tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post7388509896976439418..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Metaphysical middle manEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger38125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35701135254409073372019-06-07T14:49:01.278-07:002019-06-07T14:49:01.278-07:00Dr. Feser probably has.
The Science Delusion auth...Dr. Feser probably has.<br /><br /><i>The Science Delusion</i> author and panpsychist Rupert Sheldrake argues that materialism leads to a dead-end in the philosophy of mind.<br /><br />See his full <a href="https://www.electricuniverseuk.eu/dynamic-earth-2019/" rel="nofollow">EU-UK18</a> presentation "<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFhsObpja8A" rel="nofollow">Is the sun conscious?</a>." (Don't be turned off by the title; it's more interesting, even for Thomists, than it may seem <i>prima facie</i>.)Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7012665616881576632014-08-14T10:33:41.586-07:002014-08-14T10:33:41.586-07:00Are Scott or Gene Callahan still here? I'd lo...Are Scott or Gene Callahan still here? I'd love to ask you some more questions about idealism, or even better, read something you've written. If I don't see the answer here, please write me at donsalmon7@gmail.com. Also, you may enjoy stopping over at www.bernardokastrup.com <br /><br />Thanks!Donhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13741454531338054082noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69038296775800910342013-02-05T22:31:23.918-08:002013-02-05T22:31:23.918-08:00C Emerson: [Is "persons who comment on blogs ...C Emerson: <i>[Is "persons who comment on blogs = posters" an acceptable connotation of the word "posters"?]</i><br /><br />Certainly. In fact, it's an acceptable denotation. A poster is anyone who posts a message, whether by dropping mail into a postbox, or by publishing it on the web via the HTTP "POST" command. Sometimes a "post" refers to the Original Post, as distinguished from comments; sometimes commenters' posts are distinguished from the main article; usually the context is clear.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84944449595393016322013-02-05T02:45:23.847-08:002013-02-05T02:45:23.847-08:00Welll .... usually blogs has 1 post and several co...Welll .... usually blogs has 1 post and several comments which IN THEORY are related to the post.<br /><br />However Forums, have 1 thread with multiple posts!<br /><br />So..... yeah maybe...Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25641970878354604802013-02-05T00:46:04.408-08:002013-02-05T00:46:04.408-08:00My thanks to the posters here for excellent elucid...My thanks to the posters here for excellent elucidation. <br /><br />[Is "persons who comment on blogs = posters" an acceptable connotation of the word "posters"?]c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67172430026290683452013-02-04T20:09:40.717-08:002013-02-04T20:09:40.717-08:00"Scott, one of my recent academic projects ha..."Scott, one of my recent academic projects has been to demonstrate that Berkeley was NOT a 'subjective idealist.'"<br /><br />That would be of interest to me, and I'd be eager to follow any links you'd care to post.<br /><br />As to the present point, does that also mean that, in your view, Berkeley's metaphysics provides a non-occasionalist account of the physical world that allows for it to be understood (relatively) independently of theology? If so, to what extent do you regard it as a genuine alternative to the sort of thing Feser is arguing for in the post that started all of this?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74365254470733323212013-02-04T19:55:02.544-08:002013-02-04T19:55:02.544-08:00Scott, one of my recent academic projects has been...Scott, one of my recent academic projects has been to demonstrate that Berkeley was NOT a "subjective idealist."<br /><br />And yes, I agree with you: these these views are not as far apart as they are often taken to be: I also think that A-T metaphysics can be well explained from within an idealist POV.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75647395768021856142013-02-04T19:49:29.499-08:002013-02-04T19:49:29.499-08:00Really? XD
U_U you two got interested in all that...Really? XD<br /><br />U_U you two got interested in all that.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75675731241144763172013-02-04T19:49:25.035-08:002013-02-04T19:49:25.035-08:00"I say we idealist have a perfectly good expl..."I say we idealist have a perfectly good explanation of 'nature' and 'natural regularities' that stem from OUR metaphysics."<br /><br />And with that much, as an idealist myself, I'd agree. But Feser's claim was about occasionalism, not idealism, and Berkeley's own subjective idealism -- which I think commits him to occasionalism as least with regard to what we ordinarily call physical events -- still strikes me as an example rather than a counterexample. I think an adequate idealist metaphysics that allows for real physics has to allow that physical entities genuinely do have "natures" and real causal powers even if what we mean by "physical entities" turns out not to be quite what A-T-ists mean. (And the two views may not be very far apart in any significant respect. Neither objective idealists nor A-Tists would regard physical entities as <i>completely</i> independent; such independence is a matter of degree.)<br /><br />But I think we've probably exhausted the subject as far as this thread is concerned. Again, thanks for your gracious reply and your clarification.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9398756927684944492013-02-04T18:31:56.050-08:002013-02-04T18:31:56.050-08:00"it would have to be shown that Berkeley attr..."it would have to be shown that Berkeley attributed causal powers to things like rocks and suns and so forth."<br /><br />OK, Scott, but now we're back to where we were: *of course* Berkeley does not think those things have causal powers. If what you mean is "I will only allow things to be called 'natural regularities' if the theory that posits them says that 'natural' objects have causal powers," well then, naturally no theory that denies rocks etc. have causal powers can account for "natural" regularities. Similarly, if we say "No theory can account for ghostly apparitions if it does not posit them as being caused by actual ghosts," then we rule out all theories denying there are ghosts as explanatory of ghostly apparitions.<br /><br />Scott, I totally get your point: if we accept that "natural regularities" must mean "regularities caused by natural things with independent causal powers," then Berkeley of course posits no natural regularities.<br /><br />But that really signifies nothing more than "Berkelian metaphysics is not A-T metaphysics." I say we idealist have a perfectly good explanation of "nature" and "natural regularities" that stem from OUR metaphysics. *Naturally* -- get it? -- our view of what is "natural" does not agree with the A-T view -- that is why we are idealists and not A-T metaphysicians.<br /><br />So, yes, our view of what is "natural" will not meet your criteria. And your view will not meet ours. But I still say that, as the idea of "natural regularities" is commonly understood, we idealists have a perfectly good way of explaining them. In fact, a better way. :-)gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44789625892224704522013-02-04T18:11:03.308-08:002013-02-04T18:11:03.308-08:00Thank you for your gracious reply. Sorry about the...Thank you for your gracious reply. Sorry about the misunderstanding.<br /><br />"OK, so why do you think the formulation you quote is merely a start of an answer, and not an answer, to that question?"<br /><br />Because Berkeley didn't believe that physical objects had any causal powers, and that's exactly the point Feser was making about occasionalism.<br /><br />Berkeley did attribute causal powers to spirits both finite and infinite, but that won't do the job here. In order for his metaphysics to constitute a counterexample to the claim that occasionalism doesn't allow for natural science in the sense Feser intends (and the sense of "natural" here is by no means unique to A-T metaphysics), it would have to be shown that Berkeley attributed causal powers to things like rocks and suns and so forth.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86920612129636954952013-02-04T17:27:29.201-08:002013-02-04T17:27:29.201-08:00Well, OK, Scott, I am willing to admit that I may ...Well, OK, Scott, I am willing to admit that I may have misunderstood your first reply: I took it as a mere quibble over words, and your question as rhetorical. But if you meant it sincerely, I should have addressed it earlier.<br /><br />OK, so why do you think the formulation you quote is merely a start of an answer, and not an answer, to that question? I.e., what more would you like to see me provide?gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27545587652168384862013-02-04T12:51:46.766-08:002013-02-04T12:51:46.766-08:00And I'll add that this -- "This idea of n...And I'll add that this -- "This idea of nature produces its own idea of natural regularities: those regularities are a coherent, rational world of ideas." -- is a good start. Had you replied with it when I asked you the question in the first place, this exchange would have gone very differently.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13768486069373011902013-02-04T12:50:02.301-08:002013-02-04T12:50:02.301-08:00"Berkeley has an idea of nature: nature is a ..."Berkeley has an idea of nature: nature is a world of ideas in the mind of God."<br /><br />Good. Then you should find it easy enough to answer the question I originally asked: In <i>what sense</i> would the regularities in a Berkeleyan world be "natural"?<br /><br />Since that <i>is</i> the question you need to answer in order to explain why your response effectively refutes Feser's point, why not turn your mind to it instead of critiquing arguments I haven't made?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56217176539047279052013-02-04T07:39:37.020-08:002013-02-04T07:39:37.020-08:00Criminy, Scott, if you insist on using *natural* a...Criminy, Scott, if you insist on using *natural* as is meant by A-T metaphysicians, then *of course* only A-T metaphysicians will have *natural* regularities.<br /><br />In that case: So what? All your are saying is "only MY metaphysics has the implications of MY metaphysics."<br /><br />Berkeley has an idea of nature: nature is a world of ideas in the mind of God. This idea of nature produces its own idea of natural regularities: those regularities are a coherent, rational world of ideas.<br /><br />And by the way to call these regularities "miracles" is a substitution of name calling for thought: Berkeley can easily distinguish a miracle from a natural regularity in his system.<br /><br />All you keep doing is rejecting these as natural regularities because nature for Berkeley is not what nature is for an A-T metaphysician. I'm sorry, but: duh. gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89507013025134371942013-02-04T07:29:31.099-08:002013-02-04T07:29:31.099-08:00"BTW, it is not right to say for Berkeley God..."BTW, it is not right to say for Berkeley God 'could' make regularities appear before us, as if this were a whim. Berkeley provides an argument as to why God *will*, and always will, do so."<br /><br />Yes, but again, the point you seem to be missing is the one Feser was in fact making: that <i>those</i> regularities would be comparable to miracles and there would be no <i>natural</i> regularities to discover. I don't see how he could have been much clearer about this, and it should be perfectly obvious from the context: he's arguing that occasionalism makes <i>natural science</i> impossible.<br /><br />The point is not that occasionalism can't account for the sun rising and rocks falling. The point is that because it can't do so in any way that <i>involves the nature of the relevant entities or objects</i>, it would mean that we wouldn't be able to learn what causes the sun to rise by studying <i>nature itself</i>. There would be nothing discoverable in the <i>nature</i> of metal that made it a better material for aircraft than, say, paper; all we could do would be to observe that God made certain properties appear together "regularly," and that would be the end of it. Those "regularities" might be "scientific" in an attenuated sense (indeed in the only sense allowable in such a world), but they wouldn't be "natural"; they would be attributable only directly to God, and (as Feser says) physics would be nothing more than a branch of theology.<br /><br />That's why "natural" is a better word to use here than "scientific," that's why Feser used it, and that's why your reply missed the mark. If that still isn't clear to you, I'm not sure what else to say, so I'll let it go at that.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83311423925634580582013-02-04T04:34:29.040-08:002013-02-04T04:34:29.040-08:00Oh boy.
Feser: Only a nature with independent pow...Oh boy.<br /><br />Feser: Only a nature with independent powers can account for natural regularities.<br /><br />Gene: Not true: Berkeley's metaphysics accounts for things like the sun rising and rocks falling to earth perfectly well.<br /><br />Scott: Those don't count!<br /><br />Gene: Huh?<br /><br />Scott: They don't arise from a nature with independent powers!<br /><br />Scott wins by definition!<br /><br />Of course, Berkeley's metaphysics does not account for natural regularities as such regularities are understood in A-T metaphysics. It accounts for such regularities as they understood in Berkelian metaphysics. I readily "concede" this point.<br /><br />BTW, it is not right to say for Berkeley God "could" make regularities appear before us, as if this were a whim. Berkeley provides an argument as to why God *will*, and always will, do so.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63112008350411794932013-02-03T21:17:48.635-08:002013-02-03T21:17:48.635-08:00"Oh come on, Scott, we both clearly are talki..."Oh come on, Scott, we both clearly are talking about 'regularities in the world of nature'! The fact I chose a different word surely makes no difference!"<br /><br />Oh, come on, Gene. <i>Of course</i> the fact that you chose a different word makes a difference.<br /><br />The subject was occasionalism; you objected to Feser's claim that if occasionalism were true, then everything that happened would be tantamount to a miracle and there would be no <i>natural</i> regularities. Your objection amounted in effect to <i>But that's not right, because Berkeley's God could make regularities appear in our experiences.</i><br /><br />Berkley's view that regularities are due directly to God is occasionalism plain and simple, and in proposing it as a counterexample you're just conceding Feser's point that under occasionalism there would be no <i>natural</i> regularities.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56414835837913886952013-02-03T20:52:32.800-08:002013-02-03T20:52:32.800-08:00@scott: 'Feser referred not to "scientifi...@scott: 'Feser referred not to "scientific" regularities but to natural ones. In what sense would the regularities in a Berkeleyan world be "natural"?'<br /><br />Oh come on, Scott, we both clearly are talking about "regularities in the world of nature"! The fact I chose a different word surely makes no difference!gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69066508281588532542013-02-03T20:47:32.587-08:002013-02-03T20:47:32.587-08:00Dr. Feser, does the Thomist theory of concurrentis...Dr. Feser, does the Thomist theory of concurrentism only apply to "per se" events, or does it also apply to "per accidens" events?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76786367189163524482013-02-03T14:40:43.311-08:002013-02-03T14:40:43.311-08:00Well ... doesn't sheldrake has a online TV pro...Well ... doesn't sheldrake has a online TV program or something like that XD.<br /><br />It would be awkward he spamming stuff around here XD, espcially since I don't think he beliefs in classical theism.<br /><br />Now Hatted-twerp... ...... .... hmmmm it doesn't ring any bells in my very limited mind XD.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16155794361382164402013-02-03T14:07:16.753-08:002013-02-03T14:07:16.753-08:00Probably Sheldrake desperately straining for credi...Probably Sheldrake desperately straining for credibility. Reminds me of a certain hatted-twerp atheist author.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60570753438029442912013-02-03T14:01:24.725-08:002013-02-03T14:01:24.725-08:00Calm down Machine, maybe the second guy isn't ...Calm down Machine, maybe the second guy isn't reeaaaalllllyyy a spammer.<br /><br />Even he also has no blog too XD.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43188790706138404832013-02-03T13:19:57.467-08:002013-02-03T13:19:57.467-08:00The alexi de sadesky blog has been reported for sp...The alexi de sadesky blog has been reported for spamming.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58913702199017468622013-02-03T12:54:53.207-08:002013-02-03T12:54:53.207-08:00The "Pro Western Christianity" blog has ...The "Pro Western Christianity" blog has been reported for link spamming.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.com