tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6946431445403493251..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011)Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger118125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39885824261412312162016-02-22T11:04:50.112-08:002016-02-22T11:04:50.112-08:00Shelley said, "The point is it's absolute...Shelley said, "The point is it's absolutely incorrect for you <b>Christian theists</b> to say "the universe is uncaring and unaware."'<br /><br /><br />A Christian believes in a god.<br />A theist is someone who believes in a god.<br />A Christian is a theist.<br /><br />No need to be redundant, Shelley. Do you go around saying "non-believing atheist"? I hope not. You'll sound like an idiot.GoldRush Applehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04672912751538200761noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83891394302508451362012-01-06T12:23:34.880-08:002012-01-06T12:23:34.880-08:00Fr. Barron had an interesting video on what he tho...Fr. Barron had an interesting video on what he thought of Christopher Hitchens...its pretty interesting. http://battleforthecoreoftheworld.blogspot.com/2011/12/i-found-this-to-be-valid-point-about.htmlAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59000447162351791252011-12-23T10:24:19.640-08:002011-12-23T10:24:19.640-08:00@Dianelos Georgoudis,
Most western Theologians te...@Dianelos Georgoudis,<br /><br />Most western Theologians teach Hell is the spiritual starvation the soul feels from being deprived of the Vision of God.<br /><br />I remember reading Archbishop Timothy Ware talking about how Hell is the pain from receiving God's when you can do nothing but hate him.<br /><br />Imagine how icky that feels then multiply it by infinity?<br /><br />Personally I don't think either of these views are mutually exclusive.<br /><br />Merry Christmas.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25653482355367173292011-12-23T09:58:19.571-08:002011-12-23T09:58:19.571-08:00@Flying
>Don't pray for his soul. Don'...@Flying<br /><br />>Don't pray for his soul. Don't do him this diservice. You dishonour a man vehemently opposed to the totalitarian dictatorhip of God. Respect the memory of the dead.<br /><br />Since there is no God then there is no Hitchens. Not anymore since the collection of atoms once called "Hitchens" by other collections of Atoms has dispersed.<br />Thus if other collections of atoms think or plead mercies to the non-existent "god" for the non-existent "soul" of the now non-existent Hitchens how is he being harmed?<br /><br />OTOH If you say his "memory" is being harmed I fail to see how a bunch of nerve impulses in the brains of a bunch of collections of Atoms are harmed by this useless activity?<br /><br />So your demand is not rational but it is amusing.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83291437788398543092011-12-22T13:14:46.290-08:002011-12-22T13:14:46.290-08:00Anon 12:12
“ It's safe to say that Hitchens i...Anon 12:12<br /><br />“<i> It's safe to say that Hitchens is now getting precisely what he wanted while he was alive: A reality completely devoid of God.</i>”<br /><br />I don’t think there is reality completely devoid of God, as there is no existence which is not sustained by God. <br /><br />“<i>And is there hope for redemption after death, a la C.S. Lewis' Great Divorce?</i>”<br /><br />I understand you mean this question on the assumption that the dogma of hell is right. Well, in the Eastern Orthodox tradition there is the belief that the power of prayer is unbounded, and thus has the power to pull souls out of hell. If this is so then at some time in the future hell will be empty, for people in heaven will pray for the salvation of those in hell. <br /><br />It seems evident to me that only when all humanity is united with God will all be well, God’s desire will be fulfilled, and creation will be perfected.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77242181501972753222011-12-22T11:38:33.165-08:002011-12-22T11:38:33.165-08:00grod:
"If anything, Evolution theory even sli...grod:<br />"If anything, Evolution theory even slightly boosts the AT teleological account."<br /><br />How so?George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7303800232114312542011-12-21T16:45:17.486-08:002011-12-21T16:45:17.486-08:00@RH:
"Further, as I suspected, Prof. Feser&#...@RH:<br /><br />"Further, as I suspected, Prof. Feser's explication of "ends" and "final cause" and "good" run into trouble against evolution. Feser explained that the concept of the "good" in his Aristotelian sense entails a type of appeal to norms - but I pointed out that the way evolution works means that it is often (if not always) the individual who deviates from the norm who survives (via natural selection), which is WHY populations survive/evolve over time. Hence it does not appear this notion of "good" being associated with the norm is very cogent in tracking with the reality of the evolutionary process (was the regular population that died off the "good" form, or is it the deviant form that actually allowed for survival when selection pressures changed? If it's the latter, then how would we say the previous population represented the "good" form? If it's the former, then how can the deviant form that survives be "good," and when, if ever does the following population become "good" forms? How is identifying all of this anything but arbitrary on Feser's part? Etc)."<br /><br />First, there is no problem with evolution. If anything, Evolution theory even slightly boosts the AT teleological account. A good book to read is Etienne Gilson's "From Aristotle to Darwin and back again: a journey in final causality, species and evolution". Second, I cannot make heads or tails of what you mean by good -- it certainly bears no resemblance to how it is understood in the AT framework, so I am not even sure what you imagine you are refuting.<br /><br />"All of which is to say, I don't need to have necessarily read a full book by Prof. Feser to note that my original skepticism has only been bolstered by what I HAVE seen from Prof. Feser on the subjects."<br /><br />From what I have seen from your responses, you would really profit from a little reading (that most dangerous of activities).grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22057153381341601332011-12-21T11:49:08.960-08:002011-12-21T11:49:08.960-08:00Similarly, I know Feser and his audience share Wil...<i>Similarly, I know Feser and his audience share Wilson's belief that a materialist account of the mind does not work (and is self-defeating), but I at least thought you might want to admit that Wilson's presentation of the argument just doesn't get him there. (For some of the reasons I've pointed out).</i><br /><br />The point that you're continuing to miss is that the argument isn't Wilson's. It's the argument made by <i>materialists</i> that Wilson is merely accepting and highlighting the absurdity of. I did say that he was doing it in a Hitchensesque fashion, so I'm not sure what else I was supposed to say about it.<br /><br />But at the end of the day your argument isn't with Wilson, it's with materialists like Rosenberg.E.H. Munrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09038816873823422488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31765016678173590102011-12-21T10:46:35.731-08:002011-12-21T10:46:35.731-08:00As for arguments from Prof. Feser and his T-Aristo...As for arguments from Prof. Feser and his T-Aristotelian approach in general, yes of course there is value in reading someone's entire argument if you want to grapple with the argument. However, typically when I read extended treatise by theists I find myself in immediate disagreement with some of the assumptions and leaps of logic being made, and it only compounds and compounds from there into a baroque fortress of disputable and (in my view) unjustified premises and conclusions.<br /><br />So another avenue for checking the claims is to engage the other side on smaller portions of an argument. The type of thing that happens in comment sections like these.<br /><br />A problem with interacting with a book is that the author of the book gets to state which questions must be answered, and then he'll go on to <br />say how his theory answers the questions. But I find theists in their treatise are often not answering the actual questions I would be asking - the ones that I think are most likely to elicit problems in their argument.<br /><br />The nice thing about immediate dialogue is that I can be immediately corrected if I've misunderstood an aspect of your argument, and I can also be in the position to say "hold on, let's examine your first claim before moving on…"<br /><br />I've already seen Prof. Feser's reasoning on some of these subjects in action, for instance concerning ends, final causes, necessity of teleology etc. And I have found just the type of unjustified assertions and leaps-of-logic that I would have suspected. I also engaged Prof. Feser in a bit of back and forth on this issue (on Eric Macdonald's blog) and, again, noticed his answers were problematic in just the way I expected: He was trying to justify inference to objective "facts" about ends, final causes and "oughts," and yet there was no actual justification in his moves, all of them evincing subjectivity and arbitrariness on his part. He'd also beg the question saying "Everyone knows…X" when that was precisely what I pointed out was in dispute.<br /><br />Further, as I suspected, Prof. Feser's explication of "ends" and "final cause" and "good" run into trouble against evolution. Feser explained that the concept of the "good" in his Aristotelian sense entails a type of appeal to norms - but I pointed out that the way evolution works means that it is often (if not always) the individual who deviates from the norm who survives (via natural selection), which is WHY populations survive/evolve over time. Hence it does not appear this notion of "good" being associated with the norm is very cogent in tracking with the reality of the evolutionary process (was the regular population that died off the "good" form, or is it the deviant form that actually allowed for survival when selection pressures changed? If it's the latter, then how would we say the previous population represented the "good" form? If it's the former, then how can the deviant form that survives be "good," and when, if ever does the following population become "good" forms? How is identifying all of this anything but arbitrary on Feser's part? Etc).<br /><br />All of which is to say, I don't need to have necessarily read a full book by Prof. Feser to note that my original skepticism has only been bolstered by what I HAVE seen from Prof. Feser on the subjects. <br /><br />I want to repeat what I've said before: I respect Prof. Feser and I understand some of his frustration with New Atheists. Even as someone who mingles with New Atheists (and may in some ways identify as one), I have experienced some annoying traits among them as well. I don't think all Prof. Feser's criticisms hit the mark, but some do, and I am happy to have intelligent folks like Prof. Feser aiming his analysis on any gaffs made by atheists.<br /><br />I guess it's over 'n out for now. <br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />RHRHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7779471220441993732011-12-21T10:39:04.950-08:002011-12-21T10:39:04.950-08:00E.H. Munro and grodrigues,
As I said, I'...E.H. Munro and grodrigues,<br /><br />As I said, I'm aware of purported challenges to a materialist account of the mind.<br /><br />I was simply using the fact that Brian posted the debate documentary featuring Wilson against Hitchens, to point to a Christian "doing it wrong."<br /><br />In other words: As an atheist I agree with other atheists that we haven't met a good reason for believing in God (and that there are good reasons to think the highly specific Gods of human religions are man-made). However, I would be happy to identify when an atheist is giving a poor line of argument to get to these conclusions.<br /><br />Similarly, I know Feser and his audience share Wilson's belief that a materialist account of the mind does not work (and is self-defeating), but I at least thought you might want to admit that Wilson's presentation of the argument just doesn't get him there. (For some of the reasons I've pointed out).<br /><br />That's all. I know you have other, more densely reasoned arguments waiting in the wings.<br /><br />RHRHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15837708894727071042011-12-21T09:19:22.448-08:002011-12-21T09:19:22.448-08:00If they really wanted to "honor his memory&qu...If they really wanted to "honor his memory" they would obviously be killing Muslims in the name of "reason". However, I think I prefer their decidedly less homicidal actions. Hitchens was the Josef Goebbels of neoconservatism, so the prayers are probably more than he merits.E.H. Munrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09038816873823422488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63540759540667987342011-12-21T03:31:43.351-08:002011-12-21T03:31:43.351-08:00Don't pray for his soul. Don't do him thi...Don't pray for his soul. Don't do him this diservice. You dishonour a man vehemently opposed to the totalitarian dictatorhip of God. Respect the memory of the dead.The Flying Sqrlhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12308430284358385077noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8042217090212061912011-12-20T13:21:35.859-08:002011-12-20T13:21:35.859-08:00@RH:
"If you think I've missed the targe...@RH:<br /><br />"If you think I've missed the target of Wilson's argument, show me how. If not, it's hardly fair to set up some other completely different target elsewhere and claim "He's missing the target.""<br /><br />I was fairly specific (or at least I thought I was) to what I was objecting -- not to your direct response to Wilson's presentation of the argument, which I am ignorant of, but to what is implied in your argument. Missing the target? Here is more evidence. From your post December 20, 2011 9:31 AM in response to suomynonA:<br /><br />"In a nutshell: if you investigate a human being you will find he is physical. And there is no good evidence we are anything other than physical entities (hence, matter/energy). Add to this we observe that humans think, feel, reason about the world and make statements many of us hold as "true," and you have at least prima facie evidence for the proposition that purely physical (made of matter/energy) beings can think, feel and reason to truths about the world. (Actually, I think it goes well beyond prima facie…I know of NO reliably established evidence of a human being operating non-physically)."<br /><br />I would say there is plenty of evidence, so I repeat my, and Brian's, reading suggestion.<br /><br />And btw, no one is denying that we have "true thoughts"; the claim is rather a <i>reductio</i> that (eliminative) materialism destroys rationality itself.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67657563635915718262011-12-20T12:02:28.219-08:002011-12-20T12:02:28.219-08:00I think your problem may be with Rosenberg, not Wi...I think your problem may be with Rosenberg, not Wilson. What Wilson is making reference to, in a Hitchensesque fashion (which is to say that it's more amusing than strictly true, though he's far closer to accurately characterizing eliminative materialism than Hitchens ever was with his one liners), is the precept that all materialism is necessarily eliminative. But that's a position advanced by eliminative materialists, and there's a very good argument to be made there (i.e. if materialism is true then this is the philosophical result).<br /><br />You may not like the way that Wilson characterizes the argument, but you would first need to engage people like Rosenberg to disprove eliminative materialism. And that's one reason that you're speaking at cross-purposes with the posters here. (Oh, and the verification word is <i>grater</i>, is there a more appropriate captcha for a bloody, war-mongering socialist?)E.H. Munrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09038816873823422488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30075940152102130732011-12-20T11:25:40.933-08:002011-12-20T11:25:40.933-08:00I think you are stereotyping most of the left in p...I think you are stereotyping most of the left in precisely the way most of us lefties stereotype you on the right. Sure, some far lefties are in love with theories about "the working class" and socialist utopias, but others donate time or money to groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch--often they opposed the Iraq War which Hitchens supported because they expected it to become the bloodbath. They were right and Hitchens was wrong. There's no great honor in supporting a political cause that is likely to turn into a catastrophe. When Hitchens stopped being a Marxist he still carried that old habit with him.<br /><br />Which is not to say that Hitchens was wrong about everything political. He was complicated. But the problem with him is that he was nearly always unfair to his opponents when he felt passionately about something, whether it was God or the Iraq War. <br /><br /><br />DonaldAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29377868977913234842011-12-20T09:41:38.951-08:002011-12-20T09:41:38.951-08:00grodrigues ,
I do not know how Wilson presents ...grodrigues ,<br /><br /><i>I do not know how Wilson presents the argument (and am not really interested),</i><br /><br />Then I'm not sure why you'd respond to a subject in which you are not interested.<br /><br /><i>then the only appropriate answer is to direct him to Prof. Feser's books and posts -- "Philosophy of the Mind" or the recent posts on Rosenberg's book are particularly relevant here. He misses the target completely and does not understand what he is replying to.</i><br /><br />I have been explicit that my target here is Wilson's argument in particular, not Feser's at this point.<br />That's been my stated target. I KNOW that people here have their arguments against materialism, but given Brian posted a link to Hitchens' debate with Wilson, in which Wilson's central theme was the argument against a materialist account of the mind, beauty etc, it seemed apropos to ask if anyone here thought WILSON's argument was any good. I'd have hoped that some here might at least agree it was quite poor.<br /><br />If you think I've missed the target of Wilson's argument, show me how. If not, it's hardly fair to set up some other completely different target elsewhere and claim "He's missing the target."<br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />RHRHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62446059783055369572011-12-20T09:31:33.550-08:002011-12-20T09:31:33.550-08:00suomynonA,
First, thanks for your reply.
RH: &q...suomynonA,<br /><br />First, thanks for your reply.<br /><br />RH: "This is part and parcel with his non-sequitur claim moving from "If we are matter in motion..if our bodies consist of chemical reactions…then we have no reason to believe our thoughts to be true"<br /><br /><i>suomynonA: That does not appear to be a non-sequitur</i><br /><br />Sure it is. One statement does not follow from the other, and there is no connective argument whatsoever given to show that it does. There is a massive unexplained gulf between the two statements. And it's a gulf that needs formidable evidence and argument, because it is starting off against all the evidence. In a nutshell: if you investigate a human being you will find he is physical. And there is no good evidence we are anything other than physical entities (hence, matter/energy). Add to this we observe that humans think, feel, reason about the world and make statements many of us hold as "true," and you have at least prima facie evidence for the proposition that purely physical (made of matter/energy) beings can think, feel and reason to truths about the world. (Actually, I think it goes well beyond prima facie…I know of NO reliably established evidence of a human being operating non-physically).<br /><br />Someone denying this will have to have damned strong arguments and evidence denying those claims: e.g. evidence that humans are not purely physical entities (good luck with that) and deny that we can have true thoughts (for instance, I think Australia is situated below the equator. Does someone want to deny this is true? If they don't deny it, then I have a true thought. Do they then want to say "well, you can have a true thought…but you aren't purely physical!" Then it's up to them to show how I am not a physical entity (or that my mental life is non-physical or whatever).<br /><br />As to an the reliability of our cognition, you seem to gesture towards Plantinga's EAAN. Do you really think his EAAN is a good argument and that it shows the combination of naturalism and belief in evolution to be self-defeating? If so, I would be happy to explain why I find Plantinga's argument fails to offer plausible defeaters to the naturalistic account ;-)<br /><br />RH<br /><br />(Of course Plantinga's EAAN, even if it were successful, doesn't argue per se that human mentality must be non-physical).RHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59297181597572835852011-12-20T05:43:05.814-08:002011-12-20T05:43:05.814-08:00@suomynonA:
"I would also be interested to s...@suomynonA:<br /><br />"I would also be interested to see a reply to RH's critique of the argument."<br /><br />RH says the following about the materialist / physicalist stance:<br /><br />"The obvious stance from a materialist/physicalist concerning the difference between a pop bottle and a human being is that, yes, both are manifestations of underlying physics, but they are significantly different manifestations - different entities. Pop bottles don't have a complex nervous system, a brain, can't speak, understand speech, use reason, logic, reflect on experience, produce models and theories, communicate with other people etc. Human beings can. Citing the fact that both humans and pop bottles and the rest of the universe consists of matter and energy, as if it would obviate these massively significant differences, is just plain stupid."<br /><br />I do not know how Wilson presents the argument (and am not really interested), but if RH thinks that nakedly asserting that some specific arrangements of matter like a nervous system or a brain are different in kind and not just in degree and in the relevant sense from other specific arrangements of matter or pointing out the tautological fact that different arrangements of matter are different constitutes any sort of response to the objections against (eliminative) materialism, then the only appropriate answer is to direct him to Prof. Feser's books and posts -- "Philosophy of the Mind" or the recent posts on Rosenberg's book are particularly relevant here. He misses the target completely and does not understand what he is replying to.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22420749915283192202011-12-20T02:10:33.202-08:002011-12-20T02:10:33.202-08:00I would also be interested to see a reply to RH...I would also be interested to see a reply to RH's critique of the argument. <br />Has he summarised it correctly? Is his objection valid? If not *why not*?<br /><br />RH:<br /><i>"This is part and parcel with his non-sequitur claim moving from "If we are matter in motion..if our bodies consist of chemical reactions…then we have no reason to believe our thoughts to be true"</i><br /><br />That does not appear to be a non-sequitur (regardless of the truth of the rest of the argument).<br />In fact, I would say not only is it not a non-sequitur it's also correct.<br />We have no reason to believe our thoughts to be true*, nor are they.<br /><br />Humans are notoriously fallible to cognitive biases, fantasies, and particularly completely off-base intuitions and understandings about our own internal workings and motivations.<br /><br />If it's an argument it's one that favours a naturalist universe. <br />But it's not a non-sequitur.<br /><br />*If the reply is "natural selection" or anything else then it's incorrect - evolution selects for *that which survives* not *that which is true* - where truth coincides with survival we will develop the ability to have true beliefs, where truth inhibits survival we will not. <br />e.g. 'Knowledge that falling kills and falling further kills more' - obviously selected for vs 'believing we are continuous individuals who have their own bodies' - also selected for - rather than the truth that we are non-continuous chemical reactions inhabiting a limited physical space that we <i>call</i> our body, even though it is not really truthfully 'seperate' in any way from the rest of the universe, except by our belief and convention.suomynonAnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30629033659382786612011-12-19T22:19:20.348-08:002011-12-19T22:19:20.348-08:00(Not that I've ever seen any good argument for...(Not that I've ever seen any good argument for the conclusion he and you want, btw).<br /><br />Have you read Philosophy of Mind? The Last Superstition? Feser's posts on Rosenberg's book?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56304334239924017502011-12-19T21:28:21.982-08:002011-12-19T21:28:21.982-08:00Brian wrote: I just do not understand how what y...Brian wrote: <i>I just do not understand how what you have written engages Wilson's argument at all.</i><br /><br />I know. You've already expressed that sentiment. But repeating "I don't understand…" is unenlightening. What I'm waiting for is for you to actually explain how my critique doesn't engage Wilson's argument. Again, in a nutshell, Wilson "argues" from the premise that "If the universe is simply matter in motion" hence everything in it including humans and pop bottles are "simply matter in motion," then there seems no reason to impute any difference of consequence between pop bottles fizzing and human beings trying to reason with one another. (This is part and parcel with his non-sequitur claim moving from "If we are matter in motion..if our bodies consist of chemical reactions…then we have no reason to believe our thoughts to be true).<br /><br />These are utterly unsubstantiated non-sequiturs for the reasons I have given.<br />As I've pointed out, Wilson's line of "reasoning" depends on simply ignoring an obvious fact of central importance: that matter and energy takes on varying forms with various characteristics and consequences - a fact virtually no sane person denies. Hence it's ludicrous to pretend that merely pointing out that physical object <b>A</b> (pop bottle) SHARES the property of being the result of underlying physics with physical object <b>B</b> (humans) that therefore it obviates any difference of consequence between object A and B.<br /><br />A pillow and a Great White Shark are both understood to be manifestations of underlying physics, but you'd be a damned fool to not recognize they have substantially different characteristics, and that these characteristics at the "macro level" are incredibly consequential…which will be graphically illustrated should you try treating a Great White Shark the same as your sleeping pillow, just because "Hey, they're both just matter in motion, yo?" <br /><br />The argument AS PRESENTED by Wilson, especially in appealing to the pop bottle/human reason analogy, relies on pretending to be utterly ignorant of these massively obvious facts. The obvious stance from a materialist/physicalist concerning the difference between a pop bottle and a human being is that, yes, both are manifestations of underlying physics, but they are significantly different manifestations - different entities. Pop bottles don't have a complex nervous system, a brain, can't speak, understand speech, use reason, logic, reflect on experience, produce models and theories, communicate with other people etc. Human beings can. Citing the fact that both humans and pop bottles and the rest of the universe consists of matter and energy, as if it would obviate these massively significant differences, is just plain stupid.<br /><br />Now, I'm well aware of various critiques of materialism/physicalism and I know what Wilson is getting at and what he wants to say. I'm saying he does a truly pitiful job of ACTUALLY producing a good argument that gets him there. (Not that I've ever seen any good argument for the conclusion he and you want, btw).<br /><br />Now, you say:<br /><i>I am not sure how that is relevant to our critique of materialism,</i><br /><br />Remember, I've been clear from the beginning that this concerned Wilson's presentation, his argument, in the debate. (And I've seen Wilson's type of poorly formed argument repeated by many Christians…which is not to say ALL Christians).<br />If you disagree with my critique, then please show me where it goes wrong, and point to where Wilson actually gave a strong argument that it follows from everything being "matter in motion" to "we'd have no reason to believe our thoughts could be true."<br />If you have your own argument - please present it. But first, since you seem to be trying to defend Wilson's argument against my critique of it, I'd appreciate if you actually do so with some substance. <br />Thanks,<br />RH.RHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90444067098670687012011-12-19T20:24:43.145-08:002011-12-19T20:24:43.145-08:00I just do not understand how what you have written...I just do not understand how what you have written engages Wilson's argument at all. What you are saying is that "that matter/energy takes on significantly different characteristics depending on what form it takes." Ok. I am not sure how that is relevant to our critique of materialism, which makes me think you do not understand the critique. See Feser's latest posts on Rosernberg's "Atheist Guide to Reality," for example.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20230853776433923192011-12-19T19:16:01.684-08:002011-12-19T19:16:01.684-08:00Ed, Hitchens support for the Iraq War was just a c...Ed, Hitchens support for the Iraq War was just a continuation of his Bolshevism: more blood-thirsty, messianic war-mongering.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33778311388954977192011-12-19T17:59:08.095-08:002011-12-19T17:59:08.095-08:00Brian,
Remember, I was dealing with Wilson's ...Brian,<br /><br />Remember, I was dealing with Wilson's argument specifically.<br /><br /><i>I do not understand how you think you have even responded. When matter is all there is, nothing matters. </i><br /><br />Please read the second half of my reply.<br /><br />What you are doing there is producing a non-sequitur similar to Wilson's (which, I guess, helps explain why you would accept Wilson as making sense).<br /><br />You've simply made an assertion, a non-sequitur that is not an argument.<br /><br />I pointed out that matter/energy takes on significantly different characteristics depending on what form it takes. You agree with this every time you discriminate between any physical object (or decide which physical objects will suite which purposes). And this is the case despite that we know physical objects share the underlying characteristics of being matter/energy.<br /><br />Therefore to appeal to the underlying fact that all is matter/energy is no argument against the acknowledge reality that objects made of matter/energy will exhibit differing characteristics of consequence.<br /><br />It's special pleading. Wilson does no better than this. Your non-sequitur implies a similar fallacy up ahead.<br /><br />But, again, I asked if anyone thought WILSON's argument was a good one. You thought it was. But <br />you haven't shown why my analysis of Wilson's fallacy is wrong.<br /><br />RHRHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80217850794150046052011-12-19T17:47:13.105-08:002011-12-19T17:47:13.105-08:00(Cont'd reply to Brian)
Imagine "Ted&quo...(Cont'd reply to Brian)<br /><br />Imagine "Ted" saying to "Brad":<i>"Let's drive to work on this"</i> and he's holding a banana. Bad points out <i>"But, Ted, that's a banana, not a car."</i> And Ted replies: <i>"But aren't they both made of underlying physical particles and energy?"</i> Brad says "Of course." Ted continues: <i>"Well, then if they are both ultimately JUST MATTER IN MOTION...why discriminate between a banana and a car? If I can point out they are both MATTER IN MOTION then that's an argument that there is no difference of any real consequence between them."</i><br /><br />Now, everyone (at least those not in religious apologetics mode) understand Ted isn't being enlightening: he's being a fool. Everyone, atheist or religious, would recognize Ted is being an idiot because he is speaking in a way that blindly ignores the obvious: That just because you can describe some shared underlying characteristic between a banana and a car, that they consist of "matter in motion" it's incredibly stupid to miss the fact that matter in the form of a car exhibits important, extremely consequentially different characteristics than matter in the form of a banana. Things like…having wheels, a combustion engine, a propellant, seats etc.<br /><br />Yet Wilson effectively puts on this dunce cap, says inane things that just skip over the obvious important details any materialist would point out…and he pretends he's acting like an atheist while wearing this dunce cap. No. He's just making a fool of himself. He's using a very typical apologist trick: using deflationary language as if it were an argument. So long as you can cite some shared characteristics and say "both A and B share the characteristics of JUST being C" and if the description C does not illustrate the differences, then…hey…it means there is no significant difference between A and B.<br /><br />This cheap deflationary language tactic can be used to "reduce" the significance of anything. Why in the world should anyone consider the Bible to be significantly different from Winnie The Pooh? Don't you know that at bottom both can be described as "simply" "words on paper?" Or that both are "simply made up of chemicals?" Or both are simply "made of physical particles which themselves display no literature or meaning content?"<br /><br />We'd immediately recognize anyone using this "gotcha" as being disingenuous (or astonishingly ignorant) about the fact that, at the level of physics human beings experience as "books/literature," there are huge differences in significance between the two books. The fact they both can be described as sharing an underlying physics is no threat to these relevant facts whatsoever.<br /><br />It's clearly a tenet of any materialist/physicalist account that we observe how matter and energy in one form (e.g. a human being), takes on and exhibits extremely different characteristics than matter/energy in another form (e.g. a rock). And that to ignore the significance and consequences of these differences is an absurd move apparently best left to theists trying to reason as atheists.<br />Wilson at a slightly later point says someone may raise the fallacy of division against him (which is not exactly what I've just done, btw). But all he does is say "I don't think I'm making that fallacy," and all he does is start off asserting his ridiculous reasoning, unvarnished.<br /><br />So…yes..it's a really, really bad "argument" (in fact, not even an argument…the way Wilson goes about it, it's a non-sequitur). I honestly think would not want to be associated with such bad arguments. But I'm ever amazed to see otherwise intelligent Christians assent to these arguments. <br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />RHRHnoreply@blogger.com