tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post9153546895338315793..comments2024-03-28T09:37:08.486-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Five Proofs on CrossExaminedEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger130125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51035142572240029112018-01-10T17:29:30.837-08:002018-01-10T17:29:30.837-08:00I saw Dr. Feser on EWTN today. I heard his thought...I saw Dr. Feser on EWTN today. I heard his thoughts on God as the self-actualized actualizer. Well, I don't want to go all Arian this evening but...<br /><br />If God the Father is the begetter while God the Son is the begotten, doesn't God the Son require God the Father to be actualized. If so, how can God the Son be God if he requires a begetter in order to be the begotten.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7217889519296415332018-01-06T12:18:51.683-08:002018-01-06T12:18:51.683-08:00Tony
I said the questtion is whether something (a...Tony<br /><br />I said the questtion is whether something (a change) can happen in the absense of an efficient cause, and the example of prime matter was meant to show that if something can change in the absence of an efficient cause (even if it has a material cause, e.g.) then the Aristotelean notion of being, act and potency is wrong. <br />And <i>if</i> the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is correct, the Aristotelan notion of act and potency etc; is wrong.<br />I am not claiming that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, BTW, but it hasn't been proven wrong and as long as it hasn't been proven wrong, serious doubt about A-T metaphysics is justified.<br /><br />And I object to coming to be of material being from nothing. I don't object to coming to be from a prior immaterial condition. Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4480035931456797562018-01-06T09:14:58.763-08:002018-01-06T09:14:58.763-08:00I see Stardusty, the one-trick pony, has infected ...I see Stardusty, the one-trick pony, has infected the comments section of the Cross Examined website. SteveKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00497892283006396471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6640395121558503332018-01-06T08:11:24.000-08:002018-01-06T08:11:24.000-08:00Let's suppose there is some kind of eternal &q...<i>Let's suppose there is some kind of eternal "prime matter" that can spontaneously become something else or stay the same. ... So, if something can spontaneously become something else, the argument from change fails. </i> <br /><br />But the question is whether anyone is ALLOWED to "suppose" what you supposed in the first sentence. Is it tantamount to supposing, say, some "condition A" about squares that appears to be plausible but is logically equivalent to condition B, which is equivalent to condition C, ... which implies one side not equal to another side. If "being", "act", and "potency" are the kind of thing that Aristotle says, then it is not the sort of thing for which the supposition could possibly make sense. A person who objects that they don't think being, act and potency are like that should be arguing <i>that</i> issue, not simply assuming a contradictory assumption that (unmentioned) really picks a bone with a prior principle. Making the above assumption WITHOUT disagreeing with Aristotle on being, act, and potency <i>really is</i> nonsensical. <br /><br /><i>The absence of any cause at all would mean that something can come from nothing. <br />Maybe there are people who think that's possible, but I, for one, reject the possibility of something coming from nothing. For the same reason I reject creatio ex nihilo. For the same reason I reject creatio ex nihilo.</i> <br /><br />I can see that one might object to creation on various grounds. But the claim of (divine) creation is that it is NOT coming to be "ex nihilo", it is coming to be on account of something prior. <br /><br />What I suspect you object to is coming to be of material being from a prior condition without there being any material being - the <i>matter</i> coming from "nothing" in the qualified sense of "not from other matter". <i>This is a different problem</i> than the more GENERAL problem of "coming to be from nothing". One can argue that it is just as big a problem, but they really do stand differently. Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80248967621651096742018-01-06T00:50:25.326-08:002018-01-06T00:50:25.326-08:00Anonymous
There is a reason for that rate, but, a...Anonymous<br /><br />There is a reason for <i>that rate</i>, but, at least under the Copenhagen interpretation, there is no reason for neutrom x to decay at time t.<br />So, the nature of reality may <i>restrict</i> which events are actually possible without offering a <i>sufficient</i> reason for a certain event. <br />This would count as an exception to the PSR.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68123093543657874602018-01-05T08:06:51.947-08:002018-01-05T08:06:51.947-08:00Tony
Let's suppose there is some kind of eter...Tony<br /><br />Let's suppose there is some kind of eternal "prime matter" that can spontaneously become something else or stay the same. In that case, we have a material cause, but we don't really have an efficient cause. <br />Yet, this would contradict that something can only be changed by something external to it that is immutable. So, if something can spontaneously become something else, the argument from change fails.<br /><br />The absence of any cause at all would mean that something can come from nothing. <br />Maybe there are people who think that's possible, but I, for one, reject the possibility of something coming from nothing. For the same reason I reject creatio ex nihilo.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57312116249750884362018-01-05T07:14:03.706-08:002018-01-05T07:14:03.706-08:00And I will point out, again: if there is a rate of...And I will point out, again: if there is a rate of decay of neutrons (i.e. one rate that is consistent between samples), then there is a reason the rate is that rate and not some other rate. It is not just "not known" but <i>unintelligible</i> to assert that there is a <i>specific</i> rate of decay but no <i>reason</i> for that specific rate. There being no reason <b>at all</b> could only result in their being no <i>determinate</i> rate that applies across different samples. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56278058946516506332018-01-05T07:05:41.350-08:002018-01-05T07:05:41.350-08:00That the Copenhagen interpretation is "intell...That the Copenhagen interpretation is "intelligible" in the philosophical and metaphysical sense intended, is not certain. If it turns out to be the wrong interpretation, the same proof that it is wrong will in some sense be the proof that it was never fully intelligible all along. In that event, the later scientists would correctly say of the 20th century reflections on it that "the manner in which the Copenhagen interpretation was fundamentally unintelligible was not yet determined." Ignorance of the lack of cohesion in a theory is not intelligibility per se. <br /><br />Feser is not the source of the quote above. <br /><br />In any case, if a person is willing to hold that an event can be caused by <i>non-deterministic</i> causes, then <b>they have no strong reason to accept a Copenhagen theory of "no cause"</b> based on a lack of finding a <i>deterministic</i> relationship between prior conditions and later conditions. Non-deterministic causes will <i>naturally</i> show situations where there is no deterministic relationship between prior conditions and later conditions. Modern physicists are emotionally unprepared to accept such type of cause, <i>except inversely</i> by simply asserting it to be "not a cause" in quantum events. <br /><br />It's rather similar to Lawrence Krauss's magical hand-waving over the meaning of "nothing" in "A Universe From Nothing". Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73826966559666695322018-01-05T06:47:19.563-08:002018-01-05T06:47:19.563-08:00Walter, the actual question is whether a change ca...Walter, the actual question is whether a change can happen in the absence of a cause. <br /><br />Your attempt to reduce the question to "the absence of an efficient cause" simply begs the question, by interposing an assumption into the considerations, that only efficient causality will be considered. Which is <i>precisely</i> the issue I raised. Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84278904591437023342018-01-05T02:45:53.588-08:002018-01-05T02:45:53.588-08:00The question at hand is: What caused the radioacti...The question at hand is: What caused the radioactive atom to decay at time t? Or, in A-T terminology, what caused the actualization of the potential of the radioactive atom to decay at time t?<br /><br />Quantum physics does *not* answer that question. Quantum physics (as is the case with all science) discovers mathematical order (whether deterministic or probabilistic) in physical phenomena and nothing more. The above question is a question about what takes place in reality, and is therefore a metaphysical question. There are two possible answers to that question: Either there is a cause for that change or there isn’t. A-T metaphysics is based on the claim that the latter view is unintelligible. <br /><br />Now there are several interpretations of quantum physics and thus metaphysical descriptions of the reality that causes our experiences of physical phenomena. As Feser explains in the quote Anonymous (January 4, 2018 at 6:03 AM) introduced in this thread, one of these interpretations, namely Bohm’s, describes a reality in which what causes the decay of that radioactive atom at time t is the so-called pilot wave. This is a vastly complex field which is *essentially* unknowable. But this only proves that there is a borderline intelligible metaphysics which says there is a cause for the radioactive atom decaying at time t. But there is another interpretation, namely Copenhagen, which describes a reality in which that change obtained without any cause whatsoever. The Copenhagen interpretation is intelligible too, indeed much more intelligible than Bohm’s and that’s why it is the one taught in quantum physics classes. <br /><br />In the aforementioned quote Feser wants to give the impression that while there is a possibility of their being a cause A-T metaphysics remains viable. But that’s not the case, for in order to invalidate A-T it suffices to demonstrate that there is an intelligible metaphysical theory which denies the necessary existence of causes. And we have just that. Aquinas’s project is built on the principle “To be intelligible reality must be thus”, but the intelligibility of the Copenhagen interpretation disproves his solution. On the other hand as far as I am concerned the correct solution was discovered by Berkeley (whom Feser sadly thinks of as being “nuts”). I find that Berkeley’s metaphysics is the only truly intelligible description of reality, and I say this follows from true first principles namely from the nature of our cognitive faculties. It’s a pity that what I take to be a passion for tradition keeps such a smart mind as Feser’s from seeing this. <br /><br />Incidentally the intelligibility and thus the possibility of uncaused events in a rational creation is splendid news for theodicy and thus for the growth of our understanding of God. But that’s another issue. <br /><br />I have <a href="https://www.facebook.com/FreePhilosopher/posts/1990637604543509" rel="nofollow">a rather long text</a> where I argue that it is unreasonable to believe that determinism is true. This is relevant to the above discussion, because if the physical world is not deterministic then physical phenomena (such as the decay of a radioactive atom at time t) need not have a cause. And indeed the potential absence of causes would be the natural understanding, but not the only possible one: the theist may hypothesize that God is the cause of all physical phenomena which do not have a physical cause.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44665913052043189922018-01-05T01:23:59.066-08:002018-01-05T01:23:59.066-08:00Reality can either be necessarily such that there ...Reality can either be necessarily such that there is a certain probability that certain events happen, in which case, I agree that there is a "reason".<br />On the other hand reality could just happen to be such that there is a certain probability that certain events happen. <br />The point is that the second scenario does not preclude that those certain events cause other events or, if you prefer, are the reason for other events.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52182469268523591352018-01-04T14:26:14.850-08:002018-01-04T14:26:14.850-08:00If scientists assign a certain probability to its ...If scientists assign a certain probability to its happening, then whether the event happens or not is <i>according to a rule</i> - namely, the probability assigned. <br /><br />It is nonsensical to say something happens "according to a rule" but not on the basis of some reason. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48033252266568857112018-01-04T08:10:02.918-08:002018-01-04T08:10:02.918-08:00Tony
The quation is whether something (a change) ...Tony<br /><br />The quation is whether something (a change) can happen in the absense of an efficient cause. If it can, the argument form change fails.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76159422658532842512018-01-04T08:06:54.557-08:002018-01-04T08:06:54.557-08:00Anonymous
The claim is that some individual event...Anonymous<br /><br />The claim is that some individual events at the quantum level may be uncaused, nothing more and nothing less. <br />The problem how some people interpret "uncaused". It is not as if things can come form "absolute nothingness", what is meant is that there is a state of affairs that has a certain probability of changing into another state of affairs. <br />Yes, that is a "rule" that besically says the reality has certain properties.<br />But you seem to forget one thing here. <i>If</i> this interpretation if correct, then the distinction between potentiality and actuality fades away. <br />Now, you are correct that there’s a lack of consensus as to interpretations, so it would be premature if I were to claim that this is a defeater for the argument from motion. But it is equally premature to claim that it is impossible for change to occur without a cause. It may be very hard to imgine this, I agree, but as long as e.g. the Copenhagen Interpretation is not proven impossible, the claim the change cannot possibily occur without a cause is simply not justified.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68180904546141107032018-01-04T06:44:40.553-08:002018-01-04T06:44:40.553-08:00Anonymous
It is impossible for something to be in...Anonymous<br /><br />It is impossible for something to be in a condition of "in potency to X actuality but not having X actuality" to change to the condition of "having X actuality" <br /><br />If the distinction between potency and act is truly as radical as you seem to believe, then you are correct, but the real question is: does the act/potency distinction correspond to what reality is like? <br />Some interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for "things" to happen without clear causes. Sure, there is a condition that makes it possible for certain quantum events to occur, but it seems to me that we can describe this condition as a potency and the "things" that happen as a kind of actuality.<br />Under this interpretation, it seems perfectly possible for something to be in a condition of "in potency to X actuality but not having X actuality" to change to the condition of "having X actuality". <br /><br />Maybe this model is incorrect and the "things" de have causes we are simply unbale to observe, but until someone can actually prove that there is such a cause, "impossibility" claims are a bit premature.<br /><br />Moreover, even people who think that quantum events are truly without causes still spend absolutely enormous efforts to go finding causes for other things and that is, in part, due to the fact that the vast amount of ordinary events are observed to have causes, so it is not impossible to assign a probability that a given event is caused. What is true is that we cannot ever assign a 100 % probability to anything. But science e.g; does not work with certainties. Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49628834842141921072018-01-04T06:31:30.116-08:002018-01-04T06:31:30.116-08:00Anonymous, I suspect that part of what is going on...Anonymous, I suspect that part of what is going on is that scientists are looking <i>only</i> for deterministic efficient causes. When you allow for non-deterministic causes, and other kinds of cause than efficient causality, their "it's not caused" fails to be as rigorous as they suppose. In addition to being merely one interpretation of the data, not "proven". Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72407745240153168532018-01-04T06:03:34.809-08:002018-01-04T06:03:34.809-08:00But of course reality is not required to respect o...<i>But of course reality is not required to respect our ways of thinking, and modern science does describe some events (as the decay of a radioactive atom at time t) as having literally no cause. </i> <br /><br />I quote: <br /><br /><i>While the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, called the Copenhagen interpretation, assumes true randomness, other interpretations do not. There are several interpretations of quantum physics. Most explain the same equations and experimental results but differ as to the MEANING of the equations. These include the Bohmian interpretation and the Many Worlds Interpretation, both of which are deterministic (or largely deterministic) and rule out randomness.<br /><br />At this time, physicists are not able to grant more validity to one interpretation rather than another based on experimental results. So, there’s alack of consensus as to interpretations, and, in particular, a lack of consensus as to whether nature is characterized by true randomness at the quantum level; or, instead, we’re just ignorant as to all the processes governing quantum behavior such as nuclear decay.<br /><br />The orthodox Copenhagen interpretation has been taught in physics classrooms for almost 100 years. It holds that nature at the quantum level is characterized by true randomness, including as to the timing of radioactive decay. Since the Copenhagen interpretation has been taught so long, some people assume that it IS quantum mechanics.</i> <br /><br />I observe that, logically, there being a known <i>rate</i> of decay (for large samples) of atomic nuclei or of particles implies <i>reasons</i> for the decay. Something that is truly and absolutely uncaused <i>cannot</i> be described by mathematical rules that fit the events into a law, even a probabilistic one. Physicists who would claim that neutron decay (as one example) being truly random and uncaused and yet describable in the aggregate according to a law need to go to school for some logic classes. <b>There cannot be a rule</b> that describes what happens without rules, principles, or causes. <br /><br />Also, if there were some events that occur without a rule and without a cause, then there <i>could not be any possible principle</i> to preclude ANY events from occurring the same way. It could not be limited solely to "quantum-sized" events: we could also see gold ingots appear out of nothing, clowns popping into existence without prior cause, or elephants, or stars and planets, and galaxies, and any other thing that could exist at all: purple trees, livers that do not pertain to any body, diplomats in the State Dept that are not dye-in-the-wool liberals, <i>anything</i> that could exist. OK, maybe that last is impossible. If there can be random uncaused actualities, there <i>cannot</i> be a principle that demands that they be only small events, and claim that they are limited to small events is itself a claim that they occur <i>according to some rule</i>. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25552531346507796382018-01-04T05:44:32.798-08:002018-01-04T05:44:32.798-08:00Why is it impossible for a change to occur without...<i>Why is it impossible for a change to occur without a cause? </i> <br /><br />It is impossible for something to be in a condition of "in potency to X actuality but not having X actuality" to change to the condition of "having X actuality" without there being some reason for "having X actuality" when before it did not have X actuality. That <b>just is</b> "a cause". <br /><br />The alternative is that things happen for no reason, that actualities pop into existence for no reason. Not only is this simply impossible given the meanings of "potency" and "actuality" that Aristotle was using, it would mean also that EVERY observable event that happens could just as easily be uncaused as caused, which would mean that scientists who insist on spending <i>absolutely enormous</i> efforts to go on finding "the cause", even after multiple failures to discover the cause, are doing something foolish because they are making a <i>presumption</i> that it is worthwhile to search for a cause when it is just as possible that there isn't one. Actually, it would be logically impossible to assign a probability that a given event is caused versus not caused, so it might be far <i>more</i> likely to be uncaused than caused. If there are brute facts, there is no way to pre-determine how many brute facts there are. <br /><br />But the observation that <i>our response</i> to events by searching for their causes implies a recognition that something needs explaining is secondary to the basic point, which is that the mere suggestion that we might get the second condition "has X actuality" after the prior condition "does not have X actuality" without a cause is to misunderstand "actuality" to begin with. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55607949272727152322018-01-03T23:48:32.694-08:002018-01-03T23:48:32.694-08:00I heard the discussion between Feser and atheist p...I heard the <a href="https://www.premierchristianradio.com/Shows/Saturday/Unbelievable/Episodes/Unbelievable-5-Proofs-of-the-Existence-of-God-Ed-Feser-vs-Arif-Ahmed" rel="nofollow">discussion</a> between Feser and atheist philosopher Arif Ahmed on the Aristotelian and the Rationalist. Certainly worth a listen. <br /><br />In my mind the weakest response by Feser came when Ahmed asked for the justification if the premise that every change (every actualization of a potential) must have a cause. Why is it impossible for a change to occur without a cause? This is also my criticism of the Aristotelian argument. Feser’s answer is basically that this is how we think: if we observe some common change we often already know its cause, and if we observe some unexpected change we always assume there must be a cause. But of course reality is not required to respect our ways of thinking, and modern science does describe some events (as the decay of a radioactive atom at time t) as having literally no cause. Einstein deeply disliked the idea and hypothesized that there must be “hidden variables” which caused such behavior, but all intents in the last 100 years to find some reason for believing that such hidden variables exist have fallen flat. <br /><br />Feser’s weakest response came when he claimed that the burden of proof on this point lies with the other side. There are two reasons for my criticism: First, when one presents a proof the burden of justifying one’s premises lies with oneself. Secondly, impossibility claims (such as “it is impossible for a change to obtain without a cause which actualizes the respective potential”) are very strong claims and thus particularly demanding in justification. Conversely possibility claims (such as “It is possible that an apple made of gold lies somewhere on the surface of the moon”) are much weaker and in many cases can be reasonably accepted as true without further justification, albeit they are usually worthless in an argument. <br /><br />Another weak moment came with the rationalist proof was discussed. Here Feser correctly observes that if the PSR is false then there are some true brute and thus unintelligible facts. But then goes on to argue that even if one brute fact were to exist then the whole edifice of human rationality would break down since we would not be justified in trusting in our own cognitive faculties. But suppose physicists were to discover that all physical phenomena can be described with unlimited precision using just one simple equation containing just one fundamental constant, namely the number 5. One might still ask “why is it 5 and not 4 or 6?”. To answer “that’s just a brute fact” would certainly not bring down all of rationality nor would it in any way shape or manner lead us to doubt in our cognitive faculties. Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36386949125951681402018-01-02T16:38:32.930-08:002018-01-02T16:38:32.930-08:00Thank you Hayekian for taking the time to respond ...Thank you Hayekian for taking the time to respond again. I agree that one expects overlap between the arguments (and indeed I see much overlap between the arguments). It was just that, for whatever reason, I wasn't seeing how the Aristotelian argument was self-contained. But this is a far cry from saying that it isn't solid for other reasons.<br /><br />This stuff is very interesting. Very slippery to think about to my mind, which is not a novice in philosophy, but is a novice with respect to this sort of stuff.<br /><br />Thanks again for your time.Eric Vestruphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14414470504370998756noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5757065518479469722018-01-02T12:15:57.692-08:002018-01-02T12:15:57.692-08:00Well, I think there's bound to be some overlap...Well, I think there's bound to be some overlap and I don't find it especially surprising if the fundamental metaphysical considerations of one argument are consistent with, and indeed support, the considerations of other arguments.<br /><br />But I don't think appealing to composition and simplicity, of itself, steps outside the Aristotelian argument. Again, the parts qua parts merely potentially form a whole. So what is it that actualizes that potentiality? It cannot be the whole itself as this would seem to imply some kind of incoherent self-causation. Nor could it be the parts, as this would seem to entail a vicious circularity or regress depending on how it's formulated. So it'd have to be something else, already actual, that actualizes the potentiality of the parts to form a whole.Johnny Sackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18411534460128925472noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3296533861126848162018-01-02T09:34:18.433-08:002018-01-02T09:34:18.433-08:00At this point Dr Feser might come in and say somet...At this point Dr Feser might come in and say something like "Yes, Eric, there is an argument within the Aristotelian proof that the UA is purely actual, but you just don't get it" and he'd be correct. But for whatever reason, the discussion there just doesn't sink in with me. Like I said, this is in all likelihood a defect in my understanding rather than a defect in the argument.Eric Vestruphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14414470504370998756noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79975789746948992612018-01-02T09:32:20.895-08:002018-01-02T09:32:20.895-08:00Thanks for the reply, which looks quite promising....Thanks for the reply, which looks quite promising. If I may make one more question disguised poorly as a comment: my understanding is that the proofs are supposed to be self-contained, so that (say) the Aristotelian proof would hold and be sound even if it were the only chapter in the book. You are appealing to (I believe) the neo-Platonic proof to bolster up my gap in understanding the Aristotelian proof. Nothing wrong with that of course, but is there an argument within the Aristotelian proof that the unactualized actualizer is purely actual?<br /><br />Thanks very much for the answer, very helpful. I will have to digest this and let it sit in.Eric Vestruphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14414470504370998756noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3079892469309088222018-01-02T07:09:48.470-08:002018-01-02T07:09:48.470-08:00Thank you for the civil discussion as well! If you...Thank you for the civil discussion as well! If you like, please let me know if there is any relevant literature that might help me understand your viewpoint on a deeper level that cannot be conveyed in a combox.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64495506923577925652018-01-02T05:00:30.999-08:002018-01-02T05:00:30.999-08:00Scott
I had already dropped my original argument...Scott<br /><br /><br />I had already dropped my original argument, not because I think it's wrong, but because the ambiguity of some Thomistic notions makes a discussion on that argument too complex for this combox. <br />That's why I chose to focus on another argument and Aquinas' reply may answer objction 4, but objection 4 is not my objection. Thomas' answer does not answer <i>my</i> objection, it doesn't even address it.<br />So, yes, you are, probably inadvertently, ignoring my rationale. You seem to responding, again probably inadvertently, to straw men.<br /><br />That said, I think it's wise to stop this debate right here.<br />Thank you for the interesting discussion.<br /><br /><br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.com