tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post741509553166814472..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Reading Rosenberg, Part IIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger798125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76128380745230704732012-01-11T22:58:13.621-08:002012-01-11T22:58:13.621-08:00(continued)
“My understanding is that potential b...(continued)<br /><br />“My understanding is that potential being and potentiality are the same thing.”<br /><br />Then let my comments be a warning to you, that you will probably come across this difference in understanding in your readings.<br /><br />“After all, something either exists or it does not exist. It does not make sense to say that something exists more than something else that also exists.”<br /><br />In terms of first actuality of course not. In terms of second actuality it does make sense. In other words, in terms of formal causality of course not. In terms of final causality it does make sense.<br /><br />“My contention is that the reason why S1 and S2 are different, despite a common R, is that from different perspectives, there are aspects of R that are perceived in one perspective that are different from aspects of R that are perceived in another perspective.”<br /><br />I understand your contention well. I think I've latched onto your position many posts ago and haven't needed to revise my understanding much. But to understand this stuff you have to be more familiar with substance and accident and analogy of being. Think of R in both cases as being a substance. Substances can undergo different modifications to become more determined. Transitioning to analogical predication, in each case R is modified by a different mode of being which together gives T a different sense. It isn't that the overall sense (or determined substance) is the same in each and we only look at different aspects which gives us different senses. It is that the mode of being really is different which makes the combined unity of referent and mode of being different in both cases, thus making the sense different.<br /><br />“You seem to argue that act of existence is the same as act of existence in a particular mode of being when they clearly are different.”<br /><br />They are both the same and different as substance is related to a more fully determined substance (analogy of being, anyone?).<br /><br />“And remember, the whole reason why you have to show this is because this would undermine my argument about analogy, because I am arguing that all analogies between two terms must ultimately reduce to univocal predication, and that means the same term, the same sense, and the same referent in both propositions. You are trying to demonstrate a counter-example to this claim, and thus far, have come short.”<br /><br />The kicker is in “ultimately reduce”, so far, it is nothing short of nonsense. Try to concretely follow your process of “ultimately reducing” and you'll find that you are turning a principle into a term and trying to compare it where there is no comparison. You're trying to steal the center stage from the original comparison of predications—analogicality or univocality will have none of it.<br /><br />If you'd like to continue this discussion please do email as I won't comment on this thread anymore. If you'd like the last word on this thread, then go ahead and do so, just email me (and whoever else... at least Jack) afterwards and we can go from there. If you'd like.<br /><br />All in all, it's been a decent discussion and I have learned a lot. Thank you to everyone. Especially to the persistent (but only the humbly persistent, right?).<br /><br />Ciao,<br />MichaelMichaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69951304025538040712012-01-11T22:57:46.154-08:002012-01-11T22:57:46.154-08:00dguller,
“Michael and I both agree that in order ...dguller,<br /><br />“Michael and I both agree that in order for any analogy to be possible, there must be a shared “something” between two things being compared...”<br /><br />Yes.<br /><br />“...and the question is whether you can still have a valid analogy even if this shared “something” cannot be understood or known at any level of analysis.”<br /><br />No. In analogical predication that common something is a principle... one knows this.<br /><br />“What is the referent of “real” in (1) and (2)?”<br /><br />An act of existence. Note, I do not mean “act of existence” but instead act of existence. The referent is not another term but a principle. We just don't speak about words that refer to other words ad infinitum; there are realities apart from the words we use.<br /><br />“You wrote that “real” in (1) and (2) has the same referent, i.e. an act of existence. You then stated that “real” in (1) and (2) has different senses, because the mode of being differs in (1) and (2) between a material mode of being in (1) and an immaterial mode of being in (2). But notice what you did there. You stopped talking just about an act of existence being the referent of “real”, and changed the subject (or as I put it initially, the context) from talking about act of existence to mode of being, and thus the referent of “real” has also changed from act of existence to mode of being in the next context. Thus, the different senses that you described are solely due to your changing the subject, and thus changing the referent.”<br /><br />First, I did change the “subject” (different meaning than what follows) from talking about the act of existence (subject) to the act of existence's mode of being (subject's modification). Even so, the referent never changes and is still an act of existence. I think you are still treating the referent as a term instead of a principle.<br />Second, if I did say material and immaterial mode of being, I'm not so sure that would be the best way (or even correct) to categorize them. If I am not mistaken, it would be better to say that the mode of being of the referent in (1) is substantial and in (2) it is according to reason.<br /><br />“Goodness of X is defined as the degree to which X’s final cause is actualized.”<br /><br />For the sake of brevity and staying on track I'm dropping this. All in all, it's not a bad definition, especially for a budding Aristotelian as yourself :).<br /><br />“But there are two predications. You say, “both predications”, which implies the presence of two predications. Otherwise, what does “both” mean? So, there are two predications, and there is a common principle that is shared between them, and thus the context is appropriate for whether or not this common principle must be understood univocally when compared between two predications. I contend that it must be, at some level of analysis, or else everything is fuzzy and indeterminate, and thus we cannot be said to know anything at all.”<br /><br />Yes, there are two predications. And yes, there is a common principle between them. But the common principle is not a term and is not being compared (both conditions would have to be true to attribute univocality or analogicality). Instead, it is the meaning of the common term that is being compared. <br /><br />“You don’t have to “fully apprehend the entire meaning of the predication”. However, you should at least partially apprehend some of the meaning, and that part must not be fuzzy or indeterminate, but rather by univocal and determinate when talking about the shared principle between X and Y.”<br /><br />I do apprehend some of the meaning, that the referent-principle is identical in both predications. But in order for this principle to be univocal or analogical it would a) have to be a term, and b) it would have to be the subject of comparison—it is neither.<br /><br />(continued)Michaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75972088103270000312012-01-11T09:54:05.055-08:002012-01-11T09:54:05.055-08:00Michael:
And here is another way of looking at th...Michael:<br /><br />And here is another way of looking at things.<br /><br />Say you have a term T that is used in two sentences (1) and (2), and that T refers to R in both sentences. The next step would be to show that although T refers to R in both (1) and (2), that T has sense S1 in (1) and sense S2 in (2). My contention is that the reason why S1 and S2 are different, despite a common R, is that from different perspectives, there are aspects of R that are perceived in one perspective that are different from aspects of R that are perceived in another perspective. <br /><br />Take your “real” example. “Real” refers to an act of existence, whether material or immaterial. In (1), “real” refers to a material act of existence, and in (2), “real” refers to an immaterial act of existence. My contention is that when you are <i>only</i> talking about an act of existence, then mode of being plays no role at all, and thus there is a single sense and referent, because the perspective is only of something existing in the sense of not being non-being, i.e. <i>act of existence</i>. However, the different senses come in when you bring different modes of being into the equation, and once you have done that, then you have changed the perspective and context to not <i>just</i> act of existence, but <i>also</i> mode of being. And once you have done that, you have changed the referent. Why? Because “real” refers not <i>just</i> to <i>act of existence</i>, but to either <i>act of existence in a material mode of being</i> or <i>act of existence in an immaterial mode of being</i>, and these are <i>different referents</i>, and that is why there are two senses.<br /><br />You seem to argue that <i>act of existence</i> is the same as <i>act of existence in a particular mode of being</i> when they clearly are different. Sure, they are related, because anything that exists will manifest itself in a particular mode of being, but just because they are necessarily interconnected does not mean that they are coextensive and have the same referent. Your own example above of laughter and intellect was supposed to show this very idea, i.e. that just because two things are related does not mean that they reduce to the same thing, and thus you implicitly agree with it. In fact, once you start including mode of being to act of existence, then you are <i>adding</i> information, and once you have done that, you have changed the referent from just <i>R</i> to <i>R plus extra X</i>, even if X is necessarily related to R. Addition is necessarily related to subtraction, but they are different processes, for example.<br /><br />That is why I continue to believe that you have not shown how the same term can be used in two sentences, and have the same referent, but different senses. And remember, the whole reason why you have to show this is because this would undermine my argument about analogy, because I am arguing that all analogies between two terms must ultimately reduce to univocal predication, and that means the same term, the same sense, and the same referent in both propositions. You are trying to demonstrate a counter-example to this claim, and thus far, have come short.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71928604443286320972012-01-11T06:30:49.096-08:002012-01-11T06:30:49.096-08:00Like I said, analogical predication, though a kind...<i>Like I said, analogical predication, though a kind of comparison, isn't the same as a normal analogy. It's used to compare how our linguistic tools are used, not tell us about the essence of the referent. Though, once we understand how our linguistic tools are being used, we might better understand the essence of the ultimate signification.</i><br /><br />This just seems like a non sequiter to me. We are talking about the referent, and thus linguistic tools necessarily must be part of the equation, because we are using language to refer to something in reality, and to try to understand it by comparing it to something else that we believe we understand better. And again, when we are <i>talking</i> about X by comparing it to Y, then the question of univocality is appropriate when applied to the shared principle between X and Y. <br /><br /><i>P in this case is the referent principle, X and Y are the two different predications of a single term. Analyzing the function of the term in both sentences tells me that the term in both predications has a common referent. That doesn't mean that I am always able to fully apprehend the entire meaning of the predication.</i><br /><br />You don’t have to “fully apprehend the entire meaning of the predication”. However, you should at least <i>partially</i> apprehend <i>some</i> of the meaning, and that part must not be fuzzy or indeterminate, but rather by univocal and determinate when talking about the shared principle between X and Y. Again, there must be something about the referent principle that is identical between X and Y, and we must be able to properly understand at least part of that referent principle. And the part that we do understand can be construed as being the underlying foundation between the univocal meaning between the single term applied to both X and Y. <br /><br /><i>You aren't using the terminology correctly. It seems to me you are using the principle of potentiality as interchangeable with potential being. I don't think they are the same. I want to check how potentiality and actuality and potential being are all related; I forget exactly where it was spelled out beautifully... either Copleston's Aquinas or Feser's, or somewhere else... Copleston's History?'</i><br /><br />My understanding is that potential being and potentiality are the same thing. They both refer to something that is not actually present, but that could be present in the future. And that means that my terminology is fine, and my arguments stand, and potential being is problematic, to say the least. <br /><br />Incidentally, another Thomist idea that I’ve recently reconsidered and found to be wanting is his identification of goodness with being. He argues that the more an entity conforms to its essence in reality, the more good it is, which is fine, but he also argues that it must have more being than another entity that conforms less with its essence. I don’t see why this follows at all. After all, something either exists or it does not exist. It does not make sense to say that something exists more than something else that also exists. Sure, you can say that one thing is more good than the other in terms of more closely conforming to an ideal, but I don’t see how this implies that one thing has more <i>reality</i> than another, as if being is some kind of stuff that is quantifiable and exists in degrees.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77399212528835310972012-01-11T06:30:25.297-08:002012-01-11T06:30:25.297-08:00Michael:
No. The word “real” doesn't refer to...Michael:<br /><br /><i>No. The word “real” doesn't refer to a mode of being. The referent the word refers to has a mode of being.</i><br /><br />What is the referent of “real” in (1) and (2)?<br /><br /><i>Yes, we can agree that when we have two different referents, it is possible that the senses are different (they might be the same as well). The problem is that we do not have two different referents at all. There is only one referent. Any attempt to get another one in there is changing the subject of what we are looking at.</i><br /><br />Let’s return to your examples:<br /><br />(1) The dog is real.<br />(2) The concept of a dog is real.<br /><br />You wrote that “real” in (1) and (2) has the same referent, i.e. an act of existence. You then stated that “real” in (1) and (2) has different senses, because the mode of being differs in (1) and (2) between a material mode of being in (1) and an immaterial mode of being in (2). But notice what you did there. You stopped talking just about an act of existence being the referent of “real”, and changed the subject (or as I put it initially, the context) from talking about act of existence to mode of being, and thus the referent of “real” has also changed from act of existence to mode of being in the next context. Thus, the different senses that you described are solely due to your changing the subject, and thus changing the referent. <br /><br /><i>I'll allow that your definition covers all cases for the sake of argument. This isn't a definition of essential definition, but it may help: What in your definition told us what goodness is, rather than when it is present?</i><br /><br />Goodness of X is defined as the degree to which X’s final cause is actualized. That is what “goodness” is. What else do you want? A square is a geometric shape composed of four lines of the same length, connected end to end at right angles. That is what a square <i>is</i>. What sense is there to say that I have only said when a square is present rather than what a square is. Again, what else do you want?<br /><br /><i>When I say that both predications have the same principle in common, namely the referent, I am not analyzing my language in this sentence—to do so is to change the subject of what we are analyzing. When I say “both predications have one principle in common” I am using those terms in their usual meaning. But there is no univocality until you have at least two predications to compare; I am not comparing the meaning of two predications in this phrase.</i><br /><br />But there <i>are</i> two predications. You say, “both predications”, which implies the presence of two predications. Otherwise, what does “both” mean? So, there are two predications, and there is a common principle that is shared between them, and thus the context is appropriate for whether or not this common principle must be understood univocally when compared between two predications. I contend that it must be, at some level of analysis, or else everything is fuzzy and indeterminate, and thus we cannot be said to know anything at all.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2562269393932143162012-01-11T05:21:34.902-08:002012-01-11T05:21:34.902-08:00This is not “pointing out a fallacy” *unless* you ...<i>This is not “pointing out a fallacy” *unless* you are asking me to believe that not only am I wrong in not being able to see how you have defeated the argument, but (more importantly) so were great thinkers from Aristotle to Feser inclusive who also haven’t seen what, if you’re correct, is an *obvious* flaw (well obviously those who came before Aquinas wouldn’t have noticed flaws in the Fifth Way, but when Aristotle, for example, defined God as “thought of thought” or “understanding of understanding” he is, again if you’re correct, making the same mistake).</i><br /><br />Again, just because great thinkers agree upon the truth of a proposition does not mean that it is actually true. The issue is the evidence and reasons for the proposition in question. Rather than bring in what great thinkers said, why not just provide their arguments and proof for the issue at hand? In other words, show how you go from “the only way that we can conceive of the possibility of final causation is if an intellect is involved” to “the only <i>possible</i> way is for an intellect to be involved”. You would have to support the intermediate premise that <i>if X is inconceivable to human beings, then X is necessarily false</i>. There are many examples where this is true, such as in logic and mathematics, but there are also many examples where this is untrue, such as in the history of science and philosophy. So, it is not a reliable premise at all, if sometimes it is true, and sometimes it is false. And without it, your argument cannot be deductive, and thus cannot be metaphysical.<br /><br /><i>With regards to your question about “how God’s intellect can contain all forms, but be simple and without any parts or components” I’m no theologian and I don’t know the answer but it doesn’t seem radically insoluble; God is the proper ‘object’ of His Intellect, and in a similar way that the persons of the Trinity are not essential differences , He is in a sense all forms while the Forms finite, created minds apprehend are different aspects of the same Essence. When Aristotle says, of knowledge, that the soul in a way becomes all things, I conceive of a potential knower receiving the form of the object known; but God’s Knowledge actually is all things, an All-Form.</i><br /><br />Here’s my problem with that answer. How can only apprehend different aspects of X if X has no parts? What exactly is different if X is the same through and through? In order for X to have appear differently from different perspectives, it must have asymmetries, and that would imply some parts of X having some properties, and other parts of X having other properties, and thus X would have to have <i>parts</i>. Take a sphere. It looks exactly the same no matter how you look at it, because it is perfectly symmetrical. Take a cylinder. It looks like a circle from the top and bottom, but like a rectangle from the sides. It is asymmetrical, because it is basically composed of two circles and parallel lines connecting the circumferences. In other words, it has <i>parts</i>. If you eliminate parts, then you eliminate differences, and thus if God is simple, then multiplicity cannot be contained within his Essence, because that multiplicity must have parts.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4804540129325979812012-01-11T05:21:10.776-08:002012-01-11T05:21:10.776-08:00Jack:
You say you don’t know what ontological sta...Jack:<br /><br /><i>You say you don’t know what ontological status truths such as those of relations, or mathematics, might have, and suppose that they’re simply “immaterial” but not necessarily “mental”; but then how could we know them? Is there something we can detect with material means that isn’t “real” or something we can come to know intellectually that isn’t a “thought”? For Aquinas, following Aristotle, immateriality is the root of knowledge.</i><br /><br />Well, once we know something it is necessarily mental and immaterial, but before we know something immaterial, then it is only immaterial and not mental. You seem to imply that the immaterial and the mental are essentially the same thing whereas I think that the mental is a subset of the immaterial. Why do you think that the immaterial is necessarily mental?<br /><br /><i>Modify your example so that in response to the question “How is X like Y?” you reply, “There is no real thing that X and Y share in common, but I can conceive of a relation between the two objects that is neither a univocal participation in a common concept, nor merely equivocal” remembering that a term is univocal iff its signification is precisely the same in regard of all the subjects of which it is predicated.</i><br /><br />I don’t think that this solves the problem, because you are just asserting what needs to be demonstrated. Michael and I both agree that in order for any analogy to be possible, there must be a shared “something” between two things being compared, and the question is whether you can still have a valid analogy even if this shared “something” cannot be understood or known at any level of analysis. <br /><br /><i>A pillar of the community need not be supporting a society made of stone against the force of gravity for you to understand more about the man so described.</i><br /><br />But “preventing something from collapsing” is a common property that is shared. Whether that prevention occurs due to physical forces, intellectual forces, emotional forces, or any other forces is what differentiates the two pillars, but they share a common property nonetheless. And this again demonstrates that any analogy must ultimately be reducible to a common univocal property (broadly defined).<br /><br /><i>you haven’t in any of your posts shown that final causation is possible in any other way, you’ve complained about what you see as question-begging and an argument from incredulity . </i><br /><br />I don’t have to offer any alternatives to how final causation is possible to conclude that your argument is fallacious. You are generalizing from the human capacity to hold future plans in the mind while building artifacts to this being a universal and necessary means of achieving this end. There is no way to demonstrate this deductively, and I welcome you to try. All you can show is that there must be something presently actual to guide the process, but whether that “something” necessarily must be an intellect is an inductive argument from human beings, and thus not a metaphysical demonstration at all. If you want to argue that it is <i>likely</i> that a divine intellect is behind final causation, then that is worth considering, but then you must admit that the Fifth Way is a probabilistic argument and not a metaphysical demonstration.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64476322292450760162012-01-09T21:55:39.516-08:002012-01-09T21:55:39.516-08:00(continued)
“Do you understand either X or Y any ...(continued)<br /><br />“Do you understand either X or Y any better? Has your knowledge been extended?” <br /><br />Like I said, analogical predication, though a kind of comparison, isn't the same as a normal analogy. It's used to compare how our linguistic tools are used, not tell us about the essence of the referent. Though, once we understand how our linguistic tools are being used, we might better understand the essence of the ultimate signification.<br /><br />“Furthermore, if you say that X and Y share P in common, but you have no idea what P is, then how can you even say that they share P in common at all? To say something about P, you must at least have some conception of P, and if you lack any conception of P, then you cannot talk about P at all! That has been the issue all along.”<br /><br />P in this case is the referent principle, X and Y are the two different predications of a single term. Analyzing the function of the term in both sentences tells me that the term in both predications has a common referent. That doesn't mean that I am always able to fully apprehend the entire meaning of the predication.<br /><br />“The problem with the internal version of potential being actually guiding the behavior of a being in the present is that potential being becomes actual being, and thus this account negates the very existence of potential being. The problem with the external version is that something non-existent in the present is actually influencing the present.”<br /><br />You aren't using the terminology correctly. It seems to me you are using the principle of potentiality as interchangeable with potential being. I don't think they are the same. I want to check how potentiality and actuality and potential being are all related; I forget exactly where it was spelled out beautifully... either Copleston's Aquinas or Feser's, or somewhere else... Copleston's History?'<br /><br />I'm game with email, though I don't know how much more I can really contribute as I've said all of what I know on analogical predication. My email it is my last name followed by my first name with no underscore or period inbetween at the famous gmail. If you can't get it just let me know.<br /><br />I intend to be lazy, so if you move to email, cc me in.<br /><br />Ciao,<br />Michael PetersonMichaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61835298075594128312012-01-09T21:54:38.605-08:002012-01-09T21:54:38.605-08:00dguller,
Welcome back.
“You are talking about “...dguller, <br /><br />Welcome back.<br /><br />“You are talking about “real”, which can refer to a number of possible referents, including act of existence and mode of being.”<br /><br />No. The word “real” doesn't refer to a mode of being. The referent the word refers to has a mode of being.<br /><br />“When “real” refers to act of existence, then it has a different sense and referent from when “real” refers to mode of being. Can we agree upon this?”<br /><br />Yes, we can agree that when we have two different referents, it is possible that the senses are different (they might be the same as well). The problem is that we do not have two different referents at all. There is only one referent. Any attempt to get another one in there is changing the subject of what we are looking at.<br /><br />“You admit that my definition covers all cases, and yet is not essential. How exactly is it not an essential definition then? What is your definition of “essential definition”?”<br /><br />I'll allow that your definition covers all cases for the sake of argument. This isn't a definition of essential definition, but it may help: What in your definition told us what goodness is, rather than when it is present?<br /><br />“The problem is how you can know what this “one principle in common” is supposed to be without univocal meaning at some point...”<br /><br />When I say that both predications have the same principle in common, namely the referent, I am not analyzing my language in this sentence—to do so is to change the subject of what we are analyzing. When I say “both predications have one principle in common” I am using those terms in their usual meaning. But there is no univocality until you have at least two predications to compare; I am not comparing the meaning of two predications in this phrase.<br /><br />(continued)Michaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-988036851292103672012-01-09T17:02:06.917-08:002012-01-09T17:02:06.917-08:00dguller
With regards to your question about “how ...dguller<br /><br />With regards to your question about “<i>how God’s intellect can contain all forms, but be simple and without any parts or components</i>” I’m no theologian and I don’t know the answer but it doesn’t seem radically insoluble; God is the proper ‘object’ of His Intellect, and in a similar way that the persons of the Trinity are not essential differences , He is in a sense all forms while the Forms finite, created minds apprehend are different aspects of the same Essence. When Aristotle says, of knowledge, that the soul in a way <i>becomes</i> all things, I conceive of a <i>potential</i> knower receiving the form of the object known; but God’s Knowledge <i>actually</i> is all things, an All-Form.<br /><br />I imagine Michael or BenYachov could give you a better answer but you could always seek out (dare I say) more authoritative answers to your question in the books on your reading list and the links you’ve been given in this thread. <br /><br />Anyway the stuff about elves and fairy-dust wasn’t a serious answer but a cheap shot to illustrate how badly you’d abused the Scholastic adage of making a distinction when you meet a contradiction. I regret making it, but I maintain your ‘potential-potential’ is no distinction (it’s a nonsense akin to elves and fairy-dust), and there was no contradiction to justify you making it.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71173217755649490812012-01-09T16:59:12.398-08:002012-01-09T16:59:12.398-08:00dguller,
These responses of yours were addressed ...dguller,<br /><br />These responses of yours were addressed to Michael but I’d like to comment:<br /><br />DGULLER: Here’s an example. I say: “X is like Y”, and you quite reasonably ask: “How is X like Y?” I reply: “I don’t know. It just is.” You say: “But what do X and Y share in common?” and I reply: “I don’t know. But it’s something.”<br /><br />ME: Modify your example so that in response to the question “How is X like Y?” you reply, “There is no real thing that X and Y share in common, but I can conceive of a relation between the two objects that is neither a univocal participation in a common concept, nor merely equivocal” remembering that a term is univocal iff its signification is precisely the same in regard of all the subjects of which it is predicated. <br /><br /> A pillar of the community need not be supporting a society made of stone against the force of gravity for you to understand more about the man so described.<br /><br />DGULLER: That is not what Jack is saying at all. He is saying that he trusts Aristotle and Aquinas to have discovered the truth, and thus believes their propositions on the basis of this trust, which is essentially an appeal to authority. In fact, he conceded as much at December 20, 2011 4:52 PM.<br /><br />ME: Sure I copped to the ‘appeal to authority’ charge because I don’t think it’s a crime. But I think you’ve mischaracterized what I did say:<br /><br />Remember this started with you defending yourself like this, “<i>First, I am simply pointing out a fallacy in Aquinas’ argument. Surely, this does not “impute stupidity or dishonesty” in him, but only refers to his all-to-human capacity to have made a mistake in his arguments.</i> “ <br /><br />A summary of my responses to this: you haven’t in any of your posts shown that final causation is possible in any other way, you’ve complained about <i>what you see as</i> question-begging and an argument from incredulity . This is not “pointing out a fallacy” *unless* you are asking me to believe that not only am I wrong in not being able to see how you have defeated the argument, but (more importantly) so were great thinkers from Aristotle to Feser inclusive who also haven’t seen what, if you’re correct, is an *obvious* flaw (well obviously those who came before Aquinas wouldn’t have noticed flaws in the Fifth Way, but when Aristotle, for example, defined God as “thought of thought” or “understanding of understanding” he is, again if you’re correct, making the same mistake). <br /><br />An appeal to authority is only an informal fallacy and simply pointing out “You’re weighting that guy’s testimony because he’s an expert in the field” says what exactly? In fact, it <i>is</i> reasonable that we incline towards more faith in the accuracy and sincerity of those who have demonstrably earned it. <br /><br />You’ve failed to show the authorities’ arguments to be misleading, inappropriate, irrelevant, or questionable – my appeal to them was probably unnecessary and <i>that</i> I do concede. On the other hand we could all do with the occasional reminder to humility.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89396578003724709962012-01-09T16:55:25.530-08:002012-01-09T16:55:25.530-08:00dguller, Michael, BenYachov: Happy New Year!
Here...dguller, Michael, BenYachov: Happy New Year!<br /><br />Here’s my email address: Vaughn (dot) Bodie (at) gmail (dot) com ... some comments in another thread have prompted me to think: I don’t think Dr Feser is charged by Blogger for the bandwidth we’re using in this thread, but seeing as every comment is now moderated we’re almost certainly impinging his bandwidth in another sense. I’ve three quick posts and then I’m happy to receive emails from you if that’s better.<br /> <br />dguller, <br /><br />Can I ask you to read the<a href="http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/reality.htm#56" rel="nofollow"> chapter on Realism and First Principles</a> from Pere Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s <i>Reality—A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought</i>?<br /><br />There’s no point in us discussing proofs for a Personal God (or anything else) if, at any point, you can just reject something that really should be taken for granted. The chapter will also help you understand what I mean when I say the Universe is exhausted by talking of “things” and “thoughts” (or, if you prefer “mind” and “matter”, or “real” and “ideal”) – even Plato’s Third Realm of Ideal Forms (some version of which you seem inclined to accept) is a “mental” realm, as I cannot think how else I should describe “ideas”?<br /><br />Really, when you ask, “<i>And since when is “real” and “ideal” the only possibilities?</i>” (1757 post on Christmas Eve), or when you say, “<i>Relations are neither things nor thoughts, but something else entirely.</i>” , I read you asking me why material and immaterial and nothing else. And of course my answer is because the meanings of “material“ and “immaterial” tell us that if it’s not one, it’s the other. I can see that my associations aren’t obvious and apologize for not being clearer, though your objections on this point have been sort of empty.<br /><br />You say you don’t know what ontological status truths such as those of relations, or mathematics, might have, and suppose that they’re simply “immaterial” but not necessarily “mental”; but then how could we know them? Is there something we can detect with material means that isn’t “real” or something we can come to know intellectually that isn’t a “thought”? For Aquinas, following Aristotle, immateriality is the root of knowledge.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62488216712378540602012-01-09T05:42:57.081-08:002012-01-09T05:42:57.081-08:00Finally, please don't pull the authority card ...<i> Finally, please don't pull the authority card on Jack. It's perfectly legitimate to say one doesn't know what he's talking about when he doesn't understand Aristotle or some other historical figure's position. It's not an appeal to authority because Jack isn't trying to say those ideas are true because so-and-so said so, but only that so-and-so said such-and-such and not the nonsense that you have been saying.</i><br /><br />That is not what Jack is saying at all. He is saying that he <i>trusts</i> Aristotle and Aquinas to have discovered the truth, and thus believes their propositions on the basis of this trust, which is essentially an appeal to authority. In fact, he conceded as much at December 20, 2011 4:52 PM. <br /><br /><i> The historical positions are very much the main point of this thread as you claimed that you had an argument against a particular position put forth by a particular historical figure. I think it's fair that you should understand such a figure's position before you criticize it.</i><br /><br />I know that my claims are different from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’. That does not necessarily imply that I do not understand them, unless you are claiming that their rationale is so powerful that <i>anyone</i> who understands them would necessarily agree with them as truth. That’s quite a strong claim, especially since they were fallible human beings who likely made at least some mistakes. As Aquinas’ teacher, Albert the Great, wrote: “If Aristotle had been a god then we must think that he never made a mistake. As he is a man, he has certainly made mistakes just like the rest of us”. I’m sure you would not disagree with that proposition.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29555947329449711322012-01-09T05:42:35.786-08:002012-01-09T05:42:35.786-08:00Here’s an example. I say: “X is like Y”, and you q...Here’s an example. I say: “X is like Y”, and you quite reasonably ask: “How is X like Y?” I reply: “I don’t know. It just is.” You say: “But what do X and Y share in common?” and I reply: “I don’t know. But it’s something.” Do you understand either X or Y any better? Has your knowledge been extended? If it has not, then you have not made a valid analogy at all, because the whole purpose of an analogy is to understand something we do not know on the basis of something that we do know. For example, saying that a photon is <i>like</i> a particle and <i>like</i> a wave builds upon our knowledge of particles and waves to extend to photons. <br /><br />Furthermore, if you say that X and Y share P in common, but you have no idea what P is, then how can you even say that they share P in common at all? To say something about P, you must at least have some conception of P, and if you lack any conception of P, then you cannot talk about P at all! That has been the issue all along. <br /><br /><i> Just because something is directed to a future state of affairs doesn't mean that this something is being directed by the future state of affairs. The latter is absurd and is not final causality at all, though you seem to think it is.</i><br /><br />I have offered two possibilities of how a final cause an affect the present activity of a being, one being internal to the being in the present and the other being external to the being and in the future. There are problems with both accounts, which I explicitly mentioned in a previous comment. The problem with the internal version of potential being actually guiding the behavior of a being in the present is that potential being becomes actual being, and thus this account negates the very existence of potential being. The problem with the external version is that something non-existent in the present is actually influencing the present.<br /><br />I agree that a divine intellect would be a solution to this dilemma, because it would be actually present to guide the behavior of a being by virtue of supplying the final end that it is attempting to actualize. That is not the issue. The issue is whether it is the only possible solution to this dilemma. Sure, it is the only one that we can think of right now, but that does not mean that it is the only possible solution. <br /><br />That is why I said that the Fifth Way is basically an argument from incredulity coupled with question begging. One basically argues that there must be something actually present to guide the behavior of a being towards its final end, and since human beings use their intellect to conceive of final ends while building artifacts, then that <i>must</i> be how God does it, because that is the <i>only way</i> to do it. This inference from the human way of doing X to the <i>only</i> way to do X is the issue. It is obviously a fallacious argument, because you can supply lots of counterexamples where it does not work at all. That does not mean that the conclusion is false, but only unjustified.<br /><br />If you want to argue that it is very <i>likely</i> that a divine intellect is the answer, then that would leave the realm of metaphysical arguments, which are supposed to be <i>necessary</i> and not <i>probable</i>.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90753826459277241942012-01-09T05:41:23.100-08:002012-01-09T05:41:23.100-08:00Michael:
Easy for you to say when you switch out...Michael:<br /><br /><i> Easy for you to say when you switch out the original term we are talking about with some other. In my example the term is “real”, not “referent” and not “mode of being”--stop changing the subject. If you can't see that you are changing the subject then I daresay this may be the end of the road for you... at least for now.</i><br /><br />You are talking about “real”, which can refer to a number of possible referents, including act of existence and mode of being. The question is whether you can have “real” have different senses, but the same referent. When “real” refers to act of existence, then it has a different sense and referent from when “real” refers to mode of being. Can we agree upon this?<br /><br /><i> That your definition always holds true (hypothetically, I am not saying I agree or disagree with your functional definition) is a far cry from it specifying something's essence. My example is sufficient, reread it once more and ponder it for a while and then ask questions if it doesn't click. I'll still be here though it will be some time before another reponse.</i><br /><br />Your example is <i>not</i> sufficient, for the very reason that I specified, namely, that it does not cover all cases, and thus cannot be an essential definition. You admit that my definition covers all cases, and yet is not essential. How exactly is it not an essential definition then? What is your definition of “essential definition”?<br /><br /><i> Not that I agree with your supposed counterexample, but for the sake of argument, even if it did capture all cases it would not necessarily be an essential definition.</i><br /><br />Again, if the definition of X captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for X, then it is an essential definition of X. The problem with your example of laughter being a necessary condition of the possession of an intellect is that there are instances where something laughs, but has no intellect. In other words, laughter is neither necessary nor sufficient for intellect, but my definition of “goodness” is both necessary and sufficient for all instances of goodness. If you want to reject it as an essential definition, then provide an instance where it fails to hold. If you cannot, then you have no grounds to reject it as an essential definition at all, except for apologetic grounds.<br /><br /><i> It's relevant because it shows you don't really understand much of what we have been discussing. If anything, if your argument applies to analogy in general, it would only mean that at least one principle is common in an analogy—I already agreed with this; it seems that Aquinas would have no qualm with this either. However, saying as much says nothing about predication and language and epistemology. And thus nothing about analogical and univocal predication.</i><br /><br />The problem is how you can know what this “one principle in common” is supposed to be without univocal meaning at some point, because without knowing it in this way, you cannot have an analogy at all, because an analogy is fundamentally a linguistic tool for extending knowledge and highlighting connections rooted in common properties between diverse entities. If you assume that an analogy holds, because of the presence of a common principle, but have no idea what this principle is, then you have no real analogy, because knowledge has not been extended at all, because we are ignorant of the most important part of the analogy.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3920561147727011102011-12-29T17:30:26.983-08:002011-12-29T17:30:26.983-08:00Oh, and just to let you guys know, I'm going o...Oh, and just to let you guys know, I'm going on a vacation with the family starting tomorrow, and so won't be replying to your counterpoints until late next week.<br /><br />Happy New Year!dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21613847566608254112011-12-29T17:26:16.102-08:002011-12-29T17:26:16.102-08:00(continued)
“Why is this relevant? If my argument...(continued)<br /><br />“Why is this relevant? If my arguments apply to analogy in general, then they must apply to analogical predication.”<br /><br />It's relevant because it shows you don't really understand much of what we have been discussing. If anything, if your argument applies to analogy in general, it would only mean that at least one principle is common in an analogy—I already agreed with this; it seems that Aquinas would have no qualm with this either. However, saying as much says nothing about predication and language and epistemology. And thus nothing about analogical and univocal predication.<br /><br />“Exactly.”<br /><br />If you really agreed you would see the major nonsense that you are putting forth. See below.<br /><br />“Here’s the thing. This “potential directed towards the future” is necessarily directed towards non-being, because the future does not (yet) exist. And the question is how the future, which does not (yet) exist, can influence the present by serving as a direction for the present to act towards. In other words, how can non-being guide being?”<br /><br />Just because something is directed <i>to</i> a future state of affairs doesn't mean that this something is being directed <i>by</i> the future state of affairs. The latter is absurd and is not final causality at all, though you seem to think it is.<br /><br />Finally, please don't pull the authority card on Jack. It's perfectly legitimate to say one doesn't know what he's talking about when he doesn't understand Aristotle or some other historical figure's position. It's not an appeal to authority because Jack isn't trying to say those ideas are true because so-and-so said so, but only that so-and-so said such-and-such and not the nonsense that you have been saying.<br /><br />The historical positions are very much the main point of this thread as you claimed that you had an argument against a particular position put forth by a particular historical figure. I think it's fair that you should understand such a figure's position before you criticize it.<br /><br />ciao,<br />MichaelMichaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52653953688857855852011-12-29T17:25:38.117-08:002011-12-29T17:25:38.117-08:00dguller,
“Good. So, you agree that the referents ...dguller,<br /><br />“Good. So, you agree that the referents of the two principles are different, which means that the referents of “act of existence” and “mode of being” are different, which means that they have different senses, as well. This means that you have not shown how a term can be used in two sentences, and have the same referent, but different senses.”<br /><br />Easy for you to say when you switch out the original term we are talking about with some other. In my example the term is “real”, not “referent” and not “mode of being”--stop changing the subject. If you can't see that you are changing the subject then I daresay this may be the end of the road for you... at least for now.<br /><br />“What does “mode of being” refer to? How can something refer to something that is not a referent?”<br /><br />I wasn't talking about the term “mode of being” but its referent or ultimate signification. And it is fairly obvious that a principle does not refer like (or at all) a term does—you said so yourself.<br /><br />“First, if my definition captures all cases, then how is it not essential? How else do you define “essential” in this case, except that it captures the necessary and sufficient conditions that define all cases?”<br /><br />That your definition always holds true (hypothetically, I am not saying I agree or disagree with your functional definition) is a far cry from it specifying something's essence. My example is sufficient, reread it once more and ponder it for a while and then ask questions if it doesn't click. I'll still be here though it will be some time before another reponse.<br /><br />“Second, monkeys laugh, but I doubt that you will grant them the possession of intellect. And that’s why your definition is not essential, because it does not capture all cases.”<br /><br />Not that I agree with your supposed counterexample, but for the sake of argument, even if it did capture all cases it would not necessarily be an essential definition.<br /><br />“First, isn’t the “sub-conceptual level” composed of concepts?”<br /><br />If we think about those principles, then yes. Though it does not mean those concepts are univocal.<br /><br />(continued)Michaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10774216493148809022noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71978256056114101942011-12-29T09:21:36.830-08:002011-12-29T09:21:36.830-08:00Jack:
(2) The present is actually real.
Agreed....Jack:<br /><br /><i> (2) The present is actually real.</i><br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br /><i>(3) The future is only potentially real.</i><br /><br />Agreed, and with the implication that the future is not actually real, and thus should be causally inert with respect to the behavior of beings in the present (by (1)).<br /><br /><i>(4) Final causation requires that an end that is not actually but potentially real affect a means in the present by restricting the possibilities presently available for a particular being to actualize.</i><br /><br />Agreed. But I wonder why you changed “potential being” to “final causation”. They are two aspects of a single phenomenon. After all, potential is always potential towards an end, especially a final telos, and thus potential being is necessarily interconnected to final causation in that they share the same structure. <br /><br /><i> (5) Final causation has something that is not yet actually real (i.e. the future) but that is actually ideal affecting something that is actually real(i.e. the present). </i><br /><br />First, this begs the question, as we have already discussed. One has to make an argument that the dichotomy of <i>real</i> versus <i>ideal</i> is the <i>only</i> two possibilities open to ontology. Simply saying that we don’t know any other way is not a good argument unless you have the further argument that our limitations are also reality’s limitations. In other words, if X is inconceivable, then X is necessarily false, which I would disagree with, because it is surely possible that what is true is beyond what is conceivable to us. I mean, there are truths about God that are inconceivable, e.g. how God became a human being while still remaining God, the Trinity, divine simplicity, and so on. In other words, epistemic limitations do not necessarily mean corresponding ontological limitations.<br /><br />Second, does the same idea also apply to potential being? In other words, does potential being also necessarily require something ideal to make potency possible at all? After all, potential being and final causation have a common underlying structure in that the former necessarily is directed towards the latter, and thus compromising one compromises both. And both involve the future, which is not actual (yet), being able to affect what <i>is</i> actually occurring in the present, which is supposed to be impossible, because only act can influence act. So, the question is whether Aquinas also argued that potential being required a divine intellect, and if not, then why not?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30613178097735665612011-12-28T18:57:04.788-08:002011-12-28T18:57:04.788-08:00No one accepts potential being as combining act an...<i>No one accepts potential being as combining act and non-being. Potentia is determinable being; actus is determined being. Again, this is page 1, line 1 stuff. And who is rejecting final causation? The only thing that we are denying is that a final end (such as an “oak tree”) actually exists in the real order in the present when it is not merely potentially the final end but actually something else real (in this case an “acorn”).</i><br /><br />Explain to me how potentiality can be present in actuality, other than just asserting that it is. As far as I can tell, there are two possibilities here for how potentiality can exist in actuality. Either (1) an actual being is propelled from <i>within</i> towards an end (i.e. <i>internal directedness</i>), or (2) an actual being is drawn from <i>without</i> towards an end (i.e. <i>external directedness</i>). I would say that both (1) and (2) are problematic, to say the least. <br /><br />In (1), potential being would have to be actually present in order to propel the actual being towards an end, because only actual beings have causal efficacy, but then there is no such thing as potential being, but only actual being. <br /><br />In (2), a real being is drawn towards a particular end, which would mean that something not presently real, because it is only actual in the future, can causally influence something actually existing in the present, which is supposed to be impossible, because only something actual can causally influence something actual. <br /><br />In both (1) and (2), you have a violation of a key Aristotelian principle. In (1), the reality of potential being, and in (2), the principle that only actual beings in the present can have causal efficacy upon other presently existing beings.<br /><br />The only way out of this dilemma is to argue that potential being does not affect actual beings at all, but then how can potential being limit the behavior of actual beings to only what is possible? There is something constraining actual beings to behave in particular ways, and not others, and that is indicative of some degree of causal efficacy. In that case, one is stuck with the necessity of a category of being that is problematic, to say the least.<br /><br /><i> As far as this discussion goes, since Aristotle.</i><br /><br />Argument from authority … again.<br /><br /><i> Yes it is, to the exact same extent that your invention of being somewhere between actual and potential (or is it being and non-being?) answers how a final end that does not yet actually exist in the real order can determine means in the here and now. In case you’re being uncharacteristically obtuse, I have mirrored your absurdities so that you see what you look like.</i><br /><br />So, you have no real answer then to my question. That’s too bad, because I am genuinely interested in a Thomist answer to that issue. It seems to me to be a reductio of the simplicity of God. Oh well.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80338069355745132512011-12-28T18:56:39.286-08:002011-12-28T18:56:39.286-08:00Jack:
Wrong. Correcting (in italics) your words: ...Jack:<br /><br /><i>Wrong. Correcting (in italics) your words: potential points towards a future actualization of a particular state, and thus it inherently involves being, because the future is really potential, but not really actual</i><br /><br />Look at an acorn. It has the potential to become an oak. Where exactly is this potential present within the acorn? Nowhere. Its potential necessarily points towards a possible future state of affairs in which an oak has developed from an acorn. The current reality of potential is inextricably tied to the non-being of the future, and thus you have the activity of an actual being (i.e. an acorn) being guided and directed by something unreal (i.e. the potential to become an oak in the future). <br /><br />It is the status of this “really potential” that is at issue. How can something be really present if it is not actually real? Is the potential actually real in the present? No, because then it would be actual and not potential. Saying that it is potentially real just means that it could be actualized in the future, but what is the metaphysical status of this “could be actualized in the future”? Where exactly is the potential to become an oak actually present in an acorn? It is not present anywhere, in fact. So, how can potentiality even exist at all to limit the behavior of an actual being, if it is not actually present? <br /><br />I agree with you that potential is a legitimate category of being, but I disagree with you that it is without problematic aspects.<br /><br /><i>They sure do. But why ignore the mathematical example I gave which is (like it or not) a proposition that exists independently of the human mind and of matter? It’s pretty basic moderate realism to admit the objective existence of propositions, universals, etc.</i><br /><br />I didn’t ignore it. The proposition that it is raining is different from the fact that it is raining. The latter can exist without the former. Furthermore, the proposition that 1 + 2 = 2 is different from the fact that 1 + 1 = 2. The latter can exist without the former.<br /><br /><i>Another misunderstanding of something basic and central to Aristotelian metaphysics – what are these “different aspects of reality” to which some mindless immaterial truths apparently refer, or in which they exist? In fact, given that you’re trying to deny Mind (where ideal Forms reside), what is an immaterial truth?</i><br /><br />The truths of mathematics are a good example of an immaterial truth, which propositions present in a mind refer to. <br /><br /><i>It seems you’re unaware of the care taken by everyone from Aristotle down to distinguish the ideas in their arguments. Your thinking may be loose enough to run with real1 and real2 as workable distinctions, but wondering if act is not really distinct from potency (or supposing some overlap of being and non-being for no reason and with no justification) just shows your misunderstandings of basic Aristotelian thought.</i><br /><br />Argument from authority … again.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32254656613272370242011-12-28T17:44:47.039-08:002011-12-28T17:44:47.039-08:00DGULLER: Perhaps ontology has grey areas, rather t...DGULLER: Perhaps ontology has grey areas, rather than being just black and white?<br /><br />ME: It seems you’re unaware of the care taken by everyone from Aristotle down to distinguish the ideas in their arguments. Your thinking may be loose enough to run with real1 and real2 as workable distinctions, but wondering if act is not really distinct from potency (or supposing some overlap of being and non-being for no reason and with no justification) just shows your misunderstandings of basic Aristotelian thought.<br /><br />DGULLER: If you can accept potential being as a type of being that combines aspects of actual being and non-being, then you have no grounds to reject the reality of final causes as combining aspects of actual being and potential being<br /><br />ME: No one accepts potential being as combining act and non-being. <i>Potentia</i> is determinable being; <i>actus</i> is determined being. Again, this is page 1, line 1 stuff. And who is rejecting final causation? The only thing that we are denying is that a final end (such as an “oak tree”) <i>actually</i> exists in the real order in the present when it is not merely <i>potentially</i> the final end but <i>actually </i> something else real (in this case an “acorn”).<br /><br />Your misunderstandings aside, this seems obvious.<br /><br />DGULLER: And since when is “real” and “ideal” the only possibilities?<br /><br />ME: As far as this discussion goes, since Aristotle.<br /><br />DGULLER: Is that really your answer to how a divine intellect, which is simple and without composition of parts, can retain all forms within itself?<br /><br />ME: Yes it is, to the exact same extent that your invention of being somewhere between actual and potential (or is it being and non-being?) answers how a final end that does not yet actually exist in the real order can determine means in the here and now. In case you’re being uncharacteristically obtuse, I have mirrored your absurdities so that you see what you look like.<br /><br /> DGULLER: What are the biggest weaknesses of Thomism, from your standpoint?<br /><br />ME: That it doesn’t help me predict next week’s lottery numbers. Seriously, I don’t see big weaknesses with Thomism or else I wouldn’t find it persuasive. What is this question supposed to reveal?<br /><br />DGULLER (to Michael): The contradiction is between the following propositions:<br /><br />(1) Only something actual can affect something else actual.<br />(2) The present exists.<br />(3) The future does not exist.<br />(4) Potential being requires that the future affect the present by restricting the possibilities presently available for a particular being to actualize.<br />(5) Potential being has something that does not exist (i.e. the future) affecting something that does exist (i.e. the present).<br />(6) (5) contradicts (1). <br /><br />ME: I know this comment was directed to Michael but I had to address it. This kind of sloppiness flows from the very basic mistakes you’ve made in understanding Aristotelian metaphysics, and I can borrow from Wolfgang Pauli in saying that it’s “not even wrong.”<br /><br />Corrected (in italics), I hope you will see why the paradox you claim to be solving is nothing of the sort:<br /><br /><br />(1) Only something actual can affect something else.<br />(2) The present is <i>actually real</i>.<br />(3) The future <i>is only potentially real</i>.<br />(4) <i>Final causation</i> requires that <i>an end that is not actually but potentially real</i> affect <i>a means in</i>the present by restricting the possibilities presently available for a particular being to actualize.<br />(5) <i>Final causation</i> has something that <i>is not yet actually real</i> (i.e. the future) <i>but that is actually ideal</i> affecting something that <i>is actually real</i>(i.e. the present).<br />(6) (5) <i>does not</i> contradict (1).Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22894391697113491392011-12-28T17:31:03.705-08:002011-12-28T17:31:03.705-08:00DGULLER: Here’s the problem. What is real is coext...DGULLER: Here’s the problem. What is real is coextensive with what is present. The past is not real, and the future is not real. And potentiality is intrinsically related to the future. That is why there is a distinction between what is the case, and what might be the case. In other words, potential points towards a future realization of a particular state, and thus it inherently involves non-being, because the future is not real.<br /><br />ME: Wrong. Correcting (in italics) your words: potential points towards a future <i>actualization</i> of a particular state, and thus it inherently involves <i>being</i>, because the future is <i>really potential, but not really actual</i><br /><br />These are basic concepts, dguller, and you have to get them straight – not just bicker that your own terminology is co-extensive when it isn’t.<br /><br />DGULLER: what propositions refer to often exist independently of the human mind.<br /><br />ME: They sure do. But why ignore the mathematical example I gave which is (like it or not) a proposition that exists independently of the human mind <i>and of matter</i>? It’s pretty basic moderate realism to admit the objective existence of propositions, universals, etc. <br /><br />DGULLER: That just speaks to the fact that universals, numbers and propositions cannot be material. It does not speak to the issue of whether they necessarily must occur in a mind, except when they are represented by propositions. Otherwise, they are immaterial truths about different aspects of reality.<br /><br />ME: Another misunderstanding of something basic and central to Aristotelian metaphysics – what are these “different aspects of reality” to which some mindless immaterial truths apparently refer, or in which they exist? In fact, given that you’re trying to deny Mind (where ideal Forms reside), what <i>is</i> an immaterial truth?<br /><br />DGULLER: Second, I would love to know the other arguments, especially those that you find quite compelling.<br /><br />ME: I would love to share them with you and have already pointed you at sources to supplement the books you’ve ordered. But until you grasp basic principles there is no point. Because I’ve no doubt you’d raise objections just as absurd as the ones you’ve raised so far.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23112942610590544672011-12-28T05:17:54.201-08:002011-12-28T05:17:54.201-08:00I never said that. I said that we do not fully app...<i>I never said that. I said that we do not fully apprehend at the conceptual level. But there is something intelligible at the sub-conceptual level which we must understand with terms used analogically, if we are to have any understanding at all.</i><br /><br />First, isn’t the “sub-conceptual level” composed of concepts?<br /><br />Second, is it possible to understand something without applying concepts to it? And if this is impossible, then it does not make sense to talk about “understanding” a <i>sub</i>-conceptual level at all.<br /><br /><i>Analogy is in general a comparison while analogical predication is a specific type of comparison. I can have an analogy that doesn't use analogical predication. Ex: 2 : 4 :: 16 : 32.</i><br /><br />Why is this relevant? If my arguments apply to analogy in general, then they must apply to analogical predication.<br /><br /><i>The potential to become an oak is really there. That the acorn is an oak is not. Your “really there” is being used with two different meanings.</i><br /><br />Exactly. Reality only really exists in the present. The past does not exist, and the future does not exist. That is why final causality is so paradoxical, because it implies that something that does not exist (i.e. the future) can causally affect the present. If you want to agree that the future is real, then there is no longer any paradox, because something real (i.e. the future) is affecting something else that is real (i.e. the present), and then there is no need for a divine intellect at all! <br /><br /><i>Sure. And if there wasn't anything presently existing there would not be a potential directed towards the future. So?</i><br /><br />Here’s the thing. This “potential directed towards the future” is necessarily directed towards non-being, because the future does not (yet) exist. And the question is how the future, which does not (yet) exist, can influence the present by serving as a direction for the present to act towards. In other words, how can non-being guide being?<br /><br />And notice that this is the same problem that we first identified with final causes. Final causes are the ends towards which actual beings are directed towards, and these ends does not exist in the present, which means that they do not exist. And, again, how does something that does not exist affect something that does?<br /><br />So, if you do not accept the validity of a future event affecting a present event, then not only should you find final causes paradoxical, then you should <i>also</i> find potential being paradoxical. And if you do <i>not</i> find potential being paradoxical, then you should not find final causes paradoxical, and if there is no problem with final causes, then you do not need an explanation for them, and thus do not need to postulate a divine intellect at all!<br /><br /><i>Then you aren't really talking about the principles of actuality and potentiality.</i><br /><br />Why not? I’m still talking about atoms even if I say that they are divisible. Concepts can be revised in the face of new ideas and evidence.<br /> <br /><i>Something which involves both aspects of being and non-being is not a contradiction, that is, unless they are involved in the exact same way. The principles of potentiality and actuality are not so involved.</i><br /><br />The contradiction is between the following propositions:<br /><br />(1) Only something actual can affect something else actual.<br />(2) The present exists.<br />(3) The future does not exist.<br />(4) Potential being requires that the future affect the present by restricting the possibilities presently available for a particular being to actualize.<br />(5) Potential being has something that does not exist (i.e. the future) affecting something that does exist (i.e. the present).<br />(6) (5) contradicts (1).dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17954917354404067552011-12-28T05:17:24.759-08:002011-12-28T05:17:24.759-08:00Michael:
And what you say doesn't make sense ...Michael:<br /><br /><i>And what you say doesn't make sense to me because 1) I am not picking out formal and final causes and 2) the kind of predication being used on the word “cause” is not the subject of the original predications. At best it is terminology used to talk about the terminology used to talk about analogical or univocal predication.</i><br /><br />The point is that just because A and B are interrelated does not mean that they have the same referent. They do have the same referent if A and B are both part of the same class C, and you are actually talking about C rather than A and B. However, if you start talking about A or B, then they have different referents.<br /><br /><i>So what! We aren't concerned with the kind of predication is being used in order to talk about the principles, we are only concerned with the kind of predication of the original term and evaluate (action) the term's kind of predication by examining the principles.</i><br /><br />Good. So, you <i>agree</i> that the referents of the two principles are different, which means that the referents of “act of existence” and “mode of being” are different, which means that they have different senses, as well. This means that you have not shown how a term can be used in two sentences, and have the same referent, but different senses.<br /><br /><i>If you concede this then I don't know what else you can say as your argument rests upon this misunderstanding.</i><br /><br />See my above points. You tried to show how “real” in (1) and (2) have different senses, but the same referent. I don’t think that you have done so, because when “real” has the same referent, it also has the same sense, and when “real” has different senses, then it has different references, and that depends upon the context. And that means that you have not succeeded.<br /><br /><i>Mode of being is not a referent but a principle of a referent. Just because a term points to a referent and not the mode of being, doesn't mean that the mode of being isn't integral (or doesn't exist for that matter) in understanding the referent and thus in some way the original term.</i><br /><br />What does “mode of being” refer to? How can something refer to something that is not a referent?<br /><br /><i>Any evaluation of your definition fails to capture the essence of goodness because it is not an essential definition. It may be true and evaluate correctly with every instance of something good, but that doesn't mean its an essential definition. Ex: 'If something laughs then it is a being endowed with intellect.' I would argue necessarily true, but laughter is not the essence of any being endowed with intellect. I do not dare try to give a counter-example to your functional definition, however.</i><br /><br />First, if my definition captures all cases, then how is it not essential? How else do you define “essential” in this case, except that it captures the necessary and sufficient conditions that define all cases?<br /><br />Second, monkeys laugh, but I doubt that you will grant them the possession of intellect. And that’s why your definition is not essential, because it does not capture all cases.dgullernoreply@blogger.com