Monday, July 11, 2011

A clue for Jerry Coyne

A reader alerts me that Jerry Coyne, whose philosophical efforts we had occasion recently to evaluate, has been reading some theology – “under the tutelage of the estimable Eric MacDonald,” Coyne tells us.  And who is Eric MacDonald?  A neutral party to the debate between theologians and New Atheist types like Coyne, right?  Well, not exactly.  Turns out MacDonald is “an ex-Anglican priest” who has been “wean[ed]… from his faith,” and who claims that “religious beliefs and doctrines not only have no rational basis, but are, in fact, a danger to rational, evidence-based thinking.”

Give Coyne’s post a read, then come back.  Now, you might recall my fanciful dialogue from a few months back between a scientist and a bigoted science-bashing skeptic.  The point was to try, through analogy, to help New Atheist types see how they appear to others, and how irrational and ill-informed they really are.  (If you haven’t seen the dialogue, go read that too, then come back.)  To see what is wrong with Coyne’s latest remarks, we can imagine that that dialogue might continue as follows:

Skeptic: I’m trying to learn science so I can meet head-on the argument that we science critics are ignorant of the subjectSo, under the tutelage of the estimable Bruno Latour, I have spent several weeks reading this stuff.  And so far, I’ve learned only three things.  First of all, I’m wasting my time reading drivel about beliefs that have no basis in fact when I could be learning about real things instead.  Second, scientists can’t write.  A lot of what they have to say is obscure bafflegab, and I’m starting to believe that this obscurantism is deliberate because of reason three (which I’ll get to in a minute).  I have for example, just opened Geons, Black Holes, and Quantum Foam by John Wheeler to a random chapter.  And there I find this: 

“On the other hand, when we see time symmetry marred in an elementary process, when we contemplate the writhings of spacetime in wormholes and quantum foam, when we see tiny deviations from Dirac’s predictions for the electron produced by quantum fluctuations, we realize that the “floor” of simplicity as we move to smaller and smaller domains is illusory.  Beneath that floor, in still smaller domains, chaos and complexity reign again.”

Believe me, the book contains paragraphs far more obscure and pretentious than this one.  Can you imagine reading this stuff night after night?  Do you see why my head feels about to explode?  Bruno, why are you doing this to me?

Scientist: Well, it’s easy to make fun of serious ideas by ripping them out of context.  Actually understanding them is a different story.  Wheeler is an important thinker, and you quite obviously haven’t the faintest understanding of what he’s saying.

Skeptic: Oh brother, here we go again.  “You don’t know what you’re talking about!”  You always say that.  Then comes the Courtier’s reply: “Learn the science before commenting on it!”  But now that I have learned it, even that’s not enough for you.  Why don’t you just finally admit that science is like believing in the Flying Spaghetti Monster?  I mean, “geons” and “quantum foam” are only the beginning.  This Wheeler guy goes on about tons of other crackpot stuff, like “black holes,” “muons,” “cosmic rays,””wave-particle duality,” and “It from Bit,” whatever the hell that means.  

Scientist: But my point is that you haven’t “learned the science.”  Just reading a book doesn’t mean anything if you’re not even trying to understand it.  And you’ve more or less admitted that you’re not – you’re only interested in scoring a debating point against those who’ve exposed your lack of knowledge of science.  There’s nothing obscure or crackpot about anything Wheeler said.  He’s just using technical terminology.  But the ideas are complicated and are the result of decades or even centuries of scientific developments.  You can’t seriously expect to understand it all just by mining a couple of books over the weekend for passages you can make smart-ass remarks about.

Skeptic: But why waste time trying to understand it when these scientists never show how what they’re saying tells us anything about reality in the first place?  Because that’s the third thing I’ve learned.  There seems to be no “knowledge” behind science.  One gets the strong sense when reading science that everyone is just making stuff up.  There are few arguments for relativity, quantum mechanics, evolution, etc. at all in what I read.  People just assume these things are real and go from there.

Scientist: What are you talking about?  Lots of scientists have argued for those things, at length!

Skeptic: Not in what I’ve read these last few weeks.  For example, read a book like Gregory’s Eye and Brain and you’ll find he talks about how evolution did this or how photons do that.  But he never gives us any argument for the existence of these “photon” thingies, and he never answers all the objections people have made to evolution.  It’s all based on faith.

Scientist: He doesn’t address those things at length because the book is about vision, and not photons or evolution per se.  He can take that stuff for granted because other people have argued for it elsewhere.  He isn’t even trying to answer skeptics about evolution or modern physics in a book like that.  Really, do you expect every science book to start from square one and recapitulate what others have already said about every issue that might be relevant to a subject, just to satisfy skeptics like you?  

Skeptic: But their belief in these things is not based on argument.  It’s based on peer pressure, groupthink, the fear of being ostracized.  The so-called “arguments” you refer to are just rationalizations for what scientists were indoctrinated into believing while in school and what all their colleagues expect them to believe when they go to conferences, try to get tenure or funding or to get their papers accepted for publication, etc.  It reflects the worship of science that dominates our society – its pop culture, its educational institutions, commerce and industry, you name it.  It’s all socially constructed, not based in reality.  As Latour says in Laboratory Life

Scientist: That’s another thing.  When the hell did Bruno Latour, of all people, become a neutral source in this debate?!

Skeptic: What do you mean?  Latour is himself a scientist!  In fact, he’s a recognized expert in no less than two sciences, anthropology and sociology.  He also wrote a very influential study of Einstein’s theory of relativity.  

Scientist: This is surreal.  I don’t think you’ll find a lot of physicists or biologists who would agree that what Latour does is “science.”  I’ll bet even many anthropologists wouldn’t.  And as to his article on relativity…

Skeptic: Ah, I see, so the scientists don’t even agree among themselves about what “science” is.  It’s just a bunch of warring, faith-based sects that…

Scientist: No, there is certainly consensus among serious scientists about

Skeptic: Oh, so when you cite some scientist, he’s a “serious” scientist or a “real” scientist, but when I cite some scientist in my favor, suddenly he’s not a “real” scientist or a “serious” one.  How convenient!  Do you have any idea how you sound?

Scientist: It only “sounds” suspicious if you’re hell-bent on finding something suspicious about it instead of trying to understand the reasons why I say what I do.  Look, you’re so off-base about so many things that I’ve got to start from first principles even to make a dent, and it’s complicated further by…

Skeptic: Yeah, yeah, it’s “complicated,” I don’t understand the issues, Courtier’s reply, blah blah blah.  Whatever.  You tell me I need to learn about science before criticizing it, so – just to humor you, because I already know it’s a waste of time – I do.  Then, because you don’t like what the evidence I’ve uncovered shows, you suddenly shift your ground and say that reading science books isn’t good enough after all, and that the scientists I cite are not “real” scientists.  I don’t think there’s any point in continuing this conversation any further.  And I don’t think there’s any point in reading any more science.  I don’t want to waste months of my life reading this stuff if there’s nothing to be gained from it except the ability to say to my opponents, “Yes, I do know about scientific schools of thought X, Y, and Z.”  Why bother to torture our brains if we can simply ask scientists to prove, using evidence and reason, that their viewpoint is correct, and better than that of either science critics like me, or other scientists?  But they never do that – it’s all just making stuff up or at best rationalizing preconceived ideas.

Now, Coyne would be outraged by our Skeptic, and rightly so.  But replace “Skeptic” with “Coyne,” “Scientist” with “Theologian,” and so forth, and I submit that you’ve got a dead-on summary of Coyne’s attitude toward theology.  Of course, Coyne and his ilk will insist that the cases are different.  But what you will never get from them is an actual argument for this claim, or at least not an argument that doesn’t beg the question.

If there were any doubt that Coyne’s reading project is unserious, it is dispelled by his jaw-dropping remark that he hasn’t come across any arguments for God’s existence “that aren’t taken up and refuted in The God Delusion.”  If Coyne were to imagine his own reaction to a creationist who said he hadn’t seen any arguments for evolution “that aren’t taken up and refuted in Duane Gish’s Evolution: The Fossils Say No!,” he would have some idea of what a fool he is making of himself.  Reasonable and well-informed people can disagree about whether a thinker like Aquinas (say) has proved the existence of God.  Reasonable and well-informed people cannot disagree about whether Richard Dawkins knows what the hell he is talking about when he criticizes thinkers like Aquinas in The God Delusion.  He does not, and to every Aquinas scholar it is cringe-makingly obvious that he does not.  If Coyne does not know this – and his own clueless past remarks about Aquinas show that he doesn’t – then it is hard to believe that he has even tried to look for serious defenses of the arguments for God’s existence, and thus hard to see how he has any business complaining that he hasn’t found them.

Still, Coyne insists that he really wants to know what the best arguments are, that he is “dead serious here, and not looking for sarcastic answers,” and even that he is “hoping that some real theologians will read this and provide some answers.”  Well, here is an answer.  If Coyne really wants to know what the rational foundations of theology are, he should read works that aim to lay down those foundations, instead of works that presuppose them – just like someone skeptical about evolution should read a book like Coyne’s Why Evolution is True instead of complaining that books like Richard Gregory’s Eye and Brain do not argue for evolution.

Traditionally, the central argument for God’s existence is the cosmological argument, and (also traditionally) the most important versions of that argument are the ones summed up in the first three of Aquinas’s Five Ways.  But the typical modern reader is simply not going to understand the Five Ways just by reading the usual two-page excerpt one finds in anthologies.  For one thing, the arguments were never intended to be stand-alone, one-stop proofs that would convince even the most hardened skeptic.  They are only meant to be brief sketches of arguments the more detailed versions of which the intended readers of Aquinas’s day would have found elsewhere.  For another thing, the terminology and argumentative moves presuppose a number of metaphysical theses that Aquinas also develops and defends elsewhere.

So, to understand the Five Ways, the modern reader needs to read something that makes all this background clear, that explains how modern Thomists would reply to the stock objections to the arguments, and so forth.  Naturally, I would recommend my own book Aquinas, since it was intended in part precisely as an up-to-date explanation and defense of these arguments, and will provide the reader with a useful survey of what not only Aquinas, but the Thomistic tradition more generally, has said about them.  (I do some of this in The Last Superstition too, of course.  But that book does not deal with the Third Way, as the Aquinas book does.  Moreover, New Atheists – who have a sense of humor about everything but themselves – are likely to make the polemical tone of TLS an excuse for dismissing its arguments.  This is unreasonable, of course, especially given their own excessive polemics – I’m only fighting fire with fire – but there it is.)

Another relatively recent book to look at on the Five Ways is Christopher F. J. Martin’s Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations.  Unfortunately, this is an expensive book, but it looks like the University of Chicago library has a copy, so Coyne should have no trouble getting hold of it.  If Coyne wants to dig even deeper into a broadly Thomistic approach informed by hard core analytic philosophy, I would recommend that he look at Barry Miller’s trilogy: From Existence to God, A Most Unlikely God, and The Fullness of Being.  These are also expensive, but I see that Coyne is again in luck, since the University of Chicago library has all three.  There are also some articles on Aquinas’s arguments worth checking out, such as David Oderberg’s recent piece on the first premise of the First Way.  And then there is the question of how Aquinas would deal with the atheistic objection from evil, the best recent book on which is Brian Davies’ The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil.

After Aquinas’s versions of the cosmological argument, the next most important argument for God’s existence is the kalām cosmological argument.  Here the things to read are William Lane Craig’s books The Kalām Cosmological Argument and Atheism, Theism, and Big Bang Cosmology (co-written with atheist Quentin Smith), and David Oderberg’s articles on the subject (available here, here, here, here, and here).

So, there’s your answer, Prof. Coyne.  No need to thank me!

485 comments:

  1. Sili,

    "Seriously. If it's so important that atheists study and understand theology, why is the same not true for believers?"

    The same reason it's important for Philosophers of Mind to learn some neuroscience, while it isn't true for anyone else. Atheists who are going to criticize theology and do philosophical work in so doing really do need to know the details of what they're criticizing, while every day atheists and theists don't need to know it to just go about their daily lives.

    ReplyDelete
  2. RH,

    We can't tell you why you should read or learn something unless you tell us what your purpose or interest in the topic is. You could not in any way give me a reason to study evolution if my goals and interests didn't require it. Imagine, for example, that I have a theory of mind that does not involve or require evolution. What would you say to convince me that I should study evolution and take evolutionary psychology seriously?

    I presume, if you're here, that you're interested in whether or not God exists and some of the philosophical issues. If you're interested in really examining the concept of God, all I need to say is that those works say interesting things about it.

    What would you say to anyone to make them care about evolution? What do I, as an average person, need to know about evolution to live my life?

    ReplyDelete
  3. RH,

    "That is...as long as those rules don't impinge on morality. For instance, if one of the rules the creator of chess introduced was "For each castle taken by the other side, throw a newborn baby into a fire."

    Suddenly the assent that we "ought" to follow the rules of chess "because a creator of chess has laid them out for us" hits a rather insurmountable wall, doesn't it? No one would agree that we ought to do WHATEVER is instigated by a creator. It rather seems that we consider morality quite different from the mere making up of rules (either a game, or a by a computer programmer)."

    The problem here is that the "ought" you're talking about when you start your analogy is an "ought" that's predicted on "If you're going to play chess, you should play by the rules of chess". Your bringing in of morality here might indicate a case where someone might decide that they don't want to play chess, but it doesn't invalidate the fact that if you want play chess, you have to follow the rules of chess or else you aren't playing chess.

    Thus, with morality, your argument would be this, if taken simply:

    It would be immoral to be moral.

    And that's utterly ridiculous. A better take is that some of the things that God tells us to do strike us as being horribly immoral. However, if being moral really is only doing what God says is moral, then that's still a bad objection; the fact that we don't LIKE the things that are moral is immaterial since morality, at its heart, tells us to do things we don't want to do. So you'd return to the idea that you don't want to be moral, which is fair enough but hardly an objection.

    "So, I find the Euthyphro Dilemma remains quite a useful tool in ferreting out the nature of theistic moral theories."

    Which you could do more appropriately by simply asking them about it or starting from the more advanced arguments.

    ReplyDelete
  4. @Chuck

    >Also, I think RH is trying his best to promote his point of view and I don't think he is an idiot.

    You will forgive the following geek analogy but I would say via the terminology I learned playing Advanced Dungeons & Dragons he may have a very high Intelligence Stat but clearly a low Wisdom Stat.

    I think he does have the intelligence to learn Thomism maybe even one day come up with some useful criticism of it. But it's unwise of him to refuse to learn anything about it & then go on the attack. That I think you will agree is what makes him "idiotic".

    Cheers! Keep up the good work.

    ReplyDelete
  5. "idiotic" as a term seems to be too pejorative to be useful.

    I prefer your D&D geek analogy.

    I'd love to own a "bag of holding" by the way. It would make moving rather easy, wouldn't it?

    : )

    ReplyDelete
  6. >"idiotic" as a term seems to be too pejorative to be useful.


    You are a nicer person then I my friend. Bag of Holdings rule! But never underestimate the use of a good NPC.

    Cheers.

    ReplyDelete
  7. I'm not sure if I'm nice but I'm pretty sure that I don't think I can be a successful thinker while practicing ridicule. I was one of the New Atheist cliches for the past 2 years due to anger as a form of coping with the depression of losing my faith. It served me to get past my sadness but now that I've grieved that loss, I'm ready to enjoy the world of reason. I've moved past the point where I find enjoyment from in-group agreement and, instead, am gaining greater pleasure by engaging smart people who may have a different philosophy. I don't want to share a brain with people as a source of friendship.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Eric:

    >> The fact that we will be using propositions to do so no more invalidates the process than the fact that we use light to analyze light invalidates that sort of process.

    I hope not. I just wanted to throw down this cautionary red flag, just in case this very mistake is made. I think that there is a tendency to confuse the parameters of our experience with the parameters of reality, and if we cannot help but conceive of ideas in a propositional format, then it does not follow that this same propositional format is a part of reality itself independent of ourselves.

    >> I don't see this notion of truth in Aquinas. When it comes to human intellects, he seems to hold to a type of correspondence theory, where a proposition is true if the form of what is known is the same as the form we grasp with our minds.

    I don’t think that’s entirely right. Feser writes: “A thing is true to the extent that it conforms to the ideal defined by the essence of the kind it belongs to” (Aquinas, p. 33). Whether this form is present in an intellect or not, a thing’s being is proportionate to the degree to which it conforms to its form, which is also how true it is. That is what I meant by being and truth being related, according to Aquinas.

    Anyway, this is precisely what I worried about above. We have our particular cognitive capacities, and we understand the world by applying and utilizing them. The danger is that we see the products of our cognition as inherent features of reality itself. This is one of the main problems I have with Aquinas, i.e. when he projects how we understand and experience the world onto a divine intellect, for example.

    >> So I disagree that the idea of there being truths in a mindless world can be made sense of on Thomistic grounds.

    Well, I suppose it all hinges on the Fifth Way, which is where Aquinas introduces the need for a divine intellect to underpin the teleology around us. In Feser’s book, he cites a paradox involving teleology, i.e. that the final cause must be present at the time of efficient causation in order to guide the process. How is this possible? Well, if we look at how human artisans make artifacts, they hold the end in their intellect, and then actualize it through their actions. The next move, it seems, is to jump from the fact that this is how humans do it to this is how reality operates in general, i.e. teleology requires an intellect, in fact a divine one.

    This is a dubious move from my standpoint. It seems to be a good example of how one projects our manner of perceiving and understanding the world into reality itself, and thus confusing the map with the terrain. After all, just because humans happen to be able to keep ends in mind while making artifacts does not mean that the universe operates in the same way. That is just an argument from analogy, unless I am missing something (and I likely am).

    ReplyDelete
  9. "I deny, in fact, that "natural stuff", in such an independent sense, could exist at all"
    

RH: Sure. I just don't think you can justify those claims. :-)


    That's OK, I don't think you can justify any claims to the contrary!


    RH: This can be tricky because we get into "whose definition of natural/supernatural do we use? Theist or mine?"

    Well, whose argument are we discussing? If we're discussing a theistic argument, then we'd better use the theist's definition. If we're discussing an atheist's argument, then we'd better use his definition.
    So when you say, of Feser's post about Euthyphro, that: "Ends set for us by our nature?" That doesn't make sense." — it only doesn't make sense to you because your definition of "ends" and "nature" are not what is meant by Feser (who, obviously, is using Thomistic terminology). When the terminology is understood, the argument makes perfect sense. The problem isn't with the argument, although you might challenge its premises, which will in turn be supported by further arguments, using further terminology, and so on.

    At any point, you're free to stop, but if you do want to debate a given argument — whether of theology or anything else — then the object is to make sense of the argument by interpreting it as accurately as possible. With any large, sophisticated system (like Thomism), in order to deal with the whole system, you'll need to be prepared to deal with lots of arguments and lots of definitions. Again, you're free not to debate it at all, but if you want to, it takes — no matter what the discipline, philosophical, scientific, literary, etc. — a fair amount of effort.

    ReplyDelete
  10. DGuller: [Abraham] believed in the promises and claims of God to such an extent that he was willing to sacrifice his son to obey God’s command, even though this command contradicted the morality of his age, and ours.

    Actually, one of the important points of that passage is that God was unlike pagan deities of the time because precisely in that He did not condone child sacrifice. There are various things going on in that story, and of course we have to understand the proper historical, religious, and philosophical contexts to understand it fully.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Mr. Green:

    >> Actually, one of the important points of that passage is that God was unlike pagan deities of the time because precisely in that He did not condone child sacrifice. There are various things going on in that story, and of course we have to understand the proper historical, religious, and philosophical contexts to understand it fully.

    Sure, I suppose that there are a variety of possible interpretations of that story, each of which incompatible with the other. The bottom line is that Abraham did not argue with God on that occasion, and appeared willing to follow the command simply because it was a divine one. However, on another occasion, he was comfortable enough to argue with God about the injustice of his commands. My point was that the Bible contradicts itself on whether one should unconditionally follow divine commands, or use one’s reason before offering one’s assent to them. That still seems to be the case.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Since there were some replies....

    Chuck,

    If you are going to criticise the New Atheists of not engaging in thoughtful, honest interaction with the claims they dismiss, at least stop being guilty of this yourself on this forum. You have resorted to rather astoundingly off-base interpretations of what I'm writing.

    The explanation you give after denying you were arguing against a specific form of biblical literalism, exposes you for arguing against a specific form of biblical literalism.

    Absurd. I included qualifiers in my statements (making them generalizations) and deliberately widened the scope to anyone who believes the Bible is representative of a God or of divine wisdom/truth IN ANY WAY.

    IN...ANY...WAY.

    That includes anyone from literalists to the liberal Christians who reject most of the Biblical claims as myth...but who still tend to hold that the Bible is indicative of some Divine Truth IN ANY WAY.

    To say this is arguing against a SPECIFIC form of biblical literalism has so little relationship to what the words I wrote mean (In Any Way MEANS a non-specificity; a wide generalisation), I may as well be arguing with someone blindfolded, going on his intuitions of what he's expecting me to argue, rather than what I actually write.

    It seems to me that you enjoy the fallacy of hasty generalization.

    At least you start out correct. You at least recognize I was making a generalization. (The vagueness of the general claim, the qualifiers like "essentially" and "tend to" etc, alert any honest reader that I'm generalizing).

    But would you please re-aquaint yourself with the concept of "generalization" in the context of a discussion like this? Generalizations, by nature, capture a phenomena broadly, but also admit of exceptions. Therefore, pointing out an exception does nothing against the force of the generalization.

    Are you actually willing to argue that the tendency to view the bible as, IN SOME SENSE, representing a divine truth about reality or about God, is NOT a feature found among the vast majority of Christianity? That this is NOT an accurate generalization? I suppose you could try, but it's hard to imagine you won't look really foolish. Pointing me toward minority exceptions in no way invalidates the accuracy of my generalization. It's therefore ludicrous to call my generalization "hasty." It's a very generous, inclusive generalization which acknowledges that Christianity is very diverse (something I've been acknowledging continually here).

    And my generalization applies to Thomists like Prof. Feser, who for instance writes:

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/02/tuggy-contra-mysterianism.html

    I would reiterate that the seven propositions set out in my first post, which form the core of the doctrine of the Trinity, are implied by the New Testament itself.

    In other words, Feser himself considers passages of the Bible IN SOME WAY indicative of a God or divine reality.

    It's a strange get-him-any-way-possible approach you are taking: I get berated for purportedly making statements that do not apply to Thomists here, and when it's clear my statement applies here, I get you saying: "But you are ignoring fringe Non-Thomists....!"

    Every post you make here comes with a conclusion embedded into it and, therefore, mistakes being argumentative for argumentation.

    Is that true? Could be. Except I won't know it until you start actually addressing what I write.
    Every "mistake" so far you've brought up has been one you introduced, not one I wrote.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  13. RH,

    We're talking past one another.

    Good luck to you.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Here is my simple problem. Are you looking to defeat the Thomist Cosmological Argument or, dismember all of Christian religion? Your tactics seem to indicate the latter but, the former is what this thread is concerned with.

    The only thing I get from your posts is that you think Christianity is an illegitimate superstition not, why the TCA is invalid (besides the fact it is part of the illegitimate superstition known as Christianity).

    Can you clarify how your appeal to scripture addressed the illegitimacy of the TCA?

    ReplyDelete
  15. grodrigues,

    First you asked if I could supply any substantial argument against Craig's reply to the ED. I wasn't going to let your implications off the hook, that I couldn't do so, with your use of the term "nevermind."

    You have also said:

    To be fair, your objections have no force against W. L. Craig's arguments, either.

    But you have not justified that assertion.

    I gave you some pointers.

    Yes. Whether you represent those "pointers" as being part of Craig's defense, or of your own theology's argument, I responded to them, pointing out how they did not resolve the issues raised by the ED.

    If someone can be accused of not keeping his eye on the ball, it isn't me.

    I never claimed that you were in contradiction. I wanted to know your position.

    You already know my position is that God is not the required standard for ethics. Therefore the only reasonable implication of your "So which is it?" question is that I was being contradictory or incoherent. Any normal speaker of English would understand you were clearly implying a contradiction. As I said, both the statements were in support of the same point: Positing God as The Standard doesn't help us, for reasons that the ED is helpful in uncovering.

    If I whack him in the head hard enough, he dies. End of story. Are you suggesting that the mailman is a-temporal, a-spatial, changeless, the necessary ground of all being, omnipotent, etc.?

    Really? You think that settles it? Proven? You think it ridiculous that an a-temporal, a-spatial, changeless, the necessary ground of all being, omnipotent being would manifest some part of Himself as an apparently physical human who can be harmed physically?

    Uhmm....that's what most Christians believe God did as Jesus, who apparently suffered and appeared to die just like any other human being. So a God makes himself into a mailman you can kill with a blow to the head is ridiculous. But a God who makes himself into a carpenter who dies when you nail him to a cross..THAT's a God!

    Do you believe Jesus was some manifestation of God? If so, you ought to know better than to imply The Divine wouldn't manifest as a human who can suffer physical abuse (and apparent death) as we do.

    Even if you don't think Christ was a manifestation of God, you are light years from "proving" the mailman isn't God with your example. You have to show how, given the propositions about God being Omnipotent, Omniscient, being The Standard Of Rationality...how you would disprove a claim that someone IS a manifestation of God.

    Because IF the mailman is God THEN he is the standard of rationality and morality..along with being omniscient etc. Please explain how you, a mere mortal, can know such a God COULD not manifest himself as a mailman and why you know he WOULD NOT manifest in such a way, for reasons known to Him and not to yourself. The hubris!

    If the mailman is THE Standard Of Rationality, and he tells you he is God, please explain how
    YOU can argue AGAINST the Standard Of Rationality. Right now your "proof" is no "proof" whatsoever.
    What's your next move?

    You aren't the first theist to snicker derisivelly at such a proposition, only to falter when trying to argue against it.

    As to the premises I supplied concerning a value theory, you offer no substantive response. Of course I understand that we don't have time to argue every point. No problem.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  16. Verbose Stoic (great screen name btw!)

    Imagine, for example, that I have a theory of mind that does not involve or require evolution. What would you say to convince me that I should study evolution and take evolutionary psychology seriously?

    Then it would be fair to assume that since you have a theory of mind, that it's because you are concerned with understanding the mind in the first place.

    Hence I could say to you: I you are looking to understand the mind, as it appears you are, here's a theory that does a better job helping you do so.

    (If, in fact, evolutionary psychology does. As you likely know, even a portion of biologists/psychologists/atheists etc feel that discipline does some overreaching).

    As for learning about God: In an effort to understand why people believe in God, especially Christianity given how pervasive it is on the continent in which I live, I've looked at quite a lot of the reasoning employed to get there - both from Christian writers, philosophers, theologians etc. And I've been in dialogue with Christians of many sects, quite a number of whom were very learned and who adduced their best arguments. Every argument I've encountered was, I found, a failure. And given many other reasons to doubt that there is anything beyond human imagination at work in theism, I have I think justified skepticism that some branch of Christianity has "the good arguments" I haven't somehow encountered.

    But almost every sect (Chuck, not the qualifier!) will think THEY have a good argument for God and so if I've missed it, well I'm wallowing in ignorance.

    So my point in being here is more to say "look, if you folks are going to consider atheists sooo naive, and so one dimensional (especially the new atheists), here I am. I'm surely don't represent all atheists, but if you can show me you have good reasons for some religious proposition you hold, or show me I have bad reasons for some position I hold, let's see it.
    What I'm seeing so far are assertions without any good arguments.

    At this point I've been here quite a while and have written quite a lot in response. So it looks like my time here is drawing to a close. (No doubt to the "good-riddence, don't let the door hit ya on the way out" of some here).

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  17. Haven't the Thomists here suggested you adduce the TCA?

    I don't understand your bold claims to intellectual honesty and your continued avoidance of taking on the argument.

    Many atheists have done it with charity.

    The claim to our philosophical naivete can be derived not only from the surface criticisms towards the arguments presented but, also, our claims as New Atheists to victory before engagement. It seems naive to jettison philosophical charity as a debate move.

    It's brash and silly and really a sign of a lazy intellect.

    We should be better than this. Can philosophical inquiry be more than "show me" and the "dozens"?

    You seem smarter than this RH.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Verbose Stoic,

    The problem here

    It's no problem.

    is that the "ought" you're talking about when you start your analogy is an "ought" that's predicted on "If you're going to play chess, you should play by the rules of chess".

    Yes! Agreed!

    That is, as long as you take the phrase "If you are going to play chess" to mean "If you have the desire to play chess." (Otherwise the following "ought" statement makes no sense without the desire to play chess).

    And that fact has important implications for morality, and it's one of the reasons why the Rule Maker version of morality fails.

    Remember, the question I have posed is: Why ought I accept that the nature of morality is that morality amounts to Rules made by a Divine Rule Maker?

    What PRINCIPLE are you going to appeal to in order to establish that warrant? The problem is in actually being able to point to a principle accepted elsewhere that does not in fact undermine your attempt to ground your argument.

    Your bringing in of morality here might indicate a case where someone might decide that they don't want to play chess, but it doesn't invalidate the fact that if you want play chess, you have to follow the rules of chess or else you aren't playing chess.

    And the reason someone refuses to play chess in which you burn babies in my analogy is vitally important. It's central to the issue. We do not accept the principle "A Creator Has The Right To Make ANY Rules He Wants." (I certainly do not).

    Morality does not strike me (and it strikes few people) as that arbitrary. So to appeal to examples like chess, or computer programming, and make this massive leap to the idea that I ought to accept morality has the nature of simply being Whatever Rules Someone In Power Makes Up just doesn't fly.

    So right now it's still special pleading. And to say some form of "But...the proposition is that God makes the rules for morality" is of course to simply beg the question.

    I say that when you really look at the examples used to try to ratify God as Creator Of Morality, you always uncover the fact it's special pleading and/or you uncover the fact that IF the principle being appealed to were accepted, it actually implies God is not necessary for morality.

    This happened even here when you mentioned the rational for following the rules of chess: it makes no sense to say you ought to follow the rules of a game without appealing to some desire to play the game.

    Thus, with morality, your argument would be this, if taken simply:It would be immoral to be moral.

    Not true. My argument is simply that an analogy to humans making rules like board games or computer programs fails to make any bridge to accepting that morality would amount to rules made by God.

    What is the argument? "People make rules for board games so this establishes that God can make the rules for morality." ???? The only connection between the two premises is both talk of "making rules."

    One may as well offer arguments like "The company "Bungie" made the rules for the game Halo, this establishes that Apple Computers can make the rules for the legal system."
    That's the same type of non-sequitur...need a few more premises in there. I certainly accept that computer game companies can make rules for computer games; I don't accept this means they can also make rules for our legal system.

    I accept the principle that people can create rules for board games. This in no way establishes that a Creator can make any moral rules He wants. And at this point you haven't given any such bridge from accepting one principle to the other.

    Cheers,

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  19. Chuck,

    I have already asked if someone could defend the move from the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument to the conclusion that the cause was a Being (God) like that worshipped in their Christian religion. I asked this early on. Being Thomists, of course the question is how they do it from their preferred, Thomistic Cosmological Argument.

    It's not that I'm unfamiliar with their response. But as I keep explaining, the problem is that should I produce both the argument and my rebuttal, inevitably a Christian will say "But that's not the argument as we understand it."
    (You can take the words of one Christian, tell it to another, and get "But that's not Christianity"
    The same happens with Christian theology. "But that's not how WE see the argument!").

    That is why I keep saying I prefer to actually directly interact with a Christian. Ask him how do YOU see the argument to work, rather than try to guess which precise way he's going to go.

    Given the incredible diversity among Christian opinions (even just among Catholics!) can you perhaps see the logic in this approach?

    Peace,

    RH

    (So...anyone want to show me their answer to the question above?)

    ReplyDelete
  20. RH:

    >> I have already asked if someone could defend the move from the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument to the conclusion that the cause was a Being (God) like that worshipped in their Christian religion. I asked this early on. Being Thomists, of course the question is how they do it from their preferred, Thomistic Cosmological Argument.

    Would you be willing to accept that the cosmological argument demonstrates the necessary existence of a being that is Pure Act? If you accept this, then other arguments can follow that show that this Pure Act must be eternal, immaterial, all-powerful, and a few other divine qualities. I am less convinced of the demonstration of the qualities characteristic of divine "personhood", i.e. intellect and will, but there are arguments for these qualities, as well.

    Does all of this show that this being is Jesus Christ? No, it does not, and no-one claims that it does, least of all anyone here, I think.

    ReplyDelete
  21. DGuller: I suppose that there are a variety of possible interpretations of that story, each of which incompatible with the other.

    Sure... the right one, and all the wrong ones! But presumably we want to find the best possible interpretation — you can always find some bad interpretation, so that's not very interesting. If we really can't find a good interpretation, that would be significant, but in this case, it's not hard, or even implausible.

    My point was that the Bible contradicts itself on whether one should unconditionally follow divine commands, or use one’s reason before offering one’s assent to them. That still seems to be the case.

    I don't see the contradiction. You have to make lots of assumptions to get that conclusion, and there's a non-contradictory interpretation that requires fewer assumptions. For example, you claim Abraham did not argue with God, but the Bible doesn't explicitly say so. It merely doesn't say that he did. Of course, given that it was not as culturally shocking as we would think (and note that the reason we think that is because Judaeo-Christian values so heavily pervade our culture!), we cannot take it for granted that Abraham would argue over something he believed was morally right. Or even if he did fail to reason it through, where does it say that's a good thing? What if Abraham was a good philosopher and concluded that a divine command could not be immoral, and therefore was acting both rationally and morally?

    ReplyDelete
  22. Mr Green:

    >> For example, you claim Abraham did not argue with God, but the Bible doesn't explicitly say so. It merely doesn't say that he did.

    Well, if you want to include that hermeneutic rule, then you can get the Bible to mean anything at all. After all, you can just imagine something not in the Bible as true, even though it is not actually present in the Bible.

    >> we cannot take it for granted that Abraham would argue over something he believed was morally right.

    Are you talking about sacrificing Isaac as being morally right in Abraham’s eyes?

    >> Or even if he did fail to reason it through, where does it say that's a good thing?

    My understanding is that Abraham is the father of faith, because of his unyielding devotion to following God’s commands, even if they demanded him to sacrifice his own child.

    >> What if Abraham was a good philosopher and concluded that a divine command could not be immoral, and therefore was acting both rationally and morally?

    Then why did he argue with God at Sodom and Gomorrah?

    ReplyDelete
  23. @RH:


    By your objections it is clear that at this point, not only you do not pay attention to what I write, but you are not interested in any sort of intelligent dialogue, only in scoring points. Time is tight, patience running out. Sorry, but not really my cup of tea. Bye and God bless you (or the best of luck, if any mention of God offends you).

    ReplyDelete
  24. Dguller: Well, if you want to include that hermeneutic rule, then you can get the Bible to mean anything at all. After all, you can just imagine something not in the Bible as true, even though it is not actually present in the Bible.

    You mean the rule of not reading into a text thing that aren't there? Of course I want to include that. Lots of things not in the Bible are true! What's the point of coming up with an interpretation that "might" be wrong — it's not a compelling reason for anyone to be bothered by it.

    Are you talking about sacrificing Isaac as being morally right in Abraham’s eyes?

    My understanding is that Abraham is the father of faith, because of his unyielding devotion to following God’s commands, even if they demanded him to sacrifice his own child.


    Yes. The point of it being an accepted practice in the surrounding cultures is that Abraham might have even expected something like that. More than that, this was not a sacrifice to appease God, for God had already made His promises to Abraham. God has the right to demand what He has given (Isaac), and the sacrifice was not some kind of punishment to Isaac; only to Abraham, in that he would lose his son. The test was whether Abraham would selfishly try to keep Isaac for himself, and he did not, showing that he respected God more. Indeed, that's the epitome of all moral tests: will I follow my will, or God's? The story does not suggest that Abraham's trial was in managing to figure out what the morally correct action was; that's the easy part.

    >> What if Abraham was a good philosopher and concluded that a divine command could not be immoral, and therefore was acting both rationally and morally?
Then why did he argue with God at Sodom and Gomorrah?

    Because the quality of mercy is not strained? Although the episode is often described as Abraham's "arguing" or "bargaining" with God, the Bible doesn't actually relate any arguing. Abraham presents an argument (that the true God would not commit an injustice by condemning the good along with the wicked); but God nowhere disputes this or offers any sort of counter-argument. He doesn't even say things like, "Who are you to talk so to your Creator?" or "That is My business, not yours." In fact, the Bible doesn't recount that God explicitly said he would destroy Sodom at all; Abraham maybe just drew the obvious conclusion. He then says, "You wouldn't destroy the town if it had fifty good men, right?", and God says, "No, I wouldn't."

    It is instructive to consider what commentaries say about this passage: they point out that it is an example of prayer, and like all prayer, the object is not to change God, but to change us. Note that in the preceding passage God speaks of Abraham's teaching righteousness and justice. The "debate" confirms that Abraham understands justice and understands that it must be an attribute of God. If anything, the implication is that a command coming from God could not be immoral, but here there is no command at all. God does not command Abraham to destroy Sodom, nor anyone else.

    ReplyDelete
  25. grodrigues,

    I do appreciate you having given some replies.

    At the same time, the "bless you" is rather undermined by the mischaracterization and unjustified insult preceding it.

    I invoked some of the epistemological consequences from certain attributes of God, in particular the one you floated that God would be The Standard Of Rationality. Once you do this, it makes sense to ask questions like "Ok, if God himself is the Standard by which to judge things ratinoally, how would we evaluate claims to God-hood? How would we decide that any particular manifestation, for instance in human form, would be God or not?"

    The claim that a mailman is God is a perfectly fine example from which to examine the answers. After all, as I said, Christians tend to believe that God manifested as a human (craftsman of some sort)!
    And that as a human God displayed an (at least apparent) capacity to be physically harmed, just like any human. Which makes your suggested "test" silly, even by Christian standards.

    And of course while Christianity tends to claim God manifested as a human called Jesus, plenty of other faiths have claimed other human manifestations of God. India right now is full of such claims.

    If you truly do not see these to be a serious questions, as your dismissive reply implies, then it suggests you don't understand the issues (or just don't care).

    It's of course fine if you don't want to spend your time discussing these issues. I can completely understand as I have other things to to as well.

    Except, please don't paint me as the one not taking issues seriously. I may be wrong, but it's not for lack of trying to be right, and not for the reasons you've given here.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  26. dguller,

    Would you be willing to accept that the cosmological argument demonstrates the necessary existence of a being that is Pure Act?

    I've been willing to grant this (as long as it's not already importing a sense of sentience/personhood), for sake of argument, to ask how they then justify from there the inference to a personal God of theism.

    (BTW, I won't go along with the type of move where someone ends the First Cause/Cosmological Argument with the cause, and then states "And this cause we take to be God."
    Not even in a minimal sense.
    This is disengenuous in the hands of a theist because that theist/Christian we know ACTUALLY considers a God to have quite a lot of other properties, and to call what you get at the end of the first cause argument the same name as what you call God in your theology is a word game. Just because X shares some properties with some Y you believe in, does not make it Y and words should be used to distinguish this).


    If you accept this, then other arguments can follow that show that this Pure Act must be eternal, immaterial, all-powerful, and a few other divine qualities. I am less convinced of the demonstration of the qualities characteristic of divine "personhood", i.e. intellect and will, but there are arguments for these qualities, as well.

    I've been asking for the moves to the First Cause to a personal God. I'm familiar with many of the arguments but have never found any that did not make dubious assumptions or unjustified leaps of inference.

    I've seen Prof. Feser's "So You Think You Understand The Cosmological Argument?" post.
    I agree I've seen some atheists say "Ok, so what caused God?" But most of the atheists I hang around with (figuratively..on line) are quite aware of the issues brought up by Feser's post.
    More common is the "Who designed God then?" response, but that is to the more common Argument From Design. And it is a legitimate response to some iterations of the design argument, especially ones that seek to explain apparent biological "design." (No, I don't think the theist response saying it's a Category Mistake
    works either).

    Also, if we want to talk about naivete, Feser and his devotees have to admit that Christians offer an avalanche of naive, poorly justified assertions.

    And as for bad arguments, one of the most common from theists poses the question: "If as naturalism/materialism says, we are just matter in motion, there's nothing special about us vs anything else. Notions of value are meaningless." And also: "If God doesn't exist life is meaningless and devoid of purpose." (Or alternately, if God doesn't exist, any meaning or purposes left over are "illusory.")

    These are positions that I see not only from a ridiculous number of Christians, but my jaw has dropped to the floor to see "sophisticated" Christian apologists, debaters, writers, theologians promulgate these ludicrous arguments. So bad arguments go both ways.

    Anyway, it looks like there is some action on that other post from Feser, so perhaps I'll abandon this thread and jump over there, time permitting.

    Thanks,

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  27. RH:

    >> I've been willing to grant this (as long as it's not already importing a sense of sentience/personhood), for sake of argument, to ask how they then justify from there the inference to a personal God of theism.

    Great.

    According to Thomists, this allows you to infer a number of properties of this being:

    (1) Immutable, because Pure Act cannot change due to the total absence of potential.
    (2) Eternal, because Pure Act is immutable, and thus outside time.
    (3) Immaterial, because material entities are characterized by change, which is impossible for Pure Act.
    (4) All-powerful, because Pure Act is the underlying cause of all of existence.
    (5) All-good, because Pure Act fully actualizes its nature, and thus fulfills its teleological functions to perfection.

    These are the most persuasive arguments from my perspective, and so what you can establish is that there is a necessarily existing being that is eternal, immutable, immaterial, all-powerful, all-good, and who fully actualizes its nature in a perfect fashion. Certainly, it would be fair to say that this has gone some way to demonstrate the existence of a God, but you are correct that this falls far short of the specific deity of the Judeo-Christian traditions.

    For me, the least persuasive arguments have to do with this being having intellect and will, and especially the former. From my understanding, this being’s intellect is supposed to be established by the Fifth Way, and is due to the presence of teleology in the universe requiring an Intellect to avoid the paradox of how a final end (i.e. telos) can be present at the beginning of a causal series in the first place to guide the unfolding process. By using humans as an analogy, they store the plan or end in their intellect, and then use that plan to create something. Since it seems paradoxical that these templates can exist in the world by themselves, then they must exist in an intellect, a divine intellect, in fact.

    This just seems to be an argument from analogy, and thus is particularly weak, because we do not know the sum total of the universe, and how information is stored and processed. Our experience is of human beings using their intellect to create artifacts according to predetermined plans, but there is no necessary reason why the universe must operate the same way.

    In addition, the paradox itself seems to be due to equivocation between two senses of “cause”. In one sense (i.e. cause1), it is the antecedent condition that caused a consequent condition, and thus necessarily implies that the cause precedes the effect. In another sense (i.e. cause2), it is just an explanation for why something happens, and does not necessary have to be temporally prior. An example of this would be an emergent property, such as the Invisible Hand of the Market, which is the outcome of a number of selfish individuals trying to make a profit in a free market environment. The Invisible Hand is not present at all in anyone’s mind prior to the consequences of the activity itself, but it emerges afterwards as part of the explanation of how a market economy is supposed to work.

    Speaking of Aristotelian causes, an efficient cause would be a cause1, but a final cause would be a cause2, and thus are different. The paradox happens if one asks how a final cause, which is supposed to happen at the end of the series, can be a cause at all, which is supposed to happen at the beginning of the series. The paradox is resolved, I think, when one asks the question as follows: how can a final cause2 be a cause1? The answer is that it cannot, but because they are different types of causes, there is no paradox, and thus there is no need to even postulate an intellect at all.

    ReplyDelete
  28. dguller,

    First I want to say I think your contributions on this blog are terrific!
    You constantly say what I would want to say...but often better, and also
    adding even more. (In other words, I can't help but agree with a lot of what you write).

    I also think the contributions of a lot of the theists here are terrific as well.

    As for the moves in the Cosmological argument (which I say I accept for sake of moving on) I'm not convinced about those. For one reason I don't think it can be kept as comfortably in the a priori world and when asked for examples of the things being talked about as "Potency" and "Act" references must be made to real world things (which of course Aquinas does, e.g. wood/fire). And I simply do not see the concepts mapping on well to the messy case of real-world objects, and hence no reason to accept the underlying metaphysical claims.

    You made an excellent post in the recent Cosmological Argument thread on this blog, about your interest in truth as it relates to "reality" (a sort of empirical reality I suppose) vs the simple coherence of our mental concepts. And I agree about the overreaching done in the theistic a priori arguments. Deductive arguments are typically filled with premises that are drawn a posteriori, which makes it extremely difficult to make the deductive arguments the full measurements of what can exist "out there" when it seems the soundness depends on the accuracy of our a posteriori inferences.

    Lots of more thoughtful Christian thinkers seem to realize how shaky the a posteriori inferences are for God, and that includes most references to special revelation (e.g. The Bible). So when asked for the "best arguments," and to try to fortify their own beliefs, they actually retreat back to find justification in a priori/metaphysical arguments. Hoping for something more firm, conclusive, undeniable. But, they just end up doing overreaching there as well.

    Anyway, that said...

    ReplyDelete
  29. dguller,

    (1) Immutable, because Pure Act cannot change due to the total absence of potential.

    Which does not resemble a mind, or personhood. If a person "can not change" they are dead, or non-existent, or not persons in the way we experience persons. Hence no reason to attribute traditionally God-like attributes to this cause. (Yes I'm aware of theistic objections to this; none that I've seen work).

    (2) Eternal, because Pure Act is immutable, and thus outside time.

    Same as above. All persons/minds I know of are mutable and work in time, and indeed seem to require mutability and time to be coherently referred to as "persons" (who have beliefs, desires, rationalize about how to achieve ends etc). I've seen no coherent version otherwise.

    (3) Immaterial, because material entities are characterized by change, which is impossible for Pure Act.

    Same again. Nothing about that remotely resembles any example of a mind or personhood.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  30. (4) All-powerful, because Pure Act is the underlying cause of all of existence.

    I understand Thomists don't use the Kalam version of the Cosmological Argument. But I think it's still useful to bring this up to establish some general points: From the Kalam (and similar) versions of the Cosmological Argument, this inference is utterly gratuitous for reasons I'm sure I wouldn't have to point out to someone like yourself. It really depends on identifying "cause" in a way that presumes what the theist wants to make the argument work. After all, the effects of an A-bomb are tremendously powerful. But which cause do we point to for those effects? The explosion's power seems all out of proportion to the uranium used, and even then do we trace the "cause" to just the smaller portion that actually gets fissioned in the reaction? Or to some initial atom in the reaction?

    Current science points to the origin of the universe as but an infinitesimally tiny entity compared to the vastness and complexity that resulted. Which is one reason we get plausible accounts (drawn from current inferences from quantum phenomena etc...not that I'm a physics expert) of universes arising out of incredibly simple beginnings or causes (or even "uncaused" if you go with some accounts...which you don't have to in order to accept this line of reasoning).

    Evolution too has shown our previous intuitions led us astray: We once thought, in the Design Argument, that only an Agency of Majestic Power and Intelligence could explain the biological forms we observe. Yet it seems we were wrong, and that the cause went from simpler to greater.

    This is one reason why Feser's assertion that the Thomistic Cosmological Argument is not a God of the gaps argument is in an important sense, suspect. Yes the TCA seeks to establish an a priori "pre-conditions to science" argument. Except as discussed, the premises tend to by supplied by empirically-born intuitions. And this post-TCA bit of argumentation toward an All Powerful Personal God ALSO seems reliant on empirical premises...premises which may turn out to be suspect on empirical grounds!

    For such reasons, I see no reason to accept that the assertion that the cause of the universe MUST be All Powerful. So I find that some real fudging in the application of the term "cause" must occur to get this All Powerful Cause inference.

    A Thomist will, I believe, want to instead say God is the cause of the universe in that He is the Cause Of All Things (or something similar). Hence be All Powerful since he is causing All Things. So the type of temporal objection I raised above wouldn't apply. Except I'm not convinced by what I've seen of the argument that they solve this issue - that I ought to accept their conclusion.

    Already up to this point since the other premises seem so utterly suspect, it does not give much confidence there are good reasons underlying #4 either. But since you have not presented
    the reasoning leading to the All Powerful conclusion, I won't comment further.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  31. (5) All-good, because Pure Act fully actualizes its nature, and thus fulfills its teleological functions to perfection.

    I find the Thomistic notions of "good" as I've encountered them to be unacceptable. Teleological function just begs the question. If one is using the term "Teleological" as derived from how humans design-toward-ends, then I think an analysis shows that God is an unnecessary postulate, since we humans display all the characteristics for teleology, for value to arise, for goodness to make sense etc.

    If one is using "Teleological" in a sense that is not closely analogous to human teleology, then on one hand I don't see reason to accept this use, and more important, it makes any entity attached to this teleology disanalgous to persons as we experience persons. Hence, again, no reason to accept we have moved to a Personal Being.

    Naturally a Thomist will say these objections don't stand and "Here's what Thomism actually says, or gives as an answer." But I'm responding mostly to what you have written, so if you want to develop any of the arguments feel free.

    Thanks again!

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  32. Also, if we want to talk about naivete, Feser and his devotees have to admit that Christians offer an avalanche of naive, poorly justified assertions.

    Would you approve of creationists knocking down all manner of bad arguments for evolution - and there are many offered by amateurs - with the goal of discrediting evolution? Or would you criticize them deeply for attacking strawmen and misleading people by doing so?

    If so, then there's plenty of reason to come down hard on atheists who attack theological strawmen.

    As for your comments on how the uncaused cause could not be a mind, they're question begging. You're insisting that any person would have to be awfully similar to a human, right down to being embodied, to count as a person. But Christians generally, and thomists particularly, would object to that.

    ReplyDelete
  33. Anonymous,

    No one should argue straw-men. I've seen theists do it, I've seen atheists do it, and we (obviously including myself) should be corrected when it occurs.

    I think Feser has made some good points on this issue.


    As for your comments on how the uncaused cause could not be a mind, they're question begging.

    Not per se. I'd asked for the argument that lead from the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument (Fist Cause) to the inference of a Personal Agent as that cause. If those premises are supposed to represent aspects of a Personal Agent, then they themselves would be question-begging, as they presume a relationship with personhood that
    I am questioning. I see no reason for me to accept them.

    Now I don't think the premises dguller laid out were even supposed to establish a Personal Agent quite yet, which is what I asked for. But I just pointed out that there is no reason as of yet for me to think those assertions are describing a Personal Agent.


    You're insisting that any person would have to be awfully similar to a human, right down to being embodied, to count as a person. But Christians generally, and thomists particularly, would object to that.


    I know, and it is that incoherence I'm trying to draw into the light to examine.

    Note that I did not insist that persons would have to be "embodied", in terms of being made of the same material we are. Rather, I pointed out that the properties ascribed - which amount to various claims of immutability - are not descriptive of "Persons" as I think the term is generally understood, and as I think it could be coherent.

    After all, when you say "Person" I'm going to ask "What are you talking about? Where are you getting the concept of Personhood?" Me, I can point to where: our experience of our minds and our experience of other human minds. And the characteristics ascribed to this First Cause do not match such personhood.

    If you want to say "No, my notion of personhood is not derived from the experience of our minds" I'm going to ask: Then where does it come from and why would I possibly accept your use of the term "Personhood?"

    I KNOW that a Thomist may have an idiosyncratic notion of Person when it comes to God. Theology has a reputation for being willing to take words and ascribe new meanings, make almost any move it needs to save their assumptions, especially in accepting The Biblical account into their beliefs. The question is "Why in the world should I also accept the reasons for doing so?"

    So just saying "Thomists have a different idea" doesn't give me any reason to accept Thomists idea.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  34. RH:

    I hear ya.

    The personal and psychological qualities of God are the huge sticking point for me, as well. They are supposed to be understood by analogy, and not univocally or equivocally, but I have made the argument that without some univocal meaning, all analogies break down, and if God cannot even be understood univocally, then he cannot be understood analogously either. Which means that we cannot understand him at all, especially his personal qualities.

    ReplyDelete
  35. dguller

    >I have made the argument that without some univocal meaning, all analogies break down, and if God cannot even be understood univocally, then he cannot be understood analogously either.

    Infinity can't be understood univocally but analogously I can picture in my mind a counting sequence that keeps going and never stops. But I can't actually unicovally conceive of every single number.

    By the analogy of endless counting I can understand infinity even if I can't understand it univocally.

    Thus I still maintain your criticism is flawed.

    Also I believe your claim logic fails at some levels of reality is flawed. It's better to say some realities are incomprehensible but I maintain logic applies at all levels of reality.

    There is no such thing as a reality where 2+2=5.

    Some thoughts to consider for future discussion.

    ReplyDelete
  36. BTW it's God's nature & or essence which cannot be understood unequivocally.

    God is by definition incomprehensible otherwise He is not God.

    No comprehensible "god" is worth our time or effort.

    Nothing that is incomprehensible can be understood unequivocally but it can be understood analogously.

    Maybe part of the problem is you need analogous terminology to understand the concept better.

    ReplyDelete
  37. "without some univocal meaning, all analogies break down, and if God cannot even be understood univocally, then he cannot be understood analogously either."

    I'm quoting from Daniel Sullivan here:

    "There is a likeness of proportion between beings and at the same time a dissimilarity of being. Being is proportionate to the essence in which it is found, but essences themselves are of different kinds. Thus we can say that beings have something in common because they are beings, yet differ by their very being."

    ReplyDelete
  38. >without some univocal meaning, all analogies break down, and if God cannot even be understood univocally, then he cannot be understood analogously either.

    Another problem here is if something can by nature be understood univocally then there is no need to understand it analogously since you in effect already understand it.

    ReplyDelete
  39. BenYachov:

    Yeah, I agree. But I don't think dguller means two things must be understood univocally; I think he may want to change that. At other points he said something like "unless two things have something in common, there is no basis for analogy." That's probably a better way of putting it, but the point, as in the Sullivan quote above, is that given that we have Being in common with God, then we have a basis for applying analogy. Is that correct?

    ReplyDelete
  40. Rather we have a relation in common with God(Creator vs the Created). Our being is a composition of existence joined with essence.

    God is Being Itself in which existence and essence are identical.

    anyway I found this essay very helpful.

    http://christianthinktank.com/godtalk.html

    ReplyDelete
  41. God is not a being along side other beings. God is not a being like us only more Uber. Rather God is Being Itself and thus the basis for the existence of our being.

    But Being Itself is not unequivocally comparable to a being He causes to exist.

    But then again any comparison between infinity vs finite has to be purely analogous.

    ReplyDelete
  42. One of my projects get a good book specifically on analogy.

    ReplyDelete
  43. From a book called "The Knowableness of God"...don't know if this clarifies it any, I'm trying to understand it as well...

    "The attributes applied to God and creatures have a relation of proportion -- we do not grasp their full expression in the Divine Being, though we seem to do so when they are found in creatures. "When the name wise is applied to a man, it in a way circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified, but not so in the case of God, where the thing signified still remains as uncomprehended and exceeding the signification of the name." "Since God is His being which no creature is," His relation to being and all attributes differs from that of creatures, "for what is in God simply and immaterially is in the creature materially and manifoldly." "It then follows that attributes are applied to God and creatures according to analogy, that is proportion . . . And thus whatever is said of God and creatures is said as there is some relation of the creature to God as to a principle and cause, in which preexist excellently all the perfections of things . . . In those things which are said analogically, there is not one concept as in univocals, but the name which is used manifoidly signifies diverse proportions to one thing." This proportion or relation of objects in the analogical sense is not, as St. Thomas points out, based on an agreement to something distinct from the two objects related, and which "must be something prior to both, to which both are related," but is reference based on something found in each, "where the one is prior to the other." In God and creatures the basis of analogy is the relation of cause and effect -- "nothing is prior to God, and He is prior to the creature." There is then a reason for saying that "good and other qualities are predicated commonly of God and creatures," and that is, because "the divine essence is the superexcellent likeness of all things."

    ReplyDelete
  44. dguller,

    Thanks.

    The thing is there isn't even anything in the moves I've seen from First Cause to a Personal Theistic God (especially Bible-God) that even becomes analogous
    to persons as we experience them. Certainly not in what you presented so far (I know you were just pitching for the other team there momentarily), nor in any other
    arguments I've seen that try to make the move. So we aren't even at "analogies" yet.

    The people most often promulgating these arguments, or at least the onesmost of interest to many atheists at this point, are the monotheists, in particular Abrahamic.

    So they have accepted a book that depicts what is clearly a God with person-like attributes (as well as contradictions) and they go from that assumption. Or they must try to make that square peg of the biblical God fit the round whole of the First Cause. So the moves to a Personal Agent from the First Cause always strike me as having a backwards motivation. "How do we square the First Cause with the Personal attributes of the Biblical God we have accepted?" The types of moves made only seem remotely compelling to someone coming at it from that angle.

    I don't even care so much about simple coherence, if a theist can make a God compatible with X. If you allow that type of reasoning to reign, you can make all sorts of unwarranted beliefs "compatible" with an observation. And so long as you are willing to twist God's attributes to fit in the hole you want, and give yourself a pass when doing so, you can play that game as well.

    But I'm always going to ask, as far as possible, is that the best INFERENCE from our observation?

    Is it the best INFERENCE that a theistic-type personal God is the cause of the universe/all things? Not that I can see, and I've yet to see any promising signs that theology/theism is making reasonable inferences to that end.

    Is it the best INFERENCE from nature that such a God exists? Heck no!

    Is it the best INFERENCE from the words of the Bible that it depicts in any way a good candidate for an All Knowing, All Powerful Being (and a "Good" being at that)?
    That goes into the "are you kidding me?" bin.

    All those attitudes I would of course defend. But the point is there's no reason to allow theism the inverted reasoning one often sees. Even when a theistic argument is not, you might say, "formally" inverted (assuming theism to be true and simply making claims compatible with that assumption), the very arguments themselves, and the type of errors within them, tend to point to at least a psychological path toward them. For the most part, you can see the influence of someone having accepted the truth of their revealed theism, on their desire to make other deductive arguments point toward their theism in some way.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  45. Here, btw, is one example of the type of reasoning that we atheists so often see coming out of the mouths of Christians (this from a site on Thomistic Philosophy):

    http://www.aquinasonline.com/Questions/biblegod.html

    Is the Thomistic God in agreement with the Biblical God?

    There are two ways to answer your question depending on what you mean by agreement. If one is talking about, say, Aquinas' proofs for the existence of God, then, from considering only the proof, the conclusion "the First Cause, or Unmoved Mover exists" does not capture all that God has revealed about Himself in scripture.


    That's for sure. The First cause doesn't imply anything like the Personal Being in the pages of the Bible. So, in other words: No.

    But if one is a believer,

    Ahh...great. If you ALREADY BELIEVE in the biblical God, then that God must also be the "God" indicated in The First Cause argument. How tremendously convenient.

    .....then one can put that conclusion within another argument:
    1. The God of Scripture is the First Cause of Creation (Genesis 1).


    Voila. Plug in your assumption/conclusion right from the beginning.


    1. The First Cause exists (or is known to exist on the basis of natural reason, e.g. from Aquinas' Third way).
    2. Therefore, the God of Scripture exists (or is known to exist on the basis of natural reason).



    Wait, Mr. Thomistic Philosophy, weren't you supposed to be answering the question of whether the Biblical God is in agreement with Aquinas' First Cause? You simply assumed equivalence and agreement in the first premise, then went on to a conclusion that doesn't answer the question ("Does God Exist" was not the question).

    Thus, Aquinas knows from his faith that the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is the First Cause of Existence, and knows from reason that this First Cause exists."


    One's jaw drops ("knows from his faith????!!!!). This is clearly an "argument" only acceptable to someone who already believes the proposition already that the Bible God and First Cause are the same. Nobody honestly coming to the question without theistic assumptions could have made such an "argument" as above.
    If the Thomists here regard the above as compelling, then I find that undermines the claims they likely have applied some greater rigor in arguments we atheists might not have seen.
    If the Thomists here agree the above reasoning is another case of assuming what one ought to be questioning, then you can at least see one reason why atheists have been made suspicious of theology. "Read more theology" is not compelling if what you DO see of theology - it's advertisements as it were - indicates a sham.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  46. RH

    If you could move beyond your implicit Fundamentalism with it overly anthropomorphic view of god and learn something about historic Christianity & philosophy then we could talk.

    The God of the Philosophers is the God of Abraham and the God of the Bible. There is only one God after all.

    This Bible Only Sola Scriptura neo-fundie nonsense isn't historical Christianity. Anymore than the Pop Oriental religiosity one finds in either Hollywood or California has anything to do with historic Buddhism or other Eastern Religions.

    It's that simple.

    ReplyDelete
  47. Ben wrot: If you could move beyond your implicit Fundamentalism with it overly anthropomorphic view of god and learn something about historic Christianity & philosophy then we could talk.

    You offer not the slightest indication that there is any truth to be mined in doing so.
    Sorry but the Bible is not "your" or "your church's" document. It's a historical document that we can all look at and ask the question: What makes the most sense of this document? Does it make sense to take the claims on it's pages seriously? As a literal document? As a figurative document? As a mix of myth and history?

    You don't get to a claim the answers by default, anymore than the "Church" of Scientology gets the last word on the authenticity of it's founder's claims.

    So the question remains: is there any reason to take ANY of your claims seriously?

    The God of the Philosophers is the God of Abraham and the God of the Bible. There is only one God after all.

    So, I post an instance of a Thomistic page of "philosophy" clearly just assuming the answer to the question asked, and here you are doing the same. This casst yet more doubt that I'll be encountering better reasoning in the wilds of your theology.

    This Bible Only Sola Scriptura neo-fundie nonsense isn't historical Christianity.

    And the Sola Scriptura nonsense isn't contemporary Protestant Christianity. There. Now we have two mere assertions with nothing to indicate either have any claim to Divine Truth.

    I haven't been asserting YOU are fundie or presuming such a stance necessary. I've been asking questions like "How do you move from the First Cause to a Good God/Personal Entity of the type you find in the bible."

    If you want to say you understand the Biblical God to have X attributes which make it reasonable to presume He is the same as the First Cause God...fine! Just actually back up your interpretation.

    No one is asking for all of Thomistic Theology to flood this page. As I pointed out, if someone asked "Can you give me any reason why one ought to think The Theory Of Evolution is true?" Some reasons could be presented WITHOUT having to crash the server by posting every line of evidence and reasoning in support of the theory.
    Do you really find it that hard, when asked the same question of your theology, to post a single theistic proposition that you believe and some supporting lines of reason? It seems rather fishy that you want to so resist doing so.

    I've asked tons of questions and have yet to see a good answer.
    You must have SOME argument - it doesn't have to be EVERY argument you have - that helps establish the Biblical God to be the same as the First Cause God. Or SOME move from the First Cause to a Being that one ought to call a "Personal Being" or "Good God." (Do you endorse any of the move brought up by dguller?)

    I highly suspect that if you were to try to do so, it wouldn't take long in the light of scrutiny to notice the leaps of logic, unjustified assumptions etc. But of course it's always easier to make displays of "God read books" than to actually give even a good start in an argument for Christian Theism.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  48. These are hardly the first Catholics I've encountered. On some sites I've debated certain Catholics for over a decade, so I've seen many of the directions the arguments can go, and none have worked.

    The problem in having these discussions with certain Catholics is the whole Authority Of The Church thing. Over and over a subject is pushed off the table of discussion because "Look, you unwashed masses are trying to reason about this yourself; we believe you need the Church involved to do so!"

    Hence you get these negations of discussion, especially whenever convenient.

    Well, there is no more reason to take that attitude seriously than to do so with the member of any cult, or for instance with those living under the rule of a Kim Jong-il.

    One may as well believe the inhabitants of North Korea that Dear Leader has the answers to the truth about a divine reality. (Claims of the miraculous attend their leaders). Except that anyone outside North Korea can see just how little confidence one would have in such a claim. No one would think they had to read a tome by Kim Jong-il to already have inferred that nothing indicates he is of any authority on the matter of metaphysics or the nature of reality.

    Or Harold Camping. Did atheists need to go under Camping's tutalage before they would be justified in thinking Camping had no particular claim to a theistic reality? No.
    Nothing in Camping's claims, not to mention his previous failed claims, gave any indication he held some truth.

    Same goes for The Church, which has just bumbled along history, making absurd pronouncement, being corrected by real science along the way, reversing itself on moral issues, you name it. There's no indication they have any grasp of some better understanding of reality.

    Which is why "Go read a lot of Churchly books" just doesn't fly. If someone asks the question: Why should I think I'll find any truth when I do so? You should be able to at least start along the road to answering that question.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  49. >I haven't been asserting YOU are fundie or presuming such a stance necessary.


    What you don't get is I have been asserting you are one.

    That's your problem.

    ReplyDelete
  50. >I've asked tons of questions and have yet to see a good answer.

    A Donkey can ask more questions than a wise man can answer.

    My answer is the same. Do the background reading or go somewhere else. This is not an Apologetics website. We do philosophy.

    ReplyDelete
  51. dgueller has done a lot of background reading.

    If you don't want to do the homework that is fine. But you don't get to complain.

    ReplyDelete
  52. Ben:

    What you don't get is I have been asserting you are one.

    You have asserted both that I've treated you like a fundy, and that I have been stuck on a fundamentalist-type vision of the bible. I acknowledged both accusations when I wrote: I haven't been asserting YOU are fundie or presuming such a stance necessary.

    The issue is you have not been willing to give any justifications that your approach is correct.

    A Donkey can ask more questions than a wise man can answer.

    Well, leave it to a Bible-believer to base some wisdom on talking animals ;-)

    My answer is the same. Do the background reading or go somewhere else.

    So evasion remains your default mode. So be it.

    This is not an Apologetics website. We do philosophy.

    Yet you have been unwilling here to defend ANYTHING philosophically.
    And you get others like grodrigues clearly missing the philosophically relevant problems I have given him (e.g. how to evaluate a claim that any person is God, given various attributes of God, e.g. God is the Standard Of Rationality).

    Perhaps a more accurate description would be that you don't "do philosophy' here so much as advise others to do so. At least that is how you are playing this game. (Though, in other threads, I see some people being more forthcoming).

    dgueller has done a lot of background reading.

    And a point you've avoided answering is: Do you agree with dgueller's responses so far to my challenge to show the moves from the First Cause to a Personal Being? If he has got it wrong, then wouldn't it be good of you to correct him?

    If he has got it right, then I see little indication that Thomistic answers are going down the right path.

    RH

    ReplyDelete
  53. >Yet you have been unwilling here to defend ANYTHING philosophically.

    You refuse even in principle to do the back round reading.

    Stalemate!

    If you want to get serious awesome. If not well bye. Have a nice life. I wish you well & I will pray for you.

    ReplyDelete
  54. >Do you agree with dgueller's responses so far to my challenge to show the moves from the First Cause to a Personal Being?

    God is not a "personal being" in that He is some giant Mind unequivocally compared to a human mind. We reject Theistic Personalism here.

    So it's the wrong question.

    ReplyDelete
  55. As to "correcting" dguller I am hoping to built a few bridges to help him understand.

    And vice versa.....

    ReplyDelete
  56. Here is my problem with using analogy to talk about God.

    To say that X is like Y means that X and Y must share a common property P.

    How do we understand P?

    We cannot understand P univocally, because we cannot understand ANY divine properties in this way.

    We cannot understand P equivocally, because there would be too many possible senses and meanings involved.

    We cannot understand P analogously, because that would require another analogy between a created P and the divine P, which would have to rest upon another shared property Q. But how do we understand Q? We cannot do so univocally, equivocally, and we now see that understanding Q analogously would require another shared property R, which would require another shared property S, and on and on, in an infinite regress.

    The only way to stop the regress is at a univocal meaning somewhere. Even stopping at “being” is disallowed, because the type of being of God is different from that of created beings, and so there is no univocal meaning at all, and thus analogy cannot be used at all.

    It seems to follow that we cannot understand God at all if we rely upon Thomist principles.

    ReplyDelete
  57. dguller:

    "The only way to stop the regress is at a univocal meaning somewhere. Even stopping at “being” is disallowed, because the type of being of God is different from that of created beings, and so there is no univocal meaning at all, and thus analogy cannot be used at all."

    The univocal meaning of Being applied here, as far as I understand, is "whatever is not nothing." So, there is actually a univocal meaning able to be found. God is a being and a stone is a being. That's a univocal use of being in that sentence. But the being of God is infinite, and the being of a stone is finite. These things differ in the way that they are beings, in the way that they are "not nothing."

    "The likeness we assert for such beings when we apply the same word, being, to them cannot be found then, in terms of what they are, for the gap between a finite being and God is infinite. The likeness must be sought elsewhere."

    And this is found in a likeness of proportion between beings.

    ReplyDelete
  58. Josh:

    It was my understanding that there is no univocal meaning possible when it comes to God, according to Aquinas. If you are right, then he is wrong.

    ReplyDelete
  59. dguller:

    As those ideas stated in the quotes above come from a philosophy text based wholly on the Philosophia Perennis (Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, etc.), I'd be loathe for you to think they contradict Aquinas. Is there a direct quote of his that you have in mind?

    ReplyDelete
  60. Josh:

    Here’s Feser:

    “Being is instead what Aquinas would call an analogical notion, where analogy constitutes a middle ground between the equivocal and univocal usage of terms” (Aquinas, p. 32).

    So, it does not seem that even “being” can be understood univocally, according to Aquinas.

    ReplyDelete
  61. It seems that possibly what I've been reading is a combination of Scotus and Aquinas then, because Scotus believed you could apply Being as a univocal term to God and creature alike...

    Don't know if anyone has any better ideas?

    ReplyDelete
  62. Josh:

    Naturally, if God could be described univocally in some respects, then my objections to the doctrine of analogy would be refuted. However, then you are stuck with how far a univocal understanding of God can reach.

    ReplyDelete
  63. Well, I suppose the gauntlet has been thrown down on this one, and I'm not really sure how to answer the objection.

    ReplyDelete
  64. This proportion or relation of objects in the analogical sense is not, as St. Thomas points out, based on an agreement to something distinct from the two objects related, and which "must be something prior to both, to which both are related," but is reference based on something found in each, "where the one is prior to the other." In God and creatures the basis of analogy is the relation of cause and effect -- "nothing is prior to God, and He is prior to the creature."

    Since no one is picking this up, and I'm interested in meeting your objection, does the above quote change anything? It seems the basis of analogy is not an ontological property that is referred to separately, like a Platonic Form or something (I guess), but a likeness in essence seen through a degree in which the Creator is linked to the created. Seem reasonable?

    ReplyDelete
  65. And in the article BenYachov kindly linked:

    "In summation, the analogy between creature and Creator based on causality is secured only because God is the principal, intrinsic, essential, efficient cause of the being and perfections of the world. In any other kind of causal relationship an analogical similarity would not necessarily follow. But in an analogy of being similarity must follow, for being communicates only being, and perfections or kinds of being do not arise from an imperfect being. Existence produces only after its kind, viz. other existences."

    ReplyDelete
  66. And just a couple more points for consideration from the same piece:

    "As ontologically ultimate, He is the epistemologically univocal. Thus the perfections of the creature find their standard and definition in the character of God--a univocal point. But the efficient (as opposed to material) causality of God creates the differences in the modi significandi."

    "The Thomist cause/effect scheme provides for similarity between the essence of God and the creature; the relation between God's intellect and nature provides the univocal point for analogy. And the creation of derivative subjectivities and objectivities after the pattern existing in the divine essence and actualized by the decision of the Intellect, created the access path of analogy by creation of the first different modus essendi."

    ReplyDelete
  67. Josh:

    The problem with the idea that God is the source of univocal meaning, which is then passed on to created entities, and that is why they have an imperfect idea of various of his properties, is that it starts with God, and then works our way down to creation. However, we do not start with God in our lives, but start where we are, and where we are is in the middle of the world, trying to understand God from the ground up. It is from this perspective that my criticisms apply to. If we could assume God’s point of view, then we would have univocal meaning, and would not need analogy at all.

    ReplyDelete
  68. Dguller,

    I don't see how your criticism follows. Everything I read in those quotes and other sources indicate clearly that the conclusions about the divine names are applied by reasoning from our own experience up, not the other way around. Why call parts of our nature imperfect at all if that were the case?

    ReplyDelete
  69. From I, Q. 13, Art. 2 of ST:

    Reply to Obj. 3: ...Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Question [4], Article [2]) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Question [4], Article [3]), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."

    ReplyDelete
  70. Josh:

    You are correct that we start from our experience, and our experience is sufficiently limited to make us unable to have a clear and univocal understanding of the properties of entities that are beyond our experience, such as God. That is why Aquinas says that we cannot have a univocal understanding of divine properties, i.e. God is utterly transcendent and beyond our conceptual categories, except via analogy with our own experience, which gives us a limited form of understanding.

    The question is how we get from the muddy and dirty world to the pure and pristine divine essence. The answer is that we cannot get all the way there, and that is why our understanding is fundamentally analogous, and thus tied down to the created world, which taints our comprehension of the divine, which is uncreated to its core. And given that tainted understanding, it just does not help to just assert that if you start with a pure understanding of God – which we know is impossible – then everything makes sense.

    That is the very problem, i.e. postulating something impossible in order to make sense of another impossibility. In other words, to answer the problem of how we can understand God analogously, we just first understand God in a non-analogous fashion, which we cannot do, which means that we can only understand him analogously, which we cannot do, which means that we must understand him non-analogously, which we cannot do, and on and on in the circle.

    ReplyDelete
  71. Dguller:

    Well, this has been an interesting side discussion, and I'm thankful for the insight. Just one more question before I stop clogging the combox, merely as an act of distinguishing the positions, as opposed to agreeing or disagreeing with you:

    Are you saying that the created cannot know anything about the Creator from looking at the created? IOW, we cannot know anything (perhaps aside from the fact of existence) about the cause from the effects? Gracias.

    ReplyDelete
  72. Josh:

    >> Are you saying that the created cannot know anything about the Creator from looking at the created? IOW, we cannot know anything (perhaps aside from the fact of existence) about the cause from the effects? Gracias.

    I think that we can know what the Creator is NOT like, i.e. negative theology. However, it seems to me that any positive account is simply impossible if we cannot understand his qualities either univocally, equivocally or analogously.

    What is left?

    ReplyDelete
  73. Dguller,

    I've been dipping in here and there, reading about analogy, trying to understand how it applies to God, and trying to understand your objections. Been reading Aquinas, and a couple of old Scholastic books on Natural Theology. I think we agree that the negative attributes (infinity, etc.) are applied univocally. And we agree that Aquinas says that positive names are applied analogously. And you deny that we have the warrant to even apply analogy because we have to have a univocal term in between the two analogates. And due to our imperfect mode of understanding, we are unable to do this. Is that a fair restatement of your objection?

    ReplyDelete
  74. Josh:

    That's a fair summary of my argument.

    ReplyDelete
  75. Dguller,

    All right. So, as far as I can tell, Aquinas' ability to apply analogy is based on the notion of proportionate causality (22-3 in Aquinas). And so when Aquinas applies an analogy in affirming a perfection in God that is found in creatures, he is applying the analogy of proportion. Would you also deny the notion of proportionate causality?

    ReplyDelete
  76. Josh:

    >> And so when Aquinas applies an analogy in affirming a perfection in God that is found in creatures, he is applying the analogy of proportion. Would you also deny the notion of proportionate causality?

    Can I understand any of that as being univocally applicable to God?

    ReplyDelete
  77. Dguller,

    Can I understand any of that as being univocally applicable to God?

    I'm really not sure; I was just seeing if you may agree that Aquinas' use of analogy is based on the principle of proportionate causality, and if so, if you had an explicit denial of it and why.

    ReplyDelete
  78. Also, some direct quotes from Aquinas, which I think may more directly address your objections:

    From QDP, Question VII, Art. VII, Obj. 8, contrary argument:

    Things that are like have some one thing in common: and things that have one thing in common have a common predicate. But nothing whatever can be predicated in common with God. Therefore there can be no likeness between God and the creature.

    Then his reply:

    This argument refers to things that have a common genus or matter: which does not apply to God and the creature.

    ReplyDelete
  79. Josh:

    I don't understand his point here. If God and creatures do not share a common genus, then how can they share any properties in common, and thus, how can analogy even be possible?

    ReplyDelete
  80. I don't understand what the problem is. Take the word 'tension'. It can mean a quantifiable mechanical property of solid materials, or an emotional state. There is most definitely an analogy there, even though we are comparing material and immaterial things.

    ReplyDelete
  81. Jake:

    >> I don't understand what the problem is. Take the word 'tension'. It can mean a quantifiable mechanical property of solid materials, or an emotional state. There is most definitely an analogy there, even though we are comparing material and immaterial things.

    Right, but there is a common univocal property of “inward pressure of force that is being resisted by an outward pressure”, or something similar that is driving the analogy.

    The problem is that when making an analogy between God and creatures, one must identify a univocal common property that is shared between God and creatures. Otherwise, they are not “like” one another at all. However, Aquinas claims that there are no such univocal properties at all, and that the only way to understand God’s properties is via analogy. And if analogy presupposes univocal meanings, then there cannot be analogy either.

    That’s the problem as far as I can see.

    ReplyDelete
  82. Dguller,

    "Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that he should be in any genus as a species"

    It seems that once you affirm divine simplicity, you can't apply your specific criticism of analogy to God. So, probably several things at work here (I'm just guessing):

    1. You criticism (laid out nicely by Aquinas himself) would only apply to analogies of God if he were a being alongside other beings, or, I suppose, if God as Being was considered as a univocal being to us (substance/accident, etc.). But obviously Aquinas does not believe that. So it seems that Aquinas is holding that your objection is directed at a straw man.

    2. This leads me to the belief that the type of analogy that you have presented (mirrored in Aquinas' QDP, above) is not the only type of analogy that holds between two analogates.

    3. I still don't know where you stand on the principle of proportionate causality...this seems important to understand the type of analogy that Aquinas holds to in speaking about God

    If you do affirm proportionate causality, then it seems there are grounds for affirming analogies of proportion when talking about God.

    I should have just consulted the Catholic Encyclopedia:

    "We may distinguish two kinds of analogy:

    Two objects can be said to be analogous on account of a relation which they have not to each other, but to a third object: e.g., there is analogy between a remedy and the appearance of a person, in virtue of which these two objects are said to be healthy. This is based upon the relation which each of them has to the person's health, the former as a cause, the latter as a sign. This may be called indirect analogy."


    This, I think, is the type of analogy Aquinas dismisses and the type you utilize in your criticism. Yes?

    But there is another type:

    "Two objects again are analogous on account of a relation which they have not to a third object, but to each other. Remedy, nourishment, and external appearance are termed healthy on account of the direct relation they bear to the health of the person. Here health is the basis of the analogy, and is an example of what the Schoolmen call summum analogatum (Cf. St. Thomas, ib.)

    This second sort of analogy is twofold. Two things are related by a direct proportion of degree, distance, or measure: e.g., 6 is in direct proportion to 3, of which it is the double; or the healthiness of a remedy is directly related to, and directly measured by, the health which it produces. This analogy is called analogy of proportion. Or, the two objects are related one to the other not by a direct proportion, but by means of another and intermediary relation: for instance, 6 and 4 are analogous in this sense that 6 is the double of 3 as 4 is of 2, or 6:4::3:2. The analogy between corporal and intellectual vision is of this sort, because intelligence is to the mind what the eye is to the body. This kind of analogy is based on the proportion of proportion; it is called analogy of proportionality."


    So, to sum up, it is this type of analogy I think you would have to criticize in its application, as clearly Aquinas makes no use of the other type, which your initial criticism was based upon.

    ReplyDelete
  83. dguller:

    "Right, but there is a common univocal property of “inward pressure of force that is being resisted by an outward pressure”, or something similar that is driving the analogy.

    "The problem is that when making an analogy between God and creatures, one must identify a univocal common property that is shared between God and creatures. Otherwise, they are not “like” one another at all."

    OK, but what I am saying is that for any analogy there is implicitly a univocal meaning, but a very loose one. For the word 'tension', I think your definition doesn't fit the emotional state of tension. I might define 'tension' very loosely as 'in a state that tends toward a breaking point', or 'toward a catastrophic discontinuity' or some such thing, which is a very loose definition indeed, but one which can apply equally well to physical tension as to emotional tension.

    In the case of the divine attributes, we can also apply such loose univocal meanings. For example, for 'intellect' we might define it as 'the capability to direct an action toward a predetermined end', or perhaps 'the ability to apprehend universals'. Again, very loose definitions but ones that apply to human intellect as well as the divine intellect.

    ReplyDelete
  84. To see what is wrong with Coyne’s latest remarks, we can imagine that that dialogue might continue as follows:

    Interesting analogy, but I really don’t think it holds very much water – if any.

    And the primary reason for that conclusion is that science – for all its theoretical underpinnings which one might reasonably, or unreasonably, dispute (maybe angels are really in there pushing all of the gluons and quarks about) – it still has a myriad of some significant and tangible practical applications: think electro-magnetism to computers and motors and radio and the Internet; thermodynamics to central heating and steam-engines and automobiles; particle physics to chemistry and medicine and cures for various diseases and ailments.

    Name one single solitary solid similar consequence for the existence of god. And I’m not talking of the belief therein itself but tangible evidence, consequences of the existence, of such. Any improvements to Man’s estate that follow only because god – particularly the Judeo-Christian incarnation – actually exists? Any indication that we should be praying to Allah instead of Jehovah for cures to medical ailments that science has yet to provide? Even any indication that any prayer has any efficacy that is statistically significant? Any proof or evidence that it is Jehovah that exists and not one of the literally tens of thousands of gods that mankind has worshipped over the millennia?

    I will concede that theology probably had some utility and value in the evolution of knowledge about logic and reason and philosophy. But only in the same way that astrology and alchemy were necessary precursors to astronomy and chemistry. Personally, I’ll go with a philosopher of religion – Keith Parsons – who argued that “the case for theism is a fraud”.

    ReplyDelete
  85. I know next to nothing about science or philosphy. I know a little more about Aquinas, but I am still on question one of his Summa, so I can't put forth much of his beliefs. He did say though that it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation.
    Obviously, Coyne and Hitchens and their gang of followers have not been blessed yet, with the divine revlations of God. Faith is a gift as are consolations from God and knowledge of His truth. I do not believe you can convert anyone via their intellect. Jesus did not initially come to the highly educated nor the wealthy or prestigious. He was recognized and loved by the poor, the ignorant, the sinners and the lowly. If someone is converted to Christ by their intellect only, I do not believe they will remain long as a member of the body of Christ. I do believe that if someone, sincere in their heart asks the Lord to make himself known to them, he will do so.
    I can only attest that I did not believe and I was as obnoxious and as arrogant as most of the atheists I see in the public eye and as left wing as you could get when God decided he had had enough and made it very clear that he existed and also very clear what a sinner I was. (I was 51 at the time) God is supernatural and he can come into a persons life in a manner that leaves no doubt regarding his reality and at the same time reveals the illusion of what we thought the world was.
    Nothing in this world can compare to the touch of God or the life of the Holy Spirit within ones soul. There is no peace or joy that is even possible in this world that can compare to a single contact by God, by his touch or the grace he pours out through his sacraments.
    I can only do what those who have been given a gift like this can do and that is pray for the conversion of all. Heaven does exist and can be touched while here on earth. Hell also exists as does purgatory. I can't prove any of that, but I don't just believe it, I know it. Thankfully, the Lord is patient with everyone, so there is still time for Coyne and those like him to get a taste of heaven and avoid an eternity of hell.

    ReplyDelete