Is reality intelligible? Can we make sense of it? Or is the world at bottom an unintelligible “brute fact” with no explanation? We can tighten up these questions by distinguishing several senses in which the world might be said to be (or not to be) intelligible. To make these distinctions is to see that the questions are not susceptible of a simple Yes or No answer. There are in fact a number of positions one could take on the question of the world’s intelligibility – though they are by no means all equally plausible.
Consider first the distinction between the world’s being intelligible in itself and its being intelligible to us. Suppose there is, objectively speaking, an explanation of why the world exists in the way it does. Whether we can grasp that explanation is another question. Perhaps our minds are too limited to discover it, or perhaps they are too limited to understand the explanation even if we can discover it.
Might we turn this around and suggest also that the world could be intelligible to us but not intelligible in itself? This proposal seems incoherent. If the world is not intelligible in itself, how could it be intelligible to us? To be sure, we might think that we’ve grasped some explanation even when we haven’t, but that is not the same thing. That would be a case of its merely seeming intelligible to us while not really being intelligible in itself, not a case of its really being intelligible to us while not really being intelligible in itself (whatever that could mean). So we have an asymmetry here: While something could be intelligible in itself but not necessarily intelligible to us, if it really is intelligible to us – and doesn’t just seem to be – then it must also be intelligible in itself.
A second distinction we might draw is that between the world’s being thoroughly intelligible and its being only partially intelligible. This distinction is an obvious one to draw if we think in terms of intelligibility to us. For it might be that the world is intelligible in itself but, while not entirely intelligible to us, at least partially intelligible to us.
Might the world be partially (but not thoroughly) intelligible in itself? Philosophers like Bertrand Russell and J. L. Mackie seem to think so, insofar as they think that we can explain various natural phenomena in terms of the laws discovered by empirical science, but hold also that the most fundamental level of laws cannot itself be explained, and must be regarded as a brute fact. For the reasons given above, however, it would seem incoherent to hold that the world is thoroughly intelligible to us while only partially intelligible in itself. If it is only partially intelligible in itself, it could only ever be partially intelligible to us.
With these distinctions in mind, we might identify the following possible positions on the question of the world’s intelligibility:
A. The world is thoroughly intelligible in itself and thoroughly intelligible to us: We might call this the “strong rationalist” position. Very few philosophers seem ever to have held it, but Parmenides might be an example of someone who did.
B. The world is thoroughly intelligible in itself but only partially intelligible to us: We might call this the “moderate rationalist” position. It was the view of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas and seems to have been the position of the continental rationalist philosophers. (The word “rationalism” is, of course, used in many senses. Aristotle and Aquinas were not “rationalists” in the “continental rationalist” sense of being committed to innate ideas.) The continental rationalists were not “strong rationalists” in our sense, insofar as none of them seems to have held that the world is thoroughly intelligible to us. For example, Descartes did not think we could fathom God’s purposes in creating nature as He did; Spinoza thought that we know only two of the infinite attributes of the one infinite substance, viz. thought and extension; and Leibniz did not think our finite monads had the clarity of perception that the infinite monad that is God has.
C. The world is thoroughly intelligible in itself and completely unintelligible to us: It is not clear that anyone has ever actually defended this position. “Mysterian” naturalists like Colin McGinn and Noam Chomsky would not be examples of philosophers taking this position, because while they claim that there might be some aspects of reality that we can never understand, they don’t claim that this is true of every aspect of reality, or even, necessarily, that it is thoroughly the case with respect to any aspect. Their position would seem rather to be a variant on either B above or D below. Nor would the even more skeptical naturalisms of Heraclitus, Hume, or Nietzsche seem to be instances of C. If you’re going to present a theory to the effect that metaphysics is a mere projection of human psychological tendencies, or an expression of a will to power, or whatever, then you are implicitly claiming that at least part of nature (namely us and our tendency toward metaphysical theorizing) is at least partially intelligible. These thinkers too seem committed instead to some variation on either B or D.
D. The world is only partially intelligible in itself and only partially intelligible to us: As indicated above, this seems to be the view of naturalistically-oriented philosophers like Russell and Mackie, who believed that science gives us real knowledge of the world but that the fundamental laws of nature in terms of which it explains all the others are brute facts that cannot themselves ultimately be made intelligible.
E. The world is only partially intelligible in itself and completely unintelligible to us: As with C, it is not clear that anyone has ever actually defended this position.
F. The world is completely unintelligible in itself and completely unintelligible to us: Once again, this does not seem to be a position that anyone has actually ever held. And once again, thinkers who might seem to have held it can be seen on reflection not to have done so. For example, Gautama Buddha might seem to be an example of a thinker committed to F, but he really wasn’t. For even to hold (as the Buddha did) that there is no abiding self or permanent reality of any sort is to make a claim about the world that is intended to be both intelligible and true. And even to recommend (as he also did) against indulging in much metaphysical speculation in the interests of pursuing Enlightenment is to presuppose that there is an objective, intelligible fact of the matter about what would hinder Enlightenment. The Buddha too seems in fact to have been committed to something like a variation on either B or D.
Indeed, it is very difficult to see how one could defend either the view that the world is completely unintelligible in itself or the view that it is completely unintelligible to us. For how could such a view be defended? If you give an argument for the conclusion that reality is unintelligible in itself, it would surely have to rest on premises about reality. You would be saying something like “Reality is such-and-such, and therefore it is unintelligible.” But however you fill in the “such-and-such,” you will be referring to some intelligible feature of reality, or will in any event have to do so if your argument is itself going to be both intelligible and convincing. And in that case you will in effect have conceded that reality is not after all completely unintelligible. By the same token, if you give an argument for the conclusion that reality is unintelligible for us, then you will have to appeal to premises either about some intelligible feature of reality itself, or about our cognitive faculties – which are themselves part of reality – and in that case you will, once again, have implicitly conceded that reality is at least partially intelligible.
So, D would seem to the closest one could come plausibly to claiming that reality is unintelligible. But I think that even D is not really coherent. Suppose I told you that the fact that a certain book has not fallen to the ground is explained by the fact that it is resting on a certain shelf, but that the fact that the shelf itself has not fallen to the ground has no explanation at all but is an unintelligible brute fact. Have I really explained the position of the book? It is hard to see how. For the shelf has in itself no tendency to stay aloft – it is, by hypothesis, just a brute fact that it does so. But if it has no such tendency, it cannot impart such a tendency to the book. The “explanation” the shelf provides in such a case would be completely illusory. (Nor would it help to impute to the book some such tendency after all, if the having of the tendency is itself just an unintelligible brute fact. The illusion will just have been relocated, not eliminated.)
By the same token, it is no good to say “The operation of law of nature C is explained by the operation of law of nature B, and the operation of B by the operation of law of nature A, but the operation of A has no explanation whatsoever and is just an unintelligible brute fact.” The appearance of having “explained” C and B is completely illusory if A is a brute fact, because if there is neither anything about A itself that can explain A’s own operation nor anything beyond A that can explain it, then A has nothing to impart to B or C that could possibly explain their operation. As the Scholastics would say, a cause cannot give what it does not itself have in the first place. A series of ever more fundamental “laws of nature” is in this regard like a series of instrumental causes ordered per se. The notion of “an explanatory nomological regress terminating in a brute fact” is, when carefully examined, as incoherent the notion of “a causal series ordered per se in which every cause is purely instrumental.” And thus Mackie’s and Russell’s position is itself ultimately incoherent.
The only truly coherent positions one could take on the question of the world’s intelligibility, then, are A and B. And A is, needless to say, not very plausible, even if coherent. So, some variation on B seems to be the most plausible view to take on the world’s intelligibility. Why do people bother with D, then? The answer is, I think, obvious. It is very hard to affirm either A or B without committing oneself either to classical theism or pantheism. For once it is conceded that the world is at least in itself completely intelligible, it is hard to see how this could be so unless the most fundamental level of reality is something absolutely necessary – something that is not a mixture of potentiality and actuality but rather pure actuality (as the Aristotelian would say), something which is in no way whatsoever composite but absolutely metaphysically simple (as the Neo-Platonist would say), something which is not a compound of essence and existence but rather subsistent being itself (as the Thomist would say). However one elaborates on the nature of this ultimate reality, it is not going to be identifiable with any “fundamental laws of nature” (which are contingent, and the operation of which involves the transition from potentiality to actuality within a universe of things that are in various ways composite). One might still at this point dispute whether the ultimate reality is best described in terms of the theology of classical theism or instead in terms of some pantheistic theology. But one will definitely be in the realm of theology – rational theology, natural theology – rather than empirical science.
If one wants to maintain a defensible atheist position, then, one has to try to make something like D work, as Russell and Mackie (and my younger self) did. One has to claim with a straight face that the world is intelligible down to the level of the fundamental laws, but beyond that point suddenly “stops making sense” (as Talking Heads might put it). For one has to say, not that the world has some ultimate explanation that is non-theistic, but rather that it has no ultimate explanation at all. And in that case one can hardly claim to have provided a more “rational” account of the world than theism does. To paraphrase what Copleston said to Russell, if you refuse to play the explanatory game, then naturally you cannot lose it. But by the same token, it is ludicrous to claim that you’ve won it.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> I said no such thing. I said science is incapable of addressing this question, much less coming to the conclusion you stated - it's a question of possibility space.
It can address this question if the conscious entity is given certain qualities that are supposed to manifest themselves in the material world.
For example, God is supposed to be a benevolent deity and a masterful and all-knowing designer of the world, and yet the natural world is full of waste, death and pain, and in which over 90% of all species have gone extinct, and in which biological organisms possess multiple design flaws that an engineer who was starting from scratch would never make. However, if you assume a mindless, blind algorithmic natural process, then it all makes sense.
>> But that aside - this is part of what I've been driving at in my discussion of 'beyond the universe'. On the one hand you insist that what's beyond our universe is not only unknowable, but in principle can be anything - God, illogic, whatever. But in this case it really seems like you're switching gears, and now suddenly we can say some decisive things about such things and what effect, if any, they have on our world - actively or in the past.
There are a number of levels to this.
I do believe that talk about what is beyond the empirical universe is nonsense, and you are right that science should be silent about what goes on beyond the empirical world.
However, if someone wants to persist in talking about what goes on beyond the empirical world, then this will have to be done by analogy with what goes on within the empirical world. So, taking such analogies at face value results in some predictable consequences in the empirical world. For example, talking about a benevolent and masterful designer, on analogy with benevolent human designers and engineers. By looking for the predicted consequences, and not finding them, then I can conclude that the analogies fail and the justification for the underlying ideas is insufficient to recommend its truth.
Does this make sense?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Telos is "towardness," not "goal,” and is evidenced by natural laws. If A causes B there must be something in A that "points toward" B. Otherwise, efficient causation makes no sense.
If there is “towardness”, then isn’t the next question “towards what?” and isn’t that essentially a “goal”?
>> So, if Darwin's theory is a law, there must be something in natural selection that "points toward" the origin of new species.
Natural selection “points towards” all kinds of effects, including the existence of insects, but is that an underlying goal of evolution? I mean, why even bring this teleology into the equation at all? Is the telos of “y = x^2” to make a parabola, or is a parabola just what happens when you start plugging values into x and plot them on a graph?
I suppose you could say that the parabola is the goal of the equation, but then you are basically saying that any effect is the goal of what precedes it. And if you are saying that, then where do you stop? I mean, any event can result in a number of immediate, medium-range, and long-term consequences. Which of them do you consider the goal of the event? Perhaps all of them? And then what sense is there to say that the goal of any event is for everything to happen after?
>> That is not a scientific conclusion, but an a priori metaphysical commitment; one that compels us to watch nature constantly acting lawfully toward ends while simultaneously convincing ourselves that it is all a coincidence.
I disagree. It is based upon empirical observations and using a finite number of assumptions and laws to explain the biological world. There is nothing in them that requires an organizing intelligence, and so although such an intelligence is consistent with evolution, it is certainly not necessary or indicated by the evidence.
I mean, I can take Euclid’s propositions, and deduce a number of mathematical theorems. Do I have to add anything to this, such as a conscious intelligence supervising the deductions to ensure that they are valid, or is it enough to just let the logic and mathematics speak for themselves?
>> Flowers turn toward the sun; amoebas seek out food particles; and acorns become oaks. To be unaware of possessing goals does not mean they don’t have them.
I agree.
>> Algorithm is a description of a series of calculations. It no more causes a thing than iambic pentameter is causes Hamlet. To call a process "is algorithmic" is to say only that it can be described lawfully (although in the case of evolution, without the icky mathematics). And that the world is lawful was precisely a Christian belief about the world.
What I meant is that evolution occurs by a step-by-step process secondary to the differential survival of biological organisms as a result of random genetic variation causing different phenotypes. The point is that it is a sequential and step-by-step process that just repeats, again and again, as long as certain conditions are met. In that sense, it can be conceived as an algorithmic computation with a recursive output.
>> Tautologies explain nothing.
Tautology? Do you really think that Darwinism is just that survivors will survive? Why do some survivors survive better than others? Does the tautology explain that? Darwinism does by genetic variation that results in differential expression of phenotypes, some of which will be better suited to a particular environment, and thus have a survival advantage. I don’t know about you, but I cannot see how this is similar to “all bachelors are married”.
And just out of curiosity, who here thinks that the Unmoved Mover is the Biblical God?
ReplyDelete>And just out of curiosity, who here thinks that the Unmoved Mover is the Biblical God?
ReplyDeleteNo "God" who is not the Unmoved Mover is worth worshiping. Nor would such a sub-"deity" worth our time.
The Unmoved Mover is what we can know about God via our reason alone sans Revelation.
Beside we have to first establish the natural knowledge of God via philosophy before we can even discuss revelation.
Ya gotta learn Algebra before Calculus.
dguller:
ReplyDeleteIsn’t the next question “towards what?” and isn’t that essentially a “goal”?
Sure; but saying "towardness" discounts the conscious intention that seems to spook you so.
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dguller
Natural selection “points towards” all kinds of effects, including the existence of insects, but is that an underlying goal of evolution?
"Evolution," per se, is global, so the "goal" must be global. Not insects, as such. Evolution is not aimed at a particular body-type, but only at fitness for a niche (at specific level) or at the origin of species (at the general level).
dguller
why even bring this teleology into the equation at all?
a) Not "bringing it in." It's simply there. Do we "bring in" efficient causation? (Actually, the Chinese thought it unnecessary.)
b) It's not an "equation." Darwinism notoriously eschews math.
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dguller
Is the telos of “y = x^2” to make a parabola
a) Vice versa. The telos of the equation is to represent a geometric concept algebraically. Don't believe me, ask Descartes. He started analytical geometry. No one doubts that an artisan had an end in mind when crafting his artifact.
b) Aristotle, et al. contended that what the artisan imposed artificially on parts natures accomplished thru immanent powers: e.g., gravity, reproduction, metabolism, etc.
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dguller
where do you stop?
At the terminus. E.g., an acorn's final cause is an oak, not a sapling, because at that point it stops becoming. The final cause of a falling body is the center of gravity or as physicists say "the attractor basin" of the potential function. The reaction of sodium and chlorine ends in salt, not in an oak tree. See 6 & 7: http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c02002.htm#6
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dguller
using a finite number of ... laws to explain the biological world.
Hey, where'd you get those "laws" from?
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dguller
I can take Euclid’s propositions, and deduce a number of mathematical theorems. Do I [need] a conscious intelligence supervising the deductions to ensure that they are valid?
Sure. a) Your own and b) Euclid's.
Artifacts don't avoid telos.
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dguller
a sequential ... process that just repeats, again and again
The very word "process" reeks of teleology. A process is a transformation of inputs into an output; i.e., every process has an end.
dguller
[Is] Darwinism just that survivors will survive? Why do some survivors survive better than others?
Sometimes, dumb luck. Sometimes, "free rider." Sometimes, genetic mechanisms that accommodate massive changes (cf. http://bostonreview.net/BR22.1/shapiro.html) Sometimes, epigenetics. Sometimes, the telos of the critter seeking to go on living by exploiting new environmental niches. See also, Kimura and "neutral selection."
Split some Darwinians (esp. camp followers) into two groups and present each with opposite situations, claiming each is an actual observation. One group will show how natural selection favored X; the other will show how it favored not-X. It ain't physics.
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dguller
Darwinism does [explain that] by genetic variation that results in differential expression, etc.
Actually, it is genetics that explains it. More often than not, it may be the species that selects the environment, not the environment that selects the species.
"And just out of curiosity, who here thinks that the Unmoved Mover is the Biblical God?"
ReplyDeleteThat is a Protestant question. You are addressing Catholics (mostly). It is not fully accurate to say that we Catholics believe in the "biblical God." Rather, it is more accurate to say that Catholics believe the Unmoved Mover is revealed in Christ, who imparted to His Church the fullness of Christian Revelation that is contained in the Bible, yes, but also in Sacred Tradition and the Magisterium of the Catholic Church.
In other words, we believe the Unmoved Mover is the God of the Catholic Church. This is a very important distinction since we are NOT "people of the book."
A few questions:
ReplyDelete(1) Why does a necessarily existing being have to be immutable? Does it not still exist even if it changes form? I retain my personal identity despite changing over time, because the changes retain enough underlying unity.
(2) If the inherent instability of radioactive atoms is a sufficient explanation for their inevitable decay, without having to introduce anything outside themselves, then why cannot the inherent instability of the initial singularity be enough of a cause to explain the Big Bang?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Sure; but saying "towardness" discounts the conscious intention that seems to spook you so.
Okay, as long as there is no hint of conscious intention.
>> "Evolution," per se, is global, so the "goal" must be global. Not insects, as such. Evolution is not aimed at a particular body-type, but only at fitness for a niche (at specific level) or at the origin of species (at the general level).
Okay.
>> a) Not "bringing it in." It's simply there. Do we "bring in" efficient causation? (Actually, the Chinese thought it unnecessary.) b) It's not an "equation." Darwinism notoriously eschews math.
First, is it there, because that is how we experience the world? Perhaps the world just is “one damned thing after another”, but we process our experiences in such a way that we cannot help but see directness in nature? After all, this would have been an enormous survival advantage to simplify our understanding of nature, but does that mean that it is really there, even after we are extinct?
Second, I thought evolutionary biologists who study population genetics have used statistics. And when they are studying the morphology of biological organisms, then don’t they also do so mathematically. But I suppose they do not use as much mathematics as physicists, for example.
>> At the terminus. E.g., an acorn's final cause is an oak, not a sapling, because at that point it stops becoming. The final cause of a falling body is the center of gravity or as physicists say "the attractor basin" of the potential function. The reaction of sodium and chlorine ends in salt, not in an oak tree.
Isn’t that arbitrary, though? Perhaps the acorn’s final cause is to die, because that is also something that inevitably happens as it develops. I mean, if you start with an acorn, and then there is this subsequent chain of events that happens until the entity dies and its components disperse into the environment, then which event in the chain is the “final” one to which the original was directed towards? What if the acorn’s final cause was to disperse its molecules to its surrounding fellows to support their nutrition?
Even your example of the acorn becoming an oak is when it stops becoming is circular, because you are asserting, first, that its final cause is to become an oak. What I want to know is how you selected this event from all the other events in its trajectory through space-time to be the final one?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Hey, where'd you get those "laws" from?
They just are there. I have no idea where they came from.
>> The very word "process" reeks of teleology. A process is a transformation of inputs into an output; i.e., every process has an end.
Assuming there is no feedback loop, sure, but since the empirical world contains such feedback, then it is hard to know when to stop the process at the “goal”, because the goal changes all the time.
>> Sometimes, dumb luck. Sometimes, "free rider." Sometimes, genetic mechanisms that accommodate massive changes (cf. http://bostonreview.net/BR22.1/shapiro.html) Sometimes, epigenetics. Sometimes, the telos of the critter seeking to go on living by exploiting new environmental niches. See also, Kimura and "neutral selection."
None of which is tautological. That was my point. Evolution by natural selection is not just that survivors survive, but actually has a number of additional features that add explanatory power to WHY some survivors survive better than others, which includes information about the individuals and their environments.
>> Split some Darwinians (esp. camp followers) into two groups and present each with opposite situations, claiming each is an actual observation. One group will show how natural selection favored X; the other will show how it favored not-X. It ain't physics.
Yes, because they are opposite situations. Put an organism with dark colors in a light environment, and they are eaten, then darkness likely makes it more of a target for predators, because it is harder to hide. Put an organism with dark colors in a dark environment, and it survives longer than lighter colored organisms, then the darkness contributed to its survival. You change the situation, then you change the favorability of traits.
And it definitely ain’t physics.
>> Actually, it is genetics that explains it. More often than not, it may be the species that selects the environment, not the environment that selects the species.
Yes, genetics explains the genetic part of the equation, but it does not explain why evolution occurs. I mean, the tires contribute to the mobility of the car, but they do not explain mobility alone. You have to add other components for that to happen.
we are NOT "people of the book.
ReplyDeleteWell... Except in the sense that we put the book together - together with the Orthodox, Coptic, and Oriental churches, among whom there was not then such distinctions as we make today.
Of course, once you have an Unmoved Mover, you have a being of pure act (BPA) and from that a series of logical deductions, the totality of which amounts to the God of traditional theology.
One such deduction is that this being's essence just is to exist. That is, it is Existence Itself and, as we all know, "Existence exists." If such a being could talk, it would call itself "I AM." So there is a connection between what Greek-style reason deduces and the rather peculiar and unique "name" the God of the Bible gave himself.
dguller
ReplyDeleteWhy does a necessarily existing being have to be immutable?
Because, like Euclid's elements, all the propositions tie together. The necessary being stems from the impossibility of an infinite regress of instrumental causes. We end up with a being that cannot be other than what it is: purely actual. To change, a being must move from potency to act; but a purely actual being is not in potency. Therefore, it cannot change.
I retain my personal identity despite changing over time
This being the continual change in the matter that comprises you, the inadequacy of materialism to explain such things should be evident.
dguller
If the inherent instability of radioactive atoms is a sufficient explanation for their inevitable decay..., then why cannot the inherent instability of the initial singularity be enough of a cause to explain the Big Bang?
No reason at all, assuming it is "inherently unstable." Creation does not mean a transformation of matter from one form (an alleged singularity) to another form (an expanding soup of supposed quarks). Or from the vacuum energy to virtual particles, if you are more quantumly inclined. The theory of a dynamic universe was first proposed by a Belgian priest and mathematician named Georges Lemaitre, and he was quite clear that the beginning of a space-time manifold was not the same thing as an act of creation. The theory was derisively called "the Big Bang" by an atheist and anti-clerical physicist named Fred Hoyle, who thought the theory sounded like a moment of creation. Like many of his generation, he very much wanted to believe the universe was eternal and unchanging - an attitude ironically similar to the geocentrist attitude toward the earth.
A nice biography of Lemaitre and the Big Bang theory can be found here: The Day Without Yesterday: Lemaitre, Einstein, and the Birth of Modern Cosmology
http://www.amazon.com/Day-Without-Yesterday-Lemaitre-Cosmology/dp/1560259027/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1298843017&sr=1-1
dguller
ReplyDeleteis [telos] there, because that is how we experience the world? Perhaps the world just is “one damned thing after another"
If it is, then kiss science good-bye. There are no natural laws. And you might be a brain in a vat somewhere.
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this would have been an enormous survival advantage to simplify our understanding of nature
One may find "an enormous survival advantage" in any given situation. You don't even have to show that misunderstanding the world around us actually is "an enormous survival advantage," you only have to assert that it is so. And of course, it would also be "an enormous survival advantage" to correctly apprehend the lawfulness of nature. That's what makes pop-Darwinism so vacuous. Given X or not-X, you can create a just-so story "proving" that either one is "an enormous survival advantage."
This is what really annoyed people like Gould, Orr, Margulis, and others.
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dguller
I thought evolutionary biologists who study population genetics have used statistics.
a) That is genetics.
b) Statistics is not math. Correlation is not causation.
But I suppose they do not use as much mathematics as physicists.
We have Newton's equations and Maxwell's equations and Heisenberg's equations; but where are Dawkins' equations? One of the six pillars of the Scientific Revolution was to privilege mathematics as the proper discourse in the sciences. Like some other pillars, it worked excellently well in the physics of motion, in the rest of the physics and chemistry of inanimate objects, tolerably well in biology (esp. biophysics and biochemistry), and not at all in the social "sciences." (Note the intrusion of intentionality as we move along.)
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>>an acorn's final cause is an oak, not a sapling... The final cause of a falling body is ..."the attractor basin" of the potential function. The reaction of sodium and chlorine ends in salt, not in an oak tree.
dguller
Isn’t that arbitrary, though? your example of the acorn becoming an oak is when it stops becoming is circular, because you are asserting, first, that its final cause is to become an oak. What I want to know is how you selected this event from all the other events in its trajectory through space-time to be the final one?
Simple: once it becomes an oak, it does not develop any more. In the common course of nature, it does not go on to become a Pontiac. That's what "final" means. There is nothing in the acorn that points beyond the oak. You are still thinking of finality as something imposed on the acorn from outside. This is precisely the "dead matter" model of Newton, Paley, Behe, and Dawkins.
>> Hey, where'd you get those "laws" from?
ReplyDeletedguller
They just are there.
Just so you don't think you're starting from nothing. But IT JUST IS!! does not strike me as any more rational than GOD DID IT!!
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dguller
since the empirical world contains such feedback [loops], then it is hard to know when to stop the process at the “goal”, because the goal changes all the time.
Golly, I guess Aristotle never considered the hydrological cycle as a whole when he said that finality applied to the entire cycle, not generally to the rain alone.
>>dumb luck. "free rider." genetic mechanisms that accommodate massive changes. epigenetics. the critter seeking to go on living by exploiting new environmental niches.
dguller
None of which is tautological.
And none of which is natural selection.
Evolution by natural selection ... has a number of additional features that add explanatory power
The inadequacies were well known to Darwin himself. By the final edition of ORIGIN he had even added Lamarckism back into the mix. I think you are interpreting "natural selection" to mean simply "any natural mechanism" rather that Darwin's specific and carefully thought out "engine."
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>>present [two groups] each with opposite situations... One group will show how natural selection favored X; the other will show how it favored not-X.
dguller
Put an organism with dark colors in a light environment, etc. You change the situation, then you change the favorability of traits.
The actual example was the claims:
X: Humans invest more effort and resources in their younger children than in their older.
not-X: Humans invest more effort and resources in their older children than in their younger.
No environmental change is suggested; but Darwinian fairy tales were easily constructed for each.
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dguller
genetics explains the genetic part of the equation, but it does not explain why evolution occurs.
Kool. You may be approaching the four-fold Aristotelian explanation of evolution. Generally, it is genetic mutation, but not in the 19th century "atomic" sense. See Shapiro's essay, linked in an earlier post, for some of the complexity of the modern concept of the "gene." This alters the physical character of the critter, and the critter responds by altering its behavior to take advantage of it. This is not the massive over-reproduction followed by ruthless winnowing by intraspecific competition. That certain beasties got longer necks and became giraffes did not squeeze our their sisters, who retained shorter necks and became deer or cattle.
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But this is growing time-consuming, repetitious and way off-topic.
Except for your suggestion that the apparent lawfulness (intelligibility) is an illusion caused (somehow) by "evolution."
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Because, like Euclid's elements, all the propositions tie together. The necessary being stems from the impossibility of an infinite regress of instrumental causes. We end up with a being that cannot be other than what it is: purely actual. To change, a being must move from potency to act; but a purely actual being is not in potency. Therefore, it cannot change.
But doesn’t “necessary being” just have to do with existence? In other words, it cannot not exist. If it contains some actual properties and some potential properties, it still exists as long as it has the same identity. Why does its identity have to lack any potential whatsoever?
>> This being the continual change in the matter that comprises you, the inadequacy of materialism to explain such things should be evident.
Well, the idea is that there is sufficient continuity in my body in space-time, despite many changes, to justify my personal identity. It also helps to add brain development, which results in personality development, which is also a continuous process. My identity ends once my body no longer is able to sustain its structure after death. Anyway, the point is that identity can be sustained despite a combination of actuality and potential. Why can’t this be the case for the underlying necessary being that generates the empirical world?
>> No reason at all, assuming it is "inherently unstable."
Then could one argue that the transition from singularity to Big Bang did not require anything extra, because it was inherently unstable, and was bound to make that transition on its own?
>> If it is, then kiss science good-bye. There are no natural laws. And you might be a brain in a vat somewhere.
I don’t think so. A natural law just says that if X happens, then Y can be predicted to occur afterwards. But what if we cannot help but experience that natural law as imbued with an underlying tendency to attain some goal? Sure, this might help us to conceptualize what is going on with a natural law, because that is just how we perceive things, but then we would be projecting something extra in addition to the natural law itself, which is not really there.
>> Given X or not-X, you can create a just-so story "proving" that either one is "an enormous survival advantage."
In many cases, sure, especially since there are so many confounding factors that are just impossible to fully control in the natural world. However, when you look at bacteria that evolve to be resistant to antibiotics, then do you really wonder what X resulted in an increase in fitness?
>> a) That is genetics. b) Statistics is not math. Correlation is not causation.
“Statistics is not math”? It is applied mathematics that is actually essential to understanding our world, far more than metaphysics. Without statistics, we would be unable to quantify whether a pattern that we experience is more likely to be due to chance or due to an actual underlying phenomenon.
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Simple: once it becomes an oak, it does not develop any more. In the common course of nature, it does not go on to become a Pontiac. That's what "final" means. There is nothing in the acorn that points beyond the oak. You are still thinking of finality as something imposed on the acorn from outside. This is precisely the "dead matter" model of Newton, Paley, Behe, and Dawkins.
No, I am not. I am thinking that when you start with an acorn, then a number of subsequent events occur, and the question is where you draw the line and say that THIS subsequent event is the final one. You are still arguing in a circular fashion, because you are just asserting that the final cause is to be an oak. Why can’t its final cause be to be detritus? Or to become more acorns via the medium of an oak?
The point is that there is a series of predictable events that we usefully abstract into specific groupings and patterns, but the abstraction – and the additional projections that we bring – come from us, and we have to be careful that what appears intuitively obvious to us may actually not really be there, and we need some methodology to be able to tease this out. As much as you denigrate Kant, he made us aware of the fact that our minds do not connect to reality in a pure and unfiltered fashion, and that we always bring a little of ourselves into the equation, and therefore must be cautious about our metaphysical speculations.
>> Just so you don't think you're starting from nothing. But IT JUST IS!! does not strike me as any more rational than GOD DID IT!!
All I know is that there are aspects of our universe, such as the presence of certain laws, that are just given, or present, without any clear understanding of why. Is there a deeper principle at work that justifies their existence? I do not know. Are they a fixed aspect of reality and have no deeper principle? I do not know.
I can certainly pretend to have some answers, but one thing that I have learned is that sometimes it is better to have no map than the wrong map, and when there is a great deal of uncertainty, then we have to be extra cautious that we do not cling to a narrative or theory that provides us with a great deal of satisfaction, but lacks any way to tell whether it is actually correct.
>> Golly, I guess Aristotle never considered the hydrological cycle as a whole when he said that finality applied to the entire cycle, not generally to the rain alone.
And what about the impact of the hydrological cycle upon the rest of the biosphere? Is it ALL part of the final cause of that cycle, or is it more fair to say that he arbitrarily picked a point in the causal nexus that he found intuitive, and just said, “this is the final cause”? And if that is true, then can Aristotle (and Aquinas) be accused of inventing “just-so stories”, as well?
>> And none of which is natural selection.
Really? Why not?
>> The inadequacies were well known to Darwin himself. By the final edition of ORIGIN he had even added Lamarckism back into the mix. I think you are interpreting "natural selection" to mean simply "any natural mechanism" rather that Darwin's specific and carefully thought out "engine."
Maybe we should stick to contemporary evolutionary biology? I’m pretty sure that it has incorporated the factors that you mentioned into the current theory of evolution by natural selection.
>> Except for your suggestion that the apparent lawfulness (intelligibility) is an illusion caused (somehow) by "evolution."
That is not what I said. I said that there is lawfulness, but that our experience of that lawfulness may introduce extra elements that imply a specific metaphysical system, but are not actually present in the lawfulness itself.
It can address this question if the conscious entity is given certain qualities that are supposed to manifest themselves in the material world.
ReplyDeleteNo, it can't - not unless making assumptions about hypothetical entities that are otherwise utterly invisible to science and empiricism counts as science. That's non-scientific reasoning that calls on data from the world - and it's a sort of reasoning you were expressly rejecting at first. Now you're bringing it back in.
And that's one thing I worried about all along. You did start out, I think it's fair to say, with the claim that we should say nothing about anything beyond the natural world or beyond what we can strictly take from the empirical. But it really seems like that's treated unevenly - we should be skeptical and reject all talk when our beyond-the-empirical speculations is one of God. But if it's a positive claim of atheism, of processes having no point, etc, the rules change.
By looking for the predicted consequences, and not finding them, then I can conclude that the analogies fail and the justification for the underlying ideas is insufficient to recommend its truth.
Does this make sense?
No. Not in light of what you said earlier, because now you're granting 'Sure, we can make inferences, I just don't think they're reasonable.' That's a completely different ballgame, and it's coming across as utter skepticism of our ability to make inferences if the inference is either 'God' or 'God-friendly', but that skepticism vanishes if the inference is 'atheism'.
Further, once you're making the reply you are about 'What we'd expect God to do compared to what we see', you're into theodicy. Better yet, if it's "science" to judge the natural world according to those assumptions, then the person armed with the theodicy is also making a scientific argument - and their idea will mesh with the science as well.
As well, I'd say that your counter-example doesn't really make sense. First, because there are problems with the conjunction of "blind" and "algorithmic" - algorithms have direction. Second, because it's not an explanation, but a lack of one: "There is no explanation, it just is this way for no reason at all." Back to Ed's post.
A lot of this comes down to consistency. If talking about the world "beyond nature" is as truly useless as you were saying, you undercut the lion's share of New Atheist points: We become unable to estimate the likelihood of God existing or not-existing, and the response to theology, metaphysics, and more is not 'argument' but a radical appeal to ignorance that may ultimately be incoherent, and reduce science to a pragmatic endeavor rather than one which really grants much knowledge at all.
On the flipside, if you want to allow inference about these things which go beyond empiricism, then that's exactly what you're doing - and now we're back to questions like Ed's, theology, philosophy, etc being rational and reasonable to present and pursue after all, with "But it's technically possible for you to be wrong!" hardly mattering.
dguller
ReplyDeleteThen ... the transition from singularity to Big Bang did not require anything extra, because it was inherently unstable, and was bound to make that transition on its own?
Heck, an animal breeder of the 18th century could improve his herds without the need for Darwin's theories. My mechanic can repair a transmission without a need for anything beyond himself and his tools and some aftermarket parts. Except, one may wonder where the parts or the tools or the mechanic's skill come from. Likewise, one needs the supposed singularity and its alleged instability and that the instability [somehow, hands wave] leads to the expansion of the universe and not to utter chaos or to a Packard Clipper.
A cosmologist friend of mine says that singularities are mathematical artifacts and the physical world does not do anything nearly so rude. Hence, I reserve judgment about what is or is not "required."
One may as well say that we can fly a jet airplane without any need for the Whittle hypothesis.
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dguller
A natural law just says that if X happens, then Y can be predicted to occur afterwards.
That was the Humean sabotage to the scientific program. Fortunately, most scientists simply assume finality even while they deny it, so the damage is not severe yet. But recall that when al-Ghazali said the same thing, his influence was such as to bring natural philosophy to a screeching halt in the House of Submission.
If B follows A for no particular reason but habit, then there is no cause, only correlation. Next time, A may be followed by C or D or nothing at all. There would be no reason why tomorrow an acorn might not grow into an alligator.
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dguller
“Statistics is not math”? It is applied mathematics that is actually essential to understanding our world, far more than metaphysics.
Consider this: most mathematics departments, where they teach statistics, will call themselves the Department of Mathematics and Statistics. So those of us in that game do see a difference. Applied mathematics are things like differential equations, Riemannian geometry, Galois theory, and the like.
Now, the theory of statistics is mathematical. My textbook - Paul Meyer, Introductory Probability and Statistical Applications - is chockablock with integrals and differential equations.
(My shelf holds also Nonparametric Statistical Methods, Analyzing Qualitative Data, Deming's fine Statistical Adjustment of Data, Savage's Foundations of Statistics, several books on Sampling theory and practice, including Cochran's classic Sampling Techniques, and others.)
There is a difference between statistical analysis of data and the mathematical laws that describe physical behavior. There was no statistics in the laws of gravity or of electromagnetism; of relativity or even quantum mechanics. (The laws there are exact, and always work out. The uncertainty, according to one interpretation, lies in the real world.)
s=0.5gt^2 or E=mc^2 are not mere correlations.
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dguller
Without statistics, we would be unable to quantify whether a pattern that we experience is more likely to be due to chance or due to an actual underlying phenomenon.
Teasing a signal out of noisy data; sure. But that does not establish causation or a scientific law. It may fool the layman - meaning a non-statistician - into thinking otherwise, but that is part of the decay of science in the postmodern age.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteHave you ever heard of horned dilemmas? One example would be: “X is impossible, but even if X were possible, then the conclusions would lead to rejecting X as true”. That is all I am doing here.
I do believe that talk about what is beyond space-time is nonsense, but there are others who believe that it does make sense, and that they are able to make inferences about what is beyond and how it impacts the universe. I am allowed to show that, even by their own rules, their claims fail despite the fact that, all along, it is nonsensical talk. I am pretending that it has sense.
It would be the same if I found people walking around talking about square triangles as if it made sense. I could say, “OK, let’s talk about these ‘square triangles’. Tell me about them.” And when they described them, then I can point out the contradiction between a shape with four sides and three sides, and the impossibility of them being one and the same. According to you, this is impossible, and I should just stand there impassive as stone and be utterly silent, because they are talking nonsense. Surely, I can engage them in a discussion to show them the incoherence of their propositions?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Heck, an animal breeder of the 18th century could improve his herds without the need for Darwin's theories. My mechanic can repair a transmission without a need for anything beyond himself and his tools and some aftermarket parts. Except, one may wonder where the parts or the tools or the mechanic's skill come from. Likewise, one needs the supposed singularity and its alleged instability and that the instability [somehow, hands wave] leads to the expansion of the universe and not to utter chaos or to a Packard Clipper.
I suppose that hand waving is inevitable when we are discussing these matters, because none of us actually knows what is going on with any level of precision, except that “something” must be happening. My point was that the theistic hypothesis is not necessarily the only possible one. Even God “somehow” creates the universe, and whatever possible explanation you have of how this happens will inevitably be based upon what we observe in the empirical world, which may not even apply to how God does it. So, I think that we are all in the same boat here.
>> A cosmologist friend of mine says that singularities are mathematical artifacts and the physical world does not do anything nearly so rude. Hence, I reserve judgment about what is or is not "required."
Fair enough. That is actually a reasonable position in this matter.
>> One may as well say that we can fly a jet airplane without any need for the Whittle hypothesis.
I actually have no idea what the Whittle hypothesis is, but you raise an interesting point. I just read at Jerry Coyne’s blog about how ants are able to find the shortest trails back to their homes. Dembski argued that this is impossible to understand by virtue of evolutionary biology, because the ants would have to solve the Steiner problem, which they lack the cognitive capacity to do. What the ants actually end up doing is far simpler. When they leave their home, they release pheromones, and in order to find their way back home via the shortest distance, they just follow the pheromones that they left behind, and the ones with the shortest distance have the strongest scent.
This is one thing about evolutionary biology that I find quite fascinating. Namely, a problem that we have to exert an enormous amount of calculations and resources to solving, nature has found a simple way to a solution. That something that appears so enormously complicated can actually have a fairly simple solution that a blind long-term process of trial-and-error has weeded out of the space of possibilities.
>> That was the Humean sabotage to the scientific program. Fortunately, most scientists simply assume finality even while they deny it, so the damage is not severe yet. But recall that when al-Ghazali said the same thing, his influence was such as to bring natural philosophy to a screeching halt in the House of Submission.
ReplyDeleteI disagree. There is nothing wrong with believing that your process of discovering causal relationships is fraught with the underlying possibility of being wrong and falsified at the next step. That is what scientists do all the time. The problem with al-Ghazzali was NOT necessarily his rejection of necessary causation, but his embrace of mysticism as a more reliable route to absolute truth than empirical study of the world, being the study of mere contingent relationships. It was when Muslims followed him into a spiritual realm to explore through Sufism that they fell behind in terms of their scientific advancements. So, I think that you are partially right.
The reason why Hume did not destroy Western civilization was because he did not have this additional claim that since Western science studies the contingent and deals only with possibility and not necessity that, therefore, we should rather look to a higher realm instead to seek deeper truths and realities. He said that the empirical world was all we had, and that it falls short of our desire for absolute truth and certainty, but that it is good enough to provide us with a solid knowledge base that we can tentatively build upon over time. I actually think that is quite reasonable. The best does not have to be perfect, only the best that is available, given alternatives.
>> There is a difference between statistical analysis of data and the mathematical laws that describe physical behavior. There was no statistics in the laws of gravity or of electromagnetism; of relativity or even quantum mechanics. (The laws there are exact, and always work out. The uncertainty, according to one interpretation, lies in the real world.)
Right, but to get to the exact laws, we have to muck through an uncertain world with measurements and observations that inherently contain errors that must be addressed. Even E = mc^2 requires measurements of E, m and c, which are all prone to error. How do you quantify the error in these measurements to know whether there is a genuine underlying pattern in the world or just a chance occurrence? By statistics, no?
Anyway, I will likely defer to you on the matter of mathematics. Just wanted to share with you my understanding of the issues, and hopefully my understanding is not too far off the mark.
dguller
ReplyDeleteEven E = mc^2 requires measurements of E, m and c, which are all prone to error. How do you ... know whether there is a genuine underlying pattern in the world or just a chance occurrence? By statistics, no?
a) The theory of relativity was not based on statistical analyses of measurements of E, m, and c. They were derived from tensor calculus and Riemannian geometry.
b) Evaluation of measurement system error does not establish a scientific law -- or in your case, a scientific coincidence.
c) A famous correlation was that of the annual number of births in Oldenburg German during the 1930s and the annual number of storks observed. This does not demonstrate that storks bring babies.
d) Establishing a scientific law requires careful analysis of the material logic; that is, the actual physical bodies and their interactions. Even Hawking has acknowledged this. It was only when the predicted bending of light was finally observed years afterward that the teaching of special relativity moved from the mathematics departments to the physics departments. (In fact, my exposure to relativity was still in math class: tensor analysis on manifolds.)
e) Trust me on this: that after 36 years of applied statistics in a wide variety of client applications, I know a little bit about the meaning of statistical analysis that does not come across in "stats for layman" courses in business school, or soft science classes.
f) However, a prior and deeply felt faith in the Humean metaphysic virtually requires one to believe that statistics demonstrates scientific laws.
dguller
ReplyDeleteThere is nothing wrong with believing that your process of discovering causal relationships is fraught with the underlying possibility of being wrong and falsified at the next step.
Nope; but the belief that B follows A only by coincidence and not by natural law is a rat gnawing at the sheets. Either the world is ordered and intelligible, as our host proposes as the traditional Aristothomist view, or it is simply "one damned thing after another," as the Humean tradition holds.
Otherwise, you are simply repeating things that St. Thomas Aquinas said more than 700 years ago:
The suppositions that these astronomers have invented need not necessarily be true; for perhaps the phenomena of the stars are explicable on some other plan not yet discovered by men
De coelo, II, lect. 17
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"the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them."
Summa theologica, I, q.32, a.1, ad. 2
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dguller
the theistic hypothesis is not necessarily the only possible one.
There's the rub. It's not an hypothesis, not another possible efficient cause in rivalry with other efficient causes. To quote Christoph Cardinal Schoenborn of Vienna:
Scientists are most welcome to "explain everything they need to without appeal to God;" indeed, I hope all the readers [of this magazine] would join me in strenuously objecting if God is ever invoked in the course of normal scientific explanation!
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dguller:
I actually have no idea what the Whittle hypothesis is
It is the hypothesis that jet engines are due to the creative act of Frank Whittle. Yet, try as they might, no engineer measuring the parts and components of a jet engine or their normal functioning will ever discover the existence of Whittle. And in fact, one need not believe in Whittle to fly a jet airplane.
At the >end of the flight, Pat Johnson, who had encouraged Whittle for so long said to him, "Frank, it flies!" Whittle replied, "Well, that's what it was bloody well designed to do, wasn't it?"
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dguller:
I just read at Jerry Coyne’s blog about how ants are able to find the shortest trails back to their homes. Dembski argued that this is impossible to understand by virtue of evolutionary biology, because the ants would have to solve the Steiner problem
Well, everyone tends to see a problem through the lens of his own specialty. Dembski's first PhD was in mathematics and has a masters in statistics. (He also has a bachelor degree in psychology, another masters in theology, and a second PhD in philosophy.) So that he sees the ant problem as a problem of computation. (It reminds me of a story told on John von Neuman about a fly zipping back and forth between two locomotives racing toward each other. Von Neuman naturally solved it (in his head) as the convergence of an infinite series.
But Coyne neither has shown anything evolutionary. For all we know, ants always followed scent-trails and always prefered the stronger-scented trails. He would have to show that once ants did not; then some ants could; and these ants were reproductively more successful than ants that followed any old scent trail or none at all. Since the traveling ants are sterile workers, that might pose some difficulties.
For all I know, the proper efficient-cause explanation lies in genetics and chemistry rather than in the struggle for existence among overbreeding conspecifics.
dguller:
ReplyDeletenature has found a simple way to a solution.
BTW, notice the teleology implicit in that statement. "finding a way" "to a solution."
dculler
ReplyDeleteBy looking for the predicted consequences, and not finding them, then I can conclude that ... the underlying ideas is insufficient to recommend its truth.
IOW, the Church was right to chastise Galileo? After all, heliocentrism predicted visible parallax among the fixed stars, but when folks looked they did not find it. So the underlying idea was insufficient to recommend its truth. Hence, Aristotle, Archimedes, and everyone afterward rejected the hypothesis - until a series of brilliant Christian astronomers and mathematicians overthrew a 2000 year old scientific consensus.
(Calandrelli believed he saw paralax ca. 1800; Bessel definitely did so in the 1830s, too late to do Galileo any good. The reason goes to physicist/philosopher Pierre Duhem's pointing out the flaw in Popperian falsification before Popper came along.)
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> BTW, notice the teleology implicit in that statement. "finding a way" "to a solution."
I know. It is difficult not to speak of teleology, because our experience is just loaded with it, and it is an intuitive way of explaining what we observe in the world. However, it is also difficult to speak without words, but it does not follow that reality that we are speaking about is loaded syntax and semantics. Language is a tool that we use to describe what we experience, but it does not follow that what the objects of our experience are linguistic.
I think this actually comes to the heart of my problems with this metaphysical system, as far as I have been introduced to it. It assumes that because we cannot help but experience something as intuitive, then our experience happens to map in a fully accurate fashion the objects of our experience and their properties. So, if we cannot help but experience the world as loaded with teleology, then it must, in fact, be loaded with teleology. I do not think that this necessarily follows.
Take another example that I think I mentioned earlier. When my car will not start, I will often negotiate and bargain with it to start. Does it follow that because I experience the car as having a conscious intelligence that I can appeal to that it actually does? No, it does not. We understand that we have a tendency to experience various aspects of the world as possessing intentional and mental qualities, such as other people, mammals, and so on, but that sometimes this tendency results in a false positive.
I think that the more we learn about the brain, the more we learn how it adds features to our experience that just aren’t there. A mundane example is our blind spot, which is filled in by the brain to generate a seamless visual perspective. And the fact that we know that this is going on does not affect the illusion. Another thing we learn is that introspection is nearly useless to understand how the mind works, because our introspection of visual experience does not tell us anything about how light enters the back of the eye, is converted into a neural impulse, sent to the occiptal lobe, and is subsequently processed and analyzed and integrated by the neighboring parietal lobe. This is all happening without our awareness, and I find it plausible that other aspects of our experience, which appear as obvious, may not be as they seem.
So, what I worry about is the intuitive obviousness of many of the premises are based upon our experience, which may include elements that do not exist in the world at all, but happen to be present due to the way that sensory input is processed by the brain.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteTOF:
ReplyDeleteWith regards to your comments about Galileo, from an evidence-based standpoint, it may have made sense for the church to reject Galileo’s defense of the heliocentric model. I actually do not know enough details about this matter to make an informed comment. However, what I will say is that, over time, the best way to maximize the number of true beliefs would be to follow the evidence. Yes, this will mean that sometimes you are wrong, and believe something that is true, but the alternative is to believe something, because of … what? Authority? Intuition? Personal experience? Do you think that following our personal intuition, experience and other authority figures has a better chance of increasing our true beliefs over time than following the evidence?
TOF:
ReplyDeleteIn addition, even considering some of the premises of Aquinas, such as the argument from motion and causality to an Unmoved Mover, rely upon tacit assumptions that when made clear compromise the reasoning. When he talks about the transition from potential to actuality, and motion, and change, and cause and effect, and so on, he is talking about these phenomena as they manifest themselves to us in the empirical world. As such, then shouldn’t all these premises begin with “in the empirical world, we observe …”? And as such, the conclusions should only be able to remain within the empirical world, or else jump into a realm that relies upon the assumption that it operates in the same way as the empirical world, which would have to be demonstrated and not assumed.
It would be like describing how a ball is passed around in basketball, and then start talking about how a ball is passed around in soccer, on the assumption that the way it is passed must be the same, because in both cases, a ball is involved. We know that in basketball, the ball is passed by hand, and in soccer, the ball is passed by foot. We know that this comparison does not work, because we have experience of both basketball and soccer, but what do we do when we cannot make such a comparison?
I guess I would like to know how one goes from empirical observations to metaphysical truths without assuming that the reality beyond space-time shares similar properties as the reality within space-time?
With regards to your comments about Galileo, from an evidence-based standpoint, it may have made sense for the church to reject Galileo’s defense of the heliocentric model. I actually do not know enough details about this matter to make an informed comment. However, what I will say is that, over time, the best way to maximize the number of true beliefs would be to follow the evidence. Yes, this will mean that sometimes you are wrong, and believe something that is true, but the alternative is to believe something, because of … what? Authority? Intuition? Personal experience? Do you think that following our personal intuition, experience and other authority figures has a better chance of increasing our true beliefs over time than following the evidence?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> But Coyne neither has shown anything evolutionary. For all we know, ants always followed scent-trails and always prefered the stronger-scented trails. He would have to show that once ants did not; then some ants could; and these ants were reproductively more successful than ants that followed any old scent trail or none at all. Since the traveling ants are sterile workers, that might pose some difficulties.
That was not the point.
The point is that when we come up with a solution to a particular problem, say with logic or mathematics, then it is easy to assume that this solution is somehow built into the fabric of reality somehow, but perhaps it is just one way to solve the problem, and if there are others, then why are the others not also built into reality?
So, we solve the problem of the shortest distance between two points by the Streiner method (?), but ants do something else. Who is to say which is primary and reflects reality?
Maybe this doesn’t make much sense, and I’m just feeling my way around this idea. Your comments are welcome to provide additional clarity.
Dmitry:
ReplyDeletehe is talking about [motion, and change, and cause and effect] as they manifest themselves to us in the empirical world. ...as such, the conclusions should only be able to remain within the empirical world
Why? Plenty of observations in the empirical world have ended up in the mathematical world. And vice versa.
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how one goes from empirical observations to metaphysical truths without assuming that the reality beyond space-time shares similar properties as the reality within space-time?
It doesn't. Why should it have to? Does mathematical reality - which is also beyond space-time - share similar properties?
The three levels - physics, mathematics, and metaphysics - are each profoundly different. For a simple discussion of them, see here:
http://realphysics.blogspot.com/2006/10/degrees-of-abstraction.html
dguller
ReplyDeleteover time, the best way to maximize the number of true beliefs would be to follow the evidence.
Yes, as regards physical bodies and their abstracted properties. That was Galileo's problem. The then-available evidence falsified his theory. That's why Huxley, Darwin's Bulldog, concluded that "the Church had the better case."
You see, they had no dogmatic interest in the Physics, and Augustine's principle that alternative readings could be held, but abandoned if definite proof is found to the contrary. The default interpretation of Scripture was allegorical, but parts of it might be considered an historical narrative of events. Bellarmine affirmed this in a letter to IIRC Foscarelli. The problem was a) everyone was spooked by the Protestant Revolution and their science-like insistence on literal readings and b) Galileo had no empirical evidence to establish his theory.(*) Bellarmine's quite reasonable point was that we should wait until the empirical evidence was in.
Galileo wanted to be taken on faith as an authority figure.
________________
(*) which was wrong, anyway. Kepler had the right model, but Galileo ignored him.
Just wanted to thank Mike Flynn for the yeoman's work he's doing on this thread.
ReplyDeletedguller,
ReplyDeleteas others have observed, if you demand that people stick with the empirical evidence, you need to go by the same standard. For example, by your standards then a statement like "some physicists think that the universe is cyclical" is to be discarded as irrelevant in exploring reality. Yet a naturalist makes assumptions -- has to make them -- that go beyond observable space-time just like the theist. I have written about naturalistic scenarios in chapter 2 "The origin of the universe: eternal God, eternal matter or eternal fields"of my article:
http://home.earthlink.net/~almoritz/cosmological-arguments-god.htm
My conclusion there is that:
"In fact, in order to be able to believe in a naturalistic origin of the universe, the atheist must *negate data* on what observational science tells us about actual matter, energy and fields, and instead believe in miraculous properties of such entities that science has not shown to exist."
Ironically, the problem with eternal matter that I describe there throws us right back to the argument of the Unmoved Mover.
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Why? Plenty of observations in the empirical world have ended up in the mathematical world. And vice versa.
That is an excellent point, and for yet another time, you have stopped my thinking in its tracks. Having reflected upon this point, I have a few comments that I would appreciate your help in clarifying. Keep in mind that I studied philosophy of mathematics many, many years ago, and lots of these ideas are rusty. Bear with me.
By what criteria does one use to determine whether an empirical observation should be included in mathematics, and whether a mathematical conclusion should be included in our theories of the empirical world? I do not think that there is a single criterion available, but rather that empirical observations and theories, and mathematical theories and conclusions, have their own criteria that the other must adhere to in order to be welcomed into their respective worlds.
So, in order for an empirical observation or theory to be included in mathematics, then it must meet the standards and assumptions of mathematics, which we have a great deal of experience with and knowledge of. And in order for a mathematical theory or conclusion to be included in an empirical theory, then it must meet the standards and assumptions of natural science, which include being confirmed or falsified with empirical observations.
Why is this relevant to the point that you are making? I think that mathematics and empirical observations are both things that human beings engage in, and have a great deal of experience of. As such, they are not mysterious entities that are utterly beyond our experience, but fundamentally human activities that have their own rule-governed behavior.
I suppose that you can reply that the objects with which mathematics deals with are fundamentally abstract and outside of space-time, which would provide you with enough of a foothold to allow metaphysics through. However, I wonder whether this is the case. Why does mathematics have to deal with objects at all? Why can’t it be a highly abstract conceptual activity that essentially consists of deducing consequences of various assumptions according to agreed-upon rules? So, the objects would actually be concepts in our minds.
I know that while you are deducing a proof for the first time, it can appear as if you are making contact with a deeper part of reality that is beyond experience, but what if that is just a feeling no different from what a fictional author in a moment of inspiration? It does not follow that the author is now in contact with some fictional object beyond the empirical world and existing in “fiction land”.
TOF:
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, not all mathematical theorems or proofs are useful in understanding the empirical world. The ones that are can maybe be claimed to refer to something real, but only by virtue of its tracking something real in the universe, but not beyond it. Perhaps mathematical theorems can be treated as hypotheses in need of empirical confirmation? They may be true within their assumptions and rules, but without empirical confirmation, how would you know which actually apply to the universe, and which are just fantasy? I mean, if you look at superstring theory, it is beautiful, symmetrical, elegant and sophisticated, but physicists do not call it true until it has empirical confirmation. Can’t we approach mathematical theorems in the same way? As incredible examples of human ingenuity and imagination, but that without some grounding in the world, cannot be legitimately called “true”?
I have always been struck by Wittgenstein’s idea that the incorrigibility of mathematics and logic does not reside within themselves by virtue of their contact with deeper parts of reality, but rather due to their central role in our form of life, which is why we treat them as incorrigible. In other words, if we could doubt them, then our form of life would fall apart. And our form of life is the result of our evolutionary development, cognitive capacities, cultural history, and the regularities and patterns of the world that we live in. It all gets mixed together to give us the background conceptual framework from which we live our lives.
Getting back to my original point, it ultimately comes down to the empirical world once again, and mathematics may not get you into the metaphysical reality as you hoped. So, you can certainly start with empirical observations, and then abstract them into concepts that you can manipulate according to the rules of logic and mathematics, but the truth of those conclusions depends upon some contact with the empirical world, even if they make sense – or are “true – within logic and mathematics themselves.
I hope this hasn’t been too confusing. As I said, it’s been a while, and thank you for bringing these issues back to my awareness.
And along with Tap, I would like to thank you for your efforts in clarifying my ideas, many of which are likely to be incorrect.
In other words, dguller, you are a positivist. No need to write so many words.
ReplyDeleteBrian:
ReplyDeleteIt depends on what you mean by "positivist".
positivist - someone who emphasizes observable facts and excludes metaphysical speculation about origins or ultimate causes
ReplyDeletepositivism - is an epistemological perspective and philosophy of science which holds that the only authentic knowledge is that which is based on sense experience and positive verification
From Google.
Anyway, I am going to hit you guys up so we can go on AIM.
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Yes, as regards physical bodies and their abstracted properties.
Just out of curiosity, in what area of life is it a better general rule to believe things without evidence?
Just out of curiosity, in what area of life is it a better general rule to believe things without evidence?
ReplyDeleteWhat evidence do you have that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> What evidence do you have that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number?
What evidence is there that pi is an irrational number?
Well, according to Wikipedia, there are a number of different proofs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_that_π_is_irrational
I won't even pretend to understand them, but I think that a mathematical proof should count as evidence for the truth of a proposition.
Or am I wrong?
While blogger continues to randomly eat my responses, I'll throw in this reply...
ReplyDeleteI think if you're granting that mathematical proofs constitute evidence, you've already given the exclusive commitment to direct measurement and observation away. Lacking additional argument, metaphysical arguments then can be called evidence for this or that. Even if they're regarded as inconclusive, and it may be rational to regard them as conclusive.
Either way, earlier you said..
However, if you assume a mindless, blind algorithmic natural process, then it all makes sense.
..Or if you have a theodicy, 'it all makes sense'. If having an explanation that matches what we see on that subject qualifies as science, then theology and philosophy are science here and now. But I'll note, in either case you are engaging in speculation about 'beyond the natural world'. (And I'll also note the teleological talk innate in speaking of 'algorithms'. Algorithms aren't 'blind' in the relevant sense.)
That's one point I want to drive home here. Again, your earlier arguments drew a line in the sand based on the ability to empirically follow up on claims. Now, I think that renders a tremendous amount of talk about nature itself as being suspect. But another problem is this: If speculating about God's existence (well, a God who exists beyond what we call nature) violates that, then so does speculating about His non-existence. That's sufficient to gut most of the New Atheist approaches to these questions on the spot, at least if consistency is had.
Not to mention, to even make the critique you've been making requires engaging in what you're trying to disavow. If you reject speculation about what is beyond nature on the grounds that 'It may defy logic and reason, it may not exist, it may...' -- well, you're already engaged in the speculation.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> I think if you're granting that mathematical proofs constitute evidence, you've already given the exclusive commitment to direct measurement and observation away. Lacking additional argument, metaphysical arguments then can be called evidence for this or that. Even if they're regarded as inconclusive, and it may be rational to regard them as conclusive.
What is the evidence that Harry Potter wears glasses? Well, you look up the Harry Potter books and see if there are passages where the fictional character Harry Potter is described to wear glasses. Wow. I guess I have allowed for the existence of Harry Potter, right?
The point is that I never said that the only way for a proposition to make sense is for it to be measurable and empirical. Harry Potter makes sense, and he is not empirical (in a sense). Mathematics makes sense, and it is not empirical (in a sense). Does everything that makes sense have to be factually true? I think not. Many propositions make perfect sense, but are false when tested in the empirical world.
In fact, some things that make no sense happen to be true (e.g. quantum mechanics), but they are known to be true by virtue of empirical confirmation of their predictions.
The point is that the best way that we have to sink our teeth into whether or not a proposition actually reflects how the world or the universe works is whether it can be tested empirically. If it cannot, then it might make perfect sense, but it cannot be held true.
What about metaphysical arguments compared to mathematical arguments? Sure, they both appear to be about entities that exist outside of space-time, and so allowing one should justify allowing the other. However, I do not believe that mathematics is actually about entities, but about concepts. I also believe that mathematics has demonstrated its truth, because its theorems and procedures have been shown to be operative in the empirical world through scientific theories, for example.
And metaphysics? I think it more about the structure and limits of our conceptual framework than about entities outside space-time. And where its propositions can be empirically tested and confirmed, then I give them credit, but then it is not metaphysics that we are talking about, but an ordinary garden-variety scientific hypothesis that has been tested and confirmed. So, metaphysical propositions must be beyond empirical verification, which is fine if they are referring to the foundational concepts of our background beliefs, but if they are about entities outside of space-time, then I say they are nonsense, because anything we will say to describe them will use empirical concepts, which are ill-suited to this purpose. It would be like trying to shoot the moon with a gun. The bullet will rise to a certain height, but will inevitably fall down to earth, failing to reach its target.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> But I'll note, in either case you are engaging in speculation about 'beyond the natural world'.
Right. I am playing a game that I think absurd in order to demonstrate its absurdity. You still have not remarked on my example of “square circles”. I think everything you need to know was mentioned in my previous comment to you.
>> That's one point I want to drive home here. Again, your earlier arguments drew a line in the sand based on the ability to empirically follow up on claims. Now, I think that renders a tremendous amount of talk about nature itself as being suspect.
Right, it does. Especially the part that we cannot confirm or falsify by empirical testing. That part is speculation. A good example is dark matter and superstring theory. They are really nice theories that would explain a lot about our universe, but until they have empirical confirmation, they are just speculation.
>> But another problem is this: If speculating about God's existence (well, a God who exists beyond what we call nature) violates that, then so does speculating about His non-existence. That's sufficient to gut most of the New Atheist approaches to these questions on the spot, at least if consistency is had.
I disagree. Say there is a proposition that is actually incoherent, but there are people who think it is coherent and who actually provide a number of definitions to for, being unable to see the underlying incoherence. One can either point out that it is incoherent, or can use the definitions with superficial coherence to demonstrate that it is actually false by virtue of being falsified by its predicted empirical consequences. The first strategy cuts at the heart of the matter, and the second strategy involves some “make believe” and pretending. People can pretend to believe ridiculous propositions, right? When we play with children, we do this all the time.
For a change in topic, I have just received Feser's books: the Last Superstition, Philosophy of Mind, and Aquinas.
ReplyDeleteI was wondering if those who have read all three could recommend the optimal order which to read them?
Thanks!
dguller
ReplyDeleteI think that a mathematical proof should count as evidence for the truth of a proposition. Or am I wrong?
But you have previously rejected all use of logic and insisted on empirical evidence. No circular object measured in the physical world will result in π = C/d. Instead of inferences from measured objects, you need deductions from basic postulates.
What empirical evidence do you have that there actually is an objective universe? The fact is, you cannot demand empirical evidence for everything: some things must be taken as postulates, some things deduced by logic from the observable, some things induced by science from the observables.
No consistent system strong enough to support first order logic is complete. Put another way, there are true sentences inside the system that cannot be proven (or computed) inside the system. This means that every system needs information from outside the system.
Mathematics deals with objects for the same reason physics and metaphysics deal with objects. To deal with anything, there must be an object to it. Consider:
ReplyDelete1. Empirical level. We deal with the particular properties of concrete objects. This fox terrier, that delicious apple, that plummeting rock. As such, each thing is different from every other thing. This plummeting rock differs in its concrete particulars from that plummeting rock: in its matter, shape, color, hardness, etc.
There can be no science of concrete particulars, only empirical experience. Yet, this is all that is presented to our senses.
2. Physics. The intellect differs from the imagination in that while the imagination can handle concrete particulars in sensation and memory and manipulate the memory via imagination, the intellect abstracts from the concrete particulars various universals. Thus, not this apple and that apple, but "apple" (or "red" or "delicious" or...). The physics deals with the abstracted qualities of physical objects. (Modern "natural science" deals only with the abstracted metrical properties of physical objects, but that is another story.) But notice that while Fido and Rover and Spot have empirical existence, "dog," as such, does not. "Dog" is what you get when you strip each dog of its concrete particulars.
"The mind thus considers bodies in their mobile and sensible reality, bodies garbed in their empirically ascertainable qualities and properties." The objects of physical science cannot exist without matter and cannot be conceived without matter. There is no "red" without a red thing, whether an apple or a frequency of light.
3. Mathematics. This is the second abstraction and considers ideal objects. The intellect abstracts from all empirical properties of matter. (Matter is the principle of change; mathematics considers the unchanging.) When everything empirical has been "boiled away" we are left with such things as "equal," "square root," "three," "continuous function," etc.
These objects of thought cannot exist without sensible matter, but can be conceived without it. "For, nothing sensible or experimental enters into the definition of the ellipse or of the square root."
4. Metaphysics. This is the third abstraction which considers objects stripped of all matter, not just its sensible properties, and thus addresses being as such. These objects of thought can be conceived without matter and can exist without matter, either because they never exist in matter or exist in material as well as in immaterial things: substance, quality, act and potency, beauty, goodness, etc.
In this manner, the universe is intelligible to human thought (if not always imaginable).
+ + +
I'll see your Kant and raise you an Einstein:
A. Einstein, in a letter to M. Solvine: “You find it surprising that I think of the comprehensibility of the world... as a miracle or an eternal mystery. But surely, a priori, one should expect the world to be chaotic, not to be grasped by thought in any way. One might (indeed one should) expect that the world evidenced itself as lawful only so far as we grasp it in an orderly fashion. This would be a sort of order like the alphabetical order of words. On the other hand, the kind of order created, for example, by Newton’s gravitational theory is of a very different character. Even if the axioms of the theory are posited by man, the success of such a procedure supposes in the objective world a high degree of order, which we are in no way entitled to expect a priori. Therein lies the miracle which becomes more and more evident as our knowledge develops.”
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteThe point is that I never said that the only way for a proposition to make sense is for it to be measurable and empirical.
ReplyDeleteWhere did I say you were making claims about 'making sense'? I said that your (certainly earlier) objections to metaphysics and God came down heavily on the idea that inferences of such are not open to empirical confirmation.
The point is that the best way that we have to sink our teeth into whether or not a proposition actually reflects how the world or the universe works is whether it can be tested empirically. If it cannot, then it might make perfect sense, but it cannot be held true.
Not only does that open itself to the usual objections of logical positivism, but I've pointed out all manner of limitations about this sort of reasoning (reasoning about the past, about other minds, etc.) Your response there seemed to be 'Well, I have been given no reason to doubt those things...' But that reverses this approach. It seems like you want to have it both ways: The only things we should put stock in is that which can be empirically tested - unless we really like the believe or we'd have to open the doors to absurd-sounding things (not believe in them, but just leave them as open possibilities we can't judge.) Then the standards change.
Again, you keep talking about 'metaphysics' and such being beyond empirical testing. But plenty of nature is beyond empirical testing - or is it? I mentioned that we have a limited observable universe. There's no direct empirical test of what is 'outside' said universe. You've said "Well, we can infer about it because it's part of nature..." But how do you know it's even that?
It seems more and more like a very uneven standard, one which isn't aimed so much at rejecting metaphysics, but in rejecting "that guy's metaphysics".
You still have not remarked on my example of “square circles”.
The last I remember, I did remark on that. I pointed out that you were saying logic may not hold outside the universe and that square circles may be possible. You ended up saying square circles are meaningless - I pointed out what is meaningless is not impossible, and we left it at that.
People can pretend to believe ridiculous propositions, right? When we play with children, we do this all the time.
The problem I pointed out was not one of "make believe", but of consistency. If reasoning about what, if anything, exists outside of the universe is an abandonment of reason, then this holds whether I claim "There is a God" or "there is no God" or "There's likely a God" or "There's likely no God". You seem to be suggesting that I'm talking about the problems of internal critiques - but that's not the case.
All this before realizing that not every god/God is 'beyond nature'. Ed gave the example of pantheism in his own OP, and I'd thrown in the god(s) Nick Bostrom, John Gribbin and others hypothesize about to highlight that point, and to show that 'nature' isn't quite so clear cut on this subject.
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> But you have previously rejected all use of logic and insisted on empirical evidence.
No, I didn’t. Using empirical evidence also involves logic. All I said was that logic is not sufficient to demonstrate truth about the world. Just because a proposition is logical does not mean that its content actually occurs in the world. That’s all I meant.
>> No circular object measured in the physical world will result in π = C/d. Instead of inferences from measured objects, you need deductions from basic postulates.
And that is fine, but it does not follow that what has been deduced exists as an independent entity.
>> What empirical evidence do you have that there actually is an objective universe?
Plenty of empirical evidence, but do I have absolute proof with zero uncertainty? No. Fortunately, I do not feel that absolute proof is the standard for all forms of evidence.
>> The fact is, you cannot demand empirical evidence for everything: some things must be taken as postulates, some things deduced by logic from the observable, some things induced by science from the observables.
I am not. Only for those propositions that claim to describe how the world works. Anything else is free from this limitation. Logical and mathematical theorems? Don’t need empirical evidence. When logical and mathematical theorems are claimed to describe something happening in the world? Need empirical evidence. And remember, I am looking for evidence, not proof. I think that standard is far too high for us to know much about the world.
>> No consistent system strong enough to support first order logic is complete. Put another way, there are true sentences inside the system that cannot be proven (or computed) inside the system. This means that every system needs information from outside the system.
Would postulates derived from empirical evidence count?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Mathematics deals with objects for the same reason physics and metaphysics deal with objects. To deal with anything, there must be an object to it.
Right, but does that object have to exist outside the mind in all cases? What about conceptual content being an object being dealt with in thought?
>> 4. Metaphysics. This is the third abstraction which considers objects stripped of all matter, not just its sensible properties, and thus addresses being as such. These objects of thought can be conceived without matter and can exist without matter, either because they never exist in matter or exist in material as well as in immaterial things: substance, quality, act and potency, beauty, goodness, etc.
Thanks for that summary. Again, it was helpful.
I was wondering about the abstraction process that you are describing here. It is a mental process, right? How can one know whether the mental conception of these abstracted entities refer to something in the universe? Another way of putting this is whether you been that abstraction achieved by the intellect necessarily and infallibly leads to truths about the universe and how it works? And if it does, then how does it do it?
And have you considered the possibility that these abstracted things could be the ultimate categories of our conceptual framework (or, form of life), and are more like the inherent filters through which we can understand anything rather than existing in reality itself? Again, I gave the examples of the blind spot and our mentalizing capacity as brain-generated processes that create experiences that do not correspond to anything really in the world. However, we cannot help but experience them, because of how we are wired and built. Perhaps these ultimate categories of thought and experience that metaphysical speculation has discovered operate in the same way. And if so, then they do not correspond to ontological entities independent of ourselves, but only as our way of organizing our experience by virtue of our evolved cognitive capacity over time.
Any thoughts?
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Not only does that open itself to the usual objections of logical positivism, but I've pointed out all manner of limitations about this sort of reasoning (reasoning about the past, about other minds, etc.)
All I said was that this was the “best” way, not the logically necessary way. The problem with logical positivism is that it claimed to be LOGICAL to its core, including its method of verification and use of induction. However, these are not logical. My only point is that of all the methods that human beings have tried to understand the world, empirical testing via the scientific method has led to the most insights and truths about the world. Is it an infallible and indubitable source of necessary truth? No. But it is the best method we have.
Even your examples fail to address this point. Take the existence of other minds. Can I logically prove that from my experience of people having other minds that they do, in fact, have their own minds? No, I cannot.
Can I provide evidence for that proposition? Sure. We share similar brains, which likely have similar functions, including the generation of a mind. We can interact in a predicable fashion, which indicates an underlying similarity in our we process information and choose to behave. We use a language that describes inner experiences in a way that does not result in wholesale confusion, but rather most people seem to know exactly what we are talking about when discussing inner mental states. Does any of this result in a logical deduction? No. But is it a compelling case for their having their own minds? I think so, because barring philosophical fantasies about zombies, and so on, there is nothing left to doubt its truth.
>> Again, you keep talking about 'metaphysics' and such being beyond empirical testing. But plenty of nature is beyond empirical testing - or is it? I mentioned that we have a limited observable universe. There's no direct empirical test of what is 'outside' said universe. You've said "Well, we can infer about it because it's part of nature..." But how do you know it's even that?
I think that it is possible that there are parts of the universe where the natural laws that we have discovered fail to apply. However, so far this is just a possibility that has no concrete evidence. So, by virtue of using what has worked spectacularly well in the past, I see no problem in assuming for now that the laws of nature exist throughout the universe. Sure, a black swan may come along, but until that happens, we can use natural laws (with a tiny bit of tentativeness, just in case).
And I also think that there is a difference between
(1) We have not observed ALL of X, but have found that all of our observations SO FAR have property Y, and thus infer that all of X likely has Y, as well.
And
(2) We not observed ANY of X, but think that X has property Y, and thus infer that X likely has Y.
>> It seems more and more like a very uneven standard, one which isn't aimed so much at rejecting metaphysics, but in rejecting "that guy's metaphysics".
I’m sorry if it seems so to you. It certainly was not my intention.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> The last I remember, I did remark on that. I pointed out that you were saying logic may not hold outside the universe and that square circles may be possible. You ended up saying square circles are meaningless - I pointed out what is meaningless is not impossible, and we left it at that.
That is a good point. Meaningless propositions lack any probability value, because they are empty of content. So, you are right that when I was talking about senseless and meaningless propositions, then I should not have said they were impossible. Thanks for the clarification.
>> All this before realizing that not every god/God is 'beyond nature'. Ed gave the example of pantheism in his own OP, and I'd thrown in the god(s) Nick Bostrom, John Gribbin and others hypothesize about to highlight that point, and to show that 'nature' isn't quite so clear cut on this subject.
Well, I confess that I may have some sympathy for that perspective. I have always found Spinoza to be quite compelling on this point.
TOF
ReplyDelete>> What empirical evidence do you have that there actually is an objective universe?
dguller
Plenty
TOF
You must assume an objective reality for "empirical" to make sense.
+++
TOF
>> Mathematics deals with objects...
dguller
but does that object have to exist outside the mind in all cases? What about conceptual content being an object being dealt with in thought?
TOF
But if your crypto-idealism is true, how can the same π exist in your mind as well as mine? The neural patterns in my brain are the neural patterns in my brain, not those in your brain. Yet, we both know the same π. If π existed only in the mind, there would be no reason for this. So π must exist independently of the mind. At the same time, the irrationality of π lacks empirical evidence, because irrationality of numbers is not something perceived by the senses.
dguller:
Can I logically prove that from my experience of people having other minds that they do, in fact, have their own minds? No, I cannot.
TOF
Notice that you have slipped some non-empirical metaphysics into your "empirical" evidence; viz., that "brains generate minds." This sounds an awful lot like "iambic pentameters generate Shakespeare," and fails to account for empirical cases like Chase Britton or people with Dandy Walker complex. See here: http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Science_No-Brain.pdf
Money quote: "There's a young student at this university," says Lorber, "who has an IQ
of 126, has gained a first-class honors degree in mathematics, and is socially completely normal. And yet the boy has virtually no brain." The student's physician at the university noticed that the youth had a slightly larger than normal head, and so referred him to Lorber, simply out of interest. "When we did a brain scan on him," Lorber recalls, "we saw that instead of the normal 4.5-centimeter thickness of brain tissue between the ventricles and the cortical surface, there was just a thin layer of mantle measuring a millimeter or so. His cranium is filled mainly with cerebrospinal fluid."
"The basic thesis of [Kant's] Critique is that the mind cannot move beyond the bounds of possible experience. But the more often he argues and repeats the point, the more ironic it becomes, for sooner or later it becomes clear that Kant is giving page after page of non-empirical arguments to show that only empirical arguments are possible." -- James Chastek, "The Thomist objections to Kant" (http://thomism.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/the-thomist-objections-to-kant/)
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> You must assume an objective reality for "empirical" to make sense.
I disagree. I first experience a reality that exists outside of me. That is the default state. Only after philosophical speculations and certain scientific theories get involved does the default state become difficult to adhere to, in some respects. But it is not an assumption that I pulled out of the air, but rooted in my empirical experiences themselves. I cannot help but experience the world as outside of myself.
>> But if your crypto-idealism is true, how can the same π exist in your mind as well as mine? The neural patterns in my brain are the neural patterns in my brain, not those in your brain. Yet, we both know the same π. If π existed only in the mind, there would be no reason for this. So π must exist independently of the mind. At the same time, the irrationality of π lacks empirical evidence, because irrationality of numbers is not something perceived by the senses.
You are assuming that there is not sufficient similarity in the neural patterns in our brain to share the same thought. And furthermore, even if our thoughts of pi are not identical, as long as there is sufficient similarity, which is confirmable by other users of the pi concept, then that should be enough to continue the conversation, I think. Certainly, right now we do not understand the brain in sufficient detail to know whether this is true, and so it is just a hypothesis, but it seems plausible to me as a genuine possibility. So, my position does possess difficulties that cannot fully account for the data that we have.
But let us look at your position, which amounts to a form of Platonism, I think. So, pi exists independent of the mind. Where does it exist? How do we access pi? How do we know that what we have accessed is, actually, pi and not something else? How does pi interact with other related ideas, such as numbers, division, length, circumference, and diameter, in this other place? Is pi the full number, which stretches to infinity, or just the underlying algorithm of circumference to diameter?
TOF:
ReplyDelete>> Notice that you have slipped some non-empirical metaphysics into your "empirical" evidence; viz., that "brains generate minds." This sounds an awful lot like "iambic pentameters generate Shakespeare," and fails to account for empirical cases like Chase Britton or people with Dandy Walker complex.
First, I do not think that your analogy works. Brains are living dynamic entities that are intimately connected to living dynamic bodies that are intimately connected to an empirical environment impacting the body in a variety of ways into an incredibly complicated dynamic system. Is an iambic pentameter the same thing? The only thing the components of your analogy have in common is that complexity emerges from simplicity, and even that is untrue, because the brain is possibly the most complex biological entity around. And one of the surprising insights of Darwin was the complexity can emerge from simplicity, as long as certain conditions are met, which biological organisms interacting with their environments actually do meet.
Second, the neurological conditions that you described are congenital, meaning that they were present at birth. We know that neuroplasticity is incredibly active during the early years of life, and we know that the brain is able to remodel itself to achieve necessary ends. It appears that this is possible, because of the extreme redundancy of neural circuits within the young brain, which is pruned over time into fairly fixed patterns. However, the redundancy never goes away, which is evidenced by the fact that adults who suffer strokes can regain much of their function with rehabilitation by activating dormant neural pathways through physical activity.
An example is by children who are born deaf, or lose their hearing at a young age. What happens is that the auditory part of the brain becomes recruited by the visual part of the brain to improve its function. This is because the neurons in the auditory cortex are not being used. Another example is in those who are born blind and learn Braille, what happens is that their dormant visual cortex is recruited by somatosensory pathways to enhance their function. What that means is that brain regions are not necessarily specialized to particular functions in an invariant fashion, but that there is some flexibility due to neural redundancy in which unused pathways can be recruited to achieve alternative ends.
So, none of this shows that the mind is independent of the brain, but only that the brain is an incredibly complex bodily organ that is capable of extraordinary achievements. What likely happened in the cases that you cite is that the remaining parts of their brains were recruited to assume the function of the absent or defective parts. If you are interested in a lay account of this phenomenon, then I would recommend “Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain” (2008) by Sharon Begley with a forward by the Dalai Lama.
I disagree. I first experience a reality that exists outside of me. That is the default state. Only after philosophical speculations and certain scientific theories get involved does the default state become difficult to adhere to, in some respects. But it is not an assumption that I pulled out of the air, but rooted in my empirical experiences themselves. I cannot help but experience the world as outside of myself.
ReplyDeleteEvery empirical experience you have is exactly that - experience, thought, perception. You may well be 'experiencing the world outside of yourself', but the problem is there is no 'getting outside of yourself' to verify this. "Alright, there's an object I am perceiving. Now, time to drop my perception and see if this is best explained by idealism, dualism, or something else!" doesn't take place - so empiricism doesn't decide this question. It's not for nothing that Berkeley was known as an empiricist.
You may as well say that the default state is that of a belief that cannot be verified.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Every empirical experience you have is exactly that - experience, thought, perception. You may well be 'experiencing the world outside of yourself', but the problem is there is no 'getting outside of yourself' to verify this.
I am already outside myself by virtue of my perception. In fact, much contemporary philosophy of mind is about the mind as an embodied, embedded and extended entity. In other words, my mental life inherently contains elements from my body and environment, and would make no sense without them.
>> "Alright, there's an object I am perceiving. Now, time to drop my perception and see if this is best explained by idealism, dualism, or something else!" doesn't take place - so empiricism doesn't decide this question. It's not for nothing that Berkeley was known as an empiricist.
I actually reject this entire idea. I do not experience a private subjective entity that is utterly divorced from the external world. There are no good arguments to demonstrate this, but only philosophical fairy tales whose only warrant is sheer possibility. In other words, I can kind of imagine this to be the case, and so it might be true. Sure, it might, but possibility is insufficient for a truth claim. And one is left explaining where all this external input is coming from if there is no external world, and where did I learn language, and so on.
The fact is, I experience the world. In this respect, I am more in line with Heidegger and Dewey, and the later Putnam. And this is not just an assumption I make, but an essential part of my form of life that makes everything else make sense.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Every empirical experience you have is exactly that - experience, thought, perception. You may well be 'experiencing the world outside of yourself', but the problem is there is no 'getting outside of yourself' to verify this.
I am already outside myself by virtue of my perception. In fact, much contemporary philosophy of mind is about the mind as an embodied, embedded and extended entity. In other words, my mental life inherently contains elements from my body and environment, and would make no sense without them.
>> "Alright, there's an object I am perceiving. Now, time to drop my perception and see if this is best explained by idealism, dualism, or something else!" doesn't take place - so empiricism doesn't decide this question. It's not for nothing that Berkeley was known as an empiricist.
I actually reject this entire idea. I do not experience a private subjective entity that is utterly divorced from the external world. There are no good arguments to demonstrate this, but only philosophical fairy tales whose only warrant is sheer possibility. In other words, I can kind of imagine this to be the case, and so it might be true. Sure, it might, but possibility is insufficient for a truth claim. And one is left explaining where all this external input is coming from if there is no external world, and where did I learn language, and so on.
The fact is, I experience the world. In this respect, I am more in line with Heidegger and Dewey, and the later Putnam.
I am already outside myself by virtue of my perception. In fact, much contemporary philosophy of mind is about the mind as an embodied, embedded and extended entity. In other words, my mental life inherently contains elements from my body and environment, and would make no sense without them.
ReplyDelete"Making sense", as you've already noted, isn't the issue here. I am not doubting that you can come up with a good metaphysical and philosophical perspective that you can build around the claim that there is an external world. I'm pointing out that empiricism is not getting you to the external world. One of us suggested a rejection of having beliefs that are not open to empirical validation - it was not me.
I do not experience a private subjective entity that is utterly divorced from the external world.
You don't know that empirically. Every experience you have of some 'external world' is, again, exactly that - experience. The external world you talk about is 'those experiences I have, from which I infer an external world'. But there is no viewing the world sans-experience. You yourself are admitting that.
There are no good arguments to demonstrate this, but only philosophical fairy tales whose only warrant is sheer possibility. In other words, I can kind of imagine this to be the case, and so it might be true. Sure, it might, but possibility is insufficient for a truth claim.
"Sheer possibility" is something you've been appealing to in your argument that metaphysical beliefs aren't reasonable - you certainly haven't presented arguments for the claim that, say, it's possible that what exists beyond the natural world defies logic, or, etc, etc. As for the talk of 'good arguments', I'm sure Berkeley would say the same about arguments for an external world (this thing that exists apart from experience, that we never will know except by experience, and which by Berkeley's lights - and others' - does no real "work".)
And one is left explaining where all this external input is coming from if there is no external world, and where did I learn language, and so on.
Someone who really is committed to sticking to beliefs that are subject to empirical verification has an answer to all these things: "I don't know." Earlier you said you were entirely comfortable with the idea that some things were beyond knowing or answer, and implied you were satisfied with limiting your belief and claims to what can be empirically verified. That no longer seems to be the case, given these replies.
The fact is, I experience the world.
As far as empirical verification is concerned, the only fact you really have is that you have experience. "The world" may well be nothing but experience itself. Or maybe not. Again, mystery and being unable to know when lacking empirical verification was fine a short while ago.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteJust out of curiosity, why do you think that our empirical experience of an external world is not a justification that an external world exists?
Just out of curiosity, why do you think that our empirical experience of an external world is not a justification that an external world exists?
ReplyDeleteCalling it "our empirical experience of an external world" is question begging, and "justification" in the broad sense isn't the issue here - it's justification in terms of empirical verification alone. What we have is experience - and for someone really committed to empirical verification, not even the "we" part goes through. Where's your verification - not inference, but empirical verification - I'm having this 'experience' stuff?
Again, earlier you were treating "empirical verification" as the gold standard, and strongly implied that beliefs that could not be empirically verified were not justified. If you're dropping that, that's fine - but that opens the door to taking metaphysics seriously, and the fact that we can reasonably invest our trust in what can't be empirically validated. And there's going to have to be more done to answer a given metaphysics than simply appealing to, as you suggested, mere unbridled possibility.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Calling it "our empirical experience of an external world" is question begging, and "justification" in the broad sense isn't the issue here - it's justification in terms of empirical verification alone. What we have is experience - and for someone really committed to empirical verification, not even the "we" part goes through. Where's your verification - not inference, but empirical verification - I'm having this 'experience' stuff?
I empirically verify the existence of an external world every time I use any of my senses. That is just what our empirical experience is, and does not require anything else. And this makes sense the more we study the empirical world and how it impacts our senses, and is processed by our brains. We are inherently embedded within an external environment and our empirical experiences are of that environment. I mean, those are just the facts.
Furthermore, I think that your demand only makes sense in the context of the possibility that all we have access to is our subjective experience, and then must infer the existence of an external world in some solipsism, which was one of the problems that torpedoed logical positivism, but that picture must first be demonstrated to be superior to naïve realism.
My point is that our experience of the external world is primary, and that philosophical speculation that questions the existence of an external world is parasitic upon the sense that comes from living in a world that is populated by other human beings sharing a public language within an external world. I find it fascinating that most philosophical problems are only possible by ignoring essential aspects of our form of life, but the fact is that these problems’ coherence depends upon the very thing that they are attempting to refute.
These ideas have been explored by the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the later Putnam. I find this pragmatism quite compelling and persuasive, and that it avoids a number of philosophical puzzles that have no solution, because they are premised upon distortions of how we actually operate in the world.
I empirically verify the existence of an external world every time I use any of my senses.
ReplyDeleteYou empirically verify the existence of experience whenever you use your senses. Anything else is said experience built upon additional reasoning, inference, and theory. Possibly very defensible reasoning, inference and theory. But not empirical verification of what you're ascribing your experience to.
but that picture must first be demonstrated to be superior to naïve realism.
No, it just needs to be pointed out. Talk of 'superior' gets into questions of reasoning - I'm not doubting one can mount very good arguments for the external world. They simply aren't borne of mere empirical verification that experience is due to some 'external thing'.
I find it fascinating that most philosophical problems are only possible by ignoring essential aspects of our form of life, but the fact is that these problems’ coherence depends upon the very thing that they are attempting to refute.
What I don't find fascinating is the belief that philosophical problems go away so long as we ignore the limitations of experience, and treat real limitations as non-existent so long as we put on a confident face. I'm not saying direct realism or an external world is false - far from it. I'm pointing out that you aren't getting there by simply insisting 'my experience is experience of an external world'. It's a conclusion reached after reasoning, and not itself the result of raw empirical verification.
Your previous talk of 'maybe our minds fool us...' seems apt here. Really, more apt here than where it was originally brought up.
These ideas have been explored by the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the later Putnam. I find this pragmatism quite compelling and persuasive,
ReplyDeleteI'll add that this speaks volumes. Did you need to go to Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and Putnam for support or verification that you are, as a matter of fact, having experience? Or did the philosophical arguments they provide address how you should regard your experiences?
For my part: I don't need any philosopher (or scientist, or anyone else) to tell me that I'm having experience, full stop.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> You empirically verify the existence of experience whenever you use your senses. Anything else is said experience built upon additional reasoning, inference, and theory. Possibly very defensible reasoning, inference and theory. But not empirical verification of what you're ascribing your experience to.
No, you are wrong. I experience the world whenever I have an empirical experience. You need to remember that I am not just a disembodied mind, but a mind that is embodied, embedded and extended. Once you include these facts, then there is no longer any difficulty with the existence of the external world. This is only a problem if you believe that we begin with solipsism, and then must work our way out of it, which happens to be impossible. However, if you begin at the beginning, which is of human beings experiencing the world, then you have no problem.
>> I'm pointing out that you aren't getting there by simply insisting 'my experience is experience of an external world'. It's a conclusion reached after reasoning, and not itself the result of raw empirical verification.
And you’ve given me no reason to doubt that my experience of the world is, in fact, of the world. If it is not of the world, then what is it of, a subjective experience? If that is your claim, then I’m afraid that you are in the midst of a philosophical distortion that is affecting your perception of the situation.
>> Your previous talk of 'maybe our minds fool us...' seems apt here. Really, more apt here than where it was originally brought up.
Yes, our experience of the world can be wrong, but the point is that rightness or wrongness of experience depends upon an external world that our experience either hits or misses. And just because my experiences may not be veridical from time to time does not imply that, on the whole, they accurately correspond to the external world.
I have no problem explaining illusions, delusions, hallucinations from my perspective. How do you distinguish between them if all I can experience is a subjective mental state?
>> I'll add that this speaks volumes. Did you need to go to Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey and Putnam for support or verification that you are, as a matter of fact, having experience? Or did the philosophical arguments they provide address how you should regard your experiences?
Let’s just say that they helped undo much of the confusion that my undergraduate degree in philosophy caused in my understanding. Perhaps it might be helpful to understand this as analogous to going to a magic act, being mystified by how the act can happen without magic, and then learning from another magician the underlying natural mechanisms that actually result in the illusion of magic.
Again, I do not need philosophy to justify my belief in an external world. I needed philosophy to first confuse the hell out of me with the possibility of solipsism, for example, and then to follow certain philosophers out of the fly bottle, so to speak, and back to the world. Experiencing the world is the default state that we all naturally exist in. It is easy to forget this by philosophical chimeras, but it is even easier to forget the chimeras when you have to engage in your life. Hume realized that, and was absolutely correct.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteThis is another way to put the matter.
You ask me how I know that I experience the external world, and I say that I know, because I experience the external world. If you had asked me how I know that I experience X, then the only possible answer is that I engage my senses in the direction of X, and see if, in fact, I have the experience of X. What else do you want? I mean, if I tell you that I experience the computer in front of me, and you ask me how I know, then what else can I say, except that I see it in front of me, I can feel the keyboard at my fingertips, I can hear the clicking of the keyboard. Again, what else do you want?
Perhaps you can then get all philosophical and say, “Ahhh, but how do you know that your experience of X is REALLY an experience of X, hmmm?” Then I will engage in an inquiry. I will ask others if they also experience X. If they deny that they experience X, then maybe I will go see a doctor to see if I am hallucinating. None of this is fantastical or requires me to doubt the existence of the external world.
But then you can say, “Ahhh, but how do you know that your experience of X is nothing but a subjective experience that is actually disconnected from X altogether?” And I would respond, “Why on earth would I believe that?”
And all you could do then is introduce a number of philosophical speculations that I think are the equivalent of science fiction fantasies, which (at their best) can open my thought up to new possibilities, but do not actually refer to anything real.
Does this help?
No, you are wrong. I experience the world whenever I have an empirical experience.
ReplyDeleteNo, you have experience that you attribute to 'the world'. But that you take those extra steps and attribute your experiences to 'the world', with various justifications and reasoning in mind, does not change the fact that what you're doing is interpreting your experience. And you need to engage in that interpretation, and make those inferences, because the experience itself is insufficient to get you where you want to go via verification.
It has little to do with solipsism directly, since the typical solipsist is still engaging in reasoning about their experience and coming to a conclusion about it.
And you’ve given me no reason to doubt that my experience of the world is, in fact, of the world.
I'm not attempting to. Like I said, you can put stock in an external world - you can accept various arguments and make various conditional inferences, etc. But empirically, you never go beyond your experience as experience, period. You supplement your experience with arguments or assumptions - but you don't get access to the world sans experience. Empirically, experience is all you get.
This is probably a good realization to hang onto in light of your recent response: "Solipsists are empiricists."
Again, what else do you want?
There's nothing else I want, because there's nothing else to offer. I'm pointing out one limit to the empirical, a place where reasoning beyond the empirical and having to settle for methods and conclusions that go beyond it become necessary. These limitations don't go away just because you really don't like them, or are frustrated by what the other possibilities are, or deride it all as "philosopher's tricks" and "craziness".
Hey, believe in the external world. I encourage it - why, I even do it myself. But you should probably recognize and honestly appreciate the real terms on which you do it. Those terms don't vanish just because you find them upsetting or annoying.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteDo you really think that ordinary people who have not been exposed to philosophy make inferences to justify the existence of an external world? I highly doubt that they do. They experience an external world, and that is sufficient for them, and for me. There are no inferences involved. Inferences become involved once you start a path of skepticism about the existence of an external world, which typically occurs when one is confronted by different thought experiments, such as whether you are really dreaming, whether you alone exist, and so on. It is only once you get on the road of philosophical skepticism that the inferences become necessary. They are simply not present for the majority of philosophically naïve human beings.
So, I reject your construal of what I am actually doing to justify my belief in an external world. You may use inferences to justify your belief in an external world, but that is probably because you have drunk the philosophical kool-aid too deeply, and thus feel compelled to repel the specter of solipsism, or whatever. I do not infer to the existence of the external world. Like Moore, my knowledge is more direct and lies in the fact that I do, in fact, experience an external world, and I refuse to get the philosophical fictions going by engaging in them. The burden of proof is upon the skeptical hypotheses that question the existence of the external world, especially since they would falsify everything else I know, and until I have a reason to reject my belief in the external world, I will take my immediate experience as sufficient sans inferences.
Do you really think that ordinary people who have not been exposed to philosophy make inferences to justify the existence of an external world? I highly doubt that they do. They experience an external world, and that is sufficient for them, and for me. There are no inferences involved.
ReplyDelete"Ordinary people" don't give much thought to these questions in general. If they do, they quickly find themselves engaging in philosophy. Even ordinary people have nothing but experience - that they find themselves framing it all in a certain way by habit, environmental influence, or anything else doesn't really change that. "I believe this, I don't have any justification for why I do, I just do" isn't exactly an improvement here, re: 'normal people.'
For fun: Try to empirically verify what you just claimed about other people's minds. At best you'll get some Q&A from people whose minds you were previously knocking as typically tricking them about common experiences and beliefs.
Like Moore, my knowledge is more direct and lies in the fact that I do, in fact, experience an external world, and I refuse to get the philosophical fictions going by engaging in them.
So, it's not so much the philosophical kool-aid that's the problem - it's the brand and the flavor. Like it or not, you are making inferences, and you've explicitly called upon and made references to philosophers to bolster your case. As I mentioned, that speaks volumes about just what you really are experiencing. (Namely: It's experience that you attribute a certain reality to, that you make inferences about, that you frame a certain way.)
The burden of proof is upon the skeptical hypotheses
The burden of proof, as ever, is on the person advancing this or that claim. "There is an external world" doesn't become inference free by fiat, or because it's really important to you. You're making inferences, you're drawing conclusions, and you're engaging in philosophy. Heck, you even outright named, without any prompting from me, philosophers whose views you called upon to reach you conclusion about what lies behind your experiences.
And I'll remind you: I'm not 'trying to prove there is no external world'. Far from it. I'm pointing out what sort of reasoning, inference, etc is involved in reaching conclusions about the external world. If "well I think most people assume there is one unreflexively, that's good enough for me" suits you, hey, more power to you. But it doesn't mean you suddenly have more than experience, or aren't making (typical) inferences, etc. We're fated to reason beyond what we can empirically verify. Rough, but there you go.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Like it or not, you are making inferences, and you've explicitly called upon and made references to philosophers to bolster your case.
I am making inferences when I am doing philosophy, but not when I am living my life. You assume that because I am engaging in a logical argument with you about this matter, then I must be engaging in a logical argument with myself about this at all times. The fact is, I am not making inferences about this, except when engaging with skeptical arguments, which actually come first, my inferences second, and when the skeptical arguments stop, so do my inferences, and I am back in my default state.
>> Heck, you even outright named, without any prompting from me, philosophers whose views you called upon to reach you conclusion about what lies behind your experiences.
Again, I reject your construal of the situation. When you talk about what “lies behind” my experiences, you have automatically bought into an Enlightenment conception of my experiences somehow being disconnected from the external world, and thus in need of some kind of reconnection. If you want to buy into that vision, then go for it, but I do not. My experiences are connected to the external world by virtue of the external world’s impact upon my senses. That is just the way the world works, and either you accept that, or you do not.
And it is amazing to me that you are able to see deep into my subconscious and perceive my implicit reasoning processes, which I am actually blind to. I guess I should trust your perception of my inner mental world more than my own.
>> I'm pointing out what sort of reasoning, inference, etc is involved in reaching conclusions about the external world.
* Sigh *
>> If "well I think most people assume there is one unreflexively, that's good enough for me" suits you, hey, more power to you.
I am pointing out that the web of inferences that you find yourself involved in is something that is prompted by a certain type of encounter, i.e. with philosophical skepticism. In no other context does one doubt that one’s experience of the external world is veridical. It is kind of like people mostly feeling healthy until exposed to a pathogen, and then they feel unwell. Does that exposure imply that the diseased state was there all along?
And you are making a claim that EVERYONE who believes in the existence of the external world does so on the basis of the conclusion of some INFERENCE. I am pointing out that the majority of people do not infer its existence at all.
>> But it doesn't mean you suddenly have more than experience, or aren't making (typical) inferences, etc. We're fated to reason beyond what we can empirically verify. Rough, but there you go.
We may also be fated to be tempted to satisfy our desires in the present rather than defer them for a better future state, but that does not imply that this is an optimal state of affairs for us. Similarly, we may have an innate tendency to push the boundaries of our thoughts beyond what we can empirically verify, but it does not follow that this is something to be happy about and definitely not that what our flights of fancy result in are, in fact, true.
The fact is, I am not making inferences about this, except when engaging with skeptical arguments, which actually come first, my inferences second, and when the skeptical arguments stop, so do my inferences, and I am back in my default state.
ReplyDeleteCalling it a "default state" does not automatically make it whatever you want it to be. Whether you're engaging in skeptical arguments or simply living your life, you're dealing with experience - and the experience does not become "empirical verification of an external world" just because you choose to call it that, or say "but it's default", like you can make experience something other than it is by pulling out a rulebook.
Again, I reject your construal of the situation.
"You're falling off a cliff."
"I reject your construal of my sit*splat*."
The rejection doesn't change what's happening. I grant that life would be a lot easier if it did.
And it is amazing to me that you are able to see deep into my subconscious and perceive my implicit reasoning processes, which I am actually blind to. I guess I should trust your perception of my inner mental world more than my own.
Come on. First, you were playing that very card well in advance of me bringing this up - speculating about how people's minds "fill in blanks" and make them think things that aren't really the way they are due to some or another necessity or possibility. Hell, your responses are based on dictating the way others think the way they do - it's the exposure to philosophy that does it, you insist.
Me, I'm just pointing out that what you have is experience, and you don't suddenly 'have something more than experience' just because you avoid all reflective thought on the topic and insist your attitude is default. Which, again, gets into the whole 'Knowing how everyone else thinks, despite their experiences being walled off to you' complaint you're aiming at me, such as with:
I am pointing out that the majority of people do not infer its existence at all.
Blind belief acquired unreflectively doesn't help you, even if it's granted. The fact that people may or may not reflexively 'act as if' there was an external world doesn't magically give them anything more than experience, or make their statements more pure or valid. Empirical validation is beyond their reach.
Again: The solipsist is an empiricist. The idealist is an empiricist.
Similarly, we may have an innate tendency to push the boundaries of our thoughts beyond what we can empirically verify
..But we should, at the very least, know when we are and aren't making empirical verifications. And wishing very hard upon a star that we weren't doing that, and that we're actually sticking to total empirical verification, just doesn't make it so.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Calling it a "default state" does not automatically make it whatever you want it to be. Whether you're engaging in skeptical arguments or simply living your life, you're dealing with experience - and the experience does not become "empirical verification of an external world" just because you choose to call it that, or say "but it's default", like you can make experience something other than it is by pulling out a rulebook.
That’s right, I am dealing with experience, and my experience is of an external world. I think that if I experience something, then that is a form of empirical verification.
>> "You're falling off a cliff." "I reject your construal of my sit*splat*." The rejection doesn't change what's happening. I grant that life would be a lot easier if it did.
Except that I am not falling off a cliff. And I am not consciously engaging in a logical argument with myself at all times to justify that my experience of the world is actually of an external world. I’m sorry, but that is just not what I do. My BRAIN, on the other hand, is engaging in subconscious processing and analysis of sensory information, and if that is what you mean, then we are in agreement.
>> Come on. First, you were playing that very card well in advance of me bringing this up - speculating about how people's minds "fill in blanks" and make them think things that aren't really the way they are due to some or another necessity or possibility. Hell, your responses are based on dictating the way others think the way they do - it's the exposure to philosophy that does it, you insist.
Not at all. I am raising the possibility that this might be happening. I also gave examples of other conscious experiences of some things that aren’t really there. However, those are of PARTS of our experience of the world. You are talking about the TOTALITY of our experience of the world. I can easily say that some parts may be untrue without rejecting the whole. And remember you are not saying that “it is possible that you are making inferences”, but “you ARE necessarily making inferences”.
>> Blind belief acquired unreflectively doesn't help you, even if it's granted. The fact that people may or may not reflexively 'act as if' there was an external world doesn't magically give them anything more than experience, or make their statements more pure or valid. Empirical validation is beyond their reach.
Okay, so we are in agreement that the majority of people do not infer the existence of an external world based upon their empirical experiences. They just have their empirical experience of the external world, and then live their lives accordingly.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> ..But we should, at the very least, know when we are and aren't making empirical verifications. And wishing very hard upon a star that we weren't doing that, and that we're actually sticking to total empirical verification, just doesn't make it so.
There’s no wishing going on. I empirically confirm the existence of the world the same way I empirically confirm the existence of its parts, by experiencing it. There is nothing else going on, I’m afraid. The only way for there to be any problem is if my empirical experience is fundamentally disconnected from an external world, and that is only a genuine possibility while engaging in philosophical skepticism, which is NOT the NORM, but an exceptional circumstance that does not take away from the majority of cases.
Look, it is like driving absent-mindedly. You are driving your car, while your mind is elsewhere, and the car is driven automatically without your conscious involvement. It is called implicit procedural memory. When does conscious involvement come in? When something unexpected and exceptional happens, like a child running across the street. Then the full fury of conscious awareness comes back online, and we are thinking and reasoning. But it does not follow that because you behave that way during the exception that you also behave that way during the normal state.
And just because you are busy inferring and arguing while engaging in philosophical skepticism does not mean that you are doing so when you are not engaging in philosophical skepticism.
Can you justify your belief that everyone is involved in inference and justification of the existence of the external world when they empirically experience it? That is your positive claim, and I would like to know more about how you came to believe this, please.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> The solipsist is an empiricist. The idealist is an empiricist.
But they are a subset of empiricists who believe that all we have are empirical experience of an experience, and not of an external entity. Once you start with that assumption, of course you do not end up with anything other than yourself or your mental life, both divorced from any external reality. Fortunately, there are other empiricists who do not make that same mistake.
That’s right, I am dealing with experience, and my experience is of an external world. I think that if I experience something, then that is a form of empirical verification.
ReplyDeleteYour experience is of something from which you infer, argue, or reason the external world to be. By all means, make the argument - but the argument is, in fact, required. Certainly if you attempt to offer it up to someone else.
Except that I am not falling off a cliff. And I am not consciously engaging in a logical argument with myself at all times to justify that my experience of the world is actually of an external world. I’m sorry, but that is just not what I do.
You're making an inference, and running with it day to day. "Acting as if." But acting as if X, does not get you to X. Does a person who claims "I saw an alien" have an empirical verification of aliens? Perhaps if you want to reduce "empirical verification" to something so thin it's hardly different from what I'm pointing out.
Okay, so we are in agreement that the majority of people do not infer the existence of an external world based upon their empirical experiences.
Nowhere did I say that. I said they have their experience, and they live their life according to an unspoken and unjustified inference. Hey, it works.
There’s no wishing going on.
There's plenty of wishing going on.
Can you justify your belief that everyone is involved in inference and justification of the existence of the external world when they empirically experience it?
As good as or better than you can justify your own beliefs about everyone else. Remember: I brought up my claim in the context of answering your own declarations about how everyone else's minds work.
Once you start with that assumption, of course you do not end up with anything other than yourself or your mental life, both divorced from any external reality.
No, idealists are not necessarily solipsists (idealists have very different views on what the external world is). All they start with is the recognition that all they have is experience, period, and work from there. Same as everyone else - they just don't take the step of inferring what they can't empirically verify.
The only way for there to be any problem is if my empirical experience is fundamentally disconnected from an external world, and that is only a genuine possibility while engaging in philosophical skepticism, which is NOT the NORM, but an exceptional circumstance that does not take away from the majority of cases.
ReplyDeleteIt's only possible for your experience to be mistaken when you're thinking about skeptical arguments? And you're appealing to "norms" in order to prove that you have direct and verified experience of the external world elsewise? C'mon.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> Your experience is of something from which you infer, argue, or reason the external world to be. By all means, make the argument - but the argument is, in fact, required. Certainly if you attempt to offer it up to someone else.
Again, you are telling me that I am actively making inferences whenever I believe that the external world exists by virtue of my experience of it. I am telling you that I do not do so. I mean, I don’t know what else to say to you, except that I am not doing what you think I am doing, and I wonder why you think that I am doing it. The only explanation that I can come up with is that you have imbibed a particular philosophical perspective where all we can experience is our subjective experience, which is supposed to be inherently divorced from objective reality. However, that perspective is only operative while engaging in philosophical skepticism or some other imaginative endeavor. In other words, it is not what people do for the most part, but only in specific circumstances that deviate from the norm. And you cannot necessarily infer properties of the norm from its deviations.
>> You're making an inference, and running with it day to day. "Acting as if." But acting as if X, does not get you to X. Does a person who claims "I saw an alien" have an empirical verification of aliens? Perhaps if you want to reduce "empirical verification" to something so thin it's hardly different from what I'm pointing out.
I am not “acting as if”. That would imply that I am play-acting some kind of fantasy, which assumes that what I am doing is not actually real. I do not “act as if” I am a physician. I AM a physician. There is no pretending or make-believe going on. Similarly, I do not “act as if” I experience an external world. I DO experience an external world. Sometimes my beliefs can waver when they are exposed to philosophical skepticism, much like my health can waver when exposed to a pathogen. However, once the skepticism (or the pathogen) is no longer present, then my beliefs return to their default state in which I know I experience the world, because I do, in fact, experience a world.
And as for the alien, yes, if someone claims to have seen an alien, then that would count as empirical evidence of aliens. However, given the fact that there are a number of confounding factors that may better explain that experience, then they would have to be ruled out before the existence of the alien is confirmed. And guess what? All of this occurs within an independently existing world.
>> Nowhere did I say that. I said they have their experience, and they live their life according to an unspoken and unjustified inference. Hey, it works.
Again, HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT EVERYONE IS MAKING THIS INFERENCE?
>> As good as or better than you can justify your own beliefs about everyone else. Remember: I brought up my claim in the context of answering your own declarations about how everyone else's minds work.
Go for it. Justify your claim that everyone makes an unspoken and unjustified inference from their empirical experience to the existence of an external world. Don’t just point the finger at me, but actively provide some kind of justification. I really am interested.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> No, idealists are not necessarily solipsists (idealists have very different views on what the external world is). All they start with is the recognition that all they have is experience, period, and work from there. Same as everyone else - they just don't take the step of inferring what they can't empirically verify.
Actually, most people do not “start with is the recognition that all they have is experience, period, and work from there”. If you actually asked people if all they have is their subjective experience and do not actually experience an external world, then they will look at you with befuddlement and bewilderment. It is ONLY once you start bringing in philosophical skeptical possibilities, such as that they are just dreaming, or there is an evil demon, or that only they exist, or whatever, THEN they start to see what you mean. And it is ONLY when you accept that skeptical possibilities are really possible that you have a problem, because it seems as if there is a rift between our subjective experience and the external world.
But what if you do not accept that these possibilities are really possible? What you find that there is no more reason to believe in them than to believe that we are all muggles, and blind to the existence of secret magicians? What if you just lump them all together into the FICTION category? Then there is no problem at all, and you can go back to happily experiencing the external world, which is what you were doing all along until you got momentarily confused. And it is wrong to think that in that moment of confusion that you necessarily glimpsed a deeper truth. In a delirium, people can see all kinds of things that aren’t there, and when they come out of it, it would be foolish to continue to believe in the pink rabbits that were sitting in the room. It was all just a fantasy generated by their fevered brains.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteAnd one more thing. If you really believe that all we can possibly experience is our subjective experience, which must be divorced from an external reality, then what inferences and rationales do you use -- and have to remind yourself of regularly -- to justify your belief in an external world? After all, you said that you do, in fact, believe in one.
dguller, it is like you are covering your ears and going "lalalalalalalalalaIcan'thearyou!"
ReplyDeleteYou are just engaging in bad philosophy at best and willful ignorance at worst.
Brian:
ReplyDeleteDo you believe that when you experience the external world that you only experience a subjective experience completely divorced from an external world?
And if so, then why? And how do you justify the existence of an external world from within your subjective experience, completely divorced from anything outside yourself?
Please show me what good philosophy looks like.
It does not matter what I believe. Or what you believe. Crude is rightly pointing out that, at this juncture, and under your atheistic paradigm, all you can logically say is that you experience your experience. That is it.
ReplyDeleteBrian:
ReplyDeleteThat is only true IF all I experience is a subjective experience divorced from an external world. THAT is what I want to be demonstrated, and if it cannot be demonstrated, then it is not a threat to me at all. I can happily continue to experience the external world, as I always have, except when confused by the fairy tales of radical skepticism.
Brian:
ReplyDeleteOh, and under my “atheistic paradigm”, I am a biological organism that is embedded within a natural world with an evolutionary history. There is no disconnect between myself and the world around me, since I am fundamentally a part of it. I interact with the surrounding world by virtue of by body’s movements and sensory input, which inherently put me in touch with the external world. My experience of the world is a byproduct of my brain’s processing information from my body as it interacts with the wider world. Three is no disconnect at all, in my “atheistic paradigm”, which is why the radical skepticism that you are trying to use against me just doesn’t work here. It is a seamless whole, in fact, and quite remarkable, I think.
>>That is only true IF all I experience is a subjective experience divorced from an external world. THAT is what I want to be demonstrated, and if it cannot be demonstrated, then it is not a threat to me at all.
ReplyDeleteThat is the formal fallacy of ignorance (i.e., asserting that a proposition x is true until it has been proven false). That does not fly. That our experiences are reliable (under your view) is precisely what we are talking about, and you are just asserting that they are.
>>I can happily continue to experience the external world, as I always have, except when confused by the fairy tales of radical skepticism.
But what we are trying to point out is that given your commitments (i.e., empiricism/positivism/atheism), that radical skepticism is exactly what follows under your view. To simply filibuster, hand-wave, and argue from ignorance does not change that. You're just engaging in bad philosophy.
Brian:
ReplyDelete>> That is the formal fallacy of ignorance (i.e., asserting that a proposition x is true until it has been proven false). That does not fly. That our experiences are reliable (under your view) is precisely what we are talking about, and you are just asserting that they are.
I disagree. I have been asked how I know that the external world exists, and I have replied that I experience the external world. I think that this is perfectly reasonable, because if you ask me how I know whether I am using a computer, then I can say that I see it in front of me, that I feel the keyboard while I type, and that I hear the clicks of the keys while I type. In other words, if you want to know if there is an empirical entity, then you direct yourself towards it and see if you have an experience of it. Furthermore, the more observations that you can accumulate about the empirical entity, the more secure your belief can be, and if you attempt to falsify that belief by gathering contradictory observations of potential confounding factors, and fail, then that is even better. That is what we do all the time, and is how we demonstrate the existence of empirical entities. So, why is that insufficient for the external world? Why is something that is appropriate for objects within the world, not sufficient for the world that consists of these objects? Like I asked Crude, what else do you want?
I mean, come on. You do not even believe in what you are saying. You do not doubt the existence of the external world at all, and not because you have arrived at a metaphysical argument that justifies its existence, which you must remind yourself at all times to support your actions. (And if I am wrong, and you do believe it, then I would love to know how you infer the existence of an external world from your private subjective experiences, which you claim is all we have access to.) No, you are trying to score a philosophical point against me, and are using radical skepticism as the tool. At least use something that you actually believe to be true, like Thomism, against me.
>> But what we are trying to point out is that given your commitments (i.e., empiricism/positivism/atheism), that radical skepticism is exactly what follows under your view. To simply filibuster, hand-wave, and argue from ignorance does not change that. You're just engaging in bad philosophy.
No, it does not, and it is important to pay attention to the underlying dynamics of the situation here. Radical skepticism only follows if I grant, in advance, that all I experience is my subjective experience, which also must be fundamentally divorced from an external reality. THAT is what gets radical skepticism going. You are the one that starts from an assumption that leads to radical skepticism, not me. I start firmly embedded within the world, and thus in contact with it, which is where everyone happens to be, as well. Go ahead and ask them!
Brian:
ReplyDeleteWe are not born radical skeptics, but rather are naïve realists from an early age. It is only when our naïve realism is introduced to philosophical fairy tales -- whether by others or ourselves -- that only consist of “what if …” and thus trade on sheer possibility and imagination, that our naïve realism can be doubted. We do not START doubting the existence of the external world, and then have to fill the gap somehow, but rather the doubt gets going when confronted by radical skeptical thought experiments. My point is that these thought experiments should be treated as hypotheses that need to be justified by evidence. In other words, IF they are true, then we definitely have a problem, but if they cannot be justified, then I can reject them as fantastical speculation and fiction. I am not threatened by fiction, only fact.
Unless you can justify these radical skeptical thought experiments as justifying the rejection of naïve realism, which is WHERE WE ALL START BEFORE WE START TO PHILOSOPHIZE, then I’m afraid that you have put the cart before the horse, and then accuse ME of begging the question. Seriously, try to remember a time before you were exposed to these ideas, or speak to others who are philosophically naïve, and you will know what the baseline and default state of mankind is. Trust me, it is not what you think it is. It is only when that default state is distorted by skeptical speculations that things get complicated.
Imagine this. You use reason and logic to justify your beliefs. What if someone came along and said “What if reason and logic are just fictions and don’t actually justify anything?” Then you think for a second, and then ask, “Why would I think that?” and the other person offers a reason. Then you say, “You can’t use reason and logic to refute reason and logic”. You happily realize that their hypothesis makes no sense, and you happily continue to use reason and logic. I doubt that you are haunted every moment afterwards by the thought that maybe reason and logic are just fictions. You FORGET ALL ABOUT IT, and just keep going as you were before. Same thing with your experience of the external world.
We all have to start somewhere, and we start from where we are, and where we are is embedded in a world that we experience. You assume that the confusion that results from skeptical thought experiments is somehow more veridical and trustworthy than that which you use every second of every day without any consideration of these philosophical fairy tales.
Brian:
ReplyDeleteI want to know why my experience of the world is insufficient evidence for its external existence. The only possible reason that I can think of is if you assume that my experience of the world is not of the world, but of a subjective mental state that is fundamentally divorced from the world. However, my problem with this is that you have to provide evidence for this claim. Until you do, then I do not see why I cannot justify the existence of an external world by my experience of an external world.
I am not begging the question, but am using my experience of something as evidence for its existence. If you deny that this is justified, then I have no idea what else to say to you. I mean, if you are a witness to a murder, and someone calls upon you to testify, then would you really accept the opposing council to respond to your testimony by saying that experience of X is just not good enough evidence for X, and that the testimony should be thrown out? And if that is justified in court, then why is it not justified here?
Brian:
ReplyDelete>> That is the formal fallacy of ignorance (i.e., asserting that a proposition x is true until it has been proven false). That does not fly. That our experiences are reliable (under your view) is precisely what we are talking about, and you are just asserting that they are.
I disagree. I have been asked how I know that the external world exists, and I have replied that I experience the external world. I think that this is perfectly reasonable, because if you ask me how I know whether I am using a computer, then I can say that I see it in front of me, that I feel the keyboard while I type, and that I hear the clicks of the keys while I type. In other words, if you want to know if there is an empirical entity, then you direct yourself towards it and see if you have an experience of it. Furthermore, the more observations that you can accumulate about the empirical entity, the more secure your belief can be, and if you attempt to falsify that belief by gathering contradictory observations of potential confounding factors, and fail, then that is even better. That is what we do all the time, and is how we demonstrate the existence of empirical entities. So, why is that insufficient for the external world? Why is something that is appropriate for objects within the world, not sufficient for the world that consists of these objects? Like I asked Crude, what else do you want?
I mean, come on. You do not even believe in what you are saying. You do not doubt the existence of the external world at all, and not because you have arrived at a metaphysical argument that justifies its existence, which you must remind yourself at all times to support your actions. (And if I am wrong, and you do believe it, then I would love to know how you infer the existence of an external world from your private subjective experiences, which you claim is all we have access to.) No, you are trying to score a philosophical point against me, and are using radical skepticism as the tool. At least use something that you actually believe to be true, like Thomism, against me.
>> But what we are trying to point out is that given your commitments (i.e., empiricism/positivism/atheism), that radical skepticism is exactly what follows under your view. To simply filibuster, hand-wave, and argue from ignorance does not change that. You're just engaging in bad philosophy.
No, it does not, and it is important to pay attention to the underlying dynamics of the situation here. Radical skepticism only follows if I grant, in advance, that all I experience is my subjective experience, which also must be fundamentally divorced from an external reality. THAT is what gets radical skepticism going. You are the one that starts from an assumption that leads to radical skepticism, not me. I start firmly embedded within the world, and thus in contact with it, which is where everyone happens to be, as well. Go ahead and ask them!
Brian:
ReplyDeleteWe are not born radical skeptics, but rather are naïve realists from an early age. It is only when our naïve realism is introduced to philosophical fairy tales -- whether by others or ourselves -- that only consist of “what if …” and thus trade on sheer possibility and imagination, that our naïve realism can be doubted. We do not START doubting the existence of the external world, and then have to fill the gap somehow, but rather the doubt gets going when confronted by radical skeptical thought experiments. My point is that these thought experiments should be treated as hypotheses that need to be justified by evidence. In other words, IF they are true, then we definitely have a problem, but if they cannot be justified, then I can reject them as fantastical speculation and fiction. I am not threatened by fiction, only fact.
Unless you can justify these radical skeptical thought experiments as justifying the rejection of naïve realism, which is WHERE WE ALL START BEFORE WE START TO PHILOSOPHIZE, then I’m afraid that you have put the cart before the horse, and then accuse ME of begging the question. Seriously, try to remember a time before you were exposed to these ideas, or speak to others who are philosophically naïve, and you will know what the baseline and default state of mankind is. Trust me, it is not what you think it is. It is only when that default state is distorted by skeptical speculations that things get complicated.
Imagine this. You use reason and logic to justify your beliefs. What if someone came along and said “What if reason and logic are just fictions and don’t actually justify anything?” Then you think for a second, and then ask, “Why would I think that?” and the other person offers a reason. Then you say, “You can’t use reason and logic to refute reason and logic”. You happily realize that their hypothesis makes no sense, and you happily continue to use reason and logic. I doubt that you are haunted every moment afterwards by the thought that maybe reason and logic are just fictions. You FORGET ALL ABOUT IT, and just keep going as you were before. Same thing with your experience of the external world.
We all have to start somewhere, and we start from where we are, and where we are is embedded in a world that we experience. You assume that the confusion that results from skeptical thought experiments is somehow more veridical and trustworthy than that which you use every second of every day without any consideration of these philosophical fairy tales.
No, you are trying to score a philosophical point against me, and are using radical skepticism as the tool. At least use something that you actually believe to be true, like Thomism, against me.
ReplyDeleteNowhere did I say that I doubt the existence of an external world, and actually believing in solipsism or such is not necessary to drive home the point being made here. In fact, I repeatedly said I accept the existence of an external world, and think there are plenty of good reasons to. But "empirically verifying that there is an external world" doesn't show up. You yourself are admitting as much in the context of appraising skeptical arguments. For some reason you think empirical verification only fails then, but at all other times - so long as you don't think about it - it somehow is magically succeeding, especially when you don't think about it. Or so long as you feel good and don't take it seriously most of the time.
Stop and think about it for a moment. Do you see anything - anything at all - wrong with responding to 'How do you verify the existence of an external world' with 'Well, I'm pretty sure all the other people I know believe it.'?
As Brian said, this is bad philosophizing. As TheOFloinn said earlier - you assume an objective reality to start off. Welcome to the limits of empirical verification.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> But "empirically verifying that there is an external world" doesn't show up.
Again, why not? Why is it not enough that we experience an external world to justify our belief that an external world exists?
>> You yourself are admitting as much in the context of appraising skeptical arguments. For some reason you think empirical verification only fails then, but at all other times - so long as you don't think about it - it somehow is magically succeeding, especially when you don't think about it. Or so long as you feel good and don't take it seriously most of the time.
I reject skeptical arguments, because they start with imagining a fairy tale, whether that we are really dreaming, or whether there is an evil demon, or whether we are brains in a vat, or whatever. They then take these fairy tales that are completely divorced from our experience, and try to get us to reject our experience. However, when you look at the arguments underlying them, they fail. And since they fail, there is no problem with relying upon our default state of justifying the existence of external objects with our experience of them.
>> Stop and think about it for a moment. Do you see anything - anything at all - wrong with responding to 'How do you verify the existence of an external world' with 'Well, I'm pretty sure all the other people I know believe it.'?
That is not your claim. You claim that EVERYONE starts with their subjective private experience, and then INFERS the existence of an external world. YOUR claim. I brought in the majority of human beings to show you that NO-ONE, not even philosophers, operate this way. We all operate on the default state that I mentioned above, and only after this default state is questioned can we imagine an alternative, even if it is poorly justified and barely coherent. If you are not rejecting the claim that I mentioned, then I withdraw bringing in other people.
>> As Brian said, this is bad philosophizing. As TheOFloinn said earlier - you assume an objective reality to start off. Welcome to the limits of empirical verification.
I’m sorry, but I reject the idea that there is an insurmountable gap between my experience of the world and the world. That is not based on any assumption. That is based upon my experience. These limits that you keep talking about only come AFTER my experience of the world has been questioned by skeptical fairy tales. You seem to think that the sheer presence of these fantasies is sufficient to cast doubt upon the veracity of my experience. It is YOU who puts enormous weight upon them, and not me.
Why should I put them higher than my experience? Why should I allow philosophical fictions to take the place of reality?
Again, why not? Why is it not enough that we experience an external world to justify our belief that an external world exists?
ReplyDeleteWhat we have is "experience". We take it to be of an external world. There is no empirical verification of this.
I reject skeptical arguments, because they start with imagining a fairy tale, whether that we are really dreaming, or whether there is an evil demon, or whether we are brains in a vat, or whatever.
What they start with imagining is possibility, given the data we have - our experience.
That is not your claim. You claim that EVERYONE starts with their subjective private experience, and then INFERS the existence of an external world. YOUR claim.
I said that people can unreflectively 'act as if' there is an external world. My point from the start has been that there is no 'empirical verification' of an external, objective world. You yourself cede as much when you speak about skeptical arguments. The difference is you think that, so long as you aren't actively contemplating a skeptical argument, you've somehow 'empirically verified' an objective and/or external world and aren't engaging in any assumptions.
You seem to think that the sheer presence of these fantasies is sufficient to cast doubt upon the veracity of my experience.
The sheer presence of possible explanations to explain your experience, and no way to get beyond your experience, shows that you're not 'empirically verifying' the existence of said world in any meaningful, appropriate way.
You keep trying to treat what I'm saying here as convincing you to doubt the external world - despite repeatedly saying that I accept an external world, and that that isn't my goal. I'm pointing out the limits of empirical verification. The limit doesn't go away just because you A) make assumptions about experience, then B) deny you're making assumptions.
Say "I reject that!" as many times as you like. It won't be changing the reality.
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> What we have is "experience". We take it to be of an external world. There is no empirical verification of this.
No. We have experience OF something. And what we experience is entities in the world around us. The empirical verification is to interact with your environment and perceive what is there via our senses. To doubt this is to presume that there is some interface between ourselves and the world that, once postulated, is impossible to bridge, leading to philosophical paradoxes. I reject this interface.
>> What they start with imagining is possibility, given the data we have - our experience.
No, they take aspects of our experience, imagine away essential features and leave a fantastical product that is supposed to challenge our intuitions. Take the brains in a vat example. We have experience of brains and vats, but nothing about brains in vats. So, we have no idea what would happen to a brain in a vat, and whether it would be conscious in the same way as we are. Until scientists can perform this experiment, it is just science fiction. I can also imagine a unicorn, because of my experiences of horses and horns, but do you really think that a unicorn is something real to challenge our understanding of horses, for example?
>> I said that people can unreflectively 'act as if' there is an external world.
Ask anyone if they just pretend that there is an external world. Go ahead. You might be surprised by what they say.
>> My point from the start has been that there is no 'empirical verification' of an external, objective world.
No, we empirically verify the existence of an external world when we have experiences of it. That is what empirical verification IS. What else do you think it entails other than interacting with something and seeing if we can experience it directly with our senses, or indirectly with any of the technological tools we use to extend our senses (e.g. microscopes, telescopes, etc.)? That is all empirical verification entails. How is this possible? Because our physical bodies are interacting with the environment via our senses, which are processed by our brains into our conscious experience, which integrates the mind-body-environment into a unified whole. Do you doubt that this is happening?
Crude:
ReplyDelete>> You yourself cede as much when you speak about skeptical arguments. The difference is you think that, so long as you aren't actively contemplating a skeptical argument, you've somehow 'empirically verified' an objective and/or external world and aren't engaging in any assumptions.
No, that is not the point at all. My point is that it is easy to think that skeptical arguments uncover flaws in our understanding of ourselves and our world, that they somehow reveal deeper truths that our superficial existence misses. If you assume this to be the case with skeptical arguments, then you will allow them to affect and confuse your understanding of yourself. However, if you see them as akin to a delirium brought on by an infection, then you will see them as illusions that do not have to be taken seriously, and thus whatever you think they affect are actually left alone.
>> The sheer presence of possible explanations to explain your experience, and no way to get beyond your experience, shows that you're not 'empirically verifying' the existence of said world in any meaningful, appropriate way.
No, it shows that I am empirically verifying the existence of the world in the only way “empirical verification” makes sense. You seem to think that there is a veil of appearances between myself and the world, and that in order to justify the existence of the world that I must go behind that veil, which happens to be impossible under this conception. THIS IS NOT MY CONCEPTION, and I reject it entirely. I think you are confusing my empiricism with logical positivism, which made exactly this mistake. I deny that there is an interface between ourselves and the world, but that we experience it directly, because we are embedded within it.
>> Say "I reject that!" as many times as you like. It won't be changing the reality.
It does change things, because you are making assumptions about how we experience the world. The biggest one is that we only experience our subjective experiences. That is a myth that became prominent since the seventeenth century, and has been the cause of a great deal of confusion. Your entire complaint rests upon this assumption. Without it, there is no sense to your criticism that my empirical experience must get behind itself to experience the world, which is impossible, and thus I must be assuming it.
My empiricism does NOT make this assumption, and so your criticism does not affect me. In fact, you yourself reject this assumption! Since we both reject this assumption, then why do you insist on its necessary presence in my beliefs? I think that you are confusing me with classical empiricists (e.g. Locke, Hume and Berkeley) and logical positivists who all make the assumption that we BOTH reject. My beliefs are more in line with Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Putnam. If you’re going to criticize me, then at least get my beliefs right.
As Wittgenstein wrote: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” I think that you are held captive by a picture of empiricism that I do not share, and you cannot help but view me from that distorted lens. That is too bad, because we could have a profitable discussion about many issues rather than you trying to force me into your straw man.
Congratulagions, dguller, you have successfully filibustered me.
ReplyDeleteBrian:
ReplyDeleteI think the problem is that you assume that I am a classical empiricist or a logical positivist. I am neither, because they BOTH make the wrongheaded assumption that all I can experience is my subjective experience, completely divorced from an external world. Since I do not make this assumption, I am not exposed to the inevitable criticism that I have no way of empirically verifying an external world, because I would have to get behind experience itself to do so. And since that is the only criticism you have, then you have nothing to refute me with.
Simple enough?
dguller: "No, we empirically verify the existence of an external world when we have experiences of it. That is what empirical verification IS."
ReplyDeleteWell, I have empirical verification of God's existence then. I've experienced God's presence many times in my life. I didn't realize that it was empirical verification at the time, but you've convinced me that it was!
Thanks!
Daniel:
ReplyDelete>> Well, I have empirical verification of God's existence then. I've experienced God's presence many times in my life. I didn't realize that it was empirical verification at the time, but you've convinced me that it was!
I’m talking about experience of entities in the world. Just because you have an experience of X in the world does not mean that X’s existence is automatically verified, but only that the experience serves as evidence. Now, you have to rule out other empirical explanations for the experience of X to see if it is genuinely about something in the world.
Going back to your clever example above, if God is now an entity in the world, then I suppose it is possible to experience him, but I think I would first rule out the possibility of a hallucination, for example. In addition, I think one would need a set of criteria to determine when one experiences God. What are your criteria?
>Going back to your clever example above, if God is now an entity in the world....
ReplyDeleteGod isn't an entity in the world at least from the perspective of Classical Philosophical Theism.
Thomas Aquinas would toss his cookies at that suggestion.
I hope you guys are taking it easy on dguller. I couldn't be around for while. This past Sunday my wife found her Mother dead in her apartment upstairs. Anyway I have been reading the discussion and it is fascinating.
No, we empirically verify the existence of an external world when we have experiences of it. That is what empirical verification IS.
ReplyDeleteAnd you have to assume your experiences are of the external world, because there's no getting past your experiences. And if your experiences can be mistaken, guess what? Ya ain't verifying purely. You've got assumptions at work.
You've already been refuted on this. I think Brian's comment with the filibuster is apt here.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteI suppose the seventeenth century picture of the mind really does hold you captive to the point that you take it as intuitively obvious and unassailable. The fact is I do not adhere to the assumption that all we experience is subjective experiences that are fundamentally divorced from the world. Without that assumption, you have no refutation of my empiricism. You are arguing with a straw man and figment of your imagination rather than me, I'm afraid.
I even cited some reputable philosophers that reject this assumption as a philosophical illusion that requires amnesia of how we actually live our lives in the world, which happens when one drinks philosophical kool-aid too deeply.
If you want to believe in this philosophical fiction, then be my guest, but just because you cannot imagine any other possible state of affairs does not mean that your imagination exhausts the possibilities. The fact is I believe in naive or common sense realism, which is what everyone happens to believe, except when they engage in the unusual and confusing activity of philosophical skepticism. And as I said, just because certain conclusions are derived from this highly unusual state of affairs does not make those conclusions binding when the unusual state of affairs has passed.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteAnd one more thing.
Just because our perception is occasionally wrong does not imply that our perception itself is hallucinatory. In fact, the very possibility of right and wrong perceptions presupposes an external world. Without it, there is no way to differentiate between a veridical perception, a hallucination, illusion or delusion, and without these distinctions, the entire skeptical argument cannot even get off the ground.
Crude:
ReplyDeleteAnd one more thing.
Verification is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but is a matter of likelihood, given the evidence.
Say I want to verify whether some state of affairs X is actually occurring in the world. I will direct my perspective towards X to see if X can be experienced directly by my senses or indirectly by technological extensions of my senses (e.g. microscopes, telescopes, etc.). If X can be experienced in this way, then its likelihood of being real goes up.
Now, if there are confounding factors that could be distorting my perception, whether these are cognitive biases or distortions, hallucinations, or any other quirks of our psychology, then these will have to be ruled out, if possible. If these factors are present, then the likelihood of X being real goes down. X must also be compared to our background experiences and conceptual framework to see if it contradicts it in any important way.
The likelihood never reaches 100%, because it is always possible that we could be wrong, but it is about doing the best we can, which will never be perfect. So, empirical verification is about looking for empirical evidence supporting X and ruling out empirical confounding factors that could make X an illusory phenomenon.
I think this is important to clarify, because you seem to assume that if I empirically verify X, then it is verified for all time and can never be revised. Maybe I am wrong about your assumptions, but just in case, I wanted to clarify my understanding of this matter.
dguller: "I’m talking about experience of entities in the world."
ReplyDeleteWhat does "in the world" mean?
The context of the discussion so far leads me to believe that "in the world" means "outside ourselves". Would you agree?
"Just because you have an experience of X [outside yourself] does not mean that X’s existence is automatically verified, but only that the experience serves as evidence."
OK, so we have evidence of God.
"Now, you have to rule out other empirical explanations for the experience of X to see if it is genuinely about something [outside yourself]."
Well, what I can do is find out if any others are having the same experiences as I am and - lo and behold - billions of people are!
"Going back to your clever example above, if God is now an entity [outside yourself], then I suppose it is possible to experience him, but I think I would first rule out the possibility of a hallucination, for example."
Well it would have to be a mass hallucination on a scale never heard of before now wouldn't it?
"In addition, I think one would need a set of criteria to determine when one experiences God. What are your criteria?"
My criteria is that I (and billions of others) believe it to be God. What is your criteria for the existence of anything beyond yourself?
If "empirical verification" = "experience of something outside ourselves" then my (and billions of others') experiences of God qualify as empirical verification.
If "empirical verification" is NOT EQUAL TO "experience of something outside ourselves" then your argument that the outside world is empirically verifiable crumbles.
You're attempting to straddle the fence here by saying that your experiences are empirical verification while mine are likely hallucinations.
There is no contradiction in my position though because I accept both the existence of the outside world and the existence of God by the same criteria.
Daniel:
ReplyDelete>> What does "in the world" mean?
The world is the totality of entities or events within space-time, much of which can directly or indirectly be perceivable by us.
>> OK, so we have evidence of God.
Sure.
>> Well, what I can do is find out if any others are having the same experiences as I am and - lo and behold - billions of people are!
A few questions, please. What experiences are you talking about? What is the criterion that helps you identify these experiences? How does one know when these experiences are of God, and not the devil deceiving you? Why aren’t people always having these experiences? Why doesn’t everyone have these experiences? How does a supernatural entity generate an experience within the human brain?
>> Well it would have to be a mass hallucination on a scale never heard of before now wouldn't it?
No, it is not as if everyone is constantly having these experiences, but only that lots of people have them occasionally. Lots of people have seen UFO’s, Elvis, and so on, but it does not follow that they exist.
>> My criteria is that I (and billions of others) believe it to be God.
Why do you believe it to be God?
>> What is your criteria for the existence of anything beyond yourself?
My sensory experiences constantly flood me with lots of things outside myself.
>> If "empirical verification" = "experience of something outside ourselves" then my (and billions of others') experiences of God qualify as empirical verification.
Sure, they count as evidence of God, but there is good evidence and there is bad evidence. For example, a person claiming to see a UFO is evidence, but only as an anecdote, which is prone to numerous distortions, and should be treated skeptically, especially without corroborating evidence that ideally controls for the distorting factors.
So, empirical verification of X is not just a one-off empirical experience of X, but rather must take into account the totality of empirical experiences of X, and empirical experiences of not-X. Furthermore, it must take into consideration that we are often prone to cognitive distortions and biases, which may result in erroneous conclusions.
Daniel:
ReplyDelete>> If "empirical verification" is NOT EQUAL TO "experience of something outside ourselves" then your argument that the outside world is empirically verifiable crumbles.
Things are a little more complicated, because we have veridical experiences and non-veridical experiences (i.e. hallucinations, illusions, etc.). Because of this, we have to be careful that what we experience is actually about something real in the world. Ideally, we need to account and control for possible confounding factors and cognitive distortions, because this maximizes our chances of getting things right. So, I am not saying that every empirical experience is of something real in the world, because this is just not true.
>> You're attempting to straddle the fence here by saying that your experiences are empirical verification while mine are likely hallucinations.
No, I am saying that our experience is sometimes right and sometimes wrong, which implies that it is not always wrong. What that means is that there is an external world that exists independently of us, and that we interact with in a variety of complicated ways, sometimes resulting in truth and sometimes resulting in falsehood. So, we have to be careful to make sure, as best as we can, within the limitations that we have, to have true beliefs.
>> There is no contradiction in my position though because I accept both the existence of the outside world and the existence of God by the same criteria.
Except that the vast majority of human beings experience the outside world for most of their conscious awareness, but this is not true for religious experiences, which are typically rare, as far as I understand, which is also why they are so salient and striking. And there is a difference between experiences of entities or events within space-time, which are natural, and experiences of entities or events outside space-time, which are supernatural. So, there are similarities, for sure, but also important differences, I think.
No offense, but do you happen to be a bit older? I am noticing the same kind of pattern of naivety and stubbornness and repetition that I notice with the older people with whom I work.
ReplyDeleteBrian:
ReplyDeleteNope, I’m only 32, and I hope to not reach a geriatric age before you address my points above about not being a classical empiricist or logical positivist. That means that I reject the idea that all I can experience is my subjective and private mental states. Thus, your criticism of empirical verification being unable to confirm the existence of an external world fails to affect me whatsoever, because it assumes the validity of the sense-datum theory, which (again) I reject. The onus is upon you to prove that I MUST accept this theory in order to be an empiricist. Good luck with that.
If meaning and reason were not already present in the world, we wouldn't be able to find it. Also,thinking about whether or not there is reason in the world presupposes that we know what reason is. Now where did we get the idea that there is reason, and that it could be recognized?
ReplyDelete~ Mark
Mark:
ReplyDelete>> If meaning and reason were not already present in the world, we wouldn't be able to find it.
I’m not too sure if meaning and reason are in the world. They are certainly activities that we engage in, and have served us well in numerous respects.
>> Also, thinking about whether or not there is reason in the world presupposes that we know what reason is. Now where did we get the idea that there is reason, and that it could be recognized?
Through a combination of our innate cognitive capacity interacting in a symbiotic fashion with our surrounding cultural environment that trains us to perform various activities, such as reason-giving and meaning-making.
dguller: "The world is the totality of entities or events within space-time, much of which can directly or indirectly be perceivable by us."
ReplyDeleteWhy 'within space-time'? You really have no way of knowing for sure whether or not your experiences are of things that are 'in the world' or 'within space-time'. You assume that these experiences are of things outside yourself but how do you actually know it is outside yourself and not something like a "blind spot, which is filled in by the brain"?
"And there is a difference between experiences of entities or events within space-time, which are natural, and experiences of entities or events outside space-time, which are supernatural."
Again, how do you know that? What would the specific differences be? How can you tell if you are experiencing something 'within space/time' or something 'outside space/time'? Something 'inside yourself' or something 'outside yourself'?
"Except that the vast majority of human beings experience the outside world for most of their conscious awareness, but this is not true for religious experiences, which are typically rare, as far as I understand, which is also why they are so salient and striking."
They are not as rare as you seem to think they are. They are certainly not as rare as Elvis sightings and UFO sightings which you derisively compare them to.
An observation: You came here with, what appeared to be, an open mind but, as the conversation has progressed, you seem to have become increasingly closed-minded. Many here have pointed out the inadequacies of your philosophy (and yes, atheism is a philosophy), yet you keep ignoring their most powerful arguments and instead keep going back to the areas you are most comfortable with.
The conversation is almost over now and you have Dr. Feser's books in hand (start with The Last Superstition BTW, and save The Philosophy of Mind for last) so hopefully those will help you see the error of your ways. Atheism is an incoherent philosophy when examined deeply and honestly. It has gaping holes in its explanatory power. And science is far worse. Scientific knowledge changes like the wind. Is coffee good for you or bad? What about meat? Butter? Eggs? Science is nothing to live your life by - that's for sure.
One final thing, if you are truly seeking the truth, as you said earlier, then you will find it. You must seek it diligently though - with total disregard for all that you hold dear.
May God bless you in your search.
Daniel:
ReplyDelete>> Why 'within space-time'? You really have no way of knowing for sure whether or not your experiences are of things that are 'in the world' or 'within space-time'.
Give me an example of an experience of something that does not occur within space or time.
>> You assume that these experiences are of things outside yourself but how do you actually know it is outside yourself and not something like a "blind spot, which is filled in by the brain"?
Because I experience a world outside of myself. When I move around in the world, I can see, touch, taste, smell and feel it. It is there without any doubt. That is where we all begin, whether you want to or not. It is only when someone starts using ideas that derive their meaning from within that empirical world to question the existence of that world that paradoxes and dilemmas occur. The problem is that these skeptical dilemmas end up becoming self-refuting, because they imagine away the context within which our concepts have meaning, and then pretend that they still mean the same thing. Therefore, they do not affect my naïve and common sense realism at all.
And the blind spot is something that can actually figured out with our empirical studies. There was no need to postulate anything supernatural or beyond space-time to explain it. The blind spot is just a garden-variety example of how we can perceive something in the world that is not, in fact, there. It does not follow that because I am occasionally wrong about what I perceive, then I must always be wrong about what I perceive.
>> Again, how do you know that? What would the specific differences be? How can you tell if you are experiencing something 'within space/time' or something 'outside space/time'? Something 'inside yourself' or something 'outside yourself'?
Something within space-time would occur within space in relation to other objects and would flow in time from past to future. Something outside space-time would be the opposite of this, I suppose. Truth be told, I cannot even imagine what this might be like, which is why I would like some examples from you. That might help clarify things for me.
>> They are not as rare as you seem to think they are. They are certainly not as rare as Elvis sightings and UFO sightings which you derisively compare them to.
The point is that there are examples of people believing that they have seen something that does not exist.
>> An observation: You came here with, what appeared to be, an open mind but, as the conversation has progressed, you seem to have become increasingly closed-minded. Many here have pointed out the inadequacies of your philosophy (and yes, atheism is a philosophy), yet you keep ignoring their most powerful arguments and instead keep going back to the areas you are most comfortable with.
What are the “most powerful arguments” that you allude to? The only argument that was provided against my naïve realism was that I must believe that we only experience our subjective experiences completely divorced from the external world. The “closed-minded” posts that you referred to were of me trying desperately to say that I do not believe this at all, and to explain why. Rather than engage in my reasons for not believing this superstition I was told, again and again, that I must believe in it. I don’t know what else to do.
It would be like someone telling you that you do not believe in God, and when you say that you do, they just keep saying that you don’t. What else could you do with such a person, except reinforce that you do, in fact, believe what you believe?
Daniel:
ReplyDelete>> Atheism is an incoherent philosophy when examined deeply and honestly. It has gaping holes in its explanatory power.
The “gaping holes” are just its tendency to stop where we lack empirical evidence, because beyond that, we are stuck in speculation and fantasy that can appear to be solid knowledge, but is anything but. And yes, its “explanatory power” is limited by its inability to describe metaphysical truths about a reality beyond space-time.
>> And science is far worse. Scientific knowledge changes like the wind. Is coffee good for you or bad? What about meat? Butter? Eggs? Science is nothing to live your life by - that's for sure.
Yes, the world is complicated, and as better data comes in, the conclusions of science change. At least there is a self-correcting mechanism to revise its claims over time. Would you prefer that it just stick with certain claims forever without any chance at revision? And by all means, reject science. That is your choice. Do not vaccinate your children, do not take antibiotics, avoid cars and planes and other scientific innovations, and for God’s sake, avoid the iPad 2!
>> One final thing, if you are truly seeking the truth, as you said earlier, then you will find it. You must seek it diligently though - with total disregard for all that you hold dear.
Ditto.
Take care.
The “gaping holes” [of Atheism] are just its tendency to stop where we lack empirical evidence, because beyond that, we are stuck in speculation and fantasy that can appear to be solid knowledge, but is anything but. And yes, its “explanatory power” is limited by its inability to describe metaphysical truths about a reality beyond space-time.
ReplyDeleteActually such gaping holes exists separate from any empirical evidence and have very little to do with science.. just like naturalism and scientism.
Also I think that this statement is generally untrue...
Just read a few of Feser's blog posts or his books, he elaborates on that in detail.
This post is a combination of bad poetry and a plain fallacy of equivocation. I rebut it here.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/12/edward-feser-and-bad-poetry.html