Recently, on
the Thomistic Institute’s Off-Campus Conversations program, Fr. Gregory Pine
and I had a discussion about Aquinas’s Five Ways, their metaphysical
presuppositions, and the moral and spiritual preconditions of doing philosophy
well. You can watch it
at YouTube or
listen to it
at
Soundcloud.
Great conversation; thanks for posting it!
ReplyDeleteEd, at the beginning of the lecture you talk about your upcoming book on the soul. You should check out Josh Rasmussen's "Who are you really?" It contains several arguments for the immateriality of the intellect, including one based on Cantor's diagonal proof showing that the number of possible concepts is immeasurably larger than the number of possible brain states so that they could not be put into 1 to 1 correspondence.
ReplyDeleteTim,
DeleteLike so many arguments for the existence of god, soul, or other such "immaterial" thing you conflate a logical possibility with an ontological possibility.
You conflate the abstraction of an infinite or arbitrarily large number of concepts with the ontological reality of the number of concepts attributable to a single real brain.
Is, for example, your particular brain capable of actually expressing or considering an infinite or arbitrarily large number of concepts?
Just how fast do you, for example, think? Do you think infinitely fast? How long does it take to consider a particular concept? Do you retain in perpetuity all concepts you have ever considered?
How many seconds do you require to consider a particular concept? How many seconds do you suppose your individual brain, for example, will continue to function?
Just supposing you live to 100 years old, that would be some three trillion seconds. For about a hundred dollars you can buy a storage device with more bytes of memory in it than that.
There are roughly one hundred billion cells in your brain. Do you really have so very many concepts under active consideration at any particular time that one hundred billion data elements would be insufficient to store and process them all?
It is true that if one considers all logically possible concepts that might me considered by all of humanity over all time then any particular brain is insufficient to process all such concepts simultaneously.
But is that how you actually think? Do you hold in your active consideration right now all logically possible concepts for all humanity over all time?
"Proof"? Really? Would you care to express this supposed "proof" a bit more carefully?
Stardusty,
DeleteThe argument does not go along the lines that you state, so I will express the argument more carefully when I have the book in front of me. I assume that you accept Cantor's diagonal proof of the algebraic numbers not being able to be put into one to one correspondence with the rationals (the argument does depend on that)?
This article is probably the best defense of the counting argument: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781119468004.ch21
DeleteI did read it on another place but cant remember the link.
Talmid, that article is also by Joshua Rasmussen and is probably similar to that which is in his book "Who are you really?" which is what I referred to. The reference to the difference between the cardinality of the integers and the cardinality of the real numbers mentioned in the abstract is proven via a "diagonal argument" developed by Cantor. I want to know if Stardusty accepts Cantor's diagonal proof before saying anything further on the topic.
DeleteI heard that virtue ethics and deontology contradict each other. But I thought that catholic morality is something that combines both deontology and virtue ethics. Is this actually the case?
ReplyDeleteIt depends what you mean by deontology. If you mean does the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant (which is what many people mean by deontological ethics) conflict with virtue ethics, the answer is yes. If you construe deontology more broadly as any sort of non-consequentialist ethics (i.e. there are some absolute commands/prohibitions regardless of the consequences), then deontology is compatible with virtue ethics.
DeleteCan it be said, then, that Catholic morality is a kind of virtue ethics (at least on some issues)?
DeleteWith catholic morality being focused on virtues, being more and more like Christ etc i think that it does fits more with virtue ethics.
DeleteI have, for some time, mulled over the phrase, natural theology. Sure, I know there is at least one accepted definition of this. I just can't seem to get through this thick skull the connexion between 'natural' and theology. So, help me here. Has there always been natural theology? Or, is it a post-Christian, post-Jewish, post-Islamic designation? I have no personal interest, see, it is only curiosity and my fascination with origins.
ReplyDeleteAristotle's "metaphysics" did not have that name. Originally, metaphysics had other names, such as "first philosophy" or "theology". In that sense, "natural" theology would already be in Aristotle, since metaphysics studies the "natural" world from the point of view of being as being (as opposed to physics, which would study the natural world from the point of view of motion or change).
DeleteI would define natural theology as theology that can be done without directly appealing to a source of revelation for answers. Questions 3 - 26 in the prima pars of the Summa, for example. The classical theist can come to knowledge of God’s attributes such as simplicity, asceity, etc. without opening a Bible or any other holy book.
DeleteConsider the question "what can be known of God through the natural powers of reason alone (with the natural input of the human senses and other natural powers)." That is, without supernatural evidence or supernatural action on the mind or soul or senses.
DeleteEven if the conclusion were to be that "it is impossible to know if there is a God through the natural powers of reason alone", that conclusion, and the arguments that supported it, would still fall into the realm of "natural theology" as its proper discipline, I think. Of course, I don't think that conclusion is correct: as a Christian and a Thomist I think that things can be said of God and his existence from the natural powers of reason alone, so I think that the discipline holds a significant amount of material.
Given the discipline as a proper field of study, I suspect that "the minimal sense of 'what God is' to serve in the question 'Does God exist' " would probably be a dialectical discussion needed to define the basic terms of the study: a mountain cannot be "God" in the sense needed for the discipline. Such a dialectical discussion would have to proceed along terms that would permit the logically possible outcome that "God cannot be proven to exist by the natural powers of reason" without begging the question, i.e. in terms that also equally allow the possible outcome that God can be proven to exist by the natural powers of reason. So, for that purpose, it would not be acceptable to simply define the "universe" as "everything that exists" without even acknowledging the possibility that "exists" might not be univocal in speaking of God and other things.
@Tony, you wrote "... without even acknowledging the possibility that "exists" might not be univocal in speaking of God and other things."
DeleteWhat are the consequences for predicate logic of admitting multiple senses of "exist"?
ficino, I don't really know. But it seems to me that the consequences are there regardless of this issue of natural philosophy. Don't we have to allow for different senses of "exists" (and other verbs that imply existence) to apply merely to account for things like "Oedipus killed his father" and "unicorns have a horn"?
DeleteFor Aristotelians, we have to account for "exists" in different senses for the different categories, and especially between the category of "substance" and the other nine, which are accidents. But even within substance, a genus "exists" in a way that is not perfectly the same as an individual substance.
Since we have to solve questions of non-univocal senses of "exists" anyway, I don't see the problem as special to natural theology.
Ficino,
Deletebroadly I'd say that it would entail different ways to be, i.e. it would allow for the distinguishing between contingent and necessary (a se) existence, as well as further differences like dependent and independent existence, as you see in substance and accidents. Vallicella has a few more examples in his article "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis"
@Dominik Kowalski
Delete@ Tony
Nothing that either of you wrote, as far as I can see, requires that we admit multiple senses of "exist." Different "ways to be" just cash out as different values binding variables. It's just false to say that there exists an x such that x is a unicorn (supply description) and x has one horn. It's true that there exists an x such that x is an institutional fact (e.g. in a movie) and x .... blah blah. The rub is in how we cash out "unicorn," not in how we cash out "exists."
Tony, I think you're importing Aristotle's usage of "einai" into modern logic. I maintain that modern logic is better than Aristotle's syllogistic. I am not alone in this. It solves more problems and avoids problems that arise from Aristotelian logic, like those that arise from the square of opposition. So I see no reason to accept it as a default position that difference is to be driven back to different senses of "exist." Difference is a function of the predicates by which the existential quantifier binds variables. Admit that and you have a logic that works. Without a logic that works, you can't mount convincing proofs of God or anything else.
A big step beyond Aristotle was taken when later thinkers did further work with "be". Despite the fact that followers of Prof. Feser downgrade Anthony Kenny's works, I think that Kenny on Aquinas on Being is spot on.
ficino, I don't know what Aristotle's "einai" refers to, so I didn't follow your comment.
Deleteand avoids problems that arise from Aristotelian logic, like those that arise from the square of opposition.
Have you seen the alternate translations of the O form?
Ackrill’s translation contains something a bit unexpected: Aristotle’s articulation of the O form is not the familiar ‘Some S is not P’ or one of its variants; it is rather ‘Not every S is P’. With this wording, Aristotle’s doctrine automatically escapes the modern criticism.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/#ArgAgaTraSqu
I agree that Aristotle's logic is incomplete, and bears some improvement with better clarifications. However, I feel that modern logic suffers from similar complaints, e.g. the very strong tendency to dismiss the causal connection that can be present in "B follows from A" in jumping into the symbolic representations.
So I see no reason to accept it as a default position that difference is to be driven back to different senses of "exist." Difference is a function of the predicates by which the existential quantifier binds variables.
I have not read anything modern on logic that suitably "solves" the Aristotelian push for different senses of "exists" by another route: that may be mainly because I have not read much on logic after the period inhabited by Cantor, Hilbert, and those who worked on set theory, beyond the bare basics of an introduction. But I have trouble even imagining how the formal logic systems could address the need.
Ficino,
DeleteI'm not sure you understood your own counter example here. The horn is a bad example, it's likely an essential property of a unicorn. Being white however, isn't. So you have a case where both unicorn-ness and whiteness is instantiated. However that just doesn't tell the whole story, the latter exists dependently on the former, the reversed case is not true. Both properties are instantiated, but the way they exist in the concreta is different. This has nothing to do with how we understand the unicorn, it's the understanding of substance and accidents you'd have to adjust. The requirement of univocity is a downfall here, the claim of existence of both the substance and the accident leaves out the, contingent, dependence of the latter upon the former.
This case is all the more clear in the difference between contingent and necessary beings. The properties, if there are common ones, don't make the difference, it's the relationship (or identity in the case of the a se existing object) to existence that makes the difference, what else could it be? The mistake committed here is the conflating of general with singular existence. Yes, it's true that the necessary and the contingent share some general existence with each other, captured by the broad statement "There is... ". This doesn't tell us anything about how they actually exist though. The singular existence of each item remains untouched. It's not for nothing that both Frege and Russell reject individuals and thus dispense with singular existence (something Quine doesn't, he's committed to haeccities). Socrates exists for the former is a nonsensical statement, the latter cashes it out as "something socratizes".
The thin theory reduces existence to instantiation. Universals themselves don't exist instantiated and individuals aren't instantiated either. Asymmetrical dependence isn't a fact about instantiation. And if we can even make a coherent, but not necessarily actually, distinction between contingent and necessary objects, we immediately got to a point where we talk about differences in the modes of being, not about natures.
@Dominik Kowalski:
DeleteYou wrote: "I'm not sure you understood your own counter example here. The horn is a bad example, it's likely an essential property of a unicorn. Being white however, isn't."
I'm not sure you understood your own counterargument here. Nothing prevents there being, ex hypothesi, a defective unicorn, one that lacks a horn.
When you go on to talk about contingent and necessary beings, you rely on A-T or some such metaphysics. I proposed already to Stardusty that "necessary," as Russell put forth, is a property, not of things, but of propositions. You have a lot of work to do to convince us, who have drunk the elixir of analytic philosophy, to go back before Frege and take up once again the Aristotelian syllogistic and the square of opposition and all that other furniture of an abandoned logic room.
ficino4ml,
DeleteIt seems that you take Russell's as the last word and so aren't interested in engaging with criticisms of his position(s). Relatedly, it seems that you view any of those critcisms as a full throated defense of a historically frozen Aristotelism.
Don't you think those are rather extreme positions? Especially when, for instance Tony, admits that Aristotle's logic has been improved upon?
@bmiller:
DeleteYes, logicians have proposed ways of tweaking the square of opposition. And although I refer to Russell from time to time, I hardly take his as "the last word" any more than a modern Thomist takes everything Aquinas said as the last word. Russell's theory of names as definite descriptions has undergone powerful critiques, for example.
ficino4ml,
DeleteThis response seems reasonable. The other exchanges in this subtopic didn't seem to reflect that POV.
Ficino,
Deletethe example was supposed to make the crucial distinction between essential and accidental properties, since both reflect a difference in their dependence, i.e. their existence. The color is an obvious accidental property, while the horn may not be. I don't know anything about unicorns.
If your theory of existence, deriving from Russell isn't capable of accounting for a difference in necessary and contingent beings, that's a huge defect, since it's by no means a presumption of A-T metaphysics that is required here, but a simple commitment to the PSR, which entails the existence of a necessary being.
I've made the argument of the incompatibility of the thin theory with the PSR for quite a while now.
Add to that that the commitment to necessary by writers and traditions with no theological axe to grind, be it Graham Oppy or mathematical platonists. The predication of existence can't be univocal in these cases, necessary objects exist a se, contingent ones ab alia.
The thin theory works great for general existents, it's a great tool to analyze what there is. Anything beyond that though, a statement about singular existents is neither required by predication logic nor implied by it. We want our metaphysics to be logical, but this is a case of our logic becoming metaphysical.
There's no requirement to abolish either modes of being or predication logic as long as it's realized what the latter actually does and what the metaphysical premises are, that are invoked to extend it to the thin theory of existence you find in Russell.
@Dominik Kowalski:
DeleteOppy talks about necessary propositions, but I have not seen him accept that a necessary concrete, not abstract, ENTITY exists. He has argued against versions of this claim. I will be grateful if you provide citations Oppy's accepting the existence of one or more concrete necessary entities/beings.
Mathematical platonists AFAIK hold that mathematical entities are abstract entities or objects. So far I admit the existence of abstract objects. I haven't done enough in that direction to have a view on whether abstract objects that figure as terms in necessary truths or propositions are themselves necessary entities. I've always been convinced that existence is not a first-order predicate. God in any case is not defined as an abstract object in classical theism.
I don't know that the generality of philosophers hold that explanations must be grounded in one or more necessary BEINGS, though I know that there are philosophers who have argued and do argue for this. A lot of philosophers I've encountered, if they hold the PSR, restrict its domain of explananda to facts or truths, and they say that explanations are grounded in facts of certain kinds, not in entities. But there is a big debate about all this, and I don't work on it.
BTW the Latin plural is "ab aliis" not "ab alia."
@Dominik Kowalski
Deleteadding: if I admit that abstract objects exist and that they include propositions, and if I admit that necessity is a property of certain propositions, then I seem to admit that some propositions are things that exist and are necessary. As I said above I haven't done enough work in this area to assess the implications of the above set of beliefs. Fascinating stuff, in any case, so thanks for motivating me to think more.
Ficino,
DeleteOppy accepts the initial singularity as the necessary being, he does so for example in his written dialogue with Kenneth Pearce. The problems with his specific account go beyond our discussion here, but merely serve to show that unlike in previous times, non-theistic philosophers are open to concrete, necessary beings. The one thing that has lacked thus far is an analysis of what exactly this "necessity" is supposed to be. I think everyone should agree that anything like Erik Wielenbergs "brute necessity" is just sophistry.
Although Barry Miller argues thst existence can adequately be made into a first order predicate, I don't know how exactly he cashes that one out. So I would definitely agree with you that existence isn't a first order predicate.
The issue is that denying that existence is a first order predicate, by no means entails that existence is a second order predicate, a property of properties. Doing so is an invalid move. Alternatively, existence is a property of worlds, a cognate item, like in Butchvarov or, the alternative I hold to, the unification of the properties, thus neither being a property, but still being predicable of individuals. The existence of John thus is the (external, because of Bradley's regress) contingent unity of the properties of the essential and accidental properties of John. There's no separable item called "John's existence" that gets instantiated here. Existence as a naive version of a first-order predicate, like color, leads to contradictions. Like Moreland said, "Existence is not a property, it's the *having* of properties".
I don't think it's relevant whether you hold to something like a metaphysical platonism or whether you believe in universals, propositions etc., when it comes to their self- or derived existence, the same rules apply. After all, from an ontological point of view, limitations in an abstract or concrete being are still limitations, in need of an explanation. In both cases, if necessary existence is claimed for either one, the way to analyze it will be identical. I know that my distinction between *a se* and *ab alia* existence is tedious at this point, but it serves a crucial role, because we aren't concerned with Leibnizian existence in regards to the quantity of possible worlds we're finding the object in, but rather an analysis of the object and its way to be. An object could exist in every possible world while still being contingent/dependent after all (I'm thinking of Sobel's "Dragoon" or the afromentioned abstract objects.
An unrestricted PSR, or one that is restricted to the existence of concrete, contingent entities will at the end always result in a concrete, necessary being. Russell, likely, was aware of that as well. Contingent existence itself, and I count among that everything that doesn't exist a se, is itself in need of explanation. The question "Why is there anything contingent at all?" deserves to get answered, and it can't be done in by abstract truths alone. A causally inert thing can hardly be the explanation for the existence of concrete things. Especially in the case of facts (I assume you mean states of affairs), the facts, if they're truthmakers for contingent truths about concrete beings, they will necessarily involve concrete beings, e.g. in the proposition "John loves Mary" or "Contingent concrete beings exist". If we reject brute facts, this explanation, in the case of the latter proposition, will necessarily involve a concrete being that exists of necessity.
I thank you for the correction in regards to latin grammar
I too thank you for the discussion.
Dominik
@Dominik Kowalski,
Deleteit's great to receive your considered response! Many thanks.
I work on the history of ancient Greek philosophy and rhetoric. Contemporary metaphysics are a stretch for me! But I must take responsibility for the positions I hold at present, as must we all.
In response to yours:
1. I thought that Oppy dubbed the "quantum soup," not "the initial singularity," as a necessary being. Presumably the initial singularity is dependent ontologically/causally somehow on the quantum soup, so the latter not the former would be essentially necessary. But it would of course be true that the initial singularity would be modally necessary for all possible worlds to which we have access. ???
I do not know that either the initial singularity or the quantum soup is a BEING. Is an aggregate or a state of affairs a being in a "real" sense?
2. You wrote: "The issue is that denying that existence is a first order predicate, by no means entails that existence is a second order predicate, a property of properties. Doing so is an invalid move."
I do not understand the sense in which you describe the thesis, existence is a second-order predicate, as "an invalid move," but state that existence is a property of worlds. Can you expand within reasonable length limits, lol? My first thought is that "worlds" as in "possible worlds" is a metaphor about the semantic valence of which we must be very careful. But maybe we'll be in agreement. I agree that there is no separable item, "John's existence," except as a phenomenon of ordinary speech. Your quotation from Moreland, that existence is the having of properties, seems in line with Quine's "to exist is to be a value of a bound variable."
So far I am aware that contemporary philosophers talk about things that are factually necessary - say, e.g., an eclipse in our world, but in a world where moons are transparent, maybe there would be no eclipses - and things that are absolutely necessary. But then, there is the difference, I am told, between essential and modal necessity. See above, 1.
I think you and I began discussion when I had brought up abstract objects. Anyway, on those, so far I think that it doesn't contravene Russell to say that some (maybe all, depending on how they're defined) abstract objects exist necessarily. I think it doesn't contravene Russell because he held that necessity is a property of propositions - maybe only of analytic propositions. But those are abstract objects. So it seems under different vocabulary, Russell would allow "necessity" to be a property of abstract but not concrete objects.
A sticky point that comes out of the Russell and Copleston debate would be whether God is a concrete object. Do contemporary Catholic philosophers hold that God is an "object"?
Ya'll know now, that Dr Feser does not ordinarily answer questions. He would never get anything done if he did. Besides his book(s) and articles and the subject of his next blog, he's probably working on finals and grades at his college right now. And probably planning on celebrating Easter Sunday with his wife and five children.
ReplyDeleteGoogle "natural theology gifford lectures." or "catholic natural theology." One of the best books on natural theology is the classic "Natural Theology," by G.H. Joyce. S.J. and Maurice Holloway "An Introduction to Natural Theology." Bookfinder.com for all used books.
OP,
ReplyDeleteI find it an insult to the intelligence and powers of articulation of Aquinas to hear posters continually assert what he supposedly "really meant".
Aquinas wrote, perhaps, ten million words. If he meant change, don't you suppose he had the capacity of articulation to not write move? If he was not describing moving objects in the humanly observable world why would he preface his argument with a reference to what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses"?
If Aquinas was not arguing from the motion of objects that is evident to our senses why would he use examples of ordinary motion of objects evident to our senses? Do you really suppose that one of the most prolific writers of that era was somehow at a loss of words to say what he really meant to say?
Clearly his arguments are unsound, containing multiple instances of false premises and invalid logic. The simplest explanation for the continual streams of "he really meant" is that those are just attempts to make excuses for the obvious failures of the Five Ways.
Please spare me the long convoluted excuse making with invented interpretations and simply realize that what Aquinas actually did say is wrong.
"They all work". Yes, once you have reified your many nonsensical abstractions you can then be convinced that the nonsensical arguments of Aquinas actually work. No thanks.
Yes, once you accept Aristotelian metaphysics it follows naturally that arguments based on Aristotelian metaphysics would be convincing. That sort of circularity is, however, not itself convincing, at least not for carefully rational thinkers.
"Way too much heavy lifting of Aristotelian metaphysics". Right, because such concepts are so convoluted and unbelievable that to become convinced of them requires being subjected to a blizzard of faux sophisticated terminology. The real world does not care about your convoluted abstractions; it simply exists and progresses as it does.
Here is a very simple metaphysics that does not require any such blizzard of reified abstractions. The simplest sorts of things simply are what they are and are the necessary beings. There is no upper bound, logically, on the number of necessary beings that are logically possible. Whatever number of necessary beings that are ontologically the case violates no logical necessity.
Nobody knows what the necessary beings are, perhaps they are the fields as attributed to give rise to all the particles of the Standard Model.
Your perception of intrinsic teleology is merely the consequence of necessary progressions of the necessary beings which progress as they necessarily do while not giving a wit about your reified abstractions.
"ultimate explanation" ... "requires necessary being".
Self contradiction.
By positing a necessary being you eliminate any logical possibility of ultimate explanation. That is why the assertion of god solves no logical or ontological puzzle, just pushes the same old puzzles back a step where they remain unsolved.
What is worse, in pushing the puzzles back a step you have merely introduced even more unsolved puzzles by introducing even more unknowns, god itself.
And this process of reification of abstractions that leads to positing an additional set of unknowns while solving no logical or ontological puzzles is somehow logically necessary?
“Here is a very simple metaphysics that does not require any such blizzard of reified abstractions. The simplest sorts of things simply are what they are and are the necessary beings. There is no upper bound, logically, on the number of necessary beings that are logically possible. Whatever number of necessary beings that are ontologically the case violates no logical necessity.“
DeleteInteresting! I have a couple of questions about some of the assertions you have made, however, since some of them seem rather unfounded.
For starters, it seems to me that you cannot say with confidence that “there is no upper bound… on the number of necessary beings”. How can you know this to be the case unless you think you have a good idea of what these necessary beings are? If it turns out that there are a finite number of distinct attributes that these necessary beings have, and if there are a finite number of states that these attributes can occupy, then we ought to expect that there is limited number of necessary beings.
Coming at this metaphysics with a truly open mind, then, we ought not so hastily make statements about the number of necessary beings until we have a good idea of what kinds of things are candidates for necessary beings. Statements like the one you made only seem to bias one in favor of particular candidates for necessary beings over others without any real grounds to do so.
You mentioned fields as a possible candidate for these necessary beings. That also strikes me as unlikely. The fact that we can describe fields in terms of other things suggests that they are not the simplest things that exist. It seems like you ought to flesh out this metaphysics a bit more before jumping to conclusions based on it.
Stardusty
DeleteSo the existence of the universe is just a " brute fact" as Bertrand Russell said to Fr. Fred Copleston in the famous 1948 BBC radio debate?
@the Anonymous who asked Stardusty about brute fact and the Russell-Copleston radio debate:
Deleteanother statement made by Russell in that debate was to hold that necessity is a property of (analytic) propositions, not a property of things.
"I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best point at which to begin is the question of necessary being. The word "necessary" I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a necessary being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former -- the truths of reason -- being necessary."
C: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a necessary being." I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an analytic proposition, then -- in order to avoid a dispute in terminology -- I would agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological proposition. But the proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be discovered by experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is certainly not an analytic proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that there is a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being.
R: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent." These phrases don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject.
ficino,
DeleteRussell: "I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent.""
Hmmm...if there exists no necessary being and there exists no contingent being then what would be the third alternative?
Russell agrees that on a contingent being there would have to exist a necessary being.
It seems to me that the sound alternative to the existence of contingent being(s) is that all that exists is necessary, which is my view.
All that exists is necessary. Existence is static, that is to say, no new existent beings ever come to be in existence and no existent beings ever pass out of existence.
Existential inertia is an observed scientific fact. The conservation of matter/energy is an observed scientific fact that underpins the equations of physics. There is no poof term in E=mc^2, nothing gets in or out, which is what the equal sign means.
There is no call for a first changer to account for existential inertia because the beings of the universe do not change in their existential aspect. To me, in my view, all of that which exists in the universe (the totality of the greater cosmos), all of the beings in the universe, are necessary.
If, in Russell's view the observed beings of the universe are neither necessary or contingent then I admit I am at a loss as to a third alternative given cogito ergo sum and its associated absolute truth that there must be an existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.
Possibly Russell thought a brute fact is neither necessary or contingent, rather just is, it didn't have to be, but it just is, not contingent, not necessary, just in fact the case. I'm not convinced that works.
@StardustyPsyche: your reply seems to include a tacit assumption that for all x, if x is a being, then x is either necessary or contingent. Russell's point was that it is incoherent to apply either qualifier, "necessary" or "contingent", to "beings." There are beings, and then we form propositions about beings or other propositions. Some propositions are necessary truths (an even number is divisible by 2 without remainder), and others are not (e.g. Rin Tin Tin ate my supper). You might say that Russell should have spelled out in more detail what he meant by "a being." I don't think he considered propositions to be "beings" in the sense he used the term, "being."
DeleteRussell rejected a logic that admits of multiple senses of "exist."
ficino,
Delete"Russell rejected a logic that admits of multiple senses of "exist.""
It seems you have identified the core error of Russell :-)
"Some propositions are necessary truths (an even number is divisible by 2 without remainder),"
1.That is a tautological truth.
2.The number 2 is not a being.
A mathematical truth is only necessary by definition, by convention. The number 2 is an abstraction, as is the concept of "even". "Even" is defined as being divisible by 2 without remainder, so of course when we consider a number we find to be divisible by 2 without a remainder it is considered even, because that is tautologically true.
Prior to creatures capable of abstraction of numbers beings existed but there were not 2 of them or any particular number, they simply existed. You and I with our ability to form abstractions observe this multitude of beings and choose abstractly to categorize them as being sufficiently similar to each other as to consider them to be the same sort of beings and therefore we count 2 of them in our thoughts.
The, for example, 2 apples do not give a wit for our counting, they simply are what they are. There is no intrinsic necessity that individual objects should be considered sufficiently similar as to be considered 2 of the same sort of thing.
Russell, or you, may wish for a single sense of the word "exist", but that is not the reality of human discourse.
For example, religious philosophers have long asserted that god exists as a thought in the mind, and god exists ontologically as a real being in and of itself. That is a conflation, or equivocation, or confusion between 2 very different senses of the word "exist".
To understand why the ontological argument for the existence of god fails it is crucial to realize that actual human beings do in point of fact use the word "exist" in different senses, not univocally.
To use a single word in multiple senses is fine, if those distinctions are made clear in context.
But to use a single word in multiple senses within the same context is the fallacy of equivocation, which is what the ontological arguments for the existence of god suffer from, equivocation on the sense of the word "exist", which makes those arguments logically invalid.
BTW, Russell, the great logician, failed to understand that equivocation as a young man, at one point in his younger years considering the ontological argument sound.
In the Third Way Aquinas also used the word "exist" mistakenly. There Aquinas conflated the arrangement of ontologically existent beings with an existent being in and of itself.
Without realizing it, perhaps, Aquinas used "exist" to mean "arranged". So, Aquinas might have said that a wall is generated into existence when the bricks are stacked, and the wall is corrupted from existence when the bricks are torn apart.
But are there any new beings coming into existence when bricks are stacked? Or are the existent beings static in their ontological existence, and merely re-arranged when stacked?
Thomists generally are confused about existence, typically conflating "arrangement" with "existence", likely because their namesake suffered from such confusion in the Third Way and elsewhere.
@StardustyPsyche cc: bmiller
DeleteSDP, neither of us subscribes to theism, whether "classical" or any other version, but we disagree on many points. Since our disagreement appears fundamental, I'm not sure how far we'd get if we seek to develop some of those points. Anyway, I'll note:
1. Russell held that some truths are indeed tautologies. They are "analytic." He held that the truth makers of other truths are sensory data. To say that the definition of an even number is tautologous does not establlsh that it is not a necessary truth. Russell and many other analytic philosophers would agree on this.
2. A while ago we had a brief dispute about whether abstract objects exist. bmiller thought that in the end, you admitted their existence. I'm not sure from your last what your view is. You speak of the number 2 as though there was no 2 before rational beings abstracted it. From this it sounds as though you do not admit that abstract objects exist but rather, hold that they are only human linguistic conventions.
3. 2. gets into the problem, should philosophers admit multiple senses of "exist", regardless of what the man in the street may do with the verb, "exist." AFAIK, it will be difficult to justify using standard modern predicate logic if "exists" has multiple meanings. Quine's dictum that "to exist is to be a value of a bound variable" is clear and preserves the force of the existential quantifier, even though most "laypeople" will not define "exist" as Quine did.
A consequence of 3. in my view will be whether "be" can have a wider extension than "exist" such that it can be treated as a predicate or perfection. Russell was getting at this question when he told Copleston that he did not accept the system of logic that Thomists use. Again, AFAIK, no philosophers today defend the Aristotelian syllogistic as superior to modern predicate logic unless those philosophers are trying to insulate arguments for God from criticism based on criticism of Aristotelian logic.
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Delete"If he meant change, don't you suppose he had the capacity of articulation to not write move? If he was not describing moving objects in the humanly observable world why would he preface his argument with a reference to what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses"?"
DeleteHe's pretty explicit he's referring to change in the First Way: "For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another."
In his own examples he refers to things other than physical motion, and he defines motion as the reduction of potency to act (that is, change). Perhaps it would behoove you to move beyond thinking translating from thirteenth century Latin to modern English is a one-to-one affair, or that the use of terms don't change over time.
@ficino:
Delete"AFAIK, it will be difficult to justify using standard modern predicate logic if "exists" has multiple meanings. Quine's dictum that "to exist is to be a value of a bound variable" is clear and preserves the force of the existential quantifier, even though most "laypeople" will not define "exist" as Quine did."
Standard first order predicate logic is great in certain contexts, like mathematics (where there is no change, the identity conditions are sharp and clear, extensionality and referential transparency lord over everything, etc.), but cannot do certain things like handling intensional contexts. If non-univocity of existence is to be philosophically admitted, maybe it requires some modification to standard first order logic, maybe it doesn't, I don't know, but thereby it does not follow that we would have to chuck it out the window. It is just that the things we would be interested in doing are not handled well by it. To let our philosophy be dictated by the would-be limitations of our formalism to speak about things is, dare I say, short-sighted.
ficino,
Delete"AFAIK, it will be difficult to justify using standard modern predicate logic if "exists" has multiple meanings."
Not so difficult, just state or realize by context the sense of the "exists" intended.
For example, one could say "there exists an X such that X plus two equals four."
I can also state "the number two does not exist".
In the first context I think it is clear that we are using "exists" to mean that in an abstract set of abstractions there is an abstract member such that...
In the second context I think it is clear that one is making the assertion that there is no ontological being we can rightly call "two".
It those different senses of "exist" are not clear from context, well, OK, but I am not exactly the first person to make those philosophical distinctions, I mean, the question of the existence of abstractions versus material objects goes back thousands of years.
This isn't a matter of trying to dumb down our language for the average person.
To say that god exists is an ontological claim, it is a claim that there is a real being with existential realization, that is a beable, that is ontologically actual.
To say that god exists as a thought in one's mind, as if that means god has ontological reality in one's mind simply because one thinks about god, is a false statement, an equivocation.
A thought about a chair is not a sort of chair inside your skull. Nor the thought of an elephant or a star or anything else. The thought is an abstraction. An abstraction is not an ontological being.
It does not require a lay person to make this fundamental error of equivocation of the word "exist". Philosophers have been making this mistake for a very long time.
Pretending there is only one sense of the word "exist" in common use by trained philosophers only serves to perpetuate this error of equivocation.
Anonymous (of April 10, 2023 at 4:46 PM)
DeleteYou stopped just a little too soon...
*as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand*
"Perhaps it would behoove you to move beyond thinking translating from thirteenth century Latin to modern English is a one-to-one affair,"
Perhaps it would behoove you to realize that the translations are typically made by very serious scholars who are fluent in both Latin and English, and who have studied the works of Aquinas for many years.
Also, you would do well to realize that people of that era were highly articulate and very capable of saying change when they mean change generally, and saying move and motion when they mean to speak of a moving object.
"In his own examples he refers to things other than physical motion"
No, he does not, but he likely did not realize that because he was ignorant of how motion actually works in the real world, and instead drew his unsound conclusions based on the gross errors of Aristotle.
All change entails physical motion.
You cannot cite any sort of change that does not entail physical motion.
"he defines motion as the reduction of potency to act (that is, change)."
That is indeed his primary error.
Aquinas made the fundamental mistake of considering motion to be a species of change.
*as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand*
The staff is an object in physical motion and Aquinas made the fundamental error that the staff moving is the staff changing.
That is the primary error of Aquinas, that physical motion is change.
Aristotle thought that sustained motion is change. Aristotle made that mistake because he erroneously believed that sublunary motion is in an impeding medium. Actually, all motion is in space, you are in space, everything is in space, and space does not impede motion.
Newton corrected Aristotle. Sustained motion is not change, rather, inertial motion is a state.
Inertial motion disproves the First Way.
Inertial motion proves, according to that which is manifest and evident to our senses a first mover is not necessary.
@grodrigues: you wrote "If non-univocity of existence is to be philosophically admitted, maybe it requires some modification to standard first order logic, maybe it doesn't, I don't know, but thereby it does not follow that we would have to chuck it out the window. It is just that the things we would be interested in doing are not handled well by it."
DeleteI don't have expertise in maths or physics. From what you write, it sounds as though you allow non-univocity of "existence" in order to construct proofs of God's existence. That procedure would seem to land you in circular or question-begging reasoning.
@SdPL you wrote: "For example, one could say "there exists an X such that X plus two equals four."
DeleteI can also state "the number two does not exist".
In the first context I think it is clear that we are using "exists" to mean that in an abstract set of abstractions there is an abstract member such that...
In the second context I think it is clear that one is making the assertion that there is no ontological being we can rightly call "two"."
I rarely like to tell people that they're confusing things, but I think there is a confusion in yours above, i.e. between two questions. One question: is "exist" univocal in propositions that use the existential quantifier? Another question: do abstract objects exist? Your two examples present propositions that each can be standardized in symbolic form as used in now-traditional predicate logic. What differs between the two examples is not the sense of "exists" but what is predicated of the bound variable. Your second example does not use a DIFFERENT existential quantifier. It merely appends the negation sign to the proposition. The predicates are what differ, not the sense of "exists."
Aristotle will often say of two things that "the being is different." Standard analytic philosophy cashes this out as a difference in first-order predicates, leaving "there exists an x such that" to do the same work in all particular propositions.
As to the further question, do abstract objects exist, I suggest that one must get clear on the semantic value of "exists" before one tries to tackle the problem of abstract objects. It won't do to appeal to the usage of the man in the street to solve such problems, because they are not problems of lexicography or even of the grammar of a particular language.
"
DeleteI don't have expertise in maths or physics. From what you write, it sounds as though you allow non-univocity of "existence" in order to construct proofs of God's existence. That procedure would seem to land you in circular or question-begging reasoning."
That's a very strange accusation, especially since it's completely uncalled for. Non-theistic rejections of the univocity post-Frege can be found in Heidegger and Milton Munitz.
Do a little exercise for yourself. In modern reduction of existence to the denial of the number zero, existence is a property of properties., meaning that for a red object, redness is instantiated. But now ask yourself, how does redress itself, the universal exist?
Lastly, actually Russell isn't all that clear that there's only one way to be in his ontology. In fact, van Inwagen in his "rant" has been faulting him for affirming a different way of existence for relations
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DeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
Deleteficino
Delete"One question: is "exist" univocal in propositions that use the existential quantifier?"
No, because the subject of the proportion might be purely an abstraction or in another case the subject might be an ontologically existent being.
"Your two examples present propositions that each can be standardized in symbolic form"
That is the step in human thought where the equivocation occurs. It is such a comfortable and ordinary process that such equivocation is highly insidious, as evidenced by our ongoing engagement on this subject.
"What differs between the two examples is not the sense of "exists" but what is predicated of the bound variable."
In the first case one uses an abstract sense of "exist" to refer to an abstraction.
In the second case one use an abstract sense of "exist" to refer to an ontologically existent being, which is fundamentally an equivocation, an equivocation so powerful that it becomes very difficult to enlighten those in its grips of the equivocation they are laboring under.
I can say "1 plus 1 equals 2" with precision and logical necessity.
If I say "This apple plus that apple equals two apples" any thought of precision and necessity is misplaced. We are immediately called to question how we can have two things that are different sorts of things. How can we even add real ontological beings that are different in physical structure while pretending they are actually precisely the same and necessarily two of precisely the same thing? One rationally cannot.
Abstracting real ontological beings is at best an approximation made for practical convenience, not to be taken too literally by the careful thinker.
Unfortunately, such careful thinking is atypical, leading to false beliefs that somehow the imprecise abstraction is somehow precise, at which time the abstraction of an ontologically existent being becomes a fallacy of equivocation.
It is the very binding of the variable that links the nature of the predicate to the existential quantifier. The existential quantifier transcendentally references the ontological or abstract nature of that which is bound in the bound variable.
There exists a number equal to 1 plus 1.
There exists a man equal to 1 plus 1 meters.
The first proposition is necessarily logically true.
The second proportion is almost certainly false, and at best fraught with ontologically difficulties.
Now, if you wish, you can entirely decouple the man from the proposition, and only make the proposition using abstractions. Then you can use "exist" univocally, but only because the variable is no longer bound to an ontologically existent being, in this case a man.
I have a motivation for my insistence that I will not admit of a univocal use of "exist" in any logic bound in any sense to an ontologically existent being. Equivocation along these lines is so pervasive as to be easily manipulated for insidious ontological arguments that are logically invalid, yet highly persuasive to millions, even a young Bertrand Russell.
I am not having it, not even for dt.
@Dominik Kowalski:
DeleteSo far I have found van Inwagen persuasive when he argues that abstract objects such as redness exist.
@ficino:
Delete"From what you write, it sounds as though you allow non-univocity of "existence" in order to construct proofs of God's existence."
It is baffling to me how you managed to hear that from my answer; more seriously, and to be fair, it would be a legitimate worry for anyone steeped in modern logic to wonder if one allows non-univocity, if and how much that would infect any such proof, but that can only be decided by looking at its details.
It is simply a fact that medieval logicians (or in Aristotelean logic) did not treat existence and identity as a modern logician does, as a second-order concept, a logical connective, but as a syncategorematic concept -- see for example Gyula Klima's "Being, Unity, and Identity in the Fregean and Aristotelian Traditions" in the volume edited by Prof. Feser "On Aristotle and Method".
I've read a lot of Klima, thanks. I suppose we simply may differ on whether fairly standard modern predicate logic or the Aristotelian syllogistic channeled through Porphyry et al to Aquinas is superior (I leave out Avicenna, Buridan, et al.).
Delete"I suppose we simply may differ on whether fairly standard modern predicate logic or the Aristotelian syllogistic channeled through Porphyry et al to Aquinas is superior"
DeleteDid I say that it was superior in any unqualified sense?
"I've read a lot of Klima, thanks."
Of course you did. As well as you read my words.
@grodrigues: Did I say anything about pre-Fregean predicate logic's superiority "in any unqualified sense"?
DeleteI have been in discussions with Thomist contributors to online boards, and some of them do tout the superiority of the syllogistic. If you think it's superior in some senses but not in others, fine. I don't make direct use of it myself, but I understand that others do.
Anonymous April 7, 2023 at 4:39 PM,
ReplyDelete"you cannot say with confidence that “there is no upper bound… on the number of necessary beings”."
Indeed, which is why I did not say that. You took my statement regarding logical possibility and conflated it with ontological possibility, even though I clearly stated:
"There is no upper bound, logically, on the number of necessary beings that are logically possible."
Nobody knows how many necessary beings actually exist, but there is no logical necessity that there must be only 1 necessary being.
"You mentioned fields as a possible candidate for these necessary beings. That also strikes me as unlikely. The fact that we can describe fields in terms of other things suggests that they are not the simplest things that exist."
There is no logical necessity for a necessary being to be simple. Complexity could be a necessary feature of a necessary being.
Also, I think you will find it difficult to describe what a field truly *is*. One rather vague attempt might be to say that that a field is a fluidlike substance that permeates the universe. Ok, but a fluid of what?
Thomists typically will freely admit they cannot really describe god either, and cannot properly speak of god, but can only provide flawed analogies of what god sort of might kind of be like. We can sort of wave our arms around and say that the necessary being is _____like, but stating what the necessary being *is* is perhaps an unsolvable linguistic problem.
Anonymous April 7, 2023 at 5:21 PM
"So the existence of the universe is just a " brute fact" as Bertrand Russell said"
I am not familiar with Russell's exact words so I am not signing up to what he said precisely, but at some point in a regression analysis of existence we arrive at some sort of brute fact.
If god exists then god is the fundamental existential brute fact.
If our big bang is just a part of something larger then that greater cosmos at its most fundamental level is the existential brute fact.
If our big bang is the entirety of all that exists then our universe at its most fundamental level is the existential brute fact.
Let’s hold up here. If you think if the number of ontologically possible and logically possible necessary beings is not by definition the same, then I think we need to nail down clearly what you mean by “necessary being” because we are certainly not using the term in the same way. You seem to be suggesting that it is logically possible for there to be either more or less necessary beings than there really are.
Delete@StardustyPsyche: "Nobody knows how many necessary beings actually exist..."
DeleteIf I understand Bertrand Russell correctly (see above), I think he would hold that zero necessary beings exist. (He'd probably resist the qualifier, "actually," as well, but I'm only guessing on that.) Russell maintained that talk of necessary beings is incoherent. He said, "The word "necessary" I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions."
Thoughts?
Here is that part of their debate on the existence of the universe. It ends with the section: "Religious Experience."
Deletehttp://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/cosmological_radio.htm
Anonymous (of April 8, 2023 at 12:06 PM)
Delete"Let’s hold up here."
Ok, fair enough.
"You seem to be suggesting that it is logically possible for there to be either more or less necessary beings than there really are."
Yes, is that so surprising for you?
A proposition is logically possible when it does not violate a law of logic, such as non-contradiction.
A proposition is ontologically possible when the nature of the cosmos in its entirety allows for the realization of the proposed being or process.
Confusing or conflating or equivocating or simply ignoring that distinction is a core flaw in a large number of arguments for the existence of god from Anselm to Plantinga.
Despite what such apologists argue, wishing does not make it so.
Dr. Feser elsewhere, as well as many others, have contended that it makes no sense to ask why the necessary being is necessary since that amounts to asking why the thing that could not fail to be, is.
However, supposing you assert X is the necessary being, but I propose A B C and D are all necessary beings. How would we begin to attempt to resolve this difference of opinion between us? Each of us would naturally ask the other why X or A B C D should be necessary beings as opposed to any other proposed necessary being or perhaps none at all.
Merely defining a proposed being as necessary does not make it so.
Merely being able to identify no logical flaw in the proposed being does not make it so.
Merely not knowing if the being does in fact exist does not make it so.
Logical possibility does not necessitate ontological possibility.
Human ignorance does not necessitate ontological possibility.
A single deistic god is logically possible.
Multiple deistic gods are logically possible.
The Christian formulation of god is logically impossible, due to the combination of omni properties that come into logical contradiction with each other or lead to logical self contractions individually.
Nobody knows if deistic gods are ontologically possible because human beings do not have enough knowledge of the cosmos in its entirety to rule in or rule out as to whether the nature of the cosmos permits their existential realization.
Star, Feser has engaged these criticisms over and over and over.
Delete@SP
DeleteI’m not particularly interested in your thoughts on whose metaphysics you think doesn’t work. They’re neither relevant to the topic at hand nor particularly interesting given we’ve all had that conversation before, and it’s a lot easier to poke holes in someone’s theory than it is to come up with something better.
I want to hear more about the metaphysics you proposed above. I think I’m following you until about here: “ Merely defining a proposed being as necessary does not make it so.
Merely being able to identify no logical flaw in the proposed being does not make it so.
Merely not knowing if the being does in fact exist does not make it so.”
This is your metaphysics we’re evaluating here. How do *you* propose we can deduce if something is in fact a necessary being? In your original comment you proposed that the necessary beings were the “simplest” things that exist, but you appear to be walking that back in subsequent comments with skepticism about how we can know if a thing is indeed a necessary being.
When you say that we lack the knowledge of the cosmos to know for sure if certain candidates are indeed necessary beings, are you referring to scientific knowledge or something else?
ficino
DeleteI agree that "actually" is redundant in the phrase "actually exists". You could find other such examples in my writing. For better or worse I use some phrases that contain, strictly speaking, redundant words, for emphasis and clarity.
I realize you would prefer to use "exist" univocally however the present state of general dialog on the subject is anything but. I tend to use a lot of qualifiers to try to be clear of the sense of "exist" I am using at the moment.
Anonymous (of April 8, 2023 at 2:01 PM)
Thanks for the link.
Russell: "I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all."
I don't think that settles the matter so quickly as Russell asserts.
If the universe just exists, then that seems to be equivalent to saying that an essence of the universe is to exist, which is another way of saying the the universe is necessary.
In this context "universe" means the set of all existent beings in the totality of the cosmos.
Just supposing the universe is "just there". Could it have not been just there? If the answer is yes then the universe must have had a cause, unless one thinks there can be an effect without a cause, which would mean that the universe arose spontaneously from absolutely nothing at all for no reason, by no cause.
In my view the notion of something from nothing by no cause is entirely irrational. Richard Carrier asserts that something can arise from nothing because in the case of nothing there are no rules to stop something from arising from nothing. I have always found that to be rather preposterous because events do not occur due to a lack of inhibition to the event, rather, events occur because causal powers give rise to them, whereas nothing can have no causal powers, and therefore nothing can arise from nothing.
But again with Russell, suppose it is not the case that the universe could not have been just there, well, that is a distinction without a difference to stating the universe is necessary.
So, it seems to me that when Russell says the universe does not have an explanation and is "just there" that inevitably leads to the assertion that the universe is necessary by one set of terminology or another.
Copleston got things much worse though, I think. He repeatedly asserted such things as the mother being the cause or the reason for the child and that all things in our observed world are contingent, and therefore there must be a necessary being, god.
Aquinas in the Third Way argues much the same, and Dr. Feser says all 5 ways, in his opinion, are sound. In truth, all 5 ways are so obviously unsound it continually amazes me that anybody finds any value in them whatever.
In the Third Way Aquinas does make at least 1 good point "there must exist something the existence of which is necessary".
Aquinas failed to realize that what appears to us as though things in nature begin to exist and cease to exist in point of fact those are only re-arrangements of material that previously existed and continues to exist all through what Aquinas falsely perceived as generation and corruption.
The existence of the universe is static. That which exists in the universe is continually or continuously changing in arrangement, but never changing in existence.
No new existent material is ever generated.
No existent material is ever corrupted.
The entire universe, at its fundamental base of existence, is necessary.
Whoa, whoa, whoa, Stardusty. You're painting with a very wide brush here.
DeleteChristians, philosophers, theologians, and "apologists" are not "merely defining a proposed being as necessary." Maybe that holds for certain versions of the ontological argument defended by the likes of Anselm and Plantinga (I don't know; I'm rusty with studying those type of arguments), but theism doesn't solely rest its case on that genus of argument. Contrary to your protestations, most theists don't ad hoc engage in "[m]erely defining a proposed being as necessary...". Philosophically-minded theism is in the business of making arguments. For example, the Aristotelian argument from motion doesn't do what you insist that most theists and "apologists" do. God's necessity is carefully deduced from him being established as an "unmoved mover" in the context of sophisticated Aristotelian metaphysical principles. Now, we get that you reject arguments like that and the metaphysics underlying it, but then that means you got to show why those arguments and the underlying metaphysics fail instead of just mouthing off with a demonstrable falsehood about how Christian theists have reasoned about God's existence and his necessity, a fact that can be attested to by just reading and comprehending the content of this blog.
"A proposition is logically possible when it does not violate a law of logic, such as non-contradiction.
A proposition is ontologically possible when the nature of the cosmos in its entirety allows for the realization of the proposed being or process."
Surely, though, what is ontologically possible is also logically possible, no? If my memory serves, Aristotelian ontology rests on the law of non-contradiction, as well as the other classical laws of logic, as unavoidable axioms of reasoning. I don't see the apparent issue here.
Moreover, why should I accept your assertion that a deistic god is logically possible? It seems to me that a deistic transcendent creator of the universe, while being the ground of all being is also somehow post-creation otherwise independent of all being, smacks of both ontological and also logical incoherence. The notion of there being multiple deistic transcendent creators suffers the same kind of problem.
Modus,
Delete"You're painting with a very wide brush here."
Painting can be fun, as well as useful and constructive, don't you agree?
"theism doesn't solely rest its case on that genus of argument."
Fair enough. Care to find specific flaws in my arguments of StardustyPsyche April 10, 2023 at 6:37 AM?
"For example, the Aristotelian argument from motion doesn't do what you insist that most theists and "apologists" do."
That particular argument suffers from false premises and invalid logic, as I detail at the referenced location.
"God's necessity is carefully deduced from him being established as an "unmoved mover""
No, god is tacked on at the end of the argument for a first mover, as an afterthought, a non-sequitur that has no logical connection to the argument for first mover.
"sophisticated Aristotelian metaphysical principles."
Faux sophistication satisfies theists generally. Expressing irrationality with big words lends a veneer of sophistication to irrationality.
"you got to show why those arguments and the underlying metaphysics fail"
Fair enough. In a nutshell, inertial motion shows that an unmoved mover is unnecessary. Mutual causation shows the linear hierarchical regression analysis is wrong. Modern physics shows Aristotle was wrong.
"Surely, though, what is ontologically possible is also logically possible, no?"
Yes, but consider
If O then L
L
Therefore O
Given your handle I should think you can identify the error in that reasoning.
"It seems to me that a deistic transcendent creator of the universe, while being the ground of all being is also somehow post-creation otherwise independent of all being, smacks of both ontological and also logical incoherence. The notion of there being multiple deistic transcendent creators suffers the same kind of problem."
So you assert, but you have not identified any such problems here.
I earlier referenced the famous Russell/Copleston debate held in 1948. In 1994, Frederick Copleston, S.J., published his last book, "Memoirs." He gives the back story to his debate with Lord Russell, and said that he still believed that philosophy that a valid argument could be made for the existence of God, providing one accepted certain metaphysical assumptions. It's a fascinating book. He was a close friend of the atheist philosopher A.J.Ayer.
Deletehttps://www.amazon.com/Memoirs-Philosopher-Frederick-Charles-Copleston/dp/1556125704
BTW, Prof. A.J.Ayer was not only a world-renowned philosopher, he actually bested heavyweight boxing champion in a verbal confronation when he came to the aid of Naomi Campbell at a party. A true story.
https://www.theweek.in/webworld/features/society/a-j-ayer-the-philosopher-who-supplanted-god-bested-mike-tyson-by-words.html
Anonymous (of April 9, 2023 at 12:21 PM)
Delete"This is your metaphysics we’re evaluating here. How do *you* propose we can deduce if something is in fact a necessary being?"
With absolute certainty? We can't.
I am absolutely certain I exist in some form, but my certain existence does not require me to be a necessary being.
However, if you and I agree by convention to provisionally accept the basic reliability of the human senses and the basic laws of logic then we can begin to make some observations and deductions, on those provisional postulates.
On that basis we can rule out certain patently bad arguments, such as the 5 ways of Aquinas, and every argument for the existence of god in general circulation, since they all fail immediately and obviously.
"In your original comment you proposed that the necessary beings were the “simplest” things that exist,"
Ontology.
" but you appear to be walking that back in subsequent comments with skepticism about how we can know if a thing is indeed a necessary being."
Epistomology.
What exists, is quite another matter from what we can learn and know.
"When you say that we lack the knowledge of the cosmos to know for sure if certain candidates are indeed necessary beings, are you referring to scientific knowledge or something else?"
Science seems like the most likely tool to discover the necessary beings, if they can be discovered at all. Our unaided senses clearly lack the resolution and bandwidth needed to discover the necessary beings, while even our best techology might be barred, even in principle, from ever detecting the necessary beings.
Or, maybe we already have detected them. For example, one interpretation of the Standard Model is that every particle is actually a manifestiation of its progenitor field, and that the universe is permeated by a superpostion of such fields, one for each particle in the Standard Model.
If that turns out to be true, and if it turns out that such fields are the necessary beings, then we have already discovered a very great deal about the necessary beings using science.
However, it is certainly far too soon in our investigations to affirmatively conclude that such fields are the necessary beings, and indeed, we might be barred, even in principle, from ever being able to reasonably make such an assertion.
It has been said, there is plenty of room at the bottom, and it may well turn out that no matter how low we go we might never be certain we have reached the absolute bottom.
OP
ReplyDelete"All five ways are sound"
In point of fact, all five ways are unsound, which is not even difficult to show.
The First Way
""The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion."
These two sentences are very good, although Aquinas makes an error is asserting that what is evident to our senses is certain, still, on the postulate of the basic reliability of the human senses this is an excellent basis to proceed.
Keep in mind, the argument must be based on what is manifest and evident to our senses.
"Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another"
False. The First Way fails already. It is not evident to our senses that whatever we observe to presently be in motion is being put in motion by another.
Aristotle thought that. Aristotle was wrong. This mistake is reasoned from the false notion that all sublunary motion is in an impeding medium such that sustained motion requires sustained force.
In truth all motion is in space. You are in space. All things are in space. The observed fact of motion in space, what is manifest and evident to our senses about motion in space, is that it continues ad infinitum and does not require being put in motion by another.
Thus, Aristotle and Aquinas had the mistaken notion that motion is a species of change. Aristotle almost had inertial motion understood in his Book IV of Physics where he did not treat motion in a void as a species of change and stated it would continue ad infinitum. A core error of Aristotle was that he did not know all motion is in space and that space is the functional equivalent of the void for motion, that is, space does not impede motion.
Elsewhere Dr. Feser has said that inertial motion does not rule out a first mover. That is true, and inertial motion does not rule out 10^100 little witches on broomsticks nudging every particle in the universe along moment to moment.
In making that assertion of compatibility Dr. Feser is moving the goalposts.
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover,"
The First Way is an argument for necessity, not compatibility. Inertial motion eliminates necessity based on what is manifest and evident to our senses, because there is no mover called for in evidence of our senses for observed inertial motion. Since the argument fails to prove necessity the argument fails.
(cont.)
ReplyDelete"But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover"
Begging the question. This is an argument for a first mover, and Aquinas is here using as a premise that there must be a first mover.
"therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself."
False. You move yourself. A star moves itself. Many objects move themselves. Attributing such motion to a soul violates the requirement to show necessity based on what is manifest and evident to our senses. There is no star soul evident to our senses.
This is also a false dichotomy because it assumes a linear hierarchical causal chain. In fact physics works with mutual causation, for example with gravity. Objects move each other and are thus both mover and moved in a causal process that is fundamentally circular, not linear.
Like a planar circle this sort of causation, the real causation that is evident to our senses, has no beginning or end yet is finite in overall size, and thus terminates finitely without the need to regress to infinity.
" and this everyone understands to be God"
This does not even deserve the dignity of being called an argument. It is a non-sequitur, a tack on, an afterthought of bare assertion with no logical connection to the argument for a first mover.
Dr. Feser, I think of you as a prodigal son. You were a good child of atheism in the nineties, but then you became lost in the wilderness and then lured by the intoxicants of theism around the turn of the century. But, my hope for your wellbeing springs eternal, always hopeful you will find your way back home to the clear rationality of atheism, I will keep a candle in the window for you to light your way on your journey :-)
Stardusty,
DeleteHappy Easter.
Maybe ask a kind relative for a better set of arguments this next year. All of these misunderstandings have been answered long ago.
StarDusty, again, Feser has engaged the Kinds of criticisms you raise ad nauseam. You show all the signs of having only superficially skimmed the scholarly works here.
DeletePat
SP, have you actually read Dr Feser's "Five Proofs"? If so, perhaps you could post your detailed refutations (together with the objections to the objections) on a blog and link to it in future comments. They should be serious objections, not the absurd and wilful misrepresentations you usually post in the comments. This will save both you and others the tedium of having to write/read future comments. At the moment you appear to be simply trolling. But perhaps that's your intention?
DeleteI see that all 3 responses to my clear and specific disproofs are of the form of "says you" or "somebody else showed you are wrong someplace else".
DeleteTherefore, thus far, my clear disproofs of the First Way stand unrefuted here in any significant manner.
The First Way is based on the incorrect physics of Aristotle that failed to understand inertial motion. Inertial motion proves that a first mover is unnecessary. Dr. Feser has nowhere shown otherwise.
The First Way is also based on the false notion of a linear hierarchical essential causal series. The mutuality of the formulations of modern physics proves that causation is fundamentally mutual and circular, not hierarchical and linear, which makes the regression analysis of the First Way invalid and irrelevant. Dr. Feser has nowhere shown otherwise.
The First Way contains invalid logic including false dichotomy, begging the question, and non-sequitur. I have quoted the specific locations of that invalid logic. Dr. Feser has nowhere shown otherwise.
But by all means, if any individual here can do better than vaguely pointing into the distance claiming somehow the answer is out there, cite the specific argument.
So, that's a no, then. You either haven't read Five Proofs or you haven't understood it. Dr Feser answers all your objections and more.
Delete@All,
DeleteSuppose a self-admirer said, "Therefore, thus far, my clear disproofs of the First Way stand unrefuted here in any significant manner."
If someone replied, "says you", the self-admirer would make some illogical claim that he has shown Aquinas to be wrong (he is "unrefuted"). Well actually it would be irrelevant, but the "says you" chatter he has emitted is supposed to make some kind of argument, which it hasn't and it gives him no brownie points. So why does he emit such chatter?
Why such chatter? 🤣
Well, when he emits nothing but nonsensical chatter a particular emission has to say something🤣.
We can see with his "says you" proof that he operates outside of the realm of sense. With that in mind let us marvel at his hatred of Aquinas. By attacking Aquinas ceaselessly, he seems to think that he is proving that God does not exist.
But for the sake of argument, let us assume that Aquinas never wrote anything that was not nonsense. Bearing in mind that the ridiculous "says you" chatter entails, according to the chatterer, brownie points to him we can see that we need not take a word he emits seriously, so his claim to have "disproved" Aquinas can be laughed at with no significant relevance to the existence of God. But we assume for the sake of argument that Aquinas' proofs were wrong. Would this have any bearing on the existence of God?
Of course not.
If I said, "hfy nged vhgf, therefore God exists," would that have any bearing on the existence of God?
No, verbal nonsense claimed as a proof that God exists has no relevance, but as we have borne in mind that the chatterer likes such irrelevant nonsense, we can see how unreliable he is as a thinker.
He has not shown, except through such nonsense, that Aquinas was wrong about anything. I personally do not think that Aquinas was never wrong, yet the chatterer hasn't managed to prove a single mistake in Aquinas.
He simply does not understand Aquinas. I realize that he awards himself a brownie point that I say this, but what if he actually does not understand Aquinas? The chatterer's self-awarding of brownie points here entails in the chatterer's mind that he cannot be wrong in his imagined understanding of Aquinas.
He CANNOT be wrong! 🤣
The nutty circularity is clearly visible here.
He claims, "Science, therefore I am right!, in what is always an absurd non-sequitur of some sort. He has no answer to the various ways that science is limited, as even science itself has shown. Talk about limited compressibility flies right over his head. "Simplicity shimplicity," he says, "I have shown that to be irrelevant. I need answer nothing because I AM!"
Beware. Do not take his soft talk seriously. His dying New Atheist death cult looks to oppress, through aiding murderous violence against Christians. and seeks only monomaniacal poeer.
Beware!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Anonymous (of April 11, 2023 at 11:51 AM)
Delete"You either haven't read Five Proofs"
Have.
"or you haven't understood it."
Have.
" Dr Feser answers all your objections and more.
Has not.
Your reliance on others indicates you cannot answer for yourself.
Aquinas failed by falsely claiming objects cannot move themselves.
Aquinas failed when he asserted falsely that when an object is in motion it is being put in motion by another.
Aquinas failed by the false dichotomy of assuming a linear hierarchical regression, while neglecting the scientific fact of multidirectional fundamentally circular causation.
Aquinas failed by begging the question in using the need for a first mover as a premise in an argument for a first mover.
Aquinas failed by non-sequitur by tacking on the word "god" at the end in a manner that has zero logical connection to the rest of the argument, even Koons calls this the gap problem.
Dr. Feser has never answered any of those problems in any of his books, articles, or lectures. But by all means, cite the specific words of Dr. Feser that show precisely how and why I am wrong.
Better yet, instead of just following along with somebody else, write your own words using true premises and valid logic to specifically refute my arguments.
SP,
Delete"You move yourself. A star moves itself. Many objects move themselves."
By move, we mean actualization of potential. An actual part of me can actualize another part of me, sure, but no one denies that. The question is: how does something not actual actualize itself?
"I see that all 3 responses to my clear and specific disproofs are of the form of "says you" or "somebody else showed you are wrong someplace else"."
What I just said was fairly basic. I'm fairly certain you've heard it before, so to continue push these "disproofs" is simply disingenuous.
Stardusty,
DeleteYou and I have been over this before.
It is clear that inanimate objects do not move themselves either individually or in groups else they could start and stop their own motion or change their own directions (like left or right). It's not like you've even tried to answer this fact. You simply ignored it then and now.
You also don't seem to know that "circular causation" is simply A causes B causes A reducing to A causes A. TFW addresses this by stating "therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself." Since circular causation is impossible then any series of moving movers must have a first mover.
It has also been pointed out to you ad infinitum that TFW is intended to literally demonstrate the existence of God. You have no excuse. Maybe Koon is ignorant but why are you claiming "somebody else showed you are wrong someplace else"
sd claims that he has understood the five proofs, but he has not, other than from the false authority of his circular gibberish.
DeleteHe does not understand the five proofs 🤣!
He claims that Dr. Feser has not answered all of his objections and more.
We cannot expect someone who actually thinks he can prove atheist determinism to be capable of reason, so it would be asking a lot to expect Dr. Feser to reply to the circular gibberish that sd thinks is rational proof. I note that Dr. Feser doesn't seem to reply to it. That says something.
Why would he want to debate gibberish?
The martyr maker says "Your reliance on others indicates you cannot answer for yourself"
What utter hypocrisy🤣!
Of course we do not have the magical "pouf", which sd deploys to claim as he does that the gibberish of "Saint" Russell, etcetra is original sd gibberish.
sd claims from his personal false authority that "Aquinas failed by falsely claiming objects cannot move themselves."
Aquinas did not falsely claim this.
"The martyr maker claims that "Aquinas failed when he asserted falsely that when an object is in motion it is being put in motion by another."
The martyr maker has failed to establish this other than through his kooky authority.
That he is kooky is amply shown by his belief that he can actually PROVE his determinist atheism, which depends solely on his circular method. 🤣
sd says, "Aquinas failed by the false dichotomy of ... blah, blah, blah"
Here again is sd's beloved "false dichotomy". Wow!. What a deep education sd must have to be able to say "false dichotomy" and then by magical "pouf" to have made a false proof in his own mind.
Does he not understand that he cannot dictate the contents of his head and thereby create an irrefutable proof? 🤣
The martyr maker says, "Aquinas failed by begging the question in using the need for a first mover as a premise in an argument for a first mover."
sd does not understand Aquinas, which is to be expected of someone with a head full of circular gibberish. It is sd who assumes his conclusion.
sd,Aquinas failed by the false dichotomy of assuming a linear hierarchical regression, while neglecting the scientific fact of multidirectional fundamentally circular causation."
sd says, " ... while neglecting the scientific fact of multidirectional fundamentally circular causation."
The fundamental problem here is that sd doesn't understand what science can prove. He has amply demonstrated this by giving the magical "pouf it's gone" treatment whenever what science can do goes over his head.
"write your own words using true premises and valid logic to specifically refute my arguments," says sd.
But why? sd doesn't use true premises and circular logic leads to no valid conclusion 🤣.
A lot of people do not accept sd as an authority on anything.
Beware!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Billy,
Delete"By move, we mean actualization of potential"
That is another failure of Aquinas, the notion of a one way push.
That is one of the failures of Aquinas I pointed out above, the notion of causation as a linear hierarchical essential series. That is not how causation works. There is no such thing as a one way push.
"An actual part of me can actualize another part of me, sure, but no one denies that."
Aquinas denied that when he cited the staff and the hand.
For some reason Thomists are keen to ignore the example of the staff and the hand. The staff and the hand are cited in support of the assertion that nothing can move itself. Obviously, the person in the example is moving himself. To account for this Aquinas made up, ad hoc, the notion of the soul as the prime mover of a human being.
"The question is: how does something not actual actualize itself?"
The answer is that there is no such thing as a one way push. Your idea that one thing changes another thing and then another thing in a linear chain of causation is wrong.
Parts change each other.
There is no call for a part to change itself. Part A and part B change each other mutually. That is how parts in the real universe work.
"What I just said was fairly basic. I'm fairly certain you've heard it before, so to continue push these "disproofs" is simply disingenuous."
Yes, I have heard your errors many times before.
Your key mistake is the notion of a one way causation. A paraphrased version of what Newton said:
"For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction"
There is no such thing as a one way causation.
Causation is, at a minimum, bi-directional. In real systems causation is a multilateral process.
The concept of a chain of causes regressing back to an uncaused cause is a false concept. That is not how the universe works.
In the real universe there is no identifiable first cause because all causation is mutual and multilateral wherein the designation of a first would be arbitrary and meaningless.
bmiller,
Delete"It has also been pointed out to you ad infinitum that TFW is intended to literally demonstrate the existence of God. You have no excuse. Maybe Koon is ignorant but why are you claiming "somebody else showed you are wrong someplace else""
It took a Nixon to go to China, it has been said.
In other words, sometimes people will listen to one of their own when they won't listen to an outsider. Koons is one of your own, but even he realizes there is a "gap problem".
I don't need Koons to understand that there is no logical connection between god and the First Way. It is obvious as a matter of logical argumentation that Aquinas simple tacked on the word "god" at the end as a non-sequitur.
Another one of your own is Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, Ph.D. (aka, Don Paco), Founder and author of Ite ad Thomam, referenced by Dr. Feser on this page.
It is so obvious that there is no logical connection between the last assertion after the semicolon in the last sentence of the First Way, and the argument for a first mover, that Carrasquillo does not even attempt to represent any such connection syllogistically, because there is none. He just stops his translation before that semicolon, completely omitting any mention of god in his logical analysis.
C-C: Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other (f).
End
iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2011/01/first-way-in-syllogistic-form.html
But by all means folks, help Aquinas, Koons, and Carrasquillo out here by connecting god, logically, necessarily, in the First Way.
Stardusty,
DeleteNo doubt you have an incorrect conception of God so perhaps that's why you think TFW doesn't provide evidence of the god you have in mind.
But who knows what you have in mind.
You can't distinguish between force and velocity, between circular causation and Newton's 3rd law nor between animate and inanimate objects.
Your habit of verbosely repeating the same misconceptions without alteration after having been shown what your misconceptions are is, to be kind, not very persuasive.
@ All,
DeleteAquinas' proofs of the existence of God are proofs of the consistency of the idea of God. When we prove anything our proof is about an idea. Proving that an idea is consistent with what we know takes sophisticated reasoning not available to one whose conclusions follow from premises decided as "true" in the first place. The assumptions, in this case, are arbitrary and the circularity makes the pseudo-proofs of sd irrational.
In order to "follow" sd, one must give up the notion of free will so that pushing something with a stick is not something that can be done by the free will choice of an agent capable of making such a choice. This, apparently, and irrationally is supposed to follow according to Newton's third law.
We do not have free will, according to sd, because Newton's third law "proves" it! 🤣 Actually, Newton's third law has been around in inchoate form for millenia, and it is totally irrelevant to whether or not we can truly make choices that affect how the sensible world evolves. A person throwing a spear in the year 10,000 BC could tell that there was a pushing back as after a day of practice his muscles would be sore. He also knew that a child's light spear pushed back less than his more massive adult spear. It is literally common sense. But, somehow, formulating the third law makes the free will choice to throw the spear "go away" as an entertainable idea, according to sd.
What garbage!🤣
Newton's third law is not even accurate, as physics shows. Even though physics shows that the future is indeterminate, sd, in the face of that, insists, through an act of faith in his determinist circularity, that we do live in a determinate, sensible world and have no free choice. That this is highly irrational, anyone can see.
He has various verbal tricks, like making definitions and then after applying his circular "knowing", that the determinist sensible world is all, claiming that he has proved that the determinist sensible world is all, so there can be no indeterminacy or free will.
Zany huh?🤣
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"No doubt you have an incorrect conception of God so perhaps that's why you think TFW doesn't provide evidence of the god you have in mind."
Ok, so that is a negative for any logical link between the word "god" and the rest of the first way.
I am not surprised. Since scholars generally cannot demonstrate any such logical link, it is highly unlikely that you would be able to.
I will give you a bit of assistance, however.
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."
In general, a semicolon can be replaced with a period. A semicolon can be used to join separate sentences into a single sentence when the author considers the sentences to be closely linked.
C1-"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other."
C2-"This everyone understands to be God."
What is the logical connection within the First Way for C2? What premises were set forth regarding god, and then reasoned to conclude god?
C1 is at least logically connected with the rest of the argument, which develops various notions of first, and subsequent, as well as considering motion and movers in various ways.
No such development exists within the First Way for god.
That's why Carrasquillo omits C2 from his syllogistic analysis, because C2 has no place, logically, in the arguments of the First Way. C2 is not a part of the syllogistic structure of the First Way.
The lack of syllogistic structural connection of C2 to the rest of the First Way is obvious just by reading the argument carefully. But it is made even more obvious when the First Way is translated into syllogistic format, and still more obvious when the syllogistic format is in turn translated into symbolic format. The omission of god from a careful logical analysis of the First Way is necessary because there is no logical connection between god and the rest of the arguments in the First Way.
God is just a tack on, a throwaway, ad hoc, blurted out utterance.
God is a non-sequitur in the First Way. That is why scholars call it the gap problem, because there is a gap, logically, between the arguments of the First Way and the unsupported assertion of god at the very end.
SP,
Delete"The answer is that there is no such thing as a one way push. Your idea that one thing changes another thing and then another thing in a linear chain of causation is wrong. Parts change each other. There is no call for a part to change itself. Part A and part B change each other mutually. That is how parts in the real universe work."
A can't actualize B if A is not actual, and so if B doesn't get actualized, then it also can't actualize A. If A and B are both actual, then to say they change each other is to say they actualize each other...but they are already actual, so they can't be actualizing each other.
What you are talking about is part of A being actual, then that part actualizing part of B, but you would agree that this part of A must have already been actual and that the part of B it actualized was not actual (which is why it needed to be actualized by this part of A). Thus, this part of B, because it is not actual, could not have actualized this part of A, but once this part of B is actualized, it can actualize another part of A. So, there might be different parts of A and B actualizing each other in succession, so A and B are changing each other in that sense, but that isn't mutual, it's still a "one way push", as you call it. It's successive. The part of A that actualizes a part of B isn't also itself actualized by that same part of B because, again, that same part of B can't actualize anything until it is actual itself, which is done by that part of A. But that part of A is already actual, so that part of B can't actualize it (BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY ACTUAL).
Something that is not actual can't actual anything. If it is actual, it doesn't need to be actualized. Thus A and B, can't actualize (or change) each other because if they are both not actual, they can't actualize anything, and if they are both actual, they don't need to be actualized. So, either way, there can't be any mutual actualization of change.
"Aquinas denied that when he cited the staff and the hand."
No it doesn't. Aquinas is simply separating substances. But whether its the stone, stick and hand, or hand, forearm muscles and motor neurons, the same concept applies. The hand can't move itself, just as the stone can't. It needs the forearm muscles, just as the stone needs the stick. The forearm muscles need the motor neurons, just as the stick needs the hand.
It's the same concept just illustrated with 3 separate substances compared to 3 separate parts of one substance.
None of this is in conflict with Newton. Actions having equal and opposite reactions is still successive. It even says it in the law. An action, which is actual, actualizes a reaction. The reaction isn't mutually actualizing the action. It's successive. It's just action in parts of A actualizing a reaction against other parts of A.
Stardusty,
DeleteAgain, you and I have been over this before.
Catholic students studying the Summa Theologica will have already been taught about God's attributes in their religious training. So they will have already known that God is immutable, perfect, simple, eternal, one etc. The Five Proofs are quick summaries to establish evidence of some of those attributes from which the others can be derived.
TFW shows that an Unmoved Mover exists which is an attribute of God and of nothing else.
St Thomas says what he is going to show, he shows it, and then after showing it, he declares that he has shown it. What is so difficult to understand about that?
You may have been ignorant of this context in the past, but you really have no excuse at this point. You haven't shown that any scholars have called this a "gap problem" in the sense you are presenting it, you've merely declared it. Maybe you misunderstood what they were saying.
Billy,
Delete"A can't actualize B if A is not actual"
The notion of actualization of a potential is worse than useless, it rots the brain.
"so they can't be actualizing each other."
Except they do. The whole of modern physics is formulated as just the mutuality you say cannot be.
You say that which is somehow cannot be. The reason is that your thinking has been rotted and polluted with the nonsense analytical approach of actualization of a potential.
Two of the most familiar forces are gravity and the electrostatic force. They both act mutually and multilaterally and according to an inverse square of distance.
F = (G m1m2)/r^2
F = (k q1q2)/r^2
These forces do not act sequentially, rather, mutually.
m1 and m2 change each other mutually.
q1 and q2 change each other mutually.
"So, there might be different parts of A and B actualizing each other in succession"
No. That was one of the great insights of Newton some 350 years ago. Every bit acts upon every other bit in a multilateral mutual process.
"it's still a "one way push", as you call it. It's successive."
No. Your thinking has been addled by the worse than worthless analytical technique of actualization of a potential.
There is no such thing as a one way push.
For example, consider an interstellar cloud of dust. Every bit of dust acts upon every other bit of dust such that the cloud collapses in upon itself.
"But whether its the stone, stick and hand, or hand, forearm muscles and motor neurons, the same concept applies. The hand can't move itself, just as the stone can't. It needs the forearm muscles, just as the stone needs the stick. The forearm muscles need the motor neurons, just as the stick needs the hand."
You stopped too soon. The whole organism moves itself.
A rocket moves itself.
A star moves itself.
Many objects move themselves. Aquinas was wrong.
"None of this is in conflict with Newton. Actions having equal and opposite reactions is still successive. It even says it in the law. "
False.
*LAW III.
To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction : or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.
Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone. If a horse draws a stone tied to a rope, the horse (if I may so say) will be equally drawn back towards the stone: for the distended rope,
by the same endeavour to relax or unbend itself, will draw the horse as much towards the stone, as it does the stone towards the horse, and will obstruct the progress of the one as much as it advances that of the other.
If a body impinge upon another, and by its force change the motion of the other, that body also (because of the equality of the mutual pressure) will undergo an equal change, in its own motion, towards the contrary part. The changes made by these actions are equal, not in the velocities but in
the motions of bodies; that is to say, if the bodies are not hindered by any other impediments. For, because the motions are equally changed, the changes of the velocities made towards contrary parts are reciprocally proportional to the bodies. This law takes place also in attractions, as will
be proved in the next scholium.*
@bmiller: there is a long step from a first unmoved mover to Yahweh. And it won't do to say that what is taught about Yahweh in scripture can all be allegorized away, leaving only a deposit of an Aristotelian first unmoved mover a la Physics 8 or Metaphysics 12.
DeleteYahweh is a nasty piece of work as represented in the sources we have. And the Yahweh figure is a necessary ground of the Catholic system of propositions, since Yahweh is identical to the "Lord" etc of the Gospels.
ficino4ml,
DeleteYour response isn't relevant to the point I made:
TFW shows that an Unmoved Mover exists which is an attribute of God and of nothing else.
That you think God is a monster doesn't matter. What would matter is, having agreed that TFW is successful, if you could produce a different, more convincing candidate for the Unmoved Mover.
All you've contributed is to tell us you hate God. So what?
@bmiller: you provided a list of attributes of the god of classical theism. I responded with reference to the Yahweh character because Christianity inherits that tradition, too, along with what it picked up from Aristotle, neo-Platonism and elsewhere.
DeleteI stand by what I wrote about the Yahweh character. The Zeus character is objectionable in many ways, too. I don't "hate Zeus" in way that entails that I think Zeus exists. I don't "hate God" in a way that entails that I think God exists. There are some cultural/historical pieces of our civilization that I think are best left behind. A literal belief in the Olympian pantheon would be one; a literal belief in the unique doctrines of Christianity would be another. Of course I do not expect you to agree with that.
bmiller
DeleteThe Unmoved Mover is an attribute of Aristotle's God and if you are correct and it is an attribute of nothing else, then TFW does not show that Aquinas's God exists.
In fact, in that case it shows that Aquinas's God, who I suppose is the Catholic God, does not and cannot exist.
ficino4ml,
DeleteAgain. So what?
Your response is still irrelevant to my point. The fact that you persist seems to indicate to me that you have some emotional issue. I can't help you with that. Go see a priest.
Walter,
DeleteGod is the God of everyone so it doesn't matter who you are, if you can reason properly you can reason to at least some understanding of God.
The fact that Aristotle was able to reason to at least some understanding of Yahweh independently supports belief in the existence of God. Of course he did not have access to revelation so he could not be expected to get the full picture. It's remarkable he got as far as he did.
bmiller
DeleteBut Aristotle did not reason to any understanding of Yahweh. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover has nothing whatsoever to do witj Yahweh
@bmiller: "Your response is still irrelevant to my point. The fact that you persist seems to indicate to me that you have some emotional issue. I can't help you with that. Go see a priest."
Delete??? You expect me to retract what I wrote about Zeus and the Yahweh character? As though a negative evaluation of those representations -- or maybe, only of the Yahweh representation -- is arrived at only or mostly because of "some emotional issue"?
Maybe you ought to reread the Bible very carefully.
I think our dialogue has reached its end, at least for now.
ficino4ml,
DeleteNow you're missing my second point.
My first point was that your opinion that "Yahweh is a nasty piece of work" was irrelevant to the topic of whether or not the last sentence of the First Way was a non-sequitor.
My second point is that you doubled down on your irrelevant comment after it was pointed out to you. So that is a sign you either don't understand what a fallacy of irrelevancy is or you are peeved about something. You're a smart guy so I know you understand why your continued discussion was fallacious...yet you continued. I expect more from you than others so that was why I was harsh.
Additionally I don't care what you do or don't "retract". I do care if you try to change the subject.
Walter,
DeleteLet's recall the background of this particular dispute. It was asserted that The First Way ended in a non-seqitor:
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."
My argument was that The Summa Theologica was a text for Catholic theology students and so they would have already had some basic religious training and know of the attributes of God and so when it was demonstrated that the Unmoved Mover exists they would recognize at least some of those attributes are attributes of God and no other. And so the argument is an argument for the existence of God and
so the last statement is not ad hoc or a non-sequitor.
The argument itself doesn't care who is making it...Aristotle, Aquinas, Ed Feser, etc. All it does is show that there is an Unmoved Mover. That is all. Theology students will have recognized that this Unmoved Mover is God. So the last statement is just a closing reminder.
It is irrelevant to both The First Way and my argument regarding the last statement whether Aristotle or Aquinas (or whoever) held additional/different views in addition to the argument of The First Way. As far as theology students are concerned this is what they call God. As a matter of fact, so does Aristotle.
bmiller
DeleteAs far as theology students are concerned this is not what they call God. It is what Aristotle called God because Aristotle was some sort of (proto-)deist.
You (as well as Ed and Aquinas and many others) seem to think that if deism is proven, you just have to add some things ad you get to theism. But that is falls. If deism is proven, theism is necessarily false.
Aristotle, as far as I know, realized that "what he called God" could not possibly interfere, reveal or create from nothing, so there is no logically possible way to get from Aristotle's God to the God of Aquinas.
That is also Aristotle's revenge.
bmiller,
Delete"All it does is show that there is an Unmoved Mover."
"That is all."
" So the last statement is just a closing reminder.""
Indeed.
All 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god, as you clearly acknowledge here.
Perhaps you would be so kind as to remind the folks on the Fermilab post of this obvious fact?
Walter,
DeleteThat is also Aristotle's revenge.
Cute. I like it.
However.
You assert that theology students have been wrong for centuries and have been calling the Being that is the cause of all change God erroneously. That's a pretty remarkable assertion. You'll have to show me where and when the Catholic Church made your assertion dogma in order for your argument to be credible.
You are also assuming facts not in evidence. There is nothing in The First Way that establishes a deistic god in any way whatsoever. The First Way does not establish that the Unmoved Mover "could not possibly interfere, reveal or create from nothing". It won't do to add stuff not in the argument and then make claims based on the stuff you added.
there is no logically possible way to get from Aristotle's God to the God of Aquinas.
So what? No one was ever trying to do that. Pointing out that even a pagan can prove the existence of at least some of the attributes of God does not entail therefor that everything this particular pagan thought was correct.
Stardusty,
DeletePerhaps you would be so kind as to remind the folks on the Fermilab post of this obvious fact?
If you mean I should remind them of this reminder:
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."
I think it is you who needs to be reminded of the reminder you said "Indeed" to.
They already got it.
"All 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god, as you clearly acknowledge here."
DeleteThey have _not_ acknowledged this!
Tom Cohoe
bmiller
DeleteI don't assert that theology students have been wrong for centuries and have been calling the Being that is the cause of all change God erroneously.
Theology students have been calling God the Being that is omnipotent, omniscient, all-good, and the creator of everything that exists ex nihilo who revelas Himself and interferes in Hid creation.
Suppose i believe that the unmoved mover is an impersonal 'force', is that also "that which everyone understands to be God"?
And of course there is something in The First Way that establishes a deistic god.
The Unmoved Mover for Aristotle was a kind of deistic god.
Walter,
DeleteSince you agree that theology students have considered the Being that is responsible for all change is God, then they would recognize "a first mover, put in motion by no other" as what they call God. That is all that is needed to be in agreement with my argument.
That they would also have recognized other characteristics as being descriptive of God doesn't negate that fact.
Suppose i believe that the unmoved mover is an impersonal 'force', is that also "that which everyone understands to be God"?
Then I would suppose you are making a different argument. I can only repeat that to you so many times.
bmiller
DeleteThere is nothing in thé First Way that says thé Unmoved Mover cannot be an impersonal Force, so, by your logic, that would be that which everybody underrstands to be God.
Walter,
DeleteThere is nothing in thé First Way that says thé Unmoved Mover cannot be an impersonal Force, so, by your logic, that would be that which everybody underrstands to be God.
You must be a Star Wars fan;-) But that shouldn't get in the way of making valid arguments. The fact is that the argumemt is sufficient to establish an attribute that theology students will recognize as belonging to God as taught by the Catholic faith. You seem to have agreed with me in your prior post.
You keep wanting to shoehorn in something that is simply not in the argument or, in this, case you make an argument from ignorance. There are an infinite number of propositions that are not prohibited in the TFW but it doesn't follow that it is an argument for all of those either.
However, it pleases me to know that you find TFW convincing and that you're at least a deist and not an atheist. ;-)
bmiller
DeleteSo, I gather if I found some brown animal hairs on my property you would say that the hair belongs to that which everybody understands to be a brown bear, because, you know, brown hair is definitely an attribute that belongs to a brown bear.
If Aquinas had said after presenting all five ways that the combination of those ways leads to that which everybody understands to be God, he would have made some Sense.
At thé end of thé First Way, it is a non-sequitur.
And, indeed, if the First way were sound I would be a deist and for that reason, not a theist.
But the first way isn't sound.
Walter,
DeleteYour analogy bears (ha!) no resemblance to the argument at hand.
Theology students have been taught the unique attributes of God as part of their faith instruction including scripture. There is simply no doubt that the Unmoved Mover fits at least one/some of those unique attributes as you've conceded. Since The First Way proves such a being exists with this/these unique attributes then it it follows that the students are justified in all calling this being God.
Even you have been calling this being God.
bmiller
DeleteYou say that if it is proven (which is false,BTW) that a being exists with this/these unique attributes then it follows that studente are justified, and I agree they would be justified if it were proven that a being existed with all these attributes But a being who only has one of these attributes is not what any of the studentes would call God
Now, they, as well as Aquinas, may think that if a being has this attribute it also has the others, but that isn't proven and Aristotle himself would reject it.
Hence, saying that this being can be identified as God is not only unjustified, it is also somewhat arrogant on the part of Aquinas to think he is so much
better than Aristotle.
a
Walter,
DeleteAll I can say, once again, is you are attacking an arguement of your own making, not that of Aquinas. Aquinas specifically is not making an argument about all the attributes of God, only that the fact that God exists can be proven by natural reason.
Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
Either God exists or he does not exist. Atheists hold the latter position.
You yourself said you would cease to be an atheist given the argument of TFW is true.
So if you cease to hold that God does not exist, then it necessarily means that God does exist and you are a theist.
Looks like we are just repeating things now. Thanks for the discussion.
bmiller
Deleteindeed, it's time to move forward.
Just one final remark. the fact that I would cease to be an atheist if TFW is true only proves my point because in that case I would not believe in the same God as you, which menas that there is no being which everybody understands to be God. You understand X to be God while I would in that case understand Y to be God, just like Aquinas understood X to be God while Aristotle understood Y to be God.
Anyway, thanks for the discussion.
Prof. Feser, could you do an analysis on the Resurrection of Christ, why is it rational to believe in it?
ReplyDeleteThat would be welcomed
DeletePhilosopher Peter Van Imwagen has written about it.
For a full analysis, you need to do C. S. Lewis (or Thomas Aquinas) style classical apologetics and establish the existence of God and the immateriality of the soul before examining the historical evidence pertaining to the event of the resurrection. However, evidentialist apologetics getting strait to the historical evidence, such as practiced by Lee Strobel or Tim and Lydia McGrew often works in practice. This is because the default view on the mind/body problem is dualist (as the best physicalist philosophers concede) and because many (not all) agnostics and professing atheists have a deep down belief that God exists but hate God or have been hurt by the Church.
DeleteA book about the Resurrection from a philosophical perspective was written by Prof. C.Stephen Evans, "The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith." Publjshed by Oxford Univ. Press in 1996.
Deletehttps://www.amazon.com/Historical-Christ-Jesus-Faith-Incarnational/dp/019826397X
It was favorably reviewed by Prof. Peter Van Inwagen of Notre Dame.
https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/vaninwagen.htm
Has Dr. Feser made any blog posts RE: universals & God’s omniscience? I find that discussion to be truly one of the greatest ways in which The Holy Gospels address certain philosophical truths (e.g. Our Lord’s Words to Pilate, The Last Gospel at the Latin Mass, etc.). Dr. Feser gives it a remarkable treatment in his book, and, frankly, if he’s written more about it I’d love to read more!
ReplyDeleteWhich book of Dr Feser's? sounds fascinating
DeleteAfter listening/seeing this on You Tube, I think that nowadays in our Intro. to Philosophy class, we should first prove to students that philosophy is a serious endeavor rather than a game, matter of unproven opinion, or “studied for the questions”.
ReplyDelete@ All,
ReplyDeletemartyr maker says, "Dr. Feser, I think of you as a prodigal son. You were a good child of atheism in the nineties, but then you became lost in the wilderness and then lured by the intoxicants of theism around the turn of the century. But, my hope for your wellbeing springs eternal, always hopeful you will find your way back home to the clear rationality of atheism, I will keep a candle in the window for you to light your way on your journey :-)"
What pathetic simpering 🤣!
And yet what velvet gloved, uncompromising, true unfriendliness.
Since his logic is tightly circular and he cares not how many martyrs his words help to make, he is not a person to be listened to as anything but one who misleads for the purpose of sating his own lust for power.
He certainly does not understand Aquinas. This is not a claim that he allows in his head but his gibberish requires the claim to be made anyway.
I have been busy the last few days at a significant distance from my own parish helping to prepare my son for his Baptism and Confirmation into the Catholic Church - the preparation of a potential martyr for martyr maker and his ilk who post and exchange with him with banal unconcern for the murderous attacks on Christianity that they engender.
Power is obviously martyr maker's real concern. He certainly cannot teach as wilful circularity makes him incapable of doing anything but dictating and makes him incapable of examining in any way but superficial and pretentious any thought that would contradict his "knowing".
The dying New Atheist cult has nothing but social inertia on its side. Anyone not willing to be a new atheist disciple can see that. Randomness abounds in the sensible world although martyr maker has dictated that there can be no such thing and has put out a few definitions which "disallow" the expression of such a concept as randomness, a method that he actually thinks is good thinking.
He is a dangerous nut. His screws rattle inside his head.
Hey, hey, new atheist play, how many martyrs have you made today!
😏
Tom Cohoe
@Tom Cohoe: your insults and jibes do not attract me to your church. Just sayin'.
DeleteI don't insult and jibe. I defend the Church from murderers.
DeleteTom Cohoe
Cohoe
DeleteSo you think that StarDusty is a murderer do you?
Have you noticed that not a single individual has jumped in to support you in your bizarre allegations?
@Tom Cohoe: "What pathetic simpering 🤣!" That including the emoticon is not an insult? And Stardusty is a murderer?
DeleteOK, I think you are using words differently from the way most people use them.
Yes, Christians are being murdered. Nobody addressing me is concerned with that. Hatred of God encourages this murder. That none of my addressors is concerned about this makes my point.
Delete"Let's all be nice. The murder of Christians is much less important. We don't believe in God anyway, so the sooner we do away with Christians the better. They're not very nice to us as we kill them and yet we are so nice to each other as we kill them."🤣
You don't like talk like this?
Tough.
I am using words the way everyone else does. They are plain, simple, to the point, and easy to understand, even when you use pseudo-logic.
What absolute nonsense to say that I am not using words the way most people do🤣.
(Come back to your senses)
😏
Tom Cohoe
Cohoe
DeleteEr, I think ficino was being sarcastic🤣🤣
My son, 17, has been accepted into a Physics program, is plowing through Aquinas and loving it. It took him a few attempts to get started, though. With some help from Thomistic Institute, he has finally started getting it though. Next step, Scholastic Metaphysics then Aristotle's Revenge. :)
ReplyDeleteDaniel,
DeleteOne of the greatest joys of being a father is to experience your son besting you. Don't you agree?
There is something deeply satisfying when your son surpasses you in accomplishment. A great many parents who did not have the opportunity to receive an advanced education, work hard to assist their children to attend university, and then that day when he graduates and thus surpasses, yes, I am sure you will be very proud of your son when that day comes.
However, I suggest you prepare yourself for the inevitable time that your son can prove Aquinas wrong, because modern physics disproves the ways of Aquinas.
Aquinas was hindered by Aristotle. Newton came later than Aquinas, disproving Aristotle and, with those disproofs Aquinas fell.
Your son will hear of Aristotle, however. He will learn that an ancient man who did not experiment reached many false conclusions. Your son will learn that Aristotle was wrong about motion, wrong about change, wrong about the elements, and wrong about causation.
Your son will learn that those ancient ideas are of no more value than Greek mythology of the pantheon of gods, just quaint and now useless misconceptions believed only in ancient times except for a few ignorant modern people, the ilk of flat Earthers.
When your son learns the truth of modern physics and the falsehoods of Aristotle I hope you remain proud of him as he proves Aquinas a failure.
@ All,
DeleteMartyr maker (sd) says, "However, I suggest you prepare yourself for the inevitable time that your son can prove Aquinas wrong, because modern physics disproves the ways of Aquinas."
Modern physics does not disprove the ways of Aquinas, but then he neither understands the ways of Aquinas nor the limits of physics. That he actuall thinks that he can PROVE his deterministic atheism is a clue to his irrationality. His method is entirely based on self-willed circularity, which is irrational.
The martyr maker says, "Aquinas was hindered by Aristotle. Newton came later than Aquinas, disproving Aristotle and, with those disproofs Aquinas fell."
Newton did not disprove Aristotle in any way significant to Aquinas' metaphysics. Certainly the dumb "false dichotomy" is just from the whole cloth of his personal ramblings, not something worth regarding as rational thought.
I have to say that it is quite an ugly thing the way sd latches onto an innocent father's expression of joy and starts preaching his almost certainly unwanted, flakey, material.
Martyr maker says, "Your son will learn that those ancient ideas are of no more value than Greek mythology of the pantheon of gods, just quaint and now useless misconceptions believed only in ancient times except for a few ignorant modern people, the ilk of flat Earthers."
His opinion as proud bigotry disgusts as he never has any rational answer to objections to his mental errors.
He just has his magical, "that is not in my head, so it is disproved - the "pouf" of the New Atheist cult which gives cover and encouragement to other flakes killing Christians around the world.
😏
Tom Cohoe
My son has an intellect and free will. He will come to his own conclusions as he grows. I pray he continues to value truth above all, since God is Truth.
DeleteWith regard to his physics degree - I believe he is well equipped now to distinguish between well founded scientific assertions relating to his subject and off the cuff quasi philosophical remarks that in no way follow from any scientific facts. So much of what comes out of the mouths of atheists and agnostic types these days is grounded in unfounded and often unrecognized metaphysical assumptions. They sound more like fundamentalist Christian types these days, as your above post so abundantly demonstrates. Like the flip side of the God is Not Dead movie.
Daniel,
Delete"My son has an intellect and free will. He will come to his own conclusions as he grows. I pray he continues to value truth above all,"
That's a good thing then, that you are teaching him to value truth above all.
In truth university level physics books generally ignore Aristotle because his physics was so wrong it is a waste of ink to present such notions when the goal is present modern physics.
In a conceptual physics course, or a physics course for non-technical students, Aristotle may be presented as a historical figure who got things pretty much all wrong because he used superficial observation and thought, not experiment.
To the extent Aristotelian physics is taught at all it is used as examples of how not to do science, and how humans can be fooled or fool themselves into mistaken concepts.
Students who are taught Aristotelian physics at all are taught how mistaken Aristotle was about supposed natural and violent motion, different sorts of motion in the heavens as opposed to sublunary motion, his false notions about the elements, and his false explanations for continued motion of a thrown object.
Yet, still today in 2023, there are many who cling to these erroneous Aristotelian notions of a sublunary lossy medium, unidirectional causation, and the useless notion of change as the actualization of a potential.
So, it is a very good thing that your son will have the opportunity to learn how wrong those ancient mistakes of Aristotle were.
Have you prepared yourself mentally to be educated by your son when he explains inertial motion to you, the cosmological principle, and how the very notion of causation has given way to the mutuality of modern physics formulations?
Daniel
DeleteYou should also prepare yourself for the possibility that your son will employ his intellect and free will to escape the straight jacket of the world view that you have assiduously socialised and inculcated into him. He will now encounter a diversity of perspectives held by the clever people around him - both students and instructors - and meet secularists, gay people, trans people and others who do not subscribe to your belief system or behavioural mores. I wish him well in his liberation.
@ Daniel,
Delete"My son has an intellect and free will. He will come to his own conclusions as he grows. I pray he continues to value truth above all, since God is Truth."
I pray that he continues to follow truth.
Meanwhile, your pretentious interlocuter doesn't know what he is talking about. For example, a simple thesis that he cannot disprove is that God causes every scientific experiment to turn out as He wills it to turn out.
I do not advance this thesis, but it cannot be disproven either. Therefore, the intellectually vacuous project to prove deterministic atheism fails immediately.
If your interlocutor cannot see this obvious fact, he is highly unlikely to be reliable as a "thinker" in anything more subtle, like understanding Professor Feser, Aristotle, or Aquinas.
He just pesters people with impotent blather and participates in the hatred of the Church and the undeniably deadly consequences of this hatred.
Tom Cohoe
Stardusty certainly illicits a guarenteed response from you Tom Cohoe. It must be quite unpleasant to feel so pestered all the time and to be compelled to respond to what you see as 'impotent blather'.🤣
DeleteII must say , Stadusty - unlike some- is invariably civil and polite, and conducts himself - again, unlike some - without the slightest hint of hatred or malice.
The subject matter of your address reveals bad priorities.
DeleteThe more outraged my speech makes you, the more you reveal bad priorities. The murder of Christians by God haters is not a nice thing.
Poor, poor, "nice", sd🤣.
His blather is intellectually impotent, but it influences other people of weak intellect and thereby jacks up the hatred of God, leading to the murder of Christians, in growing numbers.
Where is _your_ concern about this?
😏
Tom Cohoe
StardustyPsyche
DeleteHas Ed ever defended Aristotelian physics on this blog or anywhere else? Hi focus is almost entirely on Aristotelian metaphysics, which he makes a strong case for in all of his books and brings into dialogue with modern physics, especially when discussing quantum mechanics, A and B theory of time, and so on.
Just out of curiosity have you read Aristotle's Revenge, Neo-Scholastic Essays, or even Aquinas? I suspect not, because then you wouldn't state such obvious straw man arguments about what Ed actually advocates for with regard to Aquinas and its relationship with the sciences.
Cohoe
DeleteDo you draw absolutely no conclusions from the complete lack of support that you are attracting for your excesses? Might I suggest that you are having no affect whatsoever on StarDusty, who is simply ignoring you, are embarrassing fellow Christians by your conduct, and just annoying your opponents who are hardly likely to be encouraged to explore your perspectives further by your mindless emoticon-laden insults?
Daniel,
Delete"Has Ed ever defended Aristotelian physics on this blog or anywhere else?"
Yes, in defending assertions such as:
1."Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another"
This statement is dependent upon Aristotelian physics, the notion that sublunary motion is in an impeding medium such that a moving object will slow and stop and its motion will be lost. We now know that premise is false.
2."For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality"
This defines motion as change, which is an Aristotelian physics claim that was denied by Newton in his Principia.
3."nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality"
This is the Aristotelian notion of a 1 way push, which Newton denied in his Principia.
4."It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself"
This is another Aristotelian physics notion that is false at the level of the physics examples Aquinas provided (wood, fire, staff, hand), since at that level of organization examples of self movers abound.
Dr. Feser has defended all these Aristotelian physics assertions by asserting that all 5 ways are sound.
Oh, I should add that the OP is primarily concerned with the characters of laws of nature, that is, in physics, when we speak of a law of nature what does that really mean, and just what is the character of a law of nature? I agree with Dr. Feser broadly that material progresses as it does as a consequence of the natures or properties or characters of that material.
"you wouldn't state such obvious straw man arguments about what Ed actually advocates for with regard to Aquinas"
Could you please be more specific?
What assertions of mine, specifically, are in your view straw man arguments?
Why, specifically?
What specifically has been said by Dr. Feser to demonstrate that I am somehow misrepresenting his views?
Could you possibly cite a specific assertion I have attributed to Dr. Feser and also cite the words of Dr. Feser that show I am, in your opinion, misrepresenting his words?
I hereby apologize in advance for any misrepresentation of anybody's words, and will repeat the apology and desist upon specific evidence of such, or retract the apology in the event of a lack of valid specific example.
First note that sd actually thinks that he can prove deterministic atheism, which demonstrates the irrational nature of his thinking, because it is easy to think up metaphysical scenarios in which his schemes cannot work, as I already did here.
Delete"the notion that sublunary motion is in an impeding medium such that a moving object will slow and stop and its motion will be lost. We now know that premise is false."
All mediums are impeding and there is medium everywhere. Saying "sublunary" is a bogus obsession of sd's. Saying "net loossless" is another bogus obsession that has no bearing on the concepts of motion, identity, or unmoved mover. Saying these things just demonstrates the lack of understanding of the martyr maker in anything that he does not dictate from his own head. He is irrational by self-willed free-will choice. The world just doesn't have to work according to his dictates.
A fat raspberry for sd🤣!
"This defines motion as change, which is an Aristotelian physics claim that was denied by Newton in his Principia"
You are actually claiming that Newton denies that change occurs?!?!🤣
Well he doesn't.
See how kooky sd is?🤣
"This is the Aristotelian notion of a 1 way push"
It is not. Your private interpretation is unimpressive, to say the least.
"I agree with Dr. Feser broadly that material progresses as it does as a consequence of the natures or properties or characters of that material."
Since you put down long lists of disagreement with Professor Feser ever time he publishes something, this is patently false. You broadly disagree with him, but you seem to think that saying "Op" converts him into a witless supporter.
I repeat, your belief that you can actually prove deterministic atheism and somehow capture all other minds proves how kooky you actually are.🤣
Some say that I am a big bad meanie for defending freedom, Christianity, and the Catholic Church from murderers, but at least that is a human and worthwhile cause. OTOH, what is the excuse for writing (small "g") god when yammering away about (capital "G") God on a Christian website, except out and out rudeness. But your atheist collaborators insist you are so nice and polite.
Heh! Ok, if that's being nice and polite your collaborators love rudeness🤣!
"apologize in advance … retract … in the event of …"
But, but, but. Isn't the future deterministically decided? Isn't it either 1 or 0? An apology in advance is either required 100% sure or is not required period. What's with the vague, indeterministic, expression? How can you betray your certainty with such mushy words?
Is there hope for you after all? I'll pray for you to the Holy Family.
Sorry for being such a meanie, but when someone as irrational as you says, "we've won except we haven't got rid of religion (a paraphrase)" I have no choice but to regard you as dangerous.
😏
Tom Cohoe
StardustyPsyche,
DeleteYou have listed principles that Ed has asserted, yes. But you have not engaged with any of his defenses of these principles. I am here at this blog primarily to learn about Aquinas, Aristotle, and how Ed brings them into dialogue with modern science. I think it is somewhat fair to expect someone who is attempting to debunk Aquinas and Aristotle, to actually be able to site the key arguments from Ed's books in favor of those principles. Stating principles that Ed defends, then providing no adequate account of the ways in which Ed defends those principles is a form of straw manning in my opinion. At the very least, it does not lead me to take your arguments seriously at all. This is what I meant when I said "You wouldn't state such obvious straw man arguments about what Ed actually advocates for with regard to Aquinas."
So you ask for this:
"Could you possibly cite a specific assertion I have attributed to Dr. Feser and also cite the words of Dr. Feser that show I am, in your opinion, misrepresenting his words?"
I would say you have not shown any knowledge of Ed's defenses of the principles he argues for. What would convince me to take you more seriously is perhaps a summary of, say Ed's primary descriptions of change and engagement with Newton in Aristotle's revenge. For example, are you aware that Aristotle defines four types of change, of which local motion is only one? Can you list the other three? Do you reject them as well? Because arguing against these other types of change have far reaching implications on the metaphysics of life, metaphysics of color, the metaphysics of qualia, propositional attitudes, and so on. These all relate to kinds of change that are not reducible to local motion, or any of the clarifications that Newton makes with regard to local motion.
Ed goes on to discuss motion in general here, including local motion and has a specific chapter on Newtonian physics and its relation to Aristotle. Are you aware of his discussions here or any of the arguments he makes?
Thanks,
Daniel
Tom Cohoe
DeleteYou need to lighten up and take your pills dude. Man.of your age shouldn't be getting so excited.
Daniel,
Delete"You have listed principles that Ed has asserted, yes. But you have not engaged with any of his defenses of these principles."
Such as?
How does Dr. Feser defend what I have labeled 1,2,3,and 4 above? What possible rational defense could there be for those gross errors that have been shown to be wrong so many times over the past centuries that the number of counter demonstrations defies accurate counting?
The only defense for 1. is to deny that all motion is in space.
The only defense for 2. is to deny inertial motion.
The only defense for 3. is to deny the mutuality of causation.
The only defense for 4. is to deny examples of self movers.
What possible sound defenses could Dr. Feser or anybody offer for such denials?
Recall, Aquinas begins by asserting that his arguments are from what is manifest and evident to our senses, and ends by asserting the necessity of a first mover.
For inertial motion Dr. Feser has, I have read, retreated from necessity to assert mere compatibility, but there are a multitude of idle speculations that are merely compatible.
I have read Dr. Feser attempt to explain causality using macro objects, merely repeating the errors of Aristotle in describing a one way push. To deal with the mutuality of causation that is evident to our senses Dr. Feser has reprinted a strawman of Russell on the subject.
"For example, are you aware that Aristotle defines four types of change, of which local motion is only one?"
Yes, that is another error of Aristotle, long ago shown to be false.
"These all relate to kinds of change that are not reducible to local motion"
All change entails what you call "local motion". Color arises from the motion of light and of signals in the optic system. When you change your mind there is corresponding motion in your brain, as absent such motion in your brain you cannot think anything at all because in that case you are dead. Change of temperature requires motion.
You cannot name any sort of change that does not entail motion.
"Ed goes on to discuss motion in general here"
Here where?
But yes, I have read a variety of arguments from Dr. Feser regarding Aristotelian notions of change, causation, and physics. None of them were sound.
If you have any such arguments available by all means, post one or more here, or provide a link and a specific passage reference, or better yet use your own words instead of relying on the words of others to express your views.
If you provide any specific defense of 1,2,3,or 4 above I can provide the specific manner in which that defense is unsound.
@ All,
Delete"If you provide any specific defense of 1,2,3,or 4 above I can provide the specific manner in which that defense is unsound."
Heh! He can't🤣!
He cannot show that Dr. Feser is unsound because he cannot understand Dr. Feser in the first place. That sd actually thinks that he can prove deterministic atheism shows that he is unhinged at best. He cannot show, for example, that every perception of sd's is not simply a matter of God's will, especially since the determinism sd insists obtains allows sd no method to distinguish a difference between brute external science and God's willful pulling the strings of sd's perceptions.
I do not advance this thesis, but since it is impossible to disprove by communicable argument, sd's project is clearly the project of a mind that is unhinged at best. I say "at best" because the unprovability of deterministic atheism has been shown here many times. sd has no good excuse for continuing with it.
That God _is_ involved in the sensible world can be privately discovered by means of humble intercessory prayer asking for sufficient light of grace, but sd, tightly bound to his unprovable preconception, asserts his God given free will against doing so. It would be a first step in understanding how foolishly wrong he is.
Previously, I showed how a non-sequitur in a writing, a speech, or in communicable thought does not imply that a fallacy has been discovered. It implies nothing more than that he who calls "non-sequitur!" cannot follow the argument. sd has failed to understand this, again, unsurprisingly, since he is engaged in the lunacy of trying to prove what, as I have demonstrated repeatedly, cannot be proven.
He cannot, and in fact does not, understand the arguments, from Aristotle and earlier, through Aquinas, and up to Professor Feser and others if they run counter in some way to his unprovable and unwarranted assumption. He just emits dumb mumbo jumbo which does not engage but which merely asserts from imaginary authority.
His new atheist defenders insist that he is "nice" and "polite", just not nice and polite enough on a Christian website to at least spell "God" with a capital "G". But this would be a minor matter does he not, by his own admission, intend the elimination of religion, which would be the elimination of freedom to choose what to believe - always a goal of oppressors. Compared to some oppressors with "polite" and "friendly" defenders, the dying new atheist cult, to which sd belongs, is amateur night at the forum, so impotent are its arguments. Nevertheless, deliberately misleading people at a vulnerable stage, with the goal of eliminating their choice always engenders murderous violence, so sd has to be defended against to always be kept in the spotlight as to what he is really all about - an utterly kooky seeking after the power to dictate.
😏
Tom Cohoe
I asked you whether Ed has ever defended Aristotelian physics on this blog. You then listed a whole bunch of metaphysical points and claimed that they depend on Aristotelian physics.
DeleteAre you aware that Ed specifically states in his book, Aristotle’s Revenge, that he is “not going to be defending the claim that the sublunary and superlunary realms are governed by different laws, or the doctrine of natural place. [He is] talking about philosophical ideas that can be disentangled from this outdated scientific framework, such as the theory of actuality and potentiality and the doctrine of the four causes. (see the Preface.)” You are saying in your Point 1 that it is dependent on Aristotle’s Physics. Ed is saying specifically that they are not and can be disentangled from it. Thus it would be a straw man argument to claim that Ed is defending Aristotle’s Physics. And so attacking Aristotle’s Physics is attacking a position that Ed is not attempting to defend. And you would know this, if you read the first page of his book. Rather, he is showing how modern physics does not contradict point 1. Ed says
“The central argument of this book is that Aristotelian metaphysics is not only compatible with modern science, but is implicitly presupposed by modern science.”
So I ask you again, why is it that you come here without knowing any of the arguments he makes in his books? Why do you expect us to spoon feed you Ed’s arguments, when you state without even knowing what they are that you can provide the specific manner in which his arguments are unsound?
I feel no need to engage with you at all on these subjects because you have already predetermined your answer.
Now, if you actually purchase a copy of Aristotle’s Revenge, I’d be happy to go over his discussions with you. But I will not spoon feed you.
Bill,
Delete"“not going to be defending the claim that the sublunary and superlunary realms are governed by different laws"
Then Dr. Feser cannot defend the First Way, because 1. above depends on this principle, as I enumerated above.
In the sublunary realm Aristotle believed that all motion is in an impeding medium, such that motion will slow and stop and be lost. Thus, on that view of sublunary physics if one observes a moving object there must be something acting upon it to keep it moving, hence the (fallacious) regress to a first mover.
"philosophical ideas that can be disentangled from this outdated scientific framework, such as the theory of actuality and potentiality and the doctrine of the four causes."
Wrong on both counts.
Actuality and potentiality require a one way push, such that A acts upon B without B equally acting upon A. Dr. Feser cannot disentangle this outdated scientific framework if he wishes to defend the theory of actuality and potentiality.
Further, the four causes are another outdated scientific framework that Dr. Feser cannot disentangle from, because in modern science there are no such causes, only a continual or continuous process of multilateral mutual causal processes.
"You are saying in your Point 1 that it is dependent on Aristotle’s Physics. Ed is saying specifically that they are not and can be disentangled from it."
Indeed, I am well aware that Dr. Feser makes that mistake.
"Thus it would be a straw man argument to claim that Ed is defending Aristotle’s Physics."
No. Dr. Feser must defend Aristotelian physics to defend those notions dependent upon such mistaken ideas.
"“The central argument of this book is that Aristotelian metaphysics is not only compatible with modern science, but is implicitly presupposed by modern science.”"
Yes, I am well aware that Dr. Feser makes those errors.
"Why do you expect us to spoon feed you Ed’s arguments,"
I am much more interested in your arguments. I have demonstrated conclusively many errors of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dr. Feser again and again.
What say you? Do you have your own views in your own words?
@Daniel
Delete@StardustyPsyche
You both were discussing whether Aristotle's types of "motion" other than local motion (sc. I didn't see ya'll list the other three, but they are alteration, generation and corruption) "entail" local motion. It's worth noting that in Metaphysics 7 and 12, Aristotle makes local motion a condition for the other three. Aquinas comments that that local motion is the first of motions and is necessary for all other forms of motion, since nothing can move in any other way that is not moved with/by local motion: "All other motions however [i.e. other than local motion] are posterior to that motion that is according to place. Therefore, if the first is removed, it is necessary that the posterior be removed. Whence [it follows that] whatever is found to be moved by other motions is moved by local motion." (In XII Meta l. 8 C2551).
Hey ficino4ml - There is a difference between reducible and entail. To reduce all the other types of change to local motion is to deny that the other types of change even exist. A dependency on local motion does not mean reducability to local motion. For example, you cannot analyze the loss of a substantial form purely in terms of local motion.
DeleteDo you agree?
Thanks,
Daniel
Well, since ficino4ml is joining the conversation, maybe there is a point in actually engaging in a discussion of Ed's views on this topic in Aristotle's Revenge. Note that this is an extended paraphrase of chapter 4, section 2.3 Inertia. Thus the quality is reduced since this is my interpretation of the text and I have likely made mistakes here and there. Buy the book if you want to get it from the horse's mouth.
DeleteSo, rather than focus on all four of SDP's restatements of the principle of motion, lets just focus on the principle of motion in comparison to Newton's principle of Inertia. That is how Ed goes about discussing the issue. Any objections? So the principles are as follows:
Principle 1 The principle of motion. Everything that is in motion must be moved by something else. Whatever that is in motion is put in motion by another.
Principle 2 The principle of inertia. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
Some claim that these two principles are in conflict because some assume that Aristotle and Aquinas taught that objects cannot keep moving unless something is continuously moving it, whereas Newton showed that it is a law of physics that an object, once it is set in motion, will remain in motion without any such mover.
Ed says these claims are unfounded because having this position requires you to read into both Aristotle and Newton, positions that they don’t actually hold. Ed claims that the principle of inertia presupposes the principle of motion.
Ed lists five ways in which this conflict is illusory:
1-There is no formal contradiction between the two: Assuming that motion is being used in the same sense, there is no contradiction between the two. The principle of inertia states that a body will in fact continue its uniform rectilinear motion if it is moving at all, as long as external forces do not prevent this. It does not tell us why it will do so. In particular, it does not tell us one way or the other whether there is a mover of some sort which ensures that an object obeys the First Law, and which is in that sense responsible for its motion. In other words, it is a assumed that Newton is making this claim, but he makes no such claim.
Lets discuss this first, then I'll go post the second way.
@ All,
Delete"Do you have your own views in your own words?" says sd, hypocritically, for does he have his own views in his own words, or are there special rules where sd can cite "Saint Russell" and many others and they magically become his own words?
sd assumes his conclusion before setting out to argue that it is true, and far from answering cogent criticisms "again and again", he never answers them. He does not answer the criticism that it is impossible to prove that God does not create every sensation that sd experiences including the sensation of "thinking" thoughts. Certainly sd has given up on the idea that he is free to determine his own thoughts because the determinism he fervently embraces cannot allow it.
Yet he persists in insisting that he can think well enough to give a response to Daniel's objections and accuse him of some kind of "plagiaristic" stealing of the words and ideas of the people that Daniel cites, while coming up with nothing original himself.
"No, I will not read a book you name, you must come up with your arguments de novo while I can cite whoever I want", he says, abusing Daniel with hypocrisy.
"in modern science there are no such causes, only a continual or continuous process of multilateral mutual causal processes" says sd, even though he is incapable of understanding the limits of modern science, limits demonstrated by modern science itself. He needs to claim modern science as "his" in his pseudo-arguments for the purposes of foisting "pseudo-explanations" on people he pretends to teach as if from an unassailably superior intellect that does not need to respond (especially in his own, unsupported, words) to criticisms which he dares not allow himself to understand.
Why, just by writing "OP" he signals that he understands Professor Feser better than Professor Feser understands himself and Professor Feser then somehow becomes sd's assistant and self defeated thinker🤣.
"In the sublunary realm Aristotle believed that all motion is in an impeding medium, such that motion will slow and stop and be lost. Thus, on that view of sublunary physics if one observes a moving object there must be something acting upon it to keep it moving, hence the (fallacious) regress to a first mover."
All mediums _are_ impeding. The "fallacy" is in sd's mind only.
"Actuality and potentiality require a one way push, such that A acts upon B without B equally acting upon A" says sd.
This is false.
"Further, the four causes are another outdated scientific framework that Dr. Feser cannot disentangle from, because in modern science there are no such causes, only a continual or continuous process of multilateral mutual causal processes."
Science studies only the sensible world and it has concluded that it is limited even in what it can learn about the material world, a fact that sd refuses to understand. The repeated failure of a particular psr doctrine is as legitimate as an experimental finding, and this one is as strongly established as any science.
"No. Dr. Feser must defend Aristotelian physics to defend those notions dependent upon such mistaken ideas" says sd.
Too bad for sd that he cannot understand Aristotelian _metaphysics_ (not physics), which is as correct as it must be for the purposes of Aquinas.
Beware!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Daniel,
DeleteYes, I am aware of that approach taken by Dr. Feser, as I mentioned that Dr. Feser retreats to mere compatibility, and there are innumerable idle speculations one can concoct that are compatible with observed inertial motion.
For example, it could be witches, donch ya know? Lots and lots of little magical witches, invisible little magical witches, 10^100 of them all nudging every particle in the universe along moment by moment.
Compatibility just won't do.
The First Way is an argument for necessity. If the best you have is compatibility then necessity is logically ruled out.
Further, Dr. Feser is violating the foundational method of Aquinas in the First Way, to argue from what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses".
At the level of the unaided senses Aristotle and thus Aquinas seem to be correct. Sublunary motion does seem to be in a impeding medium, and clearly all thrown or rolled objects do slow and stop, and it does seem as though their motion is lost. I mean, Aristotle was not an idiot, he did not just dream this up in his sleep or something.
He wrote a description of what is apparent to the ordinary observer, just as it is apparent that the sun orbits the Earth and that the Earth is motionless.
So, based on that appearance it makes sense that to keep an object moving something must keep moving it, and this very logically leads to a regress terminating in a first mover.
But we have expanded what is manifest and evident to our senses. It is now manifest and evident to our senses that there is nothing pushing or pulling an object to keep it in inertial motion. It is now manifest and evident to our senses that all motion is in space, which is lossless for motion. It is now evident to our senses that motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed.
So now we no longer have an argument for a first mover based on what is manifest and evident to our senses, because it is now very obvious that there is no external mover at work to accomplish inertial motion.
So again, Dr. Feser violates the principle Aquinas set forth at the beginning, to base the argument on what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses", not just concocted speculations of invisible and undetectable movers.
ficino,
Delete"local motion (sc. I didn't see ya'll list the other three, but they are alteration, generation and corruption) "entail" local motion."
How about kinds of change? Do you happen to have a similar list handy for change (say of temperature, place, quantity, etc)?
@Daniel: "A dependency on local motion does not mean reducability [sic] to local motion."
DeleteAFAIK, the A-T position is what you say, that local motion of some substance is a condition for the other kinds of motions in/of substances, but those kinds of motions are not just themselves instances of local motion. If Aristotle had thought that they were, I don't suppose that he would have marked out three other kinds of motion as such, but rather, would have included them among kinds of local motion (pushing, pulling, twirling).
Generation and corruption won't occur unless something has undergone local motion, but they are not proper instances of local motion because the subject does not perdure throughout generation or corruption. There are a lot of passages in Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle that make this point. When Aristotle talks about, e.g., a quantity of water as changing into a quantity of air, the water does not persist beyond its own corruption. Aquinas would say that what perdures throughout generation or corruption is prime matter. Lindsay Judson maintained, when I asked him about this in a colloquium, that what perdures in Aristotle's view is not "prime matter" (Judson like many today denies that Aristotle had a doctrine of prime matter) but "the extension."
A second reason why generation and corruption in A-T are not proper motions like local motion is that they are instantaneous not successive (cf. e.g. Aquinas In I De Anima l. 6 C75).
@ficino4ml Thank you for this great response. I appreciate it. And I think that aligns with what Ed was saying in Aristotle's revenge.
Delete@sdp, so Ed's point in his first way is to show that there is no formal contradiction between the principle of motion and the principle of inertia. I think you admit this point when you go on about the causes of sustained motion might might be witches.
DeleteYou brought up the point about the first way, and I take it you mean Aquinas's first way. That is fine, but besides the point at the moment. My purpose here is to review Ed's five points showing that there is no contradiction between the principle of motion and the principle of inertia. I'm not here trying to prove the first way. OK? I just want to stick to one topic at a time, if that is alright with you.
With regard to this "Further, Dr. Feser is violating the foundational method of Aquinas in the First Way, to argue from what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses"."
Again, I think this applies to Aquinas' first way, so lets leave that aside and just focus on the two principles.
So, glad we can come to an agreement on way 1, although I understand you don't think much about that point. The second way covers familiar ground.
2-Equivocation: But motion is in fact not being used in exactly the same sense. As I have stated, Aristotle identifies four difference kinds of change, of which local motion is only one. Ed argues that these other forms of change are not reducible to local motion. More fundamentally, all changes involves an actualization of a potential. When the Newtonian principle states that a body in motion will tend to stay in motion, it isn’t saying that a potential which is being actualized will tend to continue being actualized. Even if it were suggested that the principle entails this claim, the point is that that isn’t what the principle of inertia itself is saying. Modern physics says nothing at all about actuality and potentiality. And just because it doesn’t use these terms, doesn’t mean that these terms are not applicable or true, and they are certainly not debunked.
Again, the whole purpose of this section for Ed is to debunk the notion that Newton's laws debunk the principle of motion, or act and potency. I think this is a fair point to make. Newton is just talking about forces. He never brings up causes. He never talks about act and potency. Now, before you bring up witches and wizards again, there are another three ways to discuss. He gets into more details there. But I think we can agree that Newton makes no mention of causality at all.
The point that I'm sure you will return to, is the claim that Aristotle and Aquinas believed in the necessity of a continuous one way push. Ed is going to talk about that later, so if you are OK with way 2, I will move on.
@SdP: "How about kinds of change? Do you happen to have a similar list handy for change (say of temperature, place, quantity, etc)?"
DeleteMy list of Aristotle's kinds of motion was simplified, because in the Categories 15a13-14 , he gives six kinds of "kinesis", i.e. "motion" (in a broader sense than local motion): generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and "change in regard to place." Over time, increase and decrease no longer appear in Aristotle as "motions."
But notice that earlier, I gave Aristotle's types of "motion." But "motion" in Aristotle, as I said, can be roughly what we'd call change. I think that if your new question were put in Aristotle's terms, it would be asking for a list of types of "alteration." You mention "change of place," but for Aristotle that is the first type of motion, i.e. local motion. Your "quantity" comes up as a kind in the Categories, as I just cited. I think "temperature" and the rest would be folded under change in "quality." For Aristotle, "the hot" is a feature of nature even more fundamental than any of the four elements. Aristotle gives as the most fundamental features of nature two pairs of contraries, the hot and the cold, which are active principles, and the wet and dry, which are passive principles. I don't off top of head know of a comprehensive list of kinds of quality in Aristotle.
You may know Aristotle's list of ten "categories" or ways in which "being" is said: substance, and then nine kinds of accident, sc. quantity, quality, relation, place, time, in position, having, acting, and being acted upon.
@SdP: "I mentioned that Dr. Feser retreats to mere compatibility,"
DeleteI remember that you said this, and I was surprised to hear it. This thread now is quite long! Earlier you wrote this: "For inertial motion Dr. Feser has, I have read, retreated from necessity to assert mere compatibility, but there are a multitude of idle speculations that are merely compatible."
I think you said that Dr. Feser allowed that inertial motion is compatible with a First (unmoved) Mover.
Can you help me/us out by giving citations for this in Feser's works?
@ All,
DeleteInteresting. Professor Feser "brackets off" part of Aristotle and then theism and atheism are somehow "compatible" within what remains. Of course, Professor Feser also shows that none of the various types of scientism (note that _scientism_ is a metaphysical position on what science can do - it is not the operation of sensible science itself) really work. So the "compatibility" does not really support scientism at all. Throwing out part of Aristotle's metaphysics does not result in scientism as a possible truth.
In rushes sd, the ultimate scientismist, claiming that the leading "compatibility" introduced by Professor Feser has somehow caused the fall of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Professor Feser himself.
This is a very odd type of pseudo-thinking, even for pseudo-thinking.🤣
Let us give it a whirl:
"sd does not understand what Professor Feser is talking about" and "sd never misunderstands at all" are incompatible sentences. Let us make these two sentences compatible by "bracketing off" (essentially, "removing") part of the first sentence. Now we have "What Professor Feser is talking about sd never misunderstands at all".
Whee, what fun!🤣
Apart from sacrificing truth for utility in argument, sd has invented a cool new way to advance whatever he feels like as necessary.
Too bad it's a load of circular BS. Start of as a scientismist, end up proving scientism. Start off a pseudo-thinker, end up pseudo-thinking pseudo-thoughts.
He does indirectly prove that he doesn't understand the methods of Aristotle, Aquinas, or Professor Feser.
I said it was cool, but it's actually painful to see such incoherence as sd wilfully exhibits. I feel sorry that his potentially fine mind is thrown away on clinging to what, deep down, he must know is a false procedure that he dares not to doubt.
Unfortunately, as part of what he has expressed as an unfulfilled goal is the elimination of religion. One who insists on "thinking" as poorly as sd does and who would see the elimination of religion as an achievement is a danger to those who choose to practise Christianity. We already have enough martyrs. So …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Daniel,
Delete"Ed's point in his first way is to show that there is no formal contradiction between the principle of motion and the principle of inertia."
There is no formal contradiction between Casper the Friendly Ghost and inertial motion. That does not make a ghost necessary.
By arguing for a lack of formal contradiction you are attempting to do just that, make a ghost necessary just because it cannot be absolutely proved that there is no ghost pushing everything along.
Lack of formal contradiction is logically invalid to demonstrate necessity.
Necessity.
Keep that word in mind at all times. Anybody can concoct wild speculations that lack formal contradiction, so what? If that is all you have then you have nothing of any value.
"I'm not here trying to prove the first way. OK? "
No, not OK. If you cannot defend the ways of Aquinas then Thomism fails.
"Aristotle identifies four difference kinds of change, of which local motion is only one."
Local motion is not a change. That is another error of Aquinas.
Change of motion is a change. Continued motion is not a change, it is a state. Aristotle recognized that for motion in the heavens and for motion in a void. Aristotle made the mistake of considering sublunary motion to be in a lossy medium, and that mistake is at the very core of the errors of Aquinas.
"More fundamentally, all changes involves an actualization of a potential."
That is another mistake of Aristotle. That idea reduces to a one way push, which is wrong.
The premise that a thing with potential can only be actualized by something else that is already actualized in the same respect is also wrong.
"When the Newtonian principle states that a body in motion will tend to stay in motion, it isn’t saying that a potential which is being actualized will tend to continue being actualized."
Right, because inertial motion is not a change.
"Modern physics says nothing at all about actuality and potentiality. And just because it doesn’t use these terms, doesn’t mean that these terms are not applicable or true, and they are certainly not debunked."
They are debunked which is why modern physics says nothing about those terms.
"But I think we can agree that Newton makes no mention of causality at all."
That's what Newton was describing, a debunking of Aristotelian causality and a description of mutual causality.
Newton, Principia - "But how we are to collect the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences ; and, vice versa, how from the motions, either true or apparent, we may come to the knowledge of their causes and effects, shall be explained more at large in the following tract.
For to this end it was that I composed it."
Isaac-Newton-Principia-English-1846.pdf
ficino,
Delete"For Aristotle, "the hot" is a feature of nature even more fundamental than any of the four elements."
This is almost too painful to even listen to. Thanks for taking the time to provide the above details.
It would not be so bad if one could just read all the errors of Aristotle as quaint historical misunderstandings that represented mankind's primative first steps using the unaided senses to try to make sense of the natural world.
The painful part is when one realizes that there are still whole communities of modern human beings, otherwise intelligent and highly functional folks, who actually still believe this nonsense, almost as a sort of holy scripture that by definition cannot be wrong, as though a mere man has been elevated to a near god-like status as source of eternal physics truth. Very sad.
"I think you said that Dr. Feser allowed that inertial motion is compatible with a First (unmoved) Mover.
Can you help me/us out by giving citations for this in Feser's works?"
Daniel goes into detail about this April 20, 2023 at 9:03 AM. It has come up a number of times on this blog over the years so it is just something I remember as an expressed principle, not something I can cite by passage, sorry.
Of course, it is an irrational inversion of logic to cite speculative compatibility to assert necessity, the sad part is Thomists actually find that sort of nonsense somehow convincing of necessity.
ficino,
DeleteThis might be a useful starting point as you consider citations you requested above.
Oerter on inertial motion and angels
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/01/oerter-on-inertial-motion-and-angels.html
Right, SDP I'm going to take it that you agree that there is no formal contradiction between Newton's first law since you reverted to a riff on witches and wizards. Understand that Ed is building a cumulative case. So don't declare victory until you've heard the entire case.
DeleteYour comments with regard to the second point once again go into the one way push concept and the idea that continued linear motion is a state for Newton. This will be discussed in Ed's fourth way for showing there is no conflict between the principle of inertia and the principle of motion.
"Newton, Principia - "But how we are to collect the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences ; and, vice versa, how from the motions, either true or apparent, we may come to the knowledge of their causes and effects, shall be explained more at large in the following tract.
For to this end it was that I composed it."
Isaac-Newton-Principia-English-1846.pdf"
Ed talks about this in a more general discussion of the project of mathemetizing change in his fifth way of showing there is no contradiction. So put that in your pocket for now.
Here is the third way.
3-The “state” of motion: Newton claims that inertia is a state. Fair enough. But, you have to agree that there is a change at least in location, such that an object transitions from one position to another, in the same way as there is change from a state of repose to motion itself. Having said that, what inertia as a state implies is that there is an absence of change. In addition, it holds that external forces are required to move a thing out of this state and thus bring about a change. These would cause acceleration or deceleration. The acceleration and the change require an external mover. But this in no way contradicts the principle of motion. The disagreement is at most over whether a particular phenomenon counts as a true change or motion in the relevant sense, not over whether it would require a mover or changer if it did so count.
With regard to unchanging motion as a state, Ed goes into a discussion of absolute motion versus relative motion. For example, if you were in empty space, you might be able to feel acceleration or deceleration, but without some frame of reference, there would be no way to tell how fast or slow you are going. This is a complicated question, and Ed goes into the topic in detail but I don't think it is necessary to discuss it since our main topic is discussing whether there is a conflict between the principle of inertia and the principle of motion. The main point here is that the state of motion can just as well be seen as a lack of change, and therefor need not be discussed in terms of act and potency or the principle of motion and those points in the principle of inertia that do involve changes, such as acceleration and deceleration, are completely open to analysis in terms of act and potency and the principle of motion.
@ All,
Deletesd says, "it cannot be absolutely proved that there is no ghost pushing everything along"
Then sd's project to deny God fails since he cannot prove that there is no ghost.
But he's going to go on trying to contradict himself anyway🤣.
sd says, "Lack of formal contradiction is logically invalid to demonstrate necessity."
So if sd cannot contradict his claim that he cannot prove that there is no ghost it is, by his own just stated "principal", "logically invalid to demonstrate necessity".
In other words, again, he has no argument against God. Just BS.
It needs to be said again that a prime reason to see sd as a wordy kook is that he actually thinks he can prove deterministic atheism (despite the fact that he has already said twice at this point that he can't).
sd says, "If that is all you have then you have nothing of any value"
Then since he cannot disprove them, even by ridiculously calling them "wild", he has nothing of value.
Because of his tight circularity, he is just burning rubber with the brakes locked on, getting from nowhere to nowhere.
sd says, "If you cannot defend the ways of Aquinas then Thomism fails".
If Dr. Yogami does not defend Aquinas then Aquinas fails? Strange🤣.
"That is another mistake of Aristotle. That idea reduces to a one way push, which is wrong"
No Aristotelian mistake here. Things get pushed. That does not "reduce to a one way push", except in sd's argument from blather.
"The premise that a thing with potential can only be actualized by something else that is already actualized in the same respect is also wrong."
As unsupported a personal opinion as it gets. Just declare something "wrong", and, why by the false light streaming from sd's intellect, it _is_ wrong🤣!
sd doesn't have this intellectual power. Not that he doesn't have a potentially fine mind that he could make actual if he would so choose, but doesn't have the power to radiate private opinions that others have no choice but to accept as truth.
sd says, "local motion is not a change"
Is too!
sd says, "Continued motion is not a change, it is a state"
False. It is a state of change.
sd says, "inertial motion is not a change"
Is too! (I just have to shake my head at his crazy pseudo-teaching).
sd says, "They are debunked which is why modern physics says nothing about those terms"
They are not debunked. That a book about alfalfa says nothing about plate tectonics does not mean plate tectonics is debunked. It's difficult to believe that you think you are making sense. The only thing being debunked is your credibility. Not that circularity is credible anyway.
sd's quotation from Newton is not a "debunking" of Aristotle any more than Einstein's relativity is a "debunking" of Newton. "Refinement", a positive concept, is not "debunking", a negative concept. Else sd would have to say that quantum mechanics debunks all science of the sensible world and sd's silly ideas.
sd cannot understand this. Come to think of it, he doesn't really understand anything🤣.
BEWARE!
Tom Cohoe
@ All,
Deletesd says, "almost as a sort of holy scripture that by definition cannot be wrong, as though a mere man has been elevated to a near god-like status as source of eternal physics truth"
Whoever sd refers to in his vague, mixed-up, statement, it is ridiculous if he means that Christians think Aristotle is a source of "eternal physics truth". It is also ridiculous if he means that Christians think that Jesus Christ is a "source of eternal physics truth". sd probably doesn't understand himself what he means since, from his tight circularity he actually thinks he can "prove" deterministic atheism, which is pretty kooky.
It appears to me that, at his wit's end, he is desperately appealing to ficino for help in his anti-Christian bigotry.
I just want to say here that if I appear scornful and dismissive to the "very nice" sd, that he was so to me much earlier. He scornfully told me that I didn't know enough to be worth talking to and stopped addressing me directly. I continued to address him by his fake handle for quite a while before I decided to be similarly "nice" to him and stopped using it.
Anyone as anti-Christian as sd is is neither nice nor friendly, nor can he truly be concerned with human rights. So …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Daniel,
Delete"But, you have to agree that there is a change at least in location"
You mean as the sun changes location and the Earth is motionless? That is what is evident to our senses, correct? It is pretty obvious, the sun is changing location all day long as it arcs across the sky. The Earth is not moving at all, just go outside and sit on a big rock, pretty obvious, the Earth is not changing location.
"in the same way as there is change from a state of repose to motion itself"
Huge error.
No, those two things are entirely different. No, acceleration is not the same as inertial motion.
Acceleration is a change in the motion of an object.
Inertial motion is not a change in the motion of an object.
"a conflict between the principle of inertia and the principle of motion."
Of course there is.
Continued Aristotelian sublunary motion requires an external mover.
Inertial motion does not require an external mover.
Dr. Feser's blizzard of rationalizations does nothing to address that fundamental fact.
Aquinas defines motion as change:
"For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality."
Aquinas clearly states that all motion is change, and all motion requires an external mover.
Inertial motion denies that assertion.
Thomistic motion and Newtonian motion are opposites of each other.
Inertial motion invalidates Thomism.
This is an outline of Thomism:
Manifest.
Evident to our senses.
Motion is change.
Change requires an external changer.
Necessity.
First mover.
God.
In the days of Aristotle and Aquinas that was indeed evident to the senses. Continued motion did require an external mover, such as a horse was needed to keep a wagon moving. It made sense.
But new experiments tuned our senses. Galileo and Newton were the first to comprehensively show how to sense more accurately.
This is how inertial motion invalidated Thomism:
Manifest.
Evident to our senses.
Motion does not require an external mover.
First mover not necessary.
"Acceleration is a change in the motion of an object. Inertial motion is not a change in the motion of an object."
DeleteMy point above is that if inertial motion is a state, then it need not be analyzed as requiring any actualizing of a potential. Also, regarding acceleration or deceleration, I think that this is required in Newton's principle of inertia. Lets look at it again:
Principle 2 The principle of inertia. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
Right, so "unless it is compelled to change the state by forces impressed upon it" clearly involves something that either accelerates, decelerates, or changes the direction of the thing that had once been at rest or in uniform motion. That can be analyzed according to act and potency. Can you, without a wall of text, agree to this fact at least? Because it is as clear as day to me that there is no contradiction here.
If yes, then all we have left to discuss is the first part: "Everything continues in a state of rest or continued motion in a straight line". Ed has proposed here that the state of rest or continued motion need not be viewed as needing an actualizer because Newtonian physics describes it as a state, and therefore implies lack of change. An actualizer, as per Ed, is only required when a change occurs. Note that this argument rests on Newton's definition, not on Aristotle's definition and I think this is a valid application of the law of motion.
But, you say this:
Delete"In the days of Aristotle and Aquinas that was indeed evident to the senses. Continued motion did require an external mover, such as a horse was needed to keep a wagon moving. It made sense."
And this gets us to Ed's fourth way, finally. Here is my summary of it:
4-Natural motion: Ed says that the idea that Aristotle or Aquinas taught that no object can continue in local motion unless some mover is continuously conjoined to it is an urban legend. Rather, what they believed in was the doctrine of natural place to which an object would move towards due to its natural form. Ed is not defending the doctrine of natural place, but this does show that the previous idea of one way push was not held by them. And so they believed that whatever imparted an object’s form imparts its motion to it, but neither the generator or the generator’s form need remain conjoined to the object it generated. Light things move upward by virtue of their form, heavy bodies downward.
With regard to projectile motion, Aquinas says “An instrument is understood to be moved by a principle agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principle agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and light things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby … And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.” Thus, when an object’s motion tends against an object’s natural place, it requires a conjoined mover to initiate the motion. And so projectile motion resembles accelerated motions in Newtonian physics because accelerated motions require a force to act on a body throughout the time that it is accelerating (second part of the principle of inertia).
And since natural motion requires no conjoined mover, as opposed to the case of projectile motion, this seems much more compatible with Newton (first part of the principle of inertia). The principle of inertia in the sense of absence of external forces is similar to Aristotle’s concept of natural gravitation.
Aquinas did believe that force was conveyed through a medium after accelerated motion occurred, which goes against the principle of inertia. But in his defense, modern science still relies on a notion of “field” that is a medium to explain the motion of bodies. So yes, it was a mistake, but not one that debunks the principle of motion, especially if we accept Newton's description of inertia as a state where there is an absence of change.
So, if natural gravitation shows us real instances of motion without needing an external mover of force being applied as per Aristotle and Aquinas, then they should have had no problem accepting the first part of Newton's principle of inertia such that "Everything continues in a state of rest or continued motion in a straight line". They would have seen this as just an intrinsic part of its nature, in a similar way that motion generated toward natural place was thought to be an intrinsic part of all natural objects as well. No external movers required.
@ All,
Deletesd says, "It is pretty obvious, the sun is changing location all day long as it arcs across the sky. The Earth is not moving at all, just go outside and sit on a big rock, pretty obvious, the Earth is not changing location."
Wrong, right off the bat🤣!
I guess sd never heard of Einstein's general relativity, in which the Earth, steady as a rock with the sun orbiting it is as valid as the "debunked" (sd's word, not mine) Newton would have it.
Yeah, Aristotle and Aquinas were just better observers than sd. Huge error🤣!
sd says "Dr. Feser's blizzard of rationalizations does nothing to address that fundamental fact"
I suppose, to sd, fake teaching from fake wisdom, blind to how Einstein falsifies sd's words from the very start, Dr. Feser's words would be as impossible for sd to see through to what Dr. Feser is actually saying, as a blizzard would be impossible for sd to see through to reliable sense.
Guys, don't pay any attention to sd. He doesn't know what he is talking about. He chooses, using his God given free will, to block reason.
sd says, "Inertial motion denies that assertion"
Yeah, yeah, sd's a real Einstein🤣!
sd says, "Inertial motion invalidates Thomism"
False.
sd says, "Thomistic motion and Newtonian motion are opposites of each other"
False. sd doesn't even understand what "opposite" means in this metaphysical context
sd says "This is an outline of Thomism:
Manifest.
Evident to our senses.
Motion is change.
Change requires an external changer.
Necessity.
First mover.
God.
[...]
This is how inertial motion invalidated Thomism:
Manifest.
Evident to our senses.
Motion does not require an external mover.
First mover not necessary."
Blah, blah, blah! sd with his fake wisdom cannot think correctly because he is afraid to think correctly. If he did, he would have to admit that his kooky project to prove atheist determinism is impossible. In fact, he already has admitted it - "it cannot be absolutely proved that there is no ghost pushing everything along," sd said in a recent comment.
Ok, sd, with your Einstein brain, then give it up and take the first step towards seeking truth instead of blindly attacking what you do not allow yourself to understand.
Meanwhile, it is an amazing thing to watch sd flounder like a beached tuna🤣!
Pray for sd.
But let us not forget that this non-Einstein-like atheist determinist is dangerous as he would like to see the end of religion and freedom of choice in this age of martyring Christians. So, truly, …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Daniel,
Delete"Right, so "unless it is compelled to change the state by forces impressed upon it" clearly involves something that either accelerates, decelerates, or changes the direction of the thing that had once been at rest or in uniform motion. That can be analyzed according to act and potency. Can you, without a wall of text, agree to this fact at least?"
I will try not to put too many textual bricks in this wall:-)
Change of motion, either from rest or uniform linear motion, can be analyzed as a change due to mutual causation. Aristotelian act and potency is an invalid analytical technique because it is a fundamentally linear and one way causation paradigm, and is thus unrealistic and not at all useful in a realistic analysis of change.
"Ed says that the idea that Aristotle or Aquinas taught that no object can continue in local motion unless some mover is continuously conjoined to it is an urban legend."
Dr. Feser is wrong about that. His attempts at such assertions are just revisionist attempts at a patch up for a clearly failed view, Aristotelian sublunary motion as accurately described in the First Way by Aquinas.
"For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality."
Aquinas clearly defined all motion as change requiring a continuous external changer. Dr. Feser is cherry picking and ignoring much evidence to deny the obvious, that Aristotle and Aquinas were fundamentally wrong about inertial motion.
Why do you suppose Newton's ideas were so revolutionary, because they matched with what was then considered to be settled physics? No, just the opposite, Newton's laws overturned Aristotle, radically, fundamentally.
"And since natural motion requires no conjoined mover,"
Which is exactly backwards from Newton.
So-called natural motion is the opposite of inertial motion. Aristotle said a heavy thing falls because it is going to its natural place. Newton said a heavy thing falls because there is a force attracting (moving) that object toward the Earth, and the Earth equally toward it. We call that acceleration due to the force of gravity, which is not inertial motion.
Dr. Feser has it completely backwards. He is equating Aristotelian natural motion with Newtonian inertial motion. In fact Aristotelian natural motion is supplanted by Newtonian acceleration due to mutual attraction.
" medium to explain the motion of bodies. So yes, it was a mistake, but not one that debunks the principle of motion"
Aristotle thought sublunary motion was in a lossy medium such that an object subjected to so-called violent motion would slow and stop and its motion would be lost. That totally invalidates the Aristotelian principle of motion.
In fact all motion is in space. There is no lossy sublunary medium. Violent motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed, so Aristotle got that wrong. That error invalidates Thomism because the primary argument of Thomism is based unavoidably on that fundamental Aristotelian error.
Daniel,
Delete"So, if natural gravitation shows us real instances of motion without needing an external mover of force being applied as per Aristotle and Aquinas,"
It doesn't. Gravitation is a real instance of mutual forces applied to each other, each being external to the other.
"then they should have had no problem accepting the first part of Newton's principle of inertia such that "Everything continues in a state of rest or continued motion in a straight line""
Again, you have conflated opposites, conflating acceleration due to mutual gravitational forces with inertial motion.
"natural place was thought to be an intrinsic part of all natural objects as well. No external movers required."
Which is exactly backwards from reality. Aristotelian natural motion is supplanted by the effects of movers external to each other.
Aristotle had it backwards.
Aquinas had it backwards.
Dr. Feser has it backwards.
What Aristotle thought happened on its own actually happens with mutually external movers.
What Aristotle thought happened with an external mover actually happens on its own.
What he thought was not a change actually is a change.
What he thought was a change actually is not a change.
"Natural" motion (not a perceived change) is really gravitational acceleration (a change).
Sublunary continued motion (a perceived change) is really inertial motion (not a change).
@ All,
Deletesd says "Sublunary continued motion (a perceived change) is really inertial motion (not a change)".
The word "sublunary" is irrelevant, but it fascinates sd for some reason🤣!
Inertial motion is not "not a change".
sd says, "So-called natural motion is the opposite of inertial motion"
They are the same thing. A description of motion based on the idea of gravity does not make metaphysical cause false.
sd just eliminates it by fiat. He thinks that he is right because he is right🤣.
That is circularity. You would think Newton was an atheist, having described the action of gravity and force laws. But Newton "wasn't smart enough" to deduce atheism from the description. Only sd is "smart" enough to do that. Except that he isn't. He just assumes it in the first place.
It's actually not very smart to think that you are deducing atheism from Newton when you have assumed it in the first place.
Objects do go to their natural places whether that is mathematically described or not.
sd does not understand what is meant by "violent motion". He takes it to mean motion in which no willful action is involved because, for sd, the determinist atheist, there is no such thing as free will.
sd's thinking this does not make it so, except by assuming it in the first place. It certainly doesn't follow from anything Newton wrote.
That is just massive delusion🤣.
It is the massive delusion of someone who actually thinks he can prove deterministic atheism.
That is cloud kookoo land.
Never mistake sd's irrational, circularity based, fake "teaching" as anything based on reason. He does not allow himself to think correctly.
His beliefs require that nobody has a choice and that what you think can be "wrongthink", requiring correction.
That someone so deluded can think that wrongthink needs correction (just look at his fanatical persistence) makes him dangerous.
So …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
“Change of motion, either from rest or uniform linear motion, can be analyzed as a change due to mutual causation. Aristotelian act and potency is an invalid analytical technique because it is a fundamentally linear and one way causation paradigm, and is thus unrealistic and not at all useful in a realistic analysis of change.”
DeleteI see where the problem is. The thing that moves another in the case of two objects or forces colliding with one another involves an analysis of change in terms of act and potency in both directions. Thus the mover is also moved by the thing it caused a change in rest or rectilinear motion. You say this makes it not at all useful. But I don’t see why a mover must only be a mover and not also moved? There is nothing in the principle of motion that requires, say, an unmoved mover to be the one causing the motion. That is only the result of Aquinas’s first way to prove the existence of God. Your focus on Aquinas’s first way distracts you from what the principle of motion actually states. Let me remind you again:
Principle 1 The principle of motion. Everything that is in motion must be moved by something else. Whatever that is in motion is put in motion by another.
Where, in this description, does it say that the thing that is mover must be itself unmoved and in no way be also moved in the interaction with the thing it moved?
“Dr. Feser is wrong about that. His attempts at such assertions are just revisionist attempts at a patch up for a clearly failed view, Aristotelian sublunary motion as accurately described in the First Way by Aquinas.
"For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality."”
And where in this description does it require that the thing in actuality cannot be itself in potentiality towards motion? Nowhere. All things, except for God, are a mixture of act and potency. And so there is no contradiction here if the mover is also moved in some way. The fact that it had a potentiality that was brought into actuality by the thing it moved is fine.
“Aquinas clearly defined all motion as change requiring a continuous external changer. Dr. Feser is cherry picking and ignoring much evidence to deny the obvious, that Aristotle and Aquinas were fundamentally wrong about inertial motion.”
That claim can only be applied to projectile motion, not to natural motion or natural gravitation. And the fact that he did accept a type of motion that has its motion intrinsic to its nature, requiring no continuous motion, is enough to show that there is no fundamental contradiction between Aquinas and Aristotle’s principle of motion and the principle of inertia.
“Why do you suppose Newton's ideas were so revolutionary, because they matched with what was then considered to be settled physics? No, just the opposite, Newton's laws overturned Aristotle, radically, fundamentally.”
So Ed admits elsewhere that other scholastics, such as Averroes and some later Thomists, did believe that the one way push was at the heart of all motion. Ed has shown that this was not fundamental to all motion for Aquinas and Aristotle. For example, if I climb castle wall in Aquinas’ day, and dropped a rock, my act of dropping the rock involves me simply unclasping my hands. No external motion is imparted to the rock as it falls. That motion, they thought, was intrinsic to the rock, and did not require a continuous mover, as it falls. Because no external force was imparted to the rock.
“So-called natural motion is the opposite of inertial motion. Aristotle said a heavy thing falls because it is going to its natural place. Newton said a heavy thing falls because there is a force attracting (moving) that object toward the Earth, and the Earth equally toward it. We call that acceleration due to the force of gravity, which is not inertial motion.”
DeleteEd is not saying they are the same. Ed is not defending the theory of natural place. He is simply refuting the claim that all motion requires an external and continuous mover. Although their theory of natural place was wrong, it is an instance of natural motion that does not require an external and continuous mover.
“Dr. Feser has it completely backwards. He is equating Aristotelian natural motion with Newtonian inertial motion. In fact Aristotelian natural motion is supplanted by Newtonian acceleration due to mutual attraction.”
Yes, but you have missed the point by showing that the theory, that Ed has already acknowledge is false, is refuted by later science. The point is simply this. You can no longer maintain that: “Aquinas clearly defined all motion as change requiring a continuous external changer.” You must change it to something like this: “Aquinas defined that some motion, but not all motions, such as motions generated by natural place, requires a continuous external changer.” And this could easily be changed to something like this: “Aquinas defined all motion as change that requires an external changer.” No reference to continuous change required. And thus, there is no contradiction between the principle of motion and the principle of inertia.
“Aristotle thought sublunary motion was in a lossy medium such that an object subjected to so-called violent motion would slow and stop and its motion would be lost. That totally invalidates the Aristotelian principle of motion.”
DeleteThis may be true or not true, but it is beside the point at the moment since we are only talking about the principle of motion and the principle of inertia. The nature of the medium has no impact on this current discussion, whether it be a field that is not lossy or otherwise. If we have defined uniform motion as a state, then no change is occurring. And if the principle does not require a continuously conjoined mover, then again, the continuous inertial motion poses no problem.
But this does raise an important issue. There is no way in principle for us to verify or falsify whether rectilinear motion continues for infinity. Yes, Newton’s first principle is very successful at describing motion in various ways, but it cannot be validated. Einstein wrote:
”The weakness of the principle of inertia lies in this, that it involves an argument in a circle, a mass moves without acceleration if it is sufficiently far from other bodies; we know that it is sufficiently far from other bodies only by the fact that it moves without acceleration.”
Eddington also says this:
“”Every body continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, except in so far as it doesn’t.”
Isaac Asimov says this:
“”The Newtonian principle of inertia … holds exactly only in an imaginary ideal world in which no interfering forces exist: no friction, no air resistance … It would therefore seem that the principle of inertia depends upon a circular argument. We begin by stating that a body will behave in a certain way unless a force is acting on it. Then, whenever it turns out that a body does not behave in that way, we invent a force to account for it. Such circular argumentation would be bad indeed if we set about trying to prove Newton’s first law, but we do not do this. Newton’s law of motion represents assumptions and definitions and are not subject to proof… The principle of inertia has proved extremely useful in the study of physics for nearly three centuries now and has involved physicists in no contradictions. For this reason (and not out of any consideration of truth) physicists hold to the law of motion and will continue to do so. “
“In fact all motion is in space. There is no lossy sublunary medium. Violent motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed, so Aristotle got that wrong. That error invalidates Thomism because the primary argument of Thomism is based unavoidably on that fundamental Aristotelian error.”
Here Aquinas and Aristotle make a distinction between accidentally ordered change and essential ordered change. Accidental motion can go on to infinity for them, in principle. But not essentially ordered change. But again, this takes us off topic.
Daniel,
Delete"But I don’t see why a mover must only be a mover and not also moved?"
Indeed. You have now joined me in disproving Thomism.
* It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved*
iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2011/01/first-way-in-syllogistic-form.html
What you say makes sense, which also invalidates the First Way.
"There is nothing in the principle of motion that requires, say, an unmoved mover to be the one causing the motion."
Ok, so you have again invalidated Thomism.
"And so there is no contradiction here if the mover is also moved in some way."
Very well, Thomism is thus invalid, as you continue to make clear.
"the fact that he did accept a type of motion that has its motion intrinsic to its nature, requiring no continuous motion, is enough to show that there is no fundamental contradiction between Aquinas and Aristotle’s principle of motion and the principle of inertia."
The contradiction is that he got it backwards.
"So Ed admits elsewhere that other scholastics, such as Averroes and some later Thomists, did believe that the one way push was at the heart of all motion. Ed has shown that this was not fundamental to all motion for Aquinas and Aristotle."
In that case Dr. Feser invalidated Thomism. The arguments of Aquinas fall apart without a one way push. Are you sure about this? I am not familiar with the passages you are alluding to here.
"He is simply refuting the claim that all motion requires an external and continuous mover."
If that were the case then Dr. Feser invalidated Thomism because the argument for a first mover depends on just that assertion, that all motion requires an external and continuous mover.
"yes" (that Dr. Feser has it completely backwards)
We agree then, very well.
"You can no longer maintain that: “Aquinas clearly defined all motion as change requiring a continuous external changer.”"
This is what Aquinas said:
*For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.*
"motion is nothing else than" is a clear statement of total inclusion of all sorts of motion.
"the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality"
That is the definition of change for Aquinas.
Thus, Aquinas stated explicitly that all motion is change.
"But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except"
So, Aquinas says all things that are changed...
"by something in a state of actuality."
are changed by something else.
Aquinas clearly said that all motion is change and all change requires an external changer.
If you found an instance where Aquinas claimed otherwise then you have found an instance where Aquinas invalidated his own argument for a first mover.
Daniel,
Delete"If we have defined uniform motion as a state, then no change is occurring"
But that cannot be the case in a lossy medium.
In a lossy medium change will occur as the object is decelerated absent a mover.
In a lossy medium to maintain constant velocity change much occur with the continuous action of a mover.
The issue of a lossy medium is critical because we cannot perceive constant velocity in a straight line as no change if a lossy medium is the case.
In the case of a lossy medium and perceived uniform inertial motion then a first mover makes sense.
In the case of no lossy medium and perceived uniform inertial motion the First Way is invalidated, and with it the primary argument for Thomism.
"Isaac Asimov says this:"
A very great deal of nonsense. He was obviously much better at writing fiction than analyzing motion.
The principle of inertia and the principle of acceleration hold simultaneously. It is often called superposition. The combination of principles explains observed motions.
What we perceive as air resistance is the aggregate of superposition of inertial motion and acceleration on a molecular scale as every molecule moves losslessly through space, because all motion is in space.
Aristotle thought the air was a lossy medium because it seems that way, even to a bright modern guy like Asimov. Based on those observations and the notion that motion is lost in the lossy medium Aristotle and Aquinas made seemingly sound arguments.
Now that we know the motion is never lost and that all motion is through lossless space we know the arguments of Aristotle and Aquinas are based on many false premises.
Daniel,
DeleteFrom my interactions with Stardusty it appears to me that he conflates or confounds some basic physical concepts like velocity, force and/or momentum. He has similar or worse confusions wrt to Thomism. It's a real dog's breakfast when he tries to address both systems.
For example, it appears that he thinks that Newton's law of equal and opposite forces somehow refutes the First Way. As if a locomotive pulling a train was somehow not causing the train to move. Maybe the train is equally pulling the locomotive and nothing is going anywhere?
I'm also not sure if he's playing dumb to pull your chain when he ignores your implicit assumption of proximate movers vs the Unmoved Mover. He should know better since he's been going on about essentially ordered series.
I think he's getting worse now with his talk about lossy medium. It's obvious that friction slows down and eventually stops objects in local motion like a ball rolling on the floor. It's here where he conflates local motion/velocity with conservation of kinetic/potential energy. Now it's a quasi-quantum superposition of molecules moving "losslessly through space, because all motion is in space." Where would motion take place if not in space?
So don't assume he is using terms the same way you are and do assume he has some strange concepts no one else has.
“It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved.”
DeleteWhen two things in uniform motion collide together, object 1’s actuality actualizes a potential in object 2 that hurls object 2 into a new direction and a new speed with a new inerita. Object 2 has had its potential actualized by object 1.
Switch to object 2’s perspective.
Object 2’s actuality actualizes a potential in object 1 that hurls object 1 into a new direction and a new speed with a new inerita. Object 1 has had its potential actualized by object 2.
I fail to see where the principle you quote is violated. Clearly a potential has been actualized in both, but not in the same way and in the same respect. What is the difference? They have both been moved by different external agents. They have both been moved by something else.
This is an application of the law of non contradiction.
God does not violate this rule because he is pure actuality without any potentiality. There is no potential that can be actualized in God.
So no, Thomism has not been invalidated by admitting what was obvious to Thomas and Aristotle, that when two objects collide together, both will be impacted by the collision.
I’ve been at this for a week with you StarfustyPsyche. At this point, I’m done.
Take care my friend.
God bless.
Dan
@ All,
Deletesd says, "A very great deal of nonsense"
This is what sd himself speaks ceaselessly, based on circularity from which he manufactures false principles of thinking. He is abusing Daniel with false pseudo-teaching now. He will do this to you if he can.
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Daniel,
Delete"object 1’s actuality actualizes a potential in object 2 that hurls object 2 into a new direction and a new speed with a new inerita. Object 2 has had its potential actualized by object 1.
You have substituted 2 one way pushes in place of a single one way push.
You are getting closer! You have the beginnings of an understanding of mutual causation, so that is good progress for you.
Consider you shake hands with your friend.
But you do not let go.
Instead you both choose to simultaneously contract your biceps and pull each other toward each other.
Who pulled who?
Did you only pull your friend?
Did your friend only pull you?
Or did you both contribute not only to the other's motion but also your own?
Suppose instead of shaking hands you grab the handle of a locked door.
You pull on the handle and move yourself forward.
Who or what pulled who or what?
Did the locked door handle only pull you?
Did you only pull the locked door handle?
Or did you pull yourself?
If you pulled yourself to the locked handle what is the difference in your same forces and your same motions when you pulled yourself toward your friend?
Mutual causation is just that, mutual. Both actors "actualize" both actors mutually and simultaneously.
There is no such thing as a one way push or a one way pull.
There is no such thing as two separate one way pushes or one way pulls.
There is only mutual causation.
"So no, Thomism has not been invalidated by admitting what was obvious to Thomas and Aristotle, that when two objects collide together, both will be impacted by the collision."
You invalidated Thomism when you agreed that there is no such thing as a one way push.
But because you are conceptually impeded with the less than useless notion of actualization of a potential you have attempted to analyze mutual causation as 2 separate one way pushes (or pulls).
Thomism is invalidated by realizing that both applications of the notion of a one way push, the actualization of a potential by an external actor, are false. Only mutual causation is real.
Daniel,
Delete"I’ve been at this for a week with you StarfustyPsyche. At this point, I’m done."
Do I detect a note of exhaustion? No worries, you are not the first. I have never engaged with anybody who could sustain that engagement sufficiently to reach a conclusion.
When analyzing the primary argument of Thomism keep in mind:
1.Dr. Feser's principle of motion is an invalid abstraction because it ignores critical ontological facts when translating from the ontological state of affairs of motion to an abstract model for analysis, and is therefore less than useless to analyze motion.
2.Aristotelian natural motion is in no way analogous to either inertial motion or mutual acceleration. In "natural" motion a stone accelerates itself, moves itself, then stops, none of which is realistic for a stone.
3.The Aristotelian notion of a sublunary lossy impeding medium is critical to the primary argument of Aquinas, but there is no such lossy sublunary medium since all motion is in space and all motion through space is lossless.
4.Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed.
5.There is no such thing as a one way push (or pull). Nor is there any such thing as 2 one way pushes (or pulls). Only mutual causation is real.
6.Mutual causation terminates the regress of causation finitely, invalidating the call for an infinite regress, and making such assertion a false dichotomy.
7.The primary argument of Aquinas requires necessity, not mere compatibility.
8.God has no part in the syllogistic structure of the primary argument of Aquinas, with the addition of that word, "god", being a mere non-sequitur.
Here is my favorite study source for the Thomistic arguments.
As you study the translation to English from Latin, the further translation to syllogistic form, and the further translation to symbolic form keep the above facts ever in mind. If you do so and you apply your reasoning you will quickly realize for yourself the many instances of false premises and invalid logic Aquinas employed.
I suggest you read each and every word, carefully, repeatedly, for isolated meaning, meaning in the context of the phrase, the sentence, the syllogistic form, and perhaps most importantly, in light of the foundational Aristotelian physics assumptions and misapprehensions regarding sublunary motion both "natural" and "violent".
iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2011/01/first-way-in-syllogistic-form.html
"Take care my friend.
God bless.
Dan"
Same to you :-)
"When analyzing the primary argument of Thomism keep in mind:
Delete1.Dr. Feser's principle of motion is an invalid abstraction because it ignores critical ontological facts when translating from the ontological state of affairs of motion to an abstract model for analysis, and is therefore less than useless to analyze motion."
Ontology is the study of being as being. Thus, but its very nature, it abstracts away all but the most general level of details when describing things such as change. What you do, my friend, is confuse metaphysics with physics, which instead of abstracting to the most general level of detail, exclusively abstracts to property of substances that can be converted into mathematical data. This gives physics its wonderfully useful precision. But that very focus causes it to ignore all other layers of reality. It ignores chemistry, it ignores biology, and yes, it ignores metaphysics. Until you resolve this confusion in your mind, you will never understand Thomism.
"2.Aristotelian natural motion is in no way analogous to either inertial motion or mutual acceleration. In "natural" motion a stone accelerates itself, moves itself, then stops, none of which is realistic for a stone."
The principle of motion or the principle of causality applies to all motion. Natural motion is an instance of motion described by Aristotle that did not require a one way push. And since this is so, Aristotle would have had no problem with inertial movement.
"3.The Aristotelian notion of a sublunary lossy impeding medium is critical to the primary argument of Aquinas, but there is no such lossy sublunary medium since all motion is in space and all motion through space is lossless."
This is merely an assertion. In no way does this invalidate the principle of motion of the principle of causality.
"4.Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed."
So what. This does not invalidate the principle of motion or the principle of causality.
"5.There is no such thing as a one way push (or pull). Nor is there any such thing as 2 one way pushes (or pulls). Only mutual causation is real."
There is simply your refusal to see act and potency s as a perfectly coherent description of event. You have not shown in any way that mutual causation cannot be cashed out in terms of act and potency.
"6.Mutual causation terminates the regress of causation finitely, invalidating the call for an infinite regress, and making such assertion a false dichotomy."
We never talked about this because it was out of the scope of our current conversation. But I alluded to it above in terms of essentially ordered motion, which must have a first mover, versus accidentally ordered motion, which need not have a first mover, at least in principle, if not in fact.
"7.The primary argument of Aquinas requires necessity, not mere compatibility."
Again, you are mixing in different topics in this discussion. Necessity comes in when speaking of essentially ordered motion.
"8.God has no part in the syllogistic structure of the primary argument of Aquinas, with the addition of that word, "god", being a mere non-sequitur."
Aquinas is very clear that the first mover is what we call God. He gets additional data on what God is in each of the other four ways. Data about God is provided by the five ways. This is called natural theology and it is the conclusion of the arguments.
bmiller,
Delete"For example, it appears that he thinks that Newton's law of equal and opposite forces somehow refutes the First Way. As if a locomotive pulling a train was somehow not causing the train to move. Maybe the train is equally pulling the locomotive and nothing is going anywhere?"
Yes, of course, the train cars are equally pulling the locomotive.
This is called drawbar force. It is equal and opposite where the leading train car couples with the trailing locomotive.
The train cars pull on the locomotive and the locomotive pulls on the train cars, equally, yes, of course.
And yes, of course, Newtonian physics invalidates the First Way. Dr. Feser's attempts to show otherwise are as fallacious as your analysis of something so simple as the basic forces and motions of a train.
You have chosen to limit your own thinking, as has every Thomist. When you decide to apply all your intelligence to a thorough analysis of both the motions of a train and the First Way then you will learn that your analysis of train motion is fallacious, as are the arguments of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dr. Feser.
I will give you a helping hand with your analytical errors regarding train motion, just to get you started on your journey to rationality.
Again, yes, of course, the train cars pull equally on the locomotive.
The train cars move with respect to the surface of the Earth because the drawbar force is greater than the sum of what we call the frictional forces at the wheels and axels as well as what we call air resistance.
The locomotive moves with respect to the surface of the Earth because the force at the wheels and axels we call the tractive force is greater than the drawbar force.
The train and the Earth thus move equally with respect to the other. The change in motion of the train during acceleration is of equal magnitude with the change in motion of the Earth, like a lumberjack running on a spinning log in the water, because the Earth is in space, and the train is in space, and all motion is through space.
Stardusty,
DeleteThanks for the explanation. I'm sure it was an oversight on your part but let me add that drawbar pull (DBP) is the actual pulling ability of a locomotive (not railroad cars).
The train cars move with respect to the surface of the Earth because the drawbar force is greater than the sum of what we call the frictional forces at the wheels and axels as well as what we call air resistance.
So it seems from that explanation the fact that the locomotive and train cars pull equally on each other is irrelvant to the fact that the locomotive causes the entire train to move (due to it's DBP). And so in a similar fashion the fact that the hand stick and stone of TFW example exert equal and opposite forces on each other is irrelvant to the fact that the hand is the cause of that particular train of objects moving. So Newton's 3rd law really doesn't have anything to do with the First Way. Thanks again for clearing that up for me.
Most people who get on a train in Kansas City and get off in St. Louis think that they have actually been moved across the state of Missouri and, since they've changed location, have experienced local motion. And so it seems they have...since St. Louis is in a different part of space than Kansas City. Since all local motion is in space and all that. It seems though, that since they were in one place and now in another, local motion was not conserved or they would end up in the same place? No?
@ All,
Deletesd takes standard set pieces, examples, and problems from physics texts and portrays them as applying to the metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dr. Feser. He does not understand these metaphysics, but just relies on a massive circularity in measurable, sensible, physics, as if it existed anyway, and makes declarations that follow no rational method.
It is funny that he had to denounce his fellow atheist, Isaac Asimov, because Daniel or bmiller was using an argument from Asimov🤣.
Asimov, writing on everything under the sun, was known as a "hack" because of his voluminous, popular, output. So sd had to call him a hack.
Look in the mirror sd🤣!
You are not proving anything except what you assume in the first place.
Popularity and volume are not really fair measures of hackdom, but they play to sd's desire to be an unanswerable "expert" that the masses are "incapable of seeing through". Don't worry. He is easy to see through, but sd just cannot resist argument from authority, which is, in fact, a glaring clue to his circular vacuity.
People tire of sd because he just repeats the same stuff with minor variations, and they have lives to live and do not have the time to be the corrective tail wagged by a dog's silly argument.
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"I'm sure it was an oversight on your part but let me add that drawbar pull (DBP) is the actual pulling ability of a locomotive (not railroad cars)."
Drawbar force is the force at the drawbar, which might be either a push or a pull depending on conditions.
Drawbar force is equal in magnitude for the lead car and the trailing locomotive.
In the case of a pull force the lead car pulls on the trailing locomotive equally as the trailing locomotive pulls on the lead car.
"local motion was not conserved or they would end up in the same place? No?"
Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed.
The air is not a lossy medium, it just seems so to the average person who has not analyzed motion correctly, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Dr. Feser, and other Thomists.
There is no net loss of motion, only transferred or transformed motion. There are a couple basic reasons for this.
1.Air is mostly empty space. As objects move through that space they do not loose any motion. This is true for large scale objects as well as the atoms, molecules, and particles the air is composed of.
2.When an object contacts the atoms, molecules, or particles in the air the motion of the object is net losslessly transferred to the atoms, molecules, or particles in the air and is thus not lost, rather, conserved.
If the sublunary environment consisted of a net lossy medium then the First Way would be a good argument based on observed continued motion.
We observe ongoing motion in general but we also observe that motion of a projectile or unaided wagon or other ordinary object quickly seems to end, and the motion of that object seems to have been lost.
The loss of motion is only apparent relative to ordinary macro objects. In fact other objects gain whatever motion our observed objects loose.
On a lossy sublunary medium absent any unseen mover everything would grind to a stop fairly quickly.
Absent a lossy medium there is no necessity for an unseen mover because everything just keeps bumping into everything else in perpetual net lossless motion, invalidating the First Way.
Stardusty,
DeleteDrawbar force is the force at the drawbar, which might be either a push or a pull depending on conditions.
Good point. We normally think of a train pulling but it can also push like the hand-stick-stone example. Here is a good article re-enforcing your description on how the drawbar pull of a locomotive causes a train to move.
Me:"local motion was not conserved or they would end up in the same place? No?"
You:Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed.
So the train passengers who left Kansas City in the train are really not in St. Louis because "Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed"?
Is it the subluminary non-lossy medium they mistook for a lossy medium that clouds their thought process making them unable to distinguish between 2 different cities in Missouri and consequently reach the absurd conclusion that God is the Unmoved Mover?
It may be so, but I think you'll need to fill in a few more steps in the logic of your explanation. As you know, I'm a little dense.
@All,
DeleteOnce again, sd just repeats himself. Nothing new. By asserting that "Aristotle, Aquinas, Dr. Feser, and other Thomists" have not analyzed motion correctly, he asserts that he is "the expert on motion" according to physics.
Oh well, he isn't. Physics itself limits how physics can predict the future of the sensible world - i.e, its motions as they lead to the future places of sensible things.
This, sd cannot handle, so he dismisses the problems with his massively circular obsession by ignoring it🤣.
Ignore sd instead. He is not rational, but insistent irrationality sometimes interferes with reason by its mere persistence. This is why he makes his unwelcome interventions, as he did with me long ago. Basically, sd abuses with persistent fake reason.
BEWARE
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"Is it the subluminary non-lossy medium they mistook for a lossy medium that clouds their thought process making them unable to distinguish between 2 different cities in Missouri and consequently reach the absurd conclusion that God is the Unmoved Mover?"
If riding a train convinces them of god then that indicates mistaken cloudy thinking on their parts, but I did not ask those folks exactly where they went wrong in their thinking.
Maybe you could get them to describe how they concluded a necessary god based on taking a train ride.
Now, a speculation of god might be logically compatible with such a train ride, but so are fairies, demons, space aliens, Superman, and Casper the Friendly Ghost.
No, compatibility just won't do to support the necessity of god claimed in the First Way, so, taking a train ride is not sufficient to prove necessity of god.
In the First Way god is a mere non-sequitur. Aquinas just slapped on the word "god" at the end, ad hoc. God is not part of the syllogistic structure of the First Way.
@ All,
Deletesd just repeats himself again, ignoring challenges that he cannot understand🤣.
sd writes, "fairies, demons, space aliens, Superman, and Casper the Friendly Ghost"
Christians would normally call these things "angels". sd claims that they do not exist by his fiat, quite a power he gives himself.
he says, "compatibility just won't do to support the necessity of god claimed in the First Way, so, taking a train ride is not sufficient to prove necessity of god"
Does he think the compatibility of two things proves that they are _not_ necessary?
That would be odd🤣.
BTW, I don't think sd fully understands what "necessary" means.
And then sd repeats his dumb "non sequitur " argument.🤣.
One person's puzzled, "that does not follow", is a smarter person's "I get it". Ripping a page from an algebra text does not cause the following pages to not follow from the earlier pages except in the tortured mind of one who understands very little, by his own free will choice.
sd does not understand Aristotle, Aquinas, or indeed common sense.
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Stardusty,
DeleteIt seems you've proven those train passengers have way more things wrong than just thinking God exists. They're wrong about practically everything they ever thought!
You've proven that since "Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed" that they could never have physically ended up in a different city and so boy are they dumb. Not to mention your proven fact that the equality of the drawbar force proves the locomotive did not cause the train to move in the non-lossy sublunary medium (although mistakenly thought to be lossy medium) known as the Missouri River Runner Train system. It all fits together now. Of course the locomotive did not cause the train to move BECAUSE SINCE MOTION WAS NEVER LOST, NOTHING MOVED!
I'm just spit-balling here, but I think you can actually save the environment if you can convince railroads to stop burning fossil fuels in locomotives that don't cause things to move anyway. Our carbon footprint would drop dramatically. The train passengers shouldn't complain either since all cities apparently look the same to them.
bmiller,
Delete"Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed"
Yes, that is true. At least you have learned that much, so that is progress for you.
If motion were lost, if motion really did disappear, as it seemed to Aristotle, then there would be a call for a first mover to account for the fact that motion is, in general, observed in the cosmos.
If Aristotle was correct, then absent a first mover one would reasonably expect that motion would grind down and halt generally in our observation.
However, Aristotle was wrong, sublunary motion is not in a lossy medium, as you seem to be clear on now. So now you can see that the existent motion of the cosmos continues, since motion simply transfers or is transformed, never lost.
Therefore you can now clearly understand that there is no call for a first mover, on the observation that motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed.
Stardusty,
DeleteIf motion were lost, if motion really did disappear, as it seemed to Aristotle, then there would be a call for a first mover to account for the fact that motion is, in general, observed in the cosmos.
But this is just a minor point. Since you've proven that local motion never disappears it was not only Aristotle that was wrong, but everyone who ever thought they have actually moved from one location to another, like those train passengers. They all mistakenly thought they had begun to move, moved, and then stopped moving and had ended up in a different location, St. Louis. But that is impossible of course since it would mean that their motion would have had a beginning and end or a coming into existence and a passing from existence, aka disappearing. You've proven more than just "God does not exist", you've proven that no one moves unless they end up in the same place (which to means they never actually move anywhere!).
This has profound and far reaching implications. Like the apple falling on Newton's head, your analysis of The First Way has serendipitously revolutionized human knowledge.
Your further observations that drawbar force is balanced proves not only that there is no need for a first mover in any medium what-so-ever ( sublunary or not, lossy or not) but no need for any "mover" what-so-ever. We can get rid of environment destroying trains, planes and automobiles! No need for engines of any sort since we know they cannot "cause" anything to happen.
Perhaps this was not immediately obvious to you since you were focusing on a different aspect, but it clearly follows. All I ask is for a small mention when you receive your Nobel Prize for saving the world.
@ All,
Deletesd addresses bmiller:
"bmiller,
'Motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed'
Yes, that is true. At least you have learned that much, so that is progress for you."
bmiller's words, in scare quotes, were sarcasm, not agreement with sd.
Consistent with his falseness, this does not matter to sd🤣.
He takes it as bmiller's admission that sd has won a point and sd falsely displays this to the world as such.
All mediums are lossy, something which physics is incapable of denying because physics itself denies in physics a principle of perfect predictive forecasting.
sd is first and foremost false with himself. This is by his own freely willed choice, springing from his massive circularity in which the things he thinks he is proving he has assumed in the first place.
He does not understand that logic can go in a circle and that this does not eliminate what is outside the circle as being true.
What a kooky and unreasoning irrationality🤣!
Ignore him as he is likely to turn your words falsely against you for the purposes of his misleading display, as he has duplicitly done with bmiller above.
BEWARE
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"They all mistakenly thought they had begun to move, moved, and then stopped moving and had ended up in a different location, St. Louis. But that is impossible of course since it would mean that their motion would have had a beginning and end or a coming into existence and a passing from existence, aka disappearing."
Right, now you are starting to get it, their motion did not disappear from existence, it was merely transferred or transformed.
For example, roll a ball on a hard surface. Its motion seems to disappear. Actually, what we think of as air resistance is the equal increase of motion for the material of the air as the motion of the ball is transferred to the motion of the air molecules.
For every apparent loss of motion there is an equal gain of motion, either apparent or not. Thus, there is no call for a first mover because there is no need for a first mover to make up for motion that disappears, because motion never actually passes out of existence, rather, motion is conserved.
1.As objects move through space they lose no motion to space, so inertial motion through space is conserved.
2.When objects contact each other they transfer motion net losslessly because there is no such thing as a lossy friction at the atomic scale, so motion is conserved when objects contact each other.
Now you are getting it bmiller, Aristotle and Aquinas were wrong because motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed, therefore there is no call for a first mover to account for observed motion.
Stardusty,
DeleteRight, now you are starting to get it, their motion did not disappear from existence, it was merely transferred or transformed.
Well thanks for the encouragement, but I don't quite think I've grasped all of your wisdom just yet.
I think I'm being distracted by talk of things like being able to roll a ball on a surface. You've proven from the drawbar pull example that there are no such things as movers so of course conducting that experiment would not be possible since it would imply that I caused something to move. I think you are giving me some trick questions to test my understanding.
Likewise these 2 examples are confusing:
1.As objects move through space they lose no motion to space, so inertial motion through space is conserved.
2.When objects contact each other they transfer motion net losslessly because there is no such thing as a lossy friction at the atomic scale, so motion is conserved when objects contact each other.
You seem to indicate that an object can change location from one place to another without actually remaining in place. But that would imply that it had actually been in one place, moved, and then was in another place meaning it's change in location (aka local motion) was real. But if it was a real change in location then non-conserved local motion would have occurred and disappeared which you've proven is impossible. It's almost as if you are implying that those train passengers really stopped moving in St. Louis which I know is wrong since you have never corrected me.
But as I mentioned. You're wasting your startling and revolutionary insights regarding local motion on some ancient proof that most people have never even heard of. You've proven that no movers are necessary not just a First Mover. If no movers are necessary, then no vehicles of any type have ever been necessary ever!
I'm thinking it's been a conspiracy since the beginning. Currently people are arguing over whether to power vehicles with fossil fuel or electricity while the real answer is we don't need either. It started with Aristotle who claimed we needed "movers" to move things and people went along, first buying horses to pull wagons and ships to move things from place to place...making the sellers rich.
But hold onto your hat. Do you know who the richest shipping magnate in the world was? ARISTOTLE ONASSIS!
You can bring them all down once your theory gets into general circulation. I'm here to help.
@ All,
Deletesd writes "Aristotle and Aquinas were wrong because motion is never lost, only transferred or transformed, therefore there is no call for a first mover to account for observed motion"
"No call", huh, whatever sd is dictating here😀.
The laws of physics, which establish their own predictive limit, have nothing to do with the metaphysics of Aristotle or Aquinas. Furthemore, inaccuracies, good as 1st order estimates of the later series of improved estimates of the laws of physics do not mean that Aristotle "failed" hence "Aquinas "failed".
The motion of things is always lost.
bmiller merely mocks sd, but sd just counts it as a "win" for him in a ludicrous and irrational style of what, essentially, is sd's stubborn proclamation that he is "the man".
Sad🤣!
Funny, but sad in the sense that he is lost in massive circulatity of his own, proud, freely willed choice.
By the True Cross, I call upon God, through Holy Mother Mary's intercessory prayer, to bestow upon sd a glimmer of light.
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"Well thanks for the encouragement, but I don't quite think I've grasped all of your wisdom just yet."
You are welcome, but I agree, you are not fully there yet, but don't worry, you are making marvelous progress, just keep learning the errors of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dr. Feser, then you will be able to join those of us who have already arrived at the 21st century.
I can only offer my best wishes and reason to those, like you, who remain mentally in the 3rd century BC.
Oh, and I cannot claim sole ownership of this wisdom, as much of an honor as that would be. Actually, this was all worked out a few hundred years ago and is now taught in schools throughout America and much of the world.
"But if it was a real change in location then non-conserved local motion would have occurred"
Yes, you do remain confused. An apparent change in location of an object is not itself a change in motion for that object, although the two are often correlated depending on how the frame of reference is chosen and how forces are applied.
Change of motion and change of location are two very different things. Are you clear on that now? If not, I suggest you start with Newton's Principia, which is actually very accessible and readable in plain English.
Isaac-Newton-Principia-English-1846.pdf
Just remember these scientific facts:
1.Motion is always conserved, never lost from existence, only transferred or transformed.
2.Apparent change of location is relative to the frame of reference chosen, and does not require a change of motion.
Stardusty,
DeleteYes, you do remain confused. An apparent change in location of an object is not itself a change in motion for that object, although the two are often correlated depending on how the frame of reference is chosen and how forces are applied.
No no. I think I've quite got that part. Train passengers who apparently thought they started in KC, moved and ended up in St. Louis were only aware of an apparent change of motion and an apparent change of location. Neither their location changed, nor did they experience real local motion because it would have been destroyed (per impossible) if they had. They lack your insight into how physics really works, but who can really blame them when they have been lied to for centuries that "change of location" was possible because of the possibility of "movers" (first or otherwise), not to mention that lossy medium snowjob.
Yes, you do remain confused. An apparent change in location of an object is not itself a change in motion for that object, although the two are often correlated depending on how the frame of reference is chosen and how forces are applied.
Change of motion and change of location are two very different things. Are you clear on that now?
Another trick question from the master! But I'm ready and I think I have this one figured out.
The First Way discusses local motion (an object's change in location) since it "is the first of motions and is necessary for all other forms of motion" (thanks ficino4ml). You have defeated The First Way. If you have defeated the First Way via the equality of drawbar force and the principle that the type of motion discussed in The First Way cannot disappear then it is obvious that local motion is impossible.
It follows therefore that since local motion of an object is impossible it is then absurd to posit that a change of that local motion is somehow possible. QED.
See? I passed the test.
Now. Can we discuss the next steps to get your theory into general circulation since it will save the climate?
Here's my initial assessment. Many on this board want you kicked off. Why? Most probably because they are part of the ancient "movers" conspiracy, but there others that can be convinced with a little PR and marketing.
Let's start with your name. StardustyPsyche. That does not sound commanding and does sound somewhat effeminate....like "Tinkerbell's Tights". Let's change it to something that strikes fear into the hearts of anyone who hears it. How about Taserface?
@ All
Deletesd somehow thinks that Newton' Principia proves that sd's circular reasoning makes him the boss. That is not accomplished by the circular reasoning or by the Principia, either separately or in combination.
You cannot say from Newton whether or not the sum of all things is conserved at all times, either locally or globally (assuming a consistent way to sum over all possible paths). Furthermore, a finite number of measurements cannot properly be extrapolated to the infinity of the continuum. Finally, Newton sums points (although a formula can extend that sum to a higher dimension where the use of the formula would be relatively simple - but in general it isn't) This is why Newton thought that light was particulate and not wave like despite theories before Newton showing the simplicity of pure wave models. Newton new that waves were indeed simple, but the distribution of matter through which waves would have to be distributed would, in general be neither known nor simple, so he threw waves away, the silly boy.
This relatively understandable, erroneous, simplification, by Newton does not remotely approach the extreme silliness of sd, however. One who erred like sd would say that "Newton failed" and all of science after Newton comes tumbling down.
sd doesn't even begin to understand anything like metaphysics and because he will not let go of freely willed circularity which falsely makes him think he has contemplated all, he cannot grasp that his assumptions could be false. One wonders whether sd even understands the meaning of "true" or of "false".
Extra finally, claiming bmiller's obvious mockery as progress in "teaching" is looney and dishonest.
One can go beyond science into the metaphysics of greater compression. Great compression (known as "simplification" in science) is always a striving to know more of the never completely knowable by finite human thought of the teleology of the infinite idea that we seek.
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"Now. Can we discuss the next steps to get your theory into general circulation"
No need, since, as I pointed out above, I cannot claim credit for this wisdom, as it was all worked out some three hundred years ago.
"My theory" is taught throughout the United States and most of the world in physics class.
The typical university physics book does not even bother wasting ink to mention Aristotle at all. Why should they? Aristotelian physics is nonsense. Aristotelian notions of change are worse than useless, all they do is get in the way of making realistic analysis of change.
You don't need to devise a plan to circulate "my theory" because conservation of matter-energy is already taught in every university in the United States, except maybe Prager "University".
I have a collection of physics textbooks, and in one Conceptual Physics book Aristotle is mentioned. He is used as an example of how people got things very wrong in the past. His errors are explained as a teaching device to teach modern physics.
Discussing motion and change with a Thomist is very much like discussing astronomy with a geocentrist, which, by the way, Aristotle was, among his many other errors.
"Worldview comparisons offer one way to engage in dispassionate, cool, and careful discourse regarding matters of religious disagreement. If done well, there might be virtues exhibited in the discussion, including humility, respect, open-mindedness, and imaginative sympathy. Reading such a discussion might entice non-specialists to embody such virtues in their own discussions of these matters."
ReplyDelete~ Helen De Cruz, Is There a God? A Debate (2021)
Too many comments are incorporating needless insults, remarks about who is and who isn’t a troll, and other such tiresome and unedifying stuff. Please cut it out, guys.
ReplyDelete