Saturday, May 14, 2011

Leibniz’s Mill

In section 17 of his Monadology, Leibniz puts forward the following argument against materialism:

Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions.  And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill.  That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.  Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for.  Further, nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple substance.  It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of simple substances can consist.

Because of the example he alludes to, this argument is sometimes referred to as “Leibniz’s Mill.”  How is it supposed to work?  Given the emphasis on simplicity, Leibniz’s point is clearly at least in part that a mind cannot be a composite thing, as a mill is composite insofar as it has parts which interact.  Rather, a mind has to be simple in the sense of something non-composite or without parts.  A useful exposition of the argument so interpreted can be found here.  So understood, the argument is akin to Descartes’ “indivisibility argument” and to anti-materialist arguments from the unity of consciousness.  (I discuss the indivisibility argument in chapter 2 of Philosophy of Mind and the unity of consciousness in chapter 5.)

Another way to read the argument, though, would be to take it to be saying that the mill example shows there to be a gap between material-cum-mechanical facts on the one hand and mental facts on the other.  If the brain were made the size of a mill so that we could walk around in it, we would never encounter in it anything that corresponded to thinking, feeling, and perception.  All we would encounter are material parts interacting causally (even if the causal interaction would be more complex than what the mill analogy suggests).  The point would seem to be that we could know all the material facts without knowing any mental facts (thus making the argument akin to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument), or that the entirety of the material facts does not entail any mental facts (thus making it akin to the zombie argument).  On this reading, considerations about simplicity versus compositeness arguably would not be essential to the main, anti-materialist point of the argument – though Leibniz himself presumably thought that the gap between material and mental facts should lead us to regard the mind as simple rather than composite.

In his new book Leibniz’s Mill: A Challenge to Materialism, Charles Landesman seems to be reading the argument in this second way.  William Hasker reviews the book here, and understandably complains that Landesman overlooks the “simplicity” aspect of Leibniz’s argument.  (Hasker, by the way, provides a very useful exposition of the anti-materialist argument from the unity of consciousness in his important book The Emergent Self.)  In fairness to Landesman, though, Leibniz’s Mill is (despite the title) not primarily intended as an exposition of Leibniz, who actually plays a relatively small role in the book.  And it is in any event worthwhile considering this second reading of the argument, whether or not it corresponds entirely to Leibniz’s own intentions.

Landesman considers the following objection raised by John Searle in his book Intentionality:

An exactly parallel argument to Leibniz’s would be that the behavior of H2O molecules can never explain the liquidity of water, because if we entered into the system of molecules “as into a mill we should only find on visiting it pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain” liquidity.  But in both cases we would be looking at the system at the wrong level.  The liquidity of water is not to be found at the level of the individual molecule, nor are the visual perception and the thirst to be found at the level of the individual neuron or synapse.  (p. 268)

It is ironic that Searle should put forward such an objection, given that he is also a critic of materialism who has himself elsewhere denied that such cases are “exactly parallel.”  In particular, he has insisted that whereas liquidity, solidity, and other such properties of material systems have what he calls a “third-person ontology” insofar as they are entirely objective or “public” phenomena equally accessible to every observer, consciousness has by contrast a “first-person ontology” insofar as it is subjective, “private,” or directly accessible only to the subject of a conscious experience.  But then it would seem to follow that if we observed a system of water molecules on the large scale – not just an individual molecule or two but the whole system – and noted that they were moving around in such-and-such a way relative to one another, we would (given the standard scientific account of liquidity) just be observing the system’s liquidity.  By contrast, if we observed, on the large scale, the system of neurons which makes up the brain, we would not thereby observe the conscious experiences of the person whose brain it is.  This is a consequence of Searle’s own distinction between third-person and first-person ontology, and his own insistence that consciousness is unique in having the latter sort of ontology.  (See my paper “Why Searle Is a Property Dualist” for references and for further discussion of Searle’s views.)

Landesman makes a related point in response to Searle when he notes that when observing either a mill-sized brain or a mill-sized system of water molecules, we would not be limited to observing the individual neuron or molecule but could imagine instead observing the systems on the large scale.  And when we do so, Landesman continues, we would certainly be able to observe the liquidity of the water if by “liquidity” we mean a certain kind of interaction between molecules.  On the other hand, we might instead mean by “liquidity” the phenomenal features liquid water presents to us – the way it looks or feels to us, for example – and these, Landesman allows, would not be observable as we walked through a mill-sized system of water molecules.  But then, liquidity in this sense would really not be a feature of the water itself in the first place, but only of our experience of it.  And in that case it is irrelevant that we would not observe it in observing the system of molecules.  (Cf. my discussion of the fallacy Paul Churchland commits when he suggests that the red surface of an apple is really just “a matrix of molecules reflecting photons at certain critical wavelengths.”)  By contrast, thought and perception are features of the mind itself, and yet we would not be aware of them in observing the large-scale interactions between neurons in a mill-sized brain.  Thus, Landesman concludes (quite correctly, in my view), Searle’s objection fails.

Now one might, as Landesman notes, respond by insisting that in observing the interactions between neurons, it might be that “we are in fact observing thoughts and perceptions, although we fail to recognize them for what they are” (p. 24).  But as Michael Lockwood writes in Mind, Brain and the Quantum:

To [Leibniz’s argument] I suppose one could retort by asking Leibniz how he expected to know if he had found something that explained Perception.  Except that that is supposed to be his point: one wouldn’t know and hence nothing one encountered could explain Perception. (p. 35)

And as Landesman says, it is hard to see how one could justify the claim that in our stroll through a mill-sized brain we would “in fact” be observing thoughts and perceptions without realizing it, unless one is assuming the truth of some particular theory about the mind/brain relationship that could ground this suggestion.  But in that case one would merely be begging the question against Leibniz, whose point is that the mind is not susceptible of explanation in terms of such a theory.  And if one instead took the eliminativist view that the mind is illusory and that mentalistic descriptions should simply be replaced by neuroscientific ones, then one would in effect be conceding Leibniz’s point that an inspection of neural processes will never reveal thought or perception.

Still, one might suggest that Leibniz’s argument can be seen to fail when we consider that if we were to walk through a computer expanded to the size of a mill, we wouldn’t observe the program it is running, the symbols it is processing, etc.  But it is still running the program and processing the symbols for all that.   (Lockwood considers such an objection at p. 35 of Mind, Brain and the Quantum.)  But this analogy is no good either.  The problem is that – as Searle has trenchantly argued – “computation” as usually understood is not an intrinsic feature of the physical world in the first place, but an observer-relative feature.  Nothing counts as the processing of symbolic representations, the running of algorithms, etc. except relative to human interests – in particular, those of the designers and users of computers.  That is why we wouldn’t observe the distinctively computational features of a mill-sized computer – they aren’t there intrinsically in the first place, but only ever assigned by us.  (Similarly, if we examine the physical features of a written word – whether normal-sized or expanded to the size of a mill – we will never observe its meaning or semantic content, but that is because the meaning or semantic content is not intrinsic to the physical properties of a written word in the first place, but rather derived from us as language users.)  But mental features would have to be intrinsic to the brain, if materialism were true.  So the proposed analogy between computers and brains fails.

But what if Searle is wrong and something like computation really is an intrinsic feature of the material world after all?  For example, isn’t DNA rightly said to contain the “program” or “information” for an organism?  And yet, if a DNA molecule were made the size of a mill, we wouldn’t observe this “program” or “information.”  So, doesn’t this show that Leibniz is mistaken?

I don’t know if using computationalist language is the best way to put the point, but I think such a response would be a promising one.  But it would not help the materialist in the least.  For if we say that there is something intrinsic to a material system in virtue of which it “points to” something beyond itself (as “information” does) or to a certain end-state (as a “program” does), then we are either attributing to matter something like final causality as it is understood in the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition (as I have noted in earlier posts, such as this one) or we are attributing to it something like intentionality and thus adopting either a panpsychist, or dual-aspect, or neutral monist account of matter.  And in either case, we are thereby abandoning a materialist conception of matter – and thus conceding the main point of Leibniz’s argument.

565 comments:

  1. Ben:

    >> If you read Feser you would know Aquinas believed the intellect moves the will. Volunteerists like Locke deny this.

    I have read Feser, and have quoted what he wrote above. He writes that the intellect can direct the will to make rational choices, but why does having an intellect necessitate having a will? I mean, a motor moves the wheels of a car, but it does not follow that if a motor exists, then the wheels of a car necessarily exist, too. After all, there are many motors that lack any wheels at all. So, this argument does not work. I’m wondering if there is another one that you know of to make this idea work.

    >> A square or the property of squareness is not a Pure Perfection. Of course it wouldn't make sense.

    How is “squareness” limited, by its nature, to a finite mode of realization?

    >> In Christ there are two natures. One fully human the other fully Divine which are both united in the Divine Person of the Word without mixing the two natures.

    How can one substance have two mutually contradictory natures? Perhaps there is a substance whose nature is both a square and a circle?

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  2. BenYachov,

    "Rather Analogy tells us he has something different,but related."

    At best, analogy tells us what your subjective concept of God is. I suppose that may be important to those who are interested in you personally. The same for Aquinas. His personal concept of God is trivia for those who are interested in that sort of trivia.

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  3. >How can one substance have two mutually contradictory natures?

    The Incarnate Christ is one substance? Since when? I'm sure that news to Pope St Leo the Great.

    You have yet to master natural theology. I don't think you should try to take on Christology.

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  4. >First, are you serious? And this from someone who JUST complained that I might be using terms incorrectly. I thought that meant that you were someone who understood the importance of precision in one’s terminology, but I guess not.

    Well I am serious in that I denounce as counter productive the whole Ready! Shoot! Aim! You seem to take toward criticizing Thomism. But I do think it is Pettifogging the issue to demand Aquinas has to effectively define what "is" is before we can get anywhere.

    >Second, if “will” means what everyone takes it to mean, then God has no will at all.

    Rather God doesn't have a Human will but we have already established God is not a human in His Divine Nature.

    >Do you agree with this definition?

    For a human will I would not disagree. But for will in general I will go with the mere power of intentionality. The mechanisms of how a human arrives at the point of expressing intention are not needed in God.

    >But as Feser points out, if you apply this definition to God, then God has no will, because he lacks any potential that needs to be actualized in order to result in a proper final end. He is Pure Act, after all.

    Naturally since God is not a human being.

    >which attempts to determine which possibility is best suited to leading to the proper final end of the intelligent being.

    That is of course the key sentence since God is already Perfection Itself so needs not will anything to attain what He is already Eternally.

    But God can Will to cause things outside Himself. See the link

    HERE!!!

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  5. >The only way for the analogy to hold is if you remove this idea that the will strives to achieve the proper final end of the being in question. However, if you remove this in the case of God, then why does his will do anything at all? There is nothing to be gained by exercising the will, because God is already fully actualized with no potential whatsoever.

    You may want to read the link VIII. GOD'S CREATIVE ACT AND DIVINE IMMUTABILITY

    >Because the will is utilized when a being chooses to actualize a possibility. This means that the will goes from potential to actual, and thus there is a change involved within the will itself.

    But God Will is already Purely Actual so He WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS BY ONE ACT OF WILL. It's not hard.

    >The will prior to actualization is different from the will after the actualization, and that is why there is a change, and why Aquinas talks about the “motions of the will”.

    But in those cases he is talking about Human will. Not the Divine Will.

    Thus it is clear the analogy of Will holds.

    >I have read Feser, and have quoted what he wrote above. He writes that the intellect can direct the will to make rational choices, but why does having an intellect necessitate having a will?

    I don't know I will have to study that issue.

    >How is “squareness” limited, by its nature, to a finite mode of realization?

    How can a Square be infinite and still be a square? It seems to me Love or Being etc could be infinite but how a square? If the sides of a square where infinite in length then where would they end so they could meet at right angles? If a shape doesn't have four right angles then by definition it is not a Square. It lacks the Essence of a Square. If it can't form any right angles then the same.

    Now I am going to go play Mass Effect One(I'm playing them out of order since I already finished Two).

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  6. Ben:

    >> The Incarnate Christ is one substance? Since when? I'm sure that news to Pope St Leo the Great.

    Again, this all comes down to magical thinking. A square does not have four sides, but it is still a square. You can pretend all you want that it is still a square, but once it lost its four sides, it is no longer a square at all. Similarly, you cannot talk about God being Pure Act and yet also taking on a physical and material form, which is a total contradiction. Now, you can pretend that this is not a contradiction, much like a non-four-sided square is a contradiction, by saying that there is no “mixing” between the divine Pure Act and the material Jesus Christ, but then God did not become incarnate at all.

    >> But for will in general I will go with the mere power of intentionality.

    Intentionality is just when one state is about another state. So, our consciousness has intentionality, because our thoughts are about states of affairs in the world. Just because one is conscious does not mean that one has will. I can imagine a mind that is conscious of what is happening around it, i.e. it has intentionality, but its behavior is not under its conscious control, i.e. it has no will. For example, it could be under the control of another being, or it could be fully under the control of unconscious processes. I think that this shows that will is not just intentionality, but something else.

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  7. Ben:

    >> But God can Will to cause things outside Himself.

    That is the issue in question.

    First, either God has a final cause or he does not.

    If he does have a final cause, then that implies a process of development or a sequence of events that ends at some point, but since he cannot have such a sequence of events unfolding in time, then he cannot have a final end. In addition, it implies that he has some potential, which must be actualized in the final cause, but this is impossible since he is Pure Act. Again, no final cause for God.

    If he does not have a final cause, then he does not have will, because will is just the process by which an intelligent being directs itself towards its final cause, according to Aquinas.

    Second, the link that you provided says that “God necessarily wills his own goodness as an end and freely wills creatures as ordered to that end as participants in his goodness.” This is a problem, because it was already established that God does not have a final end at all, and so I do not understand what it even means to say that he “wills his own goodness as an end”. I mean, his goodness is his essence, and it is already fully actualized without a shred of potentiality, which means that it is not an end at all, because it was always there, and not the result of a process that ends at the final cause.

    The bottom line is that if you take Aquinas’ Aristotelian concepts seriously, then you are stuck with inconsistencies when you try to assert that God has certain properties. Even taking Aquinas’ own definitions, it becomes impossible for God to have some key theological properties, such as will in this case, because he lacks an essential component of will, i.e. the direction towards a final cause, because he does not have a final cause at all, being Pure Act. And so you are left with asserting that a shape without four sides is still a square, which absolutely makes no sense, even analogously.

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  8. Ben:

    >> How can a Square be infinite and still be a square?

    As long as it has four sides of equal length at right angles, then whether it is finite or infinite is irrelevant. It is still a square, even if its lengths are infinitely long.

    >> It seems to me Love or Being etc could be infinite but how a square? If the sides of a square where infinite in length then where would they end so they could meet at right angles? If a shape doesn't have four right angles then by definition it is not a Square. It lacks the Essence of a Square. If it can't form any right angles then the same.

    I’m not too sure what the point of this is. Mathematicians use infinity in their calculations all the time. Calculus uses equations that use the limit as it approaches infinity, and this has many practical applications. According to you, it would be impossible to work at all, and yet it clearly works, even with the use of infinity.

    And who cares about infinite squares? If anything this just plays into my point, because if you are right and postulating infinity means that you lose the ability to measure anything at all at the level of the infinite, then wouldn’t we also lose any capacity to measure love, will, intellect, and so on, when these are ascribed to God? And then they would become meaningless, too.

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  9. >Now, you can pretend that this is not a contradiction, much like a non-four-sided square is a contradiction, by saying that there is no “mixing” between the divine Pure Act and the material Jesus Christ, but then God did not become incarnate at all.

    You have earned an insult with the above arogant stupidy. What part of the "Catholic Church upholds the teaching of the Council of Chalcedon" do you not understand? What part of the "Catholic Church (not to mention Aquinas, Pope Leo, Mr Smith & Myself) repudiates the monophysite heresy" do you not understand?

    What you are saying here is effectively it is not a true incarnation of the Word & the Flesh unless it's done in a monophysite fashon (not that I believe for a second you ignorant New Atheist arse know Monophysite from Diphysie from Nestorianism from a hole in the head).

    That makes about as much sense as saying God isn't really a Trinity unless he is somehow three Gods in One God instead of Three Hypostasis possessing the One Divine Nature.

    I have news for you sunshine. Nature-Mixing has never been a Catholic doctrine or philosophy. Uniting Natures yes but mixing them no.

    Get over it. Deal with our doctrines as we believe them not how you wish we believed them. Classic fundie New Atheist mistake 101!

    As for the rest of your nonsense. It is all wrong. I could deny God tomorrow and nothing there is an intelligent critique. In fact it makes the same mistake you make in Christology.

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  10. >I’m not too sure what the point of this is. Mathematicians use infinity in their calculations all the time.

    It means there is a difference between pure perfections which are none material vs physical perfection which are material & thus not pure.

    A square is a material perfection. Being is not.

    You kneejerk materialism & Physicalism at work messing up your understanding.

    You have not written a single correct critique here.

    Here is a hint. God essence is identical with His existence you keep equivocating between Him and other things he creates whose existence and essences are separate.


    >If he does not have a final cause, then he does not have will, because will is just the process by which an intelligent being directs itself towards its final cause, according to Aquinas.

    He doesn't have a human will. Get over it or have a good cry about it!

    >Again, this all comes down to magical thinking.

    Which would describe your implicit materialism philosophy threw and threw. Persons are moved by a non-existent mind that is nothing more than an illusion because only the physical exists.

    That's magic!

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  11. >Intentionality is just when one state is about another state.

    No it is there is a difference between me intending to throw a rock at you and one randomly falling on your head. My intention to throw a rock at you is compatible to God intending to make the universe. I could choose not to throw the rock. God could have chosen not to create.

    >Even taking Aquinas’ own definitions, it becomes impossible for God to have some key theological properties, such as will in this case,

    What you are really complaining about is God is not anthropomorphic and God cannot be understood unequivocally.

    Tough! Live with it. I know it's easier for Atheists to mock Old Man in the Sky but clearly you guys are at a loss when confronted by real philosophy & theology!

    It's the God we believe in not the one you wish we believed in.

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  12. >Similarly, you cannot talk about God being Pure Act and yet also taking on a physical and material form, which is a total contradiction.

    Because you are equivocating transforming & or mixing natures to create a new nature with uniting two natures without mixing them.

    If I deny God tomorrow it is clear you don't understand the basic theology of Pope Leo from a hole in the head.

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  13. >Second, the link that you provided says that “God necessarily wills his own goodness as an end and freely wills creatures as ordered to that end as participants in his goodness.” This is a problem, because it was already established that God does not have a final end at all,

    It's from Aquinas himself. You need to ask Feser what he meant vs what Aquinas meant. Likely Aquinas is talking analogously here. You seem to have trouble thinking analogously & tend to reduce things to either equivocal or unequivocal.

    Not the same but similar is a simple concept that continues to evade you.

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  14. A square can only be instantiated as a physical shape. Thus Squareness not a pure perfection and cannot be conceived as a transcendental. Love is not a physical thing. Being is not a physical thing. Indeed "being" is itself an analogous term not an unequivocal one.

    Your problem is your implicit materialism only sees things in unequivocal or equivocal terms.

    >Just because one is conscious does not mean that one has will.

    More like one has to have intellect to have will. If you read Feser AQUINAS page 123
    QUOTE"The Fifth Way, if successful, establishes by itself that God has intellect. Furthermore, intelligent beings are distinguished from
    non-intelligent ones in that the latter, but not the former, possess only their own forms. For an "intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower" (ST 1.14.1). That is to say, to understand some thing is for that thing's essence to exist in some sense in one's own intellect.......

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  15. Continue
    Now the reason non-intelligent things lack this ability to have the form of another thing is that they are wholly material, and material things can only possess one form at a time, as it were. Hence immaterial beings can possess the forms of other things precisely because they are immaterial; and the further a thing is from materiality, the more powerful its intellect is bound to be. Thus human beings, which, though they have immaterial intellects are also embodied, are less intelligent than angels, which are incorporeal. "Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality ... it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge" (ST 1.14.1). This argument presupposes a number of theses in the philosophy of mind and cannot be evaluated, or even properly understood, unless those theses are first understood. We will explore these theses in chapter 4.",END QUOTE

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  16. >> How can a Square be infinite and still be a square?

    >As long as it has four sides of equal length at right angles, then whether it is finite or infinite is irrelevant. It is still a square, even if its lengths are infinitely long.

    If the sides are infinity long then they can't end. If they can't end then it follows they can't end in right angles. Thus by nature a Square can't be infinite just as 2+2 can never equal 5.

    Your Nominalism showing but it conflicts with my Aristotelian Moderate Realism.

    I think we are wasting our time till you do more study.

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  17. Will is someone's deliberate intention or wish which flows from the intellect or is moved by the intellect.

    Based on my knowledge of Thomism that would be a good Thomistic definition of Will.

    God has both Will and Intellect analogously compared to a human intellect or will not unequivocally.

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  18. Ben:

    >> Get over it. Deal with our doctrines as we believe them not how you wish we believed them. Classic fundie New Atheist mistake 101!

    I am taking your doctrines as you believe them, but if your doctrines are incoherent, then that is not my fault. Say that there is a religion that has been around for millennia who says that a key part of their faith is that square is still a square even if it is not four-sided. What would you say? Would you take this belief seriously as worthy of deep study and respect, or would you say that their faith is based upon a contradiction, and thus is incoherent?

    And what if they complained that you are not taking their beliefs as they believe them, because they really, truly think that a non-four-sided figure is still a square? What would you say then? Does that change the fact that it is still contradictory?

    >> He doesn't have a human will. Get over it or have a good cry about it!

    That is why it is important to define “will”. I have described Aquinas’ definition of “will”, according to Feser, and according to that definition, God does not have a will. Again, if will is defined as having X, Y and Z, and if God cannot possibly have X, Y and Z, then God cannot possibly have a will. It really is that simple. If you disagree, then provide a definition of “will” that works for both God and human beings. If you cannot, then I’m afraid that you are stuck.

    >> Which would describe your implicit materialism philosophy threw and threw. Persons are moved by a non-existent mind that is nothing more than an illusion because only the physical exists.

    I don’t think that the mind does not exist. And it is certainly more than an illusion, although it does have illusory features within it.

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  19. Ben:

    >> No it is there is a difference between me intending to throw a rock at you and one randomly falling on your head. My intention to throw a rock at you is compatible to God intending to make the universe. I could choose not to throw the rock. God could have chosen not to create.

    First, you did not answer my specific objection to this idea that intentionality is necessary and sufficient for will. It is not.

    Second, I do not think that God could have chosen not to create. After all, since he is Pure Act, there is no room for alternative possibilities, because that would imply that Pure Act has some potentiality within it, which is impossible.

    >> What you are really complaining about is God is not anthropomorphic and God cannot be understood unequivocally.

    Not at all. I am just taking definitions seriously. If will is defined as necessarily having a property, and that property is impossible for God to have, then God does not have a will. Similarly, if a square is defined as being four-sided, then if a shape does not have four sides, then it cannot be a square. I can talk about it still being a square by analogy, but that does not help and appears to be more a sign of desperation, because I really, really, really want to keep calling that shape a square even though it is impossible for it to be one.

    In other words, it says more about me than about the concepts at hand. It is clear that you really, really want God to have a will, and will continue to say he has one, even if it is impossible for him to have anything that we call a will.

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  20. Ben:

    >> Because you are equivocating transforming & or mixing natures to create a new nature with uniting two natures without mixing them.

    How can one unite two contradictory natures at all? Care to give any other examples? I mean, say I said that I have found a human that has become incarnated in a dog, and you come and see a human being sitting beside a dog. I then say, “Behold! A unity of two natures without mixing them!” Would you really agree with me that a human being became incarnated in a dog? Because that seems to be what you are saying about God becoming incarnated in a man. He appears to have done no such thing.

    >> Not the same but similar is a simple concept that continues to evade you.

    And what evades you is the idea that similar must have something the same. Give me a non-theological example of something being similar to something else where they share nothing in common. Go for it. I’m all ears.

    >> More like one has to have intellect to have will.

    That was not your initial claim. You said that to have will one must have INTENTIONALITY. I showed that intentionality is not sufficient to have a will, but it is probably necessary. If you want to shift the goal posts by now talking about intellect, then I can agree with you. But then why does having intellect necessitate the possession of a will? That was my original question, and you have yet to answer it.

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  21. dguller [re: Christ]: "How can one substance have two mutually contradictory natures?"

    You have just stumbled upon the heart of the gospel. The two mutually contradictory natures are reconciled through the person of Jesus Christ.

    That was the whole point of the incarnation!

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  22. Ben:

    >> Will is someone's deliberate intention or wish which flows from the intellect or is moved by the intellect.

    First, what if someone intends to do something, but then fails to follow through. Did they still will it? Or does will require some kind of subsequent action?

    Second, if I sit around daydreaming and fantasizing about what I “wish” would happen, then have I willed it to happen?

    Third, if something “flows from” one thing to another, then doesn’t that concept inherently contain change and transition, which require potential to actualization, which is impossible for God? It would be like talking about an engine that did not move, but that propelled a car forward. It just does not make sense.

    Fourth, it appears that your definition also requires some type of transition in which the will has two steps: first, the deliberative component by the intellect to decide which possible course of action is the best, and second, the actual choice to actualize that one possibility over the others. How can a two-step process happen simultaneously?

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  23. Daniel:

    >> You have just stumbled upon the heart of the gospel. The two mutually contradictory natures are reconciled through the person of Jesus Christ.

    How are they reconciled at all? That would be like saying that square triangles can be reconciled. And then what about the idea that God cannot do a logical impossibility? It appears that he can!

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  24. dguller: "How are they reconciled at all? That would be like saying that square triangles can be reconciled. And then what about the idea that God cannot do a logical impossibility? It appears that he can!"

    First, God became man - man did not become God. It's not a logical equivalence.

    Second, God can be united to his own creation any way he chooses. It's not a logical impossibility.

    Third, God is not the equivalent of a square or a triangle - as if God could be contained in some form - he is undefineable (in the human sense) and therefore not limited to a place, or a form.

    Fourth, I am very new to Thomism and cannot say for certain that anything I've said above is "Thomist". Others here will have to clarify that for you.

    ReplyDelete
  25. >I am taking your doctrines as you believe them,

    No you are not.

    So I'm suppose to believe the Catholic Church professed the heresy of Eutyches and not the orthodoxy of Pope St Leo?

    >Say that there is a religion that has been around for millennia who says that a key part of their faith is that square is still a square even if it is not four-sided.

    Your "four sided square that is still a square even if it is not four-sided" nonsense is not in anyway shape or form analogous to any Catholic belief or Catholic doctrine.

    Squareness is not a pure property for the 50th time. Aquinas said we can only have analogous comparison of properties between God & Creatures if they are Pure Properties. Otherwise the only comparison we can have is metaphorical or no comparision at all.

    You are not even trying.

    >That is why it is important to define “will”. I have described Aquinas’ definition of “will”, according to Feser, and according to that definition, God does not have a will.

    God does not for the 50th time have a human will. God has something similar to what a human has but not the same. It's not hard.

    >Would you take this belief seriously as worthy of deep study and respect, or would you say that their faith is based upon a contradiction, and thus is incoherent?

    You have not show even one contradiction. Not even one! But you have shown a mountain of ignorance.

    You are wasting my time.

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  26. >I don’t think that the mind does not exist. And it is certainly more than an illusion, although it does have illusory features within it.

    Now that is contradictory. If the mind exists it has no illusory features. Illusion is produced because of defective senses or a confused intellect that can't correctly interpret sensory data.

    But the mind has no illusory features & presupposing it does is incompatible with Thomism.

    Wasting my time.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Daniel Smith Post May 29, 2011 2:56 PM is correct.

    You get an A Dan. dguller gets an F.

    @dguller
    The Protestant can figure it out! So what is your damage?

    >How can one unite two contradictory natures at all? Care to give any other examples?

    It would be a contradiction to claim A=B and A does not = B in the same relationship and at the same time.

    To claim Jesus has one nature that is fully God and not God at all is a flat out contradiction.

    But even if I deny God tomorrow I can't logically see how it's a contradiction to say Jesus has two distinct natures united in his Divine person in the incarnation.

    I could believe God exists but never incarnated like any Muslim or Jew. Or I could deny God and say it never happened because no Divine nature or exists to unite to a human nature.

    But you have failed to show a contradiction.

    You are wasting my time here. You can't even pay attention to the fact squareness isn't a pure property. So really you are not trying.

    Wasting my time.

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  28. > You have just stumbled upon the heart of the gospel. The two mutually contradictory natures are reconciled through the person of Jesus Christ.


    Actually they are unlike natures (accept they can be compared analogously not unequivocally or wholly equivocally).

    They are not contradictory natures.

    That is the wrong term.

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  29. >> More like one has to have intellect to have will.

    >That was not your initial claim.

    No that is Aquinas claim according to Feser on pages 123-124 of his book AQUINAS.

    At this point you are just poof texting to play a game of gotcha.

    You are not even trying to understand.

    You are wasting my time.

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  30. >I showed that intentionality is not sufficient to have a will, but it is probably necessary.

    You mean of course a "human will" needs more than intentionality to be a human will which I don't think I disagree with.

    But God & Creatures are not compared to one another unequivocally or wholly equivocally but analogously.

    God's will is not the same as a human will but it is clearly similar in that both have intentionality.

    Of course you contradict what you said earlier QUOTE"First, you did not answer my specific objection to this idea that intentionality is necessary and sufficient for will. It is not."

    I never brought up sufficiency. You keep throwing in these tangents I never brought up. Like you did with Crude. You can't seem to make up your mind if intentionality is necessary or not. But obviously it is necessary.

    So which is it?

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  31. >I do not think that God could have chosen not to create. After all, since he is Pure Act, there is no room for alternative possibilities, because that would imply that Pure Act has some potentiality within it, which is impossible.

    God can't change His mind of course. So if He wills to create he can't then not create. But there is nothing in His nature compelling Him to create. Nor is there anything in his nature that prohibitions or prevents Him from willing to create. Nor does anything outside Him force him to create. Thus he is free to create or not to create as He eternally wills.

    Why is this hard?

    Also why do you dogmatically insist if He creates he can only do so if he has to get something out of it? Why can't He create purely because he does so selflessly? Without any benefit for himself because he is good?

    Why?

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  32. >But then why does having intellect necessitate the possession of a will? That was my original question, and you have yet to answer it.

    Feser and Aquinas talk about it. Why ask me? Go read for yourself.

    ReplyDelete
  33. >And what evades you is the idea that similar must have something the same.

    Like Both having intention?

    >Give me a non-theological example of something being similar to something else where they share nothing in common.

    If they are not wholly equivocal as Aquinas says then they can have something in common.
    You haven't figured that out yet?

    >Go for it. I’m all ears.

    What you have been really saying here is show me something that IS WHOLLY EQUIVOCAL(vs. not wholly equivocal like Aquinas says) to something else and then show me what is similar between them.

    That is a contradiction. But that is not Aquinas philosophy any more than Monophysite Christology is Catholic doctrine or the belief of Aquinas.

    >Not at all. I am just taking definitions seriously.

    No you are taking them out of context and creatively redefining them.

    God is not compared to creatures unequivocally nor wholly equivocally but analogously.

    You by your own words have changes the middle proposition to mean "but wholly equivocally".

    Aquinas is right it's the little error that leads to the big ones.

    If you can't own up to this there is no point in continuing.

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  34. Daniel:

    >> First, God became man - man did not become God. It's not a logical equivalence.

    A square became a circle versus a circle became a square. Both are equally impossible, because they involve a contradiction. Whether the infinite became finite or the finite became infinite, there is still a contradiction, as well.

    >> Third, God is not the equivalent of a square or a triangle - as if God could be contained in some form - he is undefineable (in the human sense) and therefore not limited to a place, or a form.

    According to Aquinas, God is Pure Act, which means that he lacks any potentiality whatsoever, which is what would be required for him to be an Unmoved Mover. Created beings are combinations of potentiality and actuality, and thus cannot be Pure Act, and Pure Act cannot be a combination of potentiality and actuality, which is why saying that the one turned into the other is a logical impossibility.

    ReplyDelete
  35. Ben:

    >> So I'm suppose to believe the Catholic Church professed the heresy of Eutyches and not the orthodoxy of Pope St Leo?

    I am saying that you can tell yourself, again and again, that a square is still a square even if it no longer has four sides, but that you are just lying to yourself without awareness. I am taking the definitions that Aquinas provided and that Feser explained, particularly about “will”, and even Feser agrees that that definition cannot apply to God, except analogously.

    My contention, as always, is that once you have negated a core feature of a concept, then the concept has fundamentally changed to the point that it is no longer the same concept at all. When you say that will MUST involve a being with a final end, then it also must involve a being with potentiality and not pure actuality, and thus cannot possibly apply to God. You say that it is analogous to our will, but then will does not necessarily involve a being with a final end at all, and then what is left of it? What are the essential features of a will that both God and humans share?

    >> Your "four sided square that is still a square even if it is not four-sided" nonsense is not in anyway shape or form analogous to any Catholic belief or Catholic doctrine.

    Sure it does. The common property is that they both rest upon a logical contradiction. See? That’s how analogies work. There must be a common property between the two terms being declared similar, and this is a nice example of how that works.

    >> Squareness is not a pure property for the 50th time. Aquinas said we can only have analogous comparison of properties between God & Creatures if they are Pure Properties. Otherwise the only comparison we can have is metaphorical or no comparision at all.

    It does not have to be a pure property for the analogy to hold, it just has to share a common property, which in this case is “logical contradiction”. The pure property stuff that you keep bringing up is irrelevant. It would be like me saying that man is like a lion, because they are both brave, and you saying, “No, a lion walks on four legs while man walks on two legs. It’s no comparison at all!” In other words, you are focusing on what they do not have in common, which is irrelevant to the analogy. What is relevant is what they share in common.

    >> You have not show even one contradiction. Not even one! But you have shown a mountain of ignorance.

    Here is the contradiction, again.

    (1) If X has a will, then X must have a final end.
    (2) God does not have a final end.
    (3) Therefore, God does not have a will.
    (4) God does have a will.

    The contradiction is between (3) and (4). See it? (3) says that God does not have a will (by (1) and (2)), and (4) says that he does.

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  36. Ben:

    >> Now that is contradictory. If the mind exists it has no illusory features. Illusion is produced because of defective senses or a confused intellect that can't correctly interpret sensory data.

    Really? Do you see your blind spot right now? No, because your brain has filled in visual details from peripheral visual input. What you see in your blind spot is not really there, which means that it is illusory. So, your visual perception, which is a part of the mind, contains an illusion.

    >> You mean of course a "human will" needs more than intentionality to be a human will which I don't think I disagree with.

    No, I mean “will”. You were speaking generally about “will”, and did not specify “human will”. If that is what you are doing, then that’s fine, but not relevant to our discussion. I want to know what are the common features of “will” that are shared between both God and human beings, which would allow an analogy to occur at all. If they do not share anything in common, then there can be no analogy. If they do share something in common, then God CAN be spoken of univocally, contra Aquinas.

    >> God's will is not the same as a human will but it is clearly similar in that both have intentionality.

    Okay, so now you are back to the idea that “intentionality” is the common property between the two. Intentionality is the capacity for one thing to be about another thing. How is this relevant to “will”? I can see how it is relevant to consciousness (i.e. my thoughts about a cat are about a cat), but how is it helpful in our discussion of will?

    Maybe you are confusing intentionality with intentions? Is that what you mean? That both humans and God have intentions to act in a particular way, and that is the common property between them?

    >> I never brought up sufficiency. You keep throwing in these tangents I never brought up. Like you did with Crude. You can't seem to make up your mind if intentionality is necessary or not. But obviously it is necessary.

    So, then what is necessary AND sufficient for X to have a will?

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  37. >which is why saying that the one turned into the other is a logical impossibility.

    Where does the Council of Chalcedon or Pope St. Leo say Divine Nature is turned into human nature at the Incarnation?

    Well? I'm all ears!

    At this point you have lost the argument when you have to behave like an internet troll.

    >I am taking the definitions that Aquinas provided and that Feser explained......

    ...and reading your own meanings into them and or taking them out of context to distort their meaning.

    For example QUOTE"It does not have to be a pure property for the analogy to hold,"END QUOTE

    Aquinas said only pure properties can be applied to God analogously. It's in the links I quoted & provided. Thus your claim to follow the definitions of Aquinas is clearly bogus on the face of it.

    What would be the point in continuing? This and ignoring the definition of Chalcedon shows you are not arguing in good faith.

    Lying to convince people to disbelieve in Jesus. Why am I not surprised?

    You should go back to polemics against FSM and or Old Man in the Sky, Intelligent Design & other Theistic Personalist "deities".

    Clearly you are unsuited to provide any intelligent argument against any form of Classic Theism.

    Sobel, Quintin Smith and or Jack Smart you are not.

    Indeed this stupidity of yours was worthy of chuckleheads like Dawkins, Hawking or Sean Carroll.(i.e philosophically incompotent Atheist scientists without a clue vs Atheist Philosopher with one).

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  38. >Intentionality is the capacity for one thing to be about another thing.

    Actually the Stanford Dictionary of philosophy defines it as the capacity for minds to be about another thing. Dropping that word in order to convey the fiction of mindless intentions is not impressive.

    >Maybe you are confusing intentionality with intentions? Is that what you mean? That both humans and God have intentions to act in a particular way, and that is the common property between them?

    If you wish to split hairs this way then let us say intentions.

    Not that you are arguing in good faith here.

    For example:
    >Sure it does. The common property is that they both rest upon a logical contradiction.

    You have not shown any logical contradictions. You have ignored definitions that don't fit your narrative (like pretending Aquinas didn't say only Pure Properties can be applied to God analogously) and you read your own self-serving meanings into either Catholic Doctrines, Feser or Aquinas.

    >See? That’s how analogies work. There must be a common property between the two terms being declared similar, and this is a nice example of how that works.

    Yet Aquinas says only pure properties can be applied analogously. You ignore that because you need to manufacture non-existent contradictions?

    Why are you so stupid to think that will move me?

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  39. Ben:

    >> Where does the Council of Chalcedon or Pope St. Leo say Divine Nature is turned into human nature at the Incarnation?

    When one says that God became incarnated in a human being, what does this mean?

    >> Aquinas said only pure properties can be applied to God analogously. It's in the links I quoted & provided. Thus your claim to follow the definitions of Aquinas is clearly bogus on the face of it.

    What am I comparing? I am not comparing God to a geometric shape. I am comparing a Church doctrine about God to a fictional religion’s doctrine about three-sided squares. The Church’s doctrine about God contains a contradiction, and so does the fictional religion’s doctrine about three-sided squares. That is what the analogy is all about, because the two things being compared share the common property of “logical contradiction”.

    Again, I am not comparing God to a geometric shape, which is what you think I am doing, and which is why you keep perseverating about pure properties. I am comparing a DOCTRNE ABOUT God to a DOCTRINE ABOUT a geometric shape. Is the doctrine the reality? In other words, is our concept about a dog a dog itself? Of course not. And if one set of concepts contains a contradiction, then they can be analogous to another set of concepts that also contains a contradiction. Just to be clear: I am saying that your CONCEPT of God contains a contradiction, and thus can be compared to the CONCEPT of a three-sided square, for example. I am NOT – NOT NOT NOT – saying that God is like a three-sided square, but only that your concept of God is like the concept of a three-sided square. And if you would easily reject the latter as incoherent, then you should just as easily reject the former as equally incoherent.

    >> Indeed this stupidity of yours was worthy of chuckleheads like Dawkins, Hawking or Sean Carroll.(i.e philosophically incompotent Atheist scientists without a clue vs Atheist Philosopher with one).

    As always, your good manners and excellent etiquette are evident.

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  40. Ben:

    >> Actually the Stanford Dictionary of philosophy defines it as the capacity for minds to be about another thing. Dropping that word in order to convey the fiction of mindless intentions is not impressive.

    I think that conscious intentionality is parasitic upon non-conscious teleology and intentionality, and so I would say that the Stanford Encyclopedia is begging the question, and focusing upon a specific subset of intentionality, naturally the one in which the term was originally coined to describe, i.e. mental intentionality. However, I can easily conceive of the motions of an amoeba towards a nutrient gradient being about maintaining life through nutritional sustenance. But that’s a whole separate issue.

    >> If you wish to split hairs this way then let us say intentions.

    It’s not splitting hairs. Intentionality is not intentions, although having intentions presupposes intentionality, because our intentions have to be about a possible state of affairs in the world that we want to actualize in reality. However, there are forms of intentionality that are not intentions at all, such as perception and many thoughts that we have.

    >> Not that you are arguing in good faith here.

    Not that you have any manners here.

    >> Yet Aquinas says only pure properties can be applied analogously. You ignore that because you need to manufacture non-existent contradictions?

    Again, I am talking about concepts about God, not God himself. Your CONCEPTS about God contain a contradiction, and that puts them in the same category as three-sided squares, which you would not hesitate to cast aside as utterly incoherent, but you persist in adhering to your God concept, because you really, really, really want to. Your persistent desire notwithstanding, the bottom line is that I have shown you in an above comment that God both has a will and cannot have a will, which is a contradiction.

    And if you want to say that this is based upon an equivocation, because “will” means different things in those two propositions, and should be understood analogously, then what is the necessary and sufficient properties of “will” that would have to be present in both the human form of will and the divine form of will? After all, for an analogy to be possible, there must be SOMETHING in common and that something must be “will”.

    >> Why are you so stupid to think that will move me?

    I have not said a single insulting thing to you in this entire discussion, and yet you continue to be rude and abrasive with me. Do you have no sense of manners and etiquette at all? Do you think that it is not equally frustrating for me when we seem to talk past each other? And yet I am capable of exercising self-restraint and to treat you with respect and civility, which you deserve by virtue of being a fellow human being.

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  41. >When one says that God became incarnated in a human being, what does this mean?

    If you don't know what it means how can you claim contradiction?

    Logically you can't.

    This level of dishonesty pisses me off.

    >I am comparing a Church doctrine about God to a fictional religion’s doctrine about three-sided squares.

    And this is meaningful to someone who has actually read the TOME OF LEO & knows the incarnation doesn't mean Divine Nature changes into human nature how?

    You are wasting my time.

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  42. >I am saying that your CONCEPT of God contains a contradiction,

    But you haven't shown one. You made up fictional doctrines no orthodox Catholic is allowed to believe in the first place and called them contradictions.

    It's dishonest and I don't have to be polite to a willful liar.

    You are wasting my time.

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  43. >I have not said a single insulting thing to you in this entire discussion, and yet you continue to be rude and abrasive with me.

    Since I don't know much about the mechanics of Evolutionary biology or genetic I would consider it very rude to tell either Richard Dawkins or a Biology major what Evolution is really about scientifically(philosophy is another matter). Especially if I didn't read the relevant literature.

    Same with you telling me what the doctrine of the Incarnation means.

    Rude!

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  44. Ben:

    >> If you don't know what it means how can you claim contradiction?

    I do not know what it means, BECAUSE it appears to contradict. I know what a square is. I know what a triangle is. I have no idea what a square triangle is.

    >> This level of dishonesty pisses me off.

    Love the manners.

    >> And this is meaningful to someone who has actually read the TOME OF LEO & knows the incarnation doesn't mean Divine Nature changes into human nature how?

    If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean? I understand “incarnation” to mean that an immaterial entity has become embodied in the flesh. That is generally fine, but when it comes to Pure Act, which cannot possibly have any potentiality or change becoming embodied in a form that has potentiality and change, then there is bound to be some problems. Again, saying that this is possible is like saying that a square can become a triangle, but still be a square.

    >> But you haven't shown one. You made up fictional doctrines no orthodox Catholic is allowed to believe in the first place and called them contradictions.

    I’ll repeat what I wrote above:

    Here is the contradiction, again.

    (1) If X has a will, then X must have a final end.
    (2) God does not have a final end.
    (3) Therefore, God does not have a will.
    (4) God does have a will.

    The contradiction is between (3) and (4). See it? (3) says that God does not have a will (by (1) and (2)), and (4) says that he does.

    Now, you can say that the “will” in (3) is different from the “will” in (4), and must be understood analogously. However, then you back to the same problem of having to explain the necessary and sufficient conditions that make X have a “will”, and that these conditions must be applicable to both human will and divine will. If you cannot specify these conditions, then there is no common property shared between God and humans that makes them both have “will”, and thus there can be no analogy between them.

    And if you disagree with this condition of analogy, then give me a non-theological example of two things that can be compared analogously, but that share absolutely nothing in common. Go for it. I’m all ears.

    >> It's dishonest and I don't have to be polite to a willful liar.

    Okay. I guess this is how you love your enemies and treat others as you wish to be treated, eh? Nothing but the highest ethical and religious standards for you, Ben!

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  45. >Again, I am talking about concepts about God, not God himself.

    What's the difference? What double talk blather!!!! You should go into politics.

    >I have shown you in an above comment that God both has a will and cannot have a will, which is a contradiction.

    I answered this. God has a will analogously as compared to a human being. He does not have a will as unequivocally compared with a human being nor wholly equivocally. Your misdirection is God is compared to a human being but wholly equivocally not "nor wholly equivocally".

    Thus there is no contradiction. To be an analogy at minimum God mush have at least one property of human will in common. Just one will do. Since you admit intention is part of will & if God has intention then logically God has something that is analogous to human will.

    So get over it. Your argument is a failure amature! I could read Sir Anthony Kenny's polemics against Aquinas and become an Agnostic like him tomorrow if I bought into his arguments.

    But I would still be of the firm conviction you have failed to show even one contradiction. But you have shown a mountain of ignorance.

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  46. Ben:

    And here’s another point. I am sympathetic to the Thomist claim that the shared property between the divine will and human will is that the divine will causes some of its properties to be actualized in human will, and that is where the commonality occurs. In other words, God’s will is primary and human will is secondary and derivative from God’s will.

    My problem with this is that it does not help us know exactly what it is about God’s will that is common to human will. In other words, we start with our own will, are told that it is both similar to and nothing like divine will, and then have to trust there is “something” out there that “somehow” makes this analogous relationship hold true, but we have no idea what this “something somewhere somehow” is doing it. This does not seem philosophically rigorous, and I think that the most responsible thing to do is to just say that God does not have anything like human will, because this is true, and just stop there. The problem is when you go further and start talking about divine will, because then one’s thinking becomes quite muddled.

    You are then forced to say that God has a will, but it’s nothing like human will, except that it is sort of like human will in some unspecified and unknown way, except that its also nothing like human will, except that it somehow must be, except that it cannot, and on and on. You never reach a firm footing, because you never allow yourself any clear sense about what it means for ANYTHING to have a “will”, and thus just keep shifting meaning around in a shell game. And just pretending that none of this is happening, and that somehow it all makes sense, even though it appears to be total confusion, just does not cut it. Magical thinking is pleasant and only has the superficial appearance of resolving anything.

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  47. >Here is the contradiction, again.

    Let's kill this stupidly once and for all.

    >(1) If X has a will, then X must have a final end.

    If you read the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES link (& I know you have since you corrected me on chapter 73 vs 72). It clearly says God wills has final end. How do we reconcile this with Feser? Well why can't God have final ends analogously instead of unequivocally? Thus naturally when Feser said God doesn't have final ends he meant God doesn't have final ends as unequivocally compared with a human. When Aquinas says it he means analogously.

    It's not hard.

    (2) God does not have a final end.

    Not unequivocally as taught implicitly by Feser (ask him if you doubt me). But he can have a final end analogously.

    >(3) Therefore, God does not have a will.

    Right no human will. We don't know Feser was talking about will generally as you claim.

    (4) God does have a will.

    He has a will that is analogously compared to a human.

    >The contradiction is between (3) and (4). See it? (3) says that God does not have a will (by (1) and (2)), and (4) says that he does.

    There is no contradiction since you have not properly qualified the statements. Thus it's a meaningless argument.

    Maybe God does not exist but your arguments are still bogus. A smart Atheist would accept that brute fact and move on.

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  48. >You are then forced to say that God has a will, but it’s nothing like human will, except that it is sort of like human will in some unspecified and unknown way.

    God has intentions. He intended to create the universe. I intended to mock your for your willful distortion of the doctrine of the incarnation.

    It's that simple. There for his will is similar to a human. He's will in time. He doesn't unequivocally have final ends like creatures but we can say he has analogous ends.

    It's not hard. It was never hard.

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  49. Ben:

    >> Thus there is no contradiction. To be an analogy at minimum God mush have at least one property of human will in common. Just one will do. Since you admit intention is part of will & if God has intention then logically God has something that is analogous to human will.

    Thank you for agreeing that in order for an analogy between two terms to occur, then they must have a common property! Finally!

    First, do you understand God’s “intention” univocally, equivocally or analogously to human “intention”? If you are a consistent Thomist, and I know that you are, then you would have to say “analogously”. Now, what is the common property between divine and human intention that makes the analogy possible? In other words, what is the necessary and sufficient conditions of “intention” that are common to both God and human beings?

    Second, I understand “intention” to be a mental activity in which one disposes oneself towards the current or future actualization of a potential state of affairs, which from a Thomist standpoint would mean that it is directed towards actualizing the final ends of an entity. In other words, if I intend X, then (1) X must be a possible state of affairs, (2) I want X to become actualized in reality, and (3) X is thought to be consistent with my telos.

    This might be tricky for a Thomist, because (2) and (3) inherently contain properties that are impossible for God, i.e. “wanting” and “telos”. My contention is that if you eliminate “wanting” and “a final end” from “intention”, then you have stripped it of all coherent sense, and are left with a word that means nothing.

    I think that we are making progress. Thanks for hanging in there. :)

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  50. >My problem with this is that it does not help us know exactly what it is about God’s will that is common to human will.

    Because it would show an analogy between the two and kill your sophistry deader than a Remaro Zombie with a bullet in the brain.

    I going to take my son for a walk.

    I'm done.

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  51. >First, do you understand God’s “intention” univocally, equivocally or analogously to human “intention”? If you are a consistent Thomist, and I know that you are, then you would have to say “analogously”.

    This is all a sophistical word game to you isn't it?

    BTW you question assumes intention is a property of God not a feature of will.

    Category mistake.

    Also you are not distinguishing between God willing Himself to his own ends vs God willing things outside himself to their final end.

    God unequivocally wills to kill a human (like when he strikes down the Armies of the Anti-Christ at the last Judgement) just like any executioner does when he carries out his duty.

    But what does that have to do with his inner nature?

    Category mistake.

    Now leave me alone. My son is waiting.

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  52. Ben:

    >> If you read the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES link (& I know you have since you corrected me on chapter 73 vs 72). It clearly says God wills has final end.

    Where does it say that?

    >> Well why can't God have final ends analogously instead of unequivocally? Thus naturally when Feser said God doesn't have final ends he meant God doesn't have final ends as unequivocally compared with a human. When Aquinas says it he means analogously.

    A final cause is the “goal or purpose or end” of a thing, which implies that there is a temporal process of a sequence of events that results in the “goal or purpose or end”. In addition, if something has a final cause, then that means that there is a potential to be actualized, which is impossible for Pure Act, which has no potentiality at all. After all, there is no sense in saying that a beginning and end occur simultaneously, because the former must precede the latter, and the latter exists potentially in the former, and is actualized in the latter.

    You might as well say that God is evil analogously. I know, you cannot say this, because evil is not a perfection, but if you are allowed to violate the rules of logic by ad hoc rules that say that even though something appears to make no sense, it somehow still does, then why can’t I pull the same move when talking about God being evil? Either the rules apply or they do not.

    >> God has intentions. He intended to create the universe. I intended to mock your for your willful distortion of the doctrine of the incarnation.

    Here’s the thing about intentions. Once they are fulfilled, they disappear. I can intend to write a comment to you, but once I have written it, I no longer have the intention to do so, because it has been completed. The potential state of affairs that I intended has now become actualized, and now my intention no longer is operative. Now, if God is Pure Act and still has intentions, then his intentions would also have to change, because there was time when there was nothing, and then there was a time when there was something, and that means that his intention would have to have changed, which would mean that God himself would have potential and change, which is impossible for Pure Act.

    >> I going to take my son for a walk.

    I hope you have a nice walk with your son.

    ReplyDelete
  53. Ben:

    >> This is all a sophistical word game to you isn't it?

    Not at all. Aquinas says that our words have three possible senses to them, univocal, equivocal or analogous. I am just applying his categories to your statement. Are you saying that Aquinas is wrong?

    >> BTW you question assumes intention is a property of God not a feature of will.

    If intention is a feature of will, then it is not a property of God? How does that make sense? Possession of non-actualized forms is a part of the intellect, but possession of non-actualized forms is not a property of God?

    >> Also you are not distinguishing between God willing Himself to his own ends vs God willing things outside himself to their final end.

    That is because this is a distinction without a difference. If he wills things outside of himself, then wouldn’t it necessarily because doing so fulfills his own final ends? Isn’t that what will ultimately is supposed to be, according to Aquinas? I mean, I will something that I think helps me fulfill my final ends and express my essential forms as much as possible, and even when I will to help something else do the same, then it necessarily is because I also believe that it will help my final ends, as well.

    ReplyDelete
  54. BenYachov,

    Your reference to "Pure Property" seems to be nonsense. Do you have a textual reference in Aquinas?

    ReplyDelete
  55. BenYachov,

    "If the mind exists it has no illusory features. Illusion is produced because of defective senses or a confused intellect that can't correctly interpret sensory data."

    Then it follows that since some hearts develop defects those hearts do not exist.

    "But the mind has no illusory features & presupposing it does is incompatible with Thomism."

    Then it follows Thomism is clearly incompatible with reality.

    ReplyDelete
  56. dguller,

    I notice you're no longer doubtful about the applicability of logic to the 'deepest level of reality'.

    No, now that you believe it can help you "negate a core feature of a concept" you don't like, you are happy to use logic to show what you think is a contradiction.

    Consistency? Honesty? Just acceptable collateral in your war on theism.

    ReplyDelete
  57. "If the mind exists it has no illusory features. Illusion is produced because of defective senses or a confused intellect that can't correctly interpret sensory data."

    Then it follows that since some hearts develop defects those hearts do not exist.


    Hi DJ Indra, are you nuts?

    ReplyDelete
  58. Jack:

    >> I notice you're no longer doubtful about the applicability of logic to the 'deepest level of reality'.

    Not really. I still have no idea whether our rules of logic are applicable beyond the empirical world, but I will play along with those who believe that they definitely are. I will accept that they are valid for the sake of argument, as it were.

    >> No, now that you believe it can help you "negate a core feature of a concept" you don't like, you are happy to use logic to show what you think is a contradiction.

    There is nothing wrong with showing that a concept implies a contradiction. The question is what this implies in reality. In the empirical world that we can verify with our senses, a chain of reasoning that results in a contradiction results in bridges falling down due to erroneous calculations, for example. Fundamentally, it involves something that we never experience in the world, and actually can never experience. In the deepest level of reality, maybe it means that the concept should be jettisoned and rejected as incoherent, or maybe it does not. I do not know without any feedback from reality at that level, and the reality is that neither do you or anyone else.

    >> Consistency? Honesty? Just acceptable collateral in your war on theism.

    I am being consistent. I’m just assuming that the rules apply at the level of the deepest level of reality for the sake of argument. It seems that if you make the same assumption, then it results in some problems and paradoxes about the concept of God.

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  59. I think that djindra’s point is as follows.

    The mind clearly exists, and Ben’s point is that anything that exists cannot have any illusory features by virtue of the fact that illusoriness implies non-existence. So, if X exists, then X cannot be illusory. I think that is fair to say.

    Furthermore, Ben claimed that a non-existent phenomenon can be produced by a defective existent process that normally produces existent and real phenomena. For example, illusory sensory perceptions are non-existent phenomena that are produced by a defective sensory process.

    Now, djindra is deriving from Ben’s discussion the following principle (P): If X is produced by a defective process, then X does not exist. The corollary of (P) is: If X does exist, then X is produced by a normally functioning process. When you apply (P) to illusions, then what you get is: If illusions are produced by a defective process, then illusions do not exist. When you apply (P) to cardiac processes, then what you get is: If cardiac processes are produced by a defective process, then cardiac processes do not exist.

    Is that right djindra?

    ReplyDelete
  60. >Where does it say that?

    You are so lazy. As bad as me.

    SUMMU CONTRA GENTILES BOOK ONE Chapter 74 paragraphs 4 & 5.

    >Not at all. Aquinas says that our words have three possible senses to them, univocal, equivocal or analogous. I am just applying his categories to your statement. Are you saying that Aquinas is wrong?

    What does that have to do with the difference between comparing creatures to God vs God's actions in creation?

    If God kills Uzzah for touching the Ark of the Covenant he doesn't do it analogously.

    You are mixing and matching categories willfully misreading and misapplying definitions, ignoring what I write or quote and I am tired of correcting you.

    >That is because this is a distinction without a difference. If he wills things outside of himself, then wouldn’t it necessarily because doing so fulfills his own final ends?

    You are assuming God wills outside himself to fulfill his own final ends. He doesn't do good for us for his own benefit. He does it purely for ours.

    You have yet to explain why he can't do that. You just assume Aquinas metaphysical descriptions of creatures apply to him unequivocally.

    >Isn’t that what will ultimately is supposed to be, according to Aquinas?

    You shift the Goal posts between God's will, human will and will in general.

    So considering your disingeniousness how can I answer any of your questions?

    You will just shift the goal posts again.

    >if you are allowed to violate the rules of logic by ad hoc rules

    Translation: Forcing you to read links you refuse to read then apply Aquinas thinking and rules consistently and not smuggle in your own ad hoc definitions is to you a violation?

    Gotcha!

    >that say that even though something appears to make no sense,

    So if I read a paragraph here & there on Quantum Physics and I don't understand it that makes
    Quantum physic bogus right?

    You admitted when you read the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES you didn't understand what you where reading so how logically can any critique of yours be valid?

    It's can't.

    Have you e-mailed Feser any questions to get him to clarify anything he wrote? Clearly not?

    Why? Because you don't really want to know. You don't read any of my links. You ignore what I write.

    Now you want to go off on a Tangent discussing intentionality since your argument against God having a will has fallen flat.

    You are wasting my time.

    ReplyDelete
  61. >Thank you for agreeing that in order for an analogy between two terms to occur, then they must have a common property! Finally!

    I never once denied that.

    You are not an honest person.

    ReplyDelete
  62. jack bodie,

    "Hi DJ Indra, are you nuts?"

    I think I would be if I applied BenYachov's line of reasoning. But then again, we'd never know because I wouldn't exist.

    ReplyDelete
  63. >If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean?

    Well idiot is never ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever ever means divine nature can transform into human nature.

    Ever!

    Like I said you are not an honest person. I explained this to you gave you the correct definition and you ignored me.

    Talk about lack of manners and basic human civility!

    Hypocrite!

    ReplyDelete
  64. dguller,

    I'm not sure what BenYachov's point was. All I know is that everything can be considered defective in one way or another. Given enough time everything decays. Illusions are errors. That's all. It has no bearing on existence because imperfection is a normal state for all things.

    ReplyDelete
  65. Ben:

    >> You are so lazy. As bad as me.

    Yes, it is my responsibility to find the quotation that supports your contention. Anyway, thanks for the citation. Let me look at the passage that you cited:

    It says: “for each being endowed with a will the principal object willed is the ultimate end.”

    That is true. After all, the objective of the will is to attain its final end.

    “For the end is willed through itself, and through it other things become objects of will.”

    This I do not understand. The purpose or goal of the will is willed through the will? Does this mean that the purpose or goal of the will is part of the series of processes that occur within our capacity of volition? Or does it mean that the actual end result is brought about through the will? To me, this statement is quite ambiguous, and would have to be clarified, but it seems that the latter interpretation is more likely.

    “But the ultimate end is God Himself, since He is the highest good, as has been shown. Therefore, God is the principal object of His will”

    Great. Then we are right back where we started, because we are still clarifying “will”, which you have reduced to “intention”.

    >> What does that have to do with the difference between comparing creatures to God vs God's actions in creation?

    Whenever you talk about God, you are either doing so univocally, equivocally or analogously. That is why it is relevant, because whether you are comparing creatures to God or discussing God’s actions in creation, you are still referring to God, and thus must be doing so either univocally, equivocally or analogously.

    >> You are mixing and matching categories willfully misreading and misapplying definitions, ignoring what I write or quote and I am tired of correcting you.

    And you are avoiding answering a very simple question. If intention is the common property between divine will and human will, then is “intention” to be understood univocally, equivocally or analogously?

    ReplyDelete
  66. Ben:

    >> You are assuming God wills outside himself to fulfill his own final ends. He doesn't do good for us for his own benefit. He does it purely for ours.

    I’m sorry, but didn’t the citation that you mentioned say that “God is the principle object of His will”? It seems that everything he does is ultimately about himself, even when it has to do with us. Our benefits appear to be secondary to his expressing his own nature and directing it towards the good.

    >> Translation: Forcing you to read links you refuse to read then apply Aquinas thinking and rules consistently and not smuggle in your own ad hoc definitions is to you a violation?

    This does not address my point at all. My point was that either one relentlessly applies logic and reason to God, or one does not. It seems that you are selective, because when it turns out that there are essential aspects of some of his divine qualities that he logically cannot have, then you are comfortable with jettisoning logic altogether and relying upon faith that somehow an analogous relationship saves the day, even though you have no idea how it is supposed to do so.

    >> Now you want to go off on a Tangent discussing intentionality since your argument against God having a will has fallen flat.

    It is not a tangent, because YOU brought it up. I am asking you to clarify things. You are free to refuse to do so and spend time with your family, if you like. I am not your boss here, and am only asking questions that you are trying to answer to the best of your abilities, which I do appreciate.

    So, you are stuck with a trilemma:

    (1) God’s intention is univocally like human intention, which is impossible, as per Aquinas, because that would mean that we are capable of fully grasping some of his qualities.

    (2) God’s intention is equivocally like human intention, which means that they are nothing alike at all, and thus we are not saying anything at all.

    (3) God’s intention is analogously like human intention, which means that you have to specific the necessary and sufficient conditions of “intention” that are univocally shared between divine and human intention in order to have an analogy at all. After all, you admitted that for an analogy to be possible, then the two terms being compared must share a common property.

    Enjoy.

    ReplyDelete
  67. dguller

    I've answered you & you ignored what I wrote.

    You then turn around and repeat your original objection and pretend I've never answer you.

    Rinse repeat.

    Now do you want to claim the incarnation mean Divine Nature becomes human nature & have me tell you for the 100th time that is not what it has ever meant?

    You are a disingenous hypocrite.

    I thought you where better than djindra.

    I was so wrong.

    ReplyDelete
  68. BenYachov: "Actually they are unlike natures (accept they can be compared analogously not unequivocally or wholly equivocally). They are not contradictory natures."

    I was thinking theologically - as in the sinful nature of man vs. the sinless nature of God.

    Even though Jesus had no sin, he took upon himself the sins of all mankind.

    It was in that sense that I meant the two natures were contradictory - not in the mutually exclusive sense (as dguller seems to think.)

    ReplyDelete
  69. I have answered your questions. You have ignored my answers.

    So what is the point of you?

    ReplyDelete
  70. >So, you are stuck with a trilemma:

    Rather you are again giving me statements that have not been properly qualified.

    I did some more reading from the Wiki on analogy.

    QUOTE"Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle actually used a wider notion of analogy. They saw analogy as a shared abstraction. Analogous objects did not share necessarily a relation, but also an idea, a pattern, a regularity, an attribute, an effect or a function. These authors also accepted that comparisons, metaphors and "images" (allegories) could be used as arguments, and sometimes they called them analogies. Analogies should also make those abstractions easier to understand and give confidence to the ones using them........In Christian theology, analogical arguments were accepted in order to explain the attributes of God. Aquinas made a distinction between equivocal, univocal and analogical terms, the latter being those like healthy that have different but related meanings. Not only a person can be "healthy", but also the food that is good for health (see the contemporary distinction between polysemy and homonymy). Thomas Cajetan wrote an influential treatise on analogy. In all of these cases, the wide Platonic and Aristotelian notion of analogy was preserved. James Francis Ross in Portraying Analogy (1982), the first substantive examination of the topic since Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia, demonstrated that analogy is a systematic and universal feature of natural languages, with identifiable and law-like characteristics which explain how the meanings of words in a sentence are interdependent.END

    ReplyDelete
  71. Ben:

    >> I never once denied that. 

You are not an honest person.

    Really? You never denied that my explanation of “analogy” was valid?

    Here’s a few of your earlier quotes about my conception of analogy:

    “You keep insisting on using your own Ad Hoc definition of analogy instead of the Thomistic approach … Learn the Thomistic view of analogy & stop equivocating it with your view. Otherwise you are just being a dick.” (May 27, 2011 6:49 AM).

    “In order for your views on Analogy to make sense dguller one has to already accept materialism, reductionism, positivism, and Scientism as the correct description of reality.” (May 27, 2011 7:27 AM)

    “Aquinas and Miller's definition of analogy is the operative one here. You definition while quaint & post enlightement has no meaning here.” (May 27, 2011 10:53 AM)

    I think it’s pretty clear that you have fought my definition of analogy this whole time.

    >> Like I said you are not an honest person. I explained this to you gave you the correct definition and you ignored me.

    You said that Christ has two natures, divine and human, that are united, and that is supposed to explain the incarnation. My question is what exactly does this unity consist in? I earlier wrote about someone who said that a human being became incarnated into a dog, and when we go to look, we see a human standing besides a dog, and another person proclaiming: “Behold! A human being united with a dog with full preservation of their two distinct natures!” Would you believe that a human being was incarnated in a dog in that case, because there was a “unity” between the human and the dog? I doubt it, because this kind of unity is not consistent with incarnation.

    ReplyDelete
  72. Ben:

    >> I've answered you & you ignored what I wrote.

    I wrote a lot. Care you specify which of my points you have answered, and where you have answered them?

    >> You then turn around and repeat your original objection and pretend I've never answer you.

    Maybe that’s because you never did answer me?

    >> Now do you want to claim the incarnation mean Divine Nature becomes human nature & have me tell you for the 100th time that is not what it has ever meant?

    I am not claiming anything. I am saying that my understanding of “incarnation” is where an immaterial entity becomes embodied in the flesh. As I said earlier, that makes sense to me if the immaterial entity is a mixture of potential and actual, but it makes no sense to me if the immaterial entity is Pure Act, because how can Pure Act become embodied in a material form at all without sacrificing its pure actuality?

    >> I have answered your questions. You have ignored my answers.

    Keep telling yourself that. I’m sure you’ll convince yourself it’s true. After all, repeating a lie automatically makes it true, right?

    ReplyDelete
  73. Ben:

    Still waiting for an answer to the following trilemma:

    (1) God’s intention is univocally like human intention, which is impossible, as per Aquinas, because that would mean that we are capable of fully grasping some of his qualities.

    (2) God’s intention is equivocally like human intention, which means that they are nothing alike at all, and thus we are not saying anything at all.

    (3) God’s intention is analogously like human intention, which means that you have to specific the necessary and sufficient conditions of “intention” that are univocally shared between divine and human intention in order to have an analogy at all. After all, you admitted that for an analogy to be possible, then the two terms being compared must share a common property.

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  74. Re: the incarnation,

    Perhaps some scripture will help? (I chose the Amplified Bible translation because it endeavors to give the full sense of the original Greek.):

    Christ Jesus: Who, although being essentially one with God and in the form of God [possessing the fullness of the attributes which make God God], did not think this equality with God was a thing to be eagerly grasped or retained, But stripped Himself [of all privileges and rightful dignity], so as to assume the guise of a servant (slave), in that He became like men and was born a human being. And after He had appeared in human form, He abased and humbled Himself [still further] and carried His obedience to the extreme of death, even the death of the cross! Therefore [because He stooped so low] God has highly exalted Him and has freely bestowed on Him the name that is above every name, That in (at) the name of Jesus every knee should (must) bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, And every tongue [frankly and openly] confess and acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. Philippians 2:6-11 [Amplified Bible]

    What this says to me is that Christ emptied himself of the privileges of his divine nature and became a man - exactly like us: He had to eat, sleep, pee... it was for this reason that he had to pray. Would God have to pray? No, only a human - with all of our human limitations - would have to pray.

    From this I also gather that it was after the resurrection that the full privileges of Christ's divine nature were fully restored to him.

    I'm not sure how this works philosophically within Thomism but for Aquinas' commentaries on these verses see here.

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  75. Now, djindra is deriving from Ben’s discussion the following principle (P): If X is produced by a defective process, then X does not exist. The corollary of (P) is: If X does exist, then X is produced by a normally functioning process. When you apply (P) to illusions, then what you get is: If illusions are produced by a defective process, then illusions do not exist. When you apply (P) to cardiac processes, then what you get is: If cardiac processes are produced by a defective process, then cardiac processes do not exist.

    And yet this is not what djindra wrote. His subject was not cardiac processes but a heart.

    Furthermore, from the fact that defective sense perceptions produce illusions, it does not follow that either the sense organ does not exist, or that a defective pumping action produces illusions.

    If this is the standard of reading comprehension (let alone logic) that informs your reasoning, you should give it up and get some rest. If you're also so lacking in humility that you'd be convinced you, with your leet net skillz, have found a contradiction so devastating to Christian theology that thousands of years of Catholic philosophy must be unwritten, well - Nemesis will be brutal.

    ReplyDelete
  76. Now let us watch as dguller ignores what I just posted.

    It seems if one wants to understand analogy in depth James Ross is the go too guy.

    But of course dguller doesn't really want to know since he has already made up his mind it all "incoherent" magic because he can't understand any of it according to his own definitions.

    It also seems Aquinas' view on analogy is rooted in Plato and Aristotle.

    To fully understand any of this requires backround reading.

    No doubt I will hear complaining "What I have to read more books?".

    Yes you do shithead!

    Feser dealt with general themes of Aquinas & a defense of the 5 ways. But he didn't go into analogy in depth.

    So if you really want to know go read.

    If not then get lost!

    ReplyDelete
  77. Jack:

    >> Furthermore, from the fact that defective sense perceptions produce illusions, it does not follow that either the sense organ does not exist, or that a defective pumping action produces illusions.

    I agree with you. I was just trying to reconstruct djindra’s argument in the most charitable light possible. I don’t actually agree with it, at least as far as I understand it.

    >> If this is the standard of reading comprehension (let alone logic) that informs your reasoning, you should give it up and get some rest. If you're also so lacking in humility that you'd be convinced you, with your leet net skillz, have found a contradiction so devastating to Christian theology that thousands of years of Catholic philosophy must be unwritten, well - Nemesis will be brutal.

    I try to be as charitable as possible when interpreting texts. And if I find that something makes no sense, I try to allow someone to correct me with information that I may have missed. And as for my questions, they are only questions that are guided by my lack of understanding. My assumption is that there is an explanation that will address my questions. If there is no explanation, then perhaps there is some part of Christian dogma that may need to be reconsidered.

    I am not trumpeting my victory over Christianity here at all, and if you want to look at who is parading in triumph on this thread, then only Christians have been trumpeting my ignorance, hypocrisy, laziness, and sheer stupidity. I have not once insulted the Christians here by declaring them to be ignorant fundamentalists, or whatever New Atheist stereotype is out there. On the contrary, I have found people here to be highly intelligent, and though I disagree with them, that does not indicate stupidity, but only that these issues are highly complicated and difficult.

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  78. >Still waiting for an answer to the following trilemma:

    So I was right he ignored me!


    What a jerk!

    ReplyDelete
  79. Ben:

    >> Now let us watch as dguller ignores what I just posted.

    What? That Wikipedia quote? How is that relevant to anything that we are discussing?

    >> It also seems Aquinas' view on analogy is rooted in Plato and Aristotle.

    Do any of them disagree with the idea that for X to be like Y, then X and Y must share a common property? I mean, you said earlier that you agreed with this definition of “analogy”, and now you are bringing up Aquinas, Plato and Aristotle? Why? How is there conception different from the definition that I have been offering again and again?

    And I’m STILL waiting for your answer to my trilemma. Do you have one, or do you not? If you don’t, then that’s fine. That doesn’t mean that there is no answer, but only that you don’t know it. Instead of hurling insults at me, just admit that this is a problem that you don’t know the solution to. There’s no shame in admitting ignorance. There is plenty that I do not know, too.

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  80. Ben:

    >> So I was right he ignored me!

    Can you tell me which comment on this thread has answered my trilemma? I may have missed it.

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  81. >I think it’s pretty clear that you have fought my definition of analogy this whole time.

    Liar! I was telling you to go look up for yourself. You insisted either I define it or you gave yourself the right to make up your own definitions outside the Thomist tradition.

    Can't you take a hint jerkoff?

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  82. >You said that Christ has two natures, divine and human, that are united, and that is supposed to explain the incarnation.

    You kept insisting the incarnation means the Divine nature turns into a human nature! Even thought I told you the church condemns that view!

    You are such a lying snake in the grass!

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  83. Ben:

    >> Liar! I was telling you to go look up for yourself. You insisted either I define it or you gave yourself the right to make up your own definitions outside the Thomist tradition.

    I have consistently given the same definition of “analogy” throughout this discussion. One can have an analogy between X and Y if and only if X and Y share a common property. It’s really that simple.

    In response to this definition, you have called it “ad hoc”, that it presupposes “materialism, reductionism, positivism, and Scientism as the correct description of reality” and that my definition, “while quaint & post enlightement has no meaning here”.

    Now, you are saying that you have always agreed with this definition, and that I am a liar for saying otherwise. So, it appears that you agree with an ad hoc, materialist, reductionist, positivistic, scientistic, quaint and post-enlightenment definition of analogy (see May 30, 2011 1:08 PM).

    It’s actually kind of funny, really, that even your own quotes are not enough to show you that you have contradicted yourself here. I mean, trying to convince others that when you denigrated and insulted, again and again, the very definition that you now say that you agree with, that you were only doing that to get me to look at the primary sources? That’s hilarious!

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  84. Ben:

    >> You kept insisting the incarnation means the Divine nature turns into a human nature! Even thought I told you the church condemns that view!

    First, what is the nature of the unity between the two natures in Christ? I gave my reasons why not any unity will be sufficient to explain the significance of the incarnation. Furthermore, one possibility is really an impossibility, which you agree with, and another possibility is utterly banal, and just means that God has somehow formed a “unity” with Christ, but then again, when I stand beside a dog, I have formed a “unity” with the dog, too, but that does not mean that I have become incarnated in the dog.

    Second, I fully understand that the Catholic Church rejects the view that I described, but that does not say much. It is essentially an argument from authority, which I don’t care for. I am not interested in who endorses what view, but rather in what view is true. So, there is no need to cite reputable Church Fathers who believe this and believe that. Only let me know WHY they believed what they believed, and then we can have a discussion.

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  85. >I fully understand that the Catholic Church rejects the view that I described,

    If that where true why did you keep acting like that was really the Catholic view?

    You are such a lying snake in the grass!

    ReplyDelete
  86. >I have consistently given the same definition of “analogy” throughout this discussion.

    And I constantly told you to go read the authorities on the subject and you ignored me!

    What I'm suppose to talk to a 1 year student when I could read a PhD?

    What is wrong with you?

    Lying snake in the grass!

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  87. Ben:

    >> If that where true why did you keep acting like that was really the Catholic view?

    Where did I say that it was? Quote me, please.

    >> And I constantly told you to go read the authorities on the subject and you ignored me!

    Why do I have to read the primary sources when they agree with me? Why can’t we just agree upon the definition, and then move on with the discussion? I mean, it would make sense for you to tell me to go read the primary sources if we disagreed, but where we agree? Why bother with it at all?

    Also, you haven’t answered my point that you endorse a view of analogy that is ad hoc, materialist, reductionist, positivistic, scientistic, quaint and post-enlightenment. That’s quite a concession on your part!

    Honestly, this is just sad. You obviously have contradicted yourself, and rather than admit it you are playing a ridiculous and childish game. I mean, am I really to believe that you spent so much time hurling insults upon a conception of analogy that YOUR OWN texts agreed with, because you had a secret motivation to get me to read the primary texts? So, you would rain derogatory remarks upon the works of one of your saints in order to get a heathen to read his works? It was really all about me reading primary texts all along, even though this added NOTHING to the discussion?

    Wow.

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  88. >It’s actually kind of funny, really, that even your own quotes are not enough to show you that you have contradicted yourself here.

    I remember the quotes & I remember what I intended to say. That you wish to read your own self-serving meaning into my words well why break a long standing habit.

    >I mean, trying to convince others that when you denigrated and insulted, again and again, the very definition that you now say that you agree with,
    that you were only doing that to get me to look at the primary sources? That’s hilarious!

    As I recall you denied Miller's definition as given by Leo now you agree with it.

    It is hilarious!

    ReplyDelete
  89. >Where did I say that it was? Quote me, please.

    You said clearly it wasn't an incarnation unless the Divine Nature turned into a human one.

    Lying snake in the grass.

    ReplyDelete
  90. Ben:

    >> I remember the quotes & I remember what I intended to say. That you wish to read your own self-serving meaning into my words well why break a long standing habit.

    So, you intended to say that an ad hoc, materialist, reductionist, positivistic, scientistic, quaint and post-enlightenment conception of analogy was Aquinas’ all along? Wow. I don’t think the good doctor would appreciate that.

    >> As I recall you denied Miller's definition as given by Leo now you agree with it.

    Quote me, please. I rejected Miller’s idea of a limit case, but made no comments about his concept of analogy. I actually do not know what his concept of analogy even is.

    ReplyDelete
  91. Ben:

    >> You said clearly it wasn't an incarnation unless the Divine Nature turned into a human one.

    First, where did I say that this was what the Catholic Church believed? Quote me, please.

    Second, I described the only type of incarnation that makes any sense to call an incarnation. The Catholic Church’s version is not an incarnation at all. It is more like God getting especially close to a human being, which is not incarnation at all. Remember, “incarnation” is where an immaterial being assumes an embodied and material form. If God did not do that with Jesus, then it was not an incarnation, but rather something else altogether.

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  92. >Honestly, this is just sad. You obviously have contradicted yourself, and rather than admit it you are playing a ridiculous and childish game.

    I caught you in several contradictions. Which you have ignored?

    Still think a square can be infinite? Still pretending Pure Perfections are not relevant or necessary to analogy?

    What sad it your obvious cognitive dissonance and dishonestly.

    ReplyDelete
  93. >First, where did I say that this was what the Catholic Church believed? Quote me, please.

    Stop lying! You kept acting like it was and accused me of calling circles squares for denying your monophysite christology.

    You never acknowledged it wasn't the teaching of the Church.

    Stop lying!

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  94. Ben:

    >> Still think a square can be infinite? Still pretending Pure Perfections are not relevant or necessary to analogy?

    First, I did not ignore infinite squares. I specifically commented on how your conception of infinity in mathematics would nullify calculus, and would actually nullify any conception of any divine properties, because it would make them impossible to measure. And then you didn’t respond.

    Second, I answered that pure perfections are not relevant to analogy, because the concept of God’s will is analogous to the concept of a square circle in that they share the common property of being contradictory. Again, I am not saying that God is like a square circle, but am describing the concept of God is like the concept of a square circle in that they are both contradictory. Pure perfections have nothing to do with this at all.

    >> What sad it your obvious cognitive dissonance and dishonestly.

    Projection much?

    And still waiting for the answer to my trilemma …

    And I am still waiting for an explanation for why you insulted Aquinas by calling his conception of analogy ad hoc, materialist, scientistic, positivistic, and post-modern. I’m sure your Church would totally approve!

    ReplyDelete
  95. Ben:

    >> Stop lying! You kept acting like it was and accused me of calling circles squares for denying your monophysite christology.

    Seriously, man. Just quote me where I said that. You harangued me earlier for being too lazy to read the relevant texts, and now you are being equally lazy to read this very thread for evidence for your own claim. What is the definition of a “hypocrite” again? Something about saying one thing and doing another …

    ReplyDelete
  96. >I rejected Miller’s idea of a limit case, but made no comments about his concept of analogy.

    They are both related one falls the other doesn't make any sense!

    ReplyDelete
  97. >Seriously, man. Just quote me where I said that.

    Why you will just spin it away?

    >You harangued me earlier for being too lazy to read the relevant texts,

    You whined about not being able to cut and paste as well. I had no trouble!

    >and now you are being equally lazy to read this very thread for evidence for your own claim.

    I remember what you wrote. Given time I would quote you.

    But you would still ignore it!

    You are a real piece of work buddy!

    ReplyDelete
  98. Ben:

    >> They are both related one falls the other doesn't make any sense!

    No problem. Just tell me what Miller’s definition of “analogy” is, and I’ll let you know if I reject it.

    All I can say about the idea of a “limit case” is that it was supposed to show that something can be part of a series and yet not be part of a series. This was supposed to help the doctrine of analogy by showing that something can be described analogously even though it does not share any common properties with what it is analogous with. I offered my criticism of this idea, which no-one has responded to. Perhaps you’d like to?

    And anyway, how is this worse than your insulting Aquinas by calling one of his doctrines ad hoc, materialist, positivistic, scientistic and post-modern? I can certainly appreciate your attempt to create a diversion, but the truth is that your contradiction has resulted in egregious disrespect of a saint that you claim to revere and respect, and my contradiction, if there even is one, is just with Miller. Big deal.

    And why are you screaming?

    ReplyDelete
  99. Ben:

    >> Why you will just spin it away?

    Nice excuse. But seriously, try me. Quote me, please. You are making a claim about me, and I’d appreciate you justifying this claim with a quote or citation. I'm pretty sure that the Bible says something good about bearing a false witness. No wait! It's a BAD thing, not good. Oops ;)

    >> You whined about not being able to cut and paste as well. I had no trouble!

    Seriously, you are making this claim about me, and thus the burden of proof is upon you to justify it with a quote.

    >> I remember what you wrote. Given time I would quote you.

    Take your time, and quote me. I can wait. No hurry, buddy.

    >> But you would still ignore it!

    Give it a try.

    Oddly enough, if you had spent more time looking for the quote and less time insulting me and trying every diversion you could think of, then we would have gotten to the truth of this matter. It’s just like the matter of “analogy”. You wasted so much time arguing against a definition that you agreed with. I mean, what is with you and wasting time?

    ReplyDelete
  100. >First, I did not ignore infinite squares. I specifically commented on how your conception of infinity in mathematics would nullify calculus, and would actually nullify any conception of any divine properties, because it would make them impossible to measure. And then you didn’t respond.

    No you kept on ignoring the importance of Pure Properties and why Squareness cannot be a pure property since it is instantiated in a finite object.

    >Second, I answered that pure perfections are not relevant to analogy,

    Yes you did & I kept reminding you via the links you refused to read which I quoted only pure properties can be applied to God analogously!

    So Pure Properties are important!

    Squareness is not a pure property!

    Get over it!

    This is further proof you have ignored what I wrote.

    ReplyDelete
  101. Ben:

    >> No you kept on ignoring the importance of Pure Properties and why Squareness cannot be a pure property since it is instantiated in a finite object.

    Fine, you are right about this. I will concede this point, because it really does not matter.

    >> Yes you did & I kept reminding you via the links you refused to read which I quoted only pure properties can be applied to God analogously!

    I understand that “contradiction” cannot be a “pure property”, but the fact is that if the concept of God contains a contradiction, then adding this ad hoc restriction will not help. It is like finding out that square circles are contradictory, and then saying that contradiction is an impure property that cannot be ascribed to square circles, being utterly pure and awesome. Would you seriously buy this excuse? I doubt that you would in the latter case, and so why accept it in the former case, except that you really, really wish it wasn’t contradictory?

    ReplyDelete
  102. >Nice excuse. But seriously, try me. Quote me, please.

    As early as post

    May 30, 2011 9:00 AM

    You wrote"If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean?" Then you go on to discuss how Pure Actuality can't change.

    All my assertions that the above is not the doctrine of the incarnation fell on deaf ears!

    I explained it is no better than claiming God is not a Trinity unless he is three gods in one god(vs Three Hypostasis possessing the one nature).

    Rude and dishonest!

    Now what?

    ReplyDelete
  103. dguller,

    I'll give you an analogy that -- to me anyway -- explains the absurdity of this Thomist univocal/equivocal/analogous trilemma. Suppose we were trying to tell a child what sex was like. How would we do it? None of the three options seem to be adequate. I can't imagine how I'd use an analogy and do the thing justice. No matter how hard we tried I doubt the child would have any idea what we were taking about. There's just not an analogy that comes close. We'd end up leaving it as a mystery.

    Fortunately that mystery can be solved because sex does happen and experience will likely end the mystery someday.

    That limitation of communication surely applies to God, which is a far more mysterious concept. As far as we know, nobody has any knowledge -- either direct or indirect -- of God. There is no way to use analogy because we know nothing about godly attributes. Everything is a guess. When analogy is used, it's not as a comparison as the Thomist would have us believe. The Thomist has no more contact with this supposed God than we do. So what the Thomist is really doing is using analogy as a way of defining his hope or faith of what God is. It's definitional. It's not comparative, it's not descriptive in a real sense. Maybe it's a poetic sense. As you are trying to convey to them, it's simply false to use analogy to describe God. It assumes they have knowledge of what they describe. But there is no compelling evidence that they have that knowledge. So the whole thing becomes absurd. There is no common denominator between the known and unknown.

    ReplyDelete
  104. Ben:

    > You wrote"If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean?" Then you go on to discuss how Pure Actuality can't change.

    Where did I say that that was the doctrine of the Catholic Church. That is the claim that you said I made. I never said that this was the doctrine of the Catholic Church. What I said was that the doctrine of the Catholic Church made no sense as a case of incarnation at all.

    Can you not the see the difference between:

    (1) X says that Y is the case

    And

    (2) Y does not make any sense

    ?

    I never said (1), but I have been saying (2).

    ReplyDelete
  105. djindra:

    Agreed. That is a nice way to put what I've been trying to say.

    Thanks. :)

    ReplyDelete
  106. Ben:

    Just to clarify, there are three propositions here.

    (1) The Catholic Church believes that when God was incarnated in Jesus, then their two natures were mixed.

    (2) Incarnation requires an immaterial entity to become embodied in the flesh, and it is impossible for Pure Act to ever do so and still remain Pure Act.

    (3) Incarnation in the form of God and Christ forming a “unity” in which both retain their full natures does not meet the criteria for “incarnation” at all, and can at most be called a close relationship between the two. Saying that they have become incarnated when in a “unity” makes as much sense as saying that a man and dog standing next to each other, forming a “unity”, means that the man has become incarnated in the dog.

    You claim that I have been saying (1). I deny this.

    I have been saying (2) and (3), though, and that is where you should focus your attention. Just citing Church figures to contradict me is insufficient, because that only addresses (1), which I am not claiming. To address (2) and (3), you would have to cite their REASONS, which you have studiously avoided doing.

    ReplyDelete
  107. >Fine, you are right about this. I will concede this point, because it really does not matter.

    It does matter because you want to attribute a property to God then you must figure out if it is pure.

    Squares aren't pure properties. They are material.

    >if the concept of God contains a contradiction,

    Also you conflated both incomprehension and ambiguity with contradiction.

    I showed how one nature being both divine and not divine at the same time is a contradiction.

    I also show how having two natures united in one person is not a contradiction.

    You ignored what I wrote and even today as I quoted insisted the incarnation means Divine nature turning into Human nature.

    You have refuses to listen and all you have done is turn good will into bile.

    I expect this from djindra. I thought you where different.

    ReplyDelete
  108. >(1) The Catholic Church believes that when God was incarnated in Jesus, then their two natures were mixed.

    Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! Wrong!

    Monophysite heretics taught that!!! The Catholic Church teaches the two natures DO NOT MIX but remain distinct.

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  109. >You claim that I have been saying (1). I deny this.


    As early as post

    May 30, 2011 9:00 AM

    You wrote"If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean?" Then you go on to discuss how Pure Actuality can't change.

    Liar!

    ReplyDelete
  110. >(2) Incarnation requires an immaterial entity to become embodied in the flesh, and it is impossible for Pure Act to ever do so and still remain Pure Act.

    Wrong!

    The Second Person of the Trinity operates the Divine nature! He also operates the human nature which He takes the place of a mere human personality. The unity is in the Person!

    Neither nature has to change!

    Why can't you read this for yourself jerkoff?

    ReplyDelete
  111. >Incarnation in the form of God and Christ forming a “unity” in which both retain their full natures does not meet the criteria for “incarnation” at all,

    An Atheist monophysite!!!! How cute!

    >and can at most be called a close relationship between the two. Saying that they have become incarnated when in a “unity” makes as much sense as saying that a man and dog standing next to each other, forming a “unity”, means that the man has become incarnated in the dog.

    Dogs are purely material beings. Humans have non-material components. Personhood, an intellective soul,a will etc....

    God is non-material thus he can take the place of the human personality with the Divine Person of the Word.

    It's not hard!

    ReplyDelete
  112. Plus you can't take a hint. I already pointed out you couldn't (& still can't) master the finer points of natural theology. Now was not the time to go into revealed theology!

    ReplyDelete
  113. One more clarification before you write something else equally stupid.

    Christ has two wills(a divine and human one) and a human soul but his Personhood is Divine only and not Human.

    This is the only doctrine of the incarnation! No other view is the incarnation! End of story!

    ReplyDelete
  114. >Where did I say that that was the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

    Where did you claim you knew it wasn't a doctrine of the Church?

    If you knew it wasn't one then why keep bringing it up when I said over and over and over and over I reject it?

    Because you want to bust chops not learn anything or dialog.

    It's very dishonest and I am not going to tolerate it?

    ReplyDelete
  115. Ben:

    >> Squares aren't pure properties. They are material.

    Fine. Let’s change the example. Let’s say an infinitely powerful weakling. You can use whatever example you want, but the point is that there is a contradiction. That is why I said that it does not matter, because the only reason I used a square circle is because it is clearly a contradiction, and the point was the contradiction, and not the geometrical shapes.

    >> Also you conflated both incomprehension and ambiguity with contradiction.

    Not at all. I am saying that when you stick with meaningful terms, then you get contradictions. Your preferred method of eliminating the contradictions is to say that somehow stripping all necessary meaning from the terms results in the ongoing presence of sufficient meaning to reach the depths of reality. You have no idea how this happens, but it MUST happen, because otherwise your entire theology collapses.

    >> I showed how one nature being both divine and not divine at the same time is a contradiction.

    And you are correct.

    >> I also show how having two natures united in one person is not a contradiction.

    It depends upon what you mean by “united”. What do you mean?

    >> You ignored what I wrote and even today as I quoted insisted the incarnation means Divine nature turning into Human nature.

    What is your definition of “incarnation”? Maybe we are using two different terms. My understanding is when an immaterial entity becomes embodied in the flesh then that immaterial entity has become incarnated. What is your understanding of “incarnation”?

    ReplyDelete
  116. Ben:

    >> Monophysite heretics taught that!!! The Catholic Church teaches the two natures DO NOT MIX but remain distinct.

    Did you bother to read the bottom of that comment where I said that I did NOT assert that the Catholic Church believes that God and Christ mixed their natures? I don’t think that you did. You just jumped to conclusions, which is too bad.

    >> You wrote"If the divine nature does not become human, then what does “incarnation” even mean?" Then you go on to discuss how Pure Actuality can't change.

    Where did I mention THE CATHOLIC CHURCH in that comment? You are claiming that I said that the Catholic Church believed that God and Christ mixed their natures during the incarnation. I am saying that I never mentioned what the Catholic Church believed. I only described my own understanding of incarnation and how the Catholic version in which Christ’s and God’s natures remain distinct but united somehow was not real incarnation at all.

    >> The Second Person of the Trinity operates the Divine nature! He also operates the human nature which He takes the place of a mere human personality. The unity is in the Person!

    First, since you can rely upon Wikipedia, then I will quote Wikipedia on “incarnation”: “It refers to the conception and birth of a sentient creature (generally a human) who is the material manifestation of an entity, god or force whose original nature is immaterial”. That is why I said that it is where an immaterial entity assumes an embodied and material form. So, I am not a liar, but only quoting a source that you yourself relied upon.

    Second, are you saying that there is a Person who operates both a divine nature and a human nature? Is this Person divine, but who operates a human being? If there is a distance between the divine person and the human being, then how did the divine became incarnated in the human? I mean, if I use a puppet, then have I become the puppet?

    Third, why are you still yelling? My God.

    ReplyDelete
  117. Ben:

    >> God is non-material thus he can take the place of the human personality with the Divine Person of the Word.

    How can Pure Act take the place of a human person at all? This is the fundamental contradiction, as far as I can tell. Pure Act has no potential at all, and yet if Pure Act takes the place of a human being with a mixture of actual and potential, then Pure Act is no longer Pure Act. The only way for this to work is if Pure Act can assume a material form and yet still be Pure Act “somehow”.

    Again, this is a cop-out to me. It would be like deducing Godel’s theorem, and then saying that it is still false “somehow”, and that all true statements within an axiomatic system are provable despite the logical proof to the contrary, because “somehow” it all works out.

    You are putting a lot of work into this “somehow”, and by dressing it up with fancy words, like “Second Person”, and “the Word”, and “Logos”, and whatever, does not hide the fact that you have no idea how something without any potential can assume a form with potential.

    >> Christ has two wills(a divine and human one) and a human soul but his Personhood is Divine only and not Human.

    So, Christ’s will is not part of his personhood? That’s news to me. I thought that will was a part of someone’s personality.

    ReplyDelete
  118. Ben:

    >> Where did you claim you knew it wasn't a doctrine of the Church?

    You don’t get to change the rules. YOU claimed that I asserted that it was a doctrine of the Church. The burden of proof is upon you. You cannot just shift the burden on me to prove the negative. I never said that it wasn’t a doctrine of the Church, but I also never said that it was a doctrine of the Church. I did not mention the Catholic Church at all!

    >> If you knew it wasn't one then why keep bringing it up when I said over and over and over and over I reject it?

    I have made two claims.

    First, I claimed that the Catholic version of incarnation without any mixture was not incarnation at all, because there is an inevitable distance between the divine and human, which precludes the intimacy of incarnation.

    Second, I claimed that the only version that could be considered incarnation was metaphysically impossible, according to Aquinas, because it would require Pure Act to intermingle with potential.

    I have no idea why you keep getting side tracked about me allegedly saying that the Church taught that the divine and human natures mixed. I never said that. I just that that is what is required for any reasonable incarnation to occur. Anything else has too much distance between the divine and human. It would be like God controlling Jesus by mind control, which would not be incarnation at all, because there is a wide gulf between the divine and the human in that case. And the problem is that if there is any gulf between the divine and human, then there is no incarnation, because incarnation means that the divine has assumed a human form, which means that there is a mixture, which Catholicism rejects.

    ReplyDelete
  119. >I'll give you an analogy that -- to me anyway -- explains the absurdity of this Thomist univocal/equivocal/analogous trilemma. Suppose we were trying to tell a child what sex was like.

    You wish to critique the use of analogy with an argument from analogy?

    You don't see the contradiction here? Or the irony?

    >None of the three options seem to be adequate.

    Only if you seek to convey an unequivocal comprehension to the child of the experience of sex short of actually him one day actually having sex which would grant him unequivocal knowledge.

    But you can tell him it's like hugging somebody and that you feel great physical pleasure. You can describe the pleasure is being like how good it feels to go to the bathroom after holding it in for a very very long time.

    Now naturally this won't give the child an unequivocal understanding of the experience of sex but logically he would have some idea. He would have a shared abstraction as taught by Plato and Aristotle.

    OTOH if analogy is invalid then the argument fails the test of itself.

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  120. >You don’t get to change the rules. YOU claimed that I asserted that it was a doctrine of the Church.

    Project much? Your the one who claimed you knew the Catholic Church didn't teach monophysite doctrine yet this very morning you brought up your monophysite criticism. I quoted you and gave the time of the post.

    I said you would either ignore it or spin and here we are!!!

    ReplyDelete
  121. >I have no idea why you keep getting side tracked about me allegedly saying that the Church taught that the divine and human natures mixed.

    Why did you keep repeating that false definition I rejected? Why did you keep throwing it in my face?

    If you really knew that wasn't the Church's teaching as you now claim in your backpedding then the only logical response is "Ok that's not what you believe about that concept. What do you believe?".

    I told you over & over you have to deal with the doctrines we believe. Not what you wish we believed!

    You rudely ignored me.

    So I no longer trust you.

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  122. >It would be like God controlling Jesus by mind control, which would not be incarnation at all,

    Well then my merely human person is not really incarnated in my human nature since my Person controls my mind.

    You are both a theological and philosophical illiterate.

    Now WHY DID YOU KEEP BRINGING UP THE MONOPHYSITE HERESY WHEN I TOLD YOU OVER AND OVER I REJECTED IT AND SO DID THE CHURCH IF YOU REALLY KNEW IT WASN:T CHURCH TEACHING!

    WELL!

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  123. Ben:

    >> You wish to critique the use of analogy with an argument from analogy?

    He is not criticizing analogy per se, but only the inappropriate use of analogy in which one is coming what one knows to what one has no knowledge of. It is like saying that bears are like Glifnars. We have no idea what Glifnars are, and so this analogy is useless. See how one can use an analogy to show that analogies in some contexts just do not work?

    >> Project much? Your the one who claimed you knew the Catholic Church didn't teach monophysite doctrine yet this very morning you brought up your monophysite criticism. I quoted you and gave the time of the post.

    Where did I say, “The Catholic Church teaches that God and Christ’s natures were mixed”? Go ahead. Quote me.

    >> Why did you keep repeating that false definition I rejected? Why did you keep throwing it in my face?

    Because although you may reject this definition, it is the only one that is consistent with incarnation. Controlling an entity from a distance without actually assuming its bodily form is not incarnation.

    >> I told you over & over you have to deal with the doctrines we believe. Not what you wish we believed!

    I am dealing with it. I am saying that this idea that you can have incarnation without intermingling and mixing of the natures is not incarnation at all.

    Think about it this way. Does reincarnation make sense? Feser has an excellent post on the subject, and his point is that reincarnation makes absolutely no sense in a Thomist framework. Well, if re-incarnation makes no sense, then why would incarnation make any sense? They are both where a separate consciousness becomes embodied in the flesh of another body. The only difference is that reincarnation involves a human consciousness and incarnation involves a divine consciousness. Of the two, the former is more plausible, and so if the former is implausible, according to Thomism, then the latter is even more implausible, no?

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  124. >First, since you can rely upon Wikipedia,

    If the wikipedia was your original source why are you only now bringing it up that is where you got the idea from?

    You lied and I caught you!

    Plus why not read the CATHOLIC ENCYLOPEDIA on the incarnation?

    The wiki definition is general it is trying to encompass contradictory religious traditions. Like Vishnu becoming Krishna.

    I simply don't believe you.

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  125. Ben:

    >> Well then my merely human person is not really incarnated in my human nature since my Person controls my mind.

    I have no idea what you are talking about here. Your human person is incarnated in your human body, which has a human nature.

    In addition, your personality is just the self-narrative that is superimposed upon your mind, and is based upon your original temperament, genetics and life experiences, accumulated in your memories and behavioral dispositions. And your personality does not control your mind, except minimally. Your mind is operating outside of your control for the most part, according to subconscious processes.

    What does any of this have to do with what we are discussing?

    >> Now WHY DID YOU KEEP BRINGING UP THE MONOPHYSITE HERESY WHEN I TOLD YOU OVER AND OVER I REJECTED IT AND SO DID THE CHURCH IF YOU REALLY KNEW IT WASN:T CHURCH TEACHING!

    Oh my God. It is like you are part of a church that firmly believes in square circles, and when I point out that square circles are incoherent and do not make any sense, then you say, “According to my church, square circles DO make sense, and so stop bringing up the Contra-physite heresy that my church has rejected!” What would you say to such a person to get through to them? Honestly, do you find this person’s response convincing at all?

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  126. Ben:

    >> If the wikipedia was your original source why are you only now bringing it up that is where you got the idea from?

    Does it matter? Do you disagree with the definition? What is your definition of “incarnation” in general? Would you consider Zeus’ assuming the form of a common Greek man “incarnation”?

    >> You lied and I caught you!

    I did not lie. When did I say that I did not get my definition from Wikipedia? If I did say that, then you did, in fact, catch me in a lie.

    Oh, and the only one who has been clearly caught in a lie is yourself regarding the definition of “analogy”. After all, you claimed to have accepted my definition of analogy from the start and the quotations that I cited clearly show that you did not. To quote yourself: “You lied and I caught you!” :)

    By the way, have you confessed to having hurled offensive insults upon poor Aquinas’ head, calling his crucial doctrine of analogy an ad hoc, materialist, scientistic, positivistic form of post-enlightenment meaninglessness? Even worse, can you reconcile the fact that you yourself believe in this heretical definition of “analogy”? Or maybe admit the lesser of these evils, i.e. that when you condemned my definition that you literally had no idea what you were talking about?

    And when are you going to answer my trilemma? Hmmmm?

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  127. >I am dealing with it. I am saying that this idea that you can have incarnation without intermingling and mixing of the natures is not incarnation at all.

    You keep changing your story and contradicting yourself.

    If you where really dealing with it and if you really knew the Catholic Church didn't teach this you would have simply said "Ok that is not what you believe. I will drop it. What do you believe?"

    >Because although you may reject this definition, it is the only one that is consistent with incarnation. Controlling an entity from a distance without actually assuming its bodily form is not incarnation.

    That is beyond arrogant and irrational! Telling another religion what it's doctrines should be.

    A rational person deal with them as is.

    I would never tell a Jew "Your Talmud really means x when Judaism teaches it means y".

    You are just too proud to admit you didn't know what you are talking about.

    I don't believe you anymore.

    You are a disgrace to honest Atheists everywhere!

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  128. >Oh my God. It is like you are part of a church that firmly believes in square circles,

    So not believing in monophysite christology which you correctly proved is impossible because God is purely actual is the same as believing in square circles?

    You are a nutcase!

    You are irrational and you are unsuited to debate philosophy!

    You are also a rude hypocrite!

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  129. >Does it matter? Do you disagree with the definition? What is your definition of “incarnation” in general? Would you consider Zeus’ assuming the form of a common Greek man “incarnation”?

    I went to the Wikipedia to read the article. It gives the pagan definition of incarnation.

    But it has links that said For other uses, see Incarnation (Christianity) or Incarnate (disambiguation)

    So you gave me the pagan definition?

    Why would you think I would be impressed by that?

    Did you even read the Christian link on incarnation?

    Because I did it says "In the Incarnation, as traditionally defined, the divine nature of the Son was joined but not mixed with human nature[2] in one divine Person, Jesus Christ, who was both "truly God and truly man"

    So I caught you in another lie!

    So is this Atheism? Perpetual lying?

    No it is not. Since I have to believe neither Sobel or Smith or Jack Smart would ever stup this low.

    Dawkins, PZ Myers djinda and you OTOH.........

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  130. Ben:

    >> That is beyond arrogant and irrational! Telling another religion what it's doctrines should be.

    So, Catholics make no comment about whether the doctrines of other religions make sense? What about your tendency to comment on the beliefs of atheists? I suppose that you are equally “beyond arrogant and irrational”?

    >> You are just too proud to admit you didn't know what you are talking about.

    You are right that my knowledge of this area is scant. I am only presenting my flawed understanding, and would appreciate your assistance instead of your insults. My understanding of incarnation is that if there is a gap between the divine and the human, then there is no incarnation. Yes, I know that this is not what the Catholic Church teaches, and so you do not have to shout at me about this.

    My point is that the idea that the natures do not mix means that there is a fundamental gap between God and Christ, and that means that God was never embodied in Christ at all. It seems more like God was controlling Jesus from a distance, which is not incarnation at all. And saying that God did assume bodily form, but was able to leave aside his divine properties while in human form, and yet still remain being God, despite having been stripped of those divine properties, makes as much sense to me as saying that I was able to get into my car, in which I promptly suffering profound amnesia, and yet continue to be fully myself while in the car.

    Before you start yelling and screaming, I know that this contradicts the Church teaching. But that is my point. I think that the Church teaching just does not make sense. I am not saying that the Church believes that its doctrine is incoherent. It obviously thinks that it is. But just because an institution believes that its doctrines are coherent does not mean that they are. That was the point of my analogy about the church and the square circles. It did not matter that the church believed in square circles’ coherence. The fact is that they believed in something incoherent, irrespective of their beliefs to the contrary.

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  131. Ben:

    >> You are a disgrace to honest Atheists everywhere!

    And you are a monument to theists everywhere, truly living up to Christ’s moral teachings to love your enemies and to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself.

    >> So not believing in monophysite christology which you correctly proved is impossible because God is purely actual is the same as believing in square circles?

    No, believing that God can become incarnated in a human form while still fully retaining his divine properties is impossible, at least according to my understanding. Instead of yelling at me, just rationally explain to me why this is incorrect. And it does not help to use complicated language that ultimately comes down to “it is possible, somehow”.

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  132. >You are right that my knowledge of this area is scant. I am only presenting my flawed understanding, and would appreciate your assistance instead of your insults.

    More lies! You REFUSED to read the links I told you to read! You gave me the pagan definition of the incarnation and ignored the Christian one?

    You are a serious liar!

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  133. Ben:

    >> That is beyond arrogant and irrational! Telling another religion what it's doctrines should be.

    So, Catholics make no comment about whether the doctrines of other religions make sense? What about your tendency to comment on the beliefs of atheists? I suppose that you are equally “beyond arrogant and irrational”?

    >> You are just too proud to admit you didn't know what you are talking about.

    You are right that my knowledge of this area is scant. I am only presenting my flawed understanding, and would appreciate your assistance instead of your insults. My understanding of incarnation is that if there is a gap between the divine and the human, then there is no incarnation. Yes, I know that this is not what the Catholic Church teaches, and so you do not have to shout at me about this.

    My point is that the idea that the natures do not mix means that there is a fundamental gap between God and Christ, and that means that God was never embodied in Christ at all. It seems more like God was controlling Jesus from a distance, which is not incarnation at all. And saying that God did assume bodily form, but was able to leave aside his divine properties while in human form, and yet still remain being God, despite having been stripped of those divine properties, makes as much sense to me as saying that I was able to get into my car, in which I promptly suffering profound amnesia, and yet continue to be fully myself while in the car.

    Before you start yelling and screaming, I know that this contradicts the Church teaching. But that is my point. I think that the Church teaching just does not make sense. I am not saying that the Church believes that its doctrine is incoherent. It obviously thinks that it is. But just because an institution believes that its doctrines are coherent does not mean that they are. That was the point of my analogy about the church and the square circles. It did not matter that the church believed in square circles’ coherence. The fact is that they believed in something incoherent, irrespective of their beliefs to the contrary.

    Ben:

    >> I went to the Wikipedia to read the article. It gives the pagan definition of incarnation.

    It does not. It gives the “general” definition, and then in the course of the article goes over the specific variations in the different religions. You are focusing upon a specific version in Catholicism. I was starting with the general case.

    Anyway, none of this is relevant. My points remain unanswered, and you focus upon gotcha questions trying to show me as a liar or a fraud in efforts to perform as many ad hominem logical fallacies as you can. Instead, why not just address the logic of my arguments?

    Explain to me how God can become embodied in Christ, assume a human form with all its limitations, and yet still remain God. Give me some other examples of how this is possible, which could at least give you some analogous support for this contention. It really does not help to just throw Christian dogmatic statements at me unless you can explain how they explicate the problem that I mentioned. To me, they all ultimately come down to “I do not know how it works, but it must work for the sake of my faith”. That is not compelling or persuasive to me at all.

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  134. Ben:

    >> I went to the Wikipedia to read the article. It gives the pagan definition of incarnation.

    It does not. It gives the “general” definition, and then in the course of the article goes over the specific variations in the different religions. You are focusing upon a specific version in Catholicism. I was starting with the general case.

    Anyway, none of this is relevant. My points remain unanswered, and you focus upon gotcha questions trying to show me as a liar or a fraud in efforts to perform as many ad hominem logical fallacies as you can. Instead, why not just address the logic of my arguments?

    Explain to me how God can become embodied in Christ, assume a human form with all its limitations, and yet still remain God. Give me some other examples of how this is possible, which could at least give you some analogous support for this contention. It really does not help to just throw Christian dogmatic statements at me unless you can explain how they explicate the problem that I mentioned. To me, they all ultimately come down to “I do not know how it works, but it must work for the sake of my faith”. That is not compelling or persuasive to me at all.

    >> More lies! You REFUSED to read the links I told you to read! You gave me the pagan definition of the incarnation and ignored the Christian one?

    Wow. You and the screaming again.

    Now, I want you to calm down. Can you please tell me which comment of yours contained links about the incarnation? Remember, we are talking about the incarnation, and not anything else. I said that I know very little about the incarnation, and you just claimed to have posted links about the INCARNATION. Could you please tell me where these links are on this thread? I sure hope that you can, because otherwise, despite your ranting and raving about how much of a liar I am, it would mean that you have been caught in two clear lies upon this thread.

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  135. >You are focusing upon a specific version in Catholicism. I was starting with the general case.

    You are a liar!

    If I was going to critique the Christian doctrine of the incarnation I would simply start by reading on the Christian doctrine of the incarnation.

    This is just common sense which you lack.

    You are a waste of time. You have no desire to learn anything.

    Why are you even here?

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  136. >Can you please tell me which comment of yours contained links about the incarnation?

    You know fully well I'm refering to the Thomist links you refused to read!

    You are such a liar! You have no shame?

    ReplyDelete
  137. >Anyway, none of this is relevant. My points remain unanswered,

    I did answer them you just ignored the answer because it's not what you wanted to hear.

    >and you focus upon gotcha questions trying to show me as a liar or a fraud in efforts to perform as many ad hominem logical fallacies as you can.

    You are a fraud! An honest person would have read the links on thomism I refered you too.

    >Instead, why not just address the logic of my arguments?

    I did several times you ignored what I wrote.

    Why are you even here?

    You pissed off Crude and now me?

    That problem is you not me.

    So get lost!

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  138. >I am only presenting my flawed understanding,

    You gave both a flawed understanding of Thomism and Christology.

    So why should I take any of your criticism seriously?

    You don't want answers. I am suposed to believe you missed the link on Christian incarnation? I'm suppose to believe you actually thought bringing up a religious concept from a religion I reject as true would mean anything to me?

    What kind of idiot does that?

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  139. Man, this is one long ass thread.

    888 didn't read.

    ReplyDelete
  140. >It does not. It gives the “general” definition, and then in the course of the article goes over the specific variations in the different religions. You are focusing upon a specific version in Catholicism. I was starting with the general case.

    More lies! You only now brought up the wikipedia because you repeatedly kept insisting the Church believed in square circle for professing Divine nature turns into human nature.
    Now your new story is The Church believes in square circle for rejecting a doctrine you proved logically is absurd!

    You are a nutcase!

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  141. BTW look at the wiki general definition.

    Incarnation literally means embodied in flesh or taking on flesh.

    How you get get from the above sentence the idea of Divine Nature transforming into human nature.

    >It refers to the conception and birth of a sentient creature (generally a human) who is the material manifestation of an entity, god or force whose original nature is immaterial.[1]

    There is nothing in the above definition that even suggests or hints at natures undergoing change.

    Third lie I caught you in.

    You didn't get your definition from the wiki. Fess up!

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  142. >> That is beyond arrogant and irrational! Telling another religion what it's doctrines should be.

    >So, Catholics make no comment about whether the doctrines of other religions make sense?

    If I think a particular religion teaches X and someone from that Religion who is knowledgeable tell me the religion does not teach X rationally conclude I should drop X. Otherwise any criticism flowing from X is a Straw Man.

    Why is that so hard?

    >What about your tendency to comment on the beliefs of atheists? I suppose that you are equally “beyond arrogant and irrational”

    I am mature and reasonable enough to know there is no such thing as a one size fits all Atheist Philosophy or definition.

    There are many many specific schools. You seem to openly champion Empiricism and some neo-Humian Skepticism.

    Which is fine. But conflating these views with Thomism's views is a no no and I don't apologize for it.

    Believe what you want. But don't equivocate between philosophies.

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  143. Ben:

    >> You know fully well I'm refering to the Thomist links you refused to read!

    Can you please tell me the date and time of the comment in question so that I can click on the link that talks about the incarnation?

    >> I did answer them you just ignored the answer because it's not what you wanted to hear.

    Can you please tell me the date and time of the comment where you answered my points?

    >> You don't want answers. I am suposed to believe you missed the link on Christian incarnation? I'm suppose to believe you actually thought bringing up a religious concept from a religion I reject as true would mean anything to me?

    Can you please tell me the date and time of the link about incarnation?

    >> More lies! You only now brought up the wikipedia because you repeatedly kept insisting the Church believed in square circle for professing Divine nature turns into human nature.

    I only now brought it up, because you questioned the accuracy of my definition of “incarnation”, and so I wanted to show you where I got it from. And in the Wikipedia article, it describes the general definition, and then goes on to describe the specific types of incarnation in the different religions.

    >> Now your new story is The Church believes in square circle for rejecting a doctrine you proved logically is absurd!

    Wow. You really do not understand. I am saying that, according to my understanding, the Church’s doctrine in which there can be incarnation without mixing of the divine and human natures is not incarnation at all, but more of a distant form of control. It is not incoherent, but rather is not incarnation. Real incarnation, on the other hand, would require a mixing of the divine and human natures, which is actually incoherent. The overall point is that you can pretend that there was an incarnation, but really there was something else going on.

    >> You are a nutcase!

    Yeah, I’m the one who’s ranting and raving, yelling and screaming about anything and everything.

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  144. Ben:

    >> How you get get from the above sentence the idea of Divine Nature transforming into human nature.

    Because God would have to assume a bodily form. According to Thomism, the form of matter determines the essence of the substance in question. Can the form of God inhabit matter? I thought that this was impossible, because God is necessarily immaterial, as well as because God is Pure Act and matter contains potential. If incarnation is possible, then God can be material, which would falsify Aquinas’ argument that God is Pure Act. Too much would come crashing down in Thomism if incarnation was genuinely possible. I really like Thomism in general, but I find that when it comes to defending specific Christian dogmas, it ends up tying itself into knots of incoherence.

    >> There is nothing in the above definition that even suggests or hints at natures undergoing change.

    You are right that that is not in the definition. I took them to be implied in the definition. After all, for incarnation to be possible, Pure Act would have to assume a form in which there is a mixture of potential and actual. However, it would then follow that it would no longer be Pure Act. I take this to mean that incarnation is impossible.

    Can you answer this argument?

    >> You didn't get your definition from the wiki. Fess up!

    My definition of incarnation is that an immaterial entity becomes embodied in the flesh, and I got it from Wikipedia. The implications of this definition I worked out all by myself.

    Now, will you answer the specific arguments that I made regarding incarnation, as well as my points in the trilemma, and the fact that you have insulted Aquinas by ridiculing his conception of analogy? Oh, and if you have time, then can you please cite the date and time where the comment with the links about incarnation is present? I would hate for you to have been caught in two lies upon this thread.

    Remember: if you cannot answer my trilemma, then you cannot defend Thomist analogy, and thus have robbed yourself of the only way to talk about God, which means that theology is finished. I am pretty sure that theology could not possibly be finished by something so simple, and so there must be an answer somewhere. Do you know it, or can you just admit that you do not know?

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  145. Ben:

    I'll tell you what. Just to save a lot of time. I'll concede that I have no idea what I am talking about when it comes to the Catholic interpretation of the incarnation. I honestly cannot make any sense of it, but that could just be my ignorance of the concepts involved.

    I want to return our discussion to how we can even talk about God, and about analogy in particular. I have presented you with a trilemma, which you have yet to answer. I'll repeat it below, using the specific example of how we can understand God's "intention":

    (1) God’s intention is univocally like human intention, which is impossible, as per Aquinas, because that would mean that we are capable of fully grasping some of his qualities.

    (2) God’s intention is equivocally like human intention, which means that they are nothing alike at all, and thus we are not saying anything at all.

    (3) God’s intention is analogously like human intention, which means that you have to specific the necessary and sufficient conditions of “intention” that are univocally shared between divine and human intention in order to have an analogy at all. After all, you admitted that for an analogy to be possible, then the two terms being compared must share a common property.

    Could you please share your thoughts on this trilemma with me?

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  146. >> You know fully well I'm refering to the Thomist links you refused to read!

    >Can you please tell me the date and time of the comment in question so that I can click on the link that talks about the incarnation?

    I already explained I was refering to the Thomist links you refused to read. I don't claim I posted links on the incarnation.

    Though I do recall telling you to read the definition of the Council of Chalcedon.

    You lies get even more desperate and you again ignore what I just wrote.

    You are hopeless!

    >I only now brought it up, because you questioned the accuracy of my definition of “incarnation”, and so I wanted to show you where I got it from.

    No you brought it up to deflect from your phony claim that you understood the Catholic doctrine of the incarnation and you knew it wasn't the Monophysite one.

    Clearly that is not true. A rational person would not only quit beating a dead horse but quit beating the wrong dead horse.

    >Real incarnation, on the other hand, would require a mixing of the divine and human natures, which is actually incoherent.

    >Wow. You really do not understand. I am saying that, according to my understanding, the Church’s doctrine in which there can be incarnation without mixing of the divine and human natures is not incarnation at all.


    But Catholics don't believe that is real incarnation. Monophysites do. You have to deal with the Catholic view & you refused to do that. You kept pretending the monophysite view was the Catholic view.

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  147. >I'll tell you what. Just to save a lot of time. I'll concede that I have no idea what I am talking about when it comes to the Catholic interpretation of the incarnation. I honestly cannot make any sense of it, but that could just be my ignorance of the concepts involved.

    If you where an honest person you would have done that 70 posts ago.

    But now it's too late. You are not conceding this because you realize it was both wrong and illogical but for expedience.

    How cynical, dishonest and disrespectful!

    >I want to return our discussion to how we can even talk about God, and about analogy in particular.

    It's too late. You have burned my good will for you(which was great at the begining. I praised you as an honest Atheist) to ashe!

    We have nothing to discuss!

    If you really want to know about analogy and religious language get off you fat arse and read an expert

    like James F. Ross book Portraying Analogy.

    Or Chapter 7 of Brian Davies AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

    But you don't really care for an answer?

    Otherwise you wouldn't have wasted 100 posts arguing something you should have conceded there and then!

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  148. >Yeah, I’m the one who’s ranting and raving, yelling and screaming about anything and everything.

    Anger is the will to justice and your behavior towards me has not been just. That my anger is connected to emotion just proves I am a mere creature not God.

    Bye!

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  149. Ben:

    >> If you really want to know about analogy and religious language get off you fat arse and read an expert

    Okay, I read pages 147-52 in Brian Davies’ book where he talks about analogy, and he does not answer my trilemma. He basically says that Aquinas’ idea of what the terms being compared in an analogy have in common is primarily in God, and secondarily and reflected in creatures. I don’t find this particularly helpful, because we do not have precise knowledge of God’s properties, but we do have precise knowledge of our own, and we cannot help but start with our own as primary when it comes to understanding.

    My problem has always been how one goes from knowing the properties of created entities to the properties of God. To use an analogy is to say that God and human beings, for example, share a common property, but the problem is how to understand this common property. We cannot understand it univocally or equivocally, as per Aquinas. However, we also cannot understand it analogously, because then the analogy that is being used to explain the common property’s meaning will have to be explained analogously, and we are stuck with an infinite regress of meaning.

    That is why I think that we just cannot talk about God. We know ourselves and our world, and we try to use our language about ourselves and our world to describe God, but the problem is that it is like shooting a bullet to the moon. It will rise very high, but ultimately fall back down to the earth.

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  150. Ben:

    >> Otherwise you wouldn't have wasted 100 posts arguing something you should have conceded there and then!

    I was hoping that you would be able to provide some explanation of the incarnation. I tried to read some online articles about it, but it just did not make any sense to me, and so I asked you to explain this “unity”. You just kept saying that my ideas had no place in the Catholic Church, again and again and again and again, and I said that I knew that dozens of comments ago. I wanted to know the reasons that explained the “unity” of two utterly distinct natures in Christ, and you said that they were united in the “person” of Christ. I asked what that meant, and you just started screaming at me.

    I only conceded, because you do not appear to be able to explain the incarnation well. You can cite Church dogmatic statements very well, and you know you catechism, too, but that is just dogmatic statements, and not philosophical explanations. Since there was no point in going on, I just conceded, because I honestly have no idea how the divine nature and the human nature can both be fully present in the person of Jesus Christ. It still makes no sense to me, and you do not appear to be able to explain it. So, I’ll happily back off there.

    >> Anger is the will to justice and your behavior towards me has not been just. That my anger is connected to emotion just proves I am a mere creature not God.

    Okey dokey.

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  151. Ben:

    >> I already explained I was refering to the Thomist links you refused to read. I don't claim I posted links on the incarnation.

    This is what you wrote: “Did you even read the Christian link on incarnation?” (May 30, 2011 6:47 PM).

    That’s two lies, my friend.

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  152. >I was hoping that you would be able to provide some explanation of the incarnation.

    Liar!

    You asked how one substance can have two natures & I replied "Since when does Christ have one substance"?

    I also told you that you haven't yet mastered Natural Theology and it was a mistake to take on revealed theology.

    You just ignored me.

    You are a liar and you have not been arguing in good faith!

    >>This is what you wrote: “Did you even read the Christian link on incarnation?” (May 30, 2011 6:47 PM).

    >That’s two lies, my friend.

    Seriously!!
    I was refering to your Wikipedia article which you cited.

    You are a sociopath and a liar!!!!

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  153. BenYachov,

    "Squares aren't pure properties. They are material."

    This appears to be nonsensical. And it's likely nothing but nonsense will follow from it.

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  154. Ben:

    >> I was refering to your Wikipedia article which you cited.

    I double-checked the comment, and you are right. You were speaking about the Wikipedia article on “incarnation”. I missed the context, and that’s my mistake.

    >> You asked how one substance can have two natures & I replied "Since when does Christ have one substance"?

    Okay, the Catholic encyclopedia describes the incarnation as follows:

    “The human and Divine natures are united in one Divine Person so as to remain that exactly which they are, namely, Divine and human natures with distinct and perfect activities of their own.”

    “The Divine Logos identified with Divine nature (Hypostatic Union) means then that the Divine Hypostasis (or Person, or Word, or Logos) appropriates to Itself human nature, and takes in every respect the place of the human person. In this way, the human nature of Christ, though not a human person, loses nothing of the perfection of the perfect man; for the Divine Person supplies the place of the human.”

    “It is to be remembered that, when the Word took Flesh, there was no change in the Word; all the change was in the Flesh.”

    Here are my questions:

    First, how is it possible for Pure Act to assume flesh at all without ceasing to be Pure Act?

    Second, if the human and divine natures are united in a divine person, then does it follow that within the divine personality, there exists a human nature? And if so, then does that mean that Pure Act contains the properties of a nature with potential, which contradicts Pure Act’s own properties of lacking any potential whatsoever?

    Third, what was the “change … in the Flesh” that the passage above is talking about? How was the material form now different?

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  155. Ben:

    I am more interested in your thoughts on my questions about analogy. The incarnation is secondary to me, because even beign able to talk about the incarnation presupposes the truth of the doctrine of analogy, and so it would be best if we focused upon analogy as prerequisite to talking about God at all.

    What do you think?

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  156. dguller: "Too much would come crashing down in Thomism if incarnation was genuinely possible."

    Either that or you don't understand either one.

    Now which is more likely?

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  157. Daniel:

    >> Either that or you don't understand either one.

    My ignorance is absolutely an option, and I would never discount it as a viable possibility in these discussions.

    It just seems to me that Thomist theology is quite persuasive in many respects. However, once it comes to the incarnation, many of the clear principles become ambiguous and confused. For example, the idea that God must be immaterial, because he is Pure Act, and matter is a combination of the actual and the potential, is quite plausible. How does this idea continue to be true if God can become flesh? I have no idea, and the numerous contortions and fine hairsplitting ends up making no sense at all, at least to me.

    Certainly, if you can explain to me how Thomist metaphysical principles can continue to be applicable to an incarnated God, then you are more than welcome. I would really like to understand, because it just seems incoherent and utterly mystifying to me.

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  158. dguller: "Certainly, if you can explain to me how Thomist metaphysical principles can continue to be applicable to an incarnated God, then you are more than welcome. I would really like to understand, because it just seems incoherent and utterly mystifying to me."

    Your error is that you assume God incarnate is no longer God. God does not cease to be God if he chooses to dwell in a human body. God is God wherever he is.

    See also, my post in the reincarnation thread.

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  159. Daniel:

    >> Your error is that you assume God incarnate is no longer God. God does not cease to be God if he chooses to dwell in a human body. God is God wherever he is.

    If God can become incarnate, then God can be material. That seems to contradict Thomism.

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  160. dguller: "If God can become incarnate, then God can be material. That seems to contradict Thomism."

    When we say "God became man" we don't mean that God quit being God and instead became a man. The divine nature and the human nature were united forever in the person of Jesus Christ. God, in Jesus, is every bit God - he is not a material being. Jesus is a material being however. He was formed in the womb, born, matured and died. That does not change the nature of God in any way. The nature of God is unchanging. Jesus, when he was on earth, though he had the fullness of God dwelling in him, freely chose not to use that power but rather limited himself to the use of his human nature. For this reason it is said that he "took the form of a servant" and "humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death".

    So, the person of Jesus constrained himself and became like us in every way. Even though he had the divine nature in him, he chose not to live as God, but rather to live as man.

    In this sense, God became man.

    You are being over-simplistic in your understanding dguller - not allowing for the fact that these questions have been asked and answered for centuries throughout Christian history.

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  161. Daniel:

    >> Jesus, when he was on earth, though he had the fullness of God dwelling in him, freely chose not to use that power but rather limited himself to the use of his human nature.

    How can “the fullness of God” be contained within a finite, material entity? How can Pure Act be contained with a being mixed with potential and actuality? How can human nature choose not to express divine nature? In other words, how can Pure Act NOT act in Jesus Christ without no longer being Pure Act at all? By keeping divine power in check, Jesus has put a limit upon the limitless, and has stopped Pure Act from acting to its full capacity, and if it is not acting in its full capacity, then there is some potential present, which is impossible.

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  162. dguller: "How can “the fullness of God” be contained within a finite, material entity?"

    Do you think that "the fullness of God" means that ALL of God is in Jesus, and consequently cannot be anywhere else at the same time?

    You must understand that God is not a material entity. But if he were, every itty-bitty piece of him would contain everything that he is. The fullness of God is IN God and thus is wherever God is.

    "How can Pure Act be contained with a being mixed with potential and actuality?"

    They are not the same thing. The potentiality and actuality of the human nature does not negate the pure actuality of the divine.

    "How can human nature choose not to express divine nature?"

    Free will.

    "In other words, how can Pure Act NOT act in Jesus Christ without no longer being Pure Act at all?"

    Perhaps you don't understand what "act" means? It is not synonymous with "action" but rather "actuality". Maybe it would help if you thought of Pure-Act as Pure-Being?

    "By keeping divine power in check, Jesus has put a limit upon the limitless, and has stopped Pure Act from acting to its full capacity, and if it is not acting in its full capacity, then there is some potential present, which is impossible."

    But God chose to exist in Jesus in a limited role. If it was God's will to indwell a human body and allow for the limits of that human body, then there is no conflict with pure-act - since the actuality of God is actuating only that which it wills to actuate.

    Your argument reminds me of another atheist argument against God based on God not always using all of his power to do all things at all times - like God has no say in how he uses his power.

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  163. dguller,

    Have you ever thought about praying?

    I know it is God's will that his ways become known to you and (as foolish as this may sound to an atheist) he will give you insight into these things if you ask him for it.

    Just a note about prayer though: God is not Santa Claus... he promises to reveal himself to those who diligently seek him.

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  164. Daniel:

    >> Do you think that "the fullness of God" means that ALL of God is in Jesus, and consequently cannot be anywhere else at the same time?

    God has no parts or components, and is simple and indivisible. It makes no sense to say that he is one place and not another, because he is not confined to any place. If that is true, then there is nothing special about his presence in Jesus, because he is present everywhere anyway.

    >> They are not the same thing. The potentiality and actuality of the human nature does not negate the pure actuality of the divine.

    It seems that they do when they are combined into a single entity. If they are kept separate, then there is no problem, but when they are allegedly united in a person, then things become complicated.

    >> Free will.

    But if divine nature is Pure Act, then it cannot NOT be expressed, because that would mean that there is some potential that is not being actualized, which is impossible. So, Pure Act necessarily is actual and cannot be restrained by anything, including a human being’s choice.

    >> Perhaps you don't understand what "act" means? It is not synonymous with "action" but rather "actuality". Maybe it would help if you thought of Pure-Act as Pure-Being?

    It is where something happens, as opposed to potential, in which nothing happens, but could. So, Pure Act is always actually doing something. And the only way for something to happen is if there is something that exists to occur, and thus Act and Being are connected.

    >> But God chose to exist in Jesus in a limited role. If it was God's will to indwell a human body and allow for the limits of that human body, then there is no conflict with pure-act - since the actuality of God is actuating only that which it wills to actuate.

    This is just incoherent. God cannot exist in a body, because then he would be tainted by potential and change, pain and suffering, which is impossible. God cannot will what is impossible.

    >> 
Just a note about prayer though: God is not Santa Claus... he promises to reveal himself to those who diligently seek him.

    What an excellent way to blame the seeker for not being able to find him.

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  165. dguller: "This is just incoherent."

    It's funny that, while you admittedly don't understand much of anything we are telling you, at the same time you are bold enough in your "knowledge" to pronounce our arguments "incoherent".

    Ben, Crude, myself and others have given you plenty of red meat to chew on. You seem content to nibble around the edges and proclaim it "all fat".

    Have a good life.

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