tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6788081143932944756..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Pre-Christian apologeticsEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger421125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4477846185917216902017-04-23T07:27:13.480-07:002017-04-23T07:27:13.480-07:00Great post like always, only have thing to add: Ma...Great post like always, only have thing to add: Many people don't *want* Christianity to be true. Like Frank Turek often says, people should be asked: "If Christianity were true, would you become Christian?" Many, in fact, answer No.<br /><br />This is perhaps something that needs to be investigated in detail.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49713182427283614232016-11-21T08:26:42.632-08:002016-11-21T08:26:42.632-08:00Doctor Feser,
In your post you suggest that there...Doctor Feser,<br /><br />In your post you suggest that there are Thomistic arguments that only God can raise the dead. Having skimmed through the Summa Contra Gentiles, I did find that, among the arguments in favor of the position that God alone can do miracles, one to the effect that finite causes can only bring about effects to which the subject of their action is naturally in potency. A dead body was given as an example of something that was, by its nature, not in potency to life. This is, sadly, not enlightening, as the proposition "a dead body, by its nature, is not in potency to life" is precisely what I want to know how to prove. I'm assuming that it has something to do with the fact that, since part of the human soul has immaterial operations, the body, once separated from the soul, no longer has a natural potency for the sort of rational life that characterizes human, but obviously any clarification/direction you can provide would be quite useful.<br /><br />In particular, I'd like to know where in Aquinas' work he discussed the question - if indeed he did discuss it. <br /><br />Thank you for your time, <br /><br />-DavidDavehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297660669717051302noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81294655523723015242015-04-03T16:40:08.125-07:002015-04-03T16:40:08.125-07:00Regarding Hindu monotheistic "pantheism,"...Regarding Hindu monotheistic "pantheism," that is a misnomer. There is no pantheism at all in orthodox Hinduism, for the simple reason that pantheism is a metaphysical error. The supreme Principle, whether Brahma Saguna (the ontological creative Principle, the Self-determination of the Divine Essence) or Brahma Nirguna (the Absolute as such, the Divine Essence or Ipseity, absolute and infinite, Eckhart's "Gottheit"; the Sufic distinction between al-Wahidiya and al-Ahadiyya) by definition transcends the created or manifested order. There is essential identity between the Real and the relatively real, otherwise the latter would be an autonomous reality, which is absurd; but pantheism posits a substantial, not essential unity, and therefore is based on an error which effectively divinizes the created order. The immanence of the Divine within the created order is an "immanent transcendence." JamesWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5933627001085582072014-08-05T05:52:52.806-07:002014-08-05T05:52:52.806-07:00Natural theology does not grant you any priors tha...Natural theology does not grant you any priors that are relevant when assessing the truth of Christianity over any other theism:<br /><br />http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2012/04/how-to-destroy-natural-theology-in-one.html<br /><br />That's where the buck stops, if we even grant that it gained momentum.John W. Loftushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07167826997171207256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74033015547482806392014-07-24T13:13:58.538-07:002014-07-24T13:13:58.538-07:00Re: "Now while there are miracle stories in t...Re: "Now while there are miracle stories in the Islamic tradition, and even the occasional attribution of a miracle to Muhammad, it is remarkable how little emphasis is placed on the miraculous in Islam compared to Judaism and Christianity." <br /><br />It is not at all remarkable how little emphasis is placed on the miraculous in Islam compared to Judaism and Christianity. The economy of the religion is completely different--different archetypal relationship between the Absolute and the relative.<br /> <br />Also, the Koran is not a miracle of Muhammad--that is not how it is viewed in the religion. Rather, Muhammad received the revelation of the Koran. In a sense, the role of Muhammad is analogous to that of the Virgin in Christianity.<br /><br />In Christianity, the revelation is Christ: Word made flesh. In Hinduism and in Islam, as also in Judaism with the Pentateuch, the Word is made Language or Book.<br /><br />For a clear exposition of this perspective, I recommend Frithjof Schuon's "Understanding Islam".Kevin Watsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23901363636180278402014-06-14T10:35:01.334-07:002014-06-14T10:35:01.334-07:00Professor Feser,
You state that God "allows ...Professor Feser,<br /><br />You state that God "allows evil in the world only insofar as he draws greater good out of it."<br /><br />David Bentley Hart has taken issue with this claim in his essay "Tsunami and Theodicy" (link attached below) and at greater length in his book "The Doors of the Sea". I'm curious to know if you have read either of these works and, if so, would be grateful to read any thoughts you care to share on them. Sincerely-Jamie<br /><br />http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2010/01/tsunami-and-theodicyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52514512430398586752014-06-09T19:15:30.156-07:002014-06-09T19:15:30.156-07:00@dguller:
This is not an easy subject. But as bes...@dguller:<br /><br />This is not an easy subject. But as best I can understand it:<br /><br />1. The clear distinction you are drawing between free will and grace, as moving the will, isn't really what St Thomas (following Augustine here) sees. The movement of the will, and the movement of grace, are the same thing, really. (Remember that the Holy Ghost is <i>within</i> us. He does explicitly say that Grace does not override the will (it does not move us by "violence".) <br /><br />The real question is whether we can resist grace when it's offered. The Church generally seems to say "yes".<br /><br />2. I'm not sure of the term "intelligible species of the divine essence" is one Aquinas would accept. There is no essence of God separable from God Himself (except perhaps in our minds).<br /><br />He also says that God can be "known" but not "comprehended."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69241273319084505222014-06-09T09:12:37.576-07:002014-06-09T09:12:37.576-07:00Mr Green:
And if God has given us the end of kno...Mr Green:<br /><br /><i> And if God has given us the end of knowing Him, and this requires grace, then it follows that God must make that grace available to all — and this is in fact the case. God does give all men that opportunity; but of course an individual can reject or waste that grace.</i><br /><br />Aquinas writes that “in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace” (ST 1a.113.3). That implies that the free choice that is required to accept God in the context of grace is itself a byproduct and effect of the grace itself, i.e. the free will is <i>moved</i> by grace to accept grace. <br /><br />Perhaps what Aquinas means is that the free will is <i>nudged</i> towards accepting grace, but that the ultimate decision still resides within the will itself, which remains free to reject it. But the problem with that position is that Aquinas has also argued that “the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous” (ST 1a.113.7), meaning that the infusion of grace and the choice to accept grace occurs <i>at the same time</i>. In other words, there is no <i>gap</i> between the infusion of grace and <i>then</i> the activity of the will, but rather “the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly” (ST 1a.113.8), and in this case, the cause and effect occur instantaneously, which simply leaves <i>no room</i> for free will to do anything on this account. In fact, free will appears to be akin to a puppet being simultaneously caused to move in a particular direction by a puppet master, which would be the very antithesis of freedom.<br /><br /><i>Well, there is of course the doctrine of theosis to take into account. So it is acknowledged that the Beatific Vision involves something beyond-natural; but beyond that, I will leave it to those who understand the matter better than I. If we consider only the natural level, I think it would be fine to say that God wills us [in the general case] to know Him as far as is possible naturally; and that is sufficient for Ed's original point (which he explicitly frames in terms of natural theology and natural law.)</i><br /><br />But the problem is that for Aquinas, knowledge presupposes the reception of intelligible species into the intellect. As he writes: “the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands” and “the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands” (ST 1.85.2). If such reception is impossible, then knowledge is impossible. If it is impossible for the intellect to receive the intelligible species of the divine essence, because the intelligible species <i>is</i> the divine essence, then it is impossible for the intellect to know God <i>at all</i>, whether in this world or the next. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1273913656049035262014-06-09T08:46:40.991-07:002014-06-09T08:46:40.991-07:00Glenn:
One such premise is stated in two slightl...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> One such premise is stated in two slightly different ways: a) that "the human intellect receives the divine essence"; and, b) that "the divine essence is received by the human intellect".<br /><br />That that premise is incorrect</i><br /><br />I agree, but then you have a problem. If knowledge of X presupposes that the intellect has received the intelligible species of X, then if the intellect <i>cannot</i> receive the intelligible species of X, then knowledge of X is impossible. If the intellect cannot receive the divine essence, then the intellect cannot know God. Perhaps the intellect <i>can</i> receive the intelligible species of the divine essence, even though it cannot receive the divine essence itself, but then you have to explain what the difference is between the intelligible species of the divine essence and the divine essence itself. It was always my understanding that they are one and the same thing, and thus are only distinguishable in the human mind. If that is true, then when the intellect receives the intelligible species of the divine essence, then the intellect also must receive the divine essence itself, which we both agree is impossible. Thus, it seems that knowledge of God is impossible according to Thomist principles of epistemology.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6514572768327962302014-06-09T00:53:31.468-07:002014-06-09T00:53:31.468-07:00dguller,
So, unless you can show that Aquinas did...dguller,<br /><br /><i>So, unless you can show that Aquinas did not believe in formal identity, and if he did, then formal identity did not presuppose the same form in the knowing intellect and in the thing known, then I’m afraid that my objections hold true.</i><br /><br />Let me see if I have this right: whether your objections hold true is a function of whether I'm capable of showing X? Is that what you're saying? <br /><br />If so, then there's only a 1 in 3 chance that your objections hold true, and a 2 in 3 chance that your objections do not hold true:<br /><br /><b>1. </b> If I'm incapable of showing X, then your objections are true.<br /><br /><b>2. </b> If I'm capable of showing X, and do show X, then your objections do not hold true. <br /><br /><b>3.</b> If I'm capable of showing X, but don't show X, then your objections do not hold true (for the reason that, even though I didn't show X, I am capable of showing X).<br /><br />The probability that your objections are true appears to be somewhat dismal. <br /><br />Additionally, if I don't show X, you have no way of knowing whether my not showing X is due to 1. or 3. above, and so you wouldn't be able to know with a reasonable degree of certainty whether your objections hold true. Knowing how much you like to mull over things, I'll not deprive you of that occupation, and so shall refrain from showing X.<br /><br />;)<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />More seriously... <br /><br />You have taken what Aquinas says about how we know what is within genus and species, and asserted that it applies in precisely the same way regarding how we know what is beyond genus and species. I myself am unaware of what Aquinas might have said which leads you to believe that that is the way to go. <br /><br />Comment moderation is on, so that's it for me under this OP.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32127412576582272182014-06-08T21:33:43.454-07:002014-06-08T21:33:43.454-07:00Step2,
I most certainly didn't say it was ob...Step2, <br /><br />I most certainly didn't say it was obligatory to suspend judgment before investigating a paranormal claim. I'm not even sure what this means. <br /><br />One should be opened minded, and not so biased, either way, that one doesn't investigate properly, if that is what you mean.<br /><br /><i> However, if for some reason a specific claim cannot be quantifiably tested then all the historical tests that previously established its impossibility as a general rule are assumed inadequate and are not considered an overwhelming part of the historical record. </i><br /><br />I'm not sure what you are trying to argue here. It smells like question begging, though. It seems like you are trying to take the observations of natural science as if they must always hold. Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55968134512322608372014-06-08T15:01:05.428-07:002014-06-08T15:01:05.428-07:00Glenn: This is evidenced not only by his having ju...Glenn: <i>This is evidenced not only by his having just managed to kill two birds with one stone, but by his having been nonchalant while doing so.</i><br /><br />Actually, I was pretty chalant... I just hide it well!<br /><br /><br />DGuller: <i>What if the only way for the students to apply themselves is via some effort by the teacher, and that without this effort by the teacher, the students couldn’t possibly apply themselves at all?</i><br /><br />This is true, and actually I think you are right about God's being able to cause us freely to love him too. And if God has given us the end of knowing Him, and this requires grace, then it follows that God must make that grace available to all — and this is in fact the case. God does give all men that opportunity; but of course an individual can reject or waste that grace. In my example that would be something like saying the teacher has to do something, namely teach the students, in order to sincerely will that they pass the exam. However, it does not follow that if a student goofs off all term, then the teacher is further obligated to provide that student an emergency all-night tutoring session right before the exam. Likewise, if our end is knowing God in the general case, that entails that God supplies the grace necessary for each of us in general, but not that He necessarily goes beyond that in every case in every way possible.<br /><br /><i>The only way for this to be possible is if one’s intellect could become the divine intellect, and thus one would have to become God himself to know God himself, which is impossible. </i><br /><br />Well, there is of course the doctrine of theosis to take into account. So it is acknowledged that the Beatific Vision involves something beyond-natural; but beyond that, I will leave it to those who understand the matter better than I. If we consider only the natural level, I think it would be fine to say that God wills us [in the general case] to know Him as far as is possible naturally; and that is sufficient for Ed's original point (which he explicitly frames in terms of <i>natural</i> theology and <i>natural</i> law.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60135261192138477552014-06-08T14:52:14.239-07:002014-06-08T14:52:14.239-07:00Wey: Why are the majority of Christians during the...Wey: <i>Why are the majority of Christians during the first century converted gentiles? In fact, the orthodox belief in the Mosaic Laws and the theology behind the OT prevented most Jews from becoming Christians.</i><br /><br />Did it? Where are your numbers? Of course there are more Gentiles, because Gentiles outnumbered Jews. But it is not at all clear that "most" Jews did not become Christian; I have seen claims that most of them in fact did. Scriptural passages that sound otherwise must be taken in the context of the shepherd who goes after the one lost sheep: you would never conclude from all the effort that there are 99 others left behind. So language that puts emphasis on the stubborn can in no way be read as statistical figures; not to mention that references to "the Jews" can mean specifically the authorities or those who did not accept Christianity. <br /><br /><i>A man can die, but God cannot die. If Jesus was God, then he never really died at the cross, he only appeared to be dead. A God who is dead is a logical contradiction.</i><br /><br />Indeed, and now that a religion based on such a paradox has caught your attention, you will no doubt want to investigate what Christianity actually claims [hint: it's not what you suggest above] and how Christian philosophy explicates these claims. An excellent place to start is by reading all the old posts on this site — Feser addresses some of these issues directly, but the other posts supply necessary background.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54066541833178386982014-06-08T05:07:08.976-07:002014-06-08T05:07:08.976-07:00But you could or, and if you wanted to investigate...<i>But you could or, and if you wanted to investigate thoroughly, test by all other possible means. In fact, one should make such tests before suspending judgment or coming to any conclusion.</i><br /><br />This makes absolutely no sense. On one hand you say it is obligatory to suspend judgment before investigating specific paranormal claims, on the other hand you say people should test specific claims by all possible means before suspending judgment - which must include the quantifiable tests that assume naturalistic explanations. However, if for some reason a specific claim cannot be quantifiably tested then all the historical tests that previously established its impossibility as a general rule are assumed inadequate and are not considered an overwhelming part of the historical record.Step2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72083295393492517152014-06-07T11:35:51.422-07:002014-06-07T11:35:51.422-07:00dguller,
And another problem is that if the human...dguller,<br /><br /><i>And another problem is that if the human intellect receives the divine essence in order to know God at all, then according to Thomist principles, the divine essence must be limited by the human intellect. After all, a key Thomist metaphysical principle is that act is limited by potency. For example, esse (as act) is limited by essence (as potency) in a composite entity. Another example, form (as act) is limited by matter (as potency). If the divine essence is in act, which it must be as pure act, and the intellect is in potency, then when the divine essence is received by the human intellect, then the infinite has been limited by the finite, which is impossible.</i><br /><br />I hadn't seen this until after my last response, and having made that last response, there didn't seem to be any point to responding to the above. But today is another day, so...<br /><br />You reason to the conclusion that "the infinite has been limited by the finite". You then comment upon the conclusion you arrive at. Your comment on the conclusion you arrive at is that it, the conclusion, "is impossible." <br /><br />If a conclusion is impossible, then there is something wrong with one or more of the premises employed and upon which that conclusion is based. This being so, your recognition that your conclusion is impossible is a tacit acknowledgement that there is something wrong with one or more of the premises you employ in reasoning to the impossible conclusion. <br /><br />One such premise is stated in two slightly different ways: <i>a)</i> that "the human intellect receives the divine essence"; and, <i>b)</i> that "the divine essence is received by the human intellect".<br /><br />That that premise is incorrect (though sources are referenced, difference sources are used for the sake of semantic simplicity):<br /><br /><b>1.</b> "[God's] Essence is His Being. (<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=BG4Ekg_WfgUC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=God+Being+Essence+Aquinas&source=bl&ots=2EP0Zhpuk4&sig=GA7R57RWUDSNL8pwbrCfBIGUjNQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=sUuTU_v3ObbesASit4HYAg&ved=0CFAQ6AEwBQ#v=snippet&q=%22whether%20essence%20and%20being%20are%20the%20same%20in%20God%22&f=false" rel="nofollow"><i>ST</i> I Q 3 A 4</a> (click on "page 30"))<br /><br /><b>2.</b> But "[T]he being of God is… not received in any other[.]" (<a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article1" rel="nofollow"><i>ST</i> I Q 7 A 1 ad. 3</a>)<br /><br /><b>3.</b> Therefore, God's Essence, which is the divine essence (Compendium of Theology, <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Compendium.htm#11" rel="nofollow">Chapter 11</a>), is not received in any other.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44253494239612478972014-06-07T08:19:56.793-07:002014-06-07T08:19:56.793-07:00Glenn:
I suppose one must then conclude that Aqui...Glenn:<br /><br /><i>I suppose one must then conclude that Aquinas himself was ill-informed re Thomist epistemology. And that he betrayed his lack of understanding when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, rather than the thing itself.</i><br /><br />Not at all. It could just mean that his system had an inconsistency that he missed, or simply downplayed in the interests of preserving the rest of the system. <br /><br />And when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, he was grounding that likeness on the formal identity between the intelligible species and the form in the thing understood. Without the formal identity, there is no understanding, and the formal identity is based upon the idea that the form of the thing in the intellect is the formally the same as, albeit numerically distinct from, the form of the thing itself. <br /><br />If that is correct, then for the intellect to understand or know God, then there must be a formal identity between the finite intellect and God, i.e. the divine intellect. I don’t see any way that this can occur on Thomist principles without compromising God in some way. For example, the intelligible species of God <i>is</i> the divine intellect, and thus the divine intellect would have to be received by the finite intellect, which would limit the unlimited, which is impossible. <br /><br />So, unless you can show that Aquinas did not believe in formal identity, and if he did, then formal identity did not presuppose the same form in the knowing intellect and in the thing known, then I’m afraid that my objections hold true.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58578428441625258802014-06-06T18:00:41.169-07:002014-06-06T18:00:41.169-07:00Dguller,
What I am suggesting is that an explana...Dguller,<br /><br /><br /><i>What I am suggesting is that an explanation that involves factors that are well-studied and understood should be preferred to explanations that involve factors that are (a) less well-studied and understood and (b) conflict with factors that are well-studied and understood, unless there are compelling reasons to rule out the well-studied and understood factors themselves as applicable to this case. </i><br /><br />In the abstract, perhaps, but not necessarily when we are talking about specific incidents. Your point seems to rely on a soft scientism: the view that natural science has explained most of the natural or corporeal world and there are few anomalies or gaps. I disagree. But, in the end, I just don't see why we should, where natural science cannot properly investigate, only follow the methods of natural science or endorse, even provisionally, only what has the exact levels of certainty of the best science. <br /><br /><br /><i>But the paranormal can have bearing upon science.... </i> <br /><br />What you write here is questionable, and depends on the borders of natural science. The make up of ghosts is mysterious. Natural science tends to deal with the quantifiably measurable and testable aspects of the corporeal world. Now, the extent of knowledge this gives us of the whole corporeal world is open to question. The paranormal can certainly contribute to our knowledge of the corporeal world, but not generally in the core fields of investigation of natural science. It would affect our knowledge of reality but not change, for example, what we know about physics or chemistry in their current confines. Whether we include knowledge of the paranormal in science or, like history or art, as separate category is really just a question of terminology. I see no argument against allowing the paranormal here.<br /><br />History might make use of natural science, but it is not natural science. It is a knowledge of corporeal reality that is not scientific per se. Investigations of the paranormal should be as rigorous as possible. And history does not replace natural science, but it can testify to the paranormal itself. Whether we allow the reality of such testimony is much the same conversation as we having now, but history most certainly doesn't have to claim testimony about the paranormal is wrong or metaphorical or whatever. <br /><br /><i>But why not risk your life? Either such claims make a difference or they do not. If you genuinely believe them to be valid possibilities, then why not test them to see if they are true. You wouldn’t even have to jump yourself. Just throw some object instead and see if it floats! </i> <br /><br />I would have thought it was obvious why not risk your life: you don't want to die. We were talking about just suspending judgment, or not dismissing an incident. That is about as low certainty of a paranormal explanation you can have without preferring another, naturalistic explanation. It is not even endorsing a paranormal explanation per se. So, of course you wouldn't risk your life in such a situation. But you could or, and if you wanted to investigate thoroughly, test by all other possible means. In fact, one should make such tests before suspending judgment or coming to any conclusion.Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23908070656329987532014-06-06T15:38:40.554-07:002014-06-06T15:38:40.554-07:00Prof. Feser,
if the OT and ancient Israel was the...Prof. Feser,<br /><br />if the OT and ancient Israel was the way it was in order to pave the way for Christ and Christianity, then why were only a small minority of Jews early Christians. Why are the majority of Christians during the first century converted gentiles? In fact, the orthodox belief in the Mosaic Laws and the theology behind the OT prevented most Jews from becoming Christians.<br /><br />You seem to argue that the emergence of monotheism is explained best as a preparation for the incarnation of the most supreme as a human. But doesn't it create the paradox that a man is not a God? A man can die, but God cannot die. If Jesus was God, then he never really died at the cross, he only appeared to be dead. A God who is dead is a logical contradiction.<br /><br />I think the real reason why the Israelites insisted on monotheism is because they needed to defend themselves to hostile neighbors trying to take over them. Multiculti is a new invention of the 20th/21st century. Nations in the past were generally self-protective and isolationistic. The obvious resentment against idolatry is induced by the historic trauma of the Babylonean captivity. The Israelites could not understand why their living God who literally dwelled among them would allow his people and his Temple to be destroyed by a pagan nation like Babylon. Thus the hate against Babylon, an ever present theme in the OT. Thus the hate against idolatry, an ever present theme in the OT, because the Israelites blamed on idolatry for why they were completely defeated. They believed that God was angry at them because of their idolatry and thus the Israelites desperately looked for a way to reconciliation with God, that would allow them to get their country back. Note that the First Temple of Jerusalem was destroyed in 587 BC. According to the Babylonian Chronicles that recorded this event the manuscripts of the Jewish holy scriptures were destroyed during the siege, as the city of Jerusalem was plundered and razed to the ground. So what we know today as the OT is actually a reproduction by later Israelian elites who were under Babylonean captivity. It falls perfectly to the historical framework if the themes of anti-idolatry and a messianic reconcilliation with God was heavily developed from that time onward.<br /><br />Please consider that the Babylonean captivity was the reason why there is a prevalent anti-idolatry and messianic theme in the OT.<br /><br />WeyWeyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02873965247925341144noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59707581885393783652014-06-06T13:45:57.739-07:002014-06-06T13:45:57.739-07:00dguiller,
I don’t see how that helps your case at...dguiller,<br /><br /><i>I don’t see how that helps your case at all. ...to know God in any capacity is to receive God himself into our finite intellect, which is impossible, and therefore, we cannot possibly know God, according to Thomist epistemology.</i><br /><br />Hmm. I suppose one must then conclude that Aquinas himself was ill-informed re Thomist epistemology. And that he betrayed his lack of understanding when he said that the intelligible species is a likeness of the thing understood, rather than the thing itself. Oh well, shows to go ya -- one can learn something new every day.<br /><br />;)<br />Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69863460908750835212014-06-06T13:26:13.314-07:002014-06-06T13:26:13.314-07:00(Btw, and for FFR: an inordinate amount of coffee,...(Btw, and for FFR: an inordinate amount of coffee, an inordinate amount of thinking and an inordinate amount of typing all rolled into one over a long period of time, especially when I really ought to be doing something else during that time, invariably lead to short, clipped, telegraphic and staccato-like sentences from me. So, no need to worry; that's all it is.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78533331780413315642014-06-06T13:16:43.142-07:002014-06-06T13:16:43.142-07:00Glenn:
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually.</i><br /><br />I don’t see how that helps your case at all. In God, the divine intellect <i>is</i> the intelligible species, which <i>is</i> the divine essence. They are “altogether the same”, and only differ in our limited conception. Hence, if our intellect knows God, then it must have received the intelligible species of God -- because that is a necessary condition of knowledge -- which is none other than the divine essence, which is none other than God himself. Thus, to know God in any capacity is to receive God himself into our finite intellect, which is impossible, and therefore, we cannot possibly know God, according to Thomist epistemology.<br /><br /><i>I echo Scott's hope that the new born is dinging (sp?) well. ;)</i><br /><br />The baby is just fyne.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78689011833102495582014-06-06T13:11:31.591-07:002014-06-06T13:11:31.591-07:00Glenn:
And another problem is that if the human i...Glenn:<br /><br />And another problem is that if the human intellect receives the divine essence in order to know God at all, then according to Thomist principles, the divine essence must be <i>limited</i> by the human intellect. After all, a key Thomist metaphysical principle is that <i>act is limited by potency</i>. For example, esse (as act) is limited by essence (as potency) in a composite entity. Another example, form (as act) is limited by matter (as potency). If the divine essence is in act, which it must be as pure act, and the intellect is in potency, then when the divine essence is received by the human intellect, then the infinite has been limited by the finite, which is impossible.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25935193483040267392014-06-06T13:10:16.294-07:002014-06-06T13:10:16.294-07:00dguller,
Re you most recent comment:
In answer t...dguller,<br /><br />Re you most recent comment:<br /><br />In answer to your most recent question:<br /><br />o <i>Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually.</i><br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />Also... I echo Scott's hope that the new born is dinging (sp?) well. ;)<br /><br />(Later this month there'll be a barbeque in celebration of the 1st birthday of my niece's daughter. (Presumably, and certainly most hopefully, the barbecuing will be restricted to hot dogs, hamburgers, steaks and other items of an inanimate ilk.))Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4113162136888945612014-06-06T13:06:59.108-07:002014-06-06T13:06:59.108-07:00Glenn:
It is only in God's intellect that th...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> It is only in God's intellect that the intelligible species of God is His essence.</i><br /><br />And that is precisely the problem, in my opinion. What is the intelligible species of God, if not his essence? What exactly is abstracted from the divine essence to become the intelligible species in the human intellect? Is the intelligible species in the human intellect <i>formally identical</i> to the divine essence? If so, then how is this not just another way of saying that the divine essence itself is received by the human intellect, which is impossible? If not, then how can you even say that the human intellect knows God at all?<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21153328613662149532014-06-06T13:04:53.398-07:002014-06-06T13:04:53.398-07:00Scott:
Baby is dong well. Thanks for asking.Scott:<br /><br />Baby is dong well. Thanks for asking.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.com