I have always admired and appreciated Duns Scotus's Onto- Theological Argument for the existence of God. It is thoroughly explored in "God and Atheism" by Rev. Bernardino Bonansea ,OFM CUA Press, 1979.
Is it true that Scotus did not hold that the First Unmoved Mover is called a "mover" analogically? Did Scotus hold that the First Unmoved Mover must be a "mover" in a sense univocal with that predicated of other movers?
In medieval disputes over the nature of God, many theologians and philosophers (such as Thomas Aquinas) held that when one says that "God is good" and that "man is good", man's goodness is only analogous to, i.e. similar to but distinct from, God's goodness. John Duns Scotus, while not denying the analogy of being à la St. Thomas, nonetheless holds to a univocal concept of being. It is important to note that Scotus does not believe in a "univocity of being", but rather to a common concept of being that is proper to both God and man, though in two radically distinct modes: infinite in God, finite in man.[1]
The claim here is that we understand God because we can share in His being, and by extension, the transcendental attributes of being, namely, goodness, truth, and unity.[2] So far as Scotus is concerned, we need to be able to understand what ‘being’ is as a concept in order to demonstrate the existence of God, lest we compare what we know - creation - to what we do not - God. Thomas Williams has defended a version of this argument.[3]
So I'd say Scotus prefers to say "Goodness" is perfect infinitely in God and finite and imperfectly in creatures but the difference between finite and infinite is beyond compare. But that is not to deny they are analogous. So, from this, it seems it would be wrong to say this question would be true: "Is it true that Scotus did not hold that the First Unmoved Mover is called a "mover" analogically?"
Anon, Ontological arguments for the existence of god vary in their forms, but they all fail. Here are some typical defects.
Error: Circular causation is impossible. Actually, at base causation, to the extent that causation is a valid notion at all, is mutual and thus fundamentally circular. I suggest this as a source to gain understanding on this point: "On the Notion of Cause, with Applications to the Free-Will Problem" BERTRAND RUSSELL hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
Error: God exists as a thought in the mind. This mistake is an example of the fallacy of reification, that is, confusing a thought for the thing itself. When you think any thought what exists inside your head is your brain tissue, blood, and other such real material. Your thoughts are actual processes of that real existent material.
The imagined thing you are thinking about is not that thing existent in your head in any sense.
Error: Conflating a logical possibility with an existential possibility, and further confusing human ignorance of whether a logically possible thing is existentially possible, with an assumed existential possibility. This mistake is a form of the fallacy of equivocation, conflating the word "possible" in various senses.
For example, it is logically possible to express n dimensional space, but that does not entail a real possibility of n dimensional space. It might be in the nature of reality that n dimensional space cannot exist in reality.
Human ignorance as to whether or not n dimensional space can exist in reality does not necessitate a non-zero existential possibility of n dimensional space.
Human ignorance does not equal existential possibility. Logical possibility does not equal existential possibility. Ontological arguments for the existence of god commonly and fallaciously equivocate these senses of the word "possible".
All ontological arguments for the existence of god can be summarized in a single sentence.
"Ontology" is a word of relatively recent origin, adapted straight from the Greek in use long after Aquinas. Nor was there a Latin version of the word at his time, so the first thing to note is that in your essay you are not in any way attacking anything that either Duns Scotus or Aquinas said. Someone else, not me, brought up the subject of off topic comments. Yours appears to be so. I just mention this as a fact, but I hope nevertheless that Ed does not delete your amazing 🤣 reduction of all that is covered by the word "ontology" to the four words, "wishing makes it so", because your post is very funny.
Also, please don't tell me you were not talking about Aquinas or Scotus. That is obvious.
"Wishing makes it so" has no clear meaning here, but that is perhaps appropriate because (the second thing to note) the word "ontology" is so broadly used that if its meaning is not explained when it _is_ used, similarly lacks clarity. If you want to be obscure, just say "ontology" and push on without further explanation, as you have done 🤣 (please don't explain "ontology" to me - it's too late and it would miss my point about your amazing wrap of the whole of ontology to the enigmatic "wishing makes it so").
"Your thoughts are actual processes of that real existent material"
So you say but have not proven except to those who take it as a starting point, making it circular which is discursively a failure.
"The imagined thing you are thinking about is not that thing existent in your head in any sense"
Funny, unnecessary statement 🤣.
"This mistake is a form of the fallacy of equivocation, conflating the word 'possible' in various senses"
Your whole article is one huge equivocation. Heh 😀!
"For example, it is logically possible to express n dimensional space, but that does not entail a real possibility of n dimensional space. It might be in the nature of reality that n dimensional space cannot exist in reality. Human ignorance as to whether or not n dimensional space can exist in reality does not necessitate a non-zero existential possibility of n dimensional space."
Since your post is finite in word count, the number of weasel words used here is necessarily 😀 finite. "Possible", "n dimensional 'space'", "nature of 'reality'", "cannot 'exist' in 'reality'", "necessitate", "existential possibility". In fact, it just occurred to me that I erred here. Due to the possibility 😀 that your words used here could have multiple meanings, the finite word count is only a countable 😀 restriction. The number of meanings could be higher than any particular n that someone could have given beforehand 🤣.
"Human ignorance does not equal existential possibility."
It's irrelevant. Why did you put that sentence in? Never mind.
"Logical possibility does not equal existential possibility"
More vague arm waving.
"Ontological arguments for the existence of god commonly and fallaciously equivocate these senses of the word 'possible'"
Yes, only your copious equivocation is non fallacious - at least in your own estimation 🤣.
Without presuming to be an expert in predicate logic, it seems to me that all ontological arguments for God's existence are a formal fallacy of trying to introduce the existential binder (∃) over a free variable by the nature of the predicate that captures that free variable.
This is, as far as I can tell, always an illegal move.
Tom, "Someone...comments...Yours" Anonymous March 10, 2023 at 7:09 PM referenced an Ontological-Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God, by John Duns Scotus, a subject of the OP.
I prefaced my comments by pointing out that there are various forms of ontological arguments for the existence of god. My comments are relevant to such arguments.
For example, Scotus makes this assertion: (3) A circle of causes is impossible. plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/ Above I specifically addressed this error, thus my comments are relevant to this error by Scotus.
The arguments of Scotus are, of course, very long, very complex, and so riddled with Aristotelian errors, fallacious logic such as equivocation of the word "possible", and false statements such as the erroneous claim that a circle of causes is impossible, that Scotus is clearly a massive failure.
The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument.
My brief comments here can only touch on a few of the errors made by Scotus and others who made similar or related arguments.
Well actually you skipped a full track, because the question you addressed was about Scotus's "Onto-theological argument" where there was nothing called "onto-anything by Scotus" because he never used the word "ontology", which was not even used until much later and really has nothing to do with Scotus' argument. Still, Anonymous March 10, 2023 at 7:09 PM was talking about Scotus' argument, so he was half on track. Scotus argument was called "ontological" at a later time for whatever reason, and you just made a leap at "ontology" without reference to Scotus at all, so you wholly jumped track to make an attack, against the entire field of "ontology" (and a prefatory remark that there are ontological arguments against God doesn't fix your actual aim against all of ontology). Nor does it make your response against a non ontological argument on topic, or make your summing up "wishing makes it so" any more sensible or any less funny 😀.
"Scotus makes this assertion: (3) A circle of causes is impossible. plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/ Above I specifically addressed this error, thus my comments are relevant to this error by Scotus"
Heh. Above, or on a recent, thread, _I_ specifically addressed this erroneous claim of "error" 🤣. But then you must ignore my words in order to keep up your predetermined position.
You have failed to prove anything about "circular causation". You just keep repeating the failed argument that A causing B and B causing A is somehow A causing A as if Aquinas and other philosophers were too dumb to realise, as I said before, that things bounce around. 🤣 You are forced to interpret the arguments as philosophical stupidity, because if you do not, you cannot cling to your predetermined position. So you read Aquinas etcetera as unfairly as you possibly can, using deliberate linguistic legerdemain to avoid understanding what is being said so you can pretend to be an irresistible authority 🤣.
Your talk about "souls" is mere mockery that avoids what is actually meant. How does mockery rather than attempting to understand what is meant help anything here? 😏
"Aquinas made this false statement: 'Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another' Note the use of the present tense 'is' twice. That means Aquinas was claiming 'Whatever we presently observe to be in motion is presently being put in motion by another'."
Sorry, but "is" twice in that sentence works for the hierarchy of causes (Coulomb, Faraday, Maxwell, relativity), which are all operating at present, just as well as it does for whatever you are trying to say. 🤣
The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument.
Coming from you, that ranks as nearly heavenly praise, and I have now elevated his works to near the top of my reading list. Anybody who can score such a derogation from you is probably doing something right. Thank you.
John Duns Scotus showed that the First Way by Aquinas is logically invalid.
Does anybody here know if that disproof of Aquinas by Scotus was understood by Scotus at the time, or is the demonstration by Scotus of the logically fallacious structure of the First Way simply an inevitable conclusion of his arguments that he did not address at the time?
Scotus made this assertion: (3) A circle of causes is impossible.
In so doing, Scotus recognized that in an argument that references the impossibility of an infinite causal regress it is logically necessary to also address circular causation, because clearly, circular causation is a logical alternative to an infinite regress of causation.
Any argument that claims to reach a conclusion based on the impossibility of an infinite causal regress, yet does not address the logical alternative of circular causation, is necessarily logically invalid, suffering from the logical fallacy of false dichotomy for having failed to account for the obvious logical alternative of circular causation.
John Duns Scotus clearly understood that omitting the denial of any possibility of circular causation would have rendered his argument logically invalid.
Thomas Aquinas lacked that insight of his successor. By omitting this obvious logical alternative from the First Way Aquinas constructed his First Way as a logically invalid argument.
Of course, the premise stated by Scotus is false, as is evidenced by such physics formulations as the classical equations for gravitational and electrostatic forces. Physics is formulated, to the extent causality is a valid notion at all, as mutual causation, that is, fundamentally circular causation.
That is what led to this famous quote, Dr. Feser is well aware of and has devoted a bit of ink to: "In the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect; there is merely a formula." Bertrand Russell hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
"Scotus showed that the First Way by Aquinas is logically invalid"
Very funny from the guy who said "The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument" 🤣.
Who did he show it to? You? It's very funny that you pick out the one thing he apparently "showed" that agrees with your obsession and present it on his authority as a thinker as a good argument. Get that? On his authority as a thinker. Otherwise why mention his name here?
The ridiculous always makes a good basis for jokes 🤣.
"Scotus recognized that … it is logically necessary to … address circular causation"
Did he? This from the guy that quotes Russell, "there is nothing that can be called a cause" 😀?
Scotus, that "edifice of confused and fallacious argument" recognized in a demonstratively important argument that Russell was on to something when Russell opined that there was no cause here?
Your argumentation here is so illogical that I have to wonder whether you were drinking here rather than working on your jokes. It stuns before it causes laughter, but I guess that is the stuff of comedic genius 🤣.
And then, of course, Dr. Feser is advanced as a supporter of your anti-Aquinas obsession.
Save us from this! Too much laughter can make one sick!
🤣
Let me sum this up. You are against Scotus. You are against Aquinas. But if Scotus is against Aquinas you are for Scotus. But you are against Scotus because Russell is against Scotus. And you are against Feser but Feser is for you because he quoted Russell.
First comment from a long-time casual reader. And please be forewarned I’m not even an armchair philosopher.
Can you please explain what causes or upholds circular causation? It seems that Mr. Russell can’t be bothered to explain why mutually gravitating bodies should ever begin to be in a state of mutual gravitation, or why the formula exists and continues to exist from instant to instant. But I have to admit I don’t quite follow what he means by “the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at two given instants” or how it proceeds from that that the interdependent motions as a whole and the function that makes them possible are both accounted for.
As an aside, I’ve never read any of his work, but it does seem Mr. Russell is trying extremely hard to impress with vocabulary rather than analysis, and he ends up coming across as a bit goofy.
Anon, no that´s a perfectly valid question. Self-causation in the existential sense amounts to a contradiction, because in order to cause anything, in some sense the object in question has to exist. Or to put it into a more platonist oriented language, the unification of a thing´s properties can´t be done by the thing itself, because in order to unify intially, the object must already be unified. There´s no way to formulate the issue in a metaphysically coherent way.
Note that I´m making the argument from an ontological point of view. Retrocausality might explain sufficiently an objects existence at an earlier point in time, however you will note that this doesn´t address the initial question posited, because, once again, we presuppose the existence of said object.
The same issue can be seen with co-dependence. A exists, because of B, B exists because of A, the existence of the one entails the existence of the other. If we suppose that their relation is symmetrical, each depends on the other, then we are faced with a scenario where the explanation of the conjunction can´t be given (Why does AB exist?), because each existent is only explainable by referring to an object that itself is dependent on the object in question. The regress is explanatorily impotent.
This is also why at the end it´s impossible for there to be a complex object at the foundation. We have that exact scenario with the co-dependence of the whole on the parts and of the parts on the whole
careful here. What an opponent would dispute here is that we have a free variable here. The existential binder is supposed to be entailed by considerations about the nature of perfection or positive properties in the Gödelian variant. While I personally haven´t engaged with the ontological argument in a long time (haven´t read Daniel Vecchio´s book on it either yet), the intuition it captures can´t be just cast aside as a confusion in symbol language, especially if the argument is that the property that is possibly exemplified would by its exemplification entail actual existence.
Anonymous March 14, 2023 at 9:38 AM, I agree with Dominik that your points are fair and thoughtfully expressed.
"Mr. Russell can’t be bothered to explain why mutually gravitating bodies should ever begin to be in a state of mutual gravitation" True, but nobody knows that or even has a coherent speculation to solve the riddle of the origin of all that exists, as well as why we find ourselves in the sort of universe we do in fact find ourselves.
About all any of us can do is try to reason from observations as to how things seem to be, with virtually no hope or expectation of ever answering the great riddles of how and why our universe came to be as it is.
"I don’t quite follow what he means by “the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at two given instants”. Russell tends to think in terms of differential expressions. Have you had the opportunity to study differential maths? If not, it is a way to express how things change moment to moment, among other uses.
"but it does seem Mr. Russell is trying extremely hard to impress with vocabulary rather than analysis, and he ends up coming across as a bit goofy." His grandfather was prime minister in the 19th century, and he was highly educated, published multiple books including some massive mathematical work, is known for Russell's paradox, and a great deal more. In terms of his vocabulary it is more the case that he would have to hold back and tone down to write for a general audience.
Few individuals have produced such a volume of highly detailed and precise analysis.
Dominik, "Self-causation in the existential sense amounts to a contradiction" Temporally, that is to say considering the origin of all that exists, yes, that is true, and it is also true that the speculation of god does nothing to solve that contradiction, rather, just carves out a place in one's thinking where incoherent alternatives are simply allowed to be the case.
But in the present moment there is no call for existential or ontological self causation because material is already here. There is no call for a changer to continuously keep material in existence because existential inertia is no change in the aspect of existence for material.
No change calls for no changer, thus, continued existence calls for no causation.
"A exists, because of B, B exists because of A, the existence of the one entails the existence of the other. If we suppose that their relation is symmetrical, each depends on the other, then we are faced with a scenario where the explanation of the conjunction can´t be given (Why does AB exist?)" Indeed, mutual causation is not applicable to the cause of continued existence because continued existence (existential inertia) calls for no cause at all.
In the archaic Thomistic parlance material is already fully actualized in its existential nature, therefore no actualizer, no causal agent, is called for to actualize material in its existential nature.
But the sort of circle of causation that invalidates the arguments of Aquinas and Scotus is not causation of existence, rather, causation of change of motion, or change more generally, that is, work in the sense of the physics of dynamic mechanics.
This is a circle of causes, to the extent that causation is a valid notion at all: F = G*m1*m2/r^2
The case of circular causation for motion was absent entirely from the First Way making that argument by Aquinas logically invalid.
John Duns Scotus, who was about 8 years old when Aquinas died, later realized that a circle of causation is a logical option, that if true would make his arguments unsound, and if ommitted would make his arguments logically invalid.
Thus, Scotus stated that a circle of causes is impossible, which is one of many errors Scotus made.
2.1 In this chapter we offer arguments for the aforesaid fourfold division of order and for the interrelations that exist between essentially ordered terms.
2.2 When the venerable doctor Augustine, writing about your triune self, declared (in the first book On the Trinity): "Nothing whatever begets itself," you, O Lord our God, were his infallible teacher. Have you not impressed upon us with equal certitude this similar truth? (First conclusion) Nothing whatever is essentially ordered to itself.
2.3 For what is more impossible in an order of eminence than that one and the same thing be essentially greater than itself. As for the other six orders, if dependence be taken in the sense defined above, is there any greater impossibility than that one and the same thing depend essentially upon itself? that it exist without itself?
2.4 This too is in accord with truth: (Second conclusion) In any essential order a circle is impossible.
2.5 For if anything precedes the prior, it also precedes the posterior. Deny this second conclusion and you must admit the opposite of the first. Besides, the same thing will be essentially prior and posterior to one and the same thing, and so be both more perfect and less perfect or be dependent and independent of the latter, which is anything but true. In the first book of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle excluded this circle from demonstrations and it is no less possible in the order of reality.
Aquinas uses the same reasoning in SCG ch13:19 regarding motion.
[19] But, if the proposition that every mover is moved is true by itself, something impossible or awkward likewise follows. For the mover must be moved either by the same kind of motion as that by which he moves, or by another. If the same, a cause of alteration must itself be altered, and further, a healing cause must itself be healed, and a teacher must himself be taught and this with respect to the same knowledge.
Then (72b38) he gives the form of the argument in three terms, namely: “If it is A, it is B, and if it is B, it is C; therefore, if it is A, it is of necessity C.”
Then (73a1) he shows by the aforesaid form of arguing that in a circular demonstration a same thing is proved by a same thing, using only two terms. For it consists in saying, “If it is A, it is B,” and then reflecting, “If it is B, it is A”—which is a circular demonstration. Now according to the above given form it follows from these two, that “if it is A, it is A.”
The moment in which the object is already there is still a moment that requires explanation from essential causal way, not just accidental one. You´re making the mistake I addressed; the retrocausal view is explanatory impotent, since in order to unify anything, the object must already be unified. The existence at t can´t just be a brute fact for that exact reason, the condition it presupposes amount to a contradiction of requirements.
EI by itself is a metaphysically parasitic thesis on the notion of existence applied. It´s only a viable thesis if existence is something unreal, like a footprint in wet concrete and nothing actual in and of itself. If essence and existence are distinct, then the continued sustainment directly follows from it. The presupposition of EI in this case here becomes question-begging, and the combination of EI with a thomistic understanding of existence is nonsensical. It would require the composite to become prior to its unification at every moment past t, since "X exists" isn´t just a statement about a property of properties, but an act. The unification of properties aren´t in the power of the substances. One way to describe this problem is through "Bradley´s regress" and the impossibility for internal unification that follows from it.
Thus the issue of physics really is not related to the arguments of Scotus or Aquinas. Motion isn´t just motion as we use the term nowadays, but expressed a much broader category in Aristotle´s metaphysics. After all, it also includes the causation of existence, as well as giving the ability to the substances to cause. Otherwise an argument from motion could never arrive at a sustaining cause. Retrocausation in physics makes interesting points about the nature of accidental series, but it´s of little to no importance in the essentially ordered series that Aquinas and Scotus are interested in, in their arguments. Thus the supposed counterexamples don´t apply here, and they certainly don´t make for a logical mistake or inavalidity. At most a premise would just be false.
Also if you keep on referring to Scotus, then refer to a section in which he states the possibility of circular causal series? Then we can see that at most he assumed that possibility in accidental, thus temporal causes.
Last thing, logic can´t be done without metaphysics in mind. If you state the logical possibility of a circular cause simpliciter, then I will answer that this answer is false. The notion of an existential circular cause involves metaphysical impossibilities that entail a logical impossibility, for the reason that the properties involved entail a contradiction. Whether something is logically possible or not depends on the metaphysical knowledge we have about the entity in question. The same way a married bachelor involves contradictions, the same goes for a rational zebra or a circular existential cause. And with this in mind, the mere idea of a possible circular cause that can be proposed without an investigation into its nature doesn´t really have power to it. We have already seen why it fails in the kinds of causal series that the scholastics are interested in
The configuration at any three instants does not have a unique solution because of uncertainty from quantum mechanics and because gravity is nonlinear. Have you never heard of a Taylor series or a Fourier series where n goes very high? In fact, for a physical description of the measurable universe it goes to infinity, which is beyond the reach of humans but not beyond God.
Russell's opinions prove nothing.
" speculation of god does nothing to solve that contradiction"
God doesn't speculate.
"incoherent alternatives are simply allowed to be the case"
They are only incoherent in your silly jokes.
"In the archaic Thomistic parlance material is already fully actualized in its existential nature, therefore no actualizer, no causal agent, is called for to actualize material in its existential nature."
False, of course. Without a cause there would only be nothing. The denial of cause is incoherent. Even if material exists from the infinite past to the infinite future, claiming that its existence has no cause is just running away from the obvious.
"But the sort of circle of causation that invalidates the arguments of Aquinas and Scotus is not causation of existence, rather, causation of change of motion, or change more generally, that is, work in the sense of the physics of dynamic mechanics."
The only way you can get Aquinas to have made a mistake is by slandering him through deliberate misinterpretation of what he says. Loud repetitions of your favourite phrases establishes nothing.
About Russell: there are no exact configurations, as quantum mechanics tells us. As well, gravity is nonlinear, as relativity tells us, so even if exact configurations were available, differential equations developed from three of them would not be accurately predictive; n dimensional series measured at finite n points would increase accuracy but would not be predictive in the longer run, either into the future or into the past. Higher dimensional differential equations cannot be developed from three points. So much for Russell. Only God can do infinite dimensional series from infinite measurements. Something also decides which of the wider range of future configurations allowed by the qm formality from a past moment becomes the narrower configuration that can be measured when that future becomes the present.
Principia Mathematica by Russell (and Whitehead) failed to do what it was intended to do. Goedel said that the PM is "so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *1-*21 of Principia) that it represents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs . . . The matter is especially doubtful for the rule of substitution and of replacing defined symbols by their definiens"
I once borrowed the PA and examined it for a few days, but I certainly was not going to try reading through the reams of symbolic logic that lead to nothing solid.
You continue to read Aquinas and Aristotle deliberately in ways to make them seem stupid so you can cling to what you cannot actually prove. 🤣 You have failed to demonstrate any error in the First Way. You just keep repeating that you have, using the same tired phrases over and over, imagining that you are proving what cannot be proven. That physics has equations doesn't make A cause A to move itself, your humorous "third choice" especially for a follower of "there are no causes" Russell. 🤣
Your assertions are just ridiculous _and_ worn out stuff.
Dominik, "object must already be unified" Objects as we ordinarily observe them are always dynamic assemblages, never unified as a static whole.
"The existence at t can´t just be a brute fact" There must be a brute fact of existence.
Even on the speculation of god, that which exists at base is a brute fact, because in that case god is the fundamental brute fact.
The necessity of the necessary being is necessarily a brute fact, god or otherwise.
The speculation of god solves no logical problem and solves no ontological problem, rather, only introduces an unevidenced speculative unknown to push the problem back a step, which worse than simply not solving any problem, only makes the problem worse.
"The unification of properties aren´t in the power of the substances." That is because bulk properties of what we observe as substances are abstractions. What we call substances progress as they seem to because of the myriad interactions of simples in the aggregate.
"Thus the issue of physics really is not related to the arguments of Scotus or Aquinas." The argument from motion is just that, an argument that is based on motion evident to our senses, physics, and more generally change, physics again.
Existence of material does not change. Existence of material is static, conserved, and thus requires no cause.
Change requires a cause. No change requires no cause.
" it also includes the causation of existence," That is one of its errors, because existence does not call for a cause at all.
"a sustaining cause" Sustaining existence is no change and therefore requires no cause.
"they certainly don´t make for a logical mistake or inavalidity. At most a premise would just be false." "Also if you keep on referring to Scotus, then refer to a section in which he states the possibility of circular causal series?" I appreciate your long, detailed, and thoughtful responses. Just to reiterate and clarify a few points... Scotus made this assertion: (3) A circle of causes is impossible. plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/ (that is a summary in an encyclopedia, so I would be interested in more detail about how Scotus considered and treated the option of circular causality).
I agree that for Scotus at most we can say his premise of the impossibility of circular causation is false, not that (3) would make his argument invalid.
For Aquinas that is not the case. Omission of any mention of circular causation makes the First Way logically invalid, suffering from a false dichotomy.
Scotus lived after Aquinas and disagreed with his predecessor on some significant points. Do you have any information one way or the other if Scotus consciously recognized that omission of any mention of circular causation rendered the First Way logically invalid, and therefore, perhaps, Scotus decided to explicitly deny that option in order to insulate himself from that criticism?
"The notion of an existential circular cause involves metaphysical impossibilities that entail a logical impossibility," Existence calls for no cause at all, so the issue of existential circular cause is irrelevant.
But in terms of hypothetical causal powers in the present moment, if we speculate A can cause B to exist and B can cause A to exist then that is a logically possible circular existential causation. That would not explain how A and B came to exist in the first instance, but if one finds that both A and B are in fact each causing the other to exist in the present moment that is at least logically possible. But again, existence of material is static and requires no cause at all, so it is not necessary to address the ontological (im?)possibility of the above logical possibility.
Circular causation is a reframing of phenomena from the language of cause and effect to structuralism. There is no circular causation: what you're trying to say is that we live in a block universe where phenomena are connected by some mysterious quantity called "efficiency". What is "efficiency"?
(that is a summary in an encyclopedia, so I would be interested in more detail about how Scotus considered and treated the option of circular causality).
I quoted Duns Scotus above.
Let me paraphase his reasoning in terms of the existence of the motion of objects:
From the first conclusion:
The existence of the motion of A cannot cause the existence of the motion of A any more than the existence of A can cause the existence of A. Otherwise A would have to exist before it existed and A would have to be moving before it was moving.
From the second conclusion:
If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C then the existence of the motion of A is prior to both the existence of motion of B (the prior) and the existence of the motion of C (the posterior) which is plainly true. But if it is posited that the series is circular then C is actually A and therefore the exitence of the motion of A is prior to the existence of the motion of A...violating the first conclusion.
Both cases are impossible logically, physically and observably.
"The speculation of god solves no logical problem and solves no ontological problem, rather, only introduces an unevidenced speculative unknown to push the problem back a step, which worse than simply not solving any problem, only makes the problem worse."
It makes it better. Much better. Science seeks simplicity, not "brute, and that is as far as we go! There is 'no call' for any more!" That sounds just like your mockery of religion.
Simplifying information is compressing information. Raw data becomes equations, formulas, laws - whatever you want to call it. Measurement, the stuff of raw data takes megabytes, gigabytes - more - of storage to record. The laws that unify the data takes a much smaller amount of storage. But that's as far as it goes. You can compress the rules, the laws - whatever you want to call them only so far. Oh well. "Brut!"
An unbiased random infinite binary sequence is far simpler, as I have explained before. It must contain all possible finite subsequences in the correct average frequency or it is biased. Under any interpretation scheme such as used by computers to display binary sequences as intelligible English on a monitor, it has finite subsequences that display as descriptions of all describable worlds to whatever detail you want, depending on the length of the finite subsequence. All your speculation is there, even your incorrect speculation, because worlds where your speculation is incorrect is a possible world. An infinite number of copies of each of these finite descriptions exist.
The simplicity of this infinite sequence far exceeds the simplicity of all measurement data maximally compressed.
This is a model of God. It solves the silly Brut(!) escape from rationality.
Arguing about your "everything causes everything because Russell says there are no causes" and how Aquinas and Aristotle and Scotus can be willingly misunderstood and willingly misrepresented to make them into dumb losers has become extremely boring for me. But you have a new friend in Dominik, because he said, "We have already seen why [circular causation] fails in the kinds of causal series that the scholastics are interested in", so maybe you can teach him into becoming your disciple and together you can go on to argue the Brut (!) "truth" where thinking stops at the point you rule that "no more is called for!"
bmiller, (Quoting Scotus March 15, 2023 at 10:06 AM) "Nothing whatever is essentially ordered to itself." That addresses a linear regress that is asserted to be unable to terminate in individual self "begetting", and also unable to regress to an infinity of "begetting".
Those are examples of a linear ordered series, not circular. The circular case is not addressed in those statements by Scotus. But I appreciate the reference nevertheless and would be interested in any specific argument Scotus might have written to support his assertion that circular causation is impossible.
“If it is A, it is B, and if it is B, it is C; therefore, if it is A, it is of necessity C.” That is the transitive property of equality, which is a logical relationship, not an ontological relationship. A=B B=C Therefore C=A You are conflating a logical equality of value with an ontological identity of being.
If A, B, and C are real existent objects, and even supposing they have, say in the ideal case, precisely equal mass values, they remain 3 separate individual and distinct objects ontologically.
"The existence of the motion of A" Motion does not have an independent existence, rather, an object in inertial motion is in a state of motion, and a change of motion of an object is a process of change of state of the real existent object.
Motion has no independent ontological realization.
But let's put that aside and consider the relationships of your 3 body problem.
"If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C" So, I take this to mean your example is that A moves B and B moves C.
"But if it is posited that the series is circular then C is actually A" If these were purely abstract values then the transitive property of equality would logically apply, but the conflation of such equality of logical values to ontological identity of being for objects that are in fact separate entities is logically invalid, suffering from reification and equivocation.
For real existent objects A, B, and C are all simultaneously in a mutual interaction process that is fundamentally circular, not linear.
One can ask What is moving A? B and C. What is moving B? A and C. What is moving C? B and A.
Thus, the causal series has no identifiable beginning or end, analogous to the fact that a circle has no beginning or end around its circumference.
Yet the causal series is finite, analogous to the fact that in a plane a circle is of finite size.
Hence, when considering a causal regress one may consider a linear regress to a lone self mover, or a linear regress to an infinity of hierarchical movers.
But one is logically obliged to also consider a circular regress of mutual movers that terminates finitely.
It seems John Duns Scotus must of realized that circular causation is a logical alternative to the two linear sorts of causal series terminations. I say he must have realized the logical necessity of addressing circular causation because he did in fact address circular causation by explicitly denying its possibility.
Aquinas, a predecessor of Scotus, failed to address this clear logical option, and therefore constructed a logically invalid argument as his most manifest way, the First Way.
Looks like only the last word of my last comment made it, but it was a good one since it seems you begin by denying that motions of objects actually exist. But if the motions of objects do not exist they cannot cause the existence of motion in other objects. If that's the case, it sinks your circular series from the get-go without even having to show that it impossible both logically and physically.
bmiller, "Parmenides." Indeed. Perhaps the Thomistic notion of god is the case, unchanging, and since god is said to ground all things then perhaps all change is simply an illusion, this is all a dream, while in truth, I am the unchanging god and you are all figments of my unchanging divine imagination.
But, that all seems rather far fetched to me. I think Aquinas made an excellent grounding in his First Way by referencing at base what is evident to our senses. Aquinas said it is certain, but I would temper that to say I am personally convinced, because it is evident to my senses, that in the world some things are in motion.
Thanks again for the Scotus references above. Re-reading I see more of the manner Scotus was considering circular causality.
At first, it seemed to me very much to simply be a linear hierarchical argument, but re-reading it I realized that the Scotus description of circular causation is very similar to the Thomistic notion of instrumental causes in a linear hierarchical essential series, except Scotus considered what would happen if these so-called instruments were to, in some sense, loop around to act upon the prime mover. From this concept of circularity Scotus concluded circular causation was impossible.
Fortunately, unlike with Parmenides, the works of men like Aquinas and Scotus survive, so we can examine them in detail.
Scotus failed to account for mutuality, which makes his analysis unsound.
A popularized simplification of Newton's Principia treatment of motion states "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction". Today we represent more complex cases with vector maths, but the important point here is that your previous setup of a hypothetical 3 body problem exhibits the same lack of mutuality that Scotus suffered from.
"If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C" That is a one way concept of forces that induce motion. You posit that A moves B. You failed to realize that B must then, necessarily, move A equally. When A exerts a force on B, then B must necessarily exert an equal magnitude and opposite direction force on A.
There is no such thing as a one way push.
When A changes the motion of B, then necessarily B changes the motion of A by equal magnitude.
(Scotus) "2.5 For if anything precedes the prior, it also precedes the posterior. Deny this second conclusion and you must admit the opposite of the first." Thus, Scotus shows the incoherence of a unidirectional circular series of members that are either prior or posterior to another.
A is prior to B. B is prior to C. C is prior to A (in the case that we close the circle with a relation from C back to A). But as Scotus correctly points out, for a one way ordering, this leads to a contradiction. If A is prior to B and B is prior to C then by the transitive property A must be prior to C. But when we closed the loop we stated C is prior to A. In a unidirectional relationship this is a contradiction. C is prior to A A is prior to C
Real causation is multidirectional, not unidirectional, so Scotus's argument is ontologically unsound.
If we confine 3 like charges, say 3 electrons, near each other, and then, in the ideal case, instantaneously release that confinement, real causation will proceed mutually and multilaterally, in real causation that is circular and mutual at base. No identifiable first member yet finite, with 3 members, call them A, B, C if you wish, all mutually causing each other to move.
And indeed, all three will undergo what Thomists call local motion, or translation through space.
His unsound argument notwithstanding, credit belongs to Scotus for recognizing that circular causation is an option that logically must be addressed. Unfortunately, Aquinas failed to realize that, and thus created a logically invalid argument, the First Way.
"the conflation of such equality of logical values to ontological identity of being for objects that are in fact separate entities is logically invalid, suffering from reification and equivocation"
You reify and equivocate all the time in your metaphysics that rests on Brut(!) and paradoxically on the denial of metaphysics. 😀
Russell, your leader, says there is no change so you explain change by claiming that all motion is " circular", yet that Scotus was an "edifice" of stupidity, and that Aquinas, whom you deliberately misunderstand, was even stupider (your first illogical and undefended repetition today), and that "nothing more is called for". Thinking is banned as nonsense unless you allow the thought.
When A changes the motion of B, then necessarily B changes the motion of A by equal magnitude.
Are you saying that my car isn't really moving me from my house to the grocery store because the force of my inertia = the force of the car engine?
If we confine 3 like charges, say 3 electrons, near each other,
OK, if you if you impede the natural motion of 3 objects.
and then, in the ideal case, instantaneously release that confinement,
Then you remove the impediment.
real causation will proceed mutually and multilaterally,
The cause of the motion is the nature of the objects and the removal of the impediment similar to dropping 3 billiard balls to the ground.
in real causation that is circular and mutual at base. No identifiable first member
The removal of the impediment actualizes the potency of the objects to move according to their nature. The motion of none of them depend essentially on the motion of any of the others since if only one was released it would move while the others remained at rest.
There is nothing circular in this example, and none of them nor all of them together can be said to be the cause of their own motion or they could stop or stop their own motion or change their own direction jointly or together like animals seem to be able to do.
Where you go with your light study of Scotus is incorrect, leading again to repetition.
"Aquinas failed to realize that, and thus created a logically invalid argument, the First Way."
Nothing moves itself, as Aquinas showed. Your third possibility is not a counterexample. You just repeat yourself.
You have included a circular argument to the effect that free will choice is impossible because you dictate the exclusion of free will choice from what you allow to be possible, ignoring the science of quantum mechanics which makes Newton's action and reaction principal inaccurate in the prediction of the motion of matter. You fail to acknowledge that, instead, choices are made in determining the evolving motion of sensible matter by something that may be called "supernatural".
By ignoring this hole in your theory of the motion of matter, you make your conclusion to be nothing more than the circular consequence of your premise.
But it is not that you cling like this to what you want to be true that is funny. What is truly funny is that you actually seem to think that you can prove your rubbish 🤣.
So you ignore and repeat your willful trashing of Aquinas through deliberate misinterpretation of what he says, pretending that Scotus somehow helps you in your unrelated and false argument from Newton against Aquinas.
bmiller, "Are you saying that my car isn't really moving me" I'm saying that the unidirectional notion of causation used by Scotus is ontologically false, and his argument against circular causality is therefore ontologically unsound.
To understand why and how Scotus was wrong pdf page 89, or internal page 83, is a good place to start. ia902706.us.archive.org/0/items/newtonspmathema00newtrich/newtonspmathema00newtrich.pdf
When 2 billiard balls collide it is fairly easy to see that they move each other with equal magnitude. But in the case of a large and small object interacting it can seem as though the large object moves the small object but the small object does not move the large object, which is false, and never the case, only apparently the case due to the limits of human perception.
"The motion of none of them depend essentially on the motion of any of the others since if only one was released it would move while the others remained at rest." The others cannot remain at rest in that case. All motion is in space, you are in space, our planet is in space. There is no ultimate anchor in space. If only 1 electron is released then it and the entire confinement mechanism will each move in equal magnitude.
Supposing the confined electrons get beamed up to the Starship Enterprise what would happen to the released electron? It would cease accelerating and only coast in inertial motion.
Mutual repulsion of like charges is clearly what Thomists would call an essentially ordered causation.
But which is first? A or B? Well, A moves B, so perhaps A is first? Yet, equally, B moves A, so is B also first? Are neither first?
"There is nothing circular in this example" When we state that A and B move each other mutually that is a statement of circular causation. If you don't understand that basic descriptive fact there is little hope you will understand all the rest.
I'm saying that the unidirectional notion of causation used by Scotus is ontologically false, and his argument against circular causality is therefore ontologically unsound.
That's not an answer to the question I asked. Let me make it more clear. My car and I are at home at t0 and are both at the store at t1. The car applied force to me while I was at rest and so moved me per Newton's First Law. Yet you claimed above that I should have moved the car by an equal magnitude in this case and so neither of us should ever have made it to the store. Yet we did. Why?
The others cannot remain at rest in that case. All motion is in space, you are in space, our planet is in space. There is no ultimate anchor in space. If only 1 electron is released then it and the entire confinement mechanism will each move in equal magnitude.
A battery is a container of electrons. When an electrical circuit is closed, an electron moves down the wire while the battery remains in the same location. There is no equal magnitude of distance traveled over time for the electron vs the battery, nor for the electrons remaining in the battery. The electrons move because, due to the type of thing they are, they have a natural potency to move away from a negative charge and toward a positive charge whether or not the other thing with the charge is moving.
You seem to be confusing the motions of objects with something else, maybe energy.
You also seem to be defining "circular" as things moving in opposite directions which is different from the common definition which in this case according to Merriam-Webster is moving in or describing a circle or spiral. I think you should find a different term for your concept.
bmiller, "That's not an answer to the question I asked." I already answered your question multiple times, you just do not realize that.
Outside of England the Principia was rejected for a long time. You are still rejecting it, quite apparently.
The world has, in general, caught up with the Principia over the last 350 years, quite clearly, you are an exception to that general trend toward understanding.
"Yet you claimed above that I should have moved the car by an equal magnitude in this case and so neither of us should ever have made it to the store. Yet we did. Why?" Because you do not know what "motion" means in this context. If you had read the reference I provided to you then you would know and you would be able to answer your own question.
(Principia) LAW III. To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction : or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.
Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone. If a horse draws a stone tied to a rope, the horse (if I may so say) will be equally drawn back towards the stone: for the distended rope, by the same endeavour to relax or unbend itself, will draw the horse as much towards the stone, as it does the stone towards the horse, and will obstruct the progress of the one as much as it advances that of the other.
"A battery is a container of electrons. When an electrical circuit is closed, an electron moves down the wire while the battery remains in the same location." A battery is not a container of electrons. Positive and negative charges are generated on opposite plates or terminals, which move toward each other by various specific mechanisms depending on the sort of battery.
"You also seem to be defining "circular" as things moving in opposite directions I think you should find a different term for your concept." Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself. Pretty much everybody understands that if A and B mutually move each other that is a case of circular causation. I do not need a new term, you would do well to learn some basics of these concepts.
I suggest you start with the original text in the Principia in the sections I have referenced above. They prove that Scotus used an unsound argument.
"Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself."
Loops around! Ha ha ha! 🤣. Pretty much everybody understands that your loopy argument does not succeed in establishing that things move themselves.
Your circular nonsense, unfortunately does not prove that A, or anything else, moves itself.
Newton's 3rd law does not support that things change their motion by themselves. In fact, it asserts the opposite - that things change their motion _in_reaction_to the motion of other things. 😀
I already answered your question multiple times, you just do not realize that....
Because you do not know what "motion" means in this context. If you had read the reference I provided to you then you would know and you would be able to answer your own question.
No you haven't answered it even once and your quote from Newton discusses force not motion. So you must be confusing force with motion but I suspect you are also confusing energy with motion (depending on what day it is). The motion discussed in TFW is local motion which is the change of an object's location (that's why it's called "local" motion) over time, or velocity. So when you tell me that some motion of A is equal in magnitude to a motion in B you are telling me that they have the same velocity (and direction since velocity is a vector).
A battery is not a container of electrons.
Can't help it if you don't know that batteries contain electrons. Without that knowledge there's no use discussing electricity or current at all.
Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself.
Yes, because that is what "circular" actually means.
Pretty much everybody understands that if A and B mutually move each other that is a case of circular causation.
Not when you show them what "circular" actually means from a dictionary.
Regardless of your confusion of force with velocity, electrons are essentially moved by their nature and the presence of charges nearby whether those charges are changing location or not. So their motion is not caused by their own local motion nor by the local motion of another(s).
Neither the electron nor charged particles nearby nor the entire group of them can be the cause of their own local motion because none of them separately or together can start, stop nor the change direction of their own local motion(s).
bmiller, "Newton discusses force not motion." If you read the references provided you will learn what "motion" means in this context.
If you picture a curved arrow above A B pointing from A to B, and another curved arrow below A B pointing from B to A you will see in your mind's eye a circular pattern, hence the descriptive term, circular causation.
"So their motion is not caused by their own local motion nor by the local motion of another(s)." A and B cause each other's motion.
Self causation of motion is irrelevant and unnecessary to account for observed motion.
Pointing out that objects do not move by moving themselves alone is like pointing out that birds do not fly by scratching the ground, an irrelevant and pointless observation.
Real causation does not need a first mover because real simples move each other.
Scotus was not Newton's muse as you seem to think, correct for your purpose in his "edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument" 😀.
"A and B cause each other's motion"
But, but … Russell, the world's most highly educated, most intelligent man - your hero and leader - says there is no cause! 🤣
"If you picture a curved arrow above A B pointing from A to B, and another curved arrow below A B pointing from B to A you will see in your mind's eye a circular pattern, hence the descriptive term, circular causation."
The Principia is argued in classical straight edge and compass geometry. Circles can be constructed. Ellipses cannot. But circles have simple radii. Therefore arguments using circles can demonstrate effects of radius, i.e., distance from the centre. Newton did not think that things moved in circles and did not use "circular causation" to argue that there was "no need" for God as you seem to think can be done - which of course, you can if you assume that God doesn't exist in the first place, which would make your argument logical but irrational, for circular argumentation is indeed logical and it is indeed irrational.😀
However, if you assume the existence of God, no logical contradiction arises. Your emotional "there is no need for", "there is no call for", etcetera, are neither logical nor rational. They are just your private wishful thoughts. I have explained to you how non linearity and quantum uncertainty make you, Russell, Newtonian science, and your arguments incorrect. Ignoring non linearity and quantum mechanics does not cause you to suddenly become correct.
I can sum up your idea that your belief can be proved with the single word: "senseless" 🤣.
Nor do I claim that the metaphysics of Christianity can be proven in some kind of inverse to your senseless belief. I claim only that assuming God's existence does not contradict sensible science and therefore cannot be ruled out by it as you incorrectly seem to think can be done.
"Real causation does not need a first mover because real simples move each other."
There it is: your emotional argument "does not need". Sorry, but _something_ is needed, because science itself tells us that science cannot describe the motion of things with accuracy. This "something" we call "God".
That is not a metaphysical argument. It is a scientific argument.
If you read the references provided you will learn what "motion" means in this context.
It may not have occurred to you that if want to discuss local motion and you change the definition you are no longer discussing local motion. For example you've pointed to Newton's 3rd Law in response to my question of how a both a car and myself can move from my home to the store in a certain amount of time (let's say the store was 3 miles away and it took 6 minutes). I can say along with TFW and all students of physics that the average velocity of car and myself was 30 mph in the direction of home to store. How does the 3rd law apply to this situation? How is it possible that the car and I both end up at the store using only the 3rd Law as an explanation? This is not meant as a gotcha but an invitation to do some research.
Likewise with the local motion of your 2 objects. They are moving in a straight line, not a circle (See Newton's 1st Law) as you seem to be claiming.
And the daily reminder that inanimate objects obviously do not move themselves either separately or together or they could separately or together start or stop their motion or change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store.
bmiller, "How is it possible that the car and I both end up at the store using only the 3rd Law as an explanation?" I had assumed that you would be able to determine the applicability of each definition and each law described in the Principia. Apparently that is not the case.
Therefore, I will expand my suggestion. Read all the definitions and all the laws, it is really just a few pages. Most of the Principia consists of problem solving and applications.
I suggest that for now you stick with simple systems such as 2 or perhaps 3 electrons, or something like that. Analyzing something as complex as a car when you have not yet mastered a 2 body problem of simples is getting out in front of yourself, it seems apparent.
"Likewise with the local motion of your 2 objects. They are moving in a straight line, not a circle (See Newton's 1st Law) as you seem to be claiming." Hence, my suggestion that you stick with a 2 body problem until you master those concepts.
Circular causation is not moving in a circle. I assumed you understood that. Apparently I was wrong.
If you, for example, complain that somebody is talking in circles that does not mean that their voice, or their tongue, are literally moving around in circles, OK?
You might ask why B moved, answer A. Why did A move, answer B. Well, then why did B move, answer again A. By now you might be a bit fed up with the answers and accuse the answerer of talking in circles.
Circular causation is a description of a fundamental causal structure, not a literal circular motion.
"inanimate objects obviously do not move themselves either separately or together" Moving themselves together is the only way simples change their motion at all. All the fundamental forces are formulated as mutual applications of force, and it is force that induces motion.
The evidence against your statement are the force equations in every modern textbook on the subject.
"they could separately or together start or stop their motion" Yes, they do just exactly that, start and stop each other.
If 2 electrons come flying at each other they will stop each other, and then they will start each other. That is how all motion is changed at base in the real universe, mutual interactions which are causally circular in fundamental causal structure. They therefore form, in the archaic Thomistic parlance, both accidental and essential causal series, such that every essential series of motion causation terminates finitely with no identifiable first causal member. That is to say, the choice of first member would be arbitrary and meaningless since each mutual member is equally the cause as any other member is the cause.
"change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store." Your changes of motion are the aggregate of simples changing each other. You move yourself because at base simples move each other.
Really? Still can't even squeak out an answer to my car question after you've had days to google it? It's at least the 3rd time I've given you a chance. I'm going to have to conclude you're not capable.
Thanks for the amusing dodge regarding "talking in circles". I think it's an appropriate description of your style, but does not apply to any of the physical examples you've brought up.
Moving themselves together is the only way simples change their motion at all.
An electron from a battery changes location and moves down a wire while the battery and the other electrons in the battery remain in the same location. So no, a single electron moving down a wire does not require that any other electron move in either direction.
Yes, they do just exactly that, start and stop each other.
If 2 electrons come flying at each other they will stop each other, and then they will start each other.
Hahaha! You had to use violent motion to overcome their natural motion to start them "flying at each other" and then point to their natural inanimate motion. But you still had to truncate the last part of my quote: or change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store.. Nice attempt at a dodge, but you're proving my point that animate beings can dodge while inamimate beings can't.
You move yourself because at base simples move each other.
At base, inanimate "simples" cannot start, stop or change their own motion like an animate being seems to do. If you were merely an aggregate of these simples then neither could you. But since you've proven that you love to dodge and weave, you're not being very persuasive when you identify as an "aggregate of simples".
Any sensible person would laugh at the way your extreme denunciation of Scotus ("an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument") evolved into your assumption of him into a useful partner against anyone not willing to be your disciple. Inconsistency, you are always Stardusty😏.
"That is to say, the choice of first member would be arbitrary and meaningless since each mutual member is equally the cause as any other member is the cause."
"Meaningless" yet! Heh 🤣!
Well, I suppose that "nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right" could work for you, but since the world's smartest and most highly educated man says there are no causes, you could not have even thought "nothing" in your dubious belief, because you could not have been caused to think. How can you answer that?
I've got it! "Nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right".
Most people believe in causation and don't like being gaslighted by someone frozen in a nothing loop 😀!
But of course you are just making a nothing joke. Yeah, sure you are! 😏
"The evidence against your statement are the force equations in every modern textbook on the subject."
Well "nothing therefore nothing therefore ignore". Modern textbooks based on force laws do not give any method by which the future can be predicted from the past as I have explained to you already. Remember? No? "Nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right"? Ridiculous, but apparently adequate for you as an answer to everything. But everything? Yes, "nothing"! or no, "nothing"! Either way the difference is nothing.
Most people believe that Something causes a prediction from force equations that is divergent and uncertain to become a measurably more particular distribution of sensible things at later moments. Science has demonstrated this in experiments.
So the evidence is actually against you. Aquinas beats you with his "archaic parlance" just as Something beats nothing (!!!!!) 😀.
My copy of "The Faith Once For All Delivered" just arrived! What a beautiful book, nicely conservative, with a good introduction by the great Cardinal Burke!
You really need to get a life, especially if you're that particular commenter who is constantly fretting over what comments I approve, who counts as a troll, etc.
First, when someone posts a kind remark, I tend to feel it churlish to delete it, even if it is not strictly on topic (and then I deal with the problem of off-topic comments if this initial one starts to snowball into an off-topic thread). Second, the topic of this post is a little bit loose anyway (since it links to things related to subjects as different as Scotus and CRT). So, in light of these two points, I let the comment stand.
But this is really much more ado than the matter deserves. If you don't like the way comments are moderated, don't read them. And try to find something better to do with your time.
Would it repair my comment a little to say that I am now reading Ward's "Divine Ideas", that I have bought and read Brian Davies "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion", and that I will probably get the Ward book on Scotus if I can ever catch up on my reading. It looks quite interesting.
Scotus is one of these thinkers that i really want to know better someday, specially his take on the Incarnation on a world with no sin*.
But lets discuss today his cosmological argument: why do the scholastic finds necessary to argue for a First Mover, a Final Cause and a Perfect Being all separately instead of, say, arguing for a First Mover and them draw from it the other characteristics?
It just seems too complicated to me. The average rote of stablishing a creator and them that the creator is God seems to me more intuitive and so it did to probably all users of the cosmological argument.
*a thing he shares with more eastern-minded christians
Interesting that "dunce" derives from Scotus when he was such an influential and brilliant scholar. I guess it was a reflection of changing fashions in religion around the time of the reformation and renaissance, and anti-catholic sentiment in particular.
I have always admired and appreciated Duns Scotus's Onto- Theological Argument for the existence of God. It is thoroughly
ReplyDeleteexplored in "God and Atheism" by Rev. Bernardino Bonansea ,OFM
CUA Press, 1979.
Is it true that Scotus did not hold that the First Unmoved Mover is called a "mover" analogically? Did Scotus hold that the First Unmoved Mover must be a "mover" in a sense univocal with that predicated of other movers?
ReplyDeleteficino4ml,
DeleteDoes this from Wikipedia help?
In medieval disputes over the nature of God, many theologians and philosophers (such as Thomas Aquinas) held that when one says that "God is good" and that "man is good", man's goodness is only analogous to, i.e. similar to but distinct from, God's goodness. John Duns Scotus, while not denying the analogy of being à la St. Thomas, nonetheless holds to a univocal concept of being. It is important to note that Scotus does not believe in a "univocity of being", but rather to a common concept of being that is proper to both God and man, though in two radically distinct modes: infinite in God, finite in man.[1]
The claim here is that we understand God because we can share in His being, and by extension, the transcendental attributes of being, namely, goodness, truth, and unity.[2] So far as Scotus is concerned, we need to be able to understand what ‘being’ is as a concept in order to demonstrate the existence of God, lest we compare what we know - creation - to what we do not - God. Thomas Williams has defended a version of this argument.[3]
So I'd say Scotus prefers to say "Goodness" is perfect infinitely in God and finite and imperfectly in creatures but the difference between finite and infinite is beyond compare. But that is not to deny they are analogous. So, from this, it seems it would be wrong to say this question would be true:
"Is it true that Scotus did not hold that the First Unmoved Mover is called a "mover" analogically?"
I meant to say "Onto-Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God"
ReplyDeleteAnon,
DeleteOntological arguments for the existence of god vary in their forms, but they all fail. Here are some typical defects.
Error: Circular causation is impossible.
Actually, at base causation, to the extent that causation is a valid notion at all, is mutual and thus fundamentally circular. I suggest this as a source to gain understanding on this point:
"On the Notion of Cause, with Applications to the Free-Will Problem"
BERTRAND RUSSELL
hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
Error: God exists as a thought in the mind.
This mistake is an example of the fallacy of reification, that is, confusing a thought for the thing itself. When you think any thought what exists inside your head is your brain tissue, blood, and other such real material. Your thoughts are actual processes of that real existent material.
The imagined thing you are thinking about is not that thing existent in your head in any sense.
Error: Conflating a logical possibility with an existential possibility, and further confusing human ignorance of whether a logically possible thing is existentially possible, with an assumed existential possibility.
This mistake is a form of the fallacy of equivocation, conflating the word "possible" in various senses.
For example, it is logically possible to express n dimensional space, but that does not entail a real possibility of n dimensional space. It might be in the nature of reality that n dimensional space cannot exist in reality.
Human ignorance as to whether or not n dimensional space can exist in reality does not necessitate a non-zero existential possibility of n dimensional space.
Human ignorance does not equal existential possibility.
Logical possibility does not equal existential possibility.
Ontological arguments for the existence of god commonly and fallaciously equivocate these senses of the word "possible".
All ontological arguments for the existence of god can be summarized in a single sentence.
Wishing makes it so.
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"Ontology" is a word of relatively recent origin, adapted straight from the Greek in use long after Aquinas. Nor was there a Latin version of the word at his time, so the first thing to note is that in your essay you are not in any way attacking anything that either Duns Scotus or Aquinas said. Someone else, not me, brought up the subject of off topic comments. Yours appears to be so. I just mention this as a fact, but I hope nevertheless that Ed does not delete your amazing 🤣 reduction of all that is covered by the word "ontology" to the four words, "wishing makes it so", because your post is very funny.
Also, please don't tell me you were not talking about Aquinas or Scotus. That is obvious.
"Wishing makes it so" has no clear meaning here, but that is perhaps appropriate because (the second thing to note) the word "ontology" is so broadly used that if its meaning is not explained when it _is_ used, similarly lacks clarity. If you want to be obscure, just say "ontology" and push on without further explanation, as you have done 🤣 (please don't explain "ontology" to me - it's too late and it would miss my point about your amazing wrap of the whole of ontology to the enigmatic "wishing makes it so").
"Your thoughts are actual processes of that real existent material"
So you say but have not proven except to those who take it as a starting point, making it circular which is discursively a failure.
"The imagined thing you are thinking about is not that thing existent in your head in any sense"
Funny, unnecessary statement 🤣.
"This mistake is a form of the fallacy of equivocation, conflating the word 'possible' in various senses"
Your whole article is one huge equivocation. Heh 😀!
"For example, it is logically possible to express n dimensional space, but that does not entail a real possibility of n dimensional space. It might be in the nature of reality that n dimensional space cannot exist in reality.
Human ignorance as to whether or not n dimensional space can exist in reality does not necessitate a non-zero existential possibility of n dimensional space."
Since your post is finite in word count, the number of weasel words used here is necessarily 😀 finite. "Possible", "n dimensional 'space'", "nature of 'reality'", "cannot 'exist' in 'reality'", "necessitate", "existential possibility". In fact, it just occurred to me that I erred here. Due to the possibility 😀 that your words used here could have multiple meanings, the finite word count is only a countable 😀 restriction. The number of meanings could be higher than any particular n that someone could have given beforehand 🤣.
"Human ignorance does not equal existential possibility."
It's irrelevant. Why did you put that sentence in? Never mind.
"Logical possibility does not equal existential possibility"
More vague arm waving.
"Ontological arguments for the existence of god commonly and fallaciously equivocate these senses of the word 'possible'"
Yes, only your copious equivocation is non fallacious - at least in your own estimation 🤣.
Hilarious stuff. Congratulations!
😏
Tom Cohoe
Without presuming to be an expert in predicate logic, it seems to me that all ontological arguments for God's existence are a formal fallacy of trying to introduce the existential binder (∃) over a free variable by the nature of the predicate that captures that free variable.
DeleteThis is, as far as I can tell, always an illegal move.
Tom,
Delete"Someone...comments...Yours"
Anonymous March 10, 2023 at 7:09 PM referenced an Ontological-Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God, by John Duns Scotus, a subject of the OP.
I prefaced my comments by pointing out that there are various forms of ontological arguments for the existence of god. My comments are relevant to such arguments.
For example, Scotus makes this assertion:
(3) A circle of causes is impossible.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/
Above I specifically addressed this error, thus my comments are relevant to this error by Scotus.
The arguments of Scotus are, of course, very long, very complex, and so riddled with Aristotelian errors, fallacious logic such as equivocation of the word "possible", and false statements such as the erroneous claim that a circle of causes is impossible, that Scotus is clearly a massive failure.
The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument.
My brief comments here can only touch on a few of the errors made by Scotus and others who made similar or related arguments.
@ StardustyPsyche,
DeleteWell actually you skipped a full track, because the question you addressed was about Scotus's "Onto-theological argument" where there was nothing called "onto-anything by Scotus" because he never used the word "ontology", which was not even used until much later and really has nothing to do with Scotus' argument. Still, Anonymous March 10, 2023 at 7:09 PM was talking about Scotus' argument, so he was half on track. Scotus argument was called "ontological" at a later time for whatever reason, and you just made a leap at "ontology" without reference to Scotus at all, so you wholly jumped track to make an attack, against the entire field of "ontology" (and a prefatory remark that there are ontological arguments against God doesn't fix your actual aim against all of ontology). Nor does it make your response against a non ontological argument on topic, or make your summing up "wishing makes it so" any more sensible or any less funny 😀.
"Scotus makes this assertion:
(3) A circle of causes is impossible.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/
Above I specifically addressed this error, thus my comments are relevant to this error by Scotus"
Heh. Above, or on a recent, thread, _I_ specifically addressed this erroneous claim of "error" 🤣. But then you must ignore my words in order to keep up your predetermined position.
You have failed to prove anything about "circular causation". You just keep repeating the failed argument that A causing B and B causing A is somehow A causing A as if Aquinas and other philosophers were too dumb to realise, as I said before, that things bounce around. 🤣 You are forced to interpret the arguments as philosophical stupidity, because if you do not, you cannot cling to your predetermined position. So you read Aquinas etcetera as unfairly as you possibly can, using deliberate linguistic legerdemain to avoid understanding what is being said so you can pretend to be an irresistible authority 🤣.
Your talk about "souls" is mere mockery that avoids what is actually meant. How does mockery rather than attempting to understand what is meant help anything here? 😏
"Aquinas made this false statement:
'Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another'
Note the use of the present tense 'is' twice. That means Aquinas was claiming 'Whatever we presently observe to be in motion is presently being put in motion by another'."
Sorry, but "is" twice in that sentence works for the hierarchy of causes (Coulomb, Faraday, Maxwell, relativity), which are all operating at present, just as well as it does for whatever you are trying to say. 🤣
😏
Tom Cohoe
The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument.
DeleteComing from you, that ranks as nearly heavenly praise, and I have now elevated his works to near the top of my reading list. Anybody who can score such a derogation from you is probably doing something right. Thank you.
John Duns Scotus showed that the First Way by Aquinas is logically invalid.
DeleteDoes anybody here know if that disproof of Aquinas by Scotus was understood by Scotus at the time, or is the demonstration by Scotus of the logically fallacious structure of the First Way simply an inevitable conclusion of his arguments that he did not address at the time?
Scotus made this assertion:
(3) A circle of causes is impossible.
In so doing, Scotus recognized that in an argument that references the impossibility of an infinite causal regress it is logically necessary to also address circular causation, because clearly, circular causation is a logical alternative to an infinite regress of causation.
Any argument that claims to reach a conclusion based on the impossibility of an infinite causal regress, yet does not address the logical alternative of circular causation, is necessarily logically invalid, suffering from the logical fallacy of false dichotomy for having failed to account for the obvious logical alternative of circular causation.
John Duns Scotus clearly understood that omitting the denial of any possibility of circular causation would have rendered his argument logically invalid.
Thomas Aquinas lacked that insight of his successor. By omitting this obvious logical alternative from the First Way Aquinas constructed his First Way as a logically invalid argument.
Of course, the premise stated by Scotus is false, as is evidenced by such physics formulations as the classical equations for gravitational and electrostatic forces. Physics is formulated, to the extent causality is a valid notion at all, as mutual causation, that is, fundamentally circular causation.
That is what led to this famous quote, Dr. Feser is well aware of and has devoted a bit of ink to:
"In the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect; there is merely a formula."
Bertrand Russell
hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"Scotus showed that the First Way by Aquinas is logically invalid"
Very funny from the guy who said "The work of John Duns Scotus is an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument" 🤣.
Who did he show it to? You? It's very funny that you pick out the one thing he apparently "showed" that agrees with your obsession and present it on his authority as a thinker as a good argument. Get that? On his authority as a thinker. Otherwise why mention his name here?
The ridiculous always makes a good basis for jokes 🤣.
"Scotus recognized that … it is logically necessary to … address circular causation"
Did he? This from the guy that quotes Russell, "there is nothing that can be called a cause" 😀?
Scotus, that "edifice of confused and fallacious argument" recognized in a demonstratively important argument that Russell was on to something when Russell opined that there was no cause here?
Your argumentation here is so illogical that I have to wonder whether you were drinking here rather than working on your jokes. It stuns before it causes laughter, but I guess that is the stuff of comedic genius 🤣.
And then, of course, Dr. Feser is advanced as a supporter of your anti-Aquinas obsession.
Save us from this! Too much laughter can make one sick!
🤣
Let me sum this up. You are against Scotus. You are against Aquinas. But if Scotus is against Aquinas you are for Scotus. But you are against Scotus because Russell is against Scotus. And you are against Feser but Feser is for you because he quoted Russell.
Whew!
Way to go!
😏
Tom Cohoe
@StardustPsyche
DeleteFirst comment from a long-time casual reader. And please be forewarned I’m not even an armchair philosopher.
Can you please explain what causes or upholds circular causation? It seems that Mr. Russell can’t be bothered to explain why mutually gravitating bodies should ever begin to be in a state of mutual gravitation, or why the formula exists and continues to exist from instant to instant. But I have to admit I don’t quite follow what he means by “the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at two given instants” or how it proceeds from that that the interdependent motions as a whole and the function that makes them possible are both accounted for.
As an aside, I’ve never read any of his work, but it does seem Mr. Russell is trying extremely hard to impress with vocabulary rather than analysis, and he ends up coming across as a bit goofy.
But maybe I should stay in my lane?
Anon, no that´s a perfectly valid question. Self-causation in the existential sense amounts to a contradiction, because in order to cause anything, in some sense the object in question has to exist. Or to put it into a more platonist oriented language, the unification of a thing´s properties can´t be done by the thing itself, because in order to unify intially, the object must already be unified. There´s no way to formulate the issue in a metaphysically coherent way.
DeleteNote that I´m making the argument from an ontological point of view. Retrocausality might explain sufficiently an objects existence at an earlier point in time, however you will note that this doesn´t address the initial question posited, because, once again, we presuppose the existence of said object.
The same issue can be seen with co-dependence. A exists, because of B, B exists because of A, the existence of the one entails the existence of the other. If we suppose that their relation is symmetrical, each depends on the other, then we are faced with a scenario where the explanation of the conjunction can´t be given (Why does AB exist?), because each existent is only explainable by referring to an object that itself is dependent on the object in question. The regress is explanatorily impotent.
This is also why at the end it´s impossible for there to be a complex object at the foundation. We have that exact scenario with the co-dependence of the whole on the parts and of the parts on the whole
Empowering Being,
Deletecareful here. What an opponent would dispute here is that we have a free variable here. The existential binder is supposed to be entailed by considerations about the nature of perfection or positive properties in the Gödelian variant. While I personally haven´t engaged with the ontological argument in a long time (haven´t read Daniel Vecchio´s book on it either yet), the intuition it captures can´t be just cast aside as a confusion in symbol language, especially if the argument is that the property that is possibly exemplified would by its exemplification entail actual existence.
Anonymous March 14, 2023 at 9:38 AM,
DeleteI agree with Dominik that your points are fair and thoughtfully expressed.
"Mr. Russell can’t be bothered to explain why mutually gravitating bodies should ever begin to be in a state of mutual gravitation"
True, but nobody knows that or even has a coherent speculation to solve the riddle of the origin of all that exists, as well as why we find ourselves in the sort of universe we do in fact find ourselves.
About all any of us can do is try to reason from observations as to how things seem to be, with virtually no hope or expectation of ever answering the great riddles of how and why our universe came to be as it is.
"I don’t quite follow what he means by “the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at two given instants”.
Russell tends to think in terms of differential expressions. Have you had the opportunity to study differential maths? If not, it is a way to express how things change moment to moment, among other uses.
"but it does seem Mr. Russell is trying extremely hard to impress with vocabulary rather than analysis, and he ends up coming across as a bit goofy."
His grandfather was prime minister in the 19th century, and he was highly educated, published multiple books including some massive mathematical work, is known for Russell's paradox, and a great deal more. In terms of his vocabulary it is more the case that he would have to hold back and tone down to write for a general audience.
Few individuals have produced such a volume of highly detailed and precise analysis.
Dominik,
Delete"Self-causation in the existential sense amounts to a contradiction"
Temporally, that is to say considering the origin of all that exists, yes, that is true, and it is also true that the speculation of god does nothing to solve that contradiction, rather, just carves out a place in one's thinking where incoherent alternatives are simply allowed to be the case.
But in the present moment there is no call for existential or ontological self causation because material is already here. There is no call for a changer to continuously keep material in existence because existential inertia is no change in the aspect of existence for material.
No change calls for no changer, thus, continued existence calls for no causation.
"A exists, because of B, B exists because of A, the existence of the one entails the existence of the other. If we suppose that their relation is symmetrical, each depends on the other, then we are faced with a scenario where the explanation of the conjunction can´t be given (Why does AB exist?)"
Indeed, mutual causation is not applicable to the cause of continued existence because continued existence (existential inertia) calls for no cause at all.
In the archaic Thomistic parlance material is already fully actualized in its existential nature, therefore no actualizer, no causal agent, is called for to actualize material in its existential nature.
But the sort of circle of causation that invalidates the arguments of Aquinas and Scotus is not causation of existence, rather, causation of change of motion, or change more generally, that is, work in the sense of the physics of dynamic mechanics.
This is a circle of causes, to the extent that causation is a valid notion at all:
F = G*m1*m2/r^2
The case of circular causation for motion was absent entirely from the First Way making that argument by Aquinas logically invalid.
John Duns Scotus, who was about 8 years old when Aquinas died, later realized that a circle of causation is a logical option, that if true would make his arguments unsound, and if ommitted would make his arguments logically invalid.
Thus, Scotus stated that a circle of causes is impossible, which is one of many errors Scotus made.
Why circular arguments fail logically and physically.
DeleteHere is a portion of A Treatise on God as First Principle where Duns Scotus explains why a an essential order of efficient causes cannot be circular.
2.1 In this chapter we offer arguments for the aforesaid fourfold division of order and for the interrelations that exist between essentially ordered terms.
2.2 When the venerable doctor Augustine, writing about your triune self, declared (in the first book On the Trinity): "Nothing whatever begets itself," you, O Lord our God, were his infallible teacher. Have you not impressed upon us with equal certitude this similar truth? (First conclusion) Nothing whatever is essentially ordered to itself.
2.3 For what is more impossible in an order of eminence than that one and the same thing be essentially greater than itself. As for the other six orders, if dependence be taken in the sense defined above, is there any greater impossibility than that one and the same thing depend essentially upon itself? that it exist without itself?
2.4 This too is in accord with truth: (Second conclusion) In any essential order a circle is impossible.
2.5 For if anything precedes the prior, it also precedes the posterior. Deny this second conclusion and you must admit the opposite of the first. Besides, the same thing will be essentially prior and posterior to one and the same thing, and so be both more perfect and less perfect or be dependent and independent of the latter, which is anything but true. In the first book of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle excluded this circle from demonstrations and it is no less possible in the order of reality.
Aquinas uses the same reasoning in SCG ch13:19 regarding motion.
[19] But, if the proposition that every mover is moved is true by itself, something impossible or awkward likewise follows. For the mover must be moved either by the same kind of motion as that by which he moves, or by another. If the same, a cause of alteration must itself be altered, and further, a healing cause must itself be healed, and a teacher must himself be taught and this with respect to the same knowledge.
Posterior Analytics: Lecture 8
Then (72b38) he gives the form of the argument in three terms, namely: “If it is A, it is B, and if it is B, it is C; therefore, if it is A, it is of necessity C.”
Then (73a1) he shows by the aforesaid form of arguing that in a circular demonstration a same thing is proved by a same thing, using only two terms. For it consists in saying, “If it is A, it is B,” and then reflecting, “If it is B, it is A”—which is a circular demonstration. Now according to the above given form it follows from these two, that “if it is A, it is A.”
The moment in which the object is already there is still a moment that requires explanation from essential causal way, not just accidental one. You´re making the mistake I addressed; the retrocausal view is explanatory impotent, since in order to unify anything, the object must already be unified. The existence at t can´t just be a brute fact for that exact reason, the condition it presupposes amount to a contradiction of requirements.
DeleteEI by itself is a metaphysically parasitic thesis on the notion of existence applied. It´s only a viable thesis if existence is something unreal, like a footprint in wet concrete and nothing actual in and of itself. If essence and existence are distinct, then the continued sustainment directly follows from it. The presupposition of EI in this case here becomes question-begging, and the combination of EI with a thomistic understanding of existence is nonsensical. It would require the composite to become prior to its unification at every moment past t, since "X exists" isn´t just a statement about a property of properties, but an act. The unification of properties aren´t in the power of the substances. One way to describe this problem is through "Bradley´s regress" and the impossibility for internal unification that follows from it.
Thus the issue of physics really is not related to the arguments of Scotus or Aquinas. Motion isn´t just motion as we use the term nowadays, but expressed a much broader category in Aristotle´s metaphysics. After all, it also includes the causation of existence, as well as giving the ability to the substances to cause. Otherwise an argument from motion could never arrive at a sustaining cause. Retrocausation in physics makes interesting points about the nature of accidental series, but it´s of little to no importance in the essentially ordered series that Aquinas and Scotus are interested in, in their arguments. Thus the supposed counterexamples don´t apply here, and they certainly don´t make for a logical mistake or inavalidity. At most a premise would just be false.
Also if you keep on referring to Scotus, then refer to a section in which he states the possibility of circular causal series? Then we can see that at most he assumed that possibility in accidental, thus temporal causes.
Last thing, logic can´t be done without metaphysics in mind. If you state the logical possibility of a circular cause simpliciter, then I will answer that this answer is false. The notion of an existential circular cause involves metaphysical impossibilities that entail a logical impossibility, for the reason that the properties involved entail a contradiction. Whether something is logically possible or not depends on the metaphysical knowledge we have about the entity in question. The same way a married bachelor involves contradictions, the same goes for a rational zebra or a circular existential cause. And with this in mind, the mere idea of a possible circular cause that can be proposed without an investigation into its nature doesn´t really have power to it. We have already seen why it fails in the kinds of causal series that the scholastics are interested in
@ StardustyPsyche,
DeleteThe configuration at any three instants does not have a unique solution because of uncertainty from quantum mechanics and because gravity is nonlinear. Have you never heard of a Taylor series or a Fourier series where n goes very high? In fact, for a physical description of the measurable universe it goes to infinity, which is beyond the reach of humans but not beyond God.
Russell's opinions prove nothing.
" speculation of god does nothing to solve that contradiction"
God doesn't speculate.
"incoherent alternatives are simply allowed to be the case"
They are only incoherent in your silly jokes.
"In the archaic Thomistic parlance material is already fully actualized in its existential nature, therefore no actualizer, no causal agent, is called for to actualize material in its existential nature."
False, of course. Without a cause there would only be nothing. The denial of cause is incoherent. Even if material exists from the infinite past to the infinite future, claiming that its existence has no cause is just running away from the obvious.
"But the sort of circle of causation that invalidates the arguments of Aquinas and Scotus is not causation of existence, rather, causation of change of motion, or change more generally, that is, work in the sense of the physics of dynamic mechanics."
The only way you can get Aquinas to have made a mistake is by slandering him through deliberate misinterpretation of what he says. Loud repetitions of your favourite phrases establishes nothing.
About Russell: there are no exact configurations, as quantum mechanics tells us. As well, gravity is nonlinear, as relativity tells us, so even if exact configurations were available, differential equations developed from three of them would not be accurately predictive; n dimensional series measured at finite n points would increase accuracy but would not be predictive in the longer run, either into the future or into the past. Higher dimensional differential equations cannot be developed from three points. So much for Russell. Only God can do infinite dimensional series from infinite measurements. Something also decides which of the wider range of future configurations allowed by the qm formality from a past moment becomes the narrower configuration that can be measured when that future becomes the present.
Principia Mathematica by Russell (and Whitehead) failed to do what it was intended to do. Goedel said that the PM is "so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *1-*21 of Principia) that it represents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs . . . The matter is especially doubtful for the rule of substitution and of replacing defined symbols by their definiens"
I once borrowed the PA and examined it for a few days, but I certainly was not going to try reading through the reams of symbolic logic that lead to nothing solid.
You continue to read Aquinas and Aristotle deliberately in ways to make them seem stupid so you can cling to what you cannot actually prove. 🤣 You have failed to demonstrate any error in the First Way. You just keep repeating that you have, using the same tired phrases over and over, imagining that you are proving what cannot be proven. That physics has equations doesn't make A cause A to move itself, your humorous "third choice" especially for a follower of "there are no causes" Russell. 🤣
Your assertions are just ridiculous _and_ worn out stuff.
😏
Tom Cohoe
Dominik,
Delete"object must already be unified"
Objects as we ordinarily observe them are always dynamic assemblages, never unified as a static whole.
"The existence at t can´t just be a brute fact"
There must be a brute fact of existence.
Even on the speculation of god, that which exists at base is a brute fact, because in that case god is the fundamental brute fact.
The necessity of the necessary being is necessarily a brute fact, god or otherwise.
The speculation of god solves no logical problem and solves no ontological problem, rather, only introduces an unevidenced speculative unknown to push the problem back a step, which worse than simply not solving any problem, only makes the problem worse.
"The unification of properties aren´t in the power of the substances."
That is because bulk properties of what we observe as substances are abstractions. What we call substances progress as they seem to because of the myriad interactions of simples in the aggregate.
"Thus the issue of physics really is not related to the arguments of Scotus or Aquinas."
The argument from motion is just that, an argument that is based on motion evident to our senses, physics, and more generally change, physics again.
Existence of material does not change. Existence of material is static, conserved, and thus requires no cause.
Change requires a cause. No change requires no cause.
" it also includes the causation of existence,"
That is one of its errors, because existence does not call for a cause at all.
"a sustaining cause"
Sustaining existence is no change and therefore requires no cause.
"they certainly don´t make for a logical mistake or inavalidity. At most a premise would just be false."
"Also if you keep on referring to Scotus, then refer to a section in which he states the possibility of circular causal series?"
I appreciate your long, detailed, and thoughtful responses.
Just to reiterate and clarify a few points...
Scotus made this assertion:
(3) A circle of causes is impossible.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/ (that is a summary in an encyclopedia, so I would be interested in more detail about how Scotus considered and treated the option of circular causality).
I agree that for Scotus at most we can say his premise of the impossibility of circular causation is false, not that (3) would make his argument invalid.
For Aquinas that is not the case. Omission of any mention of circular causation makes the First Way logically invalid, suffering from a false dichotomy.
Scotus lived after Aquinas and disagreed with his predecessor on some significant points. Do you have any information one way or the other if Scotus consciously recognized that omission of any mention of circular causation rendered the First Way logically invalid, and therefore, perhaps, Scotus decided to explicitly deny that option in order to insulate himself from that criticism?
"The notion of an existential circular cause involves metaphysical impossibilities that entail a logical impossibility,"
Existence calls for no cause at all, so the issue of existential circular cause is irrelevant.
But in terms of hypothetical causal powers in the present moment, if we speculate A can cause B to exist and B can cause A to exist then that is a logically possible circular existential causation. That would not explain how A and B came to exist in the first instance, but if one finds that both A and B are in fact each causing the other to exist in the present moment that is at least logically possible. But again, existence of material is static and requires no cause at all, so it is not necessary to address the ontological (im?)possibility of the above logical possibility.
@StardustyPsyche
DeleteCircular causation is a reframing of phenomena from the language of cause and effect to structuralism. There is no circular causation: what you're trying to say is that we live in a block universe where phenomena are connected by some mysterious quantity called "efficiency". What is "efficiency"?
Stardusty,
Delete(that is a summary in an encyclopedia, so I would be interested in more detail about how Scotus considered and treated the option of circular causality).
I quoted Duns Scotus above.
Let me paraphase his reasoning in terms of the existence of the motion of objects:
From the first conclusion:
The existence of the motion of A cannot cause the existence of the motion of A any more than the existence of A can cause the existence of A. Otherwise A would have to exist before it existed and A would have to be moving before it was moving.
From the second conclusion:
If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C then the existence of the motion of A is prior to both the existence of motion of B (the prior) and the existence of the motion of C (the posterior) which is plainly true. But if it is posited that the series is circular then C is actually A and therefore the exitence of the motion of A is prior to the existence of the motion of A...violating the first conclusion.
Both cases are impossible logically, physically and observably.
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"The speculation of god solves no logical problem and solves no ontological problem, rather, only introduces an unevidenced speculative unknown to push the problem back a step, which worse than simply not solving any problem, only makes the problem worse."
It makes it better. Much better. Science seeks simplicity, not "brute, and that is as far as we go! There is 'no call' for any more!" That sounds just like your mockery of religion.
Simplifying information is compressing information. Raw data becomes equations, formulas, laws - whatever you want to call it. Measurement, the stuff of raw data takes megabytes, gigabytes - more - of storage to record. The laws that unify the data takes a much smaller amount of storage. But that's as far as it goes. You can compress the rules, the laws - whatever you want to call them only so far. Oh well. "Brut!"
An unbiased random infinite binary sequence is far simpler, as I have explained before. It must contain all possible finite subsequences in the correct average frequency or it is biased. Under any interpretation scheme such as used by computers to display binary sequences as intelligible English on a monitor, it has finite subsequences that display as descriptions of all describable worlds to whatever detail you want, depending on the length of the finite subsequence. All your speculation is there, even your incorrect speculation, because worlds where your speculation is incorrect is a possible world. An infinite number of copies of each of these finite descriptions exist.
The simplicity of this infinite sequence far exceeds the simplicity of all measurement data maximally compressed.
This is a model of God. It solves the silly Brut(!) escape from rationality.
Arguing about your "everything causes everything because Russell says there are no causes" and how Aquinas and Aristotle and Scotus can be willingly misunderstood and willingly misrepresented to make them into dumb losers has become extremely boring for me. But you have a new friend in Dominik, because he said, "We have already seen why [circular causation] fails in the kinds of causal series that the scholastics are interested in", so maybe you can teach him into becoming your disciple and together you can go on to argue the Brut (!) "truth" where thinking stops at the point you rule that "no more is called for!"
Let the repetition begin!
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete(Quoting Scotus March 15, 2023 at 10:06 AM)
"Nothing whatever is essentially ordered to itself."
That addresses a linear regress that is asserted to be unable to terminate in individual self "begetting", and also unable to regress to an infinity of "begetting".
Those are examples of a linear ordered series, not circular. The circular case is not addressed in those statements by Scotus. But I appreciate the reference nevertheless and would be interested in any specific argument Scotus might have written to support his assertion that circular causation is impossible.
“If it is A, it is B, and if it is B, it is C; therefore, if it is A, it is of necessity C.”
That is the transitive property of equality, which is a logical relationship, not an ontological relationship.
A=B
B=C
Therefore
C=A
You are conflating a logical equality of value with an ontological identity of being.
If A, B, and C are real existent objects, and even supposing they have, say in the ideal case, precisely equal mass values, they remain 3 separate individual and distinct objects ontologically.
"The existence of the motion of A"
Motion does not have an independent existence, rather, an object in inertial motion is in a state of motion, and a change of motion of an object is a process of change of state of the real existent object.
Motion has no independent ontological realization.
But let's put that aside and consider the relationships of your 3 body problem.
"If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C"
So, I take this to mean your example is that A moves B and B moves C.
"But if it is posited that the series is circular then C is actually A"
If these were purely abstract values then the transitive property of equality would logically apply, but the conflation of such equality of logical values to ontological identity of being for objects that are in fact separate entities is logically invalid, suffering from reification and equivocation.
For real existent objects A, B, and C are all simultaneously in a mutual interaction process that is fundamentally circular, not linear.
One can ask
What is moving A? B and C.
What is moving B? A and C.
What is moving C? B and A.
Thus, the causal series has no identifiable beginning or end, analogous to the fact that a circle has no beginning or end around its circumference.
Yet the causal series is finite, analogous to the fact that in a plane a circle is of finite size.
Hence, when considering a causal regress one may consider a linear regress to a lone self mover, or a linear regress to an infinity of hierarchical movers.
But one is logically obliged to also consider a circular regress of mutual movers that terminates finitely.
It seems John Duns Scotus must of realized that circular causation is a logical alternative to the two linear sorts of causal series terminations. I say he must have realized the logical necessity of addressing circular causation because he did in fact address circular causation by explicitly denying its possibility.
Aquinas, a predecessor of Scotus, failed to address this clear logical option, and therefore constructed a logically invalid argument as his most manifest way, the First Way.
Parmenides.
DeleteStardusty,
DeleteLooks like only the last word of my last comment made it, but it was a good one since it seems you begin by denying that motions of objects actually exist. But if the motions of objects do not exist they cannot cause the existence of motion in other objects. If that's the case, it sinks your circular series from the get-go without even having to show that it impossible both logically and physically.
bmiller,
Delete"Parmenides."
Indeed. Perhaps the Thomistic notion of god is the case, unchanging, and since god is said to ground all things then perhaps all change is simply an illusion, this is all a dream, while in truth, I am the unchanging god and you are all figments of my unchanging divine imagination.
But, that all seems rather far fetched to me. I think Aquinas made an excellent grounding in his First Way by referencing at base what is evident to our senses. Aquinas said it is certain, but I would temper that to say I am personally convinced, because it is evident to my senses, that in the world some things are in motion.
Thanks again for the Scotus references above. Re-reading I see more of the manner Scotus was considering circular causality.
At first, it seemed to me very much to simply be a linear hierarchical argument, but re-reading it I realized that the Scotus description of circular causation is very similar to the Thomistic notion of instrumental causes in a linear hierarchical essential series, except Scotus considered what would happen if these so-called instruments were to, in some sense, loop around to act upon the prime mover. From this concept of circularity Scotus concluded circular causation was impossible.
Fortunately, unlike with Parmenides, the works of men like Aquinas and Scotus survive, so we can examine them in detail.
Scotus failed to account for mutuality, which makes his analysis unsound.
A popularized simplification of Newton's Principia treatment of motion states "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction". Today we represent more complex cases with vector maths, but the important point here is that your previous setup of a hypothetical 3 body problem exhibits the same lack of mutuality that Scotus suffered from.
"If the existence of the motion of A, causes the existence of the motion of B, causes the existence of the motion of C"
That is a one way concept of forces that induce motion.
You posit that A moves B.
You failed to realize that B must then, necessarily, move A equally.
When A exerts a force on B, then B must necessarily exert an equal magnitude and opposite direction force on A.
There is no such thing as a one way push.
When A changes the motion of B, then necessarily B changes the motion of A by equal magnitude.
(Scotus)
"2.5 For if anything precedes the prior, it also precedes the posterior. Deny this second conclusion and you must admit the opposite of the first."
Thus, Scotus shows the incoherence of a unidirectional circular series of members that are either prior or posterior to another.
A is prior to B.
B is prior to C.
C is prior to A (in the case that we close the circle with a relation from C back to A).
But as Scotus correctly points out, for a one way ordering, this leads to a contradiction.
If A is prior to B and B is prior to C then by the transitive property A must be prior to C.
But when we closed the loop we stated C is prior to A.
In a unidirectional relationship this is a contradiction.
C is prior to A
A is prior to C
Real causation is multidirectional, not unidirectional, so Scotus's argument is ontologically unsound.
If we confine 3 like charges, say 3 electrons, near each other, and then, in the ideal case, instantaneously release that confinement, real causation will proceed mutually and multilaterally, in real causation that is circular and mutual at base. No identifiable first member yet finite, with 3 members, call them A, B, C if you wish, all mutually causing each other to move.
And indeed, all three will undergo what Thomists call local motion, or translation through space.
His unsound argument notwithstanding, credit belongs to Scotus for recognizing that circular causation is an option that logically must be addressed. Unfortunately, Aquinas failed to realize that, and thus created a logically invalid argument, the First Way.
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"the conflation of such equality of logical values to ontological identity of being for objects that are in fact separate entities is logically invalid, suffering from reification and equivocation"
You reify and equivocate all the time in your metaphysics that rests on Brut(!) and paradoxically on the denial of metaphysics. 😀
Russell, your leader, says there is no change so you explain change by claiming that all motion is " circular", yet that Scotus was an "edifice" of stupidity, and that Aquinas, whom you deliberately misunderstand, was even stupider (your first illogical and undefended repetition today), and that "nothing more is called for". Thinking is banned as nonsense unless you allow the thought.
A funny and pretentious behaviour indeed! 🤣
😏
Tom Cohoe
Stardusty,
DeleteWhen A changes the motion of B, then necessarily B changes the motion of A by equal magnitude.
Are you saying that my car isn't really moving me from my house to the grocery store because the force of my inertia = the force of the car engine?
If we confine 3 like charges, say 3 electrons, near each other,
OK, if you if you impede the natural motion of 3 objects.
and then, in the ideal case, instantaneously release that confinement,
Then you remove the impediment.
real causation will proceed mutually and multilaterally,
The cause of the motion is the nature of the objects and the removal of the impediment similar to dropping 3 billiard balls to the ground.
in real causation that is circular and mutual at base. No identifiable first member
The removal of the impediment actualizes the potency of the objects to move according to their nature. The motion of none of them depend essentially on the motion of any of the others since if only one was released it would move while the others remained at rest.
There is nothing circular in this example, and none of them nor all of them together can be said to be the cause of their own motion or they could stop or stop their own motion or change their own direction jointly or together like animals seem to be able to do.
@ StardustyPsyche,
DeleteWhere you go with your light study of Scotus is incorrect, leading again to repetition.
"Aquinas failed to realize that, and thus created a logically invalid argument, the First Way."
Nothing moves itself, as Aquinas showed. Your third possibility is not a counterexample. You just repeat yourself.
You have included a circular argument to the effect that free will choice is impossible because you dictate the exclusion of free will choice from what you allow to be possible, ignoring the science of quantum mechanics which makes Newton's action and reaction principal inaccurate in the prediction of the motion of matter. You fail to acknowledge that, instead, choices are made in determining the evolving motion of sensible matter by something that may be called "supernatural".
By ignoring this hole in your theory of the motion of matter, you make your conclusion to be nothing more than the circular consequence of your premise.
But it is not that you cling like this to what you want to be true that is funny. What is truly funny is that you actually seem to think that you can prove your rubbish 🤣.
So you ignore and repeat your willful trashing of Aquinas through deliberate misinterpretation of what he says, pretending that Scotus somehow helps you in your unrelated and false argument from Newton against Aquinas.
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"Are you saying that my car isn't really moving me"
I'm saying that the unidirectional notion of causation used by Scotus is ontologically false, and his argument against circular causality is therefore ontologically unsound.
To understand why and how Scotus was wrong pdf page 89, or internal page 83, is a good place to start.
ia902706.us.archive.org/0/items/newtonspmathema00newtrich/newtonspmathema00newtrich.pdf
When 2 billiard balls collide it is fairly easy to see that they move each other with equal magnitude. But in the case of a large and small object interacting it can seem as though the large object moves the small object but the small object does not move the large object, which is false, and never the case, only apparently the case due to the limits of human perception.
"The motion of none of them depend essentially on the motion of any of the others since if only one was released it would move while the others remained at rest."
The others cannot remain at rest in that case. All motion is in space, you are in space, our planet is in space. There is no ultimate anchor in space. If only 1 electron is released then it and the entire confinement mechanism will each move in equal magnitude.
Supposing the confined electrons get beamed up to the Starship Enterprise what would happen to the released electron? It would cease accelerating and only coast in inertial motion.
Mutual repulsion of like charges is clearly what Thomists would call an essentially ordered causation.
But which is first? A or B? Well, A moves B, so perhaps A is first? Yet, equally, B moves A, so is B also first? Are neither first?
"There is nothing circular in this example"
When we state that A and B move each other mutually that is a statement of circular causation. If you don't understand that basic descriptive fact there is little hope you will understand all the rest.
Stardusty,
DeleteI'm saying that the unidirectional notion of causation used by Scotus is ontologically false, and his argument against circular causality is therefore ontologically unsound.
That's not an answer to the question I asked. Let me make it more clear. My car and I are at home at t0 and are both at the store at t1. The car applied force to me while I was at rest and so moved me per Newton's First Law. Yet you claimed above that I should have moved the car by an equal magnitude in this case and so neither of us should ever have made it to the store. Yet we did. Why?
The others cannot remain at rest in that case. All motion is in space, you are in space, our planet is in space. There is no ultimate anchor in space. If only 1 electron is released then it and the entire confinement mechanism will each move in equal magnitude.
A battery is a container of electrons. When an electrical circuit is closed, an electron moves down the wire while the battery remains in the same location. There is no equal magnitude of distance traveled over time for the electron vs the battery, nor for the electrons remaining in the battery. The electrons move because, due to the type of thing they are, they have a natural potency to move away from a negative charge and toward a positive charge whether or not the other thing with the charge is moving.
You seem to be confusing the motions of objects with something else, maybe energy.
You also seem to be defining "circular" as things moving in opposite directions which is different from the common definition which in this case according to Merriam-Webster is moving in or describing a circle or spiral. I think you should find a different term for your concept.
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"But which is first? A or B? Well, A moves B, so perhaps A is first? Yet, equally, B moves A, so is B also first? Are neither first?"
Neither is moving itself. This is the obvious thing which Aquinas showed. It is not the basis of the always repeated mythical "false dichotomy".
"If you don't understand that basic descriptive fact there is little hope you will understand all the rest."
Oh, you've declared it so it must be true! 🤣
Ridiculous!
😏
Tom Cohoe
bmiller,
Delete"That's not an answer to the question I asked."
I already answered your question multiple times, you just do not realize that.
Outside of England the Principia was rejected for a long time. You are still rejecting it, quite apparently.
The world has, in general, caught up with the Principia over the last 350 years, quite clearly, you are an exception to that general trend toward understanding.
"Yet you claimed above that I should have moved the car by an equal magnitude in this case and so neither of us should ever have made it to the store. Yet we did. Why?"
Because you do not know what "motion" means in this context. If you had read the reference I provided to you then you would know and you would be able to answer your own question.
(Principia)
LAW III.
To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction : or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.
Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone. If a horse draws a stone tied to a rope, the horse (if I may so say) will be equally drawn back towards the stone: for the distended rope,
by the same endeavour to relax or unbend itself, will draw the horse as much towards the stone, as it does the stone towards the horse, and will obstruct the progress of the one as much as it advances that of the other.
"A battery is a container of electrons. When an electrical circuit is closed, an electron moves down the wire while the battery remains in the same location."
A battery is not a container of electrons. Positive and negative charges are generated on opposite plates or terminals, which move toward each other by various specific mechanisms depending on the sort of battery.
"You also seem to be defining "circular" as things moving in opposite directions I think you should find a different term for your concept."
Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself. Pretty much everybody understands that if A and B mutually move each other that is a case of circular causation. I do not need a new term, you would do well to learn some basics of these concepts.
I suggest you start with the original text in the Principia in the sections I have referenced above. They prove that Scotus used an unsound argument.
@ StardustyPsyche,
Delete"Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself."
Loops around! Ha ha ha! 🤣. Pretty much everybody understands that your loopy argument does not succeed in establishing that things move themselves.
Your circular nonsense, unfortunately does not prove that A, or anything else, moves itself.
Newton's 3rd law does not support that things change their motion by themselves. In fact, it asserts the opposite - that things change their motion _in_reaction_to the motion of other things. 😀
😏
Tom Cohoe
Stardusty,
DeleteI already answered your question multiple times, you just do not realize that....
Because you do not know what "motion" means in this context. If you had read the reference I provided to you then you would know and you would be able to answer your own question.
No you haven't answered it even once and your quote from Newton discusses force not motion. So you must be confusing force with motion but I suspect you are also confusing energy with motion (depending on what day it is). The motion discussed in TFW is local motion which is the change of an object's location (that's why it's called "local" motion) over time, or velocity. So when you tell me that some motion of A is equal in magnitude to a motion in B you are telling me that they have the same velocity (and direction since velocity is a vector).
A battery is not a container of electrons.
Can't help it if you don't know that batteries contain electrons. Without that knowledge there's no use discussing electricity or current at all.
Scotus used the word "circular" to describe causation that, in some sense, loops around upon itself.
Yes, because that is what "circular" actually means.
Pretty much everybody understands that if A and B mutually move each other that is a case of circular causation.
Not when you show them what "circular" actually means from a dictionary.
Regardless of your confusion of force with velocity, electrons are essentially moved by their nature and the presence of charges nearby whether those charges are changing location or not. So their motion is not caused by their own local motion nor by the local motion of another(s).
Neither the electron nor charged particles nearby nor the entire group of them can be the cause of their own local motion because none of them separately or together can start, stop nor the change direction of their own local motion(s).
bmiller,
Delete"Newton discusses force not motion."
If you read the references provided you will learn what "motion" means in this context.
If you picture a curved arrow above A B pointing from A to B, and another curved arrow below A B pointing from B to A you will see in your mind's eye a circular pattern, hence the descriptive term, circular causation.
"So their motion is not caused by their own local motion nor by the local motion of another(s)."
A and B cause each other's motion.
Self causation of motion is irrelevant and unnecessary to account for observed motion.
Pointing out that objects do not move by moving themselves alone is like pointing out that birds do not fly by scratching the ground, an irrelevant and pointless observation.
Real causation does not need a first mover because real simples move each other.
@ StardustyPsyche,
DeleteScotus was not Newton's muse as you seem to think, correct for your purpose in his "edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument" 😀.
"A and B cause each other's motion"
But, but … Russell, the world's most highly educated, most intelligent man - your hero and leader - says there is no cause! 🤣
"If you picture a curved arrow above A B pointing from A to B, and another curved arrow below A B pointing from B to A you will see in your mind's eye a circular pattern, hence the descriptive term, circular causation."
The Principia is argued in classical straight edge and compass geometry. Circles can be constructed. Ellipses cannot. But circles have simple radii. Therefore arguments using circles can demonstrate effects of radius, i.e., distance from the centre. Newton did not think that things moved in circles and did not use "circular causation" to argue that there was "no need" for God as you seem to think can be done - which of course, you can if you assume that God doesn't exist in the first place, which would make your argument logical but irrational, for circular argumentation is indeed logical and it is indeed irrational.😀
However, if you assume the existence of God, no logical contradiction arises. Your emotional "there is no need for", "there is no call for", etcetera, are neither logical nor rational. They are just your private wishful thoughts. I have explained to you how non linearity and quantum uncertainty make you, Russell, Newtonian science, and your arguments incorrect. Ignoring non linearity and quantum mechanics does not cause you to suddenly become correct.
I can sum up your idea that your belief can be proved with the single word: "senseless" 🤣.
Nor do I claim that the metaphysics of Christianity can be proven in some kind of inverse to your senseless belief. I claim only that assuming God's existence does not contradict sensible science and therefore cannot be ruled out by it as you incorrectly seem to think can be done.
"Real causation does not need a first mover because real simples move each other."
There it is: your emotional argument "does not need". Sorry, but _something_ is needed, because science itself tells us that science cannot describe the motion of things with accuracy. This "something" we call "God".
That is not a metaphysical argument. It is a scientific argument.
😏
Tom Cohoe
Stardusty,
DeleteIf you read the references provided you will learn what "motion" means in this context.
It may not have occurred to you that if want to discuss local motion and you change the definition you are no longer discussing local motion. For example you've pointed to Newton's 3rd Law in response to my question of how a both a car and myself can move from my home to the store in a certain amount of time (let's say the store was 3 miles away and it took 6 minutes). I can say along with TFW and all students of physics that the average velocity of car and myself was 30 mph in the direction of home to store. How does the 3rd law apply to this situation? How is it possible that the car and I both end up at the store using only the 3rd Law as an explanation? This is not meant as a gotcha but an invitation to do some research.
Likewise with the local motion of your 2 objects. They are moving in a straight line, not a circle (See Newton's 1st Law) as you seem to be claiming.
And the daily reminder that inanimate objects obviously do not move themselves either separately or together or they could separately or together start or stop their motion or change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store.
bmiller,
Delete"How is it possible that the car and I both end up at the store using only the 3rd Law as an explanation?"
I had assumed that you would be able to determine the applicability of each definition and each law described in the Principia. Apparently that is not the case.
Therefore, I will expand my suggestion. Read all the definitions and all the laws, it is really just a few pages. Most of the Principia consists of problem solving and applications.
I suggest that for now you stick with simple systems such as 2 or perhaps 3 electrons, or something like that. Analyzing something as complex as a car when you have not yet mastered a 2 body problem of simples is getting out in front of yourself, it seems apparent.
"Likewise with the local motion of your 2 objects. They are moving in a straight line, not a circle (See Newton's 1st Law) as you seem to be claiming."
Hence, my suggestion that you stick with a 2 body problem until you master those concepts.
Circular causation is not moving in a circle. I assumed you understood that. Apparently I was wrong.
If you, for example, complain that somebody is talking in circles that does not mean that their voice, or their tongue, are literally moving around in circles, OK?
You might ask why B moved, answer A. Why did A move, answer B. Well, then why did B move, answer again A. By now you might be a bit fed up with the answers and accuse the answerer of talking in circles.
Circular causation is a description of a fundamental causal structure, not a literal circular motion.
"inanimate objects obviously do not move themselves either separately or together"
Moving themselves together is the only way simples change their motion at all. All the fundamental forces are formulated as mutual applications of force, and it is force that induces motion.
The evidence against your statement are the force equations in every modern textbook on the subject.
"they could separately or together start or stop their motion"
Yes, they do just exactly that, start and stop each other.
If 2 electrons come flying at each other they will stop each other, and then they will start each other. That is how all motion is changed at base in the real universe, mutual interactions which are causally circular in fundamental causal structure. They therefore form, in the archaic Thomistic parlance, both accidental and essential causal series, such that every essential series of motion causation terminates finitely with no identifiable first causal member. That is to say, the choice of first member would be arbitrary and meaningless since each mutual member is equally the cause as any other member is the cause.
"change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store."
Your changes of motion are the aggregate of simples changing each other. You move yourself because at base simples move each other.
Stardusty,
DeleteReally? Still can't even squeak out an answer to my car question after you've had days to google it? It's at least the 3rd time I've given you a chance. I'm going to have to conclude you're not capable.
Thanks for the amusing dodge regarding "talking in circles". I think it's an appropriate description of your style, but does not apply to any of the physical examples you've brought up.
Moving themselves together is the only way simples change their motion at all.
An electron from a battery changes location and moves down a wire while the battery and the other electrons in the battery remain in the same location. So no, a single electron moving down a wire does not require that any other electron move in either direction.
Yes, they do just exactly that, start and stop each other.
If 2 electrons come flying at each other they will stop each other, and then they will start each other.
Hahaha! You had to use violent motion to overcome their natural motion to start them "flying at each other" and then point to their natural inanimate motion. But you still had to truncate the last part of my quote: or change their motion like I cause my car to do on the way to the store.. Nice attempt at a dodge, but you're proving my point that animate beings can dodge while inamimate beings can't.
You move yourself because at base simples move each other.
At base, inanimate "simples" cannot start, stop or change their own motion like an animate being seems to do. If you were merely an aggregate of these simples then neither could you. But since you've proven that you love to dodge and weave, you're not being very persuasive when you identify as an "aggregate of simples".
@ StardustyPsyche,
DeleteAny sensible person would laugh at the way your extreme denunciation of Scotus ("an enormous edifice of confused, erroneous, and fallacious argument") evolved into your assumption of him into a useful partner against anyone not willing to be your disciple. Inconsistency, you are always Stardusty😏.
"That is to say, the choice of first member would be arbitrary and meaningless since each mutual member is equally the cause as any other member is the cause."
"Meaningless" yet! Heh 🤣!
Well, I suppose that "nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right" could work for you, but since the world's smartest and most highly educated man says there are no causes, you could not have even thought "nothing" in your dubious belief, because you could not have been caused to think. How can you answer that?
I've got it! "Nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right".
Most people believe in causation and don't like being gaslighted by someone frozen in a nothing loop 😀!
But of course you are just making a nothing joke. Yeah, sure you are! 😏
"The evidence against your statement are the force equations in every modern textbook on the subject."
Well "nothing therefore nothing therefore ignore". Modern textbooks based on force laws do not give any method by which the future can be predicted from the past as I have explained to you already. Remember?
No? "Nothing therefore nothing therefore I am right"? Ridiculous, but apparently adequate for you as an answer to everything.
But everything? Yes, "nothing"! or no, "nothing"! Either way the difference is nothing.
Most people believe that Something causes a prediction from force equations that is divergent and uncertain to become a measurably more particular distribution of sensible things at later moments. Science has demonstrated this in experiments.
So the evidence is actually against you. Aquinas beats you with his "archaic parlance" just as Something beats nothing (!!!!!) 😀.
All! Beware, beware, beware.
😏
Tom Cohoe
My copy of "The Faith Once For All Delivered" just arrived! What a beautiful book, nicely conservative, with a good introduction by the great Cardinal Burke!
ReplyDeleteTom Cohoe
How very on-topic.
DeleteAnonymous at 11:47,
DeleteYou really need to get a life, especially if you're that particular commenter who is constantly fretting over what comments I approve, who counts as a troll, etc.
First, when someone posts a kind remark, I tend to feel it churlish to delete it, even if it is not strictly on topic (and then I deal with the problem of off-topic comments if this initial one starts to snowball into an off-topic thread). Second, the topic of this post is a little bit loose anyway (since it links to things related to subjects as different as Scotus and CRT). So, in light of these two points, I let the comment stand.
But this is really much more ado than the matter deserves. If you don't like the way comments are moderated, don't read them. And try to find something better to do with your time.
@ Ed,
DeleteWould it repair my comment a little to say that I am now reading Ward's "Divine Ideas", that I have bought and read Brian Davies "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion", and that I will probably get the Ward book on Scotus if I can ever catch up on my reading. It looks quite interesting.
Tom Cohoe
Scotus is one of these thinkers that i really want to know better someday, specially his take on the Incarnation on a world with no sin*.
ReplyDeleteBut lets discuss today his cosmological argument: why do the scholastic finds necessary to argue for a First Mover, a Final Cause and a Perfect Being all separately instead of, say, arguing for a First Mover and them draw from it the other characteristics?
It just seems too complicated to me. The average rote of stablishing a creator and them that the creator is God seems to me more intuitive and so it did to probably all users of the cosmological argument.
*a thing he shares with more eastern-minded christians
Interesting that "dunce" derives from Scotus when he was such an influential and brilliant scholar. I guess it was a reflection of changing fashions in religion around the time of the reformation and renaissance, and anti-catholic sentiment in particular.
ReplyDelete