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Thursday, April 13, 2023
What is a Law of Nature?
Some time
back I gave a lecture at Fermilab on the topic “What is a Law of Nature?” I’ve posted the text of the lecture at
my main website. You can watch the
video of the lecture either at the Fermilab website
or at YouTube.
Interesting talk. I think there is a parallel between the so-called theological approach denying laws of nature with regard to the physical world (and its connection to Occasionalism) and the denial of natural law within society by Edmund Burke and de Maistre. Both these authors insisted upon the contingencies of history and societies being the will of God, refusing social subjection to natural law.
That is a fascinating comment Miguel. Do you have any book recommendations on the connection between Occasionalism and a denial of the laws of nature (or perhaps just further exposition of the connection). That there would be a connection to denying the laws of nature and denying natural law makes perfect sense as natural law is rooted in human nature (i.e. the ability to reason and recognize gradation of goods in the natural order and recognition of the supreme good as the source of all goodness among gradated goods).
You'll find plenty if you trawl Conservatism's texts. For Burke, society was convention, and convention (contingency in practice) was its only law (Reflections on the Revolution). Existence was the guarantee of "divinity"; when a society suffered intolerable crisis, only if it dissolved could individuals rely on some sort of natural law, equated with anarchy, to form another absolute society (opening speech in the Hastings trial). For Burke, the contingency of existence meant divine approval, and societies could not be rationally validated by natural law - in this speech he asserted that there were no arbitrary societies anywhere in the world, only absolute ones; all that mattered for a society to be divinely approved was society's observance of its own conventions (have a read, the speech is incredible). Talking about human absolutism and contingency being divine will rather than something subject to natural law seems much like the occasionalist "science" referred to in the talk.
De Maistre was more explicit, calling on Malebranche's theories, and denying secondary causes point blank. He employed exactly the same social argumentation as Burke, dismissing natural law within society in practice. He goes on about it at length in the Saint Petersburg Dialogues.
Much as the Occasionalist can't explain why nature behaves the way it does, and refuses to have it submit to intelligible laws of nature, Conservatism's founders both demand that we accept all societies (Genghis Khan and Tamerlane are praised to the heavens in Burke's Hastings speech) as divinely approved, because they exist. Validating or reforming a society according to "abstractions" (which could be those of the French Revolution, but also the Natural Law of the Christian est), was the antithesis of their worldview.
I have considered the term, law(s) of nature, a little time-worn, if not flat out archaic. For my thinking, there is/ are fact(s) of matter. This, admittedly, does not encompass metaphysics. However, much of that is conjectural anyway---based in interests, preferences and motives.
I think that nearly all parties (other than full-out idealists) accept that there are "facts of matter". One cannot simply rule out other kinds of truths or reality, merely because there is matter. (Indeed, according to many philosophers including some atheists, to accept "facts about matter" is, per se, to accept something non-material, i.e. the truths express the facts, which truths are not, themselves, identical to the matter.)
Nor can one rule out metaphysical truths merely because those who engage in the study of metaphysics have interests, preferences, and motives. The same is said of those who engage in the physical sciences, in meteorology, in climatology, in psychological science, in computer science, etc. The fact that these scientists have preferences and motives isn't held to invalidate their science all by itself, though it is possible that the preferences and motives can invalidate their science if allowed to modify their methods or assumptions in unwarranted way. (It is also well known now that many psychological studies cannot be replicated, which speaks to the possibility of bias and motives entering into the arena.)
Scientists (including those of the "hard" sciences like physics and chemistry) would be hard pressed to practice their discipline without the use of (a) logic, and (b) math, esp. algebra, calculus and statistics. But logic and math are neither matter, nor facts about matter as such, they are more abstract, being facts about relations with respect to other facts. In addition, they always USE some set of metaphysical assumptions in their science, whether they advert to these assumptions explicitly or not, because (for example) it is impossible to pursue the effort to discern "the facts" through empirical evidence like experiments without some sort of assumption about what empirical evidence, itself, represents for drawing conclusions.
OP "I am going to argue against this supposition that there is an incompatibility between modern science and Aristotelian philosophy." Right, one can coherently assert compatibility of Aristotelian philosophy.
One cannot coherently assert necessity of Aristotelian causal explanation as evidenced by physics observations (the First Way).
In the presence of qualified physicists I note you have retreated from claims that would be sufficient to support the soundness of the First Way.
"According to occasionalism, it isn’t really the cue ball that knocks the eight ball into the corner pocket." Right. Since Newton we have understood that the cue ball does not exert a one way causal influence on the eight ball, rather, the cue ball and the eight ball mutually interact to causally influence each other equally in magnitude and oppositely in direction with neither object being coherently identifiable as first in a causal chain.
"Another problem, though, is that Carroll is simply wrong to reject PSR. For one thing, considered even just as an inference from experience, PSR is as well-supported as any law of nature. For we do in fact tend to find explanations when we look for them," Here you conflate ultimate reason with sufficient reason given the nature of the brute fact.
The material universe progresses due to the natures of material, and those natures are always the sufficient reasons for all the progressions we observe.
However, there need not be a sufficient reason for the material natures themselves.
The speculation of god solves no ontological, logical, or explanatory problem, only makes them worse by introducing unevidenced unknowns (god) while doing nothing to solve the original problems.
"Have I really explained the position of the book? It is hard to see how." All explanations are descriptions of relations. If you insist on including in all explanations an ultimate explanation then there can be no "really explained" because there can be no ultimate explanation.
The best we can do is explain the progressions of material relative to observed base natures of material. If that does not satisfy you then you will simply have to remain unsatisfied for the rest of your life, the universe does not care.
"The notion of an explanatory regress of physical laws terminating in a brute fact is, when carefully examined, no more coherent than the notion of an effect being produced by an instrument that is not the instrument of anything." Then god as the explanation is incoherent because on the existence of god then god is a brute fact.
Explanations are relative. There is nothing for the brute fact to be relative with respect to.
"In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism." Indeed.
You have falsified the First Way, Dr. Feser. Very good.
The First Way is an argument for necessity. By your own analysis, on the Aristotelian view, the choice between theism and atheism is neutral. Therefore, on the Aristotelian view, theism is not necessary.
Theism is not necessary on Aristotelian neutrality regarding atheism, therefore the necessity of theism claimed in the First Way is false, rendering the First Way unsound.
"You have falsified the First Way, Dr. Feser. Very good."
How badly you think. That you believe that you can actually prove that deterministic atheism is true shows how kooky your thinking is.
You talk to Professor Feser all the time as if he is deeply stupid while you are genius unsurpassed.
Your friendliness is obviously fake.
For example, you insist on addressing Christian believers using a small "g" form of the name "God", shows how rude you are.
It is funny how you must attack Aquinas all the time, as if you somehow your kooky idea that you think you are proving depends on what Aquinas says. Of course you have never answered any of my objections to your false "proofs" because you obviously cannot understand my objections.
What a pretender you are, spewing your nuttiness while cravenly hiding behind a false identity and helping your cult's murderous attacks on Christians to kill many.
Tim, "The argument of Aquinas in connection with laws of nature or teleology, is the fifth argument, not the first, Stardusty." All 5 ways are based on laws of nature, not just the fifth.
The First Way, for example, is based on Aristotelian concepts of motion, change, and causation.
Since Dr. Feser has pointed out that ""In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."" it must be the case that the First Way is neutral based with respect to atheism.
Did you have a chance to read the transcript in the OP? clearly Dr. Feser is referring to causation, a causal series, the properties of material, and the PSR, all of which are central to the First Way.
Since the Aristotelian principles that the First Way is based on are neutral with respect to atheism or theism, then the First Way cannot be a sound argument for the necessity of theism, as it claims to be.
Dr. Feser has thus falsified the First Way in his closing remarks in the OP.
Professor Feser did not "falsify" the first way in his comments about Aristotelian metaphysics. Neutrality between theism and atheism in Aristotelian metaphysics has no implication whatsoever for Aquinas's five ways.
Nor do you understand the five ways because you willfully take any contradiction of your determinist atheist assumption to be false, which is irrational, and which demonstrates that your "thinking" is confused. It demonstrates that you do not know how reason works, and that other than in defending the Church against your baleful influence on the murder of Christians, you are best ignored.
Did you have a chance to read the transcript in the OP?
Do you understand from reading the transcript in what sense the idea of "laws of nature" can be considered neutral wrt atheism/theism?
Suffice it to say that on the Aristotelian view, what directly grounds the laws of nature are the essences of physical things, so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause. In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism.
TFW simply doesn't bracket off that question and so is not neutral.
Dr. Feser has thus falsified the First Way in his closing remarks in the OP.
Anonymous (of April 15, 2023 at 1:36 PM) Feser-*so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause.* Indeed, the character of physical law does not necessitate a divine cause.
The First Way is an argument from the characters of physical laws regarding motion, change, and causation. If it is possible to bracket off the analysis of those physical laws from the question of their divine origin then the character of those physical laws does not necessitate a divine origin.
Since the characters of the physical laws do not necessitate a divine origin it is unsound to conclude a necessity of divine origin based on the characters of the physical laws.
The First Way concludes necessity of divine origin based on the character of the physical laws, and is therefore falsified by the assertion that the characters of the physical laws do not necessitate a divine origin.
This is sometimes called "The Gap Problem", which shows up in various arguments for the existence of god. The problem is that even if one argues to a first mover or first cause there is a logical gap between that assertion and the assertion of god.
In the First Way that gap is obvious just by reading the text. God is only mentioned once, as the very last word, as part of a semicolon separated premise that could also be written as a last sentence. The assertion of god is an obvious non-sequitur with no logical connection to the rest of the argument.
Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo shows that fact by omitting any mention of god or the last premise tacked on ad hoc at the end of the First Way. This is his last line in his translation to syllogistic format C-C: Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other (f). iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2011/01/first-way-in-syllogistic-form.html
That's it, done, no god demonstrated, no way to conclude god using the arguments in the First Way.
By acknowledging the neutrality of the natures of physical laws with respect to theism versus atheism Dr. Feser has acknowledged that one cannot rationally claim necessity of divine origin based on the natures of physical laws, but that is just what the First Way claims, that very necessity of divinity, god.
Thus, Dr. Feser has falsified the First Way as an argument for the necessity of the existence of god.
Stardusty, I have read the transcript and I have read Ed's previous work on this topic. Aristotle provided a teleological account for the existence of regularities in the cosmos but did not go on to argue from teleology to the existence of God, as Aquinas did in the fifth way. That is the sense in which the Aristotelian account of laws is neutral between atheism and theism. This does not invalidate Aristotle's cosmological argument (basically Aquinas's first way) which depends on different premises. You are confusing two separate issues. On another topic, which you have not replied to me about, do you accept Cantor's diagonal argument for the real numbers having a higher cardinality than the algebraic numbers?
@Tom, CokeDust Psycho has been wasting time here for as long as he's been posting. He isn't interested in learning anything. It's obvious that he's obsessed with attempting to poke holes in Thomism in the vain hope of undermining any confidence therein. His posts are entirely devoid of any value. It's a wonder he's allowed to continue his Depends-less ways here.
Tim, "Aristotle provided a teleological account for the existence of regularities in the cosmos but did not go on to argue from teleology to the existence of God," Right, and Feser elsewhere has acknowledged a sort of intrinsic teleology, that is, an apparent teleology which results from the aggregate progressions of material due to their intrinsic properties or natures or characters.
Hence the acknowledgement in the OP that the Aristotelian view of the characters of natural laws is neutral (agnostic) on theism versus atheism.
"Aquinas did in the fifth way" All 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the existence of god.
All 5 ways suffer from the logical fallacy of non-sequitur. In every case the word "god" is just tacked on at the end ad hoc.
There is no logical connection between "god" and the rest of the argument in each of the 5 ways.
This is known as the Gap Problem because there is a logical gap between the preceding argument and the final ad hoc assertion of god. Dr. Feser in the OP, perhaps without intending to do so, has affirmed the reality of the Gap Problem and has affirmed that all 5 ways suffer from the logical fallacy of non-sequitur as arguments for the existence of god.
"This does not invalidate Aristotle's cosmological argument (basically Aquinas's first way) " Right, the argument for a first mover is not invalidated by agnosticism as to what that first mover is.
Agnosticism, however, invalidates the claim to necessity.
NECESSITY.
The ways of Aquinas claim necessity of god. Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god. Dr. Feser has asserted agnosticism based on the characters of the natural laws that are the foundation of the arguments in the First Way, natural laws of motion, change, and causality.
Since one must remain agnostic of theism versus atheism regarding the natural laws of motion, change, and causality then the claim of necessity of god based on those natural laws is falsified.
The First Way is an argument from the characters of physical laws regarding motion, change, and causation. If it is possible to bracket off the analysis of those physical laws from the question of their divine origin then the character of those physical laws does not necessitate a divine origin.
The talk was not about TFW. As I pointed out, TFW simply doesn't bracket off that question and so is not neutral.. So it makes no sense to shoehorn in something that was not the topic of the talk.
Regarding "bracket off": Additionally, I don't have to know how a car works to drive it to the grocery store. I can still get groceries without knowing if the car is EV or internal combustion. That doesn't mean it just goes by itself. I can just bracket off that question and get on with it. Maybe this seems confusing to you but I'm sure it will make sense to you if you just keep at it.
Anonymous (of April 16, 2023 at 4:04 PM) "Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god" Strawman, at least quote my words if you are going to use quotes.
"In which SP confuses ontology with epistemology." After your strawman you arrive at a nonsense conclusion, not surprising.
An argument that is agnostic toward god cannot soundly conclude the necessity of god.
If the character of natural law is neutral toward god then natural law cannot be the basis to argue soundly for the necessity of god.
Dr. Feser has in the OP has declared the neutrality of the characters of natural laws on the Aristotelian view.
All 5 ways use the characters of natural laws to argue for the NECESSITY of god, and are therefore unsound as arguments for the necessity of god.
This can be seen by simply reading the text of all 5 ways. In all 5 cases the word "god" is just tacked on ad hoc at the end as an obvious non-sequitur, which is a logical fallacy, rendering all 5 ways logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god.
By acknowledging the neutrality toward the divinity of origin of natural laws Dr. Feser has invalidated arguments that claim the necessity of divinity based on the characters of natural law, which is just what all 5 ways of Aquinas attempt and claim.
Thus, Dr. Feser has falsified the 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of god.
bmiller, "I don't have to know how a car works to drive it to the grocery store. I can still get groceries without knowing if the car is EV or internal combustion. That doesn't mean it just goes by itself. I can just bracket off that question and get on with it." Indeed.
Therefore, under your admitted (hypothetical) ignorance of whether the car is and EV or ICE it would be logically invalid for you to assert the NECESSITY of either choice, EV or ICE.
As you pointed out on the other thread, god is not a part of the argument, it was just added on "as a reminder", you say.
"All it does is show that there is an Unmoved Mover."
"That is all." You are correct that the First Way stops its argument prior to any mention of god. The same is true for all 5 ways.
So, both bmiller and Dr. Feser have acknowledged that all 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god.
AnonymousApril 15, 2023 at 4:40 PM has a pretty good observation. Stardusty is just a troll now.
I think he used to try to legitimately try to make good arguments. Now he just repeats his discredited reasoning in each new thread trying to get reactions. He is going over the top now though.
"So, both bmiller and Dr. Feser have acknowledged that all 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god." (says a fool).
Gee, I haven't seen where either of them has said, "I acknowledge", that the five ways are logically invalid. Kooky is about the least damaging conclusion to be drawn about someone (sd) who makes false claims like this about what others acknowledge.
But then sd is no expert on logic.😀
"All 5 ways use the characters of natural laws to argue for the NECESSITY of god, and are therefore unsound as arguments for the necessity of god."
Dumb! A part of an argument insufficient by itself from which to draw the conclusion does not make the part inconsistent with the conclusion as sd seems to think. In fact, lacunae in an argument are unavoidable. Obvious lacunae need mean nothing more than an assumption that the reader or listener is capable of understanding the argument without overly simplistic explanations of details - lacunae that a person not absorbed with his own supposed brilliance would not even notice. The important thing is to understand that at some level, lacunae can always be drummed up that do not imply contradiction, and they can always be idiotically seized upon to claim "non-sequitur!, gap!, it does not follow!, etcetera" to claim that an argument is false, as sd does.
For example, ripping a page out of a mathematics textbook does not make what follows false.
From his style of argument, I don't think sd is capable of understanding this. That is why I conclude that sd is no expert on logic. There are other reasons as well. He just jumps to conclusions about the "falseness" of other people's words where no contradiction actually exists.
It is pretty disgusting to read his claims about people "admitting" things that they have never admitted.
But then he has special rules where he can substitute his self-deceiving imagination for other people's thoughts 🤣!
People this nutty who have expressed a desire to get rid of religion are indeed dangerous.
This is sometimes called "The Gap Problem", which shows up in various arguments for the existence of god. The problem is that even if one argues to a first mover or first cause there is a logical gap between that assertion and the assertion of god.
The Gap Problem is related to the Frame problem. Each syllogism or logical statement has a frame of background assumptions which are encoded in the thought space.
Take, for instance, the Kaalam cosmological argument. It concludes that if the universe has a beginning, then the universe has a cause, and that cause must be God. The frame that makes this syllogism sound is the fact that how could the cause make the universe come into being unless the cause had the capacity to choose? So this capacity of choice, when added to the frame, tells us that this cause is intelligent and an agent, and thus increases the probability that it is a deity.
Posters write spend a lot of time and effort here to write LONG, detailed posts and to what end? Who cares? If you really have something to contribute, start your own blog. Get your own following.
So are you saying that people should not contribute long, detailed posts, but short ones lacking in substance? You know, you are free to be selective about the posts you read and respond to.
That's what I suggested SP do, but Dr Feser's blog gets a lot of readers and it takes time and effort to build up a following, it's easier to ride the wave, and even better if your message opposes that of the blog (you're not preaching to the converted). Also, it's often easier to react to someone else's ideas rather than come up with your own. And writing for a following may not be the primary motivation; getting things clear in your own mind is. Writing can help with that.
We are told a political philosopher cannot say meaningfully that liberty is freedom because that's mere synonym. True. The implication is that there are two weighty questions to be answered: 1) What is liberty? 2) What is the nature of liberty? Ironically, the paper answers neither of these questions even though it's used as an analogy. For the main argument to succeed, both questions have to be asked and answered for all analogies.
So we are told a triangle is “a closed plane figure with three straight sides.” That describes it. That is the "is". If we happen upon a triangle, we know it by this description. But I disagree that this is more than "certain properties of triangles or facts about them." It does not tell us more of a triangle than mere description -- how to recognize its shape. What does it really mean to ask the nature of a triangle?
We can describe a human being with body parts and measurements, but that doesn't tell us much about the nature of human beings. Our nature would also consist of behaviors, life spans, desires, etc. How would that apply to triangles? Or is it proper to say the "nature" of a triangle is the same as its description? Maybe it's nonsensical or circular to ask the two separate questions of a triangle. IOW, a closed plane figure with three straight sides does not tell us the nature of a closed plane figure with three straight sides. If it is a nonsensical or circular question of triangles, why not also of laws of nature?
OTOH, we could say the nature of a triangle is to add structural support or assist in the measurement of distances. This makes "nature of" equivalent to "good use of." That wouldn't seem to make the nature of laws of nature more than how useful they are at doing things, and therefore wouldn't seem to make the issue more than scientist have already made of it.
I'll ignore all of the arguments against other ideas about of laws of nature and get right to the heart of the matter. In actuality the Aristotelian view is a variant of the "brute fact" approach. A "description of the powers and capacities a thing will tend to manifest given its nature or essence" is mere brute fact about the essence of a thing. If "genuine laws reflect the causal powers and capacities a physical thing will manifest given its nature or essence" then genuine laws are brute facts about essences. The Aristotelian view explains nothing and nobody would accept such explanation when put to a real test. Suppose a prosecuting attorney told the jury, "Jill's reason for killing Jack was not mere jealousy, it was not financial gain, it was not mere power struggle, it was much more fundamental than that: Jill killed Jack because she tended toward killing Jack given her essence." How many jurors would take that explanation seriously? That is what the Aristotelian view asks of us.
"In actuality the Aristotelian view is a variant of the "brute fact" approach."
No, you're not getting it. A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it. The Aristotelian view is more than that and is actually saying something regarding whether natures and causal regularities are IMMANENT/INTRINSIC or EXTERNAL/EXTRINSIC. And it also has consequences for the issue of realism vs anti-realism about universals and abstracta.
It isn't just saying that it is a brute fact that fire behaves as it does. It says that fire behaves as it does because there is a FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that; and as such, there is such a thing as a form of fire which different fires possess. The idea is that this form is intrinsic and immanent to the thing, and as such it is that thing's nature/form which explains and predicts its regularities. Which is different from thinking that the regularities come from an external agency- such as when we work to make a hammock out of liana vines, and this hammock as a result won't really grow, will have a tendency to not maintain that shape (hence we need to find a way to tie everything together etc). And different fires possess the form of fire.
This has immediate relevant and controversial metaphysical consequences: for example, a nominalist would not accept this view, because he doesn't believe there is any real "form of fire" that multiple things can possess. But then the nominalist has the cost of not being able to appeal to these forms/essences to explain causal regularities. Why do all these things that we call "fire" behave in much the same way? The nominalist will have a hard time giving an explanation since he doesn't believe in a common form of "fire".
The Aristotelian answer isn't brute fact at all. It posits immanent forms which involve the natural tendencies as such. Sure, the forms simply include the tendencies, but they are not being gratuitously posited: they are posited because it is affirmed that the regularities are *real* and hence must be traced to *some real regularity-maker*, and these forms also explain the *commonality and regularity* of multiple different things (why 10 distinct things behave the same - it's not a brute fact, it would be something surprising, so there must be a common principle shared between the 10 things which makes the regularities), as well as the *immanence* of such activities (different from extrinsic teleology and such).
"Jill killed Jack because she tended toward killing Jack given her essence."
No Aristotelian has ever said such a thing. It is certainly not in the essence of human beings to tend toward killing Jack. But it is in the essence of human beings to be able to know ends and means; to be aware of what one does; to be able to deliberate about one's actions and make plans; and as such Jill can be held guilty and culpable of killing Jack.
"A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it."
I agree. I'm saying that is what it means to say something is immanent/intrinsic.
"And it also has consequences for the issue of realism vs anti-realism about universals and abstracta."
Brute facts can have consequences.
"It says that fire behaves as it does because there is a FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that;"
And you accept "FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that" as a brute fact. Those "natural tendencies as such" are no more than brute facts. No explanation is sought or needed.
I've maintained from the first month I was on this site many years ago that this obsession with teleology is no explanation of anything. People here unquestionably accept it, and that's all there is to it. I have no fundamental complaint with this because I'm not against brute facts. Ultimately everyone must accept something as a brute fact. There is no way around it. There must always be a solid foundation -- a first principle we can say -- for any proof. My complaint is when people pretend my reasoning or my world view fails because I depend on a brute fact when they ultimately rely on their own brute fact.
"Why do all these things that we call 'fire' behave in much the same way? The nominalist will have a hard time giving an explanation since he doesn't believe in a common form of 'fire'."
That form is accepted as brute fact. It has to be.
"they are posited because it is affirmed that the regularities are *real*"
That affirmation is an affirmation of a brute fact -- the realness you claim must exist (in your view) and needs no explanation. It simply is. "I am that I am" is a statement of brute fact.
A nominalist might explain the behavior of fire by using chemistry and physics. Ultimately his explanation would reach a brute fact. I'm not disputing that. The difference is that the Aristotelian grasps onto a brute fact prematurely. The Aristotelian tends to shut down deeper explanation or consider deeper explanations a trifle. I say your metaphysical consequences are not what you claim.
"It is certainly not in the essence of human beings to tend toward killing Jack."
I'm talking about the essence of Jill, not of us all. And I am using this as a model of the questionable reasoning I believe is fostered here. I claim virtually nobody will accept essence as a good explanation today. It's not rejected because it's necessarily wrong. It's rejected because it explains nothing. It trivializes explanation. This is why the Aristotelian view gets so little attraction in the modern world where we have high standards for explanations (sans politics).
If you wanna call the form a "brute fact" then go ahead, so long as you understand that it is an existing, real thing which grounds the causal regularities and tendencies of things. Its existence will also ultimately be explained (in the order of efficient causality - its origins) by other things, it doesn't exist inexplicably. So calling it a brute fact is a little bizarre, but whatever floats your boat - I'm not interested in discussing semantics, only getting the metaphysics right.
Forms can be understood in this context as regularity-makers, if you will, in a parallel with truthmaker (from the same intuition that truths, events, prlpositions, etc. are ultimately grounded in real *things*, existing things)
"A nominalist might explain the behavior of fire by using chemistry and physics"
How? This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways. How do you explain the fact that they behave in this common manner, and with these regularities? The Aristotelian says it's because there is such a thing as a Form of fire which both A and B share. Because both A and B have that same Form, it is no surprise that they behave in the very similar way that they do: this is the effect of the Form, which is the regularity-maker. Both A and B share the same Form and this is why they behave the same even though they are distinct things. There is a principle of unity between them, which is the Form.
But since you don't wanna accept the existence of this Form, you owe us an explanation. Why is it that A and B behave in such a similar way even though they are distinct things? Is it really just a coincidence? That is unbelievable. You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress. Since you do not accept Forms, there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things. There simply are these different things you are calling "chemical structures". They are DIFFERENT, they are not the same (unless you appeal to their Formal element, which is precisely what the Aristotelian does and you want to deny).
So again, how would you, as a nominalist, explain A and B (distinct things) operating in the same manner even though they are distinct? If there is nothing in A or B that makes these regularities, then it is unexplained (and THAT would be taking the commonalities and regularities as brute facts), and if the whatever A and B have are distinct things, then we haven't explained their common behavior either.
At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances. And this is what a Form is.
"I'm talking about the essence of Jill, not of us all"
Jill's form is that of a human being. Her actions and the culpability and guilt involved in them *are* explained by their form: Jill is the sort of substance that is rational, that can be conscious of her actions, that can deliberate, plan and choose how to act. This is why she is guilty if she chose to murder someone. This "sort" of substance just described is what we call a Human Being - the form of a human being that we share along with Jill. You know, the principle of commonality and causal regularity between otherwise distinct substances, and the basis for us calling these distinct substances by a same name - the Form.
Sorry Don, Jill’s essence isn’t a thing there because it’s a choice she made, not nature acting out it’s own teleology. You need to try harder to distinguish the two concepts of obvious explanation and no explanation. Chemistry is not an explanation of why fire burns, it’s just a more detailed description of what burning is. If you tell me it is an explanation, I’m going to ask you how the chemistry brings about the burning of fire. Then you say it’s just a brute fact, so there is no reason that chemistry brings about the burning of fire, and so it’s not an explanation in the slightest.
The issue is, for most people, teleology is actually an explanation to some degree. If your doctor prescribed you medicine and you come back to him with some pain in your side. He might say “yeah the medicine causes side pain.” And, at that, most people would be satisfied. They’ve learned something: that the medicine is a side-pain-causing drug. I think Aristotle saw this as a small form of explanation, Plato saw it, many contemporary scholars see it too. Your claim is not just that they’re wrong, but that they’ve been talking about nothing this whole time. The believed in forms and teleology but were merely spouting tautologies. I’m not even inclined to believe a political philosopher really intends a tautology to say liberty is freedom, because perhaps liberty and freedom give different connotations in his mind. I think you’re stuck in a rut and need to give the issue some time to rest and return to it later. Cheers.
Atno, "This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways. How do you explain the fact that they behave in this common manner, and with these regularities?" The most direct explanation is at the level of chemistry, that is, molecules. When bonds form energy is released, which heats the gas and unburned materials in the flame. The excited atoms emit light.
Hot gases move away from the center of the Earth, not because the are going to their natural place as Aristotle erroneously asserted, rather, because of the density gradient in the atmosphere and the lower density of the hot gases.
Theses effects at the chemistry scale can be further reduced to the subatomic scale.
The reason flames the world over look broadly similar is that the aggregate of these submicroscopic interactions sums similarly in each instance.
"The Aristotelian says it's because there is such a thing as a Form of fire which both A and B share." Which is why Aristotelians get dismissed generally. Science has long ago moved beyond such vague speculations.
"this is the effect of the Form, which is the regularity-maker." No, the regularity maker is the character of the laws of nature intrinsic to mereological simples. All observed regularity is the aggregate of those natures.
"You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress" Indeed.
"there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things." Have you had the opportunity to take a chemistry course? It seems not. There is great regularity and shared structures at the level of molecular structures and interactions.
"explain A and B (distinct things) operating in the same manner even though they are distinct?" Subatomic particles progress according to what we call laws of nature, which combine in regular ways to form atoms, molecules, and the macro structures we observe with our unaided senses.
"At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances." Indeed, there is a commonality at the level of mereological simples.
"And this is what a Form is." Not distinct from the material, no. Form does not have an independent ontological realization.
"Jill is the sort of substance that is rational" The only existent substances are mereological simples, the rest is aggregates of them that we analyze in progressively higher levels of abstraction.
OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort.
I predict your explanation of forms will merely describe them or posit why you think they must be necessary. It's the necessity that makes them inexplicable. Any "necessary" truth is said to be so because it needs no proof, no explanation. So: "Forms can be understood in this context as regularity-makers." Yet what makes these regularity-makers? Where do they come from? The way forms are discussed here makes them metaphysically brute.
"This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways."
Of course they do. They both are oxidation of a fuel. The process is similar therefore the look of the things is unsurprisingly similar. That is the unity between them. There is no dependence on coincidence.
"You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress."
Yes, but a regress ultimately terminating in brute fact(s), which is all you have done with forms.
"Since you do not accept Forms, there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things."
Sure there is. That is how the chemical structure behaves. Its behavior could be considered a brute fact if we stop looking there. Or we could keep looking until we posit physical/natural laws which unify everything. You do the same with forms except you seem to tire easily and hold up a stop sign just when things get interesting.
"At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances. And this is what a Form is."
Commonality, yes. Form, no -- not unless you change your understanding of forms to mean laws of physics. Then your "form" for fire goes up in smoke and you're just substituting words.
"Jill's form is that of a human being. Her actions and the culpability and guilt involved in them *are* explained by their form..."
The proper form would be murderer, which is a small subset of human beings. Don't bother telling me that there is one and only one form for an individual human. I'll reject that as obviously insufficient. Humans are noses, big and small, fingers, stubby and thin, eyes, blue and brown, etc... -- that is, humans are a collection of a multitude of forms, not every human possessing every possible form that composes an individual. Dogs have noses too. Your forms can jump species. Jill isn't guilty because she was directed to murder as a generic human being. She was directed to murder as an instantiation of the form, murderer.
"Sorry Don, Jill’s essence isn’t a thing there because it’s a choice she made, not nature acting out it’s own teleology."
We are often told final cause is a human choice. The hand-stick-rock analogy begins with the final cause (choice) of the human. Our acts are driven by our choices which are our final cause. Regardless, do you think choice exists in a vacuum? a creatio ex nihilo?
"Chemistry is not an explanation of why fire burns, it’s just a more detailed description of what burning is."
Chemistry explains this down to a molecular level and further down to a physics level. I agree that at some point it will terminate in facts that simply have to be accepted because current understanding cannot go any further. It does not follow that everything above this level answers no why or how.
"I’m going to ask you how the chemistry brings about the burning of fire. Then you say it’s just a brute fact, so there is no reason that chemistry brings about the burning of fire, and so it’s not an explanation in the slightest."
I'm not sure what you're trying to say. Chemistry does not explain fire itself as a brute fact. I could ask you how form brings about the burning of fire? Or I could ask you why form brings about the burning of fire?
"He might say 'yeah the medicine causes side pain.' And, at that, most people would be satisfied."
He wouldn't say the medicine is "directed to" cause you side pain, though. The patient is more concerned that the medicine is "directed to" prevent a heart attack, or something positive. And I don't know what sort of patient you are, but I do want to know how the drug does what the doctor claims, and what it does that the doctor downplays. I want to know if its effects are more positive than negative. Pain is a warning. The body is telling me something the doctor isn't. I want to know why. Regardless, I would not be comforted to know doctors didn't want to know why the drug causes side pain as a side effect. I would expect them to follow up on that.
You are correct in what I claim. I don't claim the Aristotelian has to be wrong. I do claim, as you noticed, "they’ve been talking about nothing this whole time." Even if they were right about forms, I claim it is of no help whatsoever.
"Hot gases move away from the center of the Earth, not because the are going to their natural place as Aristotle erroneously asserted, rather, because of the density gradient in the atmosphere and the lower density of the hot gases" says sd.
Oh, good thinking.🤣
So hot gases are not going to their natural places when they rise to density equilibrium?
Actually they are, so Aristotle was not erroneous.
Just you🤣!
"Which is why Aristotelians get dismissed generally" says sd.
Actually, they do not get dismissed in general. Just by you, which is insufficient reason to dismiss forms as a metaphysical category, since your logic is tightly circular.
"No, the regularity maker is the character of the laws of nature intrinsic to mereological simples. All observed regularity is the aggregate of those natures"
You would think mereological theories prove themselves, but correspondence proves nothing, even if you have a whacky bootstrap argument, because other metaphysics contradicts the mereological scientismistic BS and cannot be disproven, disproving any pseudo-proof of the "proof" of a mereological "proof".
sd keeps throwing whacko bombs into Professor Feser's website🤣!
"OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort", says sd.
The tight and dangerous circularity is is very clear here. sd's pumping of his insistence on what is or is not "necessary" (a minefield of a word in itself) as "teaching" couple with his declaration that "we still need to get rid of religion" is a clear warning to anyone who wishes to be free, that they should …
BEWARE.
Enough Christians are being martyred daily without sd's false cover for it.
“ OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort.”
Note how confidently SD abandons their explicitly stated skepticism about necessary beings and simples to make a completely unfounded assertion that these necessary beings must be material.
Can’t have it both ways dude. You don’t get to put on your skeptic hat when questioned about your proposed metaphysics and also confidently claim you know that these necessary beings must in fact be material beings.
Anon (of Aril 20, 2023 at 3:31AM) "SD abandons their explicitly stated skepticism about necessary beings" I never expressed skepticism about the existence of necessary beings in general.
I have proved again and again that the First Way is riddled with false premises and invalid logic and therefore is grossly unsound as an argument for a particular sort of necessary being.
I have also proved that Dr. Feser has affirmed that that the 5 ways of Aquinas are unsound as arguments for the necessity of god.
Necessity God
Those terms are key to keep in mind as to what Dr. Feser has affirmed in the OP, namely, that the 5 ways of Aquinas are unsound as arguments for the *necessity* of *god*, specifically.
"completely unfounded assertion that these necessary beings must be material" I confess that I did not provide a sufficient foundation for that claim when I made it, hence, the "OBTW", meaning it is just a comment you are free to take for whatever it is worth to you, perhaps you feel nothing at all.
"Can’t have it both ways dude." Fair enough, it would be unsound to contradict myself, fortunately, I haven't.
Don Jindra "The proper form would be murderer, which is a small subset of human beings. Don't bother telling me that there is one and only one form for an individual human. I'll reject that as obviously insufficient. Humans are noses, big and small, fingers, stubby and thin, eyes, blue and brown, etc... -- that is, humans are a collection of a multitude of forms, not every human possessing every possible form that composes an individual. Dogs have noses too. Your forms can jump species. Jill isn't guilty because she was directed to murder as a generic human being. She was directed to murder as an instantiation of the form, murderer." The claim that there is only one for form for humanity (and that this grounds the commonality that we see) is precisely what we claim, can you please explain what you understand forms to be? I think there's some confusion here
Don Jindra ""A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it."
I agree. I'm saying that is what it means to say something is immanent/intrinsic."
No, the following passages from feser's book on scholastic philosophy explain why, the point he's making is about powers in specific but I think you'll be able to see how it also applies to the question at hand
"As the explanatory role powers play vis-a-vis change and limitation
indicates, the common charge that the Scholastic notion of powers is
vacuous and explanatorily useless is unjust. The alleged problem with
powers is famously summed up in Moliere’s joke about the doctor
who explained why opium causes sleep by attributing to it a
“dormitive power.” Since “dormitive power” means “a power to cause
sleep,” the doctor’s explanation amounts to saying “Opium causes
sleep because it has a power to cause sleep.” This, so it is claimed, is a
mere tautology and thus explains nothing. But though the statement is
not very informative, it is not in fact a tautology. To say “Opium
causes sleep because it causes sleep” would be a tautology, but the
statement in question says more than that. In attributing a sleep-
inducing power to opium, it tells us that the fact that sleep tends to
follow the taking of opium is not merely an accidental feature of thisor that sample of opium, but belongs to the nature of opium as such.
That this is not a tautology is evidenced by the fact that critics of the
Scholastic notion of powers regard the attribution of a dormitive
power to opium as false rather than (as they should regard it if it were
a tautology) trivially true. The critics do not say: “Yes, opium has the
power to cause sleep, but that is too obvious to be worth mentioning.”
Rather, they say: “No, opium has no such power, because there are no
such things as powers in the Scholastic sense.” (Cf. Martin 1997, pp.
188-90)
"Acknowledging this point, Stephen Mumford notes that a critic
might still object that appeal to a dormitive power is uninformative,
since while it tells us that there is something about the opium itself
that causes sleep, it does not tell us exactly what that is. (Mumford
1998, pp. 136-41) But this does not by itself give us any reason to
doubt or deny the existence of powers. As Mumford goes on to point
out, we have to distinguish between causal relations and causal
explanations. Whether identifying A as the cause of B provides an
informative explanation depends on our background knowledge and
on the modes of presentation under which A and B are identified.
But that is a separate issue from whether A is in fact causally related
to B. Indeed, the latter issue is in a sense more fundamental insofar
as A cannot enter into a true causal explanation of B in the first
place unless A really is causally related to B. "
Moliere: "An educated doctor is asking me the cause and reason why opium induces sleep. My answer to that is because there is in it a sleep-inducing power which by its very nature relaxes the senses."
The gracious Mr. Feser claims that statement is not a tautology. I think he's splitting hairs. Even if it's not technically a tautology, that is not the real question. We are supposed to waste time quibbling about the nature of tautology. This keeps us from answering real questions. Real question are, does this explain anything? does it tend to keep us from looking deeper into why opium induces sleep? Perhaps there is a better explanation, and that explanation involves chemistry in our body. If chemistry is a deeper, more satisfying explanation, the "sleep-inducing power" becomes a trivial statement that loses its explanatory power, if it ever had any. IOW, "sleep-inducing power" was a statement of ignorance masquerading as explanation. Arguing about its tautological nature is irrelevant. Call it what you want, it still explains nothing. It's a placeholder that begs for elaboration.
"The claim that there is only one for form for humanity (and that this grounds the commonality that we see) is precisely what we claim, can you please explain what you understand forms to be? I think there's some confusion here."
Humans have noses. Dogs have noses. You could say that not all humans have a nose therefore humanness is something different than a collection of nose, fingers, legs, etc. But whatever that "human" form is, there is no debating the fact that the form "nose" is part of the human population, even if it's not universal. A person can have the form "human" and still have an appendage of the form "nose" -- or not. I don't think you can disagree with that. So I'm saying the same applies to "murderer." A person can have the "form" of human and also have a moral attribute that matches the form of "murderer." There is no necessity that every human has every form that could be found in the human population.
In doing research for a project I ran across a clever book called "Conversations on the Plurality of the Worlds" by Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, published in 1686. It's a fictionalized dialogue between a man and a woman (the Marchioness) concerning the planets and stars and the possibility they are inhabited. There is a part that I think is appropriate to the discussion here.
This snippet starts with the man:
"Figure yourself, as spectators of an opera, the Pythagorases, the Platos, the Aristotles; all these men whose names are so celebrated. Let us suppose them viewing the flight of Phæton, rising on the wind; ignorant at the same time of the construction of the theatre, and the cords by which the figure is put in motion. One to explain the phenomenon, says, it is some hidden virtue in Phæton which causes him to rise; another replies, Phæton is composed of certain numbers which produce his elevation. A third says, Phæton has a love for the top of the stage; he is uneasy at any other part. The fourth thinks, it is not essential to the nature of Phæton to rise in the air, but he prefers flying up to leaving a vacuum at the top of the stage. Such were the ridiculous notions of the ancient philosophers, which to my astonishment have not ruined the reputation of antiquity. After all Descartes and some other moderns appear: they tell you that Phæton rises in consequence of being drawn by cords, fastened to a descending weight, which is heavier than himself. It is no longer believed that a body can have motion, unless acted upon by another body; that it can rise and descend without a counterbalancing weight; thus, whoever examines the mechanism of nature is only going behind the scenes of a theatre."
"If that be the case," answered the Marchioness, "philosophy is a very mechanical affair!"
"So much so," I replied, "that I am afraid it will fall into disrepute."
Dr Feser lets Stardusty post here because he tolerates a diversity of opinion.
You have a phenomenal grasp of the obvious, and you also phenomenally miss the point. Nobody objects to diversity of opinion. Psycho doesn't actually engage his interlocutors. He reframes, deflects and ignores anything that corrects his misperceptions, which are unmistakable indicators of mendacity. He is also an arrant liar, as proved when he came back here ostensibly to “learn” more about Thomism, being only a ruse to attack it.
There are other critics of Thomism who routinely show up here, but they at least engage the arguments and argue in good faith. That is to be welcomed. But this sewer spillage called CokeDust Psycho adds nothing of value to any discussion here.
Bill. I have posted here for many years. While Dr Feser does indeed tolerate a diversity of opinion, I can assure you he does not let every post get published. I will trust his wise judgment over your inflammatory comments.
Did you hear that professor? This Bill fellow reckons that 'this sewer spillage called CokeDust Psycho adds nothing of value to any discussion here'. How charming - wonder how long Billy spent dreaming that one up!
Thank you professor for allowing a diversity of views to be expressed here and for leaving it to the judgement of others if and when to respond. Please continue to ignore the baying of some for censorship and the ostracism of dissenters.
@Anonymous, I too have posted here for some time, so I need no reminding what the posting policy is and that not every comment is published. There is a world of difference between "diversity of views" and someone making deliberately false statements just for the sake of fingering a keyboard.
And if you're that enamored with "diversity of opinion," then quit getting twisted over mine. Talk with Psycho all you want.
Bill It is you who is getting "twisted up," which indicates you have some personal issues you need to address. If Dr. Feser can tolerate SD on his forum, why can't you? And if you can't, well, don't come here. Simple as that.
Bill’s comment, to my mind, is rather uncontroversial. What legitimate contribution to the philosophical discussion has this character actually contributed? Practically speaking, comment boxes are insurmountable obstacles to philosophical exchanges and clarifications (dialectic); although, that is not to say they are useless. What certainly is useless are “flyby” comments to what Dr. Feser writes in the attempt to sound sophisticated.
Too many comments are incorporating needless insults, remarks about who is and who isn’t a troll, and other such tiresome and unedifying stuff. Please cut it out, guys.
Hey, Ed. Did you know that you "have falsified the 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of god" and that you have "acknowledged" this? Didja know that, Ed? 'Cause a certain poster here keeps saying this. I had no idea. All I can conclude is that Thomism is in shambles and that you must hang your head in shame (and possibly become an atheist-materialist) because of this particular commenter who will not be named (and who is assuredly NOT a troll)!
DrYogami, OP-"Suffice it to say that on the Aristotelian view, what directly grounds the laws of nature are the essences of physical things, so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause. In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism." I agree with that view, that the essences, or properties, or characters of physical things, most specifically the simplest most fundamental things, whatever they turn out to be, perhaps fields, grounds what we call the laws of nature.
It is that grounding that Aquinas uses as his basis for argument, not scripture, not revelation, rather what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses". Again, I strongly agree with that approach.
All 5 ways are dependent on "analyzing the character of physical law", laws of motion, change, and causality. All 5 ways are argued by analyzing the character of physical laws as they are manifest and evident to our senses. I cannot stress too much my agreement with that analytical approach.
And it is true, that "the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism". That leaves us no logical choice than to conclude that the 5 ways cannot soundly argue for the necessity of the existence of god.
One cannot soundly argue from the character of the laws of nature to the necessity of the existence of god if it is the case that the character of the laws of nature are neutral between theism and atheism.
Note that other claims others might make are not supported merely by this fact of neutrality. Such neutrality does not by itself rule out proving the necessity of a first mover. Also, such neutrality does not by itself prove the incompatibility of either atheism or theism with a first mover.
However, on such neutrality, necessity is logically ruled out. By affirming such neutrality Dr. Feser has in fact by direct deduction invalidated all 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of the existence of god. Necessity, being the key word. Necessity cannot be soundly claimed on neutrality.
This is sometimes called the gap problem. It has been pointed out many times, that the assertion of god as the very last word is not logically connected to the rest of the argument. God simply does not enter into the syllogistic forms of the arguments.
"In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."
Note the qualifier. The implication being that there is another sense in which the Aristotelian view of laws of nature are NOT "neutral between theism and atheism".
sd says, "This is sometimes called the gap problem. It has been pointed out many times, that the assertion of god as the very last word is not logically connected to the rest of the argument. God simply does not enter into the syllogistic forms of the arguments"
I have already pointed out that a "gap", an "IT does not follow" does not imply a false argument because "IT does not follow" is only what is claimed by an individual. That the individual does not see that IT (whatever IT might be) follows does not mean that IT does not follow. The person who claims to have found a "gap" might just be a little dense. There are also other problems with a "gap" argument (this BTW has nothing to do with the so called "God of the gaps", which I suspect sd is trying to channel in another fallacy typical of him, but I do not deal with that here).
Another problem with a "gap" argument is that the "gap" is almost never a contradiction, which means that it fails to show that there is anything wrong.
I already gave the illustrative example of tearing a page out of a maths text so that there is a gap in the argument. It does not follow from the existence of this gap that the conclusion is false.
But sd refuses to get it for some odd reason🤣!
Instead, he misleadingly channels the famous "God of the gaps" argument, which is actually a reductio-ad-absurdum argument, but sd has reduced nothing to absurdity unless it is his prior claim that people who have not agreed with him have agreed with jim.
Everything he says is base on his confounded circularity. I pray that he is able to break out of it.
I have already answered the claims he has addressed to Dr. Yogami on the "Talking Theology and Natural Philosophy" thread. I do not have the time to repeat that tedious task here.
Were it not that one such as sd who has clearly desired the elimination of religion, I would ignore him. But he is given to all kinds of falsity and so must be regarded as a real danger to freedom of religion, so …
DrYogami, "The implication being that there is another sense in which the Aristotelian view of laws of nature are NOT "neutral between theism and atheism".
That really should be enough to settle it." Yet you do not describe this supposed alternative sense.
No matter, the sense already explicitly stated rules out all 5 ways of Aquinas as sound arguments for the necessity of god. That fact does indeed settle the matter.
By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed that all 5 ways are not sound arguments for the necessity of god. That fact is not controversial. Anybody who has studied the structures of the ways of Aquinas can clearly describe that the word "god" is a mere non-sequitur, a word listed ad hoc with no logical connection to the preceding argument.
Your vague allusion to some other supposed sense does nothing to make any of the 5 ways sound arguments for the necessary existence of god.
sd says, "Your vague allusion to some other supposed sense does nothing to make any of the 5 ways sound arguments for the necessary existence of god".
sd's middle name, of course is "vague"🤣.
But a "vague allusion" by Dr. Yogami would have no impact on the soundness of Aquinas except in the mind of sd in which "Aquinas is sound" contradicts sd's unwarranted assumption.
A whole shebang of sd's errors appear in his comment🤣!
sd says, "you do not describe this supposed alternative sense".
So what! Many clear things are necessarily not further "described" in communication, such being the nature of communicating with words.
sd says, "No matter, the sense already explicitly stated rules out all 5 ways of Aquinas as sound arguments for the necessity of god".
Oh this is good. sd complains that "sense" is not "described" ( i.e., what it means is unknown), yet it is good enough to rule out Aquinas anyway!
Very funny🤣!
Since the matter is "settled" in sd's mind at the start, he is getting nowhere.
sd says, "By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed …"
Huh? Where did Dr. Feser "affirm" this? This is your statements that Dr. Feser "agrees" all over again. Way to slip a cog sd🤣.
"By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed that all 5 ways are not sound arguments for the necessity of god"
Where, from the "OP" or otherwise did Dr. Feser "deduce" this🤣? More cog slipping here.
sd says, "That fact is not controversial". What "fact"?
"Anybody who has studied the structures of the ways of Aquinas can clearly describe that the word 'god' is a mere non-sequitur"
I've already taught sd several times that his personal inability to see how something follows in verbal communication does not mean that it does not follow (eg, ripping a page out of a topology text does not mean that a conclusion does not follow). Since Aquinas is sound, sd's circular insistence otherwise notwithstanding, all that we have here is good evidence that sd does not, no matter what he claims, understand Aquinas. All his cog slipping that he cannot avoid makes this unsurprising.
Well, sd thinks that his word rules, so … pray for him, and …
The question is, where do the laws of nature come from? If as per William of Ockham, God creates them, or is it physics all the way down?
Descartes claims God creates metaphysical necessities such as math. Presuppositionalist such as Bahman claim creates all including logic, agreeing essentially with Descartes.
Descartes, presuppositionalists and Ockham all agree God is good, perfectly good. If so, God could eliminate all moral evil, for example giving all mankind free will yet never choosing to do moral evil. Now the Problem Of Evil becomes a serious issue.
Aquinas tells us God cannot do the logically impossible. Descartes admits he cannot image mountains without valleys, but tells us that is because that is the mind God created for him. God cannot be claimed to be so limited. Can God make 2 + 2 = 5 as per Descartes? Or maybe nor as maybecAquinas could object. Now logic becomes a serious issue. Where does logic and metaphysical necessities come from? What are they? Does God have any limits? Purus Actus and immutability become serious issues. Things would seem then to be necessary despite existence of evil. It all seems to indicate God is a rather unlikely proposition, at least the Perfect Being God of theology.
The questions raised by Stardusty and WCB have also been raised by philosophers over the centuries. They have been addressed in many books and articles, including some by Dr. Feser.
These problems have been solved? Not that I have ever found over years of these sorts of issues.
If God is perfectly morally good, and creates the very logic of the Universe, why is there moral evil? Again, God could create a Universe where all mankind has free will but chooses freely to never do moral evil. Redefined as a sophistical series of dodges.
Since the Bible explicitly tells us what evil is, such as oppresion of the poor, widows, and orphans, good cannot be redefined in a sophistical series of bad arguments.
A Universe where evil is not necessary for a greater good is better than a Universe with necessary evil. A godvwho creates logic itself could eliminate any need for evil. That is a common apologetical dodge, but fails in the end. All such arguments that have been created are old and hoary with age and do not even approach the issue of what is logic and where it comes from.
Created by God or something outside and beyond God who cannot change the nature of logic.
Given our limited understanding, there will never be a solution to the problem of evil. But it has been well addressed in the literature by theistic philosophers.
One particularly discreditable way in which the problem of evil has been addressed is by claiming - contrary to scriptural 'evidence' - that god is good only analagously to the way ordinary people use the term. This extremely flexible piece of elastic is then used to evapourate the problem. Just redefine words like 'merciful' , 'loving', ' compassionate' etc and all is well.
Since this is a blog that affirms classical theism, I don’t know of any classical theist “address” of the POE that explains away goodness in equivocal terms. We assert that all finite terms about God’s attributes are necessarily limited approximations of what God is transcendently. That doesn’t take away from our concept of “good,” nor does it allow any escape into nebulous terminology in order to dance around the question. God is eminently good—He exists in accordance with His infinitely perfect essence, for His essence is His infinitely perfect existence. Creaturely goodness is the object of desire (that which obtains from the actualization of potencies inherent in the kind of thing one is). Once the actualization is complete, that which is actualized is a perfection. And a perfection’s goodness is measured in accordance to the degree of its actuality. There is thus an objective standard by which goodness is measured. And since all goodness is a limited likeness of God’s infinite goodness (actuality), His essence is the ultimate standard against which all creaturely goodness is measured.
The logical problem of evil is vitiated by the very good reply that so long as there is even the possibility that there is a morally justified reason for evil, then instances of evil cannot be incompatible with God’s existence. And since the possibility of a morally justified reason for evil is not itself inherently contradictory, the logical “problem” collapses.
Yes, the logical problem of evil is vitiated by the possibility that there is a morally juistified reason for evil. But that does not mean that the PoE is not a huge problem for any brand theism that claims God is good. Or do you also believe that the non-zero possibility that the fine tuning is the result of pure chance invalidates the Fine Tuning Argument?
Yes, the logical problem of evil is vitiated by the possibility that there is a morally juistified reason for evil.
Thank you. You would not believe how difficult it is to get many atheists and agnostics to see that simple point.
But that does not mean that the PoE is not a huge problem for any brand theism that claims God is good.
Now, that’s a head-scratcher. Where does the POE arise under any claim that does not assert or assume that God is good? If God isn’t good, then what’s the POE? And please recall that my post is under the rubric of classical theism. The POE was raised to assert that the existence of evil is incompatible with an all-good God.
Thus, the POE is vitiated so long as it is logically possible that there is a morally justifiable reason for evil. And since you acknowledge that a morally justifiable reason is logically possible, then there is no “problem” whatsoever.
Of course the PoE does not arise under any claim that does not assert or assume that God is good. That why I say it is a huge problem for any brand of theism that does assert or assume this.
And, yes, the Logical Problem of Evil is vitiated by the logical possibilty of a justifiable reason for evil. And since it is, so far, impossible to prove that there cannot be such logically possible reason we should admit that the LPoE is vitiated. But it is also impossible to prove that it is impossible for nothing at all to exist, hence, God is not necessary, which means God does not exist, there is no 'problem' for atheism whatsoever. But of course there are problems for atheism, and the Evidential Problem of Evil is still a huge problem for you.
You would not believe how difficult it is to get many theists, especially classical theists, to see that simple point.
And, yes, the Logical Problem of Evil is vitiated by the logical possibilty of a justifiable reason for evil. And since it is, so far, impossible to prove that there cannot be such logically possible reason we should admit that the LPoE is vitiated.
Again, thank you for acknowledging that. Atheist/agnostic philosophers have seen that for quite some time. It’s the ideologue trolls with their take-no-prisoners approach who plague the internet with their silly “proofs” against theism.
But of course there are problems for atheism, and the Evidential Problem of Evil is still a huge problem for you.
If you feel that way, that’s your business, but I don’t see it that way at all. The same answer, albeit slightly modified, would apply here. If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil. The fact that we may not be able to think of a reason does not mean that one does not exist. Evil cannot be evidence against God if it can be proved that God exists. Now, you may deny that proof, but we believe we have more than sufficient evidence that God is real. So, the debate should really focus on God’s existence.
Objections from evil seem incoherent to me. In order to gain leverage, one must appeal to an absolute standard. But where did that absolute standard come from? And if the standard is merely assumed arguendo, then evil is nothing but a private fancy. Given that, nothing is really wrong. All we have are molecules in motion. Positing an “all-good” God for argumentative purposes bears no relevance to a debate about evil since nothing is “wrong” anyway. And if it is objected that the definition of “good” is contradicted by certain phenomena, then the objection is easily answered that said definition addresses said phenomena as morally justified in the overall purpose of the Good, whether or not we can see that overall purpose. Once again, we’re back to whether God exists, not to some tangential argument over evil, which is really a red herring.
You would not believe how difficult it is to get many theists, especially classical theists, to see that simple point.
I wasn’t being snarky when I wrote similar words to which you are replying here. Contrary to a host of uneducated gnu atheists, the logical problem is dead. A basic logic course and a dose of honesty takes care of the problem. Your alleged “simple point” isn’t nearly on par with the obvious and plain failure of the logical objection. It amounts to saying that our ignorance of a justifiable reason renders our ignorance decisive against a proven reality. Thus, the argument kicks back to whether said "reality" is proved. It has nothing to do with our ignorance.
Of course If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil., but the fact is that that cannot be established. Even if it could be established that some God exists (and that has yet to be done), then, in order to establish that God is good, you have to get rid of the problem of evil. One of the problems is that for a classical theist, the goodness of God is simply a tautology. God is good because Goodness is what God is. The morally justifiable reason comes down to any reason God may have, because if God has a reason it must be morally justified because it is from God. The "absolute standard" you are talking about is simply that which Christians agree on is evil. If there is such an absolute standard, then, X is wrong is an absolute truth, which means that God cannot do X. God can only do X if X is not absolutely evil, but in that case you end up with might makes right. So, while you may believe that on atheism nothing is really wrong, that is irrelevant to the point that defenders of the PoE, and by those I mean atheist/agnostic philosophers, are making.
Of course If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil.
Yes, and thanks.
...but the fact is that that cannot be established.
I acknowledged that you disagree with me on that point, but again, that's where the argument must be focused. Since evil is compatible with an all-good God, if God exists, then it's nonsensical to appeal to it.
One of the problems is that for a classical theist, the goodness of God is simply a tautology. God is good because Goodness is what God is.
But that's what I consider a gross oversimplification of goodness under classical theism. True, being is convertible with good as a transcendental, but good is distinguished from being under the aspect of desirability. It is existence in accordance with one's telos or nature that distinguishes it from being simpliciter. In creaturely goodness, the actualization of a potency is a perfection, and goodness is the degree to which the potency was actualized. A dog born with one ear is less good than a dog born with two ears. Thus, given the clear logical distinction between the concepts, it can hardly be termed a tautology. And given that God is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, it follows that He is infinitely good (maximally existing in accordance with His perfect nature).
The morally justifiable reason comes down to any reason God may have, because if God has a reason it must be morally justified because it is from God.
If it is proved that God exists, then His purposes and acts are perfect. That follows given God's existence. Since you acknowledge that a morally justified reason for evil follows from God's existence, we are again thrown back to whether God exists. Evil is a red herring.
The "absolute standard" you are talking about is simply that which Christians agree on is evil.
And since the Christians here are classical theists, the "evil" they "agree" on is the privation of good. Any diminution of being is evil, which is either justified or unjustified. "Evil" acts are not "bad" unless they are unjustified. Since God is perfect, all His acts, by definition, are justified.
If there is such an absolute standard, then, X is wrong is an absolute truth, which means that God cannot do X. God can only do X if X is not absolutely evil, but in that case you end up with might makes right.
X is only wrong if X results in diminution of being. And as I said, X may or may not be wrong on whether X is justified. That has nothing to do with "might makes right."
So, while you may believe that on atheism nothing is really wrong, that is irrelevant to the point that defenders of the PoE, and by those I mean atheist/agnostic philosophers, are making.
The "irrelevant" point is an appeal to evil. Since we both agree that the objection fails if God exists, that's where the discussion must be focused.
This will be my last reply on this topic, because I don't see us making any progress here. To me, the idea that a being who is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, would create anything that even has the potency for a diminution of being may not be absolutely logically impossible, that is, I think it is impossible, but since I cannot prove it, I grant that it is logically possible. But it is so extremely unlikely that I don't think it is rational to think such a being exists, just as I think it's irrational to just dismiss the Fune Tuning Argument because it is not absolutely logically impossible for the constants to be what they are just by sheer coincidence. To paraphrase Stephen Law, virtually everybody agrees that, given the amount of good in the world, it would be irrational to believe the world was created by an all-evil god and therefore it is also irrational, given the amount of evil, to think that this world is created by a good god, although the logical possibility cannot be disproven at this point in time.
This will be my last reply on this topic, because I don't see us making any progress here.
No problem here. That's your call.
To me, the idea that a being who is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, would create anything that even has the potency for a diminution of being may not be absolutely logically impossible, that is, I think it is impossible, but since I cannot prove it, I grant that it is logically possible.
Well, I thank you for having the integrity to at least acknowledge its logical possibility. However, as you are probably aware, the positive arguments for theism from the classical perspective are not reliant on logical possibility arguments. They are a posteriori arguments rooted in cause-and-effect. I've read your objections to those arguments; I just don't think that they are persuasive.
And I must say that I find it odd that mere mortals with an extremely short lifespan believe that they're able to sit on the recliner of eternity and gauge the probability of what an infinite being would or wouldn't do. I realize that rational inquiry is ever-expanding, but what I personally find preposterous bears no direct relevance to the truth or falsity of a claim. Either the arguments work or they do not. Back to square one.
But it is so extremely unlikely that I don't think it is rational to think such a being exists, just as I think it's irrational to just dismiss the Fune Tuning Argument because it is not absolutely logically impossible for the constants to be what they are just by sheer coincidence.
But you haven't shown why creation by a good God is "extremely unlikely." Again, if it can be shown that God exists, it follows that God's perfect purpose is expressed in creation. Why God would do this or that doesn't even cross my mind.
However, this comment of yours is an apple to a Tonka truck. Recall that the logical POE asserts that theism is logically precluded. But since the POE purports to be a logical argument, as you acknowledge, it fails. It cannot be cogently asserted that evil cancels theism. This is not an instance of the logical-possibility-warrants-refutation fallacy. Everybody acknowledges that instances of evil are justified by greater good. And given an eternal perspective in which we are required to acknowledge ignorance, we are simply unable to say that there is no greater good for evil.
With respect to fine-tuning, a relevant comparison is a possibly strong argument for theism being rejected on the logical possibility that God doesn't exist. To my knowledge, all classical theists affirm that God's non-existence is logically possible. But to use that as the basis for rejecting a probabilistic fine-turning argument is precisely the logical possibility fallacy (because a fine-tuning argument doesn't purport to be logically undeniable). And as stated, this doesn't substantively change for the evidential problem. A strong probabilistic theistic argument cannot be vitiated by evil both because we affirm greater good arguments and because we're forced to admit our impotence to see from eternity.
So, we are again back to the question of God’s existence. Evil is a red herring. If God exists, evil is explained by God’s greater good.
I apologize for posting a comment on this thread only now. I really enjoyed reading the original article on Edward's main blog. My humble contribution to this discussion revolves around two points, one written by the physicist and the second by the philosopher. Firstly, I would like to emphasize a major point: a law of nature is always only the expression of a symmetry observed or postulated in the observation that we make of the physical objects concerned by that law of nature. Even the simplest law of motion in nature actually expresses hypotheses of symmetries, like invariances of any kind. From a philosophical standpoint, this implies that the laws of nature, as expressing symmetries in the observed reality, supposed or hypothesized, are a simple narrative often expressed in a mathematical language of the properties that are proper to the physical entities which the scientist wishes to describe. Actually, they reflect, at an ontological level, aspects of the nature itself of the considered objects, hence they are directly linked to their final cause. I hope that these simple considerations do help.
Gaëtan, You were a bit helpful prior to your penultimate sentence, then you went off the rails.
Final cause is illusory as attributed to basic laws of nature. The ontological processes we describe mathematically as laws of physics have no purpose, they simply are the ways real material interacts and progresses.
Your notion of an end, or a purpose, is purely in your imagination. It is an abstraction you applied abstractly, an illusion, an anthropomorphization, an abstract projection of your anticipation of future conditions or a retroactive abstract projection as to why particular conditions came to be the case.
An important step for you to gain realistic insights is for you to abandon your ancient misunderstandings of a teleological cosmos.
Your contributions become increasingly unhinged. Nobody is compelled to interact with StarDusty, and the claim that he is harrassing people is laughable. You clearly cannot abide the fact that others have a different take on this than your extremist one. It is you who are harassing StarDusty - that is plain for all to see. Show some maturity and dignity and halt your obsessive vendetta.
Knowing the nature of an object is all about knowing its meaning. But knowing a meaning is precisely knowing the final(ity) cause of said object. Having stressed this exquisitely philosophical point of view, I wish to remind you, sd, that, safe your respect, I am not at all interested in interacting with you: do respect, please, this wish of mine in future and avoid commenting my interventions. Thank you in advance.
Gaëtan, "Knowing the nature of an object is all about knowing its meaning." What is the purpose of an electron? What teleological end do each of its quantum numbers strive toward?
"But knowing a meaning is precisely knowing the final(ity) cause" You purport to be educated in physics. Did your physics textbooks contain a chapter on teleology?
The subject of the OP is the nature or character of what we call the Laws of Nature. I agree broadly with Dr. Feser in his post, that material progresses and interacts as it does as a consequence of natures or characters or properties intrinsic to each bit of or sort of material.
"I am not at all interested in interacting with you:" Incoherent. You say you are not interested in interacting with me at the same time you interact with me.
Now, if knowing the natures of material, that is the properties and characteristics of material at the most fundamental scale, whatever that turns out to be, perhaps fields, is identical with final cause then all purpose in the universe is illusory.
If, as you say, we know final cause based on meanings of material, its natures, properties, or characteristics at its most fundamental level, then material progresses blindly from the bottom up, or do you suppose water molecules, for example, intend to form a snowflake because they somehow have snowflake directedness in their molecular souls, or some such abstracted imaginary notion?
As a person who purports to be educated in physics surely you would assert that water molecules interact due to intermolecular forces which repeat 10^x times until a crystal is formed we then call a snowflake.
I agree broadly with Dr. Feser as well that on these Aristotelian notions the analysis of the Laws of Nature which give rise to all observed macro structures is neutral as to atheism versus theism.
Yes, the Laws of Nature and all the observed structures that arise as a consequence are compatible with either an assertion of atheism or theism.
Thus, it is impossible to logically and soundly deduce the necessity of theism from the Laws of Nature and their observed consequences, don't you agree?
Therefore, the Fifth Way of Aquinas has been invalidated by Dr. Feser and you as there can be no necessity of god validly deduced from the appearance of purpose or ends or final cause, rather, any such appearance is equally compatible with atheism, as Dr. Feser shows in the OP.
One cannot coherently conclude the necessity of god and also admit of neutrality toward atheism. But then, you have already demonstrated a willingness to contradict yourself so I imagine that further self contradictions regarding teleology will not bother you.
sd says, "it is impossible to logically and soundly deduce the necessity of theism from the Laws of Nature"
It is impossible to logically and soundly deduce from the laws of nature (what can be inferred from sensible measure) that God cannot be known (in a limited way). sd has already admitted that he cannot prove that angels, i.e., the supernatural, does not exist, but he doesn't let that stop him.
That's pretty kooky, and he is attacking the church and the metaphysics of some of the Church's best teachers from his ignorant point of view. One would not expect one who admits that he cannot prove what he insistently asserts as if he can to not really be capable of understanding how reason actually works, and therefore to be incapable of saying anything about Aristotle, Aquinas, Dr. Feser, or any sensible person that is anything more than his projection of himself as _the_ authority on things.
What he says is best described as hogwash🤣.
He encourages people to say that it is not nice for the Church to defend itself instead of lying down to be knifed by lies.
Thank you, professor! I’m going to use this as an accompaniment to my daughter’s homeschooling philosophy program.
ReplyDeleteInteresting talk. I think there is a parallel between the so-called theological approach denying laws of nature with regard to the physical world (and its connection to Occasionalism) and the denial of natural law within society by Edmund Burke and de Maistre. Both these authors insisted upon the contingencies of history and societies being the will of God, refusing social subjection to natural law.
ReplyDeleteThat is a fascinating comment Miguel. Do you have any book recommendations on the connection between Occasionalism and a denial of the laws of nature (or perhaps just further exposition of the connection). That there would be a connection to denying the laws of nature and denying natural law makes perfect sense as natural law is rooted in human nature (i.e. the ability to reason and recognize gradation of goods in the natural order and recognition of the supreme good as the source of all goodness among gradated goods).
DeleteYou'll find plenty if you trawl Conservatism's texts. For Burke, society was convention, and convention (contingency in practice) was its only law (Reflections on the Revolution). Existence was the guarantee of "divinity"; when a society suffered intolerable crisis, only if it dissolved could individuals rely on some sort of natural law, equated with anarchy, to form another absolute society (opening speech in the Hastings trial). For Burke, the contingency of existence meant divine approval, and societies could not be rationally validated by natural law - in this speech he asserted that there were no arbitrary societies anywhere in the world, only absolute ones; all that mattered for a society to be divinely approved was society's observance of its own conventions (have a read, the speech is incredible). Talking about human absolutism and contingency being divine will rather than something subject to natural law seems much like the occasionalist "science" referred to in the talk.
DeleteDe Maistre was more explicit, calling on Malebranche's theories, and denying secondary causes point blank. He employed exactly the same social argumentation as Burke, dismissing natural law within society in practice. He goes on about it at length in the Saint Petersburg Dialogues.
Much as the Occasionalist can't explain why nature behaves the way it does, and refuses to have it submit to intelligible laws of nature, Conservatism's founders both demand that we accept all societies (Genghis Khan and Tamerlane are praised to the heavens in Burke's Hastings speech) as divinely approved, because they exist. Validating or reforming a society according to "abstractions" (which could be those of the French Revolution, but also the Natural Law of the Christian est), was the antithesis of their worldview.
Thank you for following that initial fascinating comment with an even more fascinating response to my question. Very helpful.
DeleteThank you! Always ready to talk.
DeleteI have considered the term, law(s) of nature, a little time-worn, if not flat out archaic. For my thinking, there is/ are fact(s) of matter. This, admittedly, does not encompass metaphysics. However, much of that is conjectural anyway---based in interests, preferences and motives.
ReplyDeleteI think that nearly all parties (other than full-out idealists) accept that there are "facts of matter". One cannot simply rule out other kinds of truths or reality, merely because there is matter. (Indeed, according to many philosophers including some atheists, to accept "facts about matter" is, per se, to accept something non-material, i.e. the truths express the facts, which truths are not, themselves, identical to the matter.)
DeleteNor can one rule out metaphysical truths merely because those who engage in the study of metaphysics have interests, preferences, and motives. The same is said of those who engage in the physical sciences, in meteorology, in climatology, in psychological science, in computer science, etc. The fact that these scientists have preferences and motives isn't held to invalidate their science all by itself, though it is possible that the preferences and motives can invalidate their science if allowed to modify their methods or assumptions in unwarranted way. (It is also well known now that many psychological studies cannot be replicated, which speaks to the possibility of bias and motives entering into the arena.)
Scientists (including those of the "hard" sciences like physics and chemistry) would be hard pressed to practice their discipline without the use of (a) logic, and (b) math, esp. algebra, calculus and statistics. But logic and math are neither matter, nor facts about matter as such, they are more abstract, being facts about relations with respect to other facts. In addition, they always USE some set of metaphysical assumptions in their science, whether they advert to these assumptions explicitly or not, because (for example) it is impossible to pursue the effort to discern "the facts" through empirical evidence like experiments without some sort of assumption about what empirical evidence, itself, represents for drawing conclusions.
OP
ReplyDelete"I am going to argue against this supposition that there is an incompatibility between modern science and Aristotelian philosophy."
Right, one can coherently assert compatibility of Aristotelian philosophy.
One cannot coherently assert necessity of Aristotelian causal explanation as evidenced by physics observations (the First Way).
In the presence of qualified physicists I note you have retreated from claims that would be sufficient to support the soundness of the First Way.
"According to occasionalism, it isn’t really the cue ball that knocks the eight ball into the corner pocket."
Right. Since Newton we have understood that the cue ball does not exert a one way causal influence on the eight ball, rather, the cue ball and the eight ball mutually interact to causally influence each other equally in magnitude and oppositely in direction with neither object being coherently identifiable as first in a causal chain.
"Another problem, though, is that Carroll is simply wrong to reject PSR. For one thing, considered even just as an inference from experience, PSR is as well-supported as any law of nature. For we do in fact tend to find explanations when we look for them,"
Here you conflate ultimate reason with sufficient reason given the nature of the brute fact.
The material universe progresses due to the natures of material, and those natures are always the sufficient reasons for all the progressions we observe.
However, there need not be a sufficient reason for the material natures themselves.
The speculation of god solves no ontological, logical, or explanatory problem, only makes them worse by introducing unevidenced unknowns (god) while doing nothing to solve the original problems.
"Have I really explained the position of the book? It is hard to see how."
All explanations are descriptions of relations. If you insist on including in all explanations an ultimate explanation then there can be no "really explained" because there can be no ultimate explanation.
The best we can do is explain the progressions of material relative to observed base natures of material. If that does not satisfy you then you will simply have to remain unsatisfied for the rest of your life, the universe does not care.
"The notion of an explanatory regress of physical laws terminating in a brute fact is, when carefully examined, no more coherent than the notion of an effect being produced by an instrument that is not the instrument of anything."
Then god as the explanation is incoherent because on the existence of god then god is a brute fact.
Explanations are relative. There is nothing for the brute fact to be relative with respect to.
"In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."
Indeed.
You have falsified the First Way, Dr. Feser. Very good.
The First Way is an argument for necessity. By your own analysis, on the Aristotelian view, the choice between theism and atheism is neutral.
Therefore, on the Aristotelian view, theism is not necessary.
Theism is not necessary on Aristotelian neutrality regarding atheism, therefore the necessity of theism claimed in the First Way is false, rendering the First Way unsound.
The argument of Aquinas in connection with laws of nature or teleology, is the fifth argument, not the first, Stardusty.
Delete"You have falsified the First Way, Dr. Feser. Very good."
DeleteHow badly you think. That you believe that you can actually prove that deterministic atheism is true shows how kooky your thinking is.
You talk to Professor Feser all the time as if he is deeply stupid while you are genius unsurpassed.
Your friendliness is obviously fake.
For example, you insist on addressing Christian believers using a small "g" form of the name "God", shows how rude you are.
It is funny how you must attack Aquinas all the time, as if you somehow your kooky idea that you think you are proving depends on what Aquinas says. Of course you have never answered any of my objections to your false "proofs" because you obviously cannot understand my objections.
What a pretender you are, spewing your nuttiness while cravenly hiding behind a false identity and helping your cult's murderous attacks on Christians to kill many.
😏
Tom Cohoe
Tim,
Delete"The argument of Aquinas in connection with laws of nature or teleology, is the fifth argument, not the first, Stardusty."
All 5 ways are based on laws of nature, not just the fifth.
The First Way, for example, is based on Aristotelian concepts of motion, change, and causation.
Since Dr. Feser has pointed out that ""In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."" it must be the case that the First Way is neutral based with respect to atheism.
Did you have a chance to read the transcript in the OP? clearly Dr. Feser is referring to causation, a causal series, the properties of material, and the PSR, all of which are central to the First Way.
Since the Aristotelian principles that the First Way is based on are neutral with respect to atheism or theism, then the First Way cannot be a sound argument for the necessity of theism, as it claims to be.
Dr. Feser has thus falsified the First Way in his closing remarks in the OP.
Professor Feser did not "falsify" the first way in his comments about Aristotelian metaphysics. Neutrality between theism and atheism in Aristotelian metaphysics has no implication whatsoever for Aquinas's five ways.
DeleteNor do you understand the five ways because you willfully take any contradiction of your determinist atheist assumption to be false, which is irrational, and which demonstrates that your "thinking" is confused. It demonstrates that you do not know how reason works, and that other than in defending the Church against your baleful influence on the murder of Christians, you are best ignored.
😏
Tom Cohoe
StardustyPsyche
DeleteDid you have a chance to read the transcript in the OP?
Do you understand from reading the transcript in what sense the idea of "laws of nature" can be considered neutral wrt atheism/theism?
Suffice it to say that on the Aristotelian view, what directly grounds the laws of nature are the essences of physical things, so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause. In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism.
TFW simply doesn't bracket off that question and so is not neutral.
Dr. Feser has thus falsified the First Way in his closing remarks in the OP.
Are you really gonna stick with this?
Anonymous (of April 15, 2023 at 1:36 PM)
DeleteFeser-*so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause.*
Indeed, the character of physical law does not necessitate a divine cause.
The First Way is an argument from the characters of physical laws regarding motion, change, and causation. If it is possible to bracket off the analysis of those physical laws from the question of their divine origin then the character of those physical laws does not necessitate a divine origin.
Since the characters of the physical laws do not necessitate a divine origin it is unsound to conclude a necessity of divine origin based on the characters of the physical laws.
The First Way concludes necessity of divine origin based on the character of the physical laws, and is therefore falsified by the assertion that the characters of the physical laws do not necessitate a divine origin.
This is sometimes called "The Gap Problem", which shows up in various arguments for the existence of god. The problem is that even if one argues to a first mover or first cause there is a logical gap between that assertion and the assertion of god.
In the First Way that gap is obvious just by reading the text. God is only mentioned once, as the very last word, as part of a semicolon separated premise that could also be written as a last sentence. The assertion of god is an obvious non-sequitur with no logical connection to the rest of the argument.
Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo shows that fact by omitting any mention of god or the last premise tacked on ad hoc at the end of the First Way. This is his last line in his translation to syllogistic format
C-C: Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other (f).
iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2011/01/first-way-in-syllogistic-form.html
That's it, done, no god demonstrated, no way to conclude god using the arguments in the First Way.
By acknowledging the neutrality of the natures of physical laws with respect to theism versus atheism Dr. Feser has acknowledged that one cannot rationally claim necessity of divine origin based on the natures of physical laws, but that is just what the First Way claims, that very necessity of divinity, god.
Thus, Dr. Feser has falsified the First Way as an argument for the necessity of the existence of god.
Stardusty,
DeleteI have read the transcript and I have read Ed's previous work on this topic. Aristotle provided a teleological account for the existence of regularities in the cosmos but did not go on to argue from teleology to the existence of God, as Aquinas did in the fifth way. That is the sense in which the Aristotelian account of laws is neutral between atheism and theism. This does not invalidate Aristotle's cosmological argument (basically Aquinas's first way) which depends on different premises. You are confusing two separate issues. On another topic, which you have not replied to me about, do you accept Cantor's diagonal argument for the real numbers having a higher cardinality than the algebraic numbers?
@Tom, CokeDust Psycho has been wasting time here for as long as he's been posting. He isn't interested in learning anything. It's obvious that he's obsessed with attempting to poke holes in Thomism in the vain hope of undermining any confidence therein. His posts are entirely devoid of any value. It's a wonder he's allowed to continue his Depends-less ways here.
DeleteTim,
Delete"Aristotle provided a teleological account for the existence of regularities in the cosmos but did not go on to argue from teleology to the existence of God,"
Right, and Feser elsewhere has acknowledged a sort of intrinsic teleology, that is, an apparent teleology which results from the aggregate progressions of material due to their intrinsic properties or natures or characters.
Hence the acknowledgement in the OP that the Aristotelian view of the characters of natural laws is neutral (agnostic) on theism versus atheism.
"Aquinas did in the fifth way"
All 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the existence of god.
All 5 ways suffer from the logical fallacy of non-sequitur. In every case the word "god" is just tacked on at the end ad hoc.
There is no logical connection between "god" and the rest of the argument in each of the 5 ways.
This is known as the Gap Problem because there is a logical gap between the preceding argument and the final ad hoc assertion of god. Dr. Feser in the OP, perhaps without intending to do so, has affirmed the reality of the Gap Problem and has affirmed that all 5 ways suffer from the logical fallacy of non-sequitur as arguments for the existence of god.
"This does not invalidate Aristotle's cosmological argument (basically Aquinas's first way) "
Right, the argument for a first mover is not invalidated by agnosticism as to what that first mover is.
Agnosticism, however, invalidates the claim to necessity.
NECESSITY.
The ways of Aquinas claim necessity of god. Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god. Dr. Feser has asserted agnosticism based on the characters of the natural laws that are the foundation of the arguments in the First Way, natural laws of motion, change, and causality.
Since one must remain agnostic of theism versus atheism regarding the natural laws of motion, change, and causality then the claim of necessity of god based on those natural laws is falsified.
StardustyPsyche,
DeleteThe First Way is an argument from the characters of physical laws regarding motion, change, and causation. If it is possible to bracket off the analysis of those physical laws from the question of their divine origin then the character of those physical laws does not necessitate a divine origin.
The talk was not about TFW. As I pointed out, TFW simply doesn't bracket off that question and so is not neutral.. So it makes no sense to shoehorn in something that was not the topic of the talk.
Regarding "bracket off":
Additionally, I don't have to know how a car works to drive it to the grocery store. I can still get groceries without knowing if the car is EV or internal combustion. That doesn't mean it just goes by itself. I can just bracket off that question and get on with it. Maybe this seems confusing to you but I'm sure it will make sense to you if you just keep at it.
"Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god"
DeleteDumb. Agnosticism, a personal view or philosophy invalidayes nothing about God.
Your ideas are no good.
😏
Tom Cohoe
"Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god"
DeleteIn which SP confuses ontology with epistemology. Ironic considering their comments on the below thread.
Anonymous (of April 16, 2023 at 4:04 PM)
Delete"Agnosticism toward god invalidates necessity of god"
Strawman, at least quote my words if you are going to use quotes.
"In which SP confuses ontology with epistemology."
After your strawman you arrive at a nonsense conclusion, not surprising.
An argument that is agnostic toward god cannot soundly conclude the necessity of god.
If the character of natural law is neutral toward god then natural law cannot be the basis to argue soundly for the necessity of god.
Dr. Feser has in the OP has declared the neutrality of the characters of natural laws on the Aristotelian view.
All 5 ways use the characters of natural laws to argue for the NECESSITY of god, and are therefore unsound as arguments for the necessity of god.
This can be seen by simply reading the text of all 5 ways. In all 5 cases the word "god" is just tacked on ad hoc at the end as an obvious non-sequitur, which is a logical fallacy, rendering all 5 ways logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god.
By acknowledging the neutrality toward the divinity of origin of natural laws Dr. Feser has invalidated arguments that claim the necessity of divinity based on the characters of natural law, which is just what all 5 ways of Aquinas attempt and claim.
Thus, Dr. Feser has falsified the 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of god.
bmiller,
Delete"I don't have to know how a car works to drive it to the grocery store. I can still get groceries without knowing if the car is EV or internal combustion. That doesn't mean it just goes by itself. I can just bracket off that question and get on with it."
Indeed.
Therefore, under your admitted (hypothetical) ignorance of whether the car is and EV or ICE it would be logically invalid for you to assert the NECESSITY of either choice, EV or ICE.
As you pointed out on the other thread, god is not a part of the argument, it was just added on "as a reminder", you say.
"All it does is show that there is an Unmoved Mover."
"That is all."
You are correct that the First Way stops its argument prior to any mention of god. The same is true for all 5 ways.
So, both bmiller and Dr. Feser have acknowledged that all 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god.
AnonymousApril 15, 2023 at 4:40 PM has a pretty good observation. Stardusty is just a troll now.
DeleteI think he used to try to legitimately try to make good arguments. Now he just repeats his discredited reasoning in each new thread trying to get reactions. He is going over the top now though.
@ All,
Delete"So, both bmiller and Dr. Feser have acknowledged that all 5 ways are logically invalid as arguments for the necessity of god." (says a fool).
Gee, I haven't seen where either of them has said, "I acknowledge", that the five ways are logically invalid. Kooky is about the least damaging conclusion to be drawn about someone (sd) who makes false claims like this about what others acknowledge.
But then sd is no expert on logic.😀
"All 5 ways use the characters of natural laws to argue for the NECESSITY of god, and are therefore unsound as arguments for the necessity of god."
Dumb! A part of an argument insufficient by itself from which to draw the conclusion does not make the part inconsistent with the conclusion as sd seems to think. In fact, lacunae in an argument are unavoidable. Obvious lacunae need mean nothing more than an assumption that the reader or listener is capable of understanding the argument without overly simplistic explanations of details - lacunae that a person not absorbed with his own supposed brilliance would not even notice. The important thing is to understand that at some level, lacunae can always be drummed up that do not imply contradiction, and they can always be idiotically seized upon to claim "non-sequitur!, gap!, it does not follow!, etcetera" to claim that an argument is false, as sd does.
For example, ripping a page out of a mathematics textbook does not make what follows false.
From his style of argument, I don't think sd is capable of understanding this. That is why I conclude that sd is no expert on logic. There are other reasons as well. He just jumps to conclusions about the "falseness" of other people's words where no contradiction actually exists.
It is pretty disgusting to read his claims about people "admitting" things that they have never admitted.
But then he has special rules where he can substitute his self-deceiving imagination for other people's thoughts 🤣!
People this nutty who have expressed a desire to get rid of religion are indeed dangerous.
Beware!
😏
Tom Cohoe
This is sometimes called "The Gap Problem", which shows up in various arguments for the existence of god. The problem is that even if one argues to a first mover or first cause there is a logical gap between that assertion and the assertion of god.
DeleteThe Gap Problem is related to the Frame problem. Each syllogism or logical statement has a frame of background assumptions which are encoded in the thought space.
Take, for instance, the Kaalam cosmological argument. It concludes that if the universe has a beginning, then the universe has a cause, and that cause must be God. The frame that makes this syllogism sound is the fact that how could the cause make the universe come into being unless the cause had the capacity to choose? So this capacity of choice, when added to the frame, tells us that this cause is intelligent and an agent, and thus increases the probability that it is a deity.
Dr. Feser, thank you for this! Now we (I) humbly ask for the transcripts of your other talks that you have given over the years.
ReplyDeletePosters write spend a lot of time and effort here to write LONG, detailed posts and to what end? Who cares? If you really have something to contribute, start your own blog. Get your own following.
ReplyDeleteAnomympus at 1.12PM
DeleteSo are you saying that people should not contribute long, detailed posts, but short ones lacking in substance? You know, you are free to be selective about the posts you read and respond to.
That's what I suggested SP do, but Dr Feser's blog gets a lot of readers and it takes time and effort to build up a following, it's easier to ride the wave, and even better if your message opposes that of the blog (you're not preaching to the converted). Also, it's often easier to react to someone else's ideas rather than come up with your own. And writing for a following may not be the primary motivation; getting things clear in your own mind is. Writing can help with that.
DeleteI don’t believe that Star dust is serious. A fairly good troll, but he tries too hard and it reveals the troll beneath the surface. He’s good though.
DeletePat
I wonder how many of the physicists at the Fermi Lab are atheists or agnostics?
ReplyDeleteWe are told a political philosopher cannot say meaningfully that liberty is freedom because that's mere synonym. True. The implication is that there are two weighty questions to be answered: 1) What is liberty? 2) What is the nature of liberty? Ironically, the paper answers neither of these questions even though it's used as an analogy. For the main argument to succeed, both questions have to be asked and answered for all analogies.
ReplyDeleteSo we are told a triangle is “a closed plane figure with three straight sides.” That describes it. That is the "is". If we happen upon a triangle, we know it by this description. But I disagree that this is more than "certain properties of triangles or facts about them." It does not tell us more of a triangle than mere description -- how to recognize its shape. What does it really mean to ask the nature of a triangle?
We can describe a human being with body parts and measurements, but that doesn't tell us much about the nature of human beings. Our nature would also consist of behaviors, life spans, desires, etc. How would that apply to triangles? Or is it proper to say the "nature" of a triangle is the same as its description? Maybe it's nonsensical or circular to ask the two separate questions of a triangle. IOW, a closed plane figure with three straight sides does not tell us the nature of a closed plane figure with three straight sides. If it is a nonsensical or circular question of triangles, why not also of laws of nature?
OTOH, we could say the nature of a triangle is to add structural support or assist in the measurement of distances. This makes "nature of" equivalent to "good use of." That wouldn't seem to make the nature of laws of nature more than how useful they are at doing things, and therefore wouldn't seem to make the issue more than scientist have already made of it.
I'll ignore all of the arguments against other ideas about of laws of nature and get right to the heart of the matter. In actuality the Aristotelian view is a variant of the "brute fact" approach. A "description of the powers and capacities a thing will tend to manifest given its nature or essence" is mere brute fact about the essence of a thing. If "genuine laws reflect the causal powers and capacities a physical thing will manifest given its nature or essence" then genuine laws are brute facts about essences. The Aristotelian view explains nothing and nobody would accept such explanation when put to a real test. Suppose a prosecuting attorney told the jury, "Jill's reason for killing Jack was not mere jealousy, it was not financial gain, it was not mere power struggle, it was much more fundamental than that: Jill killed Jack because she tended toward killing Jack given her essence." How many jurors would take that explanation seriously? That is what the Aristotelian view asks of us.
No, that is not" what the Aristotelian view asks of us."
Delete"In actuality the Aristotelian view is a variant of the "brute fact" approach."
DeleteNo, you're not getting it. A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it. The Aristotelian view is more than that and is actually saying something regarding whether natures and causal regularities are IMMANENT/INTRINSIC or EXTERNAL/EXTRINSIC. And it also has consequences for the issue of realism vs anti-realism about universals and abstracta.
It isn't just saying that it is a brute fact that fire behaves as it does. It says that fire behaves as it does because there is a FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that; and as such, there is such a thing as a form of fire which different fires possess. The idea is that this form is intrinsic and immanent to the thing, and as such it is that thing's nature/form which explains and predicts its regularities. Which is different from thinking that the regularities come from an external agency- such as when we work to make a hammock out of liana vines, and this hammock as a result won't really grow, will have a tendency to not maintain that shape (hence we need to find a way to tie everything together etc). And different fires possess the form of fire.
This has immediate relevant and controversial metaphysical consequences: for example, a nominalist would not accept this view, because he doesn't believe there is any real "form of fire" that multiple things can possess. But then the nominalist has the cost of not being able to appeal to these forms/essences to explain causal regularities. Why do all these things that we call "fire" behave in much the same way? The nominalist will have a hard time giving an explanation since he doesn't believe in a common form of "fire".
The Aristotelian answer isn't brute fact at all. It posits immanent forms which involve the natural tendencies as such. Sure, the forms simply include the tendencies, but they are not being gratuitously posited: they are posited because it is affirmed that the regularities are *real* and hence must be traced to *some real regularity-maker*, and these forms also explain the *commonality and regularity* of multiple different things (why 10 distinct things behave the same - it's not a brute fact, it would be something surprising, so there must be a common principle shared between the 10 things which makes the regularities), as well as the *immanence* of such activities (different from extrinsic teleology and such).
"Jill killed Jack because she tended toward killing Jack given her essence."
No Aristotelian has ever said such a thing. It is certainly not in the essence of human beings to tend toward killing Jack. But it is in the essence of human beings to be able to know ends and means; to be aware of what one does; to be able to deliberate about one's actions and make plans; and as such Jill can be held guilty and culpable of killing Jack.
Anonymous,
Delete"A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it."
I agree. I'm saying that is what it means to say something is immanent/intrinsic.
"And it also has consequences for the issue of realism vs anti-realism about universals and abstracta."
Brute facts can have consequences.
"It says that fire behaves as it does because there is a FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that;"
And you accept "FORM in that thing which makes it behave like that" as a brute fact. Those "natural tendencies as such" are no more than brute facts. No explanation is sought or needed.
I've maintained from the first month I was on this site many years ago that this obsession with teleology is no explanation of anything. People here unquestionably accept it, and that's all there is to it. I have no fundamental complaint with this because I'm not against brute facts. Ultimately everyone must accept something as a brute fact. There is no way around it. There must always be a solid foundation -- a first principle we can say -- for any proof. My complaint is when people pretend my reasoning or my world view fails because I depend on a brute fact when they ultimately rely on their own brute fact.
"Why do all these things that we call 'fire' behave in much the same way? The nominalist will have a hard time giving an explanation since he doesn't believe in a common form of 'fire'."
That form is accepted as brute fact. It has to be.
"they are posited because it is affirmed that the regularities are *real*"
That affirmation is an affirmation of a brute fact -- the realness you claim must exist (in your view) and needs no explanation. It simply is. "I am that I am" is a statement of brute fact.
A nominalist might explain the behavior of fire by using chemistry and physics. Ultimately his explanation would reach a brute fact. I'm not disputing that. The difference is that the Aristotelian grasps onto a brute fact prematurely. The Aristotelian tends to shut down deeper explanation or consider deeper explanations a trifle. I say your metaphysical consequences are not what you claim.
"It is certainly not in the essence of human beings to tend toward killing Jack."
I'm talking about the essence of Jill, not of us all. And I am using this as a model of the questionable reasoning I believe is fostered here. I claim virtually nobody will accept essence as a good explanation today. It's not rejected because it's necessarily wrong. It's rejected because it explains nothing. It trivializes explanation. This is why the Aristotelian view gets so little attraction in the modern world where we have high standards for explanations (sans politics).
If you wanna call the form a "brute fact" then go ahead, so long as you understand that it is an existing, real thing which grounds the causal regularities and tendencies of things. Its existence will also ultimately be explained (in the order of efficient causality - its origins) by other things, it doesn't exist inexplicably. So calling it a brute fact is a little bizarre, but whatever floats your boat - I'm not interested in discussing semantics, only getting the metaphysics right.
DeleteForms can be understood in this context as regularity-makers, if you will, in a parallel with truthmaker (from the same intuition that truths, events, prlpositions, etc. are ultimately grounded in real *things*, existing things)
"A nominalist might explain the behavior of fire by using chemistry and physics"
How? This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways. How do you explain the fact that they behave in this common manner, and with these regularities? The Aristotelian says it's because there is such a thing as a Form of fire which both A and B share. Because both A and B have that same Form, it is no surprise that they behave in the very similar way that they do: this is the effect of the Form, which is the regularity-maker. Both A and B share the same Form and this is why they behave the same even though they are distinct things. There is a principle of unity between them, which is the Form.
But since you don't wanna accept the existence of this Form, you owe us an explanation. Why is it that A and B behave in such a similar way even though they are distinct things? Is it really just a coincidence? That is unbelievable.
You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress. Since you do not accept Forms, there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things. There simply are these different things you are calling "chemical structures". They are DIFFERENT, they are not the same (unless you appeal to their Formal element, which is precisely what the Aristotelian does and you want to deny).
So again, how would you, as a nominalist, explain A and B (distinct things) operating in the same manner even though they are distinct? If there is nothing in A or B that makes these regularities, then it is unexplained (and THAT would be taking the commonalities and regularities as brute facts), and if the whatever A and B have are distinct things, then we haven't explained their common behavior either.
At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances. And this is what a Form is.
"I'm talking about the essence of Jill, not of us all"
Jill's form is that of a human being. Her actions and the culpability and guilt involved in them *are* explained by their form: Jill is the sort of substance that is rational, that can be conscious of her actions, that can deliberate, plan and choose how to act. This is why she is guilty if she chose to murder someone. This "sort" of substance just described is what we call a Human Being - the form of a human being that we share along with Jill. You know, the principle of commonality and causal regularity between otherwise distinct substances, and the basis for us calling these distinct substances by a same name - the Form.
Sorry Don, Jill’s essence isn’t a thing there because it’s a choice she made, not nature acting out it’s own teleology. You need to try harder to distinguish the two concepts of obvious explanation and no explanation. Chemistry is not an explanation of why fire burns, it’s just a more detailed description of what burning is. If you tell me it is an explanation, I’m going to ask you how the chemistry brings about the burning of fire. Then you say it’s just a brute fact, so there is no reason that chemistry brings about the burning of fire, and so it’s not an explanation in the slightest.
DeleteThe issue is, for most people, teleology is actually an explanation to some degree. If your doctor prescribed you medicine and you come back to him with some pain in your side. He might say “yeah the medicine causes side pain.” And, at that, most people would be satisfied. They’ve learned something: that the medicine is a side-pain-causing drug. I think Aristotle saw this as a small form of explanation, Plato saw it, many contemporary scholars see it too. Your claim is not just that they’re wrong, but that they’ve been talking about nothing this whole time. The believed in forms and teleology but were merely spouting tautologies. I’m not even inclined to believe a political philosopher really intends a tautology to say liberty is freedom, because perhaps liberty and freedom give different connotations in his mind. I think you’re stuck in a rut and need to give the issue some time to rest and return to it later. Cheers.
Atno,
Delete"This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways. How do you explain the fact that they behave in this common manner, and with these regularities?"
The most direct explanation is at the level of chemistry, that is, molecules. When bonds form energy is released, which heats the gas and unburned materials in the flame. The excited atoms emit light.
Hot gases move away from the center of the Earth, not because the are going to their natural place as Aristotle erroneously asserted, rather, because of the density gradient in the atmosphere and the lower density of the hot gases.
Theses effects at the chemistry scale can be further reduced to the subatomic scale.
The reason flames the world over look broadly similar is that the aggregate of these submicroscopic interactions sums similarly in each instance.
"The Aristotelian says it's because there is such a thing as a Form of fire which both A and B share."
Which is why Aristotelians get dismissed generally. Science has long ago moved beyond such vague speculations.
"this is the effect of the Form, which is the regularity-maker."
No, the regularity maker is the character of the laws of nature intrinsic to mereological simples. All observed regularity is the aggregate of those natures.
"You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress"
Indeed.
"there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things."
Have you had the opportunity to take a chemistry course? It seems not. There is great regularity and shared structures at the level of molecular structures and interactions.
"explain A and B (distinct things) operating in the same manner even though they are distinct?"
Subatomic particles progress according to what we call laws of nature, which combine in regular ways to form atoms, molecules, and the macro structures we observe with our unaided senses.
"At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances."
Indeed, there is a commonality at the level of mereological simples.
"And this is what a Form is."
Not distinct from the material, no. Form does not have an independent ontological realization.
"Jill is the sort of substance that is rational"
The only existent substances are mereological simples, the rest is aggregates of them that we analyze in progressively higher levels of abstraction.
OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort.
Atno,
DeleteI predict your explanation of forms will merely describe them or posit why you think they must be necessary. It's the necessity that makes them inexplicable. Any "necessary" truth is said to be so because it needs no proof, no explanation. So: "Forms can be understood in this context as regularity-makers." Yet what makes these regularity-makers? Where do they come from? The way forms are discussed here makes them metaphysically brute.
"This fire A and this fire B are different from one another, but they sure do behave in very similar ways."
Of course they do. They both are oxidation of a fuel. The process is similar therefore the look of the things is unsurprisingly similar. That is the unity between them. There is no dependence on coincidence.
"You say that the nominalist can appeal to the chemistry and physics, but this just kicks the problem back up a notch and generates a regress."
Yes, but a regress ultimately terminating in brute fact(s), which is all you have done with forms.
"Since you do not accept Forms, there is no such thing as a Form of such-and-such chemical structure which can be shared between different things."
Sure there is. That is how the chemical structure behaves. Its behavior could be considered a brute fact if we stop looking there. Or we could keep looking until we posit physical/natural laws which unify everything. You do the same with forms except you seem to tire easily and hold up a stop sign just when things get interesting.
"At the end of the day, you'll need to appeal to a principle of commonality and regularity between substances. And this is what a Form is."
Commonality, yes. Form, no -- not unless you change your understanding of forms to mean laws of physics. Then your "form" for fire goes up in smoke and you're just substituting words.
"Jill's form is that of a human being. Her actions and the culpability and guilt involved in them *are* explained by their form..."
The proper form would be murderer, which is a small subset of human beings. Don't bother telling me that there is one and only one form for an individual human. I'll reject that as obviously insufficient. Humans are noses, big and small, fingers, stubby and thin, eyes, blue and brown, etc... -- that is, humans are a collection of a multitude of forms, not every human possessing every possible form that composes an individual. Dogs have noses too. Your forms can jump species. Jill isn't guilty because she was directed to murder as a generic human being. She was directed to murder as an instantiation of the form, murderer.
Journey 516,
Delete"Sorry Don, Jill’s essence isn’t a thing there because it’s a choice she made, not nature acting out it’s own teleology."
We are often told final cause is a human choice. The hand-stick-rock analogy begins with the final cause (choice) of the human. Our acts are driven by our choices which are our final cause. Regardless, do you think choice exists in a vacuum? a creatio ex nihilo?
"Chemistry is not an explanation of why fire burns, it’s just a more detailed description of what burning is."
Chemistry explains this down to a molecular level and further down to a physics level. I agree that at some point it will terminate in facts that simply have to be accepted because current understanding cannot go any further. It does not follow that everything above this level answers no why or how.
"I’m going to ask you how the chemistry brings about the burning of fire. Then you say it’s just a brute fact, so there is no reason that chemistry brings about the burning of fire, and so it’s not an explanation in the slightest."
I'm not sure what you're trying to say. Chemistry does not explain fire itself as a brute fact. I could ask you how form brings about the burning of fire? Or I could ask you why form brings about the burning of fire?
"He might say 'yeah the medicine causes side pain.' And, at that, most people would be satisfied."
He wouldn't say the medicine is "directed to" cause you side pain, though. The patient is more concerned that the medicine is "directed to" prevent a heart attack, or something positive. And I don't know what sort of patient you are, but I do want to know how the drug does what the doctor claims, and what it does that the doctor downplays. I want to know if its effects are more positive than negative. Pain is a warning. The body is telling me something the doctor isn't. I want to know why. Regardless, I would not be comforted to know doctors didn't want to know why the drug causes side pain as a side effect. I would expect them to follow up on that.
You are correct in what I claim. I don't claim the Aristotelian has to be wrong. I do claim, as you noticed, "they’ve been talking about nothing this whole time." Even if they were right about forms, I claim it is of no help whatsoever.
@ All,
Delete"Hot gases move away from the center of the Earth, not because the are going to their natural place as Aristotle erroneously asserted, rather, because of the density gradient in the atmosphere and the lower density of the hot gases" says sd.
Oh, good thinking.🤣
So hot gases are not going to their natural places when they rise to density equilibrium?
Actually they are, so Aristotle was not erroneous.
Just you🤣!
"Which is why Aristotelians get dismissed generally" says sd.
Actually, they do not get dismissed in general. Just by you, which is insufficient reason to dismiss forms as a metaphysical category, since your logic is tightly circular.
"No, the regularity maker is the character of the laws of nature intrinsic to mereological simples. All observed regularity is the aggregate of those natures"
You would think mereological theories prove themselves, but correspondence proves nothing, even if you have a whacky bootstrap argument, because other metaphysics contradicts the mereological scientismistic BS and cannot be disproven, disproving any pseudo-proof of the "proof" of a mereological "proof".
sd keeps throwing whacko bombs into Professor Feser's website🤣!
"OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort", says sd.
The tight and dangerous circularity is is very clear here. sd's pumping of his insistence on what is or is not "necessary" (a minefield of a word in itself) as "teaching" couple with his declaration that "we still need to get rid of religion" is a clear warning to anyone who wishes to be free, that they should …
BEWARE.
Enough Christians are being martyred daily without sd's false cover for it.
😏
Tom Cohoe
“ OBTW, these material simples are all necessary beings. They are the necessary beings, no need for a god of any sort.”
DeleteNote how confidently SD abandons their explicitly stated skepticism about necessary beings and simples to make a completely unfounded assertion that these necessary beings must be material.
Can’t have it both ways dude. You don’t get to put on your skeptic hat when questioned about your proposed metaphysics and also confidently claim you know that these necessary beings must in fact be material beings.
Anon (of Aril 20, 2023 at 3:31AM)
Delete"SD abandons their explicitly stated skepticism about necessary beings"
I never expressed skepticism about the existence of necessary beings in general.
I have proved again and again that the First Way is riddled with false premises and invalid logic and therefore is grossly unsound as an argument for a particular sort of necessary being.
I have also proved that Dr. Feser has affirmed that that the 5 ways of Aquinas are unsound as arguments for the necessity of god.
Necessity
God
Those terms are key to keep in mind as to what Dr. Feser has affirmed in the OP, namely, that the 5 ways of Aquinas are unsound as arguments for the *necessity* of *god*, specifically.
"completely unfounded assertion that these necessary beings must be material"
I confess that I did not provide a sufficient foundation for that claim when I made it, hence, the "OBTW", meaning it is just a comment you are free to take for whatever it is worth to you, perhaps you feel nothing at all.
"Can’t have it both ways dude."
Fair enough, it would be unsound to contradict myself, fortunately, I haven't.
Don Jindra
Delete"The proper form would be murderer, which is a small subset of human beings. Don't bother telling me that there is one and only one form for an individual human. I'll reject that as obviously insufficient. Humans are noses, big and small, fingers, stubby and thin, eyes, blue and brown, etc... -- that is, humans are a collection of a multitude of forms, not every human possessing every possible form that composes an individual. Dogs have noses too. Your forms can jump species. Jill isn't guilty because she was directed to murder as a generic human being. She was directed to murder as an instantiation of the form, murderer."
The claim that there is only one for form for humanity (and that this grounds the commonality that we see) is precisely what we claim, can you please explain what you understand forms to be? I think there's some confusion here
Don Jindra
Delete""A brute fact approach would simply say that it is what it is and that's it."
I agree. I'm saying that is what it means to say something is immanent/intrinsic."
No, the following passages from feser's book on scholastic philosophy explain why, the point he's making is about powers in specific but I think you'll be able to see how it also applies to the question at hand
"As the explanatory role powers play vis-a-vis change and limitation
indicates, the common charge that the Scholastic notion of powers is
vacuous and explanatorily useless is unjust. The alleged problem with
powers is famously summed up in Moliere’s joke about the doctor
who explained why opium causes sleep by attributing to it a
“dormitive power.” Since “dormitive power” means “a power to cause
sleep,” the doctor’s explanation amounts to saying “Opium causes
sleep because it has a power to cause sleep.” This, so it is claimed, is a
mere tautology and thus explains nothing. But though the statement is
not very informative, it is not in fact a tautology. To say “Opium
causes sleep because it causes sleep” would be a tautology, but the
statement in question says more than that. In attributing a sleep-
inducing power to opium, it tells us that the fact that sleep tends to
follow the taking of opium is not merely an accidental feature of thisor that sample of opium, but belongs to the nature of opium as such.
That this is not a tautology is evidenced by the fact that critics of the
Scholastic notion of powers regard the attribution of a dormitive
power to opium as false rather than (as they should regard it if it were
a tautology) trivially true. The critics do not say: “Yes, opium has the
power to cause sleep, but that is too obvious to be worth mentioning.”
Rather, they say: “No, opium has no such power, because there are no
such things as powers in the Scholastic sense.” (Cf. Martin 1997, pp.
188-90)
"Acknowledging this point, Stephen Mumford notes that a critic
might still object that appeal to a dormitive power is uninformative,
since while it tells us that there is something about the opium itself
that causes sleep, it does not tell us exactly what that is. (Mumford
1998, pp. 136-41) But this does not by itself give us any reason to
doubt or deny the existence of powers. As Mumford goes on to point
out, we have to distinguish between causal relations and causal
explanations. Whether identifying A as the cause of B provides an
informative explanation depends on our background knowledge and
on the modes of presentation under which A and B are identified.
But that is a separate issue from whether A is in fact causally related
to B. Indeed, the latter issue is in a sense more fundamental insofar
as A cannot enter into a true causal explanation of B in the first
place unless A really is causally related to B. "
Anonymous,
DeleteMoliere: "An educated doctor is asking me the cause and reason why opium induces sleep. My answer to that is because there is in it a sleep-inducing power which by its very nature relaxes the senses."
The gracious Mr. Feser claims that statement is not a tautology. I think he's splitting hairs. Even if it's not technically a tautology, that is not the real question. We are supposed to waste time quibbling about the nature of tautology. This keeps us from answering real questions. Real question are, does this explain anything? does it tend to keep us from looking deeper into why opium induces sleep? Perhaps there is a better explanation, and that explanation involves chemistry in our body. If chemistry is a deeper, more satisfying explanation, the "sleep-inducing power" becomes a trivial statement that loses its explanatory power, if it ever had any. IOW, "sleep-inducing power" was a statement of ignorance masquerading as explanation. Arguing about its tautological nature is irrelevant. Call it what you want, it still explains nothing. It's a placeholder that begs for elaboration.
"The claim that there is only one for form for humanity (and that this grounds the commonality that we see) is precisely what we claim, can you please explain what you understand forms to be? I think there's some confusion here."
Humans have noses. Dogs have noses. You could say that not all humans have a nose therefore humanness is something different than a collection of nose, fingers, legs, etc. But whatever that "human" form is, there is no debating the fact that the form "nose" is part of the human population, even if it's not universal. A person can have the form "human" and still have an appendage of the form "nose" -- or not. I don't think you can disagree with that. So I'm saying the same applies to "murderer." A person can have the "form" of human and also have a moral attribute that matches the form of "murderer." There is no necessity that every human has every form that could be found in the human population.
All,
DeleteIn doing research for a project I ran across a clever book called "Conversations on the Plurality of the Worlds" by Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, published in 1686. It's a fictionalized dialogue between a man and a woman (the Marchioness) concerning the planets and stars and the possibility they are inhabited. There is a part that I think is appropriate to the discussion here.
This snippet starts with the man:
"Figure yourself, as spectators of an opera, the Pythagorases, the Platos, the Aristotles; all these men whose names are so celebrated. Let us suppose them viewing the flight of Phæton, rising on the wind; ignorant at the same time of the construction of the theatre, and the cords by which the figure is put in motion. One to explain the phenomenon, says, it is some hidden virtue in Phæton which causes him to rise; another replies, Phæton is composed of certain numbers which produce his elevation. A third says, Phæton has a love for the top of the stage; he is uneasy at any other part. The fourth thinks, it is not essential to the nature of Phæton to rise in the air, but he prefers flying up to leaving a vacuum at the top of the stage. Such were the ridiculous notions of the ancient philosophers, which to my astonishment have not ruined the reputation of antiquity. After all Descartes and some other moderns appear: they tell you that Phæton rises in consequence of being drawn by cords, fastened to a descending weight, which is heavier than himself. It is no longer believed that a body can have motion, unless acted upon by another body; that it can rise and descend without a counterbalancing weight; thus, whoever examines the mechanism of nature is only going behind the scenes of a theatre."
"If that be the case," answered the Marchioness, "philosophy is a very mechanical affair!"
"So much so," I replied, "that I am afraid it will fall into disrepute."
Bill, Dr Feser lets Stardusty post here because he tolerates a diversity of opinion.
ReplyDelete@Anonymous, you write:
DeleteDr Feser lets Stardusty post here because he tolerates a diversity of opinion.
You have a phenomenal grasp of the obvious, and you also phenomenally miss the point. Nobody objects to diversity of opinion. Psycho doesn't actually engage his interlocutors. He reframes, deflects and ignores anything that corrects his misperceptions, which are unmistakable indicators of mendacity. He is also an arrant liar, as proved when he came back here ostensibly to “learn” more about Thomism, being only a ruse to attack it.
There are other critics of Thomism who routinely show up here, but they at least engage the arguments and argue in good faith. That is to be welcomed. But this sewer spillage called CokeDust Psycho adds nothing of value to any discussion here.
Bill. I have posted here for many years. While Dr Feser does indeed tolerate a diversity of opinion, I can assure you he does not let every post get published. I will trust his wise judgment over your inflammatory comments.
DeleteDid you hear that professor? This Bill fellow reckons that 'this sewer spillage called CokeDust Psycho adds nothing of value to any discussion here'. How charming - wonder how long Billy spent dreaming that one up!
DeleteThank you professor for allowing a diversity of views to be expressed here and for leaving it to the judgement of others if and when to respond. Please continue to ignore the baying of some for censorship and the ostracism of dissenters.
@Anonymous, I too have posted here for some time, so I need no reminding what the posting policy is and that not every comment is published. There is a world of difference between "diversity of views" and someone making deliberately false statements just for the sake of fingering a keyboard.
ReplyDeleteAnd if you're that enamored with "diversity of opinion," then quit getting twisted over mine. Talk with Psycho all you want.
Bill
DeleteIt is you who is getting "twisted up," which indicates you have some personal issues you need to address. If Dr. Feser can tolerate SD on his forum, why can't you? And if you can't, well, don't come here. Simple as that.
Bill’s comment, to my mind, is rather uncontroversial. What legitimate contribution to the philosophical discussion has this character actually contributed? Practically speaking, comment boxes are insurmountable obstacles to philosophical exchanges and clarifications (dialectic); although, that is not to say they are useless. What certainly is useless are “flyby” comments to what Dr. Feser writes in the attempt to sound sophisticated.
ReplyDeleteToo many comments are incorporating needless insults, remarks about who is and who isn’t a troll, and other such tiresome and unedifying stuff. Please cut it out, guys.
ReplyDeleteHey, Ed. Did you know that you "have falsified the 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of god" and that you have "acknowledged" this? Didja know that, Ed? 'Cause a certain poster here keeps saying this. I had no idea. All I can conclude is that Thomism is in shambles and that you must hang your head in shame (and possibly become an atheist-materialist) because of this particular commenter who will not be named (and who is assuredly NOT a troll)!
DeleteDrYogami,
DeleteOP-"Suffice it to say that on the Aristotelian view, what directly grounds the laws of nature are the essences of physical things, so that for the purposes of analyzing the character of physical law, one can bracket off the question of whether physical things themselves have a divine cause. In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."
I agree with that view, that the essences, or properties, or characters of physical things, most specifically the simplest most fundamental things, whatever they turn out to be, perhaps fields, grounds what we call the laws of nature.
It is that grounding that Aquinas uses as his basis for argument, not scripture, not revelation, rather what is "manifest" and "evident to our senses". Again, I strongly agree with that approach.
All 5 ways are dependent on "analyzing the character of physical law", laws of motion, change, and causality. All 5 ways are argued by analyzing the character of physical laws as they are manifest and evident to our senses. I cannot stress too much my agreement with that analytical approach.
And it is true, that "the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism". That leaves us no logical choice than to conclude that the 5 ways cannot soundly argue for the necessity of the existence of god.
One cannot soundly argue from the character of the laws of nature to the necessity of the existence of god if it is the case that the character of the laws of nature are neutral between theism and atheism.
Note that other claims others might make are not supported merely by this fact of neutrality. Such neutrality does not by itself rule out proving the necessity of a first mover. Also, such neutrality does not by itself prove the incompatibility of either atheism or theism with a first mover.
However, on such neutrality, necessity is logically ruled out. By affirming such neutrality Dr. Feser has in fact by direct deduction invalidated all 5 ways as arguments for the necessity of the existence of god. Necessity, being the key word. Necessity cannot be soundly claimed on neutrality.
This is sometimes called the gap problem. It has been pointed out many times, that the assertion of god as the very last word is not logically connected to the rest of the argument. God simply does not enter into the syllogistic forms of the arguments.
Stardusty,
Delete"In that sense, the Aristotelian view of laws of nature is neutral between theism and atheism."
Note the qualifier. The implication being that there is another sense in which the Aristotelian view of laws of nature are NOT "neutral between theism and atheism".
That really should be enough to settle it.
@ All,
Deletesd says, "This is sometimes called the gap problem. It has been pointed out many times, that the assertion of god as the very last word is not logically connected to the rest of the argument. God simply does not enter into the syllogistic forms of the arguments"
I have already pointed out that a "gap", an "IT does not follow" does not imply a false argument because "IT does not follow" is only what is claimed by an individual. That the individual does not see that IT (whatever IT might be) follows does not mean that IT does not follow. The person who claims to have found a "gap" might just be a little dense. There are also other problems with a "gap" argument (this BTW has nothing to do with the so called "God of the gaps", which I suspect sd is trying to channel in another fallacy typical of him, but I do not deal with that here).
Another problem with a "gap" argument is that the "gap" is almost never a contradiction, which means that it fails to show that there is anything wrong.
I already gave the illustrative example of tearing a page out of a maths text so that there is a gap in the argument. It does not follow from the existence of this gap that the conclusion is false.
But sd refuses to get it for some odd reason🤣!
Instead, he misleadingly channels the famous "God of the gaps" argument, which is actually a reductio-ad-absurdum argument, but sd has reduced nothing to absurdity unless it is his prior claim that people who have not agreed with him have agreed with jim.
Everything he says is base on his confounded circularity. I pray that he is able to break out of it.
I have already answered the claims he has addressed to Dr. Yogami on the "Talking Theology and Natural Philosophy" thread. I do not have the time to repeat that tedious task here.
Were it not that one such as sd who has clearly desired the elimination of religion, I would ignore him. But he is given to all kinds of falsity and so must be regarded as a real danger to freedom of religion, so …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
DrYogami,
Delete"The implication being that there is another sense in which the Aristotelian view of laws of nature are NOT "neutral between theism and atheism".
That really should be enough to settle it."
Yet you do not describe this supposed alternative sense.
No matter, the sense already explicitly stated rules out all 5 ways of Aquinas as sound arguments for the necessity of god. That fact does indeed settle the matter.
By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed that all 5 ways are not sound arguments for the necessity of god. That fact is not controversial. Anybody who has studied the structures of the ways of Aquinas can clearly describe that the word "god" is a mere non-sequitur, a word listed ad hoc with no logical connection to the preceding argument.
Your vague allusion to some other supposed sense does nothing to make any of the 5 ways sound arguments for the necessary existence of god.
@ All,
Deletesd says, "Your vague allusion to some other supposed sense does nothing to make any of the 5 ways sound arguments for the necessary existence of god".
sd's middle name, of course is "vague"🤣.
But a "vague allusion" by Dr. Yogami would have no impact on the soundness of Aquinas except in the mind of sd in which "Aquinas is sound" contradicts sd's unwarranted assumption.
A whole shebang of sd's errors appear in his comment🤣!
sd says, "you do not describe this supposed alternative sense".
So what! Many clear things are necessarily not further "described" in communication, such being the nature of communicating with words.
sd says, "No matter, the sense already explicitly stated rules out all 5 ways of Aquinas as sound arguments for the necessity of god".
Oh this is good. sd complains that "sense" is not "described" ( i.e., what it means is unknown), yet it is good enough to rule out Aquinas anyway!
Very funny🤣!
Since the matter is "settled" in sd's mind at the start, he is getting nowhere.
sd says, "By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed …"
Huh? Where did Dr. Feser "affirm" this? This is your statements that Dr. Feser "agrees" all over again. Way to slip a cog sd🤣.
"By direct deduction from the OP Dr. Feser has affirmed that all 5 ways are not sound arguments for the necessity of god"
Where, from the "OP" or otherwise did Dr. Feser "deduce" this🤣? More cog slipping here.
sd says, "That fact is not controversial". What "fact"?
"Anybody who has studied the structures of the ways of Aquinas can clearly describe that the word 'god' is a mere non-sequitur"
I've already taught sd several times that his personal inability to see how something follows in verbal communication does not mean that it does not follow (eg, ripping a page out of a topology text does not mean that a conclusion does not follow). Since Aquinas is sound, sd's circular insistence otherwise notwithstanding, all that we have here is good evidence that sd does not, no matter what he claims, understand Aquinas. All his cog slipping that he cannot avoid makes this unsurprising.
Well, sd thinks that his word rules, so … pray for him, and …
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
WCB
ReplyDeleteThe question is, where do the laws of nature come from? If as per William of Ockham, God creates them, or is it physics all the way down?
Descartes claims God creates metaphysical necessities such as math. Presuppositionalist such as Bahman claim creates all including logic, agreeing essentially with Descartes.
Descartes, presuppositionalists and Ockham all agree God is good, perfectly good. If so, God could eliminate all moral evil, for example giving all mankind free will yet never choosing to do moral evil. Now the Problem Of Evil becomes a serious issue.
Aquinas tells us God cannot do the logically impossible. Descartes admits he cannot image mountains without valleys, but tells us that is because that is the mind God created for him. God cannot be claimed to be so limited. Can God make 2 + 2 = 5 as per Descartes? Or maybe nor as maybecAquinas could object. Now logic becomes a serious issue. Where does logic and metaphysical necessities come from? What are they? Does God have any limits?
Purus Actus and immutability become serious issues. Things would seem then to be necessary despite existence of evil. It all seems to indicate God is a rather unlikely proposition, at least the Perfect Being God of theology.
WCB
The questions raised by Stardusty and WCB have also been raised by philosophers over the centuries. They have been addressed in many books and articles, including some by Dr. Feser.
ReplyDeleteWCB
ReplyDeleteThese problems have been solved? Not that I have ever found over years of these sorts of issues.
If God is perfectly morally good, and creates the very logic of the Universe, why is there moral evil? Again, God could create a Universe where all mankind has free will but chooses freely to never do moral evil.
Redefined as a sophistical series of dodges.
Since the Bible explicitly tells us what evil is, such as oppresion of the poor, widows, and orphans, good cannot be redefined in a sophistical series of bad arguments.
A Universe where evil is not necessary for a greater good is better than a Universe with necessary evil. A godvwho creates logic itself could eliminate any need for evil. That is a common apologetical dodge, but fails in the end. All such arguments that have been created are old and hoary with age and do not even approach the issue of what is logic and where it comes from.
Created by God or something outside and beyond God who cannot change the nature of logic.
WCB
Well, WCB, I think you need to read more widely. The problem of evil has been been addressed ad infinitum.
ReplyDeleteAddressed but not solved.
DeleteGiven our limited understanding, there will never be. a ' solution" to the problem of evil. But it has been well addressed.
DeleteGiven our limited understanding, there will never be a solution to the problem of evil. But it has been well addressed in the literature by theistic philosophers.
DeleteWell addressed in several mutually contradictory ways.
DeleteOne particularly discreditable way in which the problem of evil has been addressed is by claiming - contrary to scriptural 'evidence' - that god is good only analagously to the way ordinary people use the term. This extremely flexible piece of elastic is then used to evapourate the problem. Just redefine words like 'merciful' , 'loving', ' compassionate' etc and all is well.
Delete@Anonymous,
DeleteSince this is a blog that affirms classical theism, I don’t know of any classical theist “address” of the POE that explains away goodness in equivocal terms. We assert that all finite terms about God’s attributes are necessarily limited approximations of what God is transcendently. That doesn’t take away from our concept of “good,” nor does it allow any escape into nebulous terminology in order to dance around the question. God is eminently good—He exists in accordance with His infinitely perfect essence, for His essence is His infinitely perfect existence. Creaturely goodness is the object of desire (that which obtains from the actualization of potencies inherent in the kind of thing one is). Once the actualization is complete, that which is actualized is a perfection. And a perfection’s goodness is measured in accordance to the degree of its actuality. There is thus an objective standard by which goodness is measured. And since all goodness is a limited likeness of God’s infinite goodness (actuality), His essence is the ultimate standard against which all creaturely goodness is measured.
The logical problem of evil is vitiated by the very good reply that so long as there is even the possibility that there is a morally justified reason for evil, then instances of evil cannot be incompatible with God’s existence. And since the possibility of a morally justified reason for evil is not itself inherently contradictory, the logical “problem” collapses.
Yes, the logical problem of evil is vitiated by the possibility that there is a morally juistified reason for evil.
ReplyDeleteBut that does not mean that the PoE is not a huge problem for any brand theism that claims God is good.
Or do you also believe that the non-zero possibility that the fine tuning is the result of pure chance invalidates the Fine Tuning Argument?
@Walter, you write:
DeleteYes, the logical problem of evil is vitiated by the possibility that there is a morally juistified reason for evil.
Thank you. You would not believe how difficult it is to get many atheists and agnostics to see that simple point.
But that does not mean that the PoE is not a huge problem for any brand theism that claims God is good.
Now, that’s a head-scratcher. Where does the POE arise under any claim that does not assert or assume that God is good? If God isn’t good, then what’s the POE? And please recall that my post is under the rubric of classical theism. The POE was raised to assert that the existence of evil is incompatible with an all-good God.
Thus, the POE is vitiated so long as it is logically possible that there is a morally justifiable reason for evil. And since you acknowledge that a morally justifiable reason is logically possible, then there is no “problem” whatsoever.
Bill
DeleteOf course the PoE does not arise under any claim that does not assert or assume that God is good. That why I say it is a huge problem for any brand of theism that does assert or assume this.
And, yes, the Logical Problem of Evil is vitiated by the logical possibilty of a justifiable reason for evil. And since it is, so far, impossible to prove that there cannot be such logically possible reason we should admit that the LPoE is vitiated.
But it is also impossible to prove that it is impossible for nothing at all to exist, hence, God is not necessary, which means God does not exist, there is no 'problem' for atheism whatsoever.
But of course there are problems for atheism, and the Evidential Problem of Evil is still a huge problem for you.
You would not believe how difficult it is to get many theists, especially classical theists, to see that simple point.
@Walter, you write:
DeleteAnd, yes, the Logical Problem of Evil is vitiated by the logical possibilty of a justifiable reason for evil. And since it is, so far, impossible to prove that there cannot be such logically possible reason we should admit that the LPoE is vitiated.
Again, thank you for acknowledging that. Atheist/agnostic philosophers have seen that for quite some time. It’s the ideologue trolls with their take-no-prisoners approach who plague the internet with their silly “proofs” against theism.
But of course there are problems for atheism, and the Evidential Problem of Evil is still a huge problem for you.
If you feel that way, that’s your business, but I don’t see it that way at all. The same answer, albeit slightly modified, would apply here. If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil. The fact that we may not be able to think of a reason does not mean that one does not exist. Evil cannot be evidence against God if it can be proved that God exists. Now, you may deny that proof, but we believe we have more than sufficient evidence that God is real. So, the debate should really focus on God’s existence.
Objections from evil seem incoherent to me. In order to gain leverage, one must appeal to an absolute standard. But where did that absolute standard come from? And if the standard is merely assumed arguendo, then evil is nothing but a private fancy. Given that, nothing is really wrong. All we have are molecules in motion. Positing an “all-good” God for argumentative purposes bears no relevance to a debate about evil since nothing is “wrong” anyway. And if it is objected that the definition of “good” is contradicted by certain phenomena, then the objection is easily answered that said definition addresses said phenomena as morally justified in the overall purpose of the Good, whether or not we can see that overall purpose. Once again, we’re back to whether God exists, not to some tangential argument over evil, which is really a red herring.
You would not believe how difficult it is to get many theists, especially classical theists, to see that simple point.
I wasn’t being snarky when I wrote similar words to which you are replying here. Contrary to a host of uneducated gnu atheists, the logical problem is dead. A basic logic course and a dose of honesty takes care of the problem. Your alleged “simple point” isn’t nearly on par with the obvious and plain failure of the logical objection. It amounts to saying that our ignorance of a justifiable reason renders our ignorance decisive against a proven reality. Thus, the argument kicks back to whether said "reality" is proved. It has nothing to do with our ignorance.
Bill
DeleteOf course If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil., but the fact is that that cannot be established. Even if it could be established that some God exists (and that has yet to be done), then, in order to establish that God is good, you have to get rid of the problem of evil.
One of the problems is that for a classical theist, the goodness of God is simply a tautology. God is good because Goodness is what God is. The morally justifiable reason comes down to any reason God may have, because if God has a reason it must be morally justified because it is from God.
The "absolute standard" you are talking about is simply that which Christians agree on is evil.
If there is such an absolute standard, then, X is wrong is an absolute truth, which means that God cannot do X. God can only do X if X is not absolutely evil, but in that case you end up with might makes right.
So, while you may believe that on atheism nothing is really wrong, that is irrelevant to the point that defenders of the PoE, and by those I mean atheist/agnostic philosophers, are making.
@Walter, you write:
DeleteOf course If it can be established that an all-good God exists, then it follows that there has to be a morally justified reason for evil.
Yes, and thanks.
...but the fact is that that cannot be established.
I acknowledged that you disagree with me on that point, but again, that's where the argument must be focused. Since evil is compatible with an all-good God, if God exists, then it's nonsensical to appeal to it.
One of the problems is that for a classical theist, the goodness of God is simply a tautology. God is good because Goodness is what God is.
But that's what I consider a gross oversimplification of goodness under classical theism. True, being is convertible with good as a transcendental, but good is distinguished from being under the aspect of desirability. It is existence in accordance with one's telos or nature that distinguishes it from being simpliciter. In creaturely goodness, the actualization of a potency is a perfection, and goodness is the degree to which the potency was actualized. A dog born with one ear is less good than a dog born with two ears. Thus, given the clear logical distinction between the concepts, it can hardly be termed a tautology. And given that God is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, it follows that He is infinitely good (maximally existing in accordance with His perfect nature).
The morally justifiable reason comes down to any reason God may have, because if God has a reason it must be morally justified because it is from God.
If it is proved that God exists, then His purposes and acts are perfect. That follows given God's existence. Since you acknowledge that a morally justified reason for evil follows from God's existence, we are again thrown back to whether God exists. Evil is a red herring.
The "absolute standard" you are talking about is simply that which Christians agree on is evil.
And since the Christians here are classical theists, the "evil" they "agree" on is the privation of good. Any diminution of being is evil, which is either justified or unjustified. "Evil" acts are not "bad" unless they are unjustified. Since God is perfect, all His acts, by definition, are justified.
If there is such an absolute standard, then, X is wrong is an absolute truth, which means that God cannot do X. God can only do X if X is not absolutely evil, but in that case you end up with might makes right.
X is only wrong if X results in diminution of being. And as I said, X may or may not be wrong on whether X is justified. That has nothing to do with "might makes right."
So, while you may believe that on atheism nothing is really wrong, that is irrelevant to the point that defenders of the PoE, and by those I mean atheist/agnostic philosophers, are making.
The "irrelevant" point is an appeal to evil. Since we both agree that the objection fails if God exists, that's where the discussion must be focused.
@Walter, I should have said, "X is only evil if X results in diminution of being."
DeleteBill
DeleteThis will be my last reply on this topic, because I don't see us making any progress here.
To me, the idea that a being who is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, would create anything that even has the potency for a diminution of being may not be absolutely logically impossible, that is, I think it is impossible, but since I cannot prove it, I grant that it is logically possible.
But it is so extremely unlikely that I don't think it is rational to think such a being exists, just as I think it's irrational to just dismiss the Fune Tuning Argument because it is not absolutely logically impossible for the constants to be what they are just by sheer coincidence.
To paraphrase Stephen Law, virtually everybody agrees that, given the amount of good in the world, it would be irrational to believe the world was created by an all-evil god and therefore it is also irrational, given the amount of evil, to think that this world is created by a good god, although the logical possibility cannot be disproven at this point in time.
@Walter, you write:
DeleteThis will be my last reply on this topic, because I don't see us making any progress here.
No problem here. That's your call.
To me, the idea that a being who is infinitely every perfection transcendently or eminently, would create anything that even has the potency for a diminution of being may not be absolutely logically impossible, that is, I think it is impossible, but since I cannot prove it, I grant that it is logically possible.
Well, I thank you for having the integrity to at least acknowledge its logical possibility. However, as you are probably aware, the positive arguments for theism from the classical perspective are not reliant on logical possibility arguments. They are a posteriori arguments rooted in cause-and-effect. I've read your objections to those arguments; I just don't think that they are persuasive.
And I must say that I find it odd that mere mortals with an extremely short lifespan believe that they're able to sit on the recliner of eternity and gauge the probability of what an infinite being would or wouldn't do. I realize that rational inquiry is ever-expanding, but what I personally find preposterous bears no direct relevance to the truth or falsity of a claim. Either the arguments work or they do not. Back to square one.
But it is so extremely unlikely that I don't think it is rational to think such a being exists, just as I think it's irrational to just dismiss the Fune Tuning Argument because it is not absolutely logically impossible for the constants to be what they are just by sheer coincidence.
But you haven't shown why creation by a good God is "extremely unlikely." Again, if it can be shown that God exists, it follows that God's perfect purpose is expressed in creation. Why God would do this or that doesn't even cross my mind.
However, this comment of yours is an apple to a Tonka truck. Recall that the logical POE asserts that theism is logically precluded. But since the POE purports to be a logical argument, as you acknowledge, it fails. It cannot be cogently asserted that evil cancels theism. This is not an instance of the logical-possibility-warrants-refutation fallacy. Everybody acknowledges that instances of evil are justified by greater good. And given an eternal perspective in which we are required to acknowledge ignorance, we are simply unable to say that there is no greater good for evil.
With respect to fine-tuning, a relevant comparison is a possibly strong argument for theism being rejected on the logical possibility that God doesn't exist. To my knowledge, all classical theists affirm that God's non-existence is logically possible. But to use that as the basis for rejecting a probabilistic fine-turning argument is precisely the logical possibility fallacy (because a fine-tuning argument doesn't purport to be logically undeniable). And as stated, this doesn't substantively change for the evidential problem. A strong probabilistic theistic argument cannot be vitiated by evil both because we affirm greater good arguments and because we're forced to admit our impotence to see from eternity.
So, we are again back to the question of God’s existence. Evil is a red herring. If God exists, evil is explained by God’s greater good.
I apologize for posting a comment on this thread only now. I really enjoyed reading the original article on Edward's main blog. My humble contribution to this discussion revolves around two points, one written by the physicist and the second by the philosopher. Firstly, I would like to emphasize a major point: a law of nature is always only the expression of a symmetry observed or postulated in the observation that we make of the physical objects concerned by that law of nature. Even the simplest law of motion in nature actually expresses hypotheses of symmetries, like invariances of any kind. From a philosophical standpoint, this implies that the laws of nature, as expressing symmetries in the observed reality, supposed or hypothesized, are a simple narrative often expressed in a mathematical language of the properties that are proper to the physical entities which the scientist wishes to describe. Actually, they reflect, at an ontological level, aspects of the nature itself of the considered objects, hence they are directly linked to their final cause. I hope that these simple considerations do help.
ReplyDeleteGaëtan,
DeleteYou were a bit helpful prior to your penultimate sentence, then you went off the rails.
Final cause is illusory as attributed to basic laws of nature. The ontological processes we describe mathematically as laws of physics have no purpose, they simply are the ways real material interacts and progresses.
Your notion of an end, or a purpose, is purely in your imagination. It is an abstraction you applied abstractly, an illusion, an anthropomorphization, an abstract projection of your anticipation of future conditions or a retroactive abstract projection as to why particular conditions came to be the case.
An important step for you to gain realistic insights is for you to abandon your ancient misunderstandings of a teleological cosmos.
@ All,
Deletesd says, "An important step for you to gain realistic insights is for you to abandon your ancient misunderstandings of a teleological cosmos."
Nothing but his irrational circular "authority" involved here. Oh, but it's "ancient", therefore it is wrong🤣.
Random! Say sd, sorry to scare you like that🤣.
sd just doesn't have a deep understanding of anything. He has chosen it to be so.
His "explanations" are kind of disgusting and he harrasses people with his personal, shallow, poorly thought out (by choice) garbage.
😏
Tom Cohoe
Tom Cohoe
DeleteYour contributions become increasingly unhinged. Nobody is compelled to interact with StarDusty, and the claim that he is harrassing people is laughable. You clearly cannot abide the fact that others have a different take on this than your extremist one. It is you who are harassing StarDusty - that is plain for all to see. Show some maturity and dignity and halt your obsessive vendetta.
Knowing the nature of an object is all about knowing its meaning. But knowing a meaning is precisely knowing the final(ity) cause of said object.
DeleteHaving stressed this exquisitely philosophical point of view, I wish to remind you, sd, that, safe your respect, I am not at all interested in interacting with you: do respect, please, this wish of mine in future and avoid commenting my interventions. Thank you in advance.
Gaëtan,
ReplyDelete"Knowing the nature of an object is all about knowing its meaning."
What is the purpose of an electron? What teleological end do each of its quantum numbers strive toward?
"But knowing a meaning is precisely knowing the final(ity) cause"
You purport to be educated in physics. Did your physics textbooks contain a chapter on teleology?
The subject of the OP is the nature or character of what we call the Laws of Nature. I agree broadly with Dr. Feser in his post, that material progresses and interacts as it does as a consequence of natures or characters or properties intrinsic to each bit of or sort of material.
"I am not at all interested in interacting with you:"
Incoherent. You say you are not interested in interacting with me at the same time you interact with me.
Now, if knowing the natures of material, that is the properties and characteristics of material at the most fundamental scale, whatever that turns out to be, perhaps fields, is identical with final cause then all purpose in the universe is illusory.
If, as you say, we know final cause based on meanings of material, its natures, properties, or characteristics at its most fundamental level, then material progresses blindly from the bottom up, or do you suppose water molecules, for example, intend to form a snowflake because they somehow have snowflake directedness in their molecular souls, or some such abstracted imaginary notion?
As a person who purports to be educated in physics surely you would assert that water molecules interact due to intermolecular forces which repeat 10^x times until a crystal is formed we then call a snowflake.
I agree broadly with Dr. Feser as well that on these Aristotelian notions the analysis of the Laws of Nature which give rise to all observed macro structures is neutral as to atheism versus theism.
Yes, the Laws of Nature and all the observed structures that arise as a consequence are compatible with either an assertion of atheism or theism.
Thus, it is impossible to logically and soundly deduce the necessity of theism from the Laws of Nature and their observed consequences, don't you agree?
Therefore, the Fifth Way of Aquinas has been invalidated by Dr. Feser and you as there can be no necessity of god validly deduced from the appearance of purpose or ends or final cause, rather, any such appearance is equally compatible with atheism, as Dr. Feser shows in the OP.
One cannot coherently conclude the necessity of god and also admit of neutrality toward atheism. But then, you have already demonstrated a willingness to contradict yourself so I imagine that further self contradictions regarding teleology will not bother you.
@ All,
ReplyDeletesd says, "it is impossible to logically and soundly deduce the necessity of theism from the Laws of Nature"
It is impossible to logically and soundly deduce from the laws of nature (what can be inferred from sensible measure) that God cannot be known (in a limited way). sd has already admitted that he cannot prove that angels, i.e., the supernatural, does not exist, but he doesn't let that stop him.
That's pretty kooky, and he is attacking the church and the metaphysics of some of the Church's best teachers from his ignorant point of view. One would not expect one who admits that he cannot prove what he insistently asserts as if he can to not really be capable of understanding how reason actually works, and therefore to be incapable of saying anything about Aristotle, Aquinas, Dr. Feser, or any sensible person that is anything more than his projection of himself as _the_ authority on things.
What he says is best described as hogwash🤣.
He encourages people to say that it is not nice for the Church to defend itself instead of lying down to be knifed by lies.
BEWARE!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Unfortunately the only argument presented against occasionalism was how distasteful it sounds to modern sensibilities.
ReplyDeleteBeing a physicist myself, I wonder what was the reaction at Fermi lab. I found your talk very interesting and I learned a lot.
ReplyDelete