, co-opt the term "atheist" and say "Atheists say no such thing, that's a straw-man." No. Some atheists DO say that. It's a legitimate, existing target. Rather, I'd point out that such atheists don't speak for all atheists, and many of us would disagree.

    RH

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  115. dguller said: Fair enough. But maybe it is all about affection? Why should procreation take priority over affection?

    Good points. Maybe because “Jehovah” said “Be fruitful and multiply” [maybe that was really an injunction to develop and perform mathematics]: “As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined.”

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  116. That is a fair criticism, and one that I find compelling. I have no problem with there a being’s nature being such that it has a limited number of possible behavioral outcomes, and that those possible outcomes are essentially its final ends. In that sense, they are certainly objective, and you have only to observe beings in the world to see what their possible behavioral outcomes are, and then you can conclude that they are part of their final ends.

    The greeks understood the final cause for humans as eudamonia, or human flourishing, which can be understood as living or doing well, or what we might describe as our well-being. It is exactly the sort of choosing between different these different objectives that you mention.

    Now recall how Aristotle's understanding of the soul. A human is "good", in the sense that that the vegetative and sensitive aspects are healthy- he can see properly, he can digest food properly, etc.

    But the defining part of man is the intellect, the proper use of reason as "good", and this is what we think of as morally good. We can use reason to determine what the our proper ends, or what will result in our well-being in each aspect of our lives. In fact, we can't do otherwise. It is self-evident that whenever we act, we do it to pursue something we think is good or to avoid something we think is bad. The question of values is built in from the get-go, because we can look at such-and-such and using reason, determine what it will do for our well-being.

    Now, the real important question is "which values?" But I think the question is nonsense because...

    But you are correct that when we make the assumption that all of those final ends must be secondary to one Final End to rule them all, then you are stuck introducing subjective value judgments that compromise whatever objectivity your account began with.

    Assuming that values are subjective and do not correspond to anything objective completely wrecks any case for objective morality, and morality in general. If the statement "you should value human life" is just one among many attitudes, then we have nothing to say to a person who does not vale human life. It's one prejudice against another.

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  117. Josh,

    (forgot this)

    So quit playing games and deal with a particular argument, so some real argumentation can take place.

    There isn't remotely any way you can pretend I have not been dealing with particular arguments here.

    I have been giving arguments FOR my position, eliciting justifications from Thomists here, and have been analysing and arguing against those justifications...in detail.

    Why bother stooping to writing as if my efforts are invisible to you?

    RH

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  118. captainzman said: Assuming that values are subjective and do not correspond to anything objective completely wrecks any case for objective morality, and morality in general. If the statement "you should value human life" is just one among many attitudes, then we have nothing to say to a person who does not vale human life. It's one prejudice against another.

    A reasonable starting point I think. However the problematic question then arises as to how one defines - or acquires - the nature of and standards for that “objective morality”. If god actually exists and the Ten Commandments are actually the words from on high then we’re home free.

    However if god is a subjective value – the most likely state given the evidence – then we’re back at square one. And if we allow someone, some group, to dictate – and I use the word advisedly and with some emphasis – morality based on the claim that they have the inside track to such an entity – personalized or not – then we have put such standards outside the reach of rational control and adaptation. Personally, I think that a rather odious and, frankly, a quite frightening prospect.

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  119. dugller:

    Actually, evolutionary biology is more about the hereditary transmission of genes, and not necessarily about procreation. Self-sacrificing behavior to save one’s family, even if one has no children, will increase the probability of gene transmission, even if the sacrificed individual had no children of their own.

    Yes, but sex, bluntly speaking, is nature's "way" of getting us to procreate.

    Fair enough. But maybe it is all about affection? Why should procreation take priority over affection?

    Well, if it is all about affection, you'd have to argue for it in terms of natural law, and I don't think you make a successful case for it. And not to get even further off topic, but our well-being depends on procreation. The children are our future, after all. Someone has to take care of us when we get old. For example, countries in Europe are are experiencing negative birthrates are going to be facing some tough problems in the future. If you want an even more drastic example, look at China (of course, the problem there has much more to do with abortion).

    First, why does having a rational intellect make humans superior to animals, for example? Why is having understanding such an important thing? What if our capacity for understanding results in our annihilation by nuclear war or climate change? Is it still so amazing?

    Second, why shouldn’t we torture animals if they do not have rights?


    Let me answer you question with an example. Suppose a child wanders into the woods and is attacked by a bear. It is tragic, yes, but we can't say in any sense that the bear is acting wrongly. However, if a person attacked the child, we would say that person acted wrongly. The intellect allows us to understand things and make decisions in ways that bears can't.

    Nuclear war or climate change would not be good, yes, but this is from the misuse of the intellect and the cost of having free will.

    As for why it is wrong to torture animals, I believe that it is not virtuous for a person to do so. It is contrary to human flourishing (I know this sounds somewhat vague, but I'm a little short on time right now. Sorry.)

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  120. captainzman:

    Yes, but sex, bluntly speaking, is nature's "way" of getting us to procreate.

    And procreation is nature’s way of perpetuating the species. If the final cause is species perpetuation, then with increasing population sizes competing for limited resources, perhaps homosexual relationships would facilitate our species perpetuation by decreasing population size and thus increasing our chances of surviving as a species. One could make the same argument about contraception, too.

    The intellect allows us to understand things and make decisions in ways that bears can't.

    But so what? Why is understanding and rational choice better than animal instinct? Sure, it is great to understand something, but is it necessarily always better to understand something? I can think of a number of scenarios where understanding would actually be a liability. I think that the safest answer is that there is no universal good, but rather a set of goods that humans consider to be valuable, and which good is chosen in a specific situation depends upon the factors of the situation. Sometimes one good will be chosen, and another time another good will be chosen. Intellect is only one amongst many goods, and you still haven’t demonstrated why it is the ultimate good.

    Nuclear war or climate change would not be good, yes, but this is from the misuse of the intellect and the cost of having free will.

    But is the cost worth the gift? A loaded gun can be considered to be a great gift, too.

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  121. BenYachov

    "So which is it? Untenured can't speak for his beliefs if they contradict your interpretation because not every Christian agrees with him but I can't say God set up a single church that speaks for Christianity because that is wrong because Untenured can speak for his own beliefs?"

    Your church lost the battle a long time ago in trying to restrict Christian understanding of
    God and the bible. These days, "Christian" refers to the diversity of biblically based beliefs and those who profess to follow Jesus. You and your church no longer control the definition of the word. The first atheist doesn't control that word either. It doesn't even matter if "historically" Christianity was of one original sect. We live in the present. History happened.
    Sects broke off. They are called Christians. Declaring them "not Christians" is silly at this point.

    If you use the word "Christian" unaware that a great many non-Catholics are called Christians, you'd be astonishingly ignorant. Whether YOU think you are a "true Christian (tm)" or not, you have to deal with the fact there are huge numbers of people who go by the title "Christian" who do not share your version of Christianity. So if you want to communicate clearly, when you use the word "Christian" you will know this, and mention that you are specifically referencing Thomistic Christianity (or Catholicism or whatever you want to call your group).

    It's out of your hands. It's a practical matter any intelligent person has to deal with.

    I'll wait until you can calm down with the name calling and insults before I respond any more.

    RH

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  122. captainzman:

    But the defining part of man is the intellect, the proper use of reason as "good", and this is what we think of as morally good. We can use reason to determine what the our proper ends, or what will result in our well-being in each aspect of our lives. In fact, we can't do otherwise. It is self-evident that whenever we act, we do it to pursue something we think is good or to avoid something we think is bad. The question of values is built in from the get-go, because we can look at such-and-such and using reason, determine what it will do for our well-being.

    I have a similar conception of moral reasoning as the one that you just described. I think that where we differ is that I conceive of human beings having a set of values as having inherent worth – such as the value of freedom, the value of companionship, the value of respect, and so on – and that our moral calculus has to do with deciding which values to prioritize over others in a situation requiring a moral choice. I do not believe that any single value is supreme and to be prioritized over all the others in all contexts, and thus I cannot make sense of a singular Final Cause for human beings.

    I can see someone taking the Aristotelian position that which value I choose to prioritize in my moral choices is that one that I believe will maximize my well-being or flourishing, as you described above. However, there are times when I have to give up my individual well-being for the sake of the well-being of the group, and so it seems that there are acts of morality in which my well-being is actually not a priority at all, and that others take precedence. So, even this account does not work in all circumstances, I think.

    Assuming that values are subjective and do not correspond to anything objective completely wrecks any case for objective morality, and morality in general.

    I disagree. There are a number of objective aspects to this account.

    First, it is an objective fact that human beings value what they do.

    Second, I think that there are situations in which prioritizing certain values over others maximizes both individual and collective well-being. That is what Sam Harris was getting at in his book, The Moral Landscape . In other words, if we generally prioritize individual choice over authoritarianism, increasing intellectual fulfillment over ignorance in support of elite power structures, and so on, then there would be more chances of flourishing. I think that this is all objective.

    If the statement "you should value human life" is just one among many attitudes, then we have nothing to say to a person who does not vale human life. It's one prejudice against another.

    No, I disagree. Just because we cannot convince a sociopath to value human life does not devalue human life, no more than if we cannot convince someone who is mentally retarded the value of intellectual pursuits that such pursuits are worthless.

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  123. @RH

    >There isn't remotely any way you can pretend I have not been dealing with particular arguments here.

    Clearly that is not the case you are either in denial or dishonest. You haven't answered any of my arguments. Not one. Nor did you answer Josh.

    >I have been giving arguments FOR my position,

    Sorry no but you haven't positively defended anything. You have attempted to polemic a view you clearly don't understand and flat out refuse to learn about sans a few sound bites and a one page book review. dguller has unlike you read the relevant material. He hasn't offered lame arse excuses of why he should remain ignorant of it and still attack it.
    Which is why it seems captainzman has stopped answering you and has switched to him.

    That raises the IQ of the discussion by several hundred points. I suggest you stand back an watch and let a knowledgeable atheist show you how it's done. I for one am looking forward to reading the discussion.

    >Your church lost the battle a long time ago in trying to restrict Christian understanding of God and the bible.

    I don't even know what this means? The Church is objectively the final interpreter of the Holy Writ on Earth. That is like saying Elizabeth II isn't really Queen because Americans no longer follow her. Stupid to the 10th power.

    BTW what does this have to do with your original lame charge that Jesus was somehow a failure as a moral teacher? Which Untenured clearly refuted by pointing out Christ's primary purpose was to redeem mankind not give moral teaching. A belief which BTW is universal among Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and Protestants. At best a few modern liberal Protestant Churches mostly in America which are about 50 years old might hold your view that Jesus was Primarly a moral teacher and not a savior.

    But the rest of the world and the whole of history is against it. Thus it is the minority view. Tradition is as Newman said the democracy of the dead.

    BTW & I notice you still haven't addressed this, your own lame arse argument is undercut by your claim nobody has any authority to define what Christianity is, that means you can't do it either. You can't claim Jesus was primary a moral teacher & thus you can't fault him for falling short of your own subjective moral preferences and expectations.

    Live with it. You argument is illogical. That would be true even if there is/are no god(s).

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  124. BTW I will praise intelligence from the Gnu's when they start displaying non-Gnu behavior.

    For example:

    Steersman writes:
    >A reasonable starting point I think. However the problematic question then arises as to how one defines - or acquires - the nature of and standards for that “objective morality”. If god actually exists and the Ten Commandments are actually the words from on high then we’re home free.

    I reply: This is a good point. Indeed in the discussion between dguller and captainzman does belief in God even if it's only nature's God make a difference to Natural Law and interpreting final causes?

    >However if god is a subjective value – the most likely state given the evidence – then we’re back at square one.

    I reply: This statement I don't understand but I'll let it go.

    > And if we allow someone, some group, to dictate – and I use the word advisedly and with some emphasis – morality based on the claim that they have the inside track to such an entity – personalized or not – then we have put such standards outside the reach of rational control

    I reply: But what if it turns out they really speak for God? Shouldn't people be free to explore wuther or not that is the case?

    I suggest if you are sincere and you have the time in the future you should read the second Vatican council's text on religious liberty.

    That is all.

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  125. @dguller

    Do you think presupposing God even if it's only Nature's God (i.e. an Aristotelian Deity sans Divine Revelation)might be a factor in how we determine final causes in nature?

    That might be a factor here. You seem to be looking at Natural Law threw the lends of Atheism or Agnosticism? I could be wrong.

    Carry on just putting that out there.

    Cheers.

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  126. Xerces said: Steersman and the others seem to be saying that taking in the physical world by way of our senses is a necessary and sufficient condition for the development and formalization of concepts …

    Seems to be not that far removed from several comments of Feser’s:

    "To be sure, for Aristotle and the Scholastics there is nothing in the intellect that did not arise from the senses. But this does not entail the British empiricists’ thesis that concepts just are faint copies of sensations."

    ...as an Aristotelian, Aquinas is committed to the view that all our knowledge, including knowledge of God, must derive from the senses.


    Though I question the implication there that such concepts – including god – have some rather independent, objective reality – which seems rather Platonic, some related assertions here to the contrary notwithstanding. But in either case both of those positions would be entirely consistent with one definition of “empirical”: relying on or derived from observation or experiment.

    One, they simply ignore the reality of the intellect, which is said to function in joint operation with the senses to produce concepts.

    And if I were to argue, with some justification I think, that the intellect is synonymous with the observer? [Little hard to comprehend how an intellect could exist without the act or process of observing.] And that, to boot, it might be immortal, individually or collectively?

    And lastly, the most egregious error: The failure to make a crucial distinction. Nothing within this subject - the subject of concept-formation - makes or implies any claims about or has anything whatsoever to do with the subject of whether the truths of mathematics are established by empirical verification. On that subject, there is no issue. The idea that empirical verification is what is being employed in a formal, elaborate mathematical demonstration is simply nonsense of the highest order.

    For starters, as I pointed out to you before, I had made a mistake, an error, in using in a post to you one definition of “empirical” – verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment – when I should have used, as I have been using, another – relying on or derived from observation or experiment. So I was not in any way, shape or form arguing that the simple act of observing verifies the “truths of mathematics” – I’m not about to argue that observing a mirage, or trying to drink from it, quenches one’s thirst.

    What I was arguing was that the formal steps followed in establishing or verifying those truths are derived from or rely upon both the observation of the rules and axioms and concepts on which such verification depends, and the observation of the entailed control and understanding and differential execution afforded by them.

    In addition, as an aside though of some relevance, one might reasonably argue that “god” is itself a concept of unknown existence – unless you want to argue that the simple act of imagining an entity automatically endows it with independent and autonomous reality: if Jehovah then why not Allah, why not Vishnu, why not the Invisible Pink Unicorn? And if the former, the unknown existence, is the case then that concept should also be subject to the same rules of logic, for starters, as those applied to any other real or abstract entity.

    I would still call your talk as nothing but ignorance in display.

    Ok, so I can admit that I don’t know everything – and I hardly think I suggested anything of the sort or anything even approaching such a blessed state. But if that is ignorance then that brush would seem to tar everyone else here. The question seems to be finding truth through dialog – an idea of fairly ancient pedigree, if I’m not mistaken – and generally being civil about it. Or do you guys – and gals – here all subscribe to the echo-chamber model for blogs open for discussion?

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  127. >The question seems to be finding truth through dialog – an idea of fairly ancient pedigree, if I’m not mistaken – and generally being civil about it.

    Gnu'Atheists can dish it out but clearly they can't take it.

    Calls for "civility" on the part of Gnus only happen if they are treated with the same fierceness a pack of them will visit on some lone Theist given half the chance.

    Coupled with rational take downs of their irrational version of Atheism which they have never examined intellectually but swollowed pablum from the likes of Dawkins, Coyne and Myers.

    Steersman you have made many many irrational arguments which I would not buy into even if I didn't believe in God.

    But that comment toward captanzman was an improvement.

    But maybe if you didn't come in here with a chip on your shoulder making snarky generic anti-fundie potshots we would have given you a better welcome.

    Ya think?

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  128. >The question seems to be finding truth through dialog –

    Which does not happen when you first wander in here throwing bombs about how we are all "dogmatic" while you go one to bore us with your dogmatic unexamed New Atheist beliefs.

    Someone really interested in dialog would simply ask "So what is it you guy believe & why?"

    Spending your time telling us what we believe has been tedious. Nor is it dialog to attack our beliefs with fallacious and invalid arguments.

    FYI God is NOT a being alone side other beings only more Uber. No such "god" exists and you will not find it defended here. God is Pure Actuality. God is Subsistant Being Itself. God is Subsiatant Existence Itself. To compare God to a pink unicorn is like comparing Pluto to a Hartle/Hawking State.

    I can find or fail to find Pluto in my Telescope but I would never say anything so lame as "A Hartle/Hawking state doesn't exist since I can't see it threw my Telescope.

    Geez man get a clue. Vox Day was right. Gnu's act like assholes but then act surprised when nobody likes them or returns the favor in kind.

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  129. Ben Yachov said: Gnu Atheists can dish it out but clearly they can't take it.

    It might not make any difference in your conclusion, but as I have mentioned several times now I am not any sort of a gnu atheist. Although I’m certainly sympathetic to many of their points of view – did you ever read Dawkins’ The God Delusion? (you might find out something about your own backyard) – I also think at least some of them go too far in both discussion and philosophy.

    Calls for "civility" on the part of Gnus only happen if they are treated with the same fierceness a pack of them will visit on some lone Theist given half the chance.

    I’ll agree that people tend to be pack animals – ever read Lord of the Flies? – and that applies to both fundies and atheists. Personally I think that follows from a sense of certainty that I think is entirely misplaced. But that certainty also seems to be an element or feature of at least some theists here and elsewhere. On a related topic you might be interested in this article: Libido Dominandi: St. Augustine and the Lust for Domination.

    Coupled with rational take downs of their irrational version of Atheism which they have never examined intellectually but swallowed Pablum from the likes of Dawkins, Coyne and Myers. Steersman you have made many many irrational arguments which I would not buy into even if I didn't believe in God.

    I think rationality tends to be a function of the group – in both a social and a mathematical sense.

    But that comment toward captanzman was an improvement.

    Paraphrasing Groucho Marx, “Well those others were my principles too – if you don’t like them I have others”.

    But maybe if you didn't come in here with a chip on your shoulder making snarky generic anti-fundie potshots we would have given you a better welcome.

    Sorry if it looks that way, but, to quote another profound philosopher, “You gotta call ‘em the way you see ‘em”. And while I don’t want to be pissing in your cornflakes it seems to me, that as I mentioned, the ideas are important enough and the consequences of sufficient impact on our societies to justify at least criticizing them (no point preaching to the choir) – hopefully without degenerating into personal attacks. And if I’ve been guilty of the latter then mea culpa.

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  130. @RH:

    This discussion is going off the rails and quickly becoming useless. But I told you I would respond again when I had the time and so I will.

    In a way, RH, I sympathize with you when you reference all of the different interpretations of Christian doctrine. But that just means that protestantism is fundamentally flawed, not that there is some inherent ambiguity in Christian teaching. I think protestant Christianity is impossible to take seriously at an intellectual level, and I say this as a former Evangelical Christian. There is a babble of conflicting voices amongst those who call themselves "Christians". But that was not the case for the first 1500 years of Church history, nor is it true for the majority of Christians living now. There are about 1.2 billion Catholics, 400 million Orthodox, and only about 500 million protestants. The Catholics and the Orthodox agree on almost all points of Theology save the papacy, and it is only the protestants who babble about with a thousand conflicting voices. The overwhelming majority of Christians are united on theological matters. But this is not true in the English speaking world, because the English speaking world is so pervaded by protestantism that is an effective outlier. And the protestants think, absurdly, that they are the norm for Christianity generally. Why do we take the diversity of opinion which characterizes a demographic and temporal minority of Christians as representative? You can be forgiven for thinking that "Christians" are a disunited rabble. Our protestant brethren cannot.

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  131. RH:

    Untenured said: "We do not believe that Jesus is some kind of "moral teacher" like Confucius. His primary significance is not his moral teaching, and the purpose of the incarnation was not to set humanity straight about ethics."

    What, for you, is included in the essential definition of a Christian? Untenured's definition here is so broad I don't know why you quibble with it.

    This whole thing started because some Anonymous actually implied the argument on this page that you said "no atheist you knew had ever made" and then accused Untenured of attacking a straw man. It's there to read.

    Also, in this paragraph of yours:

    ALSO: there is a direct connection to Jesus because Jesus and the God of the OT are held by many Christians to be aspects of the same Being. So if Jesus was indeed an aspect of the OT God, then Jesus is culpable for whatever was commanded by God in the Bad old Days as well.

    You appropriate your own understanding of what Christians believe to use for your own purposes. The exact same thing you chided Untenured for doing.

    But I do take back the idea that you didn't address particular arguments. My apologies.

    I think you should abandon this whole "people have different opinions on the truth, therefore there is no truth thing" you've got going with Christianity. My two cents.

    Untenured: I see you've responded, and I'll stop with this thread following this post, so no further hijacking occurs.

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  132. Untenured,

    Unless I'm being too optimistic, it seems we are close to an understanding. I appreciate that you acknowledge the problem of Christian diversity, even if you
    downplay protestantism.

    America is a hotbed of discussion and dissent in terms of atheism and religion. After all, 3 of the 4 big "New Atheists" making world wide waves are from the USA. Naturally, given the profile of Protestantism, protestantism gets much of the attention. Pew Research has a whopping %51 of USA adults holding to Protestantism, with 23 % for Catholicism.

    So let's face it: America, being the most religious and highest profile western country is where a lot of this public discussion is occurring, and therefore therefore Protestant Christianity being highest profile will be the object of many atheist arguments.

    So when you had asked why this "meme" continues to circulate concerning arguments about slavery, Jesus and the bible (and I clarified those arguments), there's a good explanation: Those arguments do have quite a large target in the way Protestants think of, and argue for God and Christianity. Therefore the arguments is not some straw man dreamed up by atheists.

    As I said: whether your version of Christianity is affected or not doesn't change this fact. No matter what argument an atheist gives, no matter how directly targeted, there will be Christians of one stripe or another saying "But that's not Christianity. It's not what I believe. So you are just making stuff up...strawmannirg Christianity."

    As it happens, I'm not convinced that Catholicism escapes the problems raised in those arguments either (I know, you believe it does...but forgive me for being skeptical as that is the claim of every Christian of every sect "those aren't problems for ME.")

    But, again, whether the arguments address Catholics or not, they DO address the beliefs and arguments of the most prominent, most numerous Christians in the USA, and hence are not straw men.

    Unless I'm wrong, it seems you may be willing to concede this point?

    Cheers,

    RH

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  133. Josh,

    The part you quoted in which I wished to represent what Christians believe is this: Jesus and the God of the OT are held by many Christians to be aspects of the same Being.

    Josh replied: You appropriate your own understanding of what Christians believe to use for your own purposes. The exact same thing you chided Untenured for doing.

    What are you saying? Are you going to actually try to say that my statement above is false? As if it is just some unfair strawman of my own fantasy unrelated to Christian beliefs? Gimme a break.

    As Wikipedia says: "The majority of Christians worship Jesus as the incarnation of God the Son, and "the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity" "united in essence" with God The Father.

    And: "According to this doctrine, God exists as three persons but is one God, meaning that God the Son and God the Holy Spirit have exactly the same nature or being as God the Father in every way.[4] Whatever attributes and power God the Father has, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit have as well.[4] "Thus, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit are also eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, infinitely wise, infinitely holy, infinitely loving, omniscient."

    (Which seems to accord well with what the Catholic Encyclopedia says on the matter).

    Many Protestants also proclaim Jesus Is Lord/God.

    So this assertion that I was "appropriating my own understanding" as if what I wrote did not in fact fairly indicate what many Christians actually believe - that Jesus and God are aspects of the
    same Being (one God)...is nonsense.

    Now, if you are complaing about what I say follows from saying Jesus and God are one - that is, if the OT describes God as doing anything immoral, Jesus does not escape being bismirched by this as well...well...that would be my argument. The Christian would have to say why the argument doesn't work, which is fine. But to complain of one side of the debate taking a premise of the opponent as part of an argument is rather silly.

    So...I don't see your point.

    RH

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  134. RH,

    "What are you saying? Are you going to actually try to say that my statement above is false? As if it is just some unfair strawman of my own fantasy unrelated to Christian beliefs?"

    No, not at all. I was simply pointing out that while objecting to Untenured's generally characterizing Christian beliefs, because he couldn't speak for the whole, you had done the same thing. I really don't care about the slavery thing at all; I was merely objecting to the double standard of being able to define orthodoxy. You seem to have misunderstood me.

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  135. dguller:

    You seem to have strayed outside the lines in adding colour to some of your recent thoughts. I'm retracing the steps you and captainzman took together; he made the point that the final cause of sex is to procreate, and you introduced evolutionary biology and the transmission of genes. At first I didn't see how that was responsive but let's park that for now. Because from there you've further twisted the thread through the maze in order to say, "And procreation is nature’s way of perpetuating the species."

    Well, no, it isn't. One might say, less loosely, that procreation is nature's way of propagating the species, not perpetuating it. And so "If the final cause is species perpetuation," is, in fact, false then so too are the implied, and counterintuitive, natural goods (ie, homosexuality, contraception) that you suggested might follow.

    Now could you say that sex is part of the evolutionary process which is "nature's way" of perpetuating the species? I don't know that you can say that of sex, and I don't know that perpetuating any species is evolution's end; but in any case I suspect that if you did take that approach you would have to justify frustrating nature's end (here, eg by homosexuality) in order to facilitate nature's end (there, eg less competition for resources) when there's no reason (beyond policy preference) that it wouldn't be better to facilitate both. Perhaps you would put it that having having a rational intellect is "nature's way" of helping us negotiate such problems morally?

    Which leads me to ...

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  136. dguller wrote:

    "First, why does having a rational intellect make humans superior to animals, for example? Why is having understanding such an important thing? What if our capacity for understanding results in our annihilation by nuclear war or climate change? Is it still so amazing?"

    Is this a serious question, or a OneBrow-query of the "I don't endorse this position but tell me why X" type? - if thing A lacks just one of the positive capacities of thing B it seems you need a very specialised understanding of superiority to say A is superior to B. It seems more the case you are wondering if rational intellect has any value, let alone the extraordinary value that we all seem to suppose. You even suggest you can imagine it to be a liability, rather than an asset, in some scenarios.

    Obviously it's no crime to be loose when sketching out thoughts in a combox. But it seems obvious to say only antirationality makes it so that men are equal, or possibly inferior, to animals. I hesitate to point this out because there is ample evidence in your posts of insightfulness and intelligence - so I can't believe you missed this?

    Besides, this is you 'colouring outside the lines' again. Whether rationality makes men superior is beside the point that captainzman made very clearly and more than once: Right, far from being a physical fact, expresses a moral relation which only a rational being is capable of understanding. Only a rational being understands "oughtness", and so Rights obtain in the sphere of reason and rational beings only. That's all; no value judgment was expressed.

    You then asked: "Second, why shouldn’t we torture animals if they do not have rights?"

    Well that's simple too: though animals have no rights, and men have no duties to or towards animals we may have duties about or concerning them, and we have duties to their Supreme Owner, all of whose creatures must be treated according to reason.

    You should pick up Volume 2 of Cronin's The Science of Ethics (Professor Feser included a downloadable link in his Scholastic Bookshelf post). If you're interested in a more modern treatment of man's duties concerning animals (without arguing for animal Rights) I'd strongly recommend Dominion by Matt Scully - one of the most beautifully written books I've ever read.

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  137. Jack:

    Thanks for your points.

    One might say, less loosely, that procreation is nature's way of propagating the species, not perpetuating it. And so "If the final cause is species perpetuation," is, in fact, false then so too are the implied, and counterintuitive, natural goods (ie, homosexuality, contraception) that you suggested might follow.

    I actually had to pull out dictionary definitions for this one. What I found was that “propagate” means “to cause to continue or increase by sexual or asexual reproduction”, and “perpetuate” means “to make perpetual or cause to last indefinitely”. I think that what they both have in common is that whatever is being propagated or perpetuated is done with the intention to keep it going. So, if procreation, i.e. the having of offspring, is vitally important, then it is important in order to keep the species going. And if that is true, then my arguments for contraception and homosexuality stand, because they are both important methods of limiting overpopulation, which would compromise our ability to keep the species going.

    you would have to justify frustrating nature's end (here, eg by homosexuality) in order to facilitate nature's end (there, eg less competition for resources) when there's no reason (beyond policy preference) that it wouldn't be better to facilitate both.

    I’m not too sure what you are trying to say here, and so before I make any wrongheaded comments, could you clarify what you mean? It seems like it might be important.

    It seems more the case you are wondering if rational intellect has any value, let alone the extraordinary value that we all seem to suppose. You even suggest you can imagine it to be a liability, rather than an asset, in some scenarios.

    I do not think that rational intellect has no value. It absolutely has value. But you are correct that I wonder about the extraordinary value it is accorded. And I stand by my claim that there are circumstances where it would be better not to know something than to know something.

    Right, far from being a physical fact, expresses a moral relation which only a rational being is capable of understanding. Only a rational being understands "oughtness", and so Rights obtain in the sphere of reason and rational beings only. That's all; no value judgment was expressed.

    I wonder if the fact that there seems to be proto-rationality and proto-morality in our primate cousins impacts your view of reason and moral intelligence.

    Well that's simple too: though animals have no rights, and men have no duties to or towards animals we may have duties about or concerning them, and we have duties to their Supreme Owner, all of whose creatures must be treated according to reason.

    Couldn’t one say that animals do have rights, but not derived from their animal natures, but rather derived from our duties to God? Remember, a right is simply a way that a being is entitled to be treated, i.e. we have a duty to treat beings in specific ways and to avoid treating them in others. Where that right is derived from may be what is at issue here, but the very fact of animal rights seems to be a consensus here.

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  138. Hi dguller:

    I guess the difference with propagation as opposed to perpetuation is the notion of increase in numbers.

    It makes sense to say then that sex is "nature's way" of propagating the species because sex, properly fulfilled, will increase a species's numbers. But for us to say it is (ultimately) "nature's way" of perpetuating the species seems more problematic because of the good reasons you use to argue that fewer of the species might facilitate perpetuation.

    I don't mean to claim that "nature's way" must be the most efficient way. I also don't mean to deny that something in nature, evolution say, has perpetuation as its final cause; sex would take part in this larger process to the end you described. Here, again, a large number of the species would help as selection can only take place on the available diversity. And couldn't we easily say that it's "nature's way" to deal with resource shortages by selecting for better competitors, or adaptability to low-resource conditions.

    Sorry I was unclear in the previous post - the question I was trying to pose was: if we say sex is "nature's way" of propagating a species, and grant that it also partakes in "nature's way" of perpetuating a species, how would you justify frustrating Nature in propagation (by decreasing a species's numbers through fruitless sex) in order to facilitate Nature in perpetuation (by reducing competition for resources)?

    It just seems arbitrary to corrupt one good for the sake of another. I think you would have to show there was no alternative which (thanks to the rational intellects of superior animals like Norman Borlaug ;) ) is very hard to do. And also that perpetuation is somehow better than propagation. And even after all this, you'd be doing something unnatural in stopping sex from propagating the species (ie, stopping "nature's way") which is where you and captainzman came in I think?

    I'm afraid I don't know enough about the proto-rationality of chimpanzees, aside from some anecdotes about how studies purporting to show ASL language-acquisition have been overdrawn and are highly misleading. But to the point, if chimpanzees are rational beings they would understand "oughtness" and would have Rights.

    I disagree though that any non-rational being has rights. Sensible and feeling men treat animals with the kindness that they cannot ask for, and Reason is enough.

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  139. @RH:

    We are, perhaps, at something of an agreement. I think protestant Christianity is an intellectual disaster and it is indeed vulnerable to some of the charges that you present. I have such difficulty taking sola scriptura seriously that I don't even stop to consider it as an option. But, it that brand of protestantism is the target, I will happily concede that your criticisms go through. To my mind this is just further evidence of how wrong-headed sola-scriptura protestantism is.

    Finally, when I speak of "my" brand of Christiantiy, I am speaking of what is, throughout both space and time, unquestionably the mainstream of Christian tradition. Even though it is culturally dominant in the U.S., protestantism is a historical and demographic aberration. Our culture and politics makes it very easy to forget this.

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  140. Steersman:

    However if god is a subjective value – the most likely state given the evidence – then we’re back at square one. And if we allow someone, some group, to dictate – and I use the word advisedly and with some emphasis – morality based on the claim that they have the inside track to such an entity – personalized or not – then we have put such standards outside the reach of rational control and adaptation. Personally, I think that a rather odious and, frankly, a quite frightening prospect.

    And of course, your thinking that this is odious and frightening is also subjective, and can just be shrugged off. Moreover, any sort of morality is going to be dictated by some group as opposed to another.

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  141. @Steersman
    >It might not make any difference in your conclusion, but as I have mentioned several times now I am not any sort of a gnu atheist.

    Yet you deny Feser's satire of the Gnu's applies to them and you act as if he is dissing all Atheists? Which he does not do as a matter of fact. It smacks of tribalism(defending idiots at all costs just because they are your fellow Atheists).

    >Although I’m certainly sympathetic to many of their points of view – did you ever read Dawkins’ The God Delusion? (you might find out something about your own backyard)

    Yes & that book is a piece of shit. It's like reading Ray Comfort only it's Ray Comfort without god-belief. I've been reading Rowe, Oppy and Smith and it is the difference between reading Comfort on the one hand and Craig, Oderberg, or Davies on the other. Dawkins is a piss poor Atheist. If you want to be an intellectually respectable Atheist throw that shit out and start reading Rowe, Oppy and Smith. Your intelligence will increase by an order of magnitude.

    Dawkins is pablum for the simple minded much like Comfort. At best Kirk Cameron, Comfort's sidekick is good if you like sentimentality and you already believe. But Dawkin's lame idiotic "critique" of the Five Ways is ignorant piss and on the level of Comfort's "Bannana argument" for the existence of God. Both are cringe worthy to an informed person. There is a reason why Atheist philosophy Thomas Nagel has called Dawkins an "amateur" but I think he was being too kind.

    >I also think at least some of them go too far in both discussion and philosophy.

    Rather they display an ignorance comparable to Comfort's "banana argument". Google it or watch it on youtube.

    >And if I’ve been guilty of the latter then mea culpa.

    I accept your apology. But let me spell it out for you. 1) Your one size fits all rote polemics against Young Earth Creationists and Protestant Fundamentalists doesn't work here. 2) Your anti-Intellegent Design polemics don't work here since ID is philosophically incompatible with Thomism. 3) Acting like you know it all doesn't work here. 4) Asking sincere questions does work here & that means reading a book once in a while.

    Avoid the above errors and we can get alone. I don't give a shit if you don't believe in God. That's not my problem. I know two things there is a God and I am not Him. But I do care about reason and I have no patience for willfully irrational arguments. Regardless of the person's ultimate beliefs or non-beliefs.

    No carry on.

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  142. But is the cost worth the gift? A loaded gun can be considered to be a great gift, too.

    But you couldn't question the gift of the intellect without actually having it, right?

    I have a similar conception of moral reasoning as the one that you just described. I think that where we differ is that I conceive of human beings having a set of values as having inherent worth – such as the value of freedom, the value of companionship, the value of respect, and so on

    I completely agree with this, but the problem is the inherent worth part. We look at human beings, we see they are capable of rational thought, have free will, have certain characteristics like the virtues, etc. Now, if you believe in formal and final causes, you can say these things are "good". If you don't, they are just there. The value we assign to them is just another preference. There is nothing "out there" in the world that automatically makes us say "freedom is good".

    I do not believe that any single value is supreme and to be prioritized over all the others in all contexts, and thus I cannot make sense of a singular Final Cause for human beings.

    Well, the Thomist is going to say that the ultimate goal of man is knowledge of God.

    I can see someone taking the Aristotelian position that which value I choose to prioritize in my moral choices is that one that I believe will maximize my well-being or flourishing, as you described above. However, there are times when I have to give up my individual well-being for the sake of the well-being of the group, and so it seems that there are acts of morality in which my well-being is actually not a priority at all, and that others take precedence. So, even this account does not work in all circumstances, I think.

    But well-being also includes acting morally. Self-sacrifice is often the more virtuous path, and virtue is an important part of well-being. We say that charitable men are "good" men for example. Take a mother who pushes her child out of the way of a car but gets hit instead. She dies, yes, and on an amoral point of view she made the "wrong" choice, but from the moral point of view, one that sees good characters as an important part of well-being, we say she made the right one.

    First, it is an objective fact that human beings value what they do.

    I agree. We always act to do good and/or avoid bad. If you buy into the is/ought problem though, that doesn't mean that are values are objective, just that we act on values.

    Second, I think that there are situations in which prioritizing certain values over others maximizes both individual and collective well-being. That is what Sam Harris was getting at in his book, The Moral Landscape . In other words, if we generally prioritize individual choice over authoritarianism, increasing intellectual fulfillment over ignorance in support of elite power structures, and so on, then there would be more chances of flourishing. I think that this is all objective.

    But as a naturalist (which I assume he is), I don't think Sam Harris has any grounds to say these values are objective.

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  143. Captainzman:

    But you couldn't question the gift of the intellect without actually having it, right?

    Fair enough, but the point that I was making was that just because something is a gift does not mean that it cannot ultimately destroy you. I think that you were focusing upon a present, but irrelevant detail.

    Now, if you believe in formal and final causes, you can say these things are "good". If you don't, they are just there. The value we assign to them is just another preference. There is nothing "out there" in the world that automatically makes us say "freedom is good".

    I think that your use of “preference” is a bit of a loaded term. Just because our values come from ourselves does not make them as arbitrary as you make them out to be. We all have a blind spot that we fill in with visual information that is not really there, and we do so because we are hardwired to do so. I look upon our values in a similar light, as an intrinsic part of our cognitive system that we project onto the world. That is enough objectivity for me without the need for anything “out there”.

    Well, the Thomist is going to say that the ultimate goal of man is knowledge of God.

    Of course, he would.

    But well-being also includes acting morally. Self-sacrifice is often the more virtuous path, and virtue is an important part of well-being. We say that charitable men are "good" men for example. Take a mother who pushes her child out of the way of a car but gets hit instead. She dies, yes, and on an amoral point of view she made the "wrong" choice, but from the moral point of view, one that sees good characters as an important part of well-being, we say she made the right one.

    I agree that acting morally often includes increasing our well-being. However, my point in self-sacrifice is that death is obviously an absence of well-being, because there is no “me” to experience the well-being at all. As such, sacrificing myself, although in the time before my death, I may be increasing my well-being by feeling the satisfaction of helping others, for example, it ultimately ends in the utter elimination of well-being. And my point is not that such action is wrong, but only because I believe that not ever moral action maximizes well-being, at least over the long-term. This is one of many examples of where our moral valuation system gets short-circuited.

    I agree. We always act to do good and/or avoid bad. If you buy into the is/ought problem though, that doesn't mean that are values are objective, just that we act on values.

    When I say “objective”, I mean independent of our personal preferences. I do not mean that they exist in the same way that the moon exists, whether we exist or not.

    But as a naturalist (which I assume he is), I don't think Sam Harris has any grounds to say these values are objective.

    He does, but only in the sense that they are a universal feature of our psychological make-up, but with the exception of sociopaths, for example. Once you start from that beginning, then the rest of his points follow nicely, I think, especially about looking at which combinations of values seem to have better outcomes in terms of maximizing well-being, and which seem to result in miserable outcomes for human beings.

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  144. Jack Bodie wrote

    "... Right, far from being a physical fact, expresses a moral relation which only a rational being is capable of understanding. Only a rational being understands "oughtness", and so Rights obtain in the sphere of reason and rational beings only...."


    This is an important point. Your stating it saves a great deal of potentially wasted time as people try to sort out whether, and under what circumstances, a moral proposition can be said to have a logical truth value, and how a biological function might relate to a moral proposition having a truth value.

    We can work backwards here from the commonplace and gain a little insight along the lines you have laid out by quoting Herbert Hart, certainly no Christian, from his Concept of Law ...

    " ...in the teleological view of the world, man, like other things, is thought of as tending towards a specific optimum state or end which is set for him and the fact, that he, unlike other things, may do this consciously, is not conceived as a radical difference between him and the rest of nature. This specific human end or good is in part, like that of other living things, a condition of biological maturity and developed physical powers; but it also includes, as its distinctively human element, a development and excellence of mind and character manifested in thought and conduct. Unlike other things, man is able by reasoning and reflection to discover what the attainment of this excellence of mind and character involves and to desire it. Yet even so, on this teleological view, this optimum state is not man's good or end because he desires it; rather he desires it because it is already his natural end."


    This last sentence restates the formula that is missing from so many who have trouble conceptualizing the meaning of "good" as anything but some kind of synonym for "pleasure" or will.


    1st

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  145. Hart writes (continued)

    "... much of this teleological point of view survives in some of the ways in which we think and speak of human beings. It is latent in our identification of certain things as human needs which it is good to satisfy and of certain things done to or suffered by human beings as harm or injury. Thus, though it is true that some men may refuse to eat or rest because they wish to die, we think of eating and resting as something more than things which men regularly do or just happen to desire. Food and rest are human needs, even if some refuse them when they are needed. Hence we say not only that it is natural for all men to eat and sleep, but that all men ought to eat and rest sometimes, or that it is naturally good to do these things. The force of the word 'naturally', in such judgments of human conduct, is to differentiate them both from judgments which reflect mere conventions or human prescriptions."

    This descriptive passage from one of the 20th Century's most renowned legal philosophers, one who was not identified as part of the Natural Law tradition and who was repeating it mostly to explain its hold on mens' minds, repeats general themes that are also be found in, say, Mortimer Adler's remarks on the objectivity and sense of moral values, and hence statements.

    Hart, continues:

    "These crude examples designed to illustrate teleological elements still alive in ordinary thought about human action, are drawn from the lowly sphere of biological fact which man
    shares with other animals. It will be rightly observed that
    what makes sense of this mode of thought and expression is something entirely obvious: it is the tacit assumption that the
    proper end of human activity is survival, and this rests on the
    simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to continue in existence. ..."

    What is odd about these discussions in Feser's "comboxes", is not that they reproduce arguments over whether there is any sense content or logical meaning to ostensibly moral propositions, but rather how the questions quickly devolve into questions of whether it is objectively "better" to live or to be, than to die or not be.


    Now, whatever one might sensibly say to someone who adopted a position as if they had successfully stepped outside the context that enabled these questions to have meaning in the first place, it probably wouldn't be to try and argue with them as if they still stood inside the context.

    The strange thing is, that the nihilist usually presumes that it should.

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  146. I've been reading through some of these comments again in order to try and get a handle on just what is being argued over here, and it is still somewhat opaque.

    For example, in the argument over the concepts of final causes and their relation if any to biological functions, we find this remark:

    "Further, descriptive statements can be given for any number of things a leg can do:

    A leg can facilitate walking.
    A leg can facilitate kicking a ball.
    A leg can facilitate kicking someone in the face."


    Now, if we take these assertions at face value what they are saying is that what a leg can do is make walking easier, and make kicking a ball easier, and make kicking someone in the face [a strange adversion] easier.

    That is what facilitate means.

    But in each example, a leg must be assumed as making it at all possible in the first place.

    It's by means of a leg that one kicks in the first place. What? Do people often kick with their noses, but find that it is easier on average to do so with a leg?

    What sense does it make to say that a leg makes kicking "easier", except as a joke?

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  147. dguller said...

    " DNW:

    'The notion that human legs have an intrinsically table leg like function which is conceptually exclusive of, rather than resultant from, their normal ambulatory function, is to take an analogy predicated of an artifact and work backwards.'

    You may be right, but have not demonstrated this. The fact that whether one is standing still or moving requires muscular contraction is not a particularly salient point unless you are trying to say that the final cause of the legs is to contract their muscles, whether to stay at rest or to move?"

    My point was that if you try to use human legs in the manner you suggest as logically equivalent to any other use because of a functional indifference, they will fail, not because they are unusually underdeveloped specimens, but because human legs are "for" locomotion, not use as pedestals.

    " 'If you reflect on it for a moment you will recall that human legs cannot be used as immobile pedestals - the human being will simply collapse. Their function is movement, and walking and running are the words we most often apply to the manner of use.'

    Not at all. All I said was that the legs are immobile. ..."

    For standing ... immobile.

    Now, if we agree to rule the concept of function out of court in biological analysis, we can certainly do so and attempt to live with the conceptual consequences. I am personally for stripping away as much misleadingly analogical language as possible.

    But to say that the system function of the heart is the pumping of blood through the circulatory system, is not the same as to say that the heart was designed to pump blood for you.

    Destroy the heart, and thus permanently interrupt its function, as I have done with many deer, and I can assure you that the organism's blood ceases to be pumped, and the system dies.

    That is one way of discriminating the logical significance biological functions from "purposes" advanced as their equivalent.

    You can walk without artificial aids on legs incapable of ballet, but you cannot perform ballet on legs incapable of walking.

    Ballet is merely an affected and mannered exaggeration of the former's range, and its expression is contingent upon it.

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  148. dguller writes,


    "And I think that RH’s point is that choosing one end over another is ultimately a value judgment, and not based upon objective analysis of the situation. A case can be made for either end to be vital and useful, because there are circumstances where mobility is better than immobility (e.g. if being assaulted), and there are circumstances where immobility is better than mobility (e.g. meditation). How can one possibly decide which end is always to be preferred to the other, and thus be the Final End?

    I actually have no idea."


    I think that the problem here is that as is probably inevitable in this kind of forum, we are arguing different issues.


    The Aristotelian Thomists are arguing (apparently) that final ends determine or indicate the objective validity or reasonableness, or objective preferability, of certain moral-style claims.

    As part of their chain of reasoning they examine "natural" functions in a way that has been typical of but not exclusive to biology.

    Along the way they have to deal with the distinctions between living and non living, and handle psychological concepts of intending and intentionality in a way that is rejected if not often thematically denied in its entirety by their opponents; who seem to imagine that everything reduces to flows and and/or gates.

    The strange thing is, is that those making these deconstructive claims don't seem to operate as if they would appreciate others dealing with them in that light; i.e., conceived of as spreading inkblots which appropriate energy, process it in some objectively meaningless manner, and expel "waste".

    But back to the main point. What I am doing with my few comments here is not advancing an Aristotelian Thomist metaphysical framework, nor even pointing out the hypocrisy I mentioned just above, but rather looking at the adequacy of the supposed substitution instances proposed as examples invalidating ( to speak analogically here) the Thomist arguments.

    We have seen the assertion made that the logic of the functionality-conceived-as-purpose argument can be negated if one can provide a disjunctive function that that fits the interpretive scheme equally well.

    But what we have seen presented instead is the original function brought back out under a different name and touted as arbitrarily derived, but logically equivalent.

    Now, when you see someone presenting as a contradictory instance what is in reality merely a supplemental effect or another name for the same thing he proposes to replace during his game changing move; it makes one wonder if he could possibly be serious.

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  149. Ben Yachov said: Nor is it dialog to attack our beliefs with fallacious and invalid arguments.

    Whether they are all fallacious and invalid would seem to be the question – and I notice that you haven’t responded to several of mine that I think are anything but that.

    FYI God is NOT a being alone side other beings only more Uber. No such "god" exists and you will not find it defended here. God is Pure Actuality. God is Subsistent Being Itself. God is Subsistent Existence Itself.

    Actually I’m quite sympathetic to something at least along the line of your “God is Pure Actuality Itself” and I’ve said so several times now – which you would have noticed if you weren’t apparently so fixated on responding to the stereotype of a “gnu atheist” instead. And my “attacks” on your beliefs [fair game I figure – not like yours on my person], led, like the historical probing of the nucleus with alpha particles, to the information – which I acknowledged and thanked you for – that there’s “classical theism” [Thomism as far as I can detect] and “theistic personalism”, with the latter apparently being anathematized by the Catholic Church.

    However, all of that raises a number of questions, the first of which is “What does that buy you?”, “What benefits derive from that concept?” Steven Weinberg – quoted in The God Delusion [TGD] – argued that you can call god “energy” and find it in a lump of coal, but an extra layer of terminology hardly makes a coal-fired furnace more efficient, much less doing anything for our putatively “immortal” souls. And likewise with “God is Pure Actuality”: sure, there is conceivably pure actuality and there is presumably some “ground of being”, but that doesn’t seem to have any use or value or consequences at all – seems little more than a fancy label and a pretty bow for a box to hide our ignorance in.

    Except maybe to give some specious credibility to some of the other dogmata of the Catholic Church – which still looks suspiciously like theistic personalism – your silence on the matter notwithstanding. For instance I recollect that TGD talked of the traumatisation of several young Catholic children by the fear of a literal hell that was inculcated by various priests and nuns – “Hell-Houses” anyone? And TGD also quotes Aquinas (Summa Theologica) – though not having read much of him I’ll have to take Dawkins’ word – to the effect that:

    That the saints may enjoy their beatitude and the grace of God more abundantly they are permitted to see the punishment of the damned in hell. [TGD; pg 360]

    All of that – the tip of an iceberg, one might argue – suggests a literalism that looks like an awfully close cousin to that of the most rabid “Answers-in-Genesis” fundamentalist subscribing to theistic personalism. Personally, I think it is the literalists who give religion – and anti-religion – a bad name. But while I am happy to note, as mentioned earlier, Feser’s rejection of ID and that the Church seems to have distanced itself from a literal hell, one still might reasonably be skeptical of protestations as to the depth of its transformation: its soul or just its spots?

    And, relative to some previous comments, you might be interested to know that I have now read Feser’s articles on Scientism which I quite enjoyed – thanks – particularly the description, and related comments, on some of the problematic consequences of scientific inquiry’s philosophical assumptions. While I want to read them again before commenting extensively, I note in passing that he acknowledges, more or less in the conclusion, that the “physics of the ancients [Aristotle?] and medievals was sorely lacking”, although he still apparently thinks that their metaphysics – presumably on which that deficient physics was based – is still unsurpassed and worthy of being the basis for modern theology and ethics. While there is no doubt some truth still to be mined from that ancient metaphysics the very fact that the physics itself was “lacking” justifies some skepticism about that contention.

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  150. @Steersman:

    "However, all of that raises a number of questions, the first of which is “What does that buy you?”, “What benefits derive from that concept?” Steven Weinberg – quoted in The God Delusion [TGD] – argued that you can call god “energy” and find it in a lump of coal, but an extra layer of terminology hardly makes a coal-fired furnace more efficient, much less doing anything for our putatively “immortal” souls. And likewise with “God is Pure Actuality”: sure, there is conceivably pure actuality and there is presumably some “ground of being”, but that doesn’t seem to have any use or value or consequences at all – seems little more than a fancy label and a pretty bow for a box to hide our ignorance in."

    To anyone with even the most minimal of philosophical reading (like me), your arguments are so ridiculously bad that one is at a loss of where to begin. So I will end with just one point: Aquinas devotes literally hundreds of pages on the consequences that being Pure Actuality entails, Goodness (in the analogical sense) included. Go read a book.

    "While I want to read them again before commenting extensively, I note in passing that he acknowledges, more or less in the conclusion, that the “physics of the ancients [Aristotle?] and medievals was sorely lacking”, although he still apparently thinks that their metaphysics – presumably on which that deficient physics was based – is still unsurpassed and worthy of being the basis for modern theology and ethics. While there is no doubt some truth still to be mined from that ancient metaphysics the very fact that the physics itself was “lacking” justifies some skepticism about that contention."

    Does the skepticism cover only metaphysics? Which metaphysics by the way, you do not know, understand, and it seems, you refuse to understand -- note that I said *understand*, not *accept*. Maybe Aristotle's insights on logic can also be thrown out the widow? Does the skepticism cover only Aristotle? Go read a book.

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  151. (BTW, I'm off to pack for my vacation tomorrow. I'll try to check these comments when I come back. This thread is likely have gone silent, but at least I can see some more replies).

    Thanks again - wishing for a good weekend for everyone here!

    DNW,

    I'm not sure why anyone could be confused about what I'm asking.
    When trying to infer the nature or final cause of any entity it starts with
    observation and hence descriptive statements (otherwise of course you'd be begging
    the question to start by declaring the Final Cause...the Thomist is supposed to be able to INFER final causes).

    Therefore, we have to ask: How precisely does the Thomist select from any possible set of descriptive statements, the one, or set, that are THE FINAL CAUSE?
    What is the move? What is the step...how do you do this in a non-arbitrary, non-question-begging way?

    So when it comes to the "final cause" of legs, one can make any number of observations about legs, all the way from their atomic structure, to the chemistry involved, metabolism, muscles, bones, possible positions, all the ways a leg can be used to affect other objects etc.
    How exactly do you select, NON-ARBITRARILY, from these possible descriptive statements, the Final Cause. And yes this is essentially a version of having to show you aren't committing a Naturalistic Fallacy-type non-sequitur when you are doing so.

    So I gave a selection of descriptive statements concerning the human leg. I can see your point about using the word "facilitate" so it can be expressed in various other ways, e.g.:

    Human legs can be used for walking.
    Human legs can be used for kicking a ball.
    Human legs can be used kicking someone in the face.

    (Alternately it can be phrased as "Humans use their legs for X. Humans use their legs for Y..etc) And remember the number of descriptive statements about legs, their structure, the results of moving them one way or another, possible uses...could go on and on for pages.

    So would you take a stab at answering my question? How do you select any ONE or any SET of descriptive statements as being the Final Cause..and hence also on to normative statements about what legs "ought" to do (or how humans "ought" to use legs). But first thing is to show the way you discern the Final Cause description from the non-final cause description, in a way that does not betray arbitrariness or subjectivity on your part.

    Cheers,

    RH

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  152. DNW:

    My point was that if you try to use human legs in the manner you suggest as logically equivalent to any other use because of a functional indifference, they will fail, not because they are unusually underdeveloped specimens, but because human legs are "for" locomotion, not use as pedestals.

    Again, how did you determine this? Did you observe human legs for an extended period of time, and find that the majority of time, they were used for locomotion? Is that the criteria for a final cause? And what if there was a change in human technology, such that robots supplied our every need, and we no longer had to walk at all? Would the final cause of our legs still be locomotion? What if this new culture was present for longer than our previous evolved history? Would that change things?

    All we observe is that legs can be used to stand upright or to move in a particular direction. My question is how do you know which of these two purposes is the fundamental one, which means that the other is derivative? What is your criteria to determine which of the many functions and purposes of legs, or any entity for that matter, is primary and which is secondary?

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  153. DNW:

    I see that RH has asked the same questions that I have, as well.

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  154. grodrigues said: To anyone with even the most minimal of philosophical reading (like me), your arguments are so ridiculously bad that one is at a loss of where to begin.

    I’m obliged to have a PhD in philosophy before even thinking about posting here? Seems to me that if you were so all-fired knowledgeable and keen and able to promote your cause or position you’d take the time and effort to lead us poor benighted peons out of bondage and into the promised land of philosophical enlightenment. At least provide something more than the rather thin and imperious

    Go read a book.

    One is tempted to throw the “Courtier’s Reply” flag on the play. Though I will say instead that I’ve reserved The Last Superstition at the local library.

    Does the skepticism cover only metaphysics? Which metaphysics by the way...?

    As Feser was talking of “the philosophical wisdom of the ancients and medievals” and as he’s referenced Aristotle many times and as he indicated their “physics was sorely lacking” and as most of that is probably Aristotle’s I would think that Aristotle’s metaphysics would be a good bet.

    Maybe Aristotle's insights on logic can also be thrown out the window?

    Not knowing it in detail I would suggest that some of it might still be of some use while some of it would seem to be decidedly limited:

    It is frequently noted that Aristotle's logic is unable to represent even the most elementary inferences in Euclid's geometry, but Frege's "conceptual notation" can represent inferences involving indefinitely complex mathematical statements. [In Wikipedia’s Empiricism]

    Does the skepticism cover only Aristotle?

    Seems like skepticism about him would be a good start.

    But what a snarky response in general. I sincerely hope you’re not teaching this stuff and if you are I pity your students.

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  155. @Steersman:

    "I’m obliged to have a PhD in philosophy before even thinking about posting here?"

    I will repeat what I wrote: "To anyone with even the most minimal of philosophical reading (like me)" etc.

    "But what a snarky response in general. I sincerely hope you’re not teaching this stuff and if you are I pity your students."

    It was a snarky response, indeed. But tell me honestly, would you have the patience to respond for the umpteenth time to sophomoric objections that are delivered in an hostile tone, all the while displaying a mix of ignorance and arrogance?

    You said that you have already booked "The Last Superstition". Read it, understand it. Feel free to complain, object, show where it is wrong. But from where I am standing, your objections are mostly based on pure ignorance. Given that these issues are complex and subtle, combox answers are inadequate to do the subject justice.

    As I said above, philosophy is not my specialty, just something I have a great interest for, rather mathematics (and physics to a much lesser degree) is. Do you think I could explain to you say, topos theory, in a combox, to your satisfaction? Well, think again.

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  156. captainzman said: And of course, your thinking that this is odious and frightening is also subjective, and can just be shrugged off.

    True enough – certainly one person’s apprehensions can reasonably be shrugged off. But when many individuals, both currently and historically, reach the same conclusion then the shrugging-off would seem a little more difficult.

    Moreover, any sort of morality is going to be dictated by some group as opposed to another.

    Yes, I quite agree. Hence the justification for ensuring that there is the widest possible consensus as to which moral precepts are to be promoted or enforced. Seems the best guarantee of that is a democratic process as opposed to an authoritarian one, a theocratic one.

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  157. E.H. Munro,

    "Lastly, were I to say something like 'Don Jindra is attempting the intellectual equivalent of trying to shoehorn a square peg into a round hole by attempting to force mathematics into empirical science,' I am simply making a statement of fact."

    I'm not "attempting to force mathematics into empirical science." I'm pointing out that 1) math depends on first principles, 2) if math proofs are objectively true, those first principles must be objectively true, 3) there is no way to know any objective truth outside of what can be empirically verified, and 4) the only reason we consider math's first principles true is because they are so solidly present in the world we sense as human beings.

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  158. @Djindra:

    "I'm not "attempting to force mathematics into empirical science." I'm pointing out that 1) math depends on first principles"

    No different than any other discipline, like say, literary criticism, physics or evolutionary biology.

    "3) there is no way to know any objective truth outside of what can be empirically verified"

    There must an empirical verification for this claim, so why don't you give it to us?

    "4) the only reason we consider math's first principles true is because they are so solidly present in the world we sense as human beings"

    False as a cursory knowledge of mathematics readily shows.

    But please, do provide us with an empirical verification of the mathematical axioms. For example, can you present us with an empirical verification of logic Hilbert-calculus style? Or maybe the second order Peano axioms? The ZFC axioms? Or say, set-theory in the ETCS formulation, which is logically weaker than ZFC but already strong enough to handle most (but not all) of mathematics? Note that in the latter case, there is a re-conceptualization of the very notion of set; for example, equality of sets is a meaningless notion (more precisely, it is not an invariant notion), although you can speak of equality of two subsets of a given set. I eagerly await your enlightened responses.

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  159. dguller said...

    DNW:

    I see that RH has asked the same questions that I have, as well.
    August 19, 2011 8:52 PM



    I'll make an observation or two a little later today - possibly tomorrow - after I first clear my desk of a few things.

    Now, as a quasi flip answer to your *specific* quote and question:


    "DNW:

    'My point was that if you try to use human legs in the manner you suggest as logically equivalent to any other use because of a functional indifference, they will fail, not because they are unusually underdeveloped specimens, but because human legs are "for" locomotion, not use as pedestals.'

    Again, how did you determine this? Did you observe human legs for an extended period of time, and find that the majority of time, they were used for locomotion? ..."

    Myself and others ... http://www.hazards.org/standing/index.htm




    "Is that the criteria for a final cause?"

    It is in turn then (the kind of information cited above), one of the criteria for making judgments about function, which may in turn lead, depending on other assumptions to implications concerning the concept of final causes.

    Of course one could always ignore the biological consequences of doing so, and say that they don't matter in the sense of an "objective theory of meaning" (leaving the idea of objective sufficiently vague) but are merely descriptions of results. But then, they are playing another kind of analysis game that carries hidden its own metaphysical assumptions (as others here have repeatedly pointed out) as part of what is incorrectly claimed to be a supposedly value free exercise.

    Nonetheless, I did re-read both your comments and RH's comments Friday, before decamping myself.

    Although my response will be directed at what was already written, it might move this exchange along or end it, if you or RH could cite exactly what theory of meaning and interpretation you are employing, and provide its formulation exactly. For example someone might quote the passage from Hume, or from "Language Truth and Logic" they are referring to.

    Whose doctrine specifically are you both referring to as the basis for your fact value dichotomy? Hume? Ayer? Someone else?

    There is too much here that is implied rather than stated.

    And for example, what exactly does RH mean by naturalistic fallacy? Is he quoting Moore's use of the term?


    I would be tempted to say that I think we could simply dispose of any hedonic theory of the meaning of good, and of end-directedness, but certain remarks that have been made make me wonder about that too. Certainly no one reading Professor Feser's blog is (to be Bunt) stupid enough to endorse Bentham's definition of the "good"?

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  160. grodrigues said: "3) there is no way to know any objective truth outside of what can be empirically verified"

    There must an empirical verification for this claim, so why don't you give it to us?


    “We observe therefore we are”; we observe that we observe ..... that we observe: we observe. I would like to know how you think we can know anything without the process of observation which is, according to one definition – relying on or derived from observation or experiment, empirical.

    Which also has some support in or relevance to quantum mechanics. Eugene Wigner went so far as to argue that "It was not possible to formulate the laws (of quantum theory) in a fully consistent way without reference to consciousness" – that is, to an observer.

    Although that might still be considered somewhat tautological, though maybe still of some value in spite of if not because of that. But one might suggest – noting that the root of “observe” is “to watch” (to see) – that should humans be replaced by bats the same way that dinosaurs were replaced by humans one might envision some future “batty” philosopher arguing that “We echo-locate therefore we are; we echo-locate that we echo-locate ... that we echo-locate: we echo-locate. ....” Giving some idea, answering Nagel’s question, “what is it like to be a bat?” ....

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  161. "dguller said: Fair enough. But maybe it is all about affection? Why should procreation take priority over affection?"

    Good points. Maybe because “Jehovah” said “Be fruitful and multiply” [maybe that was really an injunction to develop and perform mathematics]: “As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined.”

    Are two naturalists seriously arguing that affection is the Darwinian cause for sex? I mean, really?

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  162. “We observe therefore we are”; we observe that we observe ..... that we observe: we observe. I would like to know how you think we can know anything without the process of observation which is, according to one definition – relying on or derived from observation or experiment, empirical.

    This is a metaphysical argument, and an awful one at that. But by your own claims it's invalid as it has no empirical support. And no, claiming that you've "observed yourself typing this nonsense" isn't empirical verification in the sense that we mean the term. Unique definition special pleading doesn't really work.

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  163. @Steersman:

    ""3) there is no way to know any objective truth outside of what can be empirically verified"

    There must an empirical verification for this claim, so why don't you give it to us?


    “We observe therefore we are”; we observe that we observe ..... that we observe: we observe. I would like to know how you think we can know anything without the process of observation which is, according to one definition – relying on or derived from observation or experiment, empirical."

    E. H. Munro has already answered but I register with some surprise that you do not even know what empirical verification is.

    "Which also has some support in or relevance to quantum mechanics. Eugene Wigner went so far as to argue that "It was not possible to formulate the laws (of quantum theory) in a fully consistent way without reference to consciousness" – that is, to an observer."

    I can only guess at what Wigner is trying to say here, because you provide no context for the quote, but if my guess is correct it has absolutely nothing to do with the issue at hand.

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  164. E.H. Munro said... Are two naturalists seriously arguing that affection is the Darwinian cause for sex? I mean, really?

    I don’t know about dguller, but, as should have been obvious, that was, at least partly, a jest on my part. But I notice from the Wikipedia article on the “Evolution of sexual reproduction” that there are several different theories for the “origin of sexual reproduction”, the leading one being “to repair genetic damage”.

    Along which line one might argue, or at least suggest as a hypothesis or conjecture, that affection is in fact the conscious manifestation of a biological need to “repair genetic damage” – possibly epigenetic, although, to be honest, I have the barest understanding of the concept – which occurs in male-male and female-female situations as well as in the traditional female-male ones. By which token one could argue that affection – in all three cases – has as much to contribute to the propagation and perpetuation of the species as that provided by the traditional variation, i.e., “to replicate ... genetic material in an efficient and reliable manner”.

    Maybe a bit of a stretch but it would seem to be rather presumptuous – at best – to insist that one has the omniscience of god and can see all of the relevant factors, causes, benefits, uses and consequences.

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  165. "Along which line one might argue, or at least suggest as a hypothesis or conjecture, that affection is in fact the conscious manifestation of a biological need to “repair genetic damage” "

    If that were granted as the case, homosexual affection - which seems to have been deliberately woven into this thread - would not have any obviously necessary relation to the supposition.

    One might tortuously conjure up arguments that purport otherwise, but that would be like arguing that the sterile and barren exist for a similar, hypothetically symbiotic, reason.

    In any event, Munro's August 22, 2011 12:54 PM comment pretty much puts this whole line of argument to rest, and there is no need for me to review again how RH's counter examples to natural function are, insofar as they make any sense, not really counter examples at all.

    I'll put the non-philosopher reply I promised the always reasonable dguller up somewhere else, and give him a link if he requests it.

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  166. DNW,

    Well, this is frustrating.

    You seem at least ready to actually tackle this issue. However, as I'd mentioned in a post not long ago I was about to leave on vacation....and I have done that.

    I tried posting a couple times on Eric Macdonald's blog on this subject, directed at Edward Feser who kindly made an appearance. Unfortunately I've found it takes too much precious vacation time (read: wife insisting I get off this wretched iPad) to carry on. So I'll have to wait until I get home. I presume this thread may have gone quiet by then. Hopefully we can pick up later.

    A note until then: Prof Feser replied to me... It was an interesting reply in of itself. However it offered no actual answer to my challenge to show how the Thomist derives ends/function/final cause or normative statements from a set of possible descriptions. In fact, it was more in the direction of confirming suspicions that you can't avoid arbitrariness and /or subjectivity in your project of discovering "objective" final causes.

    S'long for now.

    RH

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  167. RH said...

    " DNW,

    Well, this is frustrating.

    You seem at least ready to actually tackle this issue. However, as I'd mentioned in a post not long ago I was about to leave on vacation....
    S'long for now.

    RH
    August 23, 2011 3:55 PM "


    As I have already stated, what I am looking at is not how one proposes to do what has already been ruled out of court by some assumed rule, at but what counter argument you are actually making.

    You do two things:

    1. You state that an ought cannot be derived from an is, but you do not actually present the argument that you rely on, you merely reiterate its conclusion without exactly stating the argument.

    Now we know that Ayer's theory of meaning presented at length in Language Truth and Logic, turned out to be inadequate as he himself admitted.

    We also know that the hedonic theory of "good" as it relates to purpose, is such patent nonsense that it cannot be taken seriously.

    That apparently leaves Popper or Russell or Hume as your general authorities. And though you seem to be repeatedly alluding to the theory of definite descriptions as if it is dispositive here, I have not seen you actually demonstrate it as ontologically sound, rather than just logically useful.

    2. The other thing you do - and this may be part of your attempt to leverage the logic of descriptions formula as a means of advancing your case - is to supposedly provide falsifying instances which you apparently see as rendering the notion of an objective organic function as incoherent on the basis of your substitution instances.


    That really falls flat in my opinion, and that's what I address.

    My non-philosopher's response to that then, basically reiterates in more detail the point about your criticisms I made before: that you have where your substitution instances were not absurd, posited what are basically synonyms as supposedly falsifying cases, and where you were not positing practical synonyms, you were positing absurdities.

    cont.

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  168. Thus:

    "In the matter of RH and the function or purpose of legs:

    1. We find some agreement between RH and me with RH’s acknowledgement that his earlier assertion that legs merely “facilitate” walking with legs, is nonsensical.

    This is so, that is to say nonsensical, because to say that what makes something possible in the first place is what makes it easier, is meaningless. If the locomotive i.e., walking, appendages called legs exist, it becomes possible to walk on legs, not easier. If they do not, it is not less easy, it is impossible.

    A cane on the other hand, facilitates walking for the halt and unsteady, and shoes facilitate walking for the tender-footed and civilized. But legs are the part of one that make the ambulatory motions we call walking.

    We have continued disagreement in the following area:

    A. Concerning the logical coherence of RH’s introduction of ballet and line dancing (which as regards the legs are simply ritualized and exaggerated – perhaps mincing – expressions of ordinary locomotion); and wherein, the argument is made by RH that they are cogent counter examples which serve to refute the proposition that the function of the legs is walking.

    This rebuttal of objective function is accomplished, he argues, through his providing named instances of other purportedly inclusively disjunctive leg uses or functions; which as different, then ostensibly serve to falsify any claims that walking is the primary and objective biological function of legs.

    But some of RH’s “different” uses, particularly those which appear to be the most intuitively relevant substitution instances and which are deployed in hopes of demonstrating that it’s logically unsound to refer to walking as the primary function or biological purpose, are merely different names for what is basically the same phenomenon: walking.

    If these examples in RH’s scheme of refutation were sound, then we might duplicate them by saying that the proposition that the function of the legs was walking, could be effectively rebutted by pointing out that legs might equally well be used to amble, stroll, strut, saunter, stride, hike, still-hunt, and skip. Would anyone take that construction seriously?

    Once we rule out more or less obvious synonyms for walking, along with variations of gait, intensity of expression, and certain “other” ritualistic activities which presuppose the biological function of walking, what logically coherent examples of biological “use” are left?

    Shall we say paraphrasing RH that “Yes, the legs CAN be used for walking, but the point is that they CAN logically be used for many other activities just as well: activities like bread slicing, tack driving, gopher stomping, or as a portable emergency meal?

    When you leave the realm of either absurdities or synonymous and/or derivative functions, you end up back with the “final When you leave the realm of either absurdities or synonymous and/or derivative functions, you end up back with the “final cause” of the legs.

    Similarly, and by using RH’s method of logical contradiction through non-contradictory examples, we could go on to “disprove” the naive notion that the function of the eyes was to see. This, because they are alternately and even equally well used to: gaze, to view, to watch, to stare, or to look. ..."

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  169. Skipping my response to your comments about sex organs and my remarks in response to dguller ...

    Now, and finally, whether or not prescriptive propositions can be said to have truth values according to certain current doctrines of predicate logic, or how they can be derived within an interpretive system that presupposes they cannot because they are of a different “ontological category”, is another matter.

    The answer to that problem is found in whether the assumptions that underlie say, the theory of definite descriptions, or the logical positivist notion of meaning, or a fact value/dichotomy supposition that seems to ignore the possibility of predictions and prudential statements having an objective meaning, are adequate as general rules of interpretation.

    So RH ... we find ourselves then, once again, asking what is meant by objective; as almost all of Feser's regular commenters have repeatedly done before me.


    As far as I can determine no one is arguing that you can prove that you should brush your teeth in any way that is more or less than predictive of what will happen if you don't.

    Suppose then we allow, or define, predictive warnings against the consequences self-destructive activities as qualifing as "objectively anchored" as empirically verifiable, and as value reflecting, statements.

    That still would not satisfy your demand.

    You would reduce that into a description of potential consequences which have according to your rule, to receive their valuation of good or bad, and derivatively right or wrong, from a frame of reference beyond the negative effect.

    And if you say that the consequences are not bad in any sense that is significant to your adopted frame of reference, then what is anyone supposed to say to you?

    Is that where you actually live?

    As I quoted Hart earlier, "...it is the tacit assumption that the
    proper end of human activity is survival, and this rests on the
    simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to continue in existence. ..."


    It leaves me thinking that you simply do not understand the meaning of the term "good".

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  170. The second to the last paragraph in my 5:10 pm comment to RH reduplicated itself.

    It should have read:

    "When you leave the realm of either absurdities or synonymous and/or derivative functions, you end up back with the “final cause” of the legs."

    I had stored the personal take reply RH and dguller had earlier requested of me on an acquaintances' blog for possible reference; not intending to clog Professor Feser's bandwidth with the extended if offhand ruminations of a non-philosopher; and worrying that someone might imply that what I am saying in any way represents Professor Feser's views to any degree.

    It obviously does not.

    My copying or shortening up the requested reply for the combox misfired.


    Apologies ...

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  171. affection is in fact the conscious manifestation of a biological need to “repair genetic damage”

    That seems rather weak... as affection doesn't really aid in the goal of repairing genetic damage. It does however help humans cooperate, and protect offspring (both actions are beneficial towards human survival).

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  172. StoneTop said: “affection is in fact the conscious manifestation of a biological need to repair genetic damage”
    ---
    That seems rather weak... as affection doesn't really aid in the goal of repairing genetic damage. It does however help humans cooperate, and protect offspring (both actions are beneficial towards human survival).


    I did say that it was only a hypothesis or a conjecture and possibly a “bit of a stretch”. But I will agree with you in the premise that affection does “help humans cooperate and protect offspring” – as does Dr. Feser:

    All of these pleasures and affections exist in nature only because sexual reproduction does, and thus their point is to facilitate procreation, again in the full sense of not only generating, but also rearing, children. [The Last Superstition; pg 144]

    But my point was to suggest that that affection can still be present in homosexual marriages – as no small amount of evidence would seem to confirm – and can act to the same ends, at least the end of rearing the children. Hence it appears an unjustified prejudice – if not unwise – to be denying individuals the rights and benefits of such relationships.

    In addition, as Feser has emphasized the causal role of affection – the “conscious manifestation of a biological need” – in “generating children” and, as I had indicated, as the leading theory for the origin of sexual reproduction is “to repair genetic damage” it still seems not totally implausible to combine those in the hypothesis, as stated earlier, that “affection is in fact the conscious manifestation of a biological need to repair genetic damage”. Although maybe that is only “trivially true” ....

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  173. DNW said: … not intending to clog Professor Feser's bandwidth with the extended if offhand ruminations of a non-philosopher

    For a non-philosopher, though being in that boat myself, I would say you give a pretty fair approximation of one ...

    Is that your field or some other one related to it?

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  174. Steersman said...

    " DNW said: '… not intending to clog Professor Feser's bandwidth with the extended if offhand ruminations of a non-philosopher '

    For a non-philosopher, though being in that boat myself, I would say you give a pretty fair approximation of one ...

    Is that your field or some other one related to it?
    August 28, 2011 10:25 PM "


    I had to think for a moment about how to answer your question without being misleading or appearing coy.

    The short answer is that philosophy is not my field; as a relatively recent e-mail of mine to professor Feser on the subject of Bertrand Russell no doubt illustrated quite nicely. The answer I was looking for him to provide was spelled out early on in the very essay on Logical Atomism to which I was by implication and dim memory referring.

    A slightly more involved explanation is that if I had chosen to do so, I could have selected philosophy as my major. My school didn't offer double majors based merely on accumulated credits and sufficient grade levels, so I chose something else.

    But I enjoyed it. Especially Medieval philosophy and logic, and modern analytic philosophy. Even Phenomenology, to some extent.

    It seems the question of universals is a perennial one; the ostensible answers to which, continue to shape our notions of moral relations.

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  175. You are committing an over generalization in reference to "New Atheists" as many of us do give valid arguments against religion, and in particular, Christianity, and we do go through the dialectical process. The fact that I do this shows how ridiculous your assertions are--as it only takes one to refute your claim.

    On the other hand, we can cite Christian bloggers who also do what you claim. Many do not even allow comments that disagree with their posts. Note, that this is a problematic classification issue, as your description is too broad, as it would include some "New Christian" bloggers as well.

    You can view my blog and offer your own counter arguments, and we will see just how well you do.

    Please note however, just how easily I handled your "Argumentum ad Himmlerum" and be warned that if you do take up my challenge you can expect more of the same. But if you happen to give a good argument or counter argument to mine, I will freely admit it and change my view if I cannot come up with a better argument or counter argument.

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  176. I suppose I can take it from the fact that I've been banned from commenting on your blog that you're as full of hooey as the rest of your crowd?

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  177. "I suppose I can take it from the fact that I've been banned from commenting on your blog that you're as full of hooey as the rest of your crowd?"

    What a strange comment.

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