tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post7783393273083326643..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Progressive dematerializationEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger69125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61195073157012314422014-12-07T10:29:01.779-08:002014-12-07T10:29:01.779-08:00…existence/activity at different times.…existence/activity at different times.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64613909021493152832014-12-07T10:27:05.733-08:002014-12-07T10:27:05.733-08:00@VinceS:
"An ontological thing (substance) c...@VinceS:<br /><br />"An ontological thing (substance) can't be purely 'material', because matter doesn't exist except when instantiating a form."<br /><br />I think what you <i>mean</i> here is basically right, but the way you're saying it isn't quite.<br /><br />A substance isn't (in the strict sense) immaterial <i>just</i> because it has (in a looser sense) immaterial aspects. Gold, for example, is a hylemorphic "compound" of matter and form, but as a substance it's fully material. So is an oak tree, a stalk of corn, or any other plant that has only a vegetative soul/form. So is a dog, a duck, or any other animal that has only a sensitive soul/form. It's only when we get to substances with rational souls/forms that we come to substances that aren't strictly material.<br /><br />In each case what's important is not whether the matter can exist apart from the form, but whether the form can exist apart from the matter. The human/rational soul/form can do so; although it's an incomplete substance when it's not embodied, it doesn't just fail to exist at all.<br /><br />"So is the reason why qualia are 'corporeal' and cognition is not because for qualia the material and immaterial aspects are simultaneous (e.g. it is 'intrinsically dependent' on a bodily organ) while for cognition they are not (e.g. abstraction is only 'extrinsically dependent' on the brain)?"<br /><br />My previous post is in reply to this question, but I'd like to amplify one point. Simultaneity doesn't have anything to do with it <i>directly</i>; what matters is ontological dependence. It follows, as a consequence of the dependence of qualia on bodily organs, that (assuming qualia exist at all) they exist simultaneously with the operations of those organs. But intellect can be simultaneous with brain activity; "extrinsic dependence" doesn't imply non-simultaneity, <i>i.e.</i>, at different times.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66943512845612478502014-12-07T09:17:23.585-08:002014-12-07T09:17:23.585-08:00@VinceS:
"Let me see if I have this right.&q...@VinceS:<br /><br />"Let me see if I have this right."<br /><br />Sensation is "material" (in the strictest sense) because by nature it requires bodily organs, and intellect isn't because it doesn't.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91368298812973976922014-12-07T06:51:13.600-08:002014-12-07T06:51:13.600-08:00Daniel,
"Thinking about it James Ross’ Thoug...Daniel,<br /><br />"Thinking about it James Ross’ Thought and World deals with questions of modality on a broader scale in some of the later chapters. It's available online on Ross' webpage if you haven't already seen it."<br /><br />Thanks (and for the UVic link). I just shifted back into the theist camp, so I'm looking at most theist modal systems for the first time. Now that I've allowed immaterial entities back into my ontology, Lewis's realism is too inelegant to continue holding.John Westnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60439516337340848232014-12-07T03:22:08.503-08:002014-12-07T03:22:08.503-08:00@John West,
My concern was to whether grounding N...@John West,<br /><br />My concern was to whether grounding Necessary Truths, truths of essence, in the Divine Nature would in some sense make them contingent and in principle alterable to Divine Fiat, a position compared to which something like modern Platonism would seem more likely. On the Classical view of Divine modality this is not so though as the necessity of the essence is a limited expression of the necessity of the Divine Nature itself. Leftow himself doesn't exactly share this view himself though just reading about it and the alternatives was helpful. I've managed to dig out a link to that review - hope it still works:<br /><br />http://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/pir/article/view/13165/4075<br /><br />Thinking about it James Ross’ <i>Thought and World</i> deals with questions of modality on a broader scale in some of the later chapters. It's available online on Ross' webpage if you haven't already seen it.<br /><br />@All you Thomists,<br /><br />For what it's worth I am sceptical as to the sufficiency of explaining modality in terms of Act and Potency unless it really amounts to shorthand for talking about the ways in which God could create (which is essentially how Scotus and latter Leibniz took it). We should reach God through objective essences qua eternal truths possibilities and not the other way.<br /><br />We may distinguish Possibility into 'Logical Possibility', which means that the entity in question is not impossible of its essence, and 'Concrete Possibility', which means the existence or perhaps even potential existence of a prior being (other than God) with the power to bring the existence of the being in question about. <br /><br />This can be illustrated with reference to the Principle of Plenitude: the Principle, or at least the formulation of it I have in mind, goes something like 'Given a sufficiently long period of time anything that is possible is actual' (we will take the 'anything' here as referring to species not particulars). However in the light of the above what it should really read is 'Given a sufficiently long period of time anything that is possible is actual <i>providing there be a potential efficient cause to bring it about</i>'.<br /><br />This ties in with a concern I have with the Third Way* in that it is indeed ‘logically possible’ for all material beings to go out of existence but is it ‘concretely possible’ i.e. can any material being or conjunction of material beings bring that state-of-affairs about? The Third Way in as much as it relates to Contingency would seem destined to default to the Second. <br /><br />*At least given the formulation Ed seems to prefer. I know Robert Maydole has given a Modal reading of it in terms of Possible Worlds.Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53317482468484350852014-12-06T07:11:34.669-08:002014-12-06T07:11:34.669-08:00@grodrigues:
Very slick. Thanks!@grodrigues:<br /><br />Very slick. Thanks!Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36889050304415425602014-12-06T06:41:30.863-08:002014-12-06T06:41:30.863-08:00@Scott:
"Sure, it's possible to define a...@Scott:<br /><br />"Sure, it's possible to define a weird metric on what looks like a(n almost) square bit of 2-space so that it comes out "circular" with that metric."<br /><br />Intermezzo: the maximum norm will do that for you: e. g. for a 2d-vector v = (x, y) define its norm |v| as the maximum of x and y. The metric or distance between v and u is |v - u|. A general construction via Minkowski functionals shows that every balanced convex set (some hypothesis is missing here; too lazy to check it out) is the unit ball of some norm and vice-versa.<br /><br />The maximum norm is geometrically bad because, unlike the usual Euclidean metric, it does not come from an inner product. All 2d metrics that come from inner products have ellipses as unit balls, so if you additionally require some extremal condition you end up with the Euclidean metric.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-367705642645637482014-12-05T19:45:59.133-08:002014-12-05T19:45:59.133-08:00(Please append to m penultimate paragraph and real...(Please append to m penultimate paragraph <i>and really possess both properties</i>.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4414331240189853842014-12-05T19:44:48.520-08:002014-12-05T19:44:48.520-08:00@Bob:
"'The form triangularity is of its...@Bob:<br /><br />"'The form triangularity is of itself universal and one' may not be necessarily true."<br /><br />I think I see what you mean, but I don't think there's a genuine problem here.<br /><br />Here's what I take you to mean, so tell me if I'm misunderstanding you: it may be that one and the same real object may seem to instantiate one proposed "universal" under one set of conditions or from one point of view, but another, contrary "universal" under another set of conditions or from another point of view. Therefore there's some question about whether the object in question really instantiates either of those proposed "universals," and thus about whether they're genuinely "universals" at all.<br /><br />If that's what you mean, then I agree that it's a question with which realists about universals must deal. But I don't think it's especially difficult for them (or us, since I'm one) to deal with.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1234/Colorful_World.pdf" rel="nofollow">Anna Marmodoro has argued</a> (I think effectively) that an object really possess all of the colors with which it might appear to any observer under any set of conditions. If she's right, then one and the same object can be both (say) this precise shade of red and that somewhat different shade of red; it's just that these colors are <i>contraries</i> only when (so to speak) they're "competing" for a spot in someone's perceptual experience under certain conditions. The object possesses them both, but doesn't manifest them under the same conditions, and the powers to <i>appear one shade of red to one perceiver under one set of circumstances</i> and to <i>appear another shade of red to another perceiver under another set of circumstances</i> aren't contraries.<br /><br />If that's sound, then surely it's also sound to say that the same object can appear circular to one observer under one set of conditions and square to another observer under another set of conditions.<br /><br />Aside from that, it's also not at all clear why this or that object's not being <i>absolutely</i> circular (appearing circular under any and all conditions to the exclusion of any other shape) means that circularity isn't a real universal. As far as I can see, the "circularity" shared by two objects that appear circular-under-certain-conditions-to-certain-perceivers is a perfectly fine universal. That is, a property or character doesn't cease to be a real universal merely because it's exemplified or instantiated only under certain conditions.<br /><br />Have I addressed your point?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12820136929859649952014-12-05T15:57:48.772-08:002014-12-05T15:57:48.772-08:00Daniel,
Thank you. Out of curiosity, what worried...Daniel,<br /><br />Thank you. Out of curiosity, what worried you in relation to Actualism?John Westnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10363648477281264582014-12-05T14:47:06.851-08:002014-12-05T14:47:06.851-08:00@Scott
"The form triangularity is of itself ...@Scott<br /><br />"The form triangularity is of itself universal and one" may not be necessarily true.Bobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01529469776603870975noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80847546989191801182014-12-05T14:07:51.983-08:002014-12-05T14:07:51.983-08:00@Bob:
"Right and as such I suppose one might...@Bob:<br /><br />"Right and as such I suppose one might consider this weird fact with regards to universals."<br /><br />In what way?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54787285710813946512014-12-05T14:07:05.569-08:002014-12-05T14:07:05.569-08:00The Penrose Triangle is especially interesting bec...The Penrose Triangle is especially interesting because it's perfectly unexceptionable as a two-dimensional image; it generates problems only when we try to interpret that two-dimensional image as a drawing of a three-dimensional object according to the usual conventions of lighting/shading, rules of perspective, and so forth.<br /><br />The figure itself is entirely possible (that's why Matt can show us one) but there's no possible 3-D object of which it can be regarded as a drawing. In a sense we can see that object's parts, but we can't assemble them into a consistent whole.<br /><br />It's thus an illustration (and, I think, a very good one) of the fact that there can be references (like "square circle") that successfully refer only "partway," so to speak.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44029931185195979912014-12-05T14:00:51.330-08:002014-12-05T14:00:51.330-08:00@Scott
Right and as such I suppose one might cons...@Scott<br /><br />Right and as such I suppose one might consider this weird fact with regards to universals.Bobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01529469776603870975noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62345357367568739062014-12-05T13:28:59.091-08:002014-12-05T13:28:59.091-08:00re: square circles
I have only ever thought of th...re: square circles<br /><br />I have only ever thought of them as a useful illustration of nonsense. In that sense (hehe) there is something specific about a square circle that, indeed, is not shared by "non-being", "nonsense" and other such terms. I want to say that the use of the term is how I'd consider it. I've always thought of square-circles, married bachelors, and so on as illustrative. <br /><br />Actually, this brings to mind the Penrose Triangle. That is a thing, after all, I can show you one. A square circle would be harder to draw, but there are some impossible shapes that are possible to represent visually.Matt Sheeannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73540126356358781392014-12-05T12:29:18.415-08:002014-12-05T12:29:18.415-08:00@John West,
I have yet to read it fully myself bu...@John West,<br /><br />I have yet to read it fully myself but there is an essay in by Gerald J. Hughes in the anthology <i> Mind, Metaphysics and Value in the Analytic and Thomistic Tradition</i> which looks to deal with exactly these issues. It's entitled 'Ontology and the Art of the Possible.<br /><br />Brian Leftow's <i>God and Necessity</i> presents a magisterial take on questions of modality though in connection with the grounding in the Divine Nature rather than Act and Potency per say. There was a review of it linked to a while back here which summarised some of the interesting points. It (just the review) certainly helped me a lot with worries vis a vis Actualism.<br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78893669765815516912014-12-05T10:23:00.904-08:002014-12-05T10:23:00.904-08:00@Bob:
"It would be circular with respect to ...@Bob:<br /><br />"It would be circular with respect to all points being actually equidistant while simultaneously being square relative to an observer outside this bit of distorted space."<br /><br />Right. Equivalently, I think, it would be circular under one metric (the weird one) and square under another (the presumably Euclidean one the observer is implicitly using).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57578648225637070322014-12-05T10:05:51.824-08:002014-12-05T10:05:51.824-08:00@Scott,
It would be circular with respect to all ...@Scott,<br /><br />It would be circular with respect to all points being actually equidistant while simultaneously being square relative to an observer outside this bit of distorted space.<br /><br />So no, there is no danger to non-contradiction in this instance. However, it may bring up some issues with regards to the op.Bobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01529469776603870975noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20989903374770893802014-12-05T10:00:02.245-08:002014-12-05T10:00:02.245-08:00Let me see if I have this right.
An ontological t...Let me see if I have this right.<br /><br />An ontological thing (substance) can't be purely "material", because matter doesn't exist except when instantiating a form. However, one can talk of the material aspect (the matter) and the formal aspect (the form). Likewise, a property of a substance can be "material" (e.g. insofar as the matter is affected) or "formal" (immaterial; insofar as the form is affected).<br /><br />So, qualia are "material" insofar as the matter is affected (e.g. by signals traveling down the optic nerve and processed in the visual cortex). However, they aren't entirely material because the form is also affected (something is experienced).<br /><br />Cognition is "material" insofar as sense information is used to construct phantasms (e.g. neural representations). But it has a completely immaterial aspect when understanding of universals are abstracted from the phantasms (e.g. there is no neural activity associated with this; matter is not affected).<br /><br />So is the reason why qualia are "corporeal" and cognition is not because for qualia the material and immaterial aspects are simultaneous (e.g. it is "intrinsically dependent" on a bodily organ) while for cognition they are not (e.g. abstraction is only "extrinsically dependent" on the brain)?<br />VinceSnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3983967362207754402014-12-05T09:56:18.995-08:002014-12-05T09:56:18.995-08:00@John
I never said one needed to distort 3 dimens...@John<br /><br />I never said one needed to distort 3 dimensions...obviously...Bobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01529469776603870975noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43133623673305078322014-12-05T09:54:27.654-08:002014-12-05T09:54:27.654-08:00(Also, Bob, I promise I wasn't trying to be ne...(Also, Bob, I promise I wasn't trying to be nearly as unhelpful as I was, this time. I was on a bus, with a tablet.)John Westnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29301242649705744682014-12-05T09:49:22.980-08:002014-12-05T09:49:22.980-08:00Does Oderberg go into Thomistic modality more than...Does Oderberg go into Thomistic modality more than Dr. Feser? Also, has anyone tried defining a symbolic logic system with act and potency operators?John Westnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51428715216139576132014-12-05T09:39:52.382-08:002014-12-05T09:39:52.382-08:00I see Scott has given a much more helpful reply.I see Scott has given a much more helpful reply.John Westnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31913196923588650352014-12-05T09:35:22.983-08:002014-12-05T09:35:22.983-08:00@Matt Sheean and Daniel:
Matt: "We know what...@Matt Sheean and Daniel:<br /><br />Matt: "We know what a circle is and we know what a square is, and know that one has characteristics that exclude the possibility of being the other."<br /><br />I think that's the key point, yes. I do have to agree with Daniel, though, that "square circle" has content and "non-being" doesn't.<br /><br />I suspect that what's going on in the "square circle" reference is that we're actually referring to <i>two</i> properties (squareness and circularity) or forms (square and circle). In fact, if Matt is right that we can see the two are mutually exclusive even as we make the reference, then we must be.<br /><br />@Bob:<br /><br />Sure, it's possible to define a weird metric on what looks like a(n almost) square bit of 2-space so that it comes out "circular" with that metric. That might be one way of giving a non-contradictory meaning to "square circle," but of course the object wouldn't be both square and circular (thus not-square) in the same respect.<br /><br />Likewise for a three-dimensional circular cylinder with equal diameter and height. Viewed from the side, it looks square; viewed from the end, it looks circular. Here, too, the two properties aren't contraries, so it's not contradictory for one shape to have both.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86094929742701835432014-12-05T09:07:01.689-08:002014-12-05T09:07:01.689-08:00A circle is a two-dimensional shape, so no.A circle is a two-dimensional shape, so no.John Westnoreply@blogger.com