tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post7966635490489177013..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Reading Rosenberg, Part VIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57282509345222826802013-03-19T07:18:09.257-07:002013-03-19T07:18:09.257-07:00Thanks for this post: especially helpful I found y...Thanks for this post: especially helpful I found your differentiation between different kinds of teleologies and how atheists often assume "paleynism".<br /><br />Yet I find problematic the analogue between evolutionary history and a novel (not that that argument wouldn't work well in this context). The common perception is that evolution is wasteful and it seems somewhat counter-intuitive to suggest that God, the "author" of evolution, specifically meant all those extinct species to come about. Yet a novelist surely plans every character and event in his story very specifically.<br /><br />This is nothing new of course, but any thoughts on that? How long can one take the novelist analogue?Lari Launonenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02497017809623294623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19101939576941431122012-02-10T10:08:22.335-08:002012-02-10T10:08:22.335-08:00An accessible teaser of "The Atheist’s Guide ...An accessible teaser of "The Atheist’s Guide to Reality" can be found in a recent interview with him here:<br /><br />http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4209Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24796403009043258322012-02-03T14:47:28.948-08:002012-02-03T14:47:28.948-08:00Consider the following comparisons: the soul is an...<i> Consider the following comparisons: the soul is an individual thing; the substantial form is not an individual thing. The soul comes into being in nature; the substantial form is eternal. The soul is necessarily posterior to matter; the substantial form is prior to matter, for matter is for the sake of the form.</i> <br /><br />At least in this argument, George, you cannot use these points to prove that the soul "cannot be completely identified with the substantial form." For these points are precisely points that I am not in agreement with, not simply anyway. Yes, <i>there is a sense</i> in which the substantial form precedes the matter, and ANOTHER sense in which the substantial form (i.e. with respect to a really existing being) does not. The substantial form <i>in one sense</i> does not come into being in nature, and <i>in another sense</i> it does. All of your supporting points require one to gloss over different senses, and I don't grant that we can gloss over them for this discussion. At least, you haven't made the argument for why we should. <br /><br />Before God created man, the form "rational animal" existed - not really, but notionally, as the exemplar known in God's mind. When God made Adam and Eve, then 2 instances of rational animals existed, and in them, "rational animal" is the same form, but in each one that form is made individual by being informing THIS matter or THAT matter. <br /><br /><i>In a very real sense, however, the soul and the substantial form are the same thing. For the soul is nothing other than the substantial form insofar as the latter inheres (or has inhered) in determinate matter.</i> <br /><br />And that makes me think that we are really just talking past each other. Isn't this just about what I was saying?Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36979044251150980192012-02-03T12:50:21.423-08:002012-02-03T12:50:21.423-08:00Form is made individual by matter, though. Matter ...<i>Form is made individual by matter, though. Matter JUST IS the principle of individuation. That's all over Aristotle. Form determines matter with respect to kind and actuality, yes, and matter "determines" form in a different sense by individuation.</i> <br /><br />Who’s denying this? Didn’t I say that the substantial form is indeterminate with respect to the individual thing?<br /><br /><i>Switch over to a human being for clarity: it is true that in one sense the human-ness that is my human-ness is identical with the human-ness that is Bob's - on the level of "in principle", which is also identical with the exemplar that God knew before creation.</i> <br /><br />I don’t have a problem with this, either. But perhaps it would be better to say rather, “Human-ness is the formal principle of every individual human being existing in reality.” How's that?<br /><br /><i>But it is also absolutely certain that the form of a human IS the soul, and each person's soul is distinct from every other person's soul. My soul is not identical to Bob's soul.</i> <br /><br />Clearly the soul cannot be completely identified with the substantial form, so everyone may be identical with respect to the latter, and different with respect to the former. Consider the following comparisons: the soul is an individual thing; the substantial form is not an individual thing. The soul comes into being in nature; the substantial form is eternal. The soul is necessarily posterior to matter; the substantial form is prior to matter, for matter is for the sake of the form. Furthermore, although the soul is the form of the body, it is not the form of the substance, and to speak precisely, the soul is not the substance of the man at all, but rather a property of the substance.<br /><br />In a very real sense, however, the soul and the substantial form are the same thing. For the soul is nothing other than the substantial form insofar as the latter inheres (or has inhered) in determinate matter.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29193762185593206802012-02-02T17:11:12.023-08:002012-02-02T17:11:12.023-08:00TheOFloinn: "No, potency does not mean power....TheOFloinn: <i>"No, potency does not mean power."</i><br /><br />Unfortunately I've been away from the computer for a few days but... if you're still around TheOFloinn... I was commenting on this:<br /><br />Edward Feser, (January 29, 2012 11:28 AM) said... <br /><i>Hi Daniel,<br /><br />Yes, when it is said that God is pure actuality and devoid of potency, what that means is that He is devoid of any</i> passive<i> potency (the capacity to be affected by anything) whatsoever. But He is supreme in what is sometimes called</i> active<i> potency or power -- the capacity to affect other things. ("Potency" is also a word for power, after all -- as in "omnipotent.") See </i>Summa Theologiae<i> I.25.1: <br /><br />http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025</i>Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74448463164748318522012-02-02T16:20:01.703-08:002012-02-02T16:20:01.703-08:00Form is determined by form, not by matter. If form...<i>Form is determined by form, not by matter. If form were determined by matter, then matter would be form, and form would be matter, which is absurd.</i> <br /><br />Form is <i>made individual</i> by matter, though. Matter JUST IS the principle of individuation. That's all over Aristotle. Form <i>determines</i> matter with respect to kind and actuality, yes, and matter "determines" form in a different sense by individuation. <br /><br /><i>Therefore, while the substantial form “oakness” is indeterminate with respect to a real oak tree, it is NOT indeterminate with respect to the “oakness” of that real oak tree. The “oaknesses” of both are, in fact, identical.</i> <br /><br />I don't think so. Switch over to a human being for clarity: it is true that <i>in one sense</i> the human-ness that is my human-ness is identical with the human-ness that is Bob's - on the level of "in principle", which is also identical with the exemplar that God knew before creation. But it is also absolutely certain that the form of a human IS the soul, and each person's soul is distinct from every other person's soul. My soul is not identical to Bob's soul. On the level of actual existences, the form that is in the matter "informing" it is distinct in each individual instance of that species - each man for example. <br /><br />Unless you want us all to have one big soul, you have to accept that soul's are distinct in separate individuals.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7109934756660304532012-02-02T14:45:33.883-08:002012-02-02T14:45:33.883-08:00George R,
yes, Avicennians do.
it wouldn't a...George R,<br /><br />yes, Avicennians do.<br /><br />it wouldn't affect the argument. i'm totally with you in holding that forms do not come from nature.<br /><br />thanks for the recommendation. i've been meaning to read that text for a while now.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5161688473109840692012-02-02T13:13:41.357-08:002012-02-02T13:13:41.357-08:00Well, that puzzles me. I thought the whole point o...<i>Well, that puzzles me. I thought the whole point of the substantial form of a natural thing (say, an oak tree) is that it "informs" the matter so that the matter is the "matter of" an oak tree.</i><br /><br />I was not being clear enough. The point I was trying to make was that whatever is generated is a composite of form and matter. But form itself is not a composite of form and matter. It’s just form. Therefore, form is not generated.<br /><br />But the following, I believe, is a more serious problem:<br /><br /><i>In the natural thing, the substantial form is made particular and determinate by being "in" the matter of one individual tree. When we say "the substantial form of the oak tree in my back yard," then, we specify a substantial form that has individual existence, which is over and above the kind of "in principle" existence of "oakness" that "was" before the 4th day of creation.</i><br /><br />One thing has to be understood in order to avoid nominalism: while the substantial form is indeed indeterminate with respect to the individual thing existing in reality, it is definitely NOT indeterminate with respect to the essence of that thing -- that is, with respect to its own form. And how could it be? Essence is determined by essence, not by accidents. Form is determined by form, not by matter. If form were determined by matter, then matter would be form, and form would be matter, which is absurd. Therefore, while the substantial form “oakness” is indeterminate with respect to a real oak tree, it is NOT indeterminate with respect to the “oakness” of that real oak tree. The “oaknesses” of both are, in fact, identical. So, there is no difference between the “oakness” of the oak tree in your backyard, and the “oakness” in the mind of God before the creation of the world.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11841954788632867402012-02-02T10:50:58.908-08:002012-02-02T10:50:58.908-08:00Anon,
Does anybody hold the opinion of Avicenna t...Anon,<br /><br />Does anybody hold the opinion of Avicenna today? <br /><br />Even if Avicenna were correct, I do not see how it would affect my argument, which is that substantial forms do not come from nature.<br /><br />As for good sources, I would say the best first step is to read (carefully) an annotated edition of the essay <i>On Being and Essence</i> by St. Thomas. Here is the link to a good one: http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/Blackwell-proofs/MP_C30.pdf<br /><br />This will help you to distinguish between what essence (substantial form + primary matter) is and what it isn’t.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37940510776283668932012-02-01T19:24:16.839-08:002012-02-01T19:24:16.839-08:00But the substantial form qua form is not a composi...<i> But the substantial form qua form is not a composite, nor does it inhere in matter.</i> <br /><br />Well, that puzzles me. I thought the whole point of the substantial form of a natural thing (say, an oak tree) is that it "informs" the matter so that the matter is the "matter of" an oak tree. Isn't this "inhering in matter"? <br /><br /><i>They are not eternal in reality, of course, for in reality they only exist in matter, but as principles they are necessarily eternal. This eternity of substantial forms, which can in no way be gainsaid by anyone calling himself an Aristotelian,</i> <br /><br />...<br /><br /><i> But what about the substantial form? The answer is found in the Physics: the final cause and the formal cause are numerically one. In other words, the substantial form is none other than the final cause of the process of generation. The substantial form is that for the sake of which there is such and such process of generation and all the elements involved in it. Therefore, the form is the cause of the process of generation, and not the other way around.</i> <br /><br />Wait a minute. Is this an equivocation, or is it merely my misunderstanding you thoroughly? <br /><br />The form "oakness" is eternal and unchanging, and it "is" always in the same way: in principle. That kind of "is", though, is not the same kind of being that "oakness" has when (on the 4th day of creation, for example) when God made the first oak tree. Once you have a real oak tree really existing, the form "oakness" not only "is" in principle, but it "IS" in a new way also. In the natural thing, the substantial form is made particular and determinate by being "in" the matter of one individual tree. When we say "the substantial form of the oak tree in my back yard," then, we specify a substantial form that has individual existence, which is over and above the kind of "in principle" existence of "oakness" that "was" before the 4th day of creation. <br /><br />"Oakness" does not come to be or pass away. But it seems to me the individuate substantial form of the oak tree in my back yard begins to exist at the same time the tree begins to exist, and not before. In the process of generation, the substantial form is not generated (I agree with you there) but it begins to be qua individual when it had not been before, and that individuated being is being under a different sense. <br /><br />When Aristotle says (especially about generation) the final cause and the formal cause are numerically one, he is, I think, referring to one-ness at the level of the form existing in principle, not in re. For, the man who is beginning to generate is acting for a final cause that exists in him already in a way that the formal cause does not exist in the child yet to exist. The father's human-ness is real, individuate substantial form. In operation, it ACTS to generate because that's (one of) the things to-be-human means in operation. Thus generating just is being a fulfilled human being, an individual human living its formal principle in full, and that human-ness in operation is the purpose, the end. But it is the operation of the father, not the son. The son's human-ness comes FROM the father, and is not his father's own human-ness in fulfilled operation. The father's being-in-fulfillment is not numerically the son's being-in-fulfillment, nor is it numerically the son's human-ness. I think.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77343626332390810472012-02-01T12:47:11.024-08:002012-02-01T12:47:11.024-08:00George R,
what if one were to hold, with Avicenna...George R,<br /><br />what if one were to hold, with Avicenna, that the substantial forms come from Active Intellect, which is a separate substance?<br /><br />on a related note, what are good sources for the question of evolution/transformism vis-a-vis Aristotelian/Scholastic principles? thanks in advance.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1695011232716423092012-02-01T06:39:01.042-08:002012-02-01T06:39:01.042-08:00In that case, Tony, I’ll see what I can do.
First...In that case, Tony, I’ll see what I can do.<br /><br />First of all, we have to understand where the substantial form <i>doesn’t</i> come from. It doesn’t come from nature; for it can in no way either be generated or come into being in nature. That is basic Aristotelianism. For only that which is a composite of form and matter can be generated, and only that which inheres in matter can ever come to be in nature. But the substantial form qua form is not a composite, nor does it inhere in matter. Therefore, it can never be generated, nor can it ever come to be in nature. Therefore, all substantial forms are necessarily eternal with respect to nature. They are not eternal in reality, of course, for in reality they only exist in matter, but as principles they are necessarily eternal. This eternity of substantial forms, which can in no way be gainsaid by anyone calling himself an Aristotelian, is alone enough to obliterate any and all theses of Darwinian transformism. <br /><br />Now, the substantial form insofar as it exists in matter is the formal cause of the thing, with the matter being the material cause. These are the two intrinsic principles of the thing, and they are also the principles by which the thing was generated. Therefore, they were already there, somehow, before the composite was generated. But how were they there? Now, it’s not too hard to see where the matter comes from: it was formerly the substrate of the material elements of the process of generation. But what about the substantial form? The answer is found in the <i>Physics</i>: the final cause and the formal cause are numerically one. In other words, the substantial form is none other than the final cause of the process of generation. The substantial form is that for the sake of which there is such and such process of generation and all the elements involved in it. Therefore, the form is the cause of the process of generation, and not the other way around. Therefore, the process of generation depends on the form, and not the other way around. <br /><br />The substantial form qua form is the unmoved mover of nature, and can never itself be moved or changed. And since it is the principle of all nature, its cause cannot be natural.<br /><br />Objections?George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27078878605006039342012-02-01T03:06:53.353-08:002012-02-01T03:06:53.353-08:00But George, I admit to ignorance on this.But George, I admit to ignorance on this.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7757998665487962952012-01-31T18:41:52.837-08:002012-01-31T18:41:52.837-08:00Very good, George. Well said. Go ahead and answer ...<i>Very good, George. Well said. Go ahead and answer it, please.</i><br /><br />What, do <i>I</i> have to explain everything around here? Why don't you tell us, Tony? Then you can have all the glory -- assuming you nail it, of course.<br /><br /><br /><i>Might I make bold to inquire after your Flynnish roots?</i><br /><br />Well, I know my grandfather was a cop in Providence, RI. That doesn't get me quite back to Cromwell, but maybe I can dig up something more.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9364938243779050392012-01-31T18:20:32.317-08:002012-01-31T18:20:32.317-08:00@George:
au contraire: Darwin believed his theory ...@George:<br />au contraire: Darwin believed his theory to be brainless. I have simply noted what Thomas Aquinas and others would have noted; viz., that evolution is replete with telos (and from natural telos, Thomas' Fifth Way takes us interesting places. It was simply that the "ultra-Darwinians" have taken a perfectly serviceable scientific theory and deformed it into a metaphysical stance. <br /><br />Recall what Thomas wrote in passing regarding the emergence of new things: <i>Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. (Summa theologica, <br />Part I Q73 A1 reply3)</i> His point was, following Augustine, that God had endowed matter with natures capable of acting directly, and so new things could arise from the natural powers created in the beginning. He was wrong about the "putrefaction," but "mutation" is surely another form of corruption, and "the stars and elements" will do for "material bodies." <br /><br />+ + +<br />Might I make bold to inquire after your Flynnish roots? Mine go back through the Delaware Valley (NJ & PA) to Loughrea, Co. Galway, and thence to Ballinlough, Co. Roscommon in Cromwell days.TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43423266048220526292012-01-31T17:49:37.424-08:002012-01-31T17:49:37.424-08:00George: They must posit substantial forms in orde...George: <i>They must posit substantial forms in order to avoid nominalism. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to require from somebody professing himself to be a thomist to explain where he believes substantial forms come from.</i> <br /><br />Very good, George. Well said. Go ahead and answer it, please.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65931274887413020162012-01-31T17:41:25.320-08:002012-01-31T17:41:25.320-08:00OFloinn,
If you had as much faith in God as you a...OFloinn,<br /><br />If you had as much faith in God as you apparently do in Darwin's brainless theory, you'd make St. John of the Cross look like a slacker.<br /><br />And before you get all mad at me, I think you should know I'm an Irishman. And guess what my mother's maiden name is: Flynn.<br /><br />(I know I just made your night. Didn't I?)George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29528602609759738512012-01-31T14:32:13.947-08:002012-01-31T14:32:13.947-08:00I
No, potency does not mean power. Potency means ...I<br />No, <b>potency</b> does not mean power. Potency means something like capability, possibility, might-be-ness. It is opposed to <b>actuality</b>. A big blue bouncy ball is <i>actually</i> blue; but it is <i>potentially</i> red (e.g., sunlight might bleach the dye in some way as to change its coloring.) To say that there is no <b>potency</b> in God is to say that there is nothing that he <i>might could be</i> because, quite simply, He "IS". <br /><br />II<br />Telos in evolution. At the species level, the telos is greater fitness to the niche (which includes not just the passive "environment" but also the active use the organism makes of the environment). The word <b>adapt</b> is from <i>ad aptare,</i> which means "toward aptness or aptitude." (Those organisms that are inapt or inept are weeded out.) <br /><br />On the broader level, let us call the telos of evolution "the origin of species." That is, the end it the multiplication of species in time and space. <br /><br />"Ends" must be proportional to the "causes." It is silly to cite a particular biological species as the end of evolution in general. Specific ends for specific cases; general ends for generic cases.<br /><br />However, empirically speaking, evolution does have a broad tendency toward greater complexity. Even after the complex life of the Mesozoic was destroyed and life rebooted, it one again moved toward more and more complex forms.TheOFloinnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14756711106266484327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3075839098961826992012-01-30T16:01:24.678-08:002012-01-30T16:01:24.678-08:00Dr. Feser: "Yes, when it is said that God is ...Dr. Feser: <i>"Yes, when it is said that God is pure actuality and devoid of potency, what that means is that He is devoid of any passive potency (the capacity to be affected by anything) whatsoever. But He is supreme in what is sometimes called active potency or power -- the capacity to affect other things. ("Potency" is also a word for power, after all -- as in "omnipotent.") See Summa Theologiae I.25.1:"</i><br /><br />Thank you, thank you, thank you!<br /><br />Just to be clear, in the Summa passages you referred to; we can substitute "potency" for "power"? <br /><br />Objection 1 makes a lot more sense to me that way. ("It seems that <i>potency</i> is not in God" vs. "It seems that <i>power</i> is not in God".)Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23807101547054371792012-01-30T15:34:12.840-08:002012-01-30T15:34:12.840-08:00I hope you don't mind but I reposted and comme...I hope you don't mind but I reposted and commented to give you a bit of a review here: <br /><br />http://battleforthecoreoftheworld.blogspot.com/2012/01/in-depth-edward-feser-on-biological.html.<br /><br />Keep up the good work.Jonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13649212855990056161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9760614352486157742012-01-30T08:59:03.949-08:002012-01-30T08:59:03.949-08:00Damn! Slip of the keyboard.
"I don't &qu...Damn! Slip of the keyboard.<br /><br />"I don't "believe in Rosenberg" at all; there was a smile in my comment."<br /><br />Whoops, in light of your clarification I now understand what you're saying and I had you wrong. <br /><br /><i>"That's so clear that I'm almost led to believe that in Rosenberg's argument (which I don't know first hand) there must be something more than that."</i><br /><br />Well that makes more sense. Its possible though that a) he has un-mentioned hidden propositions that justify his position b) he's incompetent c) it's only so clearly wrong because Edward Feser has laid it out clearly.<br /><br />I'd be interested in hearing if anyone can verify that that is the full argument Rosenberg uses there.soumynonAnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85903630740385124892012-01-30T08:50:37.836-08:002012-01-30T08:50:37.836-08:00Moreover, Ed, you say that the substantial form of...Moreover, Ed, you say that the substantial form of man, i.e., the soul, must come from God. Okay, but where do all the other substantial forms come from? Do they come from God, too? If not, where do they come from? They must come from somewhere, no?<br /><br />It is important to understand that Darwin didn't believe in substantial forms; he fully embraced nominalism. Thomists, on the other hand, do not have that luxury. They must posit substantial forms in order to avoid nominalism. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to require from somebody professing himself to be a thomist to explain where he believes substantial forms come from.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28926019391061295882012-01-30T07:48:48.183-08:002012-01-30T07:48:48.183-08:00(cont)
The most they need to maintain is that God...(cont)<br /><br /><i>The most they need to maintain is that God intended some biological species or other to come into existence at some point or other to which rational souls might in principle be conjoined.</i><br /><br />Agreed, though that's certainly an awkward fit, since the potential to be conjoined with an immaterial rational soul wouldn't have any survival value in and of itself until the soul is actually conjoined, though I suppose that in a multiverse such a thing would inevitably happen anyway (although if God is directly imparting souls, it seems a bit odd that He'd use a multiverse to create their bodies). And the idea that God imparted the rational soul (which I agree can be proven by reason) is just as incompatible with Darwinism (here I mean the idea that Darwinian mechanisms account for all the appearance of purpose in living things) as the idea that His intention is necessary to explain the eye or the bacterial flagellum, since even though it's not material, it's still a trait possessed by biological entities which affects their behavior.<br /><br /><br /><br /><i>it does not in fact follow even from the most anti-teleological interpretation of Darwinism that this result was improbable -- or at least not improbable from the relevant, “God’s eye” point of view -- for reasons Rosenberg himself should have seen given his commitment to the multiverse hypothesis.</i><br /><br />Btw, why does it never occur to multiverse proponents that the multiverse is incompatible with Darwinism, or at least incompatible with the idea that Darwinian mechanisms explain what materialists say they do? If you need practically infinite universes to account for why evolution ended up making rational creatures like ourselves, then Darwinian evolution itself doesn't really explain our existence after all, and you're really appealing to raw chance. To invoke the multiverse is basically to concede that Darwinism isn't a sufficient explanation for our existence if there is only one universe. In fact, it basically concedes that within our universe, mutations were *not* random with respect to outcome, but that our existence as rational creatures is the outcome of an extremely fortunate series of events that would have to be chalked up to divine intent if it weren't for the multiverse.The Deucehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09664665914768916965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37771082951798134042012-01-30T07:47:57.530-08:002012-01-30T07:47:57.530-08:00Hi Ed,
For he argues that Darwinism not only make...Hi Ed,<br /><br /><i>For he argues that Darwinism not only makes theism unnecessary (as he falsely assumes), but is positively incompatible with it...<br /><br />Obviously, everything depends on how one understands “Darwinism” and “theism.”</i><br /><br />I think the correct way to understand Darwinism is in its own context. Darwin basically subscribed to the same mechanistic philosophy of Paley, complete with denial of intrinsic teleology in biology or anything else, but he was endeavoring to show how even the teleology in biology (which Paley took to be extrinsic) could be eliminated, thus (he thought) subsuming all of reality into the mechanical philosophy. It was meant to be a comprehensive elimination of teleology, including in humans who were supposed to be just another result of ateleological events. Taken to its logical conclusion, it implies the non-existence of teleology even in the human mind. It's actually eliminativism as approached from biology and working up.<br /><br />It suffers from the same basic problem that eliminativism in general does (namely that it must assume the very purpose it tries to eliminate), which is why you've got all the various "interpretations" of Darwin that attempt to deal with the incoherence it creates in various ways. And, of course, Darwin had some ideas, such as the idea that environmental pressures can "select" particular variations by weeding out others, that aren't incoherent by themselves, but result in incoherence when you attempt to use them as a comprehensive, eliminative "explanation" for the appearance of purpose in biology.<br /><br /><br /><br /><i>First and most fundamentally, it is very odd for Rosenberg to claim that any theism worth bothering with must hold that God intentionally created the human race, specifically. It’s true that some forms of theism (such as Christianity) hold that man was made in God’s image, but that claim is logically independent of the proposition that the God of classical theism exists.</i><br /><br />I'm not completely sure about this. I know that the God of classical theism is not anthropomorphic. Nevertheless, in A-T philosophy, what we can know of the divine attributes we know by analogy to powers like our own, correct? Doesn't this require that we are like Him in some ways? If we suppose that eliminativism/materialist-reductionism is true (and yes, I realize they're incoherent) about humans, that they're mechanistic, that they aren't really rational, that there's really no such things as the self or personhood, that there's no intrinsic teleology and hence no end or good for humans and that what they call "good" is merely an evolutionary contrivance, etc - if we suppose all that, and then try to grasp God's attributes by analogy to human "powers" so defined, don't you end up with something that is drastically less than the God of classical theism? At best, it seems, you could deduce only the impersonal aspects of God that way, which wouldn't imply a God at all.<br /><br />Thus, it seems to me that to argue to the God of classical theism, you must start with the premise that man is a rational creature (which isn't question-begging, since the denial of man's rationality is incoherent even on its own terms). And it can be shown that man's rationality implies the immateriality of his soul, the existence of the self, etc, which imply something very like Imago Dei. So it doesn't seem right to me to say that the claims are logically independent, even if you don't have to assume Imago Dei directly as a premise to classical theism.The Deucehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09664665914768916965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66953674215957235442012-01-30T06:57:26.372-08:002012-01-30T06:57:26.372-08:00@soumynonA (BTW, your name should be "suomyno...@soumynonA (BTW, your name should be "suomynonA" :) ).<br /><br />I don't "believe in Rosenberg" at all; there was a smile in my comment.<br /><br />What I mean is: how can Rosenberg be so naive to make an argument like "nobody knows the outcome of evolution, we are highly improbable, no omniscient God could do that".<br /><br />It's obvious that an omniscient God would know that we are the final result, no matter how "improbable" or complex the process.<br /><br />That's so clear that I'm almost led to believe that in Rosenberg's argument (which I don't know first hand) there must be something more than that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com