Sunday, July 24, 2011

Grow up or shut up

I’ve pointed out that the argument so many atheists like to attack when they purport to refute the cosmological argument -- namely “Everything has a cause; so the universe has a cause; so God exists” or variants thereof -- is a straw man, something no prominent advocate of the cosmological argument has ever put forward.  You won’t find it in Aristotle, you won’t find it in Aquinas, you won’t find it in Leibniz, and you won’t find it in the other main proponents of the argument.  Therefore, it is unfair to pretend that refuting this silly argument (e.g. by asking “So what caused God?”) is relevant to determining whether the cosmological argument has any force.    

I’ve also noted other respects in which the cosmological argument is widely misrepresented.  Now, in response to these points, it seems to me that what a grownup would say is something like this: “Fair enough.  I agree that atheists should stop attacking straw men.  They should avoid glib and ill-informed dismissals.  They should acquaint themselves with what writers like Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. actually said and focus their criticisms on that.”  But it would appear that Jason Rosenhouse and Jerry Coyne are not grownups.  Their preferred response is to channel Pee-wee Herman:  “I know you are, but what am I?” is, for them, all the reply that is needed to the charge that New Atheists routinely misrepresent the cosmological argument.  

In particular, Rosenhouse, who is curiously silent on this charge -- though it is, after all, the point at issue -- has decided to change the subject.  Like the teenager who, when caught red-handed with the evidence of his drug use, responds by criticizing Mom and Dad’s drinking habits, Rosenhouse  works himself into an adolescent dudgeon over how I’ve allegedly misrepresented Robin Le Poidevin.  And how exactly have I misrepresented him?  That is never made clear.  I said that Le Poidevin presents a variation of the straw man as if it were “the basic” cosmological argument.  And he does.  I said that Le Poidevin presents the “more sophisticated versions” he considers later on in his book as “modifications” of that straw man.  And he does.  I did not deny that Le Poidevin addresses these more sophisticated versions.  I explicitly noted that he does.  Nor did I say that Le Poidevin claimed that Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. actually defended the straw man argument themselves.  Indeed, I quoted Le Poidevin as acknowledging that “no-one has defended a cosmological argument of precisely this form.”  Rather, I said that readers who are unfamiliar with what Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. actually wrote are liable to come away from a discussion like Le Poidevin’s with the false impression that what the major defenders of the cosmological argument are up to is, essentially, merely an attempt at a patch-up job on a manifestly feeble argument.  And I explicitly said that I was not claiming that Le Poidevin was deliberately trying to give this false impression, but rather that he should know better. 

So, again, how exactly did I misrepresent him?  It turns out that Rosenhouse’s real complaint, to the extent he has any, reduces to another adolescent trope.  My problem, you see, is that I need to lighten up.  I’m “overreacting” to what was merely a “pedagogical” exercise on Le Poidevin’s part.  Beginning his treatment of the cosmological argument with the straw man was simply Le Poidevin’s gentle way of ”introducing” a complicated topic to undergraduates.  

Well, we all know why this dodge won’t work.  Suppose a creationist writer began his exposition of Darwinism by presenting the claim that “Monkeys gave birth to humans” as “the basic” claim of the theory, of which the “more sophisticated versions” of Darwinism he would consider later were variants.  Naturally, he would have little trouble showing that this claim (which no Darwinist has ever made) is false.  But suppose he defended this odd approach as merely a “pedagogical” technique for “introducing” Darwinism to his readers.  And suppose he also held that any biologist who finds this procedure outrageous is merely “overreacting.”  Rosenhouse and Co. would, quite rightly, be unimpressed.  And neither should we be impressed by Rosenhouse’s lame defense of Le Poidevin. 

To be sure, Rosenhouse thinks he has preempted such a comparison: 

The claim that a monkey gave birth to a human is not an oversimplified version of Darwinism that might serve as a helpful stepping stone into a complex topic.  It is just a completely made up idea tossed off specifically to make evolution look foolish.  

But of course, this is no answer at all, but merely reinforces my point.  For the straw man version of the cosmological argument we’ve been discussing is no less a completely made up idea, one tossed off to make the cosmological argument look foolish.  How do we know this?  Well, here’s some pretty good evidence: First, as I keep pointing out -- and, you will note, as Rosenhouse and his ilk never deny (because they can hardly deny it) -- Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, and the other prominent defenders of the cosmological argument never gave the straw man argument.  Second, the only people who ever do pay the straw man argument much attention are atheist critics of the cosmological argument, and they typically present precisely it as a reason to dismiss the cosmological argument as foolish.

So, the cases are parallel and Le Poidevin’s procedure is no more defensible than that of our imaginary creationist.  No doubt Rosenhouse, as is his wont, will at this point just stamp his foot some more.  “The cases are not parallel!  Are not!  Are not not not not not!” 

But then, Rosenhouse isn’t one to notice when he’s merely making unsupported assertions or begging the question.  For example, in an earlier post, he had written: 

Feser seems rather taken with [the cosmological argument], but there are many strong refutations to be found in the literature.  Off the top of my head, I found Mackie's discussion in The Miracle of Theism and Robin Le Poidevin's discussion in Arguing for Atheism to be both cogent and accessible. 

I then pointed out that this merely begged the question against defenders of the cosmological argument, which (given the context) it quite obviously does.  But the obvious is never obvious enough for Rosenhouse, who in his latest post writes: 

My point was simply that I think the cosmological argument is not very good, and that I think Mackie and Le Poidevin provided cogent and accessible refutations of it.  How could I have been clearer?  I have no idea what question I was begging by expressing those particular opinions. 

Well, Prof. Rosenhouse, here’s a clue:  Whether the cosmological argument is “not very good” and whether writers like Le Poidevin and Mackie have actually “refuted” it are precisely what is at issue between yourself and defenders of the cosmological argument like me.  And merely to assume some proposition which is at issue instead of arguing for it -- as you did when, in response to my advocacy of the cosmological argument, you asserted matter-of-factly that the argument had been “refuted” by the likes of Mackie and Le Poidevin -- is a textbook instance of what logicians call “begging the question.”  But then, in between all those volumes on Aquinas and Leibniz you haven’t read, it seems there are a few logic textbooks you haven’t gotten to either.

Those who are interested in other curious examples of undefended assertion are directed to the rest of Rosenhouse’s post.  But beyond providing us with Exhibit 2,345 of the Higher Cluelessness that is the New Atheism, Rosenhouse’s remarks on this controversy are absolutely devoid of interest.  As I’ve said, in response to the points I made in my earlier post, an atheist who is also a grownup would at least be happy to acknowledge that atheists should not attack straw men and should deal instead with what the major defenders of the cosmological argument actually said.  Yet Rosenhouse can’t even bring himself to do that much before launching into his botched “Gotcha!” exercise.  And that pretty much says it all.

609 comments:

  1. ACurious Mind,

    "Of course, there's nothing wrong with citing anyone, it's just that this particular citation of Feynman seems somehow...dishonest to me. I can't really explain that, and I am more that willing to let this string of argument die now. No more squabbling over who cited whom with what intent, alright?"

    No problem, I'll let you two go at it. I just noticed because I was the first to link to that particular post above, after one of Steve Smith's revelations...

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  2. @Martin:
    Well, you (and Feser too) missed to explain why it is in any way sensible to suppose that there is something "behind the laws", as this is what the cosmological argument seemingly boils down to. Why do you suppose that the laws have to be caused (what does causality even mean in the absence of time?)?

    I wrote (to show what you "missed"):
    You have to show that asking "Why this and nothing else?" is a question that can have a meaningful, falsifiable answer.

    and

    But about that point, where/when there was nothing but the laws, we cannot say anything. because time, space, energy, and everything else we automatically presuppose in our human thinking did not exist. We cannot say anything.

    I believe this is a bit more than just "where the laws came from is not a sensible question, per scientists.", as I explained why it is not a sensible question.

    And about that "grow a thicker skin" thing: I am not going to, because I was not personally offended, as you seem to have concluded. I was dismayed by the display of intellectual dishonesty that I (thought I) saw, and I called you out on that. It was not about being offensive. It was about not being argumentative and rational.

    @Steve: I'm sorry, but your post is not going to solve anything. They will go on arguing that your notion of "quantum tunneling" is not "nothing", and there we are again...

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  3. I can ignore your equivocations as you've ignored our objections to this.

    That word doesn't mean what you think it means, as I've taken great care to say what nothing means in physical theories.

    And, on the contrary, I haven't ignored the responses here. Rather, I feel that my response has been ignored, so I'll ask again:

    Arithmetic is part of physics. What causes the equation 0 = (+1) + (–1)? How is Feser's explanation that physics causes photons any different from the premise of Guth and Hawkings explanation of a universe ex nihilo?

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  4. Arithmetic is part of physics.

    what.

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  5. Steve Smith,

    Uhhhhh....did you miss my comments addressing both your points?

    Above at 10:17 Am and 3:17 PM

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  6. Brian rightly said...

    "dguller: 'Perhaps Jesus’ true teachings were lost, and only a distorted version is what was transmitted? How would we ever know, given the limited archeological and textual record?'

    Well, yeah, that is always a possibility in history, but the mere possibility of that is not anything that should be concerning. I think I wrote on this briefly in a response to you several comments up."



    I for one, have no idea if what is reported, say in the Gospels, is perfectly accurate or not.

    As far as I know the Catholic Church does not itself claim they are direct and uniform renditions of Apostolic dogma or a serially exact account of events; or at least offers provisos regarding the same.


    Yet an assumption that somehow there cannot in principle be an accurate rendition, or that there is no way of telling say an historically plausible account of events apart from something like Gnostic nonsense, is nonsense.


    Suppose you are 45 years old and your grandmother died 20 years ago.

    Suppose your father, 80 years old, is still clear of mind.

    How far does your family's institutional memory go back?

    Do you recall what your grandmother told you of her early life back when you were 20 to 25?

    I know the name of the college mine attended, and I don't believe it is written down to this day in any records I have ready to hand.


    Could you do you suppose recheck your memory of various details with your father or uncles and aunts? Does the family still own the house or land that could trigger recall?

    Maybe one doesn't remember because one never cared, and because there was nothing in one's family's history worth, or judged by one as worth, remembering.

    But events people do consider significant tend to be kept in memory.

    Don't your parents know who stood up at their wedding?

    The assumption that anyone writing about events that took place 30 to 50 years before is bound to write based on memories that are so garbled as to be completely unreliable, seems to fly in the face of experience.

    Some people are liars and delusional; but many are not.

    Your dad or grandfather never told you what ship he served on during the war in the South Pacific, or about that time they captured a German jet parked off the autobahn? "We sawed a piece of the canopy off. It was some kind of clear plastic"

    That was 60 plus years ago.

    And, shortening up the time frame quite a bit, while I may not remember or even have mentally recorded many of the impressionistic details of that accident which I witnessed across the freeway and which sent some strangers in a minivan flipping end over end through the air; I quite clearly recall Professor Turner standing before the class lecturing on logic, and fiddling with his leather watchband as he spoke on the testing of hypotheses.

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  7. ACuriousMind: "Everything behaves according to the laws"

    But aren't you insisting that NOTHING behaves according to the laws as well? Do you see the irony of this?

    What I get from this entire discussion is that science is finally discovering what theologians have known for a long time - that the universe was created from nothing and that elemental particles, even now, require an explanation that transcends the boundaries of space/time. Their equations don't work unless that is true.

    So what are we arguing about?

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  8. @Daniel:

    I am not claiming that nothing behaves according to the laws, I am claiming that we can never know for sure if the set of laws that we have discovered are truly ultimate or complete. Furthermore, "Everything behaves according to the laws" is to be read as "Everything we have hitherto discovered has in every single instance we were able to observe behaved according to the laws." which allows us, by induction, to believe reasonably that "Everything behaves according to the laws" as long as no counterexample is found.
    It seems my understanding of the scientific method is definitely not as widespread as I assumed...

    What I get from this entire discussion is that science is finally discovering what theologians have known for a long time - that the universe was created from nothing and that elemental particles, even now, require an explanation that transcends the boundaries of space/time.
    "was created" is exactly the part in question. Physicists will insist that we cannot talk about anything being "created" at a state without time (or at least they will demand that you define "creation"). And that the origin of the laws is beyond human reasoning, for they have existed since the dawn of time itself.
    "particles require an explanation" is the other part in question. While pointing again to Bell's inequality and demand a paradox-free concept of non-local hidden variables, I will say that there cannot be a causal explanation for the strange findings of QM, which makes it hard to argue for causality to be true (which is, as I understand it, needed for all versions of the cosmological argument). Things do not require explanation. It seems they simply happen. (Caveat: This is simplified. But I will not discuss the interpretations of QM here unless all other issues are discussed satisfyingly, as such discussion tend to become tedious, technical, and often confusing).

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  9. Above at 10:17 Am and 3:17 PM

    These statements are entirely wrong and it should be immediately obvious why they fail to address everything I have written and the facts I've presented.

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  10. Steve Smith,

    It surely isn't obvious to me. Otherwise I would not have said it. Perhaps you'd care to elaborate.

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  11. science is finally discovering what theologians have known for a long time - that the universe was created from nothing and that elemental particles, even now, require an explanation that transcends the boundaries of space/time. … So what are we arguing about?

    There is no god in these ex nihilo explanations, and they raise the question, which Einstein said was the one that really interested him, whether god had any choice in the creation of the universe.

    And, sorry, you've missed the bubble if you believe that particles require an explanation that transcends space and time.

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  12. lol steve u mad.

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  13. >This is what physicists mean by "nothing". Nonexistent space-time, subject to the laws of quantum mechanics.


    Naturally but it is not what philosophers mean.

    Get over it guy.

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  14. There is no god in these ex nihilo explanations, and they raise the question, which Einstein said was the one that really interested him, whether god had any choice in the creation of the universe.

    And, sorry, you've missed the bubble if you believe that particles require an explanation that transcends space and time.


    The fact that you or anyone else are willing to stamp your feet and say "I believe things happen utterly without cause!" doesn't add up to much more than "Steve and some other people believe some crazy stuff".

    Say it with me now: The cause cannot be physical as we understand the term. If there is a cause for these events, it would have to be an immaterial cause according to what we know. This conclusion will not bother people who are not materialists.

    You are more than welcome to insist that some events are causeless. For that matter, insist Last Thursdayism is true if you like. But when you say what amounts to "Scientists have witnessed things popping into existence from absolute nothingness uncaused!", you're just making it clear that you're engaged in some babble. You've mistaken your strange faith commitment for "science has shown".

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  15. DNW,

    "But, rather than actually argue that the only objective reality universals possessed as universals was the arbitrary name they were assigned and thus had in common, you went on to attack Feser instead; claiming that you had successfully undermined his position."

    I'm not sure what you mean by this. I read through the thread and this is the only thing I found that has any resemblance to your accusation: you asked me to "live up to your boast that you would defend a very radical nominalism." I didn't know then and I still don't know what your definition of "a very radical nominalism" is. I do know I'm not obliged to defend your definition of nominalism. I defended mine. My version simply denies the ontological being of absolutes or forms. Mine denies "form" mixes with matter to produce objects. It denies mathematics is based on pure abstraction.

    Furthermore, you'll have to provide the quotes from that thread which show me as attacking Feser. I think anyone who reads what I said will conclude you are imagining that attack.

    Then please provide the quotes in which I claim I had "successfully undermined his position."

    I hope you are merely imagining things rather than resorting to blatant dishonesty.

    "That is why squabbling with you is a waste of time."

    Let's see. In this present thread Gail F wrongly characterized my position as denying causality. I've been so adamant on the overwhelming nature of causality that I don't know how any rational person could have gotten it so wrong. Then Josh made false claims about how patiently people in another thread had explained things to me. That was so wrong I don't know how he could have arrived at his bizarre conclusion. And now you are doing something very similar. So what's up? When the crew here gets things so consistently wrong about little old me, why should anyone take your really big claims on the nature of reality seriously? Is it too much to ask you to first prove you can be trusted with the little stuff?

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  16. Djindra,

    Anyone can go read the thread of that discussion (or generally any other that you take part in), and see how you consistently obfuscate. You explicitly call Ed's philosophy "arbitrary" in your first post there, and when people start to respond to you, it should be clear to anyone who reads your responses that you WON'T ever admit you've made a mistake, even when you do. You can't understand the difference between 'instantaneously' and 'simultaneously'? Really? That's just your first issue in that thread.

    Your strategy: pretend not to understand what a person has said, equivocating terms or whatnot, then proceed to misstate their position. It's ALL OVER that thread; it's actually comical. And it's a great troll strategy, which is why I still harbor suspicion that you are one, in which case, BRAVO!!! You are the #1 in my book. Seriously.

    But if you aren't, well, look man, you can see how we have treated dguller, chuck, etc. recently, not because they have shown an accommodationist bent, but simply because if they are going to reject arguments they are going to do them on the same terms. You can get there too and we'll all be happier for it, if you'll quit misstating positions and terms. And as for me, I'll put aside the insults. Deal?

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  17. The cause cannot be physical as we understand the term. If there is a cause for these events, it would have to be an immaterial cause according to what we know.

    "Cannot" is a fairly strong term, requiring very strong supporting evidence... otherwise you are just using rhetoric to dodge the question by constructing a definition that is untestable and unfalsifiable.

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  18. "Cannot" is a fairly strong term, requiring very strong supporting evidence... otherwise you are just using rhetoric to dodge the question by constructing a definition that is untestable and unfalsifiable.

    Dodge the question? Steve is *agreeing* with that much. He's saying that there is no physical cause for these quantum events because there is no cause, period. I'm pointing out that the options are broader than there being a physical cause. The entire way of framing the question may rest on some crappy metaphysics.

    Try reading the exchange before you jump in to play cheerleader for the person you think is on your side.

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  19. I'm pointing out that the options are broader than there being a physical cause.

    However once you postulate that "something broader" is causing the phenomena the question then becomes "how is that causing the phenomena?"

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  20. Ahhh...finally we come back to the point in question without fiddling over QM details.
    1. A while back I asked how anything that is not matter/energy could cause matter/energy to do anything, and none of the metaphysicists here bothered to answer.
    2. Also, no one has bothered to explain how we can maintain the concept of causality in the absence of time (or space, for that matter).
    3. Further, I have not seen any explanation of in how far postulation metaphysical causes, which cannot be observed and therefore not be falsified, contribute anything to our understanding. If I cannot tell the difference between a world in which particles are uncaused and a world in which some mysterious unobservable thing causes them, then the question whether or not it exists simply fall prey to Occam's razor - why believe in it if the world looks the same without it?
    Before discussing anything else, I want answers to these points (if they are already given, just present a link to them).

    If anyone thinks he can satisfyingly answer the questionss above, here is another one:
    Why should we believe causality is true, if QM shows that no local hidden variable can possibly influence some of the seemingly uncaused events, and that non-local hidden variables always produce paradoxes (as far as have seen)?

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  21. Josh,

    "Your strategy: pretend not to understand what a person has said, equivocating terms or whatnot, then proceed to misstate their position. It's ALL OVER that thread"

    Give one example. Truth is, you've shown yourself to be an unreliable witness on what actually goes on in these threads.

    "You can't understand the difference between 'instantaneously' and 'simultaneously'? Really?"

    Outside the possibility of gravity, suppose you tell me what happens instantly -- in the real world, not in a fanciful imaginary world. I do understand the difference. Humans cannot perceive the delays that are inherent in nature.

    "because if they are going to reject arguments they are going to do them on the same terms."

    Therefore they are accommodationist, or playing that way for sake of argument. I won't argue from a false set of first principles. If I believe an assumption is wrong, I'm going to reject it as a firm basis of deductive truth. Tell me why that's illogical.

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  22. E.H. Munro said...
    "Wolfgang Smith graduated ... and others. "

    Which of those qualification means he is not a crank. There have al;wasy been cranks with great experience and knowledge. It's hard to be a good crank without it.

    Truly, he is far less qualified to speak on matters of math and physics than pre-eminents if the fields like yourself.

    The most qualified people still speak incorrectly.

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  23. I'm sorry to post again, but reading "instantaneous" and "simultaneous" made me feel I have to (Warning: I do not know what the commenters were talking about with these words. I just want to point out that they are both impossible to talk about, regradless of the actual topic):
    There is no such thing as "simultaneity" (at least it is nothing two observers who are moving at different speeds would ever be able to agree about). Go read a bit about Relativity (Special is enough, no need to confuse yourselves with the General one), and you will see that our naive intuitive notion of time is very far from what the universe we live in actually looks like.
    Similar case with "instantaneous". No information can possibly be transmitted faster than the speed of light. (Caveat: We know of no possbility, and overwhelming evidence points to GR being correct. If you think you figured out a way anything can happen instantaneous, let us know. But it is very likely that your concept can not happen in the world as we observe it to be).

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  24. DNW said...
    The assumption that anyone writing about events that took place 30 to 50 years before is bound to write based on memories that are so garbled as to be completely unreliable, seems to fly in the face of experience.

    Yet, we have all heard people talk about significant events in their life whose drama increased with each retelling, it's a cultural meme. The high-school football halfback whose big game gains another five yards or a touchdown every few years. The child whose recollections of parent abuse reflect increasing severe punishments. Etc.

    You mentioned the ability to access family records and other forms of concrete evidence. We know Michael Jordan's championship-winning shot in 98 finals was not at teh buzzer because we still have tape that shows time left on the clock, but without that tape, I guarantee you most people today would think it came at the buzzer (I heard people say it). 1900 years ago, there was no tape and no anchoring ocumentation. It would be against human nature if the events of some ministry did not get played up and dramatized.

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  25. For those interested, Dr. Vallicella has a post on matter and form. I will be interested to see if Dr. Feser responds.

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  26. ACuriousMind,

    There is no such thing as "simultaneity"

    But we're supposed to get into a medieval frame of mind and stop being so tediously obstinate.

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  27. djindra,
    I have still hope that at least some of them know how to defend their idea facing the findings of modern science. Or, at least, tell me why I should not insist on what is demonstrably how the universe is.
    I hope this is not all about simply believing that some medieval men who had no idea whatsoever what the world was like got it all right beforehand.
    Hope, you know. That thing that dies last...

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  28. The relativity of simultaneity applies to the order of linear, per accidens or "accidentally ordered" causes, not to the order of hierarchical, per se or "essentially ordered" causes. The Thomistic arguments for God make use of the latter, and not the former, notion of causation, so the issue is irrelevant.

    'some medieval men who had no idea whatsoever what the world was like'

    Not even the properties of matter are matter.

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  29. @Will:
    What is a "essential cause"? By googling it, I have gathered that "y is a essential cause for x if y is necessary for x to exist". Is this correct?
    If no, explain what you mean by "essential cause".
    If yes, explain why essential causes do not have to precede their effects in time.

    Not even the properties if matter are matter.
    What? It's certainly true, but who said they were?

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  30. Will, fair warning, sir:

    Exercise In Futility.

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  31. DNW & Brian:

    Regarding the historical accuracy of ancient records, I have to say that I am highly skeptical of any ability to know anything beyond broad outlines of historical events the farther back in time we go.

    And this is due to a number of issues that are well described in the books that I mentioned earlier.

    First, there are well-known cognitive biases and distortions, especially around memory, that have been examined and found to be universally present to varying extents. This applies to modern human beings and ancient human beings, and thus unless ancient texts can be independently corroborated, then they should be taken with extreme skepticism.

    Second, there is the issue of whether the sample of texts that we have is actually representative. With any event, there is a wide variation in how the event can be interpreted. Most are in the middle and probably closer to the truth of what happened, but there are always extreme and outlying interpretations by eccentric individuals and groups. The farther back in time we go, the less number of texts we have, and the less ability we have to determine whether the texts that we have are closer to the middle or to the extremes, and that is a huge problem that limits our historical knowledge.

    Third, we have an inherent tendency to create chronological narratives that follow a causal explanation of events, and this tendency operates even when the details are sparse. There are a number of psychological studies that demonstrate this. This is important, because we can all come up with a coherent narrative of some ancient historical event that is consistent with the evidence, but just because an explanation makes sense does not mean it is true, and without independent corroboration in the form of evidence that just isn’t available, we have to add huge caveats to our interpretations of history, especially the farther back we go.

    Given those three points, I am comfortable with accepting that someone named Jesus Christ existed, but I am uncomfortable with accepting any detailed accounts of his true teachings. We have some texts that describe interpretations of his teachings, but we have no idea whether they are accurate representations of his teachings, or whether they are constructions that have fallen prey to the number of cognitive distortions that we are all vulnerable to. And without a better sample of ancient documents, we just do not know one way or the other. This significantly weakens the foundations of Christian thought, I think, and in a way that cannot be patched up, because it is not a Christian issue at all, but an ancient history issue. I am comfortable saying that we really do not know what happened at that time other than some broad outlines, and a few specifics here and there. And believe me, this is coming from someone who LOVES reading ancient history.

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  32. dguller:We have some texts that describe interpretations of his teachings, but we have no idea whether they are accurate representations of his teachings, or whether they are constructions that have fallen prey to the number of cognitive distortions that we are all vulnerable to.

    That's what you keep saying, dguller. But as I have said, I don't think there is any reason to think that at all.

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  33. Will said...
    The relativity of simultaneity applies to the order of linear, per accidens or "accidentally ordered" causes, not to the order of hierarchical, per se or "essentially ordered" causes.

    I agree. Hierarchical, per se, and/or essentially ordered causes are not simultaneous in any fashion, so in particular the relativity of simultaneity is not applicable.

    The Thomistic arguments for God make use of the latter, and not the former, notion of causation, so the issue is irrelevant.

    However, once you drop the simultaneity from essentially ordered causal connections, the Thomistic arguments for God fall apart.

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  34. @Josh:

    Exercise In Futility.

    Please point me to concise answers to the questions I raise, and I will either stop asing them, or object to the answers. But all I have hitherto heard from the "Thomists" are claims that I either to not understand (terminologically, that is) at all or that seem to rest on assumptions that I think are false.
    It is not futile to answer my questions. I would be futile if I had been given clear answers and failed to address them - yet it seems to me it is you that fail to address me. As said, I hope that there is something substantial about this whole mess and I want to understand what exactly it is that you are trying to tell me. If you think it is futile to explain yourself (and I have asked quite precise questions, I think, not some vague "I do not understand"; if you believe to have already answered my questions, simply quote yourself and I'll see if the mistake is on my side), then so be it. But I do not think this would raise anyone's confidence in your philosophy.

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  35. @ACuriousMind:

    Disabuse yourself of your ignorance of essentially ordered causal series here and here.

    Re: the relevance of the properties of matter not being matter, remember: materialism is the view that only matter exists. Again, please disabuse yourself of your ignorance here and here.

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  36. 'It is not futile to answer my questions.'

    Well, to be fair to Josh, it is mildly odd that you obviously haven't read any of the major thinkers whose ontology, which you have already termed a 'mess', you want so badly to 'understand'.

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  37. Well, "mess" was directed at this discussion here, not meant to degrade any view that might be presented here.
    And if you fix your links, I will gladly read what you provide, and then come back to discuss this issue properly.

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  38. I mean, seriously! Is it just verificationism, positivism, scientism, etc. over and over? No one's real education, whether you are going to be a theist or not, can start until you reject that self-refuting nonsense!

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  39. @Josh:
    Where have I been a "verificationist"? I think I have been very careful to make it clear that I do not think that any statement about reality can be proven true, which is why I always insist that possible views must be able to be falsified. Falsification is the process by which science gains knowledge, and I seriously do not know where your idea of "positivism" and "scienticism" comes from. Science mainly relies on Popper's Critical Rationalism (which is the epistemic view I also adhere to) that is exactly as disapproving of verificationism and positivism as you seem to be.

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  40. Let's try again:

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/first-without-second.html

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/materialist-shell-game.html

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/12/churchland-on-dualism-part-ii.html

    @ OneBrow: Not at all, because, unlike an accidentally ordered causal series, an essentially ordered one does not extend through time. It is one event considered under different descriptions. See Ed's example in TLS of a hammer smashing a window.

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  41. Brian:

    >> That's what you keep saying, dguller. But as I have said, I don't think there is any reason to think that at all.

    It is like having an equation: M = x + y + z. We know that x = 5, but we do not know what y and z are. You say that M = 10, because x = 5 is consistent with M = 10. And we have no reason to think that y and z have values that do not add up to 5. The problem is that there is no reason to think that they add up to 5, either, and so we just do not know. All we can say is that x = 5 and M = 10 are possible, but we cannot say that it is necessary.

    Historical narratives about ancient history are like that equation. There are a number of variables in the form of ancient texts that combine to form a coherent historical narrative, but problem is that for every x that we know, there are a larger number of y and z that we do not know, and unless we know y and z, we cannot know if our value of M is the right one, but only a possible one.

    Here’s another way to think about it.

    Say that I take the height measurements of 20 people in a town of 3,000, and I find that their average height is 6 feet. Can I say that the average height of the town is also 6 feet? What if the 20 people who showed up to be measured happened to be the tallest people in the town? Then my sample is biased and unrepresentative. How can I correct for this? Take a larger sample, and randomize it. Unless I do this, then I cannot trust the result, because there are a huge number of chance and confounding factors that could be swaying the result away from the true value, and I would be utterly clueless about it. It would be best to just admit that the average height could be 6 feet, but I just do not know for sure.

    Hope this helps.

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  42. @Will:
    Thanks. Read and understood, and I think.
    So an essential cause is one whose existence is necessary for its effect (or it's successor in the chain) to exist, right? (This is why there was talk of them existing "simultaneously", but I do not think this notion is relevant any more). I understand why then there is only one First Cause, and I understand how some of its properties emerge.
    The whole idea of essential causes rests on the notions of potency and actuality, right? (Meaning that the First Cause cannot be anything but purely actual, for otherwise it could be changed, and would therefore be contingent, and not necessary to exist in its postulated manner) And that is where I wonder why Thomists so confidently assume that potency and actuality actually (excuse the pun) correspond to reality. Potency is "the ability of a thing to change" (right?), and changing into another actual state is called motion, right?
    1. What is a thing? Is the condition of a thing satisfied by "it exists"? If yes, then can multiple things (e.g. atoms) compose another thing (e.g. a molecule)? (Note: I am not sure whether this is relevant, but I am, well, curious)
    2. Why are you sure that "potency" and "actuality" actually (excuse the pun) correspond to reality? I. e. why do Thomists assume that their idea of essential causality is anything but a logical construct, resting on the premise that "the ability to change" is indeed something that matters? How is potency defined, if the First Cause is omnipotent (which would mean to me that it (he?) can cause anything to become anything else? Is the "ability of something to change" not only limited by the power whatever tries to change it?
    3. Are not the laws of physics believed to be purely actual, that is, unchanging? Are they not omnipotent, in the respect that everything obeys them? Why do they not constitute to be a First Cause? (If you say "They could be otherwise", this is something I am not convinced of. We know not of a single occasion where a law changed. (Just of occasions where we improved our understanding of the laws, and thus changed our perception of them) Why should I believe that other laws are possible? Just because we can conceive of something, this does not mean it is possible, does it?)

    Feser's take on materialism, however, does not hit me, I think. I do not claim that I know how the subjective qualia (his RED, for example) of the self arise out of mere interaction of matter, and I do not know if anybody else claims to know (I know no one).
    What I know, however, is that the material components of the brain demonstrably affect the mental state of the individual (e.g lobotomy, epilepsy,...), which is evidence that our mental state is unseparably depending on the material brain. Which, in turn, seems to me to constitute the reasonable conjecture that those material processes indeed are responsible for the qualia, as alteration of the physical state alters the mental state. I cannot tell you how (yet), but I think I have made clear why it is reasonable to suppose that they do.
    Perceptions and feelings may be immaterial, but it is the material world that creates them, thus I see no problem with the materialistic position that everything can be explained by understanding the material world.

    PS: Am I doing this better now? ;)

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  43. Will said...
    Not at all, because, unlike an accidentally ordered causal series, an essentially ordered one does not extend through time. It is one event considered under different descriptions. See Ed's example in TLS of a hammer smashing a window.

    A single cause-effect connection can be considered simultaneous. Once you have have more than one connection, it is physically false to treat them as simultaneous. Hammer hitting glass, sure, it's one cause and one effect. Hand-stick-stone, not simutaneous.

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  44. One Brow,

    The key point, as Feser outlines in Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide, is the instrumental nature of the causes. Their finiteness and simultaneity are secondary.

    Ed discusses this more here: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html

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  45. Martin said...
    The key point, as Feser outlines in Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide, is the instrumental nature of the causes. Their finiteness and simultaneity are secondary.

    I agree that in terms of identification, neither finiteness nor simultaneity are important when identifying essentially ordered causes. In fact, they could only be applied to multiple causal connections to begin with. This is fortunate, as both are counter to reality anyhow when discussing multiple causal connections. However, witout finiteness and simultaneity, the First Way argument falls apart.

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  46. One Brow,

    I don't see how they are counter to reality.

    The water in my ice cube trays freezes because cold air is being applied.

    The air is cold because the freezer compressor is working.

    The freezer compressor is working because of electricity from the power company.

    Electricity is coming from the power company because of the generators.

    The generators are running via steam from boiling water.

    The water is boiling due to coal (or nuclear).

    The coal is burning because of the nuclear reactions of the molecules.

    Which depends on the strong force.

    Weak force.

    Molecular bonds.

    Etc.

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  47. dguller: Hope this helps.

    Not really. You have said before that you are not as familiar with biblical scholarship as you are with science and philosophy, so maybe that is the problem. You have a very vague skepticism that is propped up by your epistemic pessimism, especially as we go further back into time. What I am saying is that all of that is bullshit - I mean, it is theoretical musing that is not related to the specific case we are interested in. Even if we take a totally suspicious hermeneutic to the NT, we can still mine it with historical tools to discover just enough nuggets.

    Of course, that's just the historical approach. There are plenty of post-biblical miracles that we can appeal to that easily prove the truth of Catholicism.

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  48. ACuriousMind,

    'Created (caused) from nothing' is not the same as 'Created (caused) BY nothing'.

    The latter is a logical absurdity (like saying '0=1'), the former is not (it is like '1+0=0+1'.)

    To my mind, QM seems to be saying the latter when it can really only logically know the former.

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  49. @Daniel:
    I have never said that QM states (or even allows) creation by nothing (I agree that creation by nothing is a logical absurdity, as "creation" implies there is something that creates). I have argued that, in the absence of time (which is absent in the "vacuum state" or "inexistent spacetime" Steve refers to), "creation" as we know it cannot occur and needs to be redefined (which has, in some way, been done by Will by applying the notion of essential causes, but this problem is not yet sufficiently solved for me). It is Steve who insists that a universe ex nihilo (from nothing) is possible, while the Thomists insist that the laws (aka QM and GR) that govern this coming into existence (I hesitate to use "creation" here) are not nothing (which I kinda agree with). In my understanding, QM states that the universe will, without anything existing (see below for clarification), spontaneously (um, well, this adjective isn't really applicable either because there is no time) begin to exist (which is what Steve spread out in technical detail above) because the laws require (or rather, allow) it to. Now, this is creation from nothing by...what? The laws? The laws do not "exist", at least not in the way I understand that word. They exist only in the sense that, say, the rules of chess exist. Which is very different from the way, say, everything within the universe exists. I am really unsure about the ontological state (is this the right term?) of the physical laws. They do not exist in the sense the things they govern exist, but they are certainly not entirely nothing (which is exactly what Steve and the Thomists are fighting over, as I understand it).

    PS: I apologize for the flood of brackets...

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  50. Martin said...
    I don't see how they are counter to reality.

    I am happy to offer my assistance.

    The water in my ice cube trays freezes because cold air is being applied.

    The air is cold because the freezer compressor is working.

    ...
    Etc.


    Which of these consecutive steps happens simultaneously? For example, time passes between when the compressor cools the aair and then the cooled air freezes the ice. In fact, the water might freeze even after the freezer has been turned off. This is true of every step in your description.

    Here's one for you: a Newton's cradle. You drop the right-hand ball, and that ball stops before the left-hand ball moves, yet every transfer of act to potential in the cradle is per se causation, not per accidens.

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  51. One Brow,

    Which of these consecutive steps happens simultaneously?

    But remember, it is the instrumental nature, and not the simultaneity that is key. Yes, there is a delay from burning coal ---> frozen ice cubes. But unlike with a frictionless universe, if you remove the coal after the water has boiled the ice cubes will not freeze, even though there is a slight delay.

    Take any member out, and the ice cubes will not freeze.

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  52. On further thinking I have return to one of my prior questions: The Big Bang was the beginning of space, time, energy and whatever else we automatically presuppose in our human thinking. How can we say anything about a state in which there was no space, no time, nothing that we know? The whole story of causality, the whole story of metaphysics assumes that our logic (which has evolved inside this universe) and our notions of "existence", etc. are still meaningful without the very things upon which they are based/from which they are derived. But how can we justify this? How can we justify reasoning about a state of which we know nothing, which we cannot imagine, and which is, in prinicple, unaccessible to our senses. We can (in theory) establish the complete chain (ok, lattice) of causes back to the origin of the universe. And then? How do we even define anything that is beyond that? We cannot say "before the Big Bang", because there was no time. We cannot say "outside the universe", because the manifold of spacetime needs nothing to exist "in". We cannot even conceive of a name for what is beyond that (well, I, at the moment, cannot. I suspect nobody can, but I am willing to be disproven). Worse still, what means "what is beyond that" when only can talk about things having spatial and temporal extension (I cannot conceive of anything without having to ask "Where is it?" and "How long does it last?". And the answer, for anything that "caused" the laws or the Big Bang, has to be "It is nowhere, and it cannot last."). So how dare we imply that we can say anything meaningful? I cannot even grasp the idea of anything that is not "inside" the universe without being stupefied by these questions.
    And I would really appreciate someone to provide a satisfying solution to these problems.

    PS: You (all of you here) have successfully confused me. This is no accusation, but the reason why I am now going to bed.

    PPS: One Brow and Martin, why are you still arguing about the simultaneity of (essential?) causes? Martin said that it does not matter whether they are simultaneous or not, and Brow then said it matters. None of you provided any argument that I could have followed for either claim, and then Martin returned to claim that they are simultaneous indeed, while Brow insisted they are not.
    And now Martin is back to claiming that it is instrumentality, not simultaneity that matters. If One Brow now replies by saying that it is simultaneity that matters, the circle is complete.
    Shouldn't you be discussing whether simultaneity matters in the first place?
    And the confusion of my poor mind goes on...

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  53. Martin,

    "The water in my ice cube trays freezes because cold air is being applied."

    How long does the compressor have to run before the water freezes? I think your form of simultaneity is excruciatingly slow.

    Temperature is what we call the activity of molecules bumping into molecules. Even that takes time.

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  54. ACuriousMind, One Brow, Djindra,

    As I said, above:

    "But remember, it is the instrumental nature, and not the simultaneity that is key."

    "The key point, as Feser outlines in Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide, is the instrumental nature of the causes. Their finiteness and simultaneity are secondary. Ed discusses this more here: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html"

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  55. Martin,

    "The key point, as Feser outlines in Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide, is the instrumental nature of the causes. Their finiteness and simultaneity are secondary."

    I read through "Edwards on infinite causal series" and found it to be unconvincing. The most interesting item is that, as you state, Feser backtracks on the simultaneity issue. That puts his position in the same ball park as the temporal version of the cosmological argument. So as I've been saying, there's no fundamental difference in any of the versions.

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  56. @Martin

    One Brow has told me on another thread believes the term "simultaneous" is not a purely metaphysical description, but one with a direct physical meaning.

    Of course historically Thomists and Aristotelians have used the term to mean other than a direct physical meaning.

    That is what he isn't telling you.

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  57. djindra,

    Feser published Aquinas in 2009. In Aquinas he describes how the instrumental nature of the series is key, over and above its simultaneity.

    In 2010 he wrote the Edwards post.

    How is this "backtracking?"

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  58. These acts are simultaneous in that if you pull out one process the whole thing unravels.

    Now we have my father, myself and my son. This is an accidentally ordered series and there is no simultaneous causality here. Since if you took out one the other two are not effected at all.

    Now hand+stick+rock is an old Thomistic argument but I guess One insists Simultaneous must be synonymous with instantaneous.

    That is simply not true.

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  59. When the hand holds the stick which pushes a mountain, we find the great chain of being can push back considerably harder than a little stone does. But in that instant of man against mountain, what moves the mountain? I know, we're supposed to believe God is pushing the mountain which is pushing against the stick which is frustrating my chore. But God is also a wind at my back and grease on my elbow. So why does God not take my side on this issue? Apparently we have a situation where a member of my team is playing against me. But how can this be? The mountain doesn't appear to move when I merely stare at it. It's sitting there patiently waiting for something to move it. I clearly have greater will-power than a mountain. But maybe I'm looking at this all wrong. I'm told the mountain really isn't stationary. I'm told it's composed of molecules and atoms and all of these things are in motion at all times even though my human eyes cannot see this motion. When I push against the mountain, it pushes back because it too is in motion. It does, indeed, have motion within itself. It doesn't have to wait for me to move it. It's in motion already, completely self contained. And that's the reason it pushes back. Contrary to appearances, a mountain is a big heap of motion. So I'm back to square one. Essential chains bump heads together. Examples of chains of "instramental" causation must assume each link is passive to be a good example. But no link is truly passive. A Thomist may claim the links are not passive because God is keeping them active. But that uses the explanation of the phenomenon in the very example used to explain the phenomenon. And we often are told this is not good practice.

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  60. Martin,

    I'm sorry, I guess I should have said it's going one step forward, one step back -- depending on today's opponent.

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  61. Brian:

    >> You have a very vague skepticism that is propped up by your epistemic pessimism, especially as we go further back into time.

    It is not vague at all. It is quite clear that the more lacunae there are in our evidence base, the less secure are the inferences that we make based upon that sample of evidence. This is a general principle of science, and seems quite commonsensical to me. However, when you apply it to history, especially ancient history, then it becomes difficult to justify detailed historical narratives, because they seem to be dependent upon small set of textual evidence, often written by individuals far removed from the events being described, and thus prey to a number of possible cognitive biases and distortions that we are simply unable to correct for with independent evidence. This is a huge problem, I think.

    If you disagree that human beings have a tendency towards multiple cognitive biases and distortions that we have to take seriously, then that is your prerogative. The books that I have read on the subject have convinced me to take them seriously, because if you are serious about discovering the truth, then you have to take seriously those factors that cause deviation from the truth, and to correct for them, if possible. And if correction is impossible whether due to insufficient evidence, an unrepresentative sample, or any other reason, then one must be highly tentative in one’s conclusions, especially when one desperately wishes them to be true.

    I have profited from reading Feser’s works when I was recommended them to gain a better understanding of the perspective of those individuals posting here. All I can say is that I think that you would benefit from the following works:

    “Mistakes Were Made (but not by me)” by Carol Tavris

    “Don’t Believe Everything You Think” by Thomas Kida

    “The Black Swan” by Nassim Taleb

    “The Invisible Gorilla” by Christopher Chabris

    “Irrationality” by Stuart Sutherland

    They really changed my perspective on a number of issues, and have increased my care to avoid the various distortions that may be deceiving me into believing falsehoods.

    I hope you consider reading them, as well.

    Anyway, take care.

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  62. Martin said...
    But remember, it is the instrumental nature, and not the simultaneity that is key.

    Yes, I agreed to that earlier. I also agreed that individual connections are simultaneous. Neither of those points rescues the First Way. Once you give up simultaneity, the First Way proof is gone. Vapor, but less substance.

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  63. @Martin:

    Again, I am a bit puzzled by the notion of instrumentality. As I understand it, it means that whatever the cause does, its causal power lies not within itself, it means that it needs an antecedent in the chain per se in order to achieve its effect.
    Am I correct in assuming that "the causal power lies not in itself" is equivalent to "there is something without this cause would not have achieved its effect"? Is the notion of instrumentality not based on observation? We only observe causes that have antecedents (at least, that was what Aquinas could observe). So he always sees an antecedent, and therefore inductively declares that nothing in this universe can be a cause per se by itself because he never encountered one.
    Now, when we dig deep enough, it turns out we find things for which no cause is apparent (the laws of nature, which were, as far as I know, unknown that the time of medieval philosophy, or, if laws to not count as causes, the particles that behave without apparent causes (again, something Aquinas could not know)). Is the assumption that everything within the universe has an antecedent not proven wrong? Is there a logical reason other than (outdated) observation to believe that everything physical is only instrumental?
    Or have I again misunderstood what this is all about?

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  64. ACuriousMind said...
    PPS: One Brow and Martin, why are you still arguing about the simultaneity of (essential?) causes? Martin said that it does not matter whether they are simultaneous or not, and Brow then said it matters.

    First, please do not use just half my name.

    Second, simultaneity does not matter, or matters a great deal, depending on the particular argument being discussed. Simultaneity has been dropped from the description of a linkage of per se causes but it is counter to our knowledge of physics, and many people are bright enough to realize that the First Way proof means nothing if it is grounded in fairy-tale physics. However, simultaneity is essential for the First Way proof itself. So, I occasionally find myself in a circle such as "simultaneity is not part of the definition" -- "the First Way does not work without simultaneity" -- "well, these things really are simultaneous" -- "actually they are not smultaneous" -- "simultaneity is not part of the definition". Sometimes it will go around for multiple times.

    If One Brow now replies by saying that it is simultaneity that matters, the circle is complete.

    No, it's my turns to say that since they are not simultaneous, the First Way argument fails. Don't worry, you'll learn the script soon.

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  65. BenYachov said...
    Of course historically Thomists and Aristotelians have used the term to mean other than a direct physical meaning.

    That is what he isn't telling you.


    You mean, I forgot to tell him that the notion was extended to non-physical categorizations (like genus and species) in a manner that did not change the definition at all when applied to physical events? How careless of me. I may need to shave my brow!

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  66. BenYachov said...
    Now hand+stick+rock is an old Thomistic argument but I guess One insists Simultaneous must be synonymous with instantaneous.

    That is simply not true.


    If simultaneous is not, then simultaneous has no time limitations, at all. An per se causal series can (and apparently, they all do) stretch back to the beginning of the universe. The First Way is a dead argument.

    I'm good with that.

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  67. One Brow

    >If simultaneous is not, then simultaneous has no time limitations, at all.

    It doesn't have to be solely a physical description contrary to your ad hoc self-serving hidden definition. In the 40's the USA waged war in two simultaneous theaters of operation. It doesn't mean every battle in the Pacific Theater was instantaneously happening in correspondence with a battle in the European theater.


    An per se causal series can (and apparently, they all do) stretch back to the beginning of the universe. The First Way is a dead argument.

    This statement has no meaning. Aquinas never put forth a Kalam argument. Aquinas didn't believe it was possible to argue philosophically the universe had a beginning. The First Cause refers to hear and now.

    One Brow you can't argue coherently and it's clear even after all this time you don't know the subject matter.

    The objects in the Universe can be in an accidental causal series that stretches back forever. But here and now top down they are generated by an essential series. If you take one of those processes out of that series existence collapses.

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  68. >You mean, I forgot to tell him that the notion was extended to non-physical categorizations (like genus and species)

    As well as philosophy/

    >in a manner that did not change the definition at all when applied to physical events? How careless of me. I may need to shave my brow!

    You made a positive claim that the term "simultaneous" is not a purely metaphysical description, but one with a direct physical meaning.

    You are required to prove your extra-ordinary claim. So far you have declined and wish to shift the burden of proof.

    It will not be assumed here by anyone(except maybe the Troll djindra but he doesn't count).

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  69. @BenYachov and The One Brow (does this compensate for having shortened your Name?)

    Events/Things are simultaneous if and only if their extension in time is identical (i.e their beginnings and endings (if they have terminated already) in time coincide).

    or

    Events/Things are simultaneous for the period of time where their extensions in time overlap.

    Which definition do you adhere to? Or something else?

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  70. One Brow said:

    The First way is "grounded in" fairy tale physics?

    Is that the same as saying "derived from" or"based on" since in the other thread you said they are not the same and implied I was not honest for equivocating between those terms?

    It would help all involved if you where clear & consistent in both your arguments and general writing.

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  71. ACuriousMind,

    I don't see why I couldn't accept both those definitions? One Brow by necessity can only accept one of them or his criticism collapses.

    Historically words have more than one meaning.

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  72. BTW I never gave One Brow permission to shorten my name. Since he has on occasion called me Ben.

    I never cared of course because that would be petty.

    FYI "BenYachov" is Hebrew for "Son of James" which is me.

    But if anyone wants to call me Ben go ahead.

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  73. BenYachov:
    Historically words have more than one meaning.

    True. But when we are discussing logical arguments, it is necessary that we define every word to have a precise meaning, otherwise one side can always say "But I didn't mean simultaneous that way".
    Furthermore, the definitions I provided are not compatible.

    Let me rephrase my definitions:

    1. Events/Things are simultaneous if and only if the overlap between their extensions in time is identical to their extension.

    2. Events/Things are simultaneous if and only if the overlap between their extensions in time is non-zero.

    It should be obvious to someone that is so well versed in philosophy as you are that one cannot embrace both definitions without contradiction.

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  74. But what if you are not discussing physical processes in time per say but making a metaphysical description of it?

    Your assumption here is we are putting forth a physical description of a physical process. We are making a metaphysical description.

    Motion here is not literal movement per say but change. In an essential series of change we say the processes are simultaneous because the whole thing collapses if we take a process out.

    In an accidental series one of the elements is removed the series continues to exist.

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  75. The assumption behind the objection is we are making a physical description of a physical process.

    That is wrong.

    We are not making a physical description of a processes in time per say but making a metaphysical description of it.

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  76. BenYachov,

    "But here and now top down they are generated by an essential series."

    And I suggest that the reason essentialists keep using the hand-stick-stone example (which is temporal in nature and "essential' only from an artificial viewpoint) is because the concept itself is vague to the point of nonsense.

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  77. BenYachov said...
    It doesn't have to be solely a physical description contrary to your ad hoc self-serving hidden definition. In the 40's the USA waged war in two simultaneous theaters of operation.

    However, we are not discussing any particular types of things which may or may not be simultaneous. The First Way is psecifically concerned with connected instances of per se causes. The act-potency-act transfer from A to B is never simultaneous with the connected act-potency-act transfer from B to C. There may be a separated, distinct act-potency-act transfer from A to B simultaneous with the one from B to C, but that one will not be the one directly connected.

    This statement has no meaning. Aquinas never put forth a Kalam argument.

    I know. My point is that Aquinas (at least, as presented by Feser) put forth an argument based on per se causes being of limited duration, when they are not. Thus, your objection is not relevant, since I was discussing the First Way argument, not the Kalaam argument.

    But here and now top down they are generated by an essential series.

    That essential series also streches bact tot he beginning of the universe.

    You made a positive claim that the term "simultaneous" is not a purely metaphysical description, but one with a direct physical meaning.

    You are required to prove your extra-ordinary claim.


    Why? You agree with it, as far as I can tell. You have offered no definition for simulaneous that does not have a direct physical meaning whan applied to physical phenomena. When you offer such a definition, I will revise my opinion.

    The First way is "grounded in" fairy tale physics?

    Is that the same as saying "derived from" or"based on" since in the other thread you said they are not the same and implied I was not honest for equivocating between those terms?


    The same as "based on".

    I never implied your dishonesty, though. I lamented my inability to be write this in a fashion you could understand. I do not now have, and never have had, any reason to think of you as presnting anything other than argument you genuinely believe are true and accurate.

    BTW I never gave One Brow permission to shorten my name. Since he has on occasion called me Ben.

    I apologize for my carelessness. I always try to assume the other person's chosen name is as important to them as mine is to me.

    But if anyone wants to call me Ben go ahead.

    Would that be the equivalent of calling you "son"? That seems too diminuitive. I would not want you think that I take you as lightly as a child. Do you have a preference between "Ben" and "Ben Yachov"?

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  78. @BenYachov

    Ok.
    Several questions to the notion of metaphysical description:

    1. I gather time and space are irrelevant metaphysically. Is this correct?

    2. In how far is "simultaneous" then different from "instrumental"?
    As far as I understand by now:

    a. A cause x is instrumental if and only if its causal power (its existence as a cause) depends on the existence of an antecedent y.

    b. Causes x and y are simultaneous if and only if the removal of either x or y results in that both cease to exist.

    To me, instrumental and simultaneous seem metaphysically synonymous.

    3. To my (physical) view:

    A thing/event exists if and only if it extends through space and time.

    What is the metaphysical notion of existence?

    PS: This is somehow tedious, but at least I feel we are making some progress now.

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  79. ACuriousMind said...
    Events/Things are simultaneous if and only if their extension in time is identical (i.e their beginnings and endings (if they have terminated already) in time coincide).

    or

    Events/Things are simultaneous for the period of time where their extensions in time overlap.

    Which definition do you adhere to? Or something else?


    While the definitions can be different for different things, I owuld suggest that for per se causation, they amount to the same thing. Per se causation is the activation of a potential, each transfer of energy/motion in such a linkage happens instantaneously. The real confusion, it seems to me, is the conflation of a long series of activations with a single act of activation. For example, when the hand moves the stick, every picometer of movement is an instance of motion (probably even then more than one, each quanta of energy is it's own separate transfer, to my naive thinking), requiring its own activation. Moving a stick a centimeter still requires more than a million separate activations of potential.

    July 29, 2011 7:01 AM

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  80. BenYachov said...
    Motion here is not literal movement per say but change. In an essential series of change we say the processes are simultaneous because the whole thing collapses if we take a process out.

    In the hand-stick-stone analogy, when you remove the stick, the stone keeps moving for a very short period of time.

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  81. Let's see if I get it right, One Brow:

    BenYachov would now say that, yes, the stone keeps moving (physically), but this is not motion in the metaphyscial sense of change. As soon as the stick is removed, there is no force on the stone anymore. It keeps moving, but its velocity does not change anymore (disregard friction).
    Again, the problem here is definition.

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  82. >1. I gather time and space are irrelevant metaphysically. Is this correct?

    They are not necessary. We are giving an ultimate description of Being.

    >2. In how far is "simultaneous" then different from "instrumental"?

    From my reads Thomists don't make much of a distinction.

    The rest you wrote seems correct to me.

    Good Job.

    One change "A or material thing/event exists if and only if it extends through space and time.

    Other than that we are good.

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  83. BenYachov,

    "The act-potency-act transfer from A to B is never simultaneous with the connected act-potency-act transfer from B to C."

    Then by the essentialist's own admission, C should cease to exist. That is the dogma. C needs constant sustenance from the First Cause otherwise it will dissolve into nothingness. At no moment can there be a break -- no matter how small -- in this chain.

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  84. >In the hand-stick-stone analogy, when you remove the stick, the stone keeps moving for a very short period of time.

    From the momentum it got from the stick but when there is no stick to actualize the change then the change stops.

    Why is this so hard to get One Brow?

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  85. ACuriousMind

    In zero gravity a hand + stick + rock could only be an accidental series.

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  86. >I never implied your dishonesty, though. I lamented my inability to be write this in a fashion you could understand.

    I still can't understand you. Maybe others will have better luck.

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  87. djindra

    What is actualized last in an essential series is simultaneously dependent on the first actor in the series to be in it's actual state.

    Because if you remove the first actor/first cause the last actor ceases to be actual.

    It's not hard.

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  88. @BenYachov:

    Very well.

    Regarding time and space you said:

    They are not necessary. We are giving an ultimate description of Being.

    And regarding existence you said:

    One change: "A or material thing/event exists if and only if it extends through space and time. (I think you meant "A thing, event or material...", and will proceed assuming this)

    If time and space are not necessary to discuss the ultimate Being, and time and space are by definition necessary for anything to exist, does this mean the ultimate Being does not exist? (I am puzzled.)

    Regarding my attempt to resolve the hand/stick/stone thing you said:

    In zero gravity a hand + stick + rock could only be an accidental series.

    Gravity? Where does this now come from (I talked about friction, mind you)? Did you perhaps mean:

    Without friction a hand + stick + rock could only be an accidental series. ?

    Either way, are you saying that it is necessary that there is something that stops the motion as soon as the cause is removed in order for the cause to be essential?

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  89. >BenYachov would now say that, yes, the stone keeps moving (physically), but this is not motion in the metaphyscial sense of change. As soon as the stick is removed, there is no force on the stone anymore. It keeps moving, but its velocity does not change anymore (disregard friction).
    Again, the problem here is definition.

    Rather the stick isn't actualizing the change in the rock's momentum anymore.

    Still the analogy is designed to explain an essential series. Obviously hand+stick+stone fails as an analogy in zero G.

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  90. @ACurious Mind:

    'I'm curious'

    I thought your name was ironic: you clearly haven't bothered to read Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Augustine, or Feser's TLS and Aquinas; you clearly don't use the search function on this blog; and, as a materialist, you don't believe you have a mind (or even beliefs).

    If it's not ironic and you do want to disabuse yourself of your ignorance of A-T philosophy, start reading:

    http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/aristotl.htm

    http://www.thesumma.info/reality/index.php

    I'm sorry if you thought the brief comments I've made on this thread so far were indications that I've got the time or patience to answer all your questions.

    Just to illustrate what I mean, I'll briefly address a few of your remarks:

    'our mental state is unseparably depending on the material brain'.

    If you'd bothered to do some reading, you'd know that, on the A-T view, the brain is necessary for all mental functions, but it is insufficient for intellect and will.

    'the materialistic position that everything can be explained by understanding the material world'

    Materialism is not an explanatory hypothesis; it's the view that only matter exists . Clearly, if I were to engage with you in depth, I'd have to explain your OWN metaphysical position to you as well.

    'the reasonable conjecture that those material processes indeed are responsible for the qualia'

    No, because the whole point of the mechanistic conception of matter is that it considers only quantity, not quality; that's why, as Ed explains at length in TLS, it entails dualism.

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  91. >If time and space are not necessary to discuss the ultimate Being,

    Time and space are metaphysically beings. They are something. What caused them? If Ultimate being caused them then logically Ultimate Being would not be them & outside them and exist apart from them.

    I work to do so we will hopefully talk later.

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  92. @ACurious Mind:

    You are asking good questions. I like that.

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  93. >Gravity? Where does this now come from (I talked about friction, mind you)? Did you perhaps mean:

    I will discuss metaphysical descriptions of motion assuming Newtonian physics when I get around to it.

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  94. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  95. BenYachov said...
    From the momentum it got from the stick but when there is no stick to actualize the change then the change stops.

    Why is this so hard to get One Brow?

    You missed the point, so I will rewrite it to be more clear. If the hand is pushing the stick hard enough to accelerate the stone to a faster speed, and the hand is removed, for a very brief period the stone continues to accelerate.

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  96. Rather you miss mine One Brow.

    We have to stop. Talk to others here perhaps they can get what you are saying. I give up.

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  97. Will said...
    Materialism is not an explanatory hypothesis; it's the view that only matter exists . Clearly, if I were to engage with you in depth, I'd have to explain your OWN metaphysical position to you as well.

    How refreshing it would be to have a non-materialist explain what materialism entails, as opposed to merely listen to and understand what materialists actually say their position entails. You so rarely see that.

    Although, I do agree that taking the concepts "only materials things exist" and "there are collections of phenomena we call mental processes" and combining them to make "mental process are explainable in terms of material things" is a type of deduction many non-materialists just can't be persuaded to make.

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  98. BenYachov said...
    Rather you miss mine One Brow.


    Perhaps I have been remiss in responding to your points more directly, and going over them in detail. I will work on that.

    Talk to others here perhaps they can get what you are saying.

    However, once they understand me, they stop talking to me. I can't get anyone to talk about Newton's cradle as an example of a non-simultaneous essentially ordered series. Why do you think that is?

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  99. @One Brow:

    Now you have also managed to cause me to scratch my head:

    and the hand is removed, for a very brief period the stone continues to accelerate.

    Wait, wasn't this about removing the stick in the first place?
    And do you still think the Thomists here are arguing about time when they say "simultaneous"? They are not. I don't know yet if their is a sensible way of talkinbg about it, but simply insisting on your notion of simultaneity is getting us nowhere.

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  100. >However, once they understand me, they stop talking to me.

    How do you know they understand you? Maybe with all due respect they are tired of beating a dead horse?

    Just saying.

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  101. >I don't know yet if their is a sensible way of talkinbg about it, but simply insisting on your notion of simultaneity is getting us nowhere.

    Thank you! Someone gets it!

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  102. @Will:
    It seems to me that you are confusing materialism with eliminative materialism.
    Materialism (as I understand it) indeed holds that all things are composed of physical things, but there are not only things, there are also phenomena (consciousness). And these phenomena are not material, but the result of material interaction. They are epiphenomena, to be precise in terminology.

    If that is not what you call materialism, then I am not a materialist. But I need no lecture on what I believe.

    The fact that I have not "bothered" to read Plato, Aristotle and the like is not entirely correct. I read some of their works (even in Greek, mind you), but they never seemed to refer to the world I live in. I could not follow their argument, because my scientific understanding of concepts like "cause", "simultaneity" and so on made their writing seem outdated, seem nothing more than speculations about a world that is not the existing world. It seems they need the modern interpretation (i.e. a more precise definition of what these terms actually denote) in the light of our improved understanding of nature in order to make any sense. At least, something like that.

    I will bookmark your links and work through them when I have time.

    For now, I am glad that I someone (BenYachov) finally bothers to actually answer my questions. I think it is much more interesting to explain such concepts in discussion than by reading a long book (not that I have anything against reading long books in principle, let me assure you), especially because I have not to wait and hope that the apparent inconsistencies I notice are explained somewhere further in the text - here I can ask outright.

    If you do not like this style, have no time for it, or whatever, it's fine.

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  103. @BenYachov:

    Sorry, but another question arises from your utterance:

    Time and space are metaphysically beings. They are something.

    Is being a "being" different from "existing"?
    If yes, what is "being" defined as?
    If no, there is a contradicton to
    A thing, event or material exists if and only if it extends through space and time.
    (Thinking about it, it may not be a contradiction, but then we may need a definition for existence that is valid for an entity that is "not a thing, an event or an material")
    I'm fine with you not answering fast, I am quite patient if I can rest assured that it will be dealt with.

    An aside:
    Do we agree on the notions that "space is what rulers measure" and "time is what (ideal) clocks measure"? (Again, I'm not sure it is relevant, it is just curiosity.)

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  104. Allow me to make a correction.

    A material thing or physical event exists if and only if it extends through space and time.

    I miss posted before. Hope this clears it up.

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  105. Yup, you solved the contradiction.
    But now we have no definition of existence for non-material things/non-physical events (which we need to do prior to showing that they exist, let alone discussing them).

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  106. Here is a question to blow your curious mind my friend.

    Given the above definition.

    Is a Hartle/Hawking State a material or physical thing since it is outside space and time.

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  107. No, but this is a good question.
    The Hartle/Hawking state is not a state as you probably imagine it (this is the problem with definition the other way round).
    A Hartle-Hawking state is a wave function (or a vector, or whatever. Choose the mathematical formulation you are most comfortable with). Functions have no physical reality. They do not exist. However, they (or rather, a subset of them, whose members are determined empirically)describe how physical reality behaves in space and time (starting, ideally, with t=0 and x,y,z = 0). The squared amplitude of such functions gives us the probability of a particular event occuring. We don't know why. This is important. It's a puzzle. In a way, the Hartle/Hawking state is a law, not a thing. I do not know what answer is consensus among theoretical physicists (I am not yet one), but in my limited understanding laws do not exist. We cannot observe them (only their effects, in a way). We can never be sure we got them right. We cannot explain how they influence reality. And yet it works. This is, admittedly, why I was cautious not to jump on Steve's wagon when he was theoretizing about the universe from nothing. I am very unsure what the actual ontological status of the laws is. I do not know.

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  108. ACurious Mind,

    Isn't it, though, that such laws are inherently descriptive in nature, and thus, though they are not things in themselves, they refer to objects (being) to describe? In other words, they are abstracted out of something?

    By the way, if you continue searching honestly (the way you seem to be doing), I'd be happy to answer your questions if I think I can reasonably do so. Or at least ask counter questions, which is probably better anyway.

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  109. ACuriousMind said...
    Now you have also managed to cause me to scratch my head:

    Cool.

    and the hand is removed, for a very brief period the stone continues to accelerate.

    Wait, wasn't this about removing the stick in the first place?


    In the argument for terh First Cause, when you remove any part of an essentially ordered series, the series collapses, not only the second-to-last part. It should not matter to the argument whether the stick or the hand is removed.

    And do you still think the Thomists here are arguing about time when they say "simultaneous"? They are not.

    You mean, because Ben Yachov says they are not? Ben Yachov uses arguments that no other Thomist in this forum uses. I have no reason to think of his statements as being endorsed by other Thomists.

    By the way, this is the link Ben Yachov offered for a metaphysical definition of simultaneity. If you can think of a way it differs from ordinary simultaneity when applied to physical phenomena, besides have identical temporal boundaries, I would be interested in what that is.

    It would be simple enough to show that Thomists don't really mean simultaneous in the normal sense. They could answer my question about a Newton's cradle and say that the series is accidentally ordered, even the motion in every ball is an immediate cause of the motion in the next ball. However, they would then be acknoeledge that a sequence of pro se interactions can lead to an acidentally ordered series, and the First Way argument is gone. They could argue that the series is essentially ordered, even though the right ball stops its motion before the left ball begins it, making their motion non-simultaneous. Again, down that path leads the death of the first way. Perhaps they have a resolution, but I have seen none so far.

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  110. BenYachov said...
    How do you know they understand you? Maybe with all due respect they are tired of beating a dead horse?

    Just saying.


    You are correct. I may be giving them too much credit. I prefer the more charitble interpretation.

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  111. @Josh:

    Right. The laws are descriptive. They are abstracted from observing things that exist in the sense we have defined. Therefore, of course, they refer to these things.
    This is why I emphasized that we don't know why the hell they work (this is driving scientists mad regularly, I assure you), and why I am really unsure whether I shall claim that they exist.

    I can see what you could be getting at: Why assume that they are valid when the things they refer to do not exist (aka at the beginning of the universe)? (which is the kind of argument I wielded against the Thomistic notion of essential causation above, I know)
    There is no reason. But I also said that I do not think that we can say anything meaningful about that state of a non-existent universe at all. At t=0 our whole understanding of nature breaks down. And so does our logic, our assumptions, and everything else.

    If this is not what you are aiming at, ignore it. I just tried to save you a reply. ;)

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  112. @One Brow
    >You mean, because Ben Yachov says they are not? Ben Yachov uses arguments that no other Thomist in this forum uses. I have no reason to think of his statements as being endorsed by other Thomists.

    What Thomist here endorses your nonsense One Brow? Name one!

    >By the way, this is the link Ben Yachov offered for a metaphysical definition of simultaneity.

    One Brow I was giving examples of other definitions contrary to the narrow one witch you gave then withdrew(i.e. "simultaneous" is not a metaphysical description, but a physical one.).

    I note you didn't give Curious a link to our actual conversation.

    I also cited a link to a Thomist philosopher who uses virtually the same argument and and language as Feser thought more detailed.

    http://www.phc.edu/gj_6_martin_e_aquinas.php

    You ignored that.

    QUOTE"Third, we should notice the distinctions between the hand-stick-stone example and its artificer-hammer counterpart. In the hand-stick-stone series, that is, the essentially ordered series, the causes and effects are simultaneous,and the relationships between causes are transitive. Letting 'C' mean 'causes' and x,y,and z be individual causes, it is the case that if xCy and yCz, then xCz. If the hand moves the stick (at time t) and the stick moves the stone (at time t), then one can properly say, in an essentially ordered series, that the hand moves the stone (at time t). On the other hand, an accidentally ordered series, such as the artificer-hammer example, is neither simultaneous nor transitive. Aquinas recognizes that the example of generation is even clearer than that of the artificer-hammer. He has in mind here the non-transitivity of generators."END QUOTE

    So really get a clue.

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  113. One Brow,

    However, once they understand me, they stop talking to me.

    I will confirm with Ben Yachov that I stopped talking because it is indeed beating a dead horse. I always refer people to TLS or Aquinas, but they have no interest. They just want to argue with weaker amateurs like myself (I presume so they can feel they are refuting something).

    I don't have time. I'm out.

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  114. One Brow from the beginning has always had this tendency to "Ready, Fire, Aim".

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/teleology-revisited.html

    I have anger issues myself.

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  115. @BenYachov:
    Why is that philosopher taking about time again? I thought we agreed that simultaneous has nothing do to with time and is metaphysically equivalent to "instrumental", which in turn every essential cause except the first one is?
    Let the observer move, and "the time t" becomes...well, a bit ill-defined.

    @OneBrow:

    I asked the Thomists above:
    Are you saying that it is necessary that there is something that stops the motion as soon as the cause is removed in order for the cause to be essential?

    I think this is much more going to reveal what this thing with essentiality, instrumentality and simultaneity is all about than fiddling over the same bits over and over again.

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  116. >I thought we agreed that simultaneous has nothing do to with time and is metaphysically equivalent to "instrumental", which in turn every essential cause except the first one is?

    Technically I said they are not necessary.

    But I guess we need to learn more definitions. Such as the difference between transitive and non-transitive generators.

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  117. @ ACuriousMind:

    'If you do not like this style, have no time for it, or whatever, it's fine.'

    Good. Don't think my last post was aimed at offending you. I respect the fact that you're on here asking questions, but I honestly don't have the time to define basic terminology (like when you asked me 'what the hell is intentionality?' in a recent thread) and explain fundamental concepts.

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  118. Why is that philosopher taking about time again?

    Good question. I don't know.

    But given time maybe I can find out.

    Anyway my point which I trust I made is there is more to the term "simultaneous" then others here want to pigeon hold it to mean.

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  119. >Are you saying that it is necessary that there is something that stops the motion as soon as the cause is removed in order for the cause to be essential?

    If I might point something out. "Motion" in the AT context means "change". Not movement per pay.

    It means making a potency actual by means of an actualizing agent.

    BTW nothing stops the change rather there is no longer an actualizing agent to cause the change. Thus there is no actualizing agent making a potency actual.

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  120. @ACuriousMind

    BTW now that I look at it I note the Philosopher's mentioning of Time hereseems merely descriptive. I see nothing causal about it nor related to his use of the term "simultaneous".

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  121. @BenYachov:
    The notion of motion as meaning change is known to me.
    Is uniform (physical) motion an actualization of potential? I believe it is, for it is the constant actualization of the potential of the object to be at another place, isn't it? So are you saying there needs to be an agent in order to maintain uniform motion?

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  122. If I understand you question I would say no.

    Since that seems to presuppose Aristotle's and His contemporaries faulty view of Physics.

    I can throw a football in a Zero G vacuum (i.e. actualize it to go in a specific direction). But it would need another actualizing agent to stop or change direction.

    Now I must leave other more knowledgeable to answer you.

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  123. Of course a thrown football in a Zero G vacuum wouldn't need an actualizing agent to keep it physically moving. But it wouldn't be metaphysically moving till another agent actualizes another potential in it.

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  124. @BenYachov:
    So if uniform motion is no actualization of potential, then "to be at another place" is no potency of any object, right?
    So lets note that physical motion is not included in the metaphysical motion (which leads to the question whether we should not replace this terminus by something that is not confusing modern people, huh? ;) ).
    Instead, it seems that it is acceleration that is "motion". Which, in turn, is caused by force.
    So hand-stick-stone is a really bad analogy, because modern people know that things only cease to move because of being coutered by friction and gravity, not because they can't sustain the motion by themselves. In fact, hand-stick-stone completely misses the point from a modern perspective, doesn't it?

    If you agreed that "to be at another place" is not a potency, then we need to talk again about what potency is. Because then either potency is not "what an object is able to become", or the place where an object is is not part of its essence. But as we agreed that spatial extension is necessary for an object to exist, how then can it be that changing that spatial extension by uniformly moving it does not affect the object's essence? Furthermore, the places in which a physical object can exist are limited - an overlap of the spatial extensions of two objects is impossible. So this spatial extension does matter, and you are saying that changing it is not metaphysical motion.
    I am puzzled again. ;)

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  125. >So if uniform motion is no actualization of potential,

    I don't understand the question. Do you mean actualizing something's potential to physically move? Do you mean to actualize something's potential to continuously move?

    Causing something to travel from point a to b is actualizing it to travel from point a to b. I don't understand the problem?

    >So lets note that physical motion is not included in the metaphysical motion...

    No physical motion can be described metaphysically as something changing. In the case of physical movement from rest to momentum. It's that simple.

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  126. >So hand-stick-stone is a really bad analogy, because modern people know that things only cease to move because of being coutered by friction and gravity...

    Since when are we giving an actual physical description of physical movement? We are giving a metaphysical description of a potency becoming actual.

    You are equivocating between the two.

    This is repeating earlier mistakes.

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  127. >In fact, hand-stick-stone completely misses the point from a modern perspective, doesn't it?

    Not at all. It's not intended to give a physical description of motion. On the practical level here in the gravity well hand+stick+rock is still essentially ordered and transitive. That is if my hand moves the stick I can say may hand also moves the rock.

    Stop treating this like physics. That is your mistake.

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  128. Does anybody realize hand+stick+rock is an analogy of an essential series not an unequivocal description of physics?

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  129. @BenYachov:

    Causing something to travel from point a to b is actualizing it to travel from point a to b.

    You cannot cause something to travel from a to b. You can only cause it to start the physical motion, and then you can cause it to stop that the destination. So there is actually a minimum of two causes required for travel from a to b, but let's not get distracted with that.

    No physical motion can be described metaphysically as something changing. In the case of physical movement from rest to momentum.

    Ok. Forget my metaphysical arguments against potency and act from uniform motion. Understood it. I still think philosophers could make this a lot easier for physicists to understand if they wouldn't refer to change as motion. Just saying. And the analogy really does not help, beause it has not come across to me until now that you do not actually mean that the hand is an essential cause for moving the stone in a metaphysical sense. (do you? Please say you don't... ;) )

    So all this let's me return to another question I presented earlier in this thread:

    Is the "ability of something to change" not only limited by the power of whatever tries to change it?

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  130. Martin said...
    I always refer people to TLS or Aquinas, but they have no interest.

    When I was referred to TLS, I read it through hree times, and posted a detailed response to it. I learned a lot. However, there was no part that dealt with the questions I am asking. Is there such a section in Aquinas?

    They just want to argue with weaker amateurs like myself (I presume so they can feel they are refuting something).

    You know what better than beating an amatuer? Having a pro wipe the floor with you. You learn a lot more that way. If Dr. Feser has a good answer to my questions or response to the ideas, than he is depriving all of us by withholding it.

    Even a long give-and-take with another amatuer can be a learning experience. I've been arguing with someone on my blog for seven months about relativity. I've learned some new things in that time. Learning is always worth it.

    I don't have time. I'm out.

    As you wish.

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  131. To clarify my question:

    Why do we think that actualization of potential always requires a cause?

    and

    Why do we think that the actualization of potential can only be maintained by a cause?

    and

    Is potential dependent on what is around to initiate change?

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  132. OneBrow,

    If you are caught up on the whole simultaneity/instantaneous thing, which is really ancillary to the per se metaphysical description, I offer another understanding which may assist.

    Take the hand-stick-rock example. For the stick to push the rock, it must first have certain properties to do so, and not just momentum. For instance, it must be stick-like, and therefore be somewhat rigid. This potentiality of rigidness is actualised at every point in time by the molecular structure of the stick, which is in turn actualised by the atomic members of said molecular structure, which are in turn actualised by various sub atomic particles etc etc.

    I would argue that this is an example of a per se causal series which is simultaneous in the relevant sense in order for the hand, stick, rock etc. to actually be the way they are and therefore act in the way they do i.e. capable of exerting motion on each other.

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  133. >You cannot cause something to travel from a to b.

    You can metaphysically thought not strictly physically. But your right let's not get into that.

    >Forget my metaphysical arguments against potency and act from uniform motion. Understood it.

    Hopefully and I hope you do some reading on the matter from the Professional philosophers.

    >I still think philosophers could make this a lot easier for physicists to understand if they wouldn't refer to change as motion. Just saying.

    Well Feser has tried to do that in His books and on the Blog but there are just some hard cases who insist physical movement is the sole definition of motion. Historically that is not true.
    Plus we are under no obligation to change our accepted terminology to accomidate those who refuse to learn it.

    (That excludes you since you seem to be trying to learn. Kudos my friend)

    >And the analogy really does not help,

    To ask a philosopher to not do analogy is like asking a Physicist to not turn on the particle collider.

    As too your other questions I am going to pass you to someone else. This weekend I promised myself I would MOD my FALLOUT NEW VEGAS PC game.

    They are good questions but I am too lazy to do the work right now.

    Sorry bro.

    You rock keep asking the challenging questions.

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  134. @Andrew T.:

    For instance, it must be stick-like, and therefore be somewhat rigid. This potentiality of rigidness is actualised at every point in time by the molecular structure of the stick, which is in turn actualised by the atomic members of said molecular structure, which are in turn actualised by various sub atomic particles etc etc.

    Wait - is that not just taking the definition apart?
    "Rigidness" is a measure of the strength of molecular and atomic bonds.
    "Molecular and atomic bonds" are formed by electrons.
    Electrons are not composed. They possess no inner structure as far as we know.
    If this really is an example of potency and act, and not just an analogy, then electrons are the terminators of this chain per se.
    I know that you will say they are not, but I want to hear an argument why they cannot be.

    If this is just an analogy again, I apologize, but ask you kindly to use huge tags analogy when you are coming up with something like this. It is really hard for physicists to catch analogies like that.

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  135. @BenYachov:

    I will certainly not try to get in the way between a fellow gamer and his game. ;) And I hope I will find someone (be it here or elsewhere) that is able to spread the answers to my questions out in a way that I can understand.

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  136. Hi ACuriousMind,

    "Wait - is that not just taking the definition apart?
    "Rigidness" is a measure of the strength of molecular and atomic bonds.
    "Molecular and atomic bonds" are formed by electrons. "

    It's taking the essence or form of a thing (which the definition describes) and looking at what it is that keeps something as it is.

    "Electrons are not composed. They possess no inner structure as far as we know.
    If this really is an example of potency and act, and not just an analogy, then electrons are the terminators of this chain per se.
    I know that you will say they are not, but I want to hear an argument why they cannot be."

    Well, if I am not mistaken, string theorists believe electrons to be composed of strings don't they? In any case, I don't think we can make a broad metaphysical point about whether electrons themselves are composed of smaller entities just because that is what science currently believes, my understanding is that at one point scientists believed that protons and neutrons were fundamental.

    Even if electrons were fundamental in the sense you described, they would still be composed of prime matter (potential) and form, or even more broadly, essence and existence - according to AT philosophers. There is nothing in the form or essence of an electron that necessitates it's existence, and therefore it's potential for existence must be actualised at each and every moment. However, this is probably a bit of a diversion to the discussion you are having with Ben, so I should probably shut up now.

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  137. BenYachov,

    "What is actualized last in an essential series is simultaneously dependent on the first actor in the series to be in it's actual state. Because if you remove the first actor/first cause the last actor ceases to be actual."

    No, this is not the case. A grandfather can cease to exist yet the grandson keeps on living. That's exactly the sort of chain you have if you admit the chain can be broken even for an instant.

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  138. BenYachov,

    "Does anybody realize hand+stick+rock is an analogy of an essential series not an unequivocal description of physics?"

    It's not our example. It's the essentialist's example. And it's such a poor example (especially from today's perspective) we have to wonder why it was offered at all. Not only is it a temporal chain, but nobody claims the stone will disintegrate if the stick stops pushing it. I think it's still offered as an example because there is no good example of the essentialist chain of being in nature.

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  139. Shame that TOF didnt make an appearance in the latter half of this thread.

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  140. Hello, Andrew T.:

    First of all, you needn't shut up, I am more than willing to follow your train of thoughts as well as Ben's.

    Well, if I am not mistaken, string theorists believe electrons to be composed of strings don't they?
    You're right, they believe they are. But they have no evidence at all. They are around for some 30 years now, and have failed to make a single accurate prediction as far as I know.

    In any case, I don't think we can make a broad metaphysical point about whether electrons themselves are composed of smaller entities just because that is what science currently believes, my understanding is that at one point scientists believed that protons and neutrons were fundamental.

    Right. They believed protons and neutrons to be fundamental because there was no evidence to the contrary. There was no reason to believe they were not - until some phenomena were discovered that were inconsistent with that view. I'd say they were in their time as justified in saying that protons and neutrons are fundamental as I am in saying that quarks, leptons and neutrinos are fundamental.
    And there it is again - we have no reason to believe they are composed of smaller entities, because everything we encounter is consistent with the view they are not. Occam's Razor at its best, I'd say.

    Even if electrons were fundamental in the sense you described, they would still be composed of prime matter (potential) and form, or even more broadly, essence and existence - according to AT philosophers.

    That is a bold assertion. Why should I believe they are composed of prime matter and form? They don't seem to. But I am uncertain what you call "form", so I shall ask for a definition here before I dismiss it ignorantly.

    There is nothing in the form or essence of an electron that necessitates it's existence

    Um...What is the form of an electron and what is the essence of an electron? (I am not asking for these terms in general, but I am asking you to pin down the specific form of an electron and the specific essence of an electron in order to examine whether there is necessity in there or not.)

    , and therefore it's potential for existence must be actualised at each and every moment.

    I don't see how that follows even if I grant the condition. Why do things have to be necessary in order to exist independently of an actualizing agent? (This is a question I have repeatedly asked - why do all of you assume that potential cannot be actualized unless there is a cause for it?)

    I hope not to have strained your patience with my lengthy reply...

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  141. Will,

    "No, because the whole point of the mechanistic conception of matter is that it considers only quantity, not quality;"

    You seem to use "mechanistic" and "materialistic" as if they were synonyms. Regardless, your assertion is not true. I'm not a dualist yet I consider quality quite frequently.

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  142. But they have no evidence at all. They are around for some 30 years now, and have failed to make a single accurate prediction as far as I know.

    Yep... as mathematically interesting as string theory may be it has yet to produce any evidence, and as such continues to remain a curiosity at best (and a joke at worst).

    The problem, for string theory, is that it has yet to produce any testable predictions.

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  143. Hi ACuriousMind,

    Re. the whole electron thing - I'm not trying to say previous generations of scientists were un-justified in believing that protons and neutrons were fundamental, all I am trying to say is that, just because electrons at the moment appear to be fundamental, doesn't necessarily make it so

    "That is a bold assertion. Why should I believe they are composed of prime matter and form? They don't seem to. But I am uncertain what you call "form", so I shall ask for a definition here before I dismiss it ignorantly."

    There is plenty of good reasons to think so, I will defer you to some books and online resources:

    TLS and Aquinas by the good professor
    Real Essentialism by David Oderburg
    The paper "'Hylemorphic Dualism" by David Oderberg see http://www.reading.ac.uk/dsoderberg/dso.htm

    Those will be a good start, at least try that article on for size. I would say a form is the essence of a physical thing, whereby the essence of a thing are those properties or specifying potentialities that make a thing what it is. So for an electron, it's essence or form would include it's unit negative charge, it's ability to have different spins, its probabalistic behavior etc. Note, it does not include necessary existence, as we know electrons can go out of existence.

    "I don't see how that follows even if I grant the condition. Why do things have to be necessary in order to exist independently of an actualizing agent? (This is a question I have repeatedly asked - why do all of you assume that potential cannot be actualized unless there is a cause for it?)"

    I don't have time to respond fully, but because the alternative is just absurd - how can something which is potential become actual all by itself? It's getting something from nothing, which is a contradiction.

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  144. all I am trying to say is that, just because electrons at the moment appear to be fundamental, doesn't necessarily make it so

    Which is a perfectly valid point... as future evidence can always show that the electron is composed of even smaller "particles". But without evidence to say that it has components, and then speculate about those components, is just an elaborate guessing game.

    "'Hylemorphic Dualism" by David Oderber

    read it... all I see is unfounded speculation.

    So for an electron, it's essence or form would include it's unit negative charge, it's ability to have different spins, its probabalistic behavior etc.

    except that those are already physical properties of the electron... it has a charge, as well as a spin, and the probabilistic behavior is just our description of its behavior.

    I don't have time to respond fully, but because the alternative is just absurd - how can something which is potential become actual all by itself? It's getting something from nothing, which is a contradiction.

    How so? Let's take the spin of elementary particles: It isn't getting something from nothing by transitioning from one spin to another, conserving the 'spin'.

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  145. Andrew T.

    "how can something which is potential become actual all by itself? It's getting something from nothing, which is a contradiction."

    First the essentialist invents the conditions for that contradiction then proposes a "deus ex machina" which embodies that contradiction. It's all too absurd.

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  146. @ Andrew T.:

    Thanks for the link. But I am afraid that I mainly agree with StoneTop on the relevant issues:

    You wrote:
    just because electrons at the moment appear to be fundamental, doesn't necessarily make it so.

    I do not object to that. I object to the idea that "Electrons are not fundamental" is a conjecture that is reasonable at the moment. It is not, because there is no evidence. Of course, tomorrow may prove me wrong. But until then, I think the position "Electrons are fundamental" is clearly the one we should adhere to on the grounds of evidence and Occam's Razor.

    Oderberg writes:

    Here is a standard definition of form: "The intrinsic incomplete constituent
    principle in a substance which actualizes the potencies of matter
    and together with the matter composes a definite material substance or
    natural body."


    You say:

    So for an electron, it's essence or form would include it's unit negative charge

    In how far does the unit negative charge actualize a potency of matter? I really do not understand what is meant by that.

    Oderberg writes:

    For instance, coinciding objects such
    as two shadows or two beams of light,


    And he is accusing his opponents as being scientifically ill informed?
    A shadow is not an object. Period. It is the absence of light.
    A beam of light is not an object, but the volume of space in which many many photons in rapid sucession fly along. Not an object.
    His whole point about coincidence breaks apart when one examines his examples. For a scientifically literate person there is no coincidence of objects, just a misconception of what the objects are.
    At the bottom line, he has no evidence that the world he describesis the one we live in.

    You wrote:
    but because the alternative is just absurd - how can something which is potential become actual all by itself? It's getting something from nothing, which is a contradiction.

    Why? Point to the proof that you can't get something from nothing, and I will believe you. I suspect this notion is founded on evidence from everyday experience, where it is indeed impossible. But nowadays we have QM, and everyday experience is no longer sufficient to reliably say how the world works.

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  147. djindra [regarding an essential series]: "No, this is not the case. A grandfather can cease to exist yet the grandson keeps on living. That's exactly the sort of chain you have if you admit the chain can be broken even for an instant."

    You have just given the exact example Ed and many other A-T folks use for a causal series ordered per accidens (see pg.70 of Aquinas for one example) yet you attempt to use it as an example of a causal series ordered per se!

    If you're making that type of mistake (after being here how long?), then that just shows me that you are not even trying to understand the subject!

    It's a good thing Ben is out gaming or he'd tear you a new one for that!

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  148. Daniel Smith and djindra,

    I think djindra is trying to say that if an essentially ordered series can be interrupted (because there is a slight time delay), but still continue, then it is really accidentally ordered.

    And my answer to him would be that the difference is exactly as Ed specifically says it is: an essentially ordered series is instrumental, and an accidentally ordered series is not.

    Even if you can break the per se chain for a second, the causal power is still not inherent in any of the members; they are merely transmitters.

    In the example of a long chain of mirrors reflecting the image of a cat, even though light speed is a bit slow and you could break the chain and have the image of the cat continue down the line, the mirrors themselves are just passing the image along; they have no power to cause an image of a cat themselves.

    In an accidental series, each member has its own causal power; thus, the chain can be broken indefinitely and the causal power can still continue.

    Time element or not, there is a clear difference between these two types of series.

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  149. @Martin:

    In the example of a long chain of mirrors reflecting the image of a cat, even though light speed is a bit slow and you could break the chain and have the image of the cat continue down the line, the mirrors themselves are just passing the image along; they have no power to cause an image of a cat themselves.

    If this is an essentially ordered series, does this not mean that though the mirrors themselves could not have produced the image of a cat, the cat could long be dead while the image is still continuing. In other words, wouldn't that mean that the First Cause could not be existing anymore?

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  150. Actually it is still an essential series since in time the image will be gone without the cat to cause it.

    One has to drop this idea simultaneous equals instantaneous or near instantaneous.

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  151. Andrew T said...
    If you are caught up on the whole simultaneity/instantaneous thing, which is really ancillary to the per se metaphysical description, I offer another understanding which may assist.

    Thank you for your response. First, perhaps it is my fault for being insufficiently clear, but as far as I can tell simultaneity is only important to the First Way argument, as opposed to per se causation specificially.

    Second, no matter how rigid the stick is, the hand beginning to move the stick occurs before the stick begins to move the stone, and the hand stops moving the stick before the stick stops moving the stone. This is because the impulse moving the stick is not the same, at any given instant, as the impulse moving the stone. This does not affect what per se causation is, but it does make clear the temporal nature of ccausal chains.

    However, I do appreciate your information, and will incorporate it into mine.

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  152. Daniel Smith said...

    "You have just given the exact example Ed and many other A-T folks use for a causal series ordered per accidens (see pg.70 of Aquinas for one example) yet you attempt to use it as an example of a causal series ordered per se!"

    You obviously don't understand that it's my intent to show these terms that keep flying around are often used in an ad hoc fashion. Grand designs are forgotten when it's convenient. The whole structure is inconsistent and contradictory.

    If a series must exist to support *being* at every instant of time, then that series can never be disconnected. To claim otherwise is to be inconsistent. I frankly don't care if A-T types consider example X to be "per se" or not.

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  153. Martin,

    "Even if you can break the per se chain for a second, the causal power is still not inherent in any of the members; they are merely transmitters."

    The subject -- or at least the original subject I'm trying to remain faithful to -- is the nature of the cosmological argument. Feser claims the A-T version is of a different kind than the "simple" version the ignorant either attack or promote. I've said all along that there is no fundamental difference between either version. So I'm looking at this instantaneous thing from that perspective. If the "per se" chain of being can be broken even for an instant then we have the situation that both versions of the cosmological argument merge. Because then the chain of being is admitted to not needing God's constant support. Time enters the picture. We are suddenly talking about how much time God can be removed from the picture without matter disappearing from existence. We may quibble about the length of time. Can it be a pico second? Can it be 10 billion years? Or can it be what our human perspective sees as an eternity? Logically there is no reason one time frame is superior to another. And then the deist god is just as logical as the Thomist god.

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  154. StoneTop,

    No offense, but from your comments I would suggest that while you have read the article I provided, you perhaps have not understood it. You clearly do no understand what form or essence means, so I would suggest going back to the drawing board.

    All the best.

    ACuriousMind,

    "In how far does the unit negative charge actualize a potency of matter? I really do not understand what is meant by that. "

    A unit negative charge does not actualise potency of matter per se. The form actualises the potency of matter, and a unit negative charge is but one property which constitutes an electron's form. I would suggest doing some more research on form and matter, Prof. Feser's books are a good place to start. First though, let me pose a thought experiment which is based on some considerations outlined in Real Essentialism. Try to explain what gold is, purely via the interactions between individual gold atoms. The trick here though, is that you can't presuppose any "form like" properties such as gold's molecular structure. If physicalism is true, gold's molecular structure should be wholly reducible to the individual micro particle interactions which constitute it, and must exclude any nearby gold or other atoms, in order to mark of "gold" from everything else in the universe. I think you'll find this is a difficult thing to do without positing "just so" arrangements of particles which presuppose the structure which you are trying to explain. This suggests that form is something real, and an irredicble aspect of reality which, when united with matter (actualizing the potentials of matter), gives physical substances.

    "Why? Point to the proof that you can't get something from nothing, and I will believe you. I suspect this notion is founded on evidence from everyday experience, where it is indeed impossible. But nowadays we have QM, and everyday experience is no longer sufficient to reliably say how the world works"

    This whole QM thing supposedly showing that something can come from nothing is raised so often, and yet I have never seen an argument showing how QM ever shows such a thing. If you guys want to say that from absolutely nothing can come something, just in order to save materialism, go right ahead - it just seems so evidently non-sensical that it is beyond a "proof". Consider

    1. There is absolutely nothing
    2. ....
    3. There is now something

    What on earth could 2 be?

    With regards to the whole shadow/light thing, I think you're being un-charitable to David Oderberg - do you really think he doesn't know that a shadow and beam of light is due to photons or a lack thereof? Do you think that just because he is a metaphysician, that he therefore does not know the basics of physics? Is it possible that you aren't getting his point? The fact that you bring this up leads me to believe that you are looking for a "gotcha!" to outright discount something you don't fully understand. My sincere apologies if that is an incorrect assessment, but I see this sort of thing so often when debating with some atheists.

    All the best

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  155. @Andrew T:

    Try to explain what gold is, purely via the interactions between individual gold atoms. The trick here though, is that you can't presuppose any "form like" properties such as gold's molecular structure.

    This is done by QED (the theory for which Feynman received his Nobel Prize, and which is the most accurate scientific theory ever proposed). QED provides a complete description of the interaction of electrons and light. In the case of molecular structures (or rather ion lattices, for gold has (like many metals) no "molecular" structure), the only relevant interactions are the interactions of the outer-shell electrons of the atoms with the outer-shell electrons of other atoms nearby (I really don't understand why you want me to exclude "nearby atoms". A single gold atom exhibits a different behaviour than one in an ion lattice (i.e in proximity to other gold atoms)). If we solve the QED equations for the electrons states in such an ion lattice (which is not an easy thing to do, and which cannot hitherto be done with great accuracy), I provides a description of which wavelengths of light the lattice will absorb/reflect (this is the color), how far the ions will be apart (this is the density), and so on. All physical properties of gold (as an ion lattice) emerge from applying QED to the individual gold atoms in the proximity of other atoms.
    I'm not sure if this is what you wanted from me when you said "explain what gold is", especially since I dogded your restriction of not noticing nearby atoms (I don't see the reason for that, as I said).

    This whole QM thing supposedly showing that something can come from nothing is raised so often, and yet I have never seen an argument showing how QM ever shows such a thing.

    Something comes from nothing the whole time. (Caveat: I do not know if the vacuum suffices for your definition of nothing. It does for mine) Consider the Casimir effect. When we bring two conducting plates of metal close together inside a vacuum, we find that the closer we place them, the greater is a mysterious force that is exerted on them and slam them together. This is because there are constantly pairs of particles and antiparticles that spontaneously come into existence and vanish after a very short time again. Only particles whose wavelength "fits" into the slit between the two plates can exist there. As there are therefore more particles outside the slit than there are inside, a pressure is created that slam the plates together. This is evidence that there is spontaneous coming into existence of particles, where there is no cause whatsoever present. (another example would be the Hawking radiation of black holes).

    Of course, QM presupposes the existence of space and time (else there is no vacuum). But without space and without time, what is there to argue about?



    Consider

    1. There is absolutely nothing
    2. ....
    3. There is now something

    What on earth could 2 be?



    This is an argument from incredulity. But you really think that just because we cannot imagine something, it cannot happen? Consider that some people once could not imagine how the earth can be round - we would fall off!
    In order to prove impossibility, you must show that there cannot be 2. As long as you don't, you're simply saying that we don't know how something can come from nothing (and yet we have evidence that it does). And even if we had none, you could not call it "impossible".

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  156. (continuing my response to Andrew T.)

    ...do you really think he doesn't know that a shadow and beam of light is due to photons or a lack thereof?

    Well, I don't know if he knows of photons or not. But he uses "shadow" and "light" as objects in order to show that there can be spatial coincidence of objects. And I say they don't prove his point, because there is nothing that actually spatially conincides when two beams intersect. The photons themselves do not spatially coincide. (Well, I am not sure what the term "spatially coincide" actually means when we try to apply it to particles whose position is governed by a probabilistic function, and is therefore not exactly defined.)

    I did pick this point of Oderberg's writing because it is something I disagree with. I could have picked another, say:

    distinct identity criteria for those substances, and this may include modal features, that is, features concerning how things might have been

    This is another point I don't get. How things might have been can be an identity criterion?
    So my ability to discern identities is dependent on how good my imagination is?
    I could imagine that the atoms that compose my laptop in front of me could as well form a rock. So for me, who I know of rocks, "it is not a rock, though it could ahve been" is an identity criterion that is applicable to my laptop. But for an ancient citizen, who knew nothing of atoms, it is not, because he would deny that it could have become a rock?

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  157. Correction:

    so for me, who I know of rocks,
    I meant atoms of course.

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  158. @Anonymous (Who are you, you coward? Pick a name! ;) ):

    Actually it is still an essential series since in time the image will be gone without the cat to cause it.

    I did not deny that cat+mirrors is an essential series. I wondered whether this example means that the actualization of potential that depends on the causal power of a first cause can still occur long after the first cause is gone (dead, dropped out of existence, or whatever). For the cat can grow bored sitting there and walk away, while the mirror are still passing along its image(causal power), each actualizing the potential to show a cat in its successor. If the chain of mirrors is infinite, this means that if I look at such a mirror, I can not conclude that the cat is still there. I can only conclude there must have been a cat, not that it still exists.
    If that is true, then we are exactly where dijindra always wanted us to get.

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  159. ACuriousMind,

    "If the chain of mirrors is infinite, this means that if I look at such a mirror, I can not conclude that the cat is still there. I can only conclude there must have been a cat, not that it still exists."

    And of course that's exactly the situation when we look at stars. Some we see now no longer really exist as stars. When the cat moves away from a mirror the light keeps on going. It's just gone passed us.

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  160. Hylemorphic Dualism by David S. Oderberg was offered as a good starting point on essence. It's off-topic but early in the paper there is this:

    "There is, I claim, even 'something that it is like' to calculate that two plus two equals four. It may not be qualitatively identical for all people, but then neither is the taste of strawberry ice cream exactly the same for all people..."

    Oderberg's subjective experience of 2+2=4 also agrees with my argument that the foundation of mathematics is empirical. Furthermore, Oderberg warns against assuming "that what we do and what computers do when they calculate that two and two make four is the same." Thus he recognizes "the qualitative character of calculation."

    So, according to A-T's radical subjectivism, your internal concept of 2+2=4 is based on your experience of it. My concept of 2+2=4 is based on my experience of it. But my experience is not the same as yours, and neither of them is the same as a computer's. So how can there be a Universal form for 2+2=4 that applies to us all? Oderberg is admitting that particulars form individualized concepts. We each gather our own set of particulars and form our own Universal. My Universal need not be, and probably is not, the same as yours. So all of these "Universals" are really particulars. The "Universal" is itself a nominalistic concept that I subjectively experience.

    It follows that my form of "chair" enters the chair when I view it. Your form of "chair" enters the chair when you view it. It seems the chair can take both our forms when we both view it. It's tempting to say this is absurd but accept that somehow chairs can take this added responsibility.

    I'm glad I'm a nominalist. Oderberg should accept that he is too.

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  161. @dijindra:

    ...the foundation of mathematics is empirical.

    I guess this is not the proper place to discuss it (it's a theologian's blog, after all), but the foundation of mathematics is not empirical. 2+2=4 is not, as so many confidently assume, a self-evident truth, but is based on deduction from some very cleverly designed axioms (Peano, anyone?). Mathematics alone contains no truth whatsoever about reality. Until we take a specific calculation and test it against reality (which is called physics, applied mathematics, or the like), mathematics makes no statement at all about reality. It is not meant to, and it doesn't. It is simply the study of logical structures (some of which, such as arithmetics, are indeed applicable to everyday reality. Some are not, such as prime number theory.).
    If you meant that our belief that 2 apples and 2 apples make 4 apples is, deep down, empirical, I agree. But mathematics is not about apples.
    I know I may be nitpicking here, but I can't resist it. ;)

    By the way, you're right about the stars. But I'd like to stay with the cat and the mirrors, because that was what the Thomists presented as an example.

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  162. ACuriousMind,

    "Mathematics alone contains no truth whatsoever about reality."

    We'll just disagree on that. From our earliest age we are taught numbers mean real things. Just last week at work one of the owners brought in his 3 year old. The first question an employee asked of this child was, "My! How old are you?"

    Without this empirical connection numbers would be as meaningless as paint on a Jackson Pollack painting. There would be no logical structure.

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  163. I guess this is not the proper place to discuss it (it's a theologian's blog, after all), but the foundation of mathematics is not empirical. 2+2=4 is not, as so many confidently assume, a self-evident truth, but is based on deduction from some very cleverly designed axioms (Peano, anyone?). Mathematics alone contains no truth whatsoever about reality.

    I fully endorse this sentiment. mathematics can form a useful model into which aspects of reality can be interpreted, but is not in and of itself something that contains statements about reality.

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  164. djindra,

    (since no one addressed the original topic, I feel free to digress this bit)

    Numbers are but a part of mathematics - namely, arithmetics, that is applicable to reality, because it was designed to do so.
    That is what I meant with my apples: 2+2=4 bears no inner connection to the counting of entities (like apples). 2+2=4 is mathematically true inside the field of natural numbers even if two apples and two apples mysteriously added up to five apples, because the axioms for the field of the natural numbers are defined that way. But if the "real" addition was 2+2=5, we would simply use another additive ring or field in which 2+2=5 holds true. There is a vast landscape of other disciplines (topology and graph theory) which are only remotely, if at all, connected to numbers, and are not, in their origin, connected to anything real.

    To use any mathematical statement as a statement about reality, however, we need to test it empirically.
    And, of course, most of the mathematics done before the recent centuries was almost always devised to match reality. But mathematical truth means nothing in reality without supporting evidence because mathematicians generally do not require their axioms to be true in reality.

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  165. ACuriousMind,

    "Numbers are but a part of mathematics - namely, arithmetics, that is applicable to reality, because it was designed to do so."

    We appear to agree that we designed arithmetic to be applicable to reality. To me that means the real, empirical world is the foundation of math and the ultimate source of its truthfulness.

    IMO, "two" and "2" are symbols the same way "yellow" is a symbol. "Yellow" is a token for our experience with certain colors of objects and "2" is a token for our experience with certain sets of objects. These tokens have meaning at all simply because they correspond to something we can sense. The reason there is no color mathematics is that it doesn't make real world sense to us. What would the arbitrary axiom "yellow+yellow=green" mean? The only meaningful color mathematics would be something like that corresponding to RGB additive colors. IOW, it would conform to the way we perceive colors.

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  166. djindra,

    I don't think that we disagree on any particular point.
    Arithmetics (the field of numbers as we know them and with operations of addition and multiplication and so on that have a meaning in reality) was designed to match reality. But designing it to do so does not mean that it depends on that reality to work. There are many weird vector spaces in mathematics with very weird operators that work entirely like arithmeitcs. They have a kind of addition, a kind of multiplication, and so on. But they do not match reality.
    (Consider the simple example of a space in whose addition (denoted by "+") works like this: 2"+"2=8. 4"+"4=16. 3"+"2=10. The addition I used here is x"+"y= 2x+2y (using our familiar addition). This space can also be studied, and is also subject to the laws of commutativity an asociativity just like the space of numbers we are familiar with. But there is no connection to reality in this space, and yet mathematics studies such spaces. Sometimes it turns out it has a real-world application. Sometimes it doesn't. But that's ok, because pure mathematics is not supposed to comform to reality)

    Your example of RGB is really a great one. It shows that we choose the name of the symbols of a mathematical system depending on which familiar real system is most resembles.
    For example, look at the confinement in QM:
    The math delivers us for the quarks, which constitute proton and neutrons, that they have a property that can take six values:
    Let's call them:
    a,b,c,d,e,f (in the math, these are matrices, if I remember correctly)
    It turns out that every existing particle has another value of this property, and that in fact only particles with this value can exist freely:
    Let's call it:
    0
    Further, we find that there is an addition operation on the quark values that is able to yield 0 from certain combinations of a-f.
    It turns out that the configurations that yield 0 are:
    a+b+c=0
    d+e+f=0
    a+d=0
    b+e=0
    c+f=0

    So some clever guy (I don't know who it was) had the idea to call a,b,c red, blue, yellow and d,e,f anti-red, anti-blue, anti-yellow and 0 white.
    So the above reads now:
    red+blue+yellow=white
    antired+antiblue+antiyellow=white
    red+antired=white
    ...
    and so on.
    This is a case where the mathematical symbols start out named arbitrarily (I could also have called them Steve, Bob, Carl, and the like, in fact, they were just some maatrices) and get their "real" names only after someone discovers what they resemble. But the equations would still be (mathematically) true if I had named them with human names or just left them being matrices.

    I hope I didn't bore you too much with that. ;)

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  167. djindra

    I have got another point about color mathematics for you (somehow you have managed to fascinate me with this one):

    It is true that we perceive colors by some kind of RGB mathematics. but professional printers do not use RGB color mathematics in their machines, they use a colorspace called CMYK (I know this because I recently had to create the data for such a printer to print, and therefore had to do the conversion from normal RGB images to CMYK images). CMYK is not based on the idea of light beams being addded together (which is the visualisation of RGB), but on adding the reflective properties of materials. (CMY is cyan, magenta, yellow and can be visualized like the mixing of water colors. K is "key", which means a kind of black - how dark the resulting color will be, i.e. what percentage of the light coming in will be reflected, while the CMY values determine what colors will be reflected.) This is a case where we can use two distinct mathematical systems for the same thing (color). Both work, and both conform to reality. But none is true in the sense that it would be the "one" way to express color. They are just useful models, that turn out to have empirical relevance (and were designed to do so, of course).

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  168. ACuriousMind,

    Yes, I know. It's kind of like the difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. The non-Euclidean sort wasn't really taken seriously until Relativity. This seems to say something different to you than me.

    I realized mathematicians can go down all sorts of roads that seem to have no basis in reality. It is probably true that some things in math will never be applicable to reality. But I don't see this as counter to what I've been saying. We can do the same thing with words. We can create nonsense sentences that conform to the rules. But they mean nothing. We can create stories about gods and essences that have no known relation to physical truth. But we aren't necessarily looking for that sort of truth in these stories. Nevertheless, our fictions with words do not imply that language itself is not based on the empirical world. I think language would have no meaning without that basis. Mathematicians can also create these sorts of fictions in their own language. I don't dispute that.

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  169. I would agree that language is based on the empirical world - because no one can fully formalize human languages. They cannot be constructed in theory alone, and our assessment whether a sentence is correct is based on some vague rules (I say vague because language is changing, and becuase they are nothing you could teach a computer). Therefore we cannot decide whether a sentence is correct without having watched the language in use.
    Mathematics, however, has a set of fully formalized rules, which require no grounding in reality. We can show that statements are valid without ever oberserving how a mathematician does it. We need no experience to do mathematics, we only need the set of rules and use logic. This is not possible with language - we cannot decide whether a sentence is really false or just non-sense but correct without asking the native speakers of that language. We cannot formalize language in such a way that it would be possible to jugde a sentence by logic alone. There is intuition based on our experience with that language on bord.
    The are "languages" that are fully formalized, and there we can decide the correctness of a sentence using logic and the rules only. Most of these languages are for programming, and none of them occurs naturally. A formalized language is, just as a mathematical statement, not based on reality, but on rules and logic alone.

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  170. I'm not sure that "empirical" is the correct word for language, because, to be brutally honest, the understanding and interpretation of language is more a philosophical issue than empirical one. And Djindra is a well known loon with his insistence that math is empirical. Even though he's been corrected countless times on his claims about non-euclidian geometry and relativity he still insists on trying to find wiggle room by rephrasing. But the point remains that non-euclidian geometry came long before relativity (frankly the beginnings date to Omar Khayam and the other Persian mathematicians of the 13th century) and was widely accepted by the 19th century. But he's a stubborn SOB and even though his Sola Empirica nonsense is self-contradictory he continues to try and claim justification for it in the face of all logic and common sense.

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  171. ACuriousMind:

    "A formalized language is, just as a mathematical statement, not based on reality, but on rules and logic alone."

    Am I right in reading you that something, like mathematics, based on logic is not based on reality?

    If so I think there is no clearer illustration of where your insistence that the sum of reality is matter/energy leads: the denial of reason.

    Sorry that the lifting of the NFL lockout (and attendant lamenting of 49ers' front office incompetence) distracted me from this back-and-forth. I have a couple comments from what I've read in catch-up, in no particular order:

    First off: E.H. Munro is absolutely correct in his assessment of DJindra's persistently weird nominalism. I have enjoyed thinking about the excellent questions you raised but frankly I'm amazed that you should dismiss a man of Wolfgang Smith's intellectual accomplishments as a "crank" with "crackpot" ideas because someone accuses him of being an IDer; yet you'll happily entertain debate with DJindra who will deny necessary judgements (such as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is an irrational number) because there is no empirical test that proves them. And don't ask him about adding or multiplying really big numbers ... because according to him we can't do it if we run out of physical things in the Universe to 'count'.

    Leave aside that atheism seems a pretty crackpot idea to many people, and that materialists' own assumptions about reality can't rule anything immaterial in or out without begging the question - if Djindra is worth your time, Wolfgang Smith is.

    Secondly, you repeatedly bring up Occam's Razor to justify that reality = matter/energy only. Every time science gives us deeper insight into physical reality it seems someone misapplied that heuristic in the previous case. My question would be - doesn't the complete lack of explanatory power of 'things just happen' in the quantum world necessitate some pluralites (like, possibly, more than matter/energy) if explaining reality is your goal?

    If I've misread you I apologize - I still have more than half an eye on San Francisco's secondary. ;)

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  172. @jack bodie:

    DJindra who will deny necessary judgements (such as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is an irrational number)
    Um...in his responses to me he did not say anything as stupid as that (at least I did not spot it). Yet if he is of this or a similar conviction, I would agree that he is even more a loon than Smith, and certainly not worthy of debating with him.

    Am I right in reading you that something, like mathematics, based on logic is not based on reality?

    I don't think that you have misread me. But I wonder why you think that logic necessarily bears a connection to reality? There are several forms of logic, e.g. Aristotelian logic, predicate logic, Boolean logic or fuzzy logic, of which none is evident to be connected to reality. For logic it is the same as with mathematics - it starts with axioms, and provides some rules. That's it. It is not necessary that the axioms are true statements about reality - consider the example of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries (and only one of the latter is describing our reality), where mathematical statements are valid though they are evidently not connected to reality.
    Like mathematics, logic can apply to the universe, but is not based on it.

    Secondly, you repeatedly bring up Occam's Razor to justify that reality = matter/energy only. Every time science gives us deeper insight into physical reality it seems someone misapplied that heuristic in the previous case.
    The heuristic was not misapplied. Occam's Razor can only distinguish those idea that someone already had - and scientific revolutions are based on new data, new ideas, and more precise measurement. There is no way that Newton could have seen that his laws of motion are just a special case of the more general equations of GR - neither saw he anything contradicting his laws nor was there any alternative with equal predictive power. It is not a misapplication of Occam's Razor if we hold to a theory that is the best available.

    My question would be - doesn't the complete lack of explanatory power of 'things just happen' in the quantum world necessitate some pluralites (like, possibly, more than matter/energy) if explaining reality is your goal?
    Agreed, "things just happen" is really an unsatisfactory explanation.
    But the predictive power of QM is so amazingly precise that it is more than "Things just happen." It is the most accurate description of reality ever devised, and it explains nearly every phenomenon except gravity from the quantum behavior. Well, it does not explain why quanta behave that way, admittedly.
    But I said before that "Why do things happen the way they do and not otherwise?" or "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (if nothing excludes even laws of physics) are questions to which there cannot be a meaningful answer.
    Answers to these general questions cannot provide any insight.
    "That's the way it is. So shut up and calculate." is an response to these problems that is equally unable to be falsified as "There is an unobservable, non-physical cause for the things that seemingly happen without cause.". But the former makes no assumption about anything existing beyond that which is observable while the latter does make such a claim - and this claim contributes nothing to our observation. It makes the same predictions as the former, but it is more complex (it has more axioms, if you want so). So, I'll take Occam's Razor out again and cut away this meaningless assumption which does nothing but inflate the axioms. If reality looks the same without it, it isn't real. It's is a simple as that, I think.

    Reading your post again, I think that I expect something different from an explanation of reality than you do. I expect predictions that are acurrate, and as few assumptions as possible. You expect answers to the question "Why?" that are satisfying, don't you?

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  173. Hi ACuriousMind

    I think your last statement summarises things well.

    There a few things you wrote that I could (but won't) quibble with. I wonder if the key for me is that when you say materialism is just as untestable empirically as an alternative that doesn't assume matter/energy only, you making the unspoken assumption that things are not knowable through reason alone.

    Or, rather, that, in the absence of empirical proof, we should skip past any metaphysical demonstration and go straight to a heuristic that the history of science has shown repeatedly cherishes underdetermined models over what is real. And to say that if reality looks the same without it, it isn't real ... simple as that, I think is to prize seeing over thinking.

    I don't mean to impute any malice or ideology here, merely that the manoeuvre (and the assumption behind it) doesn't strike me as obviously correct.


    By the way, I didn't mean to suggest you should ostracize djindra merely on my say so - I don't think that is the way here at all.

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  174. @jack bodie:

    you making the unspoken assumption that things are not knowable through reason alone.

    If it seems unspoken, then I will say it aloud: I am firmly convinced that not even the most elaborate reasoning can be believed to be a true statement about reality unless it makes predictions that are testable. If I cannot test it, I cannot assign a truth value to it. It may be logically valid reasoning - but whether it is true or false in regards to reality cannot be said. I find it utterly senseless to talk about "truth" in these statements when the world wouldn't look any different if they were "false".

    Or, rather, that, in the absence of empirical proof, we should skip past any metaphysical demonstration and go straight to a heuristic that the history of science has shown repeatedly cherishes underdetermined models over what is real


    Well, the "mistaken" underdetermined scientific views of the past are almost all understandable considering that their amount of data was much smaller than ours today. They had no possibility to correct the flaws in their theories. And, of course, we can never gather all data that may be there to know - this is why no scientific theory can ever claim to be undoubtedly true. Tomorrow may deliver new data that overthrow everything we thought we knew.

    And, after all, I value seeing higher than thinking. Thinking is important, but if we do not check whether our thoughts match reality, they are worthless in the quest for the truth. Which does not mean that these thoughts could not be very beautiful, or desirable to believe. The process of finding out about reality starts with data, then we think about the data, search for pattern or the like, deduce some predictions from the patterns we think to observe, and then go and check whether they are accurate or not. If they are not, we throw the theory away.

    I begin to think that, after all, it is epistemology what this discussion boils down to.

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  175. E.H. Munro,

    "Even though he's been corrected countless times on his claims about non-euclidian geometry and relativity he still insists on trying to find wiggle room by rephrasing."

    I've already documented how people around here simply make stuff up that never happened. So what are you referring to?

    "But the point remains that non-euclidian geometry came long before relativity (frankly the beginnings date to Omar Khayam and the other Persian mathematicians of the 13th century) and was widely accepted by the 19th century."

    To my knowledge you're the first person to make this point and it's not really true. Einstein's Relativity is about 1905. Who thought space was better modeled by non-Euclidean geometry prior to that? Might that not explain the hostility against it?

    My interest, I think you know, is in discounting the so-called Platonic understanding of math. If there are two or more equally valid geometries, which is the real "platonic" version? If you say all, then that's a relativistic position, not absolute. In that case geometric "facts" are not true or "real" in a platonic sense. If you pick only one, then how do you decide?

    Btw, nobody has "corrected" me. They've made assertions. And nobody has yet given an adequate answer to the question, Just where did Euclid get his postulates if not from the way the universe appears to work?

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  176. jack bodie,

    "yet you'll happily entertain debate with DJindra who will deny necessary judgements (such as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is an irrational number) because there is no empirical test that proves them."

    Have I said that? Where?

    "And don't ask him about adding or multiplying really big numbers ... because according to him we can't do it if we run out of physical things in the Universe to 'count'.

    So tell me how you are going to fully represent a number that's bigger than the number of brain cells in your head -- down to the last digit. I say it's impossible to count past that. Why is that wrong?

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  177. "Just where did Euclid get his postulates if not from the way the universe appears to work?"

    Where did Euclid ever come across a straight line in Nature?

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  178. ACuriousMind,

    "This is not possible with language - we cannot decide whether a sentence is really false or just non-sense but correct without asking the native speakers of that language."

    We can easily construct syntactically correct sentences that have no meaning. We can easily construct correct equations that have no meaning. What is the difference? (What does x=y+z mean?)

    "A formalized language is, just as a mathematical statement, not based on reality, but on rules and logic alone."

    I'm a software engineer. I can easily write a syntactically correct program that has no purpose and no meaning. Everything I do with software is, indeed, based on reality. That's surely the way I think about it.

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  179. An observation... Isn't the fact that QFT observes something comes out of nothing [ie. no efficient cause]. as Steve Smith points out, provides a deathblow to science not religion?

    Them scientist guys should be the one scratching their head, having cold sweat and going back to their drawing board.

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  180. @Djindra:

    "What does x=y+z mean?"

    The locus of a surface in three-dimensional space. Exercise left for the readers to discover what surface the equation describes.

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  181. @djindra:

    So tell me how you are going to fully represent a number that's bigger than the number of brain cells in your head -- down to the last digit. I say it's impossible to count past that. Why is that wrong?

    I don't know why you are referring to the number of our brain cells now - even a computer can represent the numbers from 0 to 3 with only 2 bits. There is no sensible connection between the number of our brain cells and the maximum number we can hold inside our head. Even if there were, I could still pin a much greater number down (e.g. 124525245123141451437425652485236487324483412487478362876128361232343434343945765946129387219837129371239), and still use the rules of mathematics to treat it just like any other number. It isn't special, it's just a bit more difficult if you have to do the calculation on paper. And I can easily use numbers like 2^100^100, that I cannot even properly imagine, but they are never the less well-defined.

    We can easily construct syntactically correct sentences that have no meaning.
    Provide the formalization of any natural language and I will consider debating your analogy. Until then, mathematics and language are very different to me.

    I can easily write a syntactically correct program that has no purpose and no meaning.

    No Purpose? Agreed. Purpose is never a necessary element of anything. No meaning? How can your syntactically correct program not have a semantic? The computer does something when it executes your program, doesn't it? That's the meaning. It hasn't to be useful, but it has a semantic - otherwise the computer would not know what to do.

    Everything I do with software is, indeed, based on reality.
    I would agree that no one would write a program that fulfills no purpose in reality. It would be a complete waste of time. But that you continuously apply your programs to reality, and choose axioms that are useful in reality, does not mean that formalized languages as such are based on reality. They are defined. And this definition needs no reality to work, but we only use the languages that are applicable to real problems. This is just like math once was, until mathematicians grew bored with reality and started to invent e.g. complex numbers. Until the advent of QM, complex numbers had no real world connection whatsoever.

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  182. @djindra wrote:
    "Have I said that? Where?"

    In Dr. Feser's post "A first without a second" you wrote at 1154 on July 10:
    "I say there is no such thing as a necessary truth ..."

    In the same comments thread you make a number of assertions the gist of which is 'without empirical evidence our knowledge is unreliable'. The commenter 'Thomas Aquinas' in his post of 1941 July 9 ably exposes your thinking as muddleheaded; he (along with Ben Yachov and others) also more than once explains to you what necessary means - later in the thread you simply deny what is obvious and say that no one explained necessary truth to you.

    djindra:
    So tell me how you are going to fully represent a number that's bigger than the number of brain cells in your head -- down to the last digit. I say it's impossible to count past that.

    Are you serious?

    Even if we assume British billions and that brain cells include neurons and neuroglia I have no trouble representing such a number as it would be less than 1,000,000,000,000,000. And I could add 1 to it. I feel like I've misunderstood you?

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  183. BTW djindra,

    Is there any chance you could tell us which software you've engineered?

    And do lives depend on it?

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  184. ACuriousMind

    "even a computer can represent the numbers from 0 to 3 with only 2 bits."

    That's what I mean. Two bits have 4 states not an infinite number of states. A computer definitely has a limit in the largest number it can represent down to the last digit. That limit is imposed on it by the number of transistors it can dedicate to representing numbers. Our brains are no different. A count of brain cells imposes an absolute limit on the largest number we can perfectly grasp. Anything beyond that is an approximation, not a hard truth.

    The reason this comes up is because the realist usually says something to the effect that numbers cannot apply to physical things because we can always add 1 to any number no matter the number of things. I say that's impossible. You cannot just keep adding 1 forever. Eventually you run into the limits of the hardware. Beyond that you are only approximating.

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  185. grodrigues,

    "Exercise left for the readers to discover what surface the equation describes."

    IOW, it means whatever the reader wants it to mean. That "x=y+z" does not express an objective truth. It's not a "truth" that's in any danger of becoming a Platonic "form" drifting detached through eternity.

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  186. djindra believes 2+2=4 is not a necessary truth.

    I just have only two meaningful questions for him. What kind of drugs is he on & where can I score some?

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  187. djindra,

    IOW, it means whatever the reader wants it to mean. That "x=y+z" does not express an objective truth. It's not a "truth" that's in any danger of becoming a Platonic "form" drifting detached through eternity.

    Nope, it does not mean whatever you want it to. The surface described by x=y+z is the plane which contains all points whose coordinates fulfill the equation. By writing it 0 = -x+y+z, we see, appling basic vector geometry, that it is a surface that contains the origin of the coordinate system and has a normal vector of [-1,1,1].

    And did you read my sentences after I said the bit about brain cells? We do not need to do the math in our head, we can do it on paper (i.e use an infinite storage room for the data that does not fit into our heads), and do the math bit for bit, in chunks that fit into our heads. To draw an analogy to computers, it is as if we had an infinite hard drive. Math does not need to fit completely into our imagination to be valid.

    @BenYachov:

    djindra believes 2+2=4 is not a necessary truth.
    We need to be careful with terminology here. It is necessarily true in the sense that its deduction from the definition of addition and natural numbers is logically valid. This does not mean that we can claim that "2+2=4" is a statement about reality without basing this on evidence of some sort, as there are other ways to define a kind of "addition" (see my examples above) inside spaces without having it correspond to reality.

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  188. >This does not mean that we can claim that "2+2=4" is a statement about reality without basing this on evidence of some sort,

    I would be the last person to say we don't need any empirical verification or evidence. But my point is there is no conceivable or possible reality where 2+2=4 is not true or that 2+2=5 is true.

    Even in a Universe of only 3 objects 2+2=4. That is my sole point.

    Cheers guy.

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  189. As you seem to mean with true that it follows necessarily from the axioms, I fully agree with you there, Ben. I just suspect that djindra means something else when he claims that 2+2=4 is based on reality. He just does not grasp the mathematical concept as not relying on the "real" meaning of 2+2=4, I think.

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  190. He doesn't grasp philosophy either. He seems to act as if mere denial of "gods" creates a sort of instantaneous rationality. He's been a troll if nothing else.

    Plus he is obsessed with politics & see philosophy as nothing more than arguing politics by other means.

    Not like you at all if I must say. It's a pleasure to read you even if I don't always agree with you.

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  191. I've already documented how people around here simply make stuff up that never happened. So what are you referring to?

    Your continuous claims that non-euclidian geometry wasn't accepted until Einstein's theory of relativity when the beginnings of hyperbolic geometry date back to the 13th century and it was widely accepted by mathematicians in the early 19th century.

    To my knowledge you're the first person to make this point and it's not really true. Einstein's Relativity is about 1905. Who thought space was better modeled by non-Euclidean geometry prior to that? Might that not explain the hostility against it?

    Your knowledge isn't very extensive. Or perhaps you're just not terribly perceptive since you've been corrected countless times on your claims vis a vis non-euclidian geometry and have just demonstrated my observation that you continuously re-state the claim in different ways to make one of them true.

    This claim above isn't even germane. Regardless of whether or no anyone believed that "space was better modeled by non-Euclidean geometry" mathematicians knew that it was true. Relativity was irrelevant to its acceptance. Physicists didn't accept non-euclidian geometry because of the theory of relativity, you have the relationship backwards.

    My interest, I think you know, is in discounting the so-called Platonic understanding of math.

    That is your personal problem, not anyone else's. Your sort of weird anti-rationalism is of little to no concern to me.

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  192. As you seem to mean with true that it follows necessarily from the axioms, I fully agree with you there, Ben. I just suspect that djindra means something else when he claims that 2+2=4 is based on reality. He just does not grasp the mathematical concept as not relying on the "real" meaning of 2+2=4, I think.

    I lack the patience to search for the debate, someone else will do it, though, I'm certain after djindra denies it, but we actually had this debate before. He was raving on about math being empirical, and that 2+2=4 was only true because when people put two apples in a bowl and added two more they saw it was four. Someone (I believe it was either Ben or TheOFloinn) pointed out to him that even in a universe where if you placed two objects in a bowl and upon adding two more that a fifth spontaneously materialised that 2+2 would still equal four because the actual description of what was happening was 2+2+1=5 and he strenuously and continuously denied it on the grounds that in that universe 2+2 would equal five (which make his accusations of relativism all the funnier).

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  193. I see djindra as expressing a valid point of view, even though I do not share it.

    "2+2=4" is not a necessary truth, it is a formal truth. Applied to a universe with three objects, it is not true, it is meaningless, because "4" does not represent anything in that universe.

    Formal truths depend on the rules used to generate the form. In a three-object universe, "2 + 2 = 1" (using what we would think of a clock arithmatic) would be somthing that could be true there, just as it is true in our universe (again, in clock-arithmetic).

    It's valid to say that if a number, or similar formal concept, can't be instantiated than that concept does not exist in reality, even if we can play it formally. Again, I'm not endorsing that view, but its neither rare nor outrageous.

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  194. One Brow,

    Your reference to modular (or clock) arithmetic is certainly showing that there is even more mathematics that does not describe reality in general than was mentioned here.
    But when you say "2+2=1", the "+" in that statement is not the same as in "2+2=4", though both are truths inside their respective axiomatic systems. They both derive clearly from the respective definition of addition.

    "2+2=4" is not a necessary truth, it is a formal truth. Applied to a universe with three objects, it is not true, it is meaningless, because "4" does not represent anything in that universe.
    There it is: "applied to a universe". But we needn't apply it. Mathematicians are very happy inhabiting weird spaces and field that cannot (yet) be applied to reality. But "2+2=4" is true in the only sense that matters in mathematics: It follows from the definition used. This is exactly why math has nothing to do with reality. Even people living in the three-object-universe could do our math, given the axioms and definitions.
    The main source of confusion here is that "mathematical truth" is very different from saying anything about reality at all.

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  195. @ One Brow

    I see djindra as expressing a valid point of view, even though I do not share it.

    Would you like to borrow my glasses? That might help you see more clearly.

    It's valid to say that if a number, or similar formal concept, can't be instantiated than that concept does not exist in reality, even if we can play it formally. Again, I'm not endorsing that view, but its neither rare nor outrageous.

    I did not say that his view was rare or outrageous, I said that it was anti-rational. And it most undeniably is.

    "2+2=4" is not a necessary truth, it is a formal truth. Applied to a universe with three objects, it is not true, it is meaningless, because "4" does not represent anything in that universe.

    Formal truths depend on the rules used to generate the form. In a three-object universe, "2 + 2 = 1" (using what we would think of a clock arithmatic) would be somthing that could be true there, just as it is true in our universe (again, in clock-arithmetic).


    I can see that someone else dealt with a good portion of my objections to this, but I'd like to note one thing further, namely that your statement isn't really true. The non-euclidian geometries would be true even if we lived in a Newtonian universe. (And I'll be the first to admit that that's not a terribly good example as by definition hyperbolic and elliptical geometry can be illustrated regardless of whether or no space is curved, but this returns to my point to djindra that all that really happened with the acceptance of relativity is that physicists found new ways to use all that nifty math that they'd learned.)

    Mathematicians work with concepts that have no observable counterpart in "reality" on a regular basis, and always have. Euclidian geometry is perfectly valid in a two dimensional system, but when did Euclid ever live in such a system? Grassman's mathematics were so far advanced that no one could understand them for decades, and certainly weren't at all modeled on "reality". Nor were they modeled upon observations regarding the world he lived in (and that's the key point). Mathematicians have never really relied on sensory evidence. Put another way, even in your three object universe two plus two would still equal four because if one of those objects were a mathematician he could work it out. Now, if the sentient object were djindra, it might remain undiscovered, but it would still be true.

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  196. ACuriousMind,

    I believe that your position is completely valid for a mathematical formalist (and I am one myself). So, I interpret it as agreeing with what I said. Did you intend any disagreements?

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  197. One Brow,
    I did not intend disagreement so much as clarification. If you think I agree with you, then I'll take your word for that. I was not sure how to interpret your distinction between necessary and formal truth, so I thought it better to outline my thoughts in my own phrases.

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