Meta-bigotry

Sophistry is the attempt to persuade someone of some proposition or policy by the use of fallacious arguments.  What I have called meta-sophistry involves accusing others of fallacies or of sophistry in a manner that is itself fallacious or sophistical.  The meta-sophist cynically deploys labels like “sophist” as a rhetorical device by which he might smear and discredit an opponent.  Where the opponent’s arguments can easily be read in a way that involves no commission of fallacies, the meta-sophist will instead opt for a less charitable reading so as to facilitate the accusation that the opponent is a sophist.  Because the meta-sophist poses precisely as a foe of sophistry and fallacious argument and as a friend of reason, his brand of sophistry is especially insidious.  He is like the politician who makes the loud condemnation of sleazy politicians a useful cover for his own sleaziness.  (As I have documented many times over the years – e.g. here, here, and here – “New Atheist” writers are paradigmatic meta-sophists.)

A close kin to meta-sophistry is what I call meta-bigotry.  This is the deployment of epithets like “bigot” in a manner that is itself bigoted.  We have seen some vivid examples recently, such as in the unhinged reaction of certain academic philosophers to Richard Swinburne’s controversial SCP talk, and in the mob that shut down Charles Murray’s lecture at Middlebury College.  Indeed, so manifestly bigoted are these purported anti-bigots – so obviously moved are they by unreasoning hatred and malice rather than by calm and dispassionate argument – that it is astonishing that they could claim with a straight face to be anything other than bigots themselves.  How have we come to this?

What bigotry is and what it isn’t

The answer is in part that a great many people seem to have forgotten what bigotry actually is and exactly why it is objectionable.  John Knasas, in the course of a discussion on a completely unrelated subject, happens to give in passing a pretty good characterization of bigotry:

[B]iases and prejudices can determine how things come across.  In the light of racial prejudice, white bigots are unable to appreciate something done by a black person in good faith.  A smile, a courtesy, will be taken as a setup, unemployment as indicative of lazy character, employment as indicative of another white person’s mercy rather than the black person’s merit, and so on.  The bigot constantly interprets what is given in the light of preconceptions.  (Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists, p. 115)

Oxford defines a bigot as “a person who is intolerant towards those holding different opinions.”  Merriam-Webster tells us that a bigot is “a person who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices.” 

These characterizations of bigotry are by no means eccentric or partisan.  They reflect longstanding English usage of the term.  Now, notice that on all of them, the nature and problematic status of bigotry are essentially procedural rather than substantive.  That is to say, they have to do, not with the content of the bigot’s beliefs, but with the manner in which he holds them.  The bigot is someone whose attachment to his beliefs is fundamentally emotional rather than rational.  He evaluates the evidence in light of his beliefs rather than evaluating his beliefs in light of the evidence.  He is reluctant or unwilling to give a fair hearing to opinions other than his own or to arguments against his own.  He tends to be hostile to those who hold those different opinions, prefers to avoid them altogether rather than engaging them and their views, and resorts to invective instead of reasoned debate.

The reason all of this is problematic, of course, is that bigotry gets in the way of our discovering truth.  If the bigot’s opinions are wrong, he is very unlikely to discover that they are, because he turns his mind violently away from all sources of information that might reveal his errors to him.  Even if he turns out to be right, that will be a matter of luck, for the manner in which he forms his opinions is so inherently unreliable that he is unlikely to be right very often or without a large admixture of error.

Now in light of these facts, it is obvious that thinkers like Swinburne and Murray are not bigots.  As those who know them or their work attest, they are both about as civilized, learned, and open to rational criticism and debate as a scholar can be.  Their manner of discourse is decidedly cerebral rather than emotive, and they are always giving arguments rather than issuing mere assertions.  Their opinions on this or that subject may or may not be wrong – that is an entirely different question – but there can be no reasonable doubt that they hold those opinions in a way that is not at all bigoted. 

By contrast, people like the foul-mouthed professors who had nothing but hatred and mockery to throw in Swinburne’s direction, and the students who violently disrupted Murray’s talk, are straight-from-central-casting bigots in the ordinary dictionary sense of the term.  They could not care less what Swinburne’s or Murray’s actual views or arguments are.  They “already know” they must be wrong.  Certainly they would never so much as entertain even the bare possibility that Swinburne or Murray might after all be right.  They responded to them precisely in terms of their own “preconceptions” (as Knasas puts it), “obstinately devoted” to their own liberal opinions (as Merriam-Webster puts it) and “intolerant” of conservative ones (as Oxford puts it).  Since they manifest this bigotry precisely under the guise of opposing bigotry, they are meta-bigots.

Now, what has facilitated this forgetting of what bigotry actually is is a simple though fairly widespread confusion – namely the confusion of what is merely in some cases one particular kind of bigotry with what all bigotry is per se. 

In particular, one kind of bigotry can involve negative opinions concerning some group of people – whether an ethnic group, adherents of a certain religion, adherents of a certain political party, or whatever.  But it would be a mistake to identify bigotry with such negative opinions.  For one thing, not all bigotry involves having negative opinions about some group of people.  For example, a person might take so negative an attitude about some set of ideas – Heideggerian existentialism, evolutionary biology, British idealism, or whatever – that he is unwilling to give it a fair hearing or to be shown that his objections to it are based on misconceptions.  Such a person would be a bigot, even though his bigotry isn’t directed toward some ethnic or religious group or the like.

For another thing, not all negative opinions concerning some group of people are bigoted.  Take, for example, the claims that bureaucrats often evade responsibility, businessmen are often too concerned with the bottom line, many lawyers are more interested in gaming the system than in securing justice, and so forth.  These are negative opinions concerning large groups of people, but someone could certainly hold them in a way that is not bigoted.  For example, someone could sincerely believe that there is good evidence for these propositions, could nevertheless be open to hearing arguments and evidence to the contrary, could be perfectly willing to acknowledge that bureaucrats, businessmen, lawyers, etc. have their good points too, and so on.  These opinions may or may not be mistaken, but the fact that they are about groups of people does not necessarily make them bigoted.  (Another obvious example would be the claim that bigots are irrational.  That’s a negative opinion about an entire group of people, but it is hardly itself bigoted!)

All the same, there is a common tendency today to suppose that any opinion concerning some group of people that is in some way negative is of its very nature bigoted – and indeed to suppose that that sort of thing is just what bigotry is.  Hence many people suppose that if someone says something concerning some group that is in some way negative, then that person simply must be a bigot – regardless of whether the person’s opinions are expressed dispassionately, whether he backs them up with arguments, is willing to listen to criticism of them, is happy to acknowledge that the group in question has good aspects too, etc.   And such people also suppose that since they personally repudiate the making of negative claims about any group, then they themselves cannot possibly be bigots – regardless of how shrill they are in their purported anti-bigotry, of their refusal to back up their position with arguments or listen to the other side, of their demonization of those who disagree with them, etc.

The fallacy here is of the general form:

Many instances of X are Y and many instances of Y are X.  Therefore, something is X if and only if it is Y. 

An example of this fallacious reasoning would be:

Many instances of stealing involve taking a person’s money without his consent and many instances of taking a person’s money without his consent involve stealing.  Therefore, something is stealing if and only if it involves taking a person’s money without his consent.

The premise here is certainly true, but the conclusion does not follow, and indeed is false.  For stealing sometimes involves something other than taking a person’s money without his consent (e.g. it might involve taking other kinds of property, or it might involve getting a person to consent under false pretenses), and taking someone’s money without his consent is not always stealing (e.g. it may involve forcing him to pay a fine for violating some just law, or requiring him to pay justly levied taxes). 

Similarly, many people who think of themselves as opponents of bigotry seem to be reasoning as follows:

Many instances of bigotry involve having a negative opinion of some sort concerning some group of people, and many instances of having a negative opinion of some sort concerning some group of people involve bigotry.  Therefore, something is bigotry if and only if it involves having some sort of negative opinion concerning some group of people.

Here too, though, while the premise is true, the conclusion does not follow and is not true.  Again, it is possible to be a bigot even if one does not have a negative opinion of some sort concerning some group of people, and it is possible to have a negative opinion of some sort concerning some group of people and nevertheless not be a bigot.

Now the fallacy is compounded by the fact that what are sometimes characterized as negative opinions about groups of people are, strictly speaking, not really that at all.  For example, if someone thinks that a certain sexual practice is immoral, it doesn’t necessarily follow that he has a negative attitude about the people who engage in that practice.  Everyone knows this where some sexual practices are concerned.  For example, if someone says “I think adultery is wrong,” few people would respond “Ah, so you hate people who commit adultery!”  However, if someone says “I think homosexual acts are wrong,” the response is often “You hate homosexuals!”  But that simply does not follow, any more than in the case of adultery.  The negative attitude in question is essentially about a certain kind of behavior, rather than about a certain group of people per se.

Similarly, if someone thinks that a certain religion has negative features, it doesn’t follow that he has a negative attitude about the adherents of the religion.  Everyone knows this where some religions are concerned.  For example, if someone says “I think Scientology has crazy doctrines and is cultish,” few people would respond “Ah, so you hate Scientologists!”  Or if someone says “I think the Amish way of life is much too restrictive and blinkered,” few would say “You hate Amish people!”  However, if someone says “I think Islam has a greater tendency to generate terrorism than other religions do,” the response is often “You hate Muslims!”  But that simply does not follow, any more than in the case of Scientologists or Amish people.  The negative attitude in question is essentially about a certain set of religious ideas, rather than about the group of people who hold those ideas.

This reinforces the point that opinions to the effect that such-and-such a sexual practice is wrong, that this or that religion has negative features, or what have you, are simply not per se bigoted.  Such opinions could be held in a bigoted way, of course, and indeed sometimes are.  But that is true of any opinion on any subject – including more favorable opinions on the sexual practice, religion, etc. in question.  Again, bigotry has essentially to do with the manner in which one holds an opinion, not the content of the opinion. 

Note that this does not entail that just any old content is reasonable or otherwise unobjectionable so long as it is not held in a bigoted way.  Lots of people have crazy beliefs that they cling to tenaciously but in a way that is nevertheless not bigoted.  They may be perfectly willing to hear counterevidence and criticism, are not emotional about the subject or contemptuous of people who disagree, etc. but nevertheless can’t be talked out of their odd views.  In my view, lots of people who firmly believe certain kinds of conspiracy theories, or who are fascinated with UFOs or other odd phenomena, or who swear by various quack medical theories, etc. are like this.  There may be irrationality here, but not necessarily bigotry.  To call someone a bigot implies a certain kind of moral failing that is simply not justly attributed to people who are merely eccentric or confused. 

Meta-bigotry as a tactic

So, accusations of bigotry are often based on misunderstandings of what bigotry is or are otherwise fallacious.  Are these errors the result of honest mistakes?  No doubt in some cases they are.  But by no means in all cases.  For the accusation of bigotry has in recent decades become a kind of rhetorical tactic among many egalitarians.  Indeed, in some cases the tactic is deliberately adopted rather than merely a tic that the egalitarian unthinkingly falls into.  The intention is to demonize critics of egalitarian policy, so as to intimidate such critics into silence and to discourage third parties from hearing out any criticisms they do express.  The aim is precisely to bypass rational discourse and instead to alter opinions at an emotional level.  In my initial post on the Swinburne SCP controversy I quoted extensively from some activists who frankly admit that this is what they are up to.

Now, a more blatant example of sophistry and bigotry cannot be imagined.  Because this tactic is deployed in the name of opposing bigotry and illogical thinking, it is a textbook instance of meta-sophistry and meta-bigotry.  Meta-bigotry is an especially insidious form of bigotry precisely because it presents itself as opposition to bigotry.  The meta-bigot is less likely than other bigots are to perceive his own bigotry.  He thinks: “But I’m so passionately opposed to bigotry!  How could I possibly be a bigot?”  (The answer is: Try dialing down the passion, and maybe you’ll see.)

The Murray incident is just the latest indicator of how pervasive meta-bigotry has become on college campuses.  The Swinburne affair is just the latest indicator of the inroads it has made even into academic philosophy.  A sizable chunk of the modern academy has become a kind of Bizarro world, in which shrill fanatics like the Middlebury mob and Swinburne’s critics are regarded as the reasonable and open-minded people, and sober scholars like Swinburne and Murray are treated as if they were shrill fanatics.  It does not seem to be an exaggeration to say that in the contemporary academic context, the people routinely labeled “bigots” usually are not really bigots (whether or not they are in error in other ways), and the people most keen to fling the “bigot” label at others usually are bigots (namely, meta-bigots).

But then, as Plato warned us, egalitarianism has always tended in this irrationalist direction.  It was, after all, the passionately egalitarian Athenians who executed the anti-egalitarian Socrates.  Swinburne and Murray are in good company.