tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post8951851884411352625..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: A is AEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger154125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75109340068732166692010-12-18T13:10:59.876-08:002010-12-18T13:10:59.876-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
... while it may...Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...<br /><i> ... while it may seem plausible for you merely to grant the latter bits without following through the bigger entailments of such a metaphysic, not embracing those entailments would amount to you misleading or deceiving yourself. </i><br /><br />I presume we agree that your statement holds only if said bigger entailments contain no additional assumptions beyond the behavior of matter following notions such as act and potency.<br /><br /><i>If you really grant that potency is endemic to entities with finite forms––if you really grant this, and don't merely nod to it as a constructivist convenience––, </i><br /><br />I'm not sure what you mean here. As I said, I'm not sure what I accept is what you believe. I see act and potency as another description of uniformitarianism.<br /><br /><i>then I encourage you to engage Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and the opening chapters of Aquinas' Summa contra gentiles to see how those concepts lead to the larger views presented on this blog. </i><br /><br />The summary Dr. Feser gave of Aquinas' first way used additional concepts besides act and potency. For example, it relied on the existence of finite chains of per se causation, as opposed to what I see as an infinte lattice, and the notion of near-simoultaneity along these chains, which are not required for the lattice. There were similar additions for the other proofs he described.<br /><br />Now, if you can honestly say that Dr. Feser did not fairly represent these arguments, and added concepts that were not necessary, I will add that reading to what you have offered on nominalism (a view that seems extreme to me from those descriptions). But I would be disappointed to do that and find the concepts also present in Aristotle/Aquinas.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49809407764194705142010-12-18T01:28:52.828-08:002010-12-18T01:28:52.828-08:00…
As for nominalism, I'll cite a few mainstr...… <br /><br />As for nominalism, I'll cite a few mainstream definitions: <br /><br />1) "It appears that both the Realists and the Nominalists accept a basic understanding of how words have legitimate meaning. Simply, following the model of a proper noun (e.g., a personal name such as "Jason" or "Heather"), terms are thought to have meaning insofar as they refer to a particular entity (in this case, the person Jason or the person Heather, respectively). ... Specifically, nominalism takes the model of meaning discussed above as the sole and sufficient model of meaning. That is, if a universal term as a name is to have meaning, it can only have meaning by way of reference. But, as we have seen in the Platonic arguments for the reality of the Forms, universals (e.g., the definition of a triangle) are not found in the material domain as objects of sense-knowledge. In this domain, instead, we find only particular entities -- and, by definition, universal terms do not refer (directly) to such particulars." <br />http://www.drury.edu/ess/history/modern/nominalism.html <br /><br />2) "Exaggerated [i.e. Platonic] Realism invents a world of reality corresponding exactly to the attributes of the world of thought. Nominalism, on the contrary, models the concept on the external object, which it holds to be individual and particular. Nominalism consequently denies the existence of abstract and universal concepts, and refuses to admit that the intellect has the power of engendering them. What are called general ideas are only names, mere verbal designations, serving as labels for a collection of things or a series of particular events. Hence the term Nominalism. Neither Exaggerated Realism nor Nominalism finds any difficulty in establishing a correspondence between the thing in thought and the thing existing in nature, since in different ways, they both postulate perfect harmony between the two." <br />http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11090c.htm <br /><br />3) "The word ‘Nominalism’, as used by contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. In one sense, its most traditional sense deriving from the Middle Ages, it implies the rejection of universals. In another, more modern but equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstract objects. To say that these are distinct senses of the word presupposes that universal and abstract object do not mean the same thing. And in fact they do not. For although different philosophers mean different things by universal, and likewise by abstract object, according to widespread usage a universal is something that can be instantiated by different entities and an abstract object is something that is neither spatial nor temporal. Thus there are (at least) two kinds of Nominalism, one that maintains that there are no universals and one that maintains that there are no abstract objects.[1] Realism about universals is the doctrine that there are universals, and Platonism is the doctrine that there are abstract objects. … The word ‘Nominalism’ carries an implication that the corresponding doctrine asserts that everything is particular or concrete, and that this is not vacuously true." <br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/ <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53684243644497396432010-12-18T01:28:22.510-08:002010-12-18T01:28:22.510-08:00About this comment of mine:
"You grant form...About this comment of mine: <br /><br /><i>"You grant form and potency. You grant that specific arrangement is crucial. Thus, as extraneous as it may seem, following the Philosopher to the Unmoved Mover is otherwise specious."</i><br /><br />I meant specious in the sense that, while it may seem plausible for you merely to grant the latter bits without following through the bigger entailments of such a metaphysic, not embracing those entailments would amount to you misleading or deceiving yourself. <br /><br />If you really grant that potency is endemic to entities with finite forms––if you really grant this, and don't merely nod to it as a constructivist convenience––, then I encourage you to engage Aristotle's <i>Physics</i>, <i>Metaphysics</i>, and the opening chapters of Aquinas' <i>Summa contra gentiles</i> to see how those concepts lead to the larger views presented on this blog. <br /><br />…Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18082571241061398242010-12-17T13:00:06.523-08:002010-12-17T13:00:06.523-08:00Also, the reason I asked if "model" is a...<i>Also, the reason I asked if "model" is a codeword for retreat is because that's how I've seen it used more than once. … The point is that if I challenge the adequacy of your nominalistic model of numbers, you can easily beg off by saying no model is meant to attain truth in the first place. No model is completely adequate, ergo no model is subject to complete rejection. Hence, you always have an escape route for retreat under a respectable piece of verbiage. </i><br /><br />Well, I do believe that we have no method for producing truths where we can be certain of the result, can demonstrate why the results are true, and have confidence that the results apply to reality. We create formal systems based on initial assumptions, the reality of which is not provable within the formal system. We conduct empirical investigations, but this is basically affirming the consequent, as you noted. We accept fundamental truths from trusted sources (interior or exterior), but wind up with no way to demonstrate their accuracy. We can combine these things, but the result never erases these gaps. So, if you feel that is a retreat, I doubt I will be able to change your mind.<br /><br />You have referred to my description as nominalistic. Is that why you and TheOFloinn keep talking about tokens? Perhaps I don’t understand enough about it, because what you have been saying does not sound like what I believe.<br /><br /><i>3's formal integrity, so to speak, means that while 3 is not intrinsically meaningless in a world of only 2 objects, it does lack referents. In a related way, 3 is only actual as long as it informs really existent triplets in at least one material instance. If the world were reduced by some means to only two objects, 3 would not lose its formal integrity but the world would lose all form of 3. 3 would be unreal but not simply a fiction. </i><br /><br />I agree. 3 would be an extrapolation, not a fiction, in such a universe.<br /><br /><i>I makes these points to underscore how we may unwittingly be arguing as masked allies rather than as polar opposites. Am I making sense? </i><br /><br />I think I understand you. Learning about this is a much a motivation for me here as anything else. I don’t see us as on opposite ends about everything, but just with slightly difference interpretations of the same thing.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7480292649488891132010-12-17T11:34:09.023-08:002010-12-17T11:34:09.023-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
If I may, I'...Codgitator (Cadgertator) said... <br /><i>If I may, I'll answer by way of rhetorical question: What grounds the identity among the numerous instances of '3' as you use it to model? </i><br /><br />I’m not sure what you mean by grounding it. I can see a couple of different possibilities. Please ignore the irrelevant one(s).<br /><br />If you meant what is real about a "3" which allows me to use it, then it doesn’t need to be grounded. We’ve discussed unicorns in this thread, and they are not grounded in that fashion. I’ve actually used transfinite induction in philosophical discussions, and that’s just an extrapolation of an extrapolation of Peano arithmetic.<br /><br />If you meant what is there specifically in reality that requires me to use "3", that would be the establishment of an objectively verifiable, arbitrarily chosen collection which has the correct number of objects to meet the use of my model. For example, I could specify that I want to consider the number of crayons on a table. Having chosen my collection, I can now count them in an objectively verifiable manner, and note the count matches the model of "3" and no other model. So, this would be a real property of the collection.<br /><br /><i>Either the tokens are formally identical or they are not. </i><br /><br />As the same creation of the same formal system, they are formally identical in that sense (created by a formal system). As they measure a type of property in the same way, they are formally identical in that sense (Aristotelian notion of form).<br /><br /><i>Pi literally defies a complete physical description and yet we grasp its meaning apart. </i><br /><br />If you believe that "3" has an underlying reality, don’t you also believe "circle" does? If so, then any physical instantiation of a circle is a description of pi. If you are referring to the decimal expansion of pi, that’s just an artifact of using decimal expansions. It doesn’t really say anything about pi outside of the decision to express real numbers by using integer bases. <br /><br /><i>Further, the physical dissimilarities between two unequally long enumerations of pi do not undermine the formal identity of pi among them. </i><br /><br />I agree.<br /><br /><i>As for your post on TLS and the first mover argument, I never saw it and, truth be told, am less interested in that topic than the things we are discussing now. But I shall have to give your post a read.</i><br /><br />Thank you for looking it over. <br /><br /><i> Why not run it by Doc Feser again? </i><br /><br />Didn’t I just do that? :)<br /><br />Maybe I’ll send him an email.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17726029932618859662010-12-17T07:53:40.085-08:002010-12-17T07:53:40.085-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
An additional po...Codgitator (Cadgertator) said... <br /><i>An additional point: <br /><br />Form is also commonly spoken of as the "ratio" of an entity. Insofar as One Brow's conception of 3 (or any number) is that it is a relation between otherwise discrete entities, recalling that form is the ratio of an entity's specific existence might show how our views are not totally opposed. Form qua ratio is the intelligible aspect of a state of affairs; form qua definition is the integral relation of statements about that SOA.</i><br /><br />I am attracted to many aspects of the Aristotelian metaphysics, even if my interpretations of what they mean differs from what is standard here. I have not seen us as being opposed, but in a discussion where I am trying to clarify things for myself.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85912853668527412822010-12-17T06:58:06.979-08:002010-12-17T06:58:06.979-08:00"Books Mu and Nu consider the metaphysical st..."Books Mu and Nu consider the metaphysical status of mathematics, and Aristotle concludes that mathematical entities are not substances. <i>Aristotle attacks in particular Plato’s view that each number corresponds to a Form</i>, primarily because this view obscures the relationships between numbers and fails to explain the relationship between numbers and sensible particulars. <i>Aristotle suggests instead that numbers are physical objects considered in abstraction from their physical and accidental properties. For example, the number five is the same thing as five cats once we factor out everything that makes the cats cats instead of something else.</i> Aristotle concludes by rejecting the idea that numbers can play a causal role in nature, reaffirming his view that substance is at the foundation of nature."<br /><br />http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/aristotle/section7.rhtmlCodgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10513843892013638062010-12-17T06:49:37.422-08:002010-12-17T06:49:37.422-08:00An additional point:
Form is also commonly spoke...An additional point: <br /><br />Form is also commonly spoken of as the "ratio" of an entity. Insofar as One Brow's conception of 3 (or any number) is that it is a relation between otherwise discrete entities, recalling that form is the ratio of an entity's specific existence might show how our views are not totally opposed. Form qua ratio is the intelligible aspect of a state of affairs; form qua definition is the integral relation of statements about that SOA.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91581126580622868152010-12-17T06:45:28.483-08:002010-12-17T06:45:28.483-08:00TheOFloinn said...
Composition is not necessarily...TheOFloinn said... <br /><i>Composition is not necessarily a logical fallacy. </i><br /><br />Either a logical argument is reliable or it is fallacious. Every logical fallacy occasionally produces true statements. Composition is a fallacy unless you do the ground workto show why it is relevant in a particular case, such as showing a property is preserved by compositions.<br /><br /><i>This object, that object, the other object have physical existence. <br /><br />Three has real existence, abstracted by the mind from a real property in the sensible world, but which is not itself a physical property of the sensible world. </i><br /><br />Again, I ask for the meaningful difference between saying this and saying "Three has no real existence; it is abstracted by the mind from a real property in the sensible world, but which is not itself a physical property of the sensible world."; a difference that amounts to this being more than just a philosophical construction.<br /><br /><i>What does ٣ represent? </i><br /><br />No idea. I’m not sure why that, or the notion of tokens in general, is relevant to this discussion.<br /><br /><i>Perhaps you are equivocating "material" to mean "natural." </i><br /><br />I’ll try to be more careful in my language.<br /><br /><i>Rather, all four kinds of "becauses" operate together. </i><br /><br />Except, I don’t see any evidence of formal or final causes operating in any way, except as stand-ins for summarizing a more detailed analysis of material and efficient causes.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29443570648986042002010-12-17T05:50:51.230-08:002010-12-17T05:50:51.230-08:00Perhaps to steer things back to the original point...Perhaps to steer things back to the original point...<br /><br />I have erred by letting A-T's moderate realism come across as too Platonic. One Brow asks where the form of 3 exists if not in actual triplets. Yet, so does Aristotle! For him, forms don't exist apart from matter (nor does matter exist apart from form). Recourse to form <i>as a mode of explanation</i> rests on the insight that it is not any single case of a triplet, nor any set of cases of triplets, which exhausts what 3 is formally speaking. Conversely, recourse to matter (i.e. to concrete instances of 3) <i>as another form of explanation</i> rests on a related insight that it is not simply our conception of a formal notion (a Pure Idea) which grounds the real existence of 3 in the world. <br /><br />3's formal integrity, so to speak, means that while 3 is not intrinsically meaningless in a world of only 2 objects, it does lack referents. In a related way, 3 is only actual as long as it informs really existent triplets in at least one material instance. If the world were reduced by some means to only two objects, 3 would not lose its formal integrity but the world would lose all form of 3. 3 would be unreal but not simply a fiction. <br /><br />I makes these points to underscore how we may unwittingly be arguing as masked allies rather than as polar opposites. Am I making sense? <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13581244976411334492010-12-17T05:26:34.918-08:002010-12-17T05:26:34.918-08:00One Brow: "If you have an alternative formula...One Brow: <i>"If you have an alternative formulation that makes an objectively verifiable difference, I would be happy to read it."</i> <br /><br />If I may, I'll answer by way of rhetorical question: What grounds the identity among the numerous instances of '3' as you use it to model? Either the tokens are formally identical or they are not. If not, and 3 is only just "3 enough for the experiment", then you've conceded not only that your model-theory of numbers provides no abiding coherence but also that there's no enduring reality for it accurately to model at all. You can't fudge integers. 3 is 3 or it is something else. Three's drunken cousin, pi, raises an interesting point too. Pi literally defies a complete physical description and yet we grasp its meaning apart. You could never exhaustively instantiate what pi "contains" for the needs of a totally precise model, but pi exists as a formal reality in its own terms. Further, the physical dissimilarities between two unequally long enumerations of pi do not undermine the formal identity of pi among them. <br /><br />As for your post on TLS and the first mover argument, I never saw it and, truth be told, am less interested in that topic than the things we are discussing now. But I shall have to give your post a read. Why not run it by Doc Feser again? <br /><br />Also, the reason I asked if "model" is a codeword for retreat is because that's how I've seen it used more than once. When a model is challenged, the defender can easily beg off by saying, "No, no, I'm not a rationalist: science doesn't attain 'truth' {snicker}, it just proposes models that help us make better technology." Consider how the fallacy of affirming the consequent is central to old-school, 'normal', deductive science. I raised this point on my blog a few years ago and a sometime atheist sniper retorted that correspondence theory of theory is so passe: coherentist modeling is hip, where it's at, what it's all about, etc. <br /><br />The point is that if I challenge the adequacy of your nominalistic model of numbers, you can easily beg off by saying no model is meant to attain truth in the first place. No model is completely adequate, ergo no model is subject to complete rejection. Hence, you always have an escape route for retreat under a respectable piece of verbiage. <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40040547328162751772010-12-16T11:56:32.744-08:002010-12-16T11:56:32.744-08:00seemed to rely on the Fallacy of Composition
Co...<i>seemed to rely on the Fallacy of Composition</i> <br /><br />Composition is not necessarily a logical fallacy. "Each tile on the floor is green; therefore the floor is green" is a true statement. The difference is this: Composition is not a <i>formal</i> fallacy (it is not invalid as to its form) but it may be a <i>material</i> fallacy (that is, depending on its [subject] matter). And there is that matter/form thingie, again.<br />+ + +<br /><i>since you are right about "3" having a real existence, therefore I am wrong about "3" being a model we construct to understand reality</i> <br /><br />This object, that object, the other object have physical existence. <br /><br />Three has real existence, abstracted by the mind from a real property in the sensible world, but which is not itself a physical property of the sensible world. <br /><br />"3" is a token used by some to represent the threeness of some things. These need not be three physical things. "3" may have physical existence as ink marks on paper, etc. <br /><br />What does ٣ represent? <br />+ + +<br /><i>formal causation is merely a shortcut for skipping over many of the details of material causation</i> <br /><br />Now I think you are using "material" cause in place of "efficient" cause. Perhaps you are equivocating "material" to mean "natural." But material, formal, efficient, and final causes are all natural when dealing with natural things. Neither are they mutually exclusive. Rather, all four kinds of "becauses" operate together. <br /><br /><i>Changes in arrangement are still physical changes</i> <br /><br />But they are not <i>material</i> changes.TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19041685090016351492010-12-16T11:18:18.872-08:002010-12-16T11:18:18.872-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
Perhaps One Bro...Codgitator (Cadgertator) said... <br /><br /><i>Perhaps One Brow is more open to his otherwise undeclared Aristotelianism. </i><br /><br />I try to be open to everything. I’m not really sure just how close our respective models of reality are, though.<br /><br />TheOFloinn said... <br /><i>The only thing that physically exists is this item and that item and the other item. Threeness, as such, has no physical existence. Yet, it is real; otherwise, we would not find diverse people abstracting it from the existence of this, that, and the other. And using it, of course, even when there are not three physical items to enumerate. </i><br /><br />I understand that it doesn’t add anything physically. What I asked for was what was added, beyond that you think it is real. The difference between your last two sentences and my version of those sentences: Yet, it is useful; otherwise, we would not find diverse people abstracting it from the existence of this, that, and the other. And generalizing upon it, of course, even when there are not three physical items to enumerate.<br /><br /><i>Ah, "emergent." The new scientificalistic way of saying "then a miracle happens." </i><br /><br />Sarcasm. How original. I don’t consider a soul to be any more miraculous than MS Word. I don’t know how either one works.<br /><br /><i>But of course the old way of saying "emergent property" was to say "formal causation." That is, there are properties of the whole that are not the result of the parts, but rather depend on the number and arrangement of parts. </i><br /><br />To me, that says formal causation is merely a shortcut for skipping over many of the details of material causation, since that sort of form boils down to material elements.<br /><br /><i>Thus, an individual in relation to others in a classroom will act differently than the same individual in relation to others in a family. The reason for the difference is formal, not material. </i><br /><br />So, does that mean my soul is different? Or just that my soul’s interactions are different? Because the second is true regardless of whether we accept the notion of formal causes as being something other than a shortcut to describe material causes.<br /><br /><i>You may be inadvertently equivocating on the term "material." The matter is precisely the same. It is the form (arrangement) of the matter that has changed. Specifically, it has ceased to move. </i><br /><br />Changes in arrangement are still physical changes, though. Two weights, set one meter apart, affect the universe differently, and are affected differently, than the same two weights set two meters apart in the same center of gravity.<br /><br /><i>This is why many materialists now eschew the term "materialism" and now refer to themselves as "physicalists." </i><br /><br />My self-labeling rarely goes beyond atheist and skeptic.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88744545215654321122010-12-16T10:53:20.071-08:002010-12-16T10:53:20.071-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26910245313990903392010-12-16T10:50:31.993-08:002010-12-16T10:50:31.993-08:00Is "model" a catch-all for intellectual ...<i>Is "model" a catch-all for intellectual retreat? </i><br /><br />I’m not sure from what it is a retreat. I see a model as being an outreach and a mechanism of dealing with reality. I don’t have a broad enough knowledge to identify it as more than one philosophical construct or less than another.<br /><br /><i>I see that you don't want it to be merely "'3'", which is good, but that you settle for it being merely an operational placeholder is… disappointing. </i><br /><br />If you have an alternative formulation that makes an objectively verifiable difference, I would be happy to read it.<br /><br /><i>2. I am impressed that you grant that potency is endemic to realist metaphysics. </i><br /><br />To me, it’s just another way of saying the universe behaves in a uniform manner in many ways. I use it as a working principle everyday.<br /><br /><i>As to why this enfeebles your naturalism, I leave it to better minds (e.g. Doc Feser, James Chastek, Brandon, Crude, OFlinn, et al.) to illuminate why this compromises your naturalism. </i><br /><br />First, I think you are selling yourself short. <br /><br />Second, since Dr. Feser never commented on <a href="http://lifetheuniverseandonebrow.blogspot.com/2009/11/review-of-tls-unmoving-first-cause.html" rel="nofollow">this post</a>, and the only Aristotelian that did comment did not make a strong attempt to tie the notion of potency to supernaturalism (it seemed to rely on the Fallacy of Composition), I was rather hoping that someone at some time would rise to the challenge, and you really seemed knowledgeable enough and intelligent to make a serious attempt. So, I am disappointed in, yet accepting of, your decision.<br /><br /><i>You grant form and potency. You grant that specific arrangement is crucial. Thus, as extraneous as it may seem, following the Philosopher to the Unmoved Mover is otherwise specious. </i><br /><br />Was "specious" ("Having the ring of truth or plausibility but actually fallacious") the word you meant to use? It seems more in line with my position.<br /><br /><i>For any such counting requires a finite amount of time which squares not with abstract entation's super-temporal existence. Capisce? </i><br /><br />That seems to be another way of saying that, since you are right about "3" having a real existence, therefore I am wrong about "3" being a model we construct to understand reality. Did I misunderstand?One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74171589639215694122010-12-16T10:17:54.086-08:002010-12-16T10:17:54.086-08:00Codge/Cadge
TOF: If you (still) drink, I'm buy...Codge/Cadge<br />TOF: If you (still) drink, I'm buying you beer (sometime around when I share a pint or two with Doc Feser). <br /><br />Hard to do. Opposite coasts.TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59710901287528810842010-12-16T10:01:04.263-08:002010-12-16T10:01:04.263-08:00TOF:
If you (still) drink, I'm buying you bee...TOF:<br /><br />If you (still) drink, I'm buying you beer (sometime around when I share a pint or two with Doc Feser).Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16040238089843252212010-12-16T09:50:50.266-08:002010-12-16T09:50:50.266-08:00Saying that a live and dead petunia are only mater...<i>Saying that a live and dead petunia are only materially different begs the question since, at minimum, their crucial difference consists in a mal-arrangement--a deformation--of otherwise sufficient matter.<br /><br /><b>OneBrow</b><br />You don’t think that is a material difference?</i> <br /><br />You may be inadvertently equivocating on the term "material." The matter is precisely the same. It is the form (arrangement) of the matter that has changed. Specifically, it has ceased to move. <br /><br />This is why many materialists now eschew the term "materialism" and now refer to themselves as "physicalists."TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51678375274763948082010-12-16T09:46:15.326-08:002010-12-16T09:46:15.326-08:00How do you think that position is different from m...<i>How do you think that position is different from my saying that you can use "3" to model the number of objects? What additional reality is added, for you?</i> <br /><br />The only thing that physically exists is this item and that item and the other item. Threeness, as such, has no physical existence. Yet, it is real; otherwise, we would not find diverse people abstracting it from the existence of this, that, and the other. And using it, of course, even when there are not three physical items to enumerate. <br /><br /><i>For me, the rational soul is emergent from physical properties.</i><br /><br />Ah, "emergent." The new scientificalistic way of saying "then a miracle happens." <br /><br />But of course the old way of saying "emergent property" was to say "formal causation." That is, there are properties of the whole that are not the result of the parts, but rather depend on the number and arrangement of parts. Thus, an individual in relation to others in a classroom will act differently than the same individual in relation to others in a family. The reason for the difference is formal, not material.TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66113570691778708472010-12-16T08:20:57.878-08:002010-12-16T08:20:57.878-08:00(Whisky'd shame…)
I should also like to add ...(Whisky'd shame…) <br /><br />I should also like to add that Thomism is as close to naturalism, without being wrong, as naturalism is close to being Thomism, without being complete. As such, One Brow and I (et al.) are not as far apart as the words may suggest. I made this point at least once at my blog in my running debate with "that atheist" (i.e. UnBeguiled, for the curious), but he shortly thereafter seems to have renounced blogging for the pure pursuit of his medical practice. Perhaps One Brow is more open to his otherwise undeclared Aristotelianism.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9355213316055841992010-12-16T08:18:16.804-08:002010-12-16T08:18:16.804-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18207740845471725592010-12-16T08:13:19.473-08:002010-12-16T08:13:19.473-08:00Frons Unus:
1. Is "model" a catch-all ...Frons Unus: <br /><br />1. Is "model" a catch-all for intellectual retreat? I have engaged an atheist before at my blog who very quickly swore off how the fallacy of composition is endemic to most "normal science", instead opting for Ronald-Giere 'modelism'. Since Popper's falsificationism has been shown to be too stringent, and Hempel's covering–law-ism has been shown to be a wax nose, "modelism" seems to be the (Kantian) move de rigeur of most non A-Tists. Is "3" <i>3</i> or is it merely <i>'3'</i>? I see that you don't want it to be merely "'3'", which is good, but that you settle for it being merely an operational placeholder is… disappointing. <br /><br />2. I am impressed that you grant that <i>potency is endemic to realist metaphysics</i>. As to why this enfeebles your naturalism, I leave it to better minds (e.g. Doc Feser, James Chastek, Brandon, Crude, OFlinn, et al.) to illuminate why this compromises your naturalism. <br /><br />3. As for parsing the material vs. formal differences in a live vs. dead petunia, my basic point is that BOTH are endemic to an adequate explanation of such a difference (cf. Sorabji, <i>Chance</i> chapter 3 for more). I think you see this, but the verbiage is too much to swallow for now. You grant form and potency. You grant that specific arrangement is crucial. Thus, as extraneous as it may seem, following the Philosopher to the Unmoved Mover is otherwise specious. <br /><br />4. My point about you subjecting numbers' abstract existence to physical contingency ties (back) in with your claim that 3 is 'just' a set of a counting. For any such counting requires a finite amount of time which squares not with abstract entation's super-temporal existence. Capisce? <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31092220307654466122010-12-16T07:59:01.192-08:002010-12-16T07:59:01.192-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator),
One additional request,...Codgitator (Cadgertator),<br /><br />One additional request, please. Above, I interpreted TheOFloinn and came up with (typos removed): <br /><br /><i>Just to be clear: my form is variable depending upon the circumstances of my environment, even when there is no related internal change? <br /><br />Also, since my soul is my form, my soul is different when I am in the classroom versus when I am at home?</i><br /><br />1) Do you think that is an accurate interpretation of TheOFloinn?<br /><br />2) Do you agree with this?One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76969675694115422132010-12-16T07:54:26.548-08:002010-12-16T07:54:26.548-08:00Imagine two distinct objects, O and O*, have 11 pr...<i>Imagine two distinct objects, O and O*, have 11 protons and 11 electrons. What makes them different? The fact that the protons and electrons are in "pairs", as you say. In the O-scenario, something prevents the p/e from bonding, while in the O*-scenario, they are allowed to bond (say by some cryogenic or supermagnetic means, etc.). </i><br /><br />To be clear, we have two separate collections of matter, each with identical material components, but in different environments (as a result of the something that is preventing the bonding) and therefore reacting differently in those environments. If I have misunderstood that, my response will probably be moot, and I apologize for that.<br /><br /><i>First, in the O-scenario, while all the material components are virtually present (in mid-air, as it were), there is no such thing as O until its matter is arranged in a specific way. O is not 'there' waiting for its matter to get bonded correctly: it simply doesn't exist without its specific form, regardless how well 'stocked' it is materially. If O's nature were entirely identical with its material base, then O would exist by virtue of the 11 p/e being co-present. But that is false, ergo, etc. </i><br /><br />I agree that the form the matter takes can be a reflection of the underlying environment, and we will see different behaviors in different environments. I don’t see why that is a problem for materialism.<br /><br /><i>Second, "pairing" is an abstract relation, not a material entity per se. </i><br /><br />I agree. The notion of pairing was merely a model I used to convey the overall balance in electrical charges. In reality, proton don’t seem to exhibit <br /><br /><i>Presumably, the materialist would retort that the pairing is a but function of the bonding, … </i><br /><br />I would not argue that. I’m not aware of any particular way that protons exhibit preferences for one electron over another, or vice-versa, so there are no actual pairs.<br /><br /><i>But then let us O and O* again, both now in virtual p/e stasis, and both with the same amount of energy in their Umwelten. </i><br /><br />But expressed differently, in your example.<br /><br /><i>Saying that a live and dead petunia are only materially different begs the question since, at minimum, their crucial difference consists in a mal-arrangement--a deformation--of otherwise sufficient matter. </i><br /><br />You don’t think that is a material difference?One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2863571047741662612010-12-16T07:53:30.585-08:002010-12-16T07:53:30.585-08:00Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
You seem to thi...Codgitator (Cadgertator) said... <br /><br /><i>You seem to think it is easy to 'pinpoint' the locus of, say, causality in physical spacetime, but in fact you merely added a *descriptive* layer to the *notion* itself.</i><br /><br />I’m not completely clear to what you are referring, so I will hold off on responding to this point, and request clarification. <br /><br /><i>1a. If verbalizing entities makes them real qua models, without attaining a real grasp of reality (beyond the model-veil, as it were), then we should be able to define unicorns into existence. Surely you grant the reason 3 models reality better than unicorns is that the former exists while the latter does not. </i><br /><br />I don’t claim our definitions nor our models make anything real; they are merely our attempts to clarify/simplify/categorize what is real into what we can process about what is real. Our models of horses have no more reality than our models of unicorn in and of themselves, but they model reality more usefully, because we the actions we take and the decisions we make based on those allow us more reliability in determining the behaviors we see in horses. Meanwhile, our models of unicorns do not allow us any sort of predictive ability. <br /><br />Outside of improved utility, I’m not sure what would make a model "better". Is Euclidean geometry (with a flat curvature) "better" for a carpenter than Lobachevskian geometry (negative curvature)? Space-time has negative curvature, so the Lobachevskian model is more accurate, but the mathematics is much more complex, and the differences not significant when you are building a house. So, I would say the Euclidean model is better for the carpenter, despite modeling reality less well for the scientist.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.com