“Why are (some) physicists so bad at philosophy?”
"Coyne on intentionality"
“The early Wittgenstein on scientism”
Stop it, you’re killing me! [on eliminativism vis-à-vis life]
For reviews of some recent books claiming to offer scientific answers to traditional philosophical questions, see:
Review of A Universe from Nothing by Lawrence Krauss [from First Things]
Review of On Being by Peter Atkins and The Tyranny of Science by Paul Feyerabend [from The Claremont Review of Books]
Review of The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow [from National Review]
For discussion of the shrill dogmatism and circular reasoning that the scientism of the “New Atheist” writers leads them into, see:
"Tom and Jerry"
The pointlessness of Jerry Coyne
"Grow up or shut up"
"Argumentum ad Himmlerum"
"Eric MacDonald's assisted intellectual suicide"
"A final word on Eric MacDonald"
"Addendum [on MacDonald]"
Scientism is related to naturalism, the view that serious philosophy is continuous with natural science and that all genuine philosophical problems can be solved at least indirectly by further research in natural science. Naturalism is ultimately as indefensible as scientism is. For some general criticisms of naturalism, see:
Scientism and naturalism derive whatever plausibility they have from the assumption that almost everything has by now been explained by science in purely materialist terms, so that it is implausible to suggest that morality, the human mind, and other philosophically puzzling phenomena will not yield too to materialistic or naturalistic explanation. But the idea that “everything else has been explained in materialist terms” is itself an illusion, based on sheer metaphysical sleight of hand. Indeed, materialism rests on a conception of matter that makes a completely materialist account of the world in principle impossible, at least given the incoherence of eliminativism. I explain why in:
Mind and Cosmos roundup