tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post8866569440884052043..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The pointlessness of Jerry CoyneEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger162125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66379969525730081452015-11-12T06:27:05.706-08:002015-11-12T06:27:05.706-08:00Well done! Thanks! As Hart has pointed out, Coyne ...Well done! Thanks! As Hart has pointed out, Coyne is tilting at the windmill of the Demiurge. As they all do. Hart spoke volumes to me, but then again, I can hear what he has to say.Dr Joseph Bray's bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13690636001086194734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73314590076178111032014-10-30T14:36:13.895-07:002014-10-30T14:36:13.895-07:00Wonderful post!
On an unrelated note, you should k...Wonderful post!<br />On an unrelated note, you should know that "Roman Catholic" is a term created by Anglicans to suggest that the Church is just another sect or "denomination". You're a Catholic.<br />God bless you!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12346593629916782252014-09-03T20:06:46.276-07:002014-09-03T20:06:46.276-07:00The man's face mirrors his crudeness of mind.The man's face mirrors his crudeness of mind. Richardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7791511411689682322014-02-08T17:59:33.313-08:002014-02-08T17:59:33.313-08:00(1) Partial Explanation works by appeal to regular...(1) Partial Explanation works by appeal to regularities that actually exist in the world. The tides are explained by gravity. In this sense the world is partly intelligible.<br /><br />That makes no difference at all when discussing true causes.<br /><br />(2) Partial Explanation works without any metaphysical leaps. You deduce what IS from what IS, and that works to the extent your description of what IS is true.<br /><br />While deducing what IS from what IS surely you would not find it strange to find a book suspended in midair. Since you deduce what IS from what IS.<br /><br />(3) Partial Explanations are final in that the phenomena is fully explained and made comprehensible GIVEN the premises. But chains of such explanations end in a brute fact - the most general regularity, that hence logically cannot be Partially Explained by a more general one - or else there is an infinite regress of such explanations.<br /><br />Are sure? Partial explanations are full explanations?<br />In any case, hence its not a true cause.<br /><br />(4) Ultimate Explanation works on sheer logic; once the terms are clear, it becomes a matter of sheer logic that in the real world there are tides. I fail to see how this is possible.<br /><br />As explained above tides are not what is necessary, its that there is a cause that is necessary out of sheer logic. If not, books suspended in midair or wood splitting without an ax would not be strange at all or lead to further question or research.<br /><br />(5) Ultimate Explanation works on pointing-to relations; an ax's essence implies it will split wood. I fail to see why they can't equally work on an ax's regularities.<br /><br />The point is not whether or not the ax IS in fact the true cause, rather that there must be a true cause. Once you need a true cause we assume it more likely lies in the ax as apposed to the moon or the table beneath.<br /><br />(6) Ultimate Explanation is a final explanation; once the terms are clear, no further explanation of the tides is needed or possible. I note we have not one example of such an explanation of any phenomena. <br /><br />We have tons of them you just don't accept it. You would rather say that wood can split without true cause.<br />As I said above we don't need to know its essence as in electrons to discuss it.<br />Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91776158100843686402014-02-08T17:59:11.999-08:002014-02-08T17:59:11.999-08:00"I think you're doing a disservice to the..."I think you're doing a disservice to the word "explanation". All explanations that we've ever found are of the Partial Explanation type (or derivatives thereof). To say that gravity doesn't explain the tides but rather brute-facts it [or whatever you want to call that relation] is to render the word unusable and to throw every scientific (and, indeed, most academic) explanation humanity has discovered. And to reserve the word "explanation" to a pipe-dream that, in my opinion, isn't even possible. "<br /><br />I don't see any justification for that.<br />Why must science find ultimate explanations in order to be useful?<br />I have no objection to the typical use of the term explanation. What is wrong with pointing out that which you agree, that it isn't an ultimate explanation? So I don't see any response necessary.<br />Its also a bit ironic how upthread you insisted that science is only about brute fact.<br /><br />"We're not interested here in why we believe the models we do."<br />You may not be interested, but I sure am. So if you aren't interested in this discussion its fine with me.<br /><br />"The models are not instrumental, however; we believe there are tables, not that acting as if tables exist is useful."<br />Of course they are instrumental, what makes you think its anything more than that? You can't just say its so and expect me to accept that. Scientists themselves agree that it is just instrumental. See Lee Smolins latest book "Time Reborn"<br />Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71959352689266951782014-02-08T17:58:49.937-08:002014-02-08T17:58:49.937-08:00I'll try to get to my point. Its not that tide...I'll try to get to my point. Its not that tides are logically necessary, its that true causes are logically necessary. Wood doesn't split without true cause and water doesn't rise without true cause. The point is not that tides exist therefor tides are necessary. The point is that for there to be tides at all there must first be a true cause for tides. Hence since tides empirically do in fact exist it must follow that a true cause does in fact exist.<br />The point is that whether or not we know of their true causes and what they actually are. The point is that they must exist.<br />I'll use an example from Maimonidies. So take into account the point not the parable as it was in line with his times.<br />If one wants to describe a King in a certain town. He can say his name is such and such he lives in that city and has a long white beard. He is describing the king.<br />He can also say that he has so many servants his palace is such and such is his chariot etc.<br />He can talk about his actions. That is the bridge that he built.<br />Or he can get even more abstract by pointing out, look around and see law and order that is from fear of the king and his rule.<br />The point is that you can point out, discuss and describe phenomenon without talking or even knowing its essence. He can describe the king without meeting or getting anywhere close.<br /><br />We don't have to see electrons to know they exist. All we need to know is about its emerging phenomenon.<br />So too, with true causes. We can know they exists because there are empirical effects.<br /><br />Now some argue that this is not at all useful. Since science works just fine without it. But as others have pointed out numerous time on this blog, they take it for a given. If not you are left with the question, why is it strange for the book not to fall to the floor? Which a scientist would surly ask.<br />Just like I don't need to think about how a calculator works every time I use it. Most people don't even have the foggiest idea about how the calculator works, yet it doesn't effect their ability to use it at all. You don't need to understand something to utilize it.<br /><br />Even if it were true that science doesn't need it at all and therefore its not useful at all. That doesn't mean our discussion is incoherent. The logic will still follow just as much. This discussion need not have anything to do with science. Mathematical proofs do not need to be useful to be true. If its true its necessarily so, if not not. Pointing out somethings usefulness is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. If you don't find it useful hence a waste of time. I won't hold you.<br /><br />Which leads me to address your point.Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82304557156919063502014-02-08T17:58:26.261-08:002014-02-08T17:58:26.261-08:00@Yair,
Thanks for introducing the term ultimate e...@Yair,<br /><br />Thanks for introducing the term ultimate explanation. It is definitely useful.<br /><br /><br />"I utterly fail to see how any explanation of the real world can stem from logical necessity. How you can go from relations between concepts to existence in the world. Be that as it may..."<br /><br />I think we are looking at it from different angles. I do agree with you that it wasn't necessary for there to be tides at all. To remind you, I'll quote myself.<br /><br />"If I understood Humes position correctly. (I never read him, only picked up bits and pieces from others. Sorry if I'm incorrect.) He takes the position that we find no bridge of cause and effect between events. We only have regularities. Which means we find nothing inherent in a stone that shatters windows only that it regularly does so.<br />While I agree with the position that <b>there is no logical reason for it to have been so.</b> I don't believe that it isn't actually so. To explain better. If I was in the business of making universes, I could have done it differently. I could have made stones bounce off windows, go through it like light or maybe even stick to it. The point is there is no reason to think it is necessary logically for a stone to shatter glass. However I would not be able to make a universe in which 2+2=5, since that is logically necessary. Hence causes and effects are not logically necessary steps."<br /><br />I'll get back to this.<br /><br />"<i>"From what I read it appears that you don't believe true [ultimate] causes exists."</i><br /><br />Indeed"<br /><br />It looks like this is were we part ways. While you think they don't exist I think they must exist for there to be causes at all.<br /><br />"But we DO have a Partial Explanation for it. We understand why tides are the way they are GIVEN gravity. These are the kinds of explanations that we DO have. Not dreams about what explanations we would like to have."<br /><br />To clear up a bit. Gravity is not a cause, rather it is the other mass that causes the warpage of spacetime. This phenomenon is called gravity. I'm not just trying to play semantics here. I just want to make sure the next point is clear.<br /><br />If mass has nothing about it that will cause it to warp spacetime. Just saying that it regularly does is not really a partial explanation at all. It really isn't an explanation. I'm not arguing that its not useful. I'll use an example that fesser uses. If the shelf has no power to hold the book from falling, then we don't have any explanation about why the book doesn't fall to the floor. Saying its the shelf holding it up while admitting that the shelf doesn't have the power to do so, is admitting that you don't have the explanation.<br /><br />The question is do you really believe that true causes don't exist? If wood would split for no reason and without cause, would you say, see I was right? or would you try to determine its cause? If you were to find a book suspended in mid air without a shelf about 4 feet off the ground will you not find it strange at all. If you were true to your position you would have to say that this is not strange at all. Yet I hardly believe that this would be the case, correct me if I'm wrong. If you would argue that since books don't regularly hang in mid air therefor you believe that this one should be that way as well. What is the justification for this position? (That you can deduce from one regularity to the next) If you assume there are regularities, what is the justification for that?<br />Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7515442733777287212014-02-08T14:54:52.601-08:002014-02-08T14:54:52.601-08:00...
"While you say we can't have a bette......<br /><br />"While you say we can't have a better explanation than gravity (or its type), I still would not therefor call it an explanation, just BRUTE FACT. There is a difference and I don't want to confuse the terms"<br /><br />I think you're doing a disservice to the word "explanation". All explanations that we've ever found are of the Partial Explanation type (or derivatives thereof). To say that gravity doesn't explain the tides but rather brute-facts it [or whatever you want to call that relation] is to render the word unusable and to throw every scientific (and, indeed, most academic) explanation humanity has discovered. And to reserve the word "explanation" to a pipe-dream that, in my opinion, isn't even possible. <br /><br />"That is just the point regularity gives us a predictive model not an explanation.<br />Finding a model is looking for the correct mathematical function that matter instantiates. <br />Where is the connection between the model and the matter that instantiates it. Isn't that a leap as well?"<br /><br />You are confusing epistemology and ontology. We're not interested here in why we believe the models we do. The models are not instrumental, however; we believe there are tables, not that acting as if tables exist is useful.<br /><br />The connection between the model and reality is that the model - we believe - corresponds well to reality. And this is what gives Partial Explanations their explanatory power. The fact that the force of gravity really does exist is what makes the explanation really work. The explanation highlights how something we know it true about what EXISTS (gravity) implies that some other thing EXISTS (tides). There are no holes, no mysterious relations between concepts and reality, between logic and existence. <br /><br />And it's a "final" explanation in a sense - it fully explains the tides [ignoring inaccuracies]. No matter what further generalities will underly it, it will REMAIN TRUE that this is precisely how gravity causes tides. Further explanation is not actually possible here - you can explain the general assumptions, but not the tides themselves. The explanation of the tides is already complete.<br /><br />In summary: from my perspective<br /><br />(1) Partial Explanation works by appeal to regularities that actually exist in the world. The tides are explained by gravity. In this sense the world is partly intelligible.<br /><br />(2) Partial Explanation works without any metaphysical leaps. You deduce what IS from what IS, and that works to the extent your description of what IS is true.<br /><br />(3) Partial Explanations are final in that the phenomena is fully explained and made comprehensible GIVEN the premises. But chains of such explanations end in a brute fact - the most general regularity, that hence logically cannot be Partially Explained by a more general one - or else there is an infinite regress of such explanations.<br /><br />(4) Ultimate Explanation works on sheer logic; once the terms are clear, it becomes a matter of sheer logic that in the real world there are tides. I fail to see how this is possible.<br /><br />(5) Ultimate Explanation works on pointing-to relations; an ax's essence implies it will split wood. I fail to see why they can't equally work on an ax's regularities.<br /><br />(6) Ultimate Explanation is a final explanation; once the terms are clear, no further explanation of the tides is needed or possible. I note we have not one example of such an explanation of any phenomena. <br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12531396110675431392014-02-08T14:54:17.533-08:002014-02-08T14:54:17.533-08:00@ Harlyd :
Allow me to skip to your recent posts;...@ Harlyd :<br /><br />Allow me to skip to your recent posts; I feel they touch on the heart of things. If you wish me to address an earlier point, please re-raise it.<br /><br />"And I'm not interested in playing a semantic game about what the term explanation really means."<br /><br />I hate word games with the burning passion of a thousand suns. But I think we really need to differentiate our two meanings of "explanation" if we're to talk about them without confusion. I suggest calling your model "Ultimate Explanation", and my model, for sheer contrast, "Partial Explanation". These are just names. With this in mind, I'll edit your following quotes:<br /><br />"An [ultimate] explanation must be of such where there can't be a deeper one. ...It will have to be of such a type that A will necessitate B, hence no deeper explanation exists....The same way 2+2=[4]."<br /><br />There are two criteria here. Let's handle them separately.<br /><br />I utterly fail to see how any explanation of the real world can stem from logical necessity. How you can go from relations between concepts to existence in the world. Be that as it may...<br /><br />"...if it would exist it would not suffer from the brute fact problem the same way 2+2=[4] doesn't. Hence it would not become circular or have an infinite regress problem."<br /><br />Yes. It would provide an Ultimate Explanation; the thing will be explained fully, with no further explanation needed or even really possible. <br /><br />"The point is what an explanation must be like to be an explanation at all. ... IF the ax is the actual [ultimate] cause then it must have within it such a nature."<br /><br />I note that we have no widely agreed upon Ultimate Explanation at all. Contra Feser, the world in this sense isn't partially intelligible; we haven't explained anything. Specifically, an ax has most definitively not been demonstrated to be the Ultimate Explanation of the splitting. <br /><br />More to the point of my main argument - where does the "pointing to" enter here? Why does an Ultimate Cause has to logically follow from a nature (a "pointing to" its potential states and tendencies, really) rather than a fundamental regularity? If it can logically follow from the ax's nature that it splits wood, why can't it logically follow from the ax's regularities that an ax will split wood? <br /><br />I guess since I don't see how the first is really possible, I don't see how the latter is impossible. <br /><br />Just to give the opposing view: the idea is that an ax's splitting power logically follow from the assumptions about what holds true in the world, so that the explanation IS logically necessary in a way - but it holds true in the world in virtue of the assumptions tracking the world, not by the sheer force of logic. <br /><br />"From what I read it appears that you don't believe true [ultimate] causes exists."<br /><br />Indeed. <br /><br />Now,<br />"I think you are fooling yourself when you say that gravity is the explanation instead of saying its simply the best explanation we have."<br /><br />It certainly not an Ultimate Explanation. We don't have an ultimate explanation of the tides. <br /><br />But we DO have a Partial Explanation for it. We understand why tides are the way they are GIVEN gravity. These are the kinds of explanations that we DO have. Not dreams about what explanations we would like to have.<br />...יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16998307665032194552014-02-08T13:14:14.501-08:002014-02-08T13:14:14.501-08:00@ Steve:
"And I trust that you can understan...@ Steve: <br />"And I trust that you can understand that the ocean's inherent tendency to respond to gravity in a particular way is at least part of the explanation of the tides."<br /><br />The point of contention is whether this tendency should be construed as a regularity or a teleology.<br /><br />@ Glenn:<br />"3. And if there isn't anything wrong with putting a name to the way particular aspects of reality just are, then what is wrong with calling the way a particular aspect of reality just is it’s "inherent nature"?"<br /><br />The only thing is that when you do that, you need to be very careful to remember you're just using a term that describes what is, that describes regularities manifest in nature; not a term that prescribes what will be, not logical relations between things, or so on.<br /><br />@ William Dunkirk: <br /><br />"the chemist is not giving us a regularly occurring causal relationship but a necessary one and that's the difference."<br /><br />I'm sorry, but I fail to see your point. A regularity happens ""always", "without fail", "never ceases to be true"". [Or at least some do.] <br /><br />The chemist notes regularities in how things mix. He tells you what, under the assumption these regularities will be maintained, will happen if you do this or that. That's it. He's talking about regularities that are always true, and specifically about causal regularities (as opposed to, e.g., some regularities seen in quantum correlations). <br /><br />Yair יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16810721239529847632014-02-05T06:55:34.082-08:002014-02-05T06:55:34.082-08:00@ Yair.
I deny your objection: the chemist is not...@ Yair.<br /><br />I deny your objection: the chemist is not giving us a regularly occurring causal relationship but a necessary one and that's the difference.<br /><br /><b>1q of X + 10q's of Y = 5q's of Z</b>.<br /><br />There's nothing "regular" about that: it's necessary - "always", "without fail", "never ceases to be true".<br /><br />Again, when we water down the intrinsic necessity of causal relationships in our language ("usually", "normally", "regularly"), it is only because change happens in time -(or because we aren't exactly certain of the specific cause)- and, therefore, there can be extrinsic factors or variables that <b>might</b> interfere with the process; however, these are not a part of the process itself and do not interfere with it necessarily. That's what matters. But the relationship: <br /><br /><b>1q of X + 10q of Y = 5q of Z</b> <br /><br /><i>Is</i> a necessary causal relationship, such that you can say:<br /><br />"If you combine 'X' and 'Y', then you get 'Z'."<br /><br />If 'A' then 'B'.William Dunkirkhttp://catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8207253783493756502014-02-04T20:16:27.959-08:002014-02-04T20:16:27.959-08:00I must confess that I feel a powerful and arguably...I must confess that I feel a powerful and arguably anal-retentive urge to point out that 2 + 2 isn't 5. ;-)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59239647055472674232014-02-04T20:02:33.898-08:002014-02-04T20:02:33.898-08:00@Yair
"leap that doesn't exist in the Reg...@Yair<br /><i>"leap that doesn't exist in the Regularity model"</i><br /><br />That is just the point regularity gives us a predictive model not an explanation.<br />Finding a model is looking for the correct mathematical function that matter instantiates. <br />Where is the connection between the model and the matter that instantiates it. Isn't that a leap as well?<br />The purpose of this model and the reason it has been very useful is that it can help us make predictions about nature and help us tap into its power and allow us to manipulate it.Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90463233173873961962014-02-04T19:53:24.309-08:002014-02-04T19:53:24.309-08:00In contrast, Powers don't explain the splittin...<i>In contrast, Powers don't explain the splitting at all; they only add mystery to the explanation. First of all - as I explained above, it still assumes regularity. But furthermore - that the ax has the Power to split the wood either merely restates the fact that axes split wood or else is an entirely mysterious relation between the ax's Essence and the actual world. There is a metaphysical leap between the Platonic world and the Real world, a leap that doesn't exist in the Regularity model of "explanation", which simply appeals to what IS, to the Real world. </i><br /><br />The point is not what the explanation actually is. The point is what an explanation <b>must</b> be like to be an explanation at all. Whether or not the ax <b>is</b> the actual cause is not relevant. Rather IF the ax is the actual cause then it must have within it such a nature.<br /><br />From what I read it appears that you don't believe true causes exists. (True causes in the way I intend to use the term, not what you call a true cause. Again I am not trying to hijack terms. Rather in order to communicate an idea properly we must first use a common language. The common language doesn't always provide us with all the terms necessary for each and every idea. Which is why new words are invented. So if I wasn't clear how my use of the terms are different than yours I can try to clarify better)Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80248332304441608742014-02-04T19:52:17.674-08:002014-02-04T19:52:17.674-08:00An explanation must be of such where there can'...An explanation must be of such where there can't be a deeper one. Whether or not such an explanation actually exists or even if it were to exist whether or not we will be able to know of it. It will have to be of such a type that A will necessitate B, hence no deeper explanation exists. Tides are not necessary from mass. Sure once you see mass appears to cause it, it would therefore also appear to necessitate it. However its not the same thing. Its not helpful when you use terms in a fuzzy way to call it necessary. Its not necessary in the same way 2+2=5.<br /><br />So to be clear what I mean when I say necessary. It means logically necessary. The same way 2+2=5.<br /><br />So to make sure I'm clear. When I say explanation I mean where A necessitates B, in the way I explained necessitate above.<br />Although in the English language the term explain may not always be intended in the way I just used it. However I don't have a better way of getting the message across. And I'm not interested in playing a semantic game about what the term explanation really means. So as long as you understand the meaning of my message even if you don't like the term I chose, try to keep with it or give me a better term. For the sake of a coherent discussion.<br /><br />You may however argue that such an explanation doesn't exist. Maybe your right maybe your wrong. Unless you have a way of proving that it can't in fact exist at all. Not that we can't know of it, rather that it can't exist.<br /><br />However if it would exist it would not suffer from the brute fact problem the same way 2+2=5 doesn't. Hence it would not become circular or have an infinite regress problem.<br /><br />I hope I've explained it well enough for this<br /><br /><i>"Either A explains B or it does not. Saying that we can't get any better explanation does not mean that it has been explained.<br />Your statement there can't be further explanation (in this context), is equivalent to stating real explanations don't exist at all."<br /><br />I'm sorry, but these are just unsupported disconnected propositions. We can't have a discussion like that.</i><br />Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14759046079420387512014-02-04T19:51:44.043-08:002014-02-04T19:51:44.043-08:00@Yair
I'm not sure we mean the same thing whe...@Yair<br /><br />I'm not sure we mean the same thing when we talk about explanations.<br /><br />Let's use your example of tides. You say tides are explained by a universal called the law of gravity. Then you add that there can be no further explanation because in the end of the day you will always end up with a brute fact.<br />Lets assume your position for now. However you seem to think that tides need an explanation, but gravity itself does not. Hence gravity is your brute fact. The question is why don't we just leave tides as the brute fact. Just say that what IS is tides. "BRUTE FACT". It would seem that you assume mass attracting as Newton put it,(btw it happens to be wrong, but lets leave it for simplicity.) as the explanation, since you find it regularly true. So you moved the brute fact up one level. If you were to find in the future a universal which is more universal, which did in fact happen, you will be OK moving the BRUTE FACT up another level.<br />If that is the case than you are basically giving up at the last point of your knowledge. As if your knowledge as anything to do with whether or not something is an explanation.<br />I think you are fooling yourself when you say that gravity is the explanation instead of saying its simply the best explanation we have.<br /><br />So I think that gravity is not an ultimate explanation, since if had we found a better explanation we would go with it.<br />I don't think you would disagree with me thus far.<br />However you do point out that even had we found the deeper explanation to gravity, it would be no better than gravity itself. It would just be another brute fact piled on. The same way we added gravity on top of tides.<br /><br />While I wont disagree that this deeper explanation wont be any better, I disagree that therefor we should call it the explanation. Since we may in the future find another deeper one we should instead say as you've said we will never get any explanation for which we will say that there can't be a deeper one.<br /><br />While you say we can't have a better explanation than gravity (or its type), I still would not therefor call it an explanation, just BRUTE FACT. There is a difference and I don't want to confuse the terms.<br />Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18817952157429477672014-02-04T04:04:07.677-08:002014-02-04T04:04:07.677-08:00@ Harlyd:
"Either A explains B or it does no...@ Harlyd:<br /><br />"Either A explains B or it does not. Saying that we can't get any better explanation does not mean that it has been explained.<br />Your statement there can't be further explanation (in this context), is equivalent to stating real explanations don't exist at all."<br /><br />I'm sorry, but these are just unsupported disconnected propositions. We can't have a discussion like that.<br /><br />"Do we say it split for no reason without explanation or do we say the ax caused the wood to split. Is the ax an explanation? (based on how you understand explanation)"<br /><br />We say the ax caused it to split, which is a condensed way of saying that under typical conditions and operation, axes regularly split wood [or something to that effect]. <br /><br />The splitting is EXPLAINED by appealing to regularities. The explanatory power stems from the actual EXISTENCE of regularities - the regularities of the strength of metal vs. that of wood, for example. It is because these regularities hold that the ax split the wood.<br /><br />In contrast, Powers don't explain the splitting at all; they only add mystery to the explanation. First of all - as I explained above, it still assumes regularity. But furthermore - that the ax has the Power to split the wood either merely restates the fact that axes split wood or else is an entirely mysterious relation between the ax's Essence and the actual world. There is a metaphysical leap between the Platonic world and the Real world, a leap that doesn't exist in the Regularity model of "explanation", which simply appeals to what IS, to the Real world. <br /><br />More later; I gotta run.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58454070124548962032014-02-04T02:57:34.566-08:002014-02-04T02:57:34.566-08:00@ Jeremy Taylor:
"I think the central point i...@ Jeremy Taylor:<br />"I think the central point is that most people, including scientists, do not take regularities as brute facts."<br /><br />No one is suggesting we should practically do so.<br /><br />" It seems perfectly arbitrary to suggest that such regularities must be treated as brute facts whereas other aspects of these objects are treated as intelligible."<br /><br />I have explained the reasoning on why fundamental regularities are to be seen as brute facts, and why precisely that is what allows higher-level regularities to be intelligible. <br /><br />@ William Dunkirk <br /><br />"My argument...is meant to show that the so-called regularities are themselves derived from causal necessities."<br /><br />Alright - lay it out.<br /><br />"Time has no causal powers whatsoever"<br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br />"Causality is "If A then B": i.e., it is always a necessary relationship"<br /><br />Why is "If A then B" not a regularity ? The chemist is noting the regularity in nature; not the "necessary relationship", whatever that is.<br /><br />@ Harlyd :<br /><br />"All you can hope to say is that all we will ever have are certain assumptions"<br /><br />I can also say that the chain of assumptions must either end in a brute fact, or in circularity, or have an infinite regress. And that given a few assumptions about what explanation and reality is like, one ends up with "brute fact" as the only open option. Hence - it IS impossible to have further explanations, given those assumptions. You need to attack these assumptions if you wish to show brute facts aren't at the bottom of all explanations.<br /><br />"An explanation of something is quite simple. Does A necessitate B or not. "<br /><br />Sorry, but that just isn't clear and good enough. I don't understand the model of explanation you refer to, and fail to see any critique of the model of explanation that I've raised (regularities can be "necessary" in some sense, too - in the sense of being universal).<br /><br />"Regularities don't necessitate anything hence they aren't explanations."<br /><br />Sure they do. When you explain the tides using the universal (i.e. regular) law of gravity, you're appealing to the fact that things feel a given force and so on - facts that are "necessitated" by the regularity.<br /><br />"Is the attraction something that IS, is it the mass that IS or is the regularity something that IS?"<br /><br />It is the attraction. In this case. The important point is that something that IS is referred to; in Newtonian physics it's a force, an attraction, in contemporary physics it would be (amplitudes of) quantum fields.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82297433524547444982014-01-30T10:40:13.836-08:002014-01-30T10:40:13.836-08:00Incomplete quote; sorry. Should have been:
You c...Incomplete quote; sorry. Should have been: <br /><br /><i>You create the world - you decide what IS... Reality just is the way it is, irregardless of any "inherent" thing.</i> <br /><br />...etc.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84025638719293231582014-01-30T10:28:27.126-08:002014-01-30T10:28:27.126-08:00Yair,
You create the world - you decide what IS
...Yair,<br /><br /><i>You create the world - you decide what IS</i><br /><br />1. If reality just is the way it is, then what is wrong about putting a name to the way reality just is?<br /><br />2. And if there isn't anything wrong with putting a name to the way reality just is, then what is wrong with putting a name to the way particular aspects of reality just are?<br /><br />3. And if there isn't anything wrong with putting a name to the way particular aspects of reality just are, then what is wrong with calling the way a particular aspect of reality just is it’s "inherent nature"?<br /><br />4. IOW, what is wrong with saying that the “inherent nature” of a thing is just the way that that thing is?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28292468248914639152014-01-30T07:22:36.356-08:002014-01-30T07:22:36.356-08:00Certainly. I trust you still can understand (wheth...<i>Certainly. I trust you still can understand (whether you agree with that or not) why someone could nevertheless say that "Gravity explains the tides".</i><br /><br />And I trust that you can understand that the ocean's inherent tendency to respond to gravity in a particular way is at least part of the explanation of the tides.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85018954660594524702014-01-30T05:36:42.166-08:002014-01-30T05:36:42.166-08:00@ Anonymous:
"One could argue that it's ...@ Anonymous:<br /><br />"One could argue that it's not even pragmatically useful and does not mesh with the practice of scientists. "<br /><br />The idea that explanation ends in brute facts isn't pragmatically useful, or empirically relevant, at all. It's a metaphysical idea, not a physical theory.<br /><br />The idea that explanations are based on general regularities, however, is extremely useful and indeed leads scientists to seek precisely those deeper regularities that you noted in your post. And from this idea (plus some extra assumptions that are frequently made, such as that local reality can be given a finite description) it follows that such explanations will end up in a brute fact.<br /><br />From personal experience, it seems to me most scientists are at least vaguely aware of this idea and consider "Laws of Nature" to be the bottom-most layer of explanation.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16093287941550158062014-01-30T05:10:01.424-08:002014-01-30T05:10:01.424-08:00@ Haryld,
Atomism has all sorts of philosophical ...@ Haryld,<br /><br />Atomism has all sorts of philosophical problems. Until nuclear physics came along it was denied that an atom could change into another atom or one element on the periodic table could become another.<br /><br />The very name "atom" was meant to -and did- deny the existence of anything like quarks (and originally also anything like electrons or parts in the atomic nucleus like protons and neutrons). We got used to talking about atoms in terms of electrons, protons and neutrons (i.e. an atom being divisible into its parts) and these being called the "sub-atomic". Now we have the sub-sub-atomic, I suppose, quarks and the like. So there is nothing atomic about modern atoms or, in other words, the possibility that there are more parts in atoms that are or can act on other parts <i>qua</i> other has increased, such that sub-atomic activities and mysteries are almost certainly going to be understood in terms of one part acting on another.<br /><br />Personally, I have an issue with this idea that everything is reducible to electrons, protons and neutrons. It sounds too much like adding bricks to bricks and expecting them to be or become fundamentally not-brick, whilst being notwithstanding still composed of bricks.William Dunkirkhttp://catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67448338236323883222014-01-30T05:05:30.291-08:002014-01-30T05:05:30.291-08:00@yair
What do you find so complicated about expla...@yair<br /><br />What do you find so complicated about explanations?<br />Either A explains B or it does not. Saying that we can't get any better explanation does not mean that it has been explained.<br />Your statement there can't be further explanation (in this context), is equivalent to stating real explanations don't exist at all.<br /><br />If you see wood being split. Do we say it split for no reason without explanation or do we say the ax caused the wood to split. Is the ax an explanation? (based on how you understand explanation)<br />If you argue that axes regularly split wood hence its the explanation. Why aren't you looking for deeper explanations as you did for the cat that regularly coincided with the stock market crash from the example above? Why should other data help. If other data helps find the real or true explanation, shouldn't you look for more data than the ax?<br /><br />If not, you must explain why for the cat you find it necessary to use other data, but not for the ax.<br />Even if you found other data, why is the other data any better. They both happen regularly before the effect.<br /><br />I think it would be obvious to say that there is something about the ax that allows us to use it for the explanation which the cat does not have.<br /><br />The point is, that if no further explanation is possible, how do you decide which regularity you should accept?<br /><br />Whether or not one can <i>say</i> gravity is the explanation of tides is not relevant. Since this is not what is meant here as explanation during this discussion. Unless you want to play a semantic game.<br /><br />"Why can't you create a universe where something stone-like breaks glass every time?"<br /><br />I don't recall saying that you can't, at least in theory.<br /><br />"Perhaps even a world where it breaks glass some times, but not at others ? "<br />If this would be the case, the stone would not be the cause.<br /><br />"You create the world - you decide what IS" <br />If this were the case, I would be the cause not the stone.Harlydnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70499332289825054302014-01-30T01:34:26.388-08:002014-01-30T01:34:26.388-08:00@ Crude:
"It's not that no further expl...@ Crude: <br /><br />"It's not that no further explanation is possible, or even intellectually necessary - the Humean is just taking a position that cuts them off from considering that. They haven't discovered 'there can't be further explanation here' - they're just committing themselves to bruteness."<br /><br />They have discovered that, given the nature of explanation (as they understand it), Agrippa's trilemma, and under the assumption that existence can be given a local finite description - there cannot be further explanation. <br /><br />You can argue against these positions. But to say that they haven't discovered it, but merely asserting it - frankly, that's akin to Cyone saying that Aquinas doesn't believe in God as the ground of being.<br /><br />@ Steve:<br /><br />"While gravity may be a necessary condition for the tides, it is not a sufficient condition."<br /><br />Certainly. I trust you still can understand (whether you agree with that or not) why someone could nevertheless say that "Gravity explains the tides". <br /><br />@ Haryld:<br /><br />"If I understood Humes position correctly. (I never read him, only picked up bits and pieces from others. Sorry if I'm incorrect.)"<br /><br />I'm hardly an expert on Hume. I say things as I understand them, that's all.<br /><br />" I would posit that if we do have a universe in which stones shatter glass, although it didn't have to be so. It would only be possible if for whatever reason the stone and the glass has inherent within it such a nature. "<br /><br />Why? Why can't you create a universe where something stone-like breaks glass every time? Perhaps even a world where it breaks glass some times, but not at others ? <br /><br />You create the world - you decide what IS, what actually occurs at every single place and moment. And once that is set - it doesn't matter what is "inherent" in the stone, if there is such a thing at all. Reality just is the way it is, irregardless of any "inherent" thing.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.com