tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6781882103768136617..comments2024-03-28T08:34:20.807-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Reply to Griffiths and HartEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger114125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44853770826775175812017-12-08T05:47:39.514-08:002017-12-08T05:47:39.514-08:00I haven't been able to keep up with this debat...I haven't been able to keep up with this debate as well as I intended to, so I'll make some general remarks. <br /><br />I think the responses to the issue of heresy broadly fall into three categories: 1) those who accept, at least in principle, the execution of heretics, 2) those who are effectively limiting the set of heretics to which the argument could apply, and 3) those who are contesting the premises more directly.<br /><br />With respect to the first camp, I think I'm happy saying for the moment that the mainstream Catholic view would regard killing people for their beliefs or ideas to be a form of religious extremism. I don't have any real reason to attribute that extremism to Feser himself, though I do think it's odd he avoided the question in his response given what he says in his book.<br /><br />With respect to the second camp, which says that not every form of intentional and obdurate heresy is worse than murder, by saying further qualifications are needed. While I think that's divergent from the way heresy has historically been understood, I am perfectly happy to admit whatever qualifications others would raise, and reduce the set of those caught up in the argument to a sub-set. Because this argument is a reductio, I would regard it as enough to show that some subset of heresy is worse than murder, and that some subset of heretics should (by the logic of the argument) be executed. Put another way, I think the sanctioning (even in principle) of killing of anyone for their beliefs or dissemination of those beliefs to be sufficiently absurd for mainstream 21st Catholics to accept.<br /><br />I think the third category is the most substantial response. I take Greg, Tony, and Brandon to be accurately pointing out that there may be either qualifications to the retributive theory of justice or else countervailing considerations. I agree in principle, but I am curious if the price of those qualifications or countervailing considerations is one people are willing to pay. The reason is that the countervailing principles will generally be just as revisionary to Catholic teaching as the modern approach to the death penalty.<br /><br />I'll give one example: that of a religious right of consciousness. I accept an inviolable civil right to believe anything, and to publish arguments for those beliefs. If one agrees with me on this, then this countervailing consideration would exclude the teaching of heretics from any civil recriminations. Yet the evolution of the Catholic Church on the issue of rights of conscience is even more striking that its evolution on the issue of the death penalty. Take Gregory XVI:<br /><br />> And from this stinking fountainhead of indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion or rather nonsense, that liberty of conscience must be claimed and demanded for anyone whatever.<br /><br />Or, more relevantly to the issue at hand, this proposition is condemned by Pope Leo X in Exsurge Domine:<br /><br />> That heretics be burned is against the will of the Spirit.<br /><br />Anyway, the more I look into the history of executing heretics, the more it seems that the weight of the Catholic tradition on the issue of executing heretics is pretty close to the weight of the tradition for execution in general. In any case, the principles appealed to in salvaging the death penalty seem in the main to be at least as innovative as the modern Catholic opposition to the death penalty.Thomas M. Cothranhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07824873424225826685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74417900536743254972017-12-07T08:21:07.627-08:002017-12-07T08:21:07.627-08:00Perilanda: You are absolutely correct. If anything...Perilanda: You are absolutely correct. If anything, I'd go farther; unless one is having a hard time with some of what one believes, and what the zeitgeist dictates, one should doubt whether one is <i>thinking</i> at all.<br /><br />I suggest we call the particular usage "the PC feminine". The funny thing is that it is only used where it is non-standard; where feminine pronouns are traditional, they must be suppressed. E.g., I absolutely refuse to go along with the growing practice - even by the Navy - of referring to ships as "it". To Hell with that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61344694660565811272017-12-07T07:46:33.504-08:002017-12-07T07:46:33.504-08:00"Therefore by executing a criminal one denies..."Therefore by executing a criminal one denies her [!] any chance of repentance in the scriptural sense."<br /><br />Since the US reinstated capital punishment in 1976, only 16 women have been executed, whereas the DP has claimed the lives of 1,399 men. Yet you still insist on using the feminine pronoun. <br /><br />I bring this up because your whole schtick--your whole vibe--Dianelos, is obsequience and groveling to the secular/liberal Weltanschauung. Until you knock that shit off, you are never going to think straight. Ever. Moreover, you'll continue to pollute the purity of Christian revelation with SJW nonsense.Perilandahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03262367943775483878noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89600267202088411502017-12-07T07:45:14.973-08:002017-12-07T07:45:14.973-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Perilandahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03262367943775483878noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24456810228548599522017-12-06T13:53:00.027-08:002017-12-06T13:53:00.027-08:00Gregory,
Atonement (in the traditional sense of ...Gregory, <br /><br />Atonement (in the traditional sense of making amends by paying some price to person wronged) is something one does out of one’s own free will. When the state punishes a criminal it is not like the criminal atones for her crimes. In front of God the only way to atone for one’s sins is by repentance.<br /><br />And the word "repentance" in the gospels has a quite different meaning from the current one. Repentance does not mean to be sorry for something one did but means to overcome one’s sinful nature - it is the transformation of soul in the likeness of Christ, the purification of the soul which takes place when one has faith in Christ and follows His commands. Indeed the word in the original Greek is “metanoia” which literally means “change of mind”. Therefore by executing a criminal one denies her any chance of repentance in the scriptural sense. Which is about the worse thing one can do to a person. Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19715115122501207052017-12-05T17:32:07.945-08:002017-12-05T17:32:07.945-08:00This is just the foolish sentimentalism that is ru...This is just the foolish sentimentalism that is ruining minds in the West.<br /><br />This reader obviously feels he has more wisdom than the milennial authority of the wisest and saintly men in the Church. Try to use your intelligence to see that precisely capital punishment is the most charitable thing for a murderer. He himself should want it as his atonement for taking another's life. But men today have no spine, just recycycled paper.Gregorynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51491868145568654562017-12-05T11:58:37.541-08:002017-12-05T11:58:37.541-08:00does anybody really think that denying mercy and m...<i>does anybody really think that denying mercy and moving for the criminal’s execution is the best for her soul?</i> <br /><br />Yes. There, is that clear enough. Yes. <br /><br />Numerous criminals have themselves attested to this: by facing death, they were brought to repentance, and they then embraced their punishment in expiation for their sins. They (some of them, that is) claimed that they probably would not have repented otherwise, for they had already spent years in prison and it did not bring about their repudiation of their evil ways. <br /><br />If you define mercy as refusing to apply the punishment, and if you define the criminal's best interest as in repentance, then denying THAT sort of mercy was, in fact, in the criminal's best interest. That's what their testimony says. Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48746310655217226902017-12-05T09:10:25.079-08:002017-12-05T09:10:25.079-08:00I was thinking that the passage in the gospel of J...I was thinking that the passage in the gospel of John where Jesus forgives the woman taken in adultery has relevance in the current discussion. My sense of it is that if torn between retribution because of the law or forgiveness because of mercy the latter is to be preferred whenever possible. <br /><br />Since repentance is the greatest good for the criminal and in the spirit of loving the criminal does anybody really think that denying mercy and moving for the criminal’s execution is the best for her soul? In which choice does the reader think we most closely embody Christ and most clearly transmit the gospel to the criminal? I am not asking the reader to weight arguments or quotes but to consider the sense of the divine and the voice of charity in one's soul. Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28884017066581520882017-12-05T09:06:50.945-08:002017-12-05T09:06:50.945-08:00Greg, I find I have nothing of value to add to wha...Greg, I find I have nothing of value to add to what I have already said. Thanks for the discussion. Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89595788618736417072017-12-05T05:22:48.666-08:002017-12-05T05:22:48.666-08:00James Bond's friend Felix is commenting on phi...James Bond's friend Felix is commenting on philosophy these days?<br /><br />(That's an obscure way of asking, "Leiter? Who's that?")R.C.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85811471029832212402017-12-04T20:31:03.502-08:002017-12-04T20:31:03.502-08:00I am sorry to hear that, for it leads me to the th...<i>I am sorry to hear that, for it leads me to the thought that you are missing out on the greatest beauty of the message of gospel.</i><br /><br />I'm sorry to disappoint, but given the untenability of your views, I confess I'm not too worried about missing out on what you take to be the greatest beauty of the gospel message.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84404869460328408702017-12-04T20:28:20.139-08:002017-12-04T20:28:20.139-08:00Well, whether the punishment of children has good ...<i>Well, whether the punishment of children has good or bad effects on their development is not a matter of philosophy but of science. And I find it interesting that natural law theory when exercised on a primitive physicalist level not only contradicts the Sermon of the Mount but also the deliverances of psychology.</i><br /><br />I've ignored your huffing and puffing about science on this topic because you haven't cited a shred of scientific evidence in support of the conclusion you want to endorse. And you still have not.<br /><br />The problem is that when you were asked to apply your theory to an obvious problem case, it transformed into what is basically an account of proportionate punishment. And of course you had no psychological data on how best to treat boys who repeatedly hit their sisters, because none exists. You just mused about what you thought was fitting.<br /><br />But anyway, even if science showed that some proportionate punishments were harmful for child development, that would not settle any disagreement between you and me. There are lots of case, in law and in parenting, where less than proportionate punishments are applied. They are still punishments. And they would still be ruled out by the Sermon on the Mount, if it contains any blanket condemnation of punishment.<br /><br /><i>And as I said in the context of our discussion on capital punishment the parenting of children is a bad analogy in any case, since the relationship between state and citizens is entirely different in nature than the relationship between parents and children.</i><br /><br />I am not arguing from analogy.<br /><br /><i>From the point of view of the child this will be an unpleasant experience, which you may wish to therefore characterize as “punishment”.</i><br /><br />Nope, that's not the reason I gave for calling them punishments. It is that the consequences of the child's action have to be imposed on the child by those who have legitimate authority over him, and that the character of those consequences is limited by proportionality and desert.<br /><br />I don't care if science shows that tying your disobedient child to the roof of your car after he has done wrong is in fact a very effective way of ensuring that he acquires desirable character traits. I don't care whether you tie the child to the roof in the purest spirit of loving care for his future. If he doesn't deserve it, it's wicked parenting.<br /><br /><i>And punishment is very often justified by its effect as a deterrent for others, and thus converts the punished person into a means (thus violating another generally accepted ethical principle, indeed one I think is entailed by natural law theory).</i><br /><br />I don't accept this ethical principle, because I don't see any clear way of making it out. Any clear way of making out what it means to treat someone merely as a means (you need the 'merely' in there, or else the principle is even more useless) should give you an alternative ethical principle which is must clearer.<br /><br /><i>is ostracism the natural consequence of hitting one’s sister? I think it is. Violent people, indeed mean people, are normally shunned by others and end up living lonely lives.</i><br /><br />Another natural consequence of hitting one's sister is that one's hands hurt. Would you rap the boy's knuckles with a ruler?<br /><br />More seriously, the point was not to contest that violent people are sometimes ostracized; it was to point out that when the parent is <i>imposing</i> (your word) this result on a child who has misbehaved, he is doing so precisely because it is not a natural consequence of the behavior. The theory is only an interesting one if the meaning of 'natural consequence' slips from one application to the other.<br /><br />Note also that there is no guarantee that the natural consequences of one's behavior are proportionate to what the child has done...Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37430045592430275192017-12-04T08:56:59.248-08:002017-12-04T08:56:59.248-08:00Thanks for helping me along Tony. I suspect some ...Thanks for helping me along Tony. I suspect some of my problem arises from the definition side. "Inalienable" in a legal context appears to refer to acts of the individual's will (according to Black's, something that is "[n]ot transferable or assignable"). The common usage of "inalienable" apparently has a broader meaning (according to Oxford online, something "[n]ot subject to being taken away from or given away by the possessor.") But even settling on a definition only gets me so far. <br /><br />I work in a context where many say moral considerations are irrelevant to the judge or even to the law; others appeal to moral considerations selectively, usually on pet issues; and some are trying to do so comprehensively, but within the confines of the judicial role, which is itself changing, at least in practice. The death-penalty issue appears to be as good as any for working towards the truth of our situation as lawyers, and my particular concerns. Again, thanks for taking a moment to help me out. JDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12350021438376002415noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83174969679792119162017-12-04T08:25:50.557-08:002017-12-04T08:25:50.557-08:00Uh oh, Ed. Leiter just endorsed Hart's review ...Uh oh, Ed. Leiter just endorsed Hart's review of your book, calling it "devastating." Stop the presses.Perilandahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03262367943775483878noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9342178240417693132017-12-04T00:47:58.897-08:002017-12-04T00:47:58.897-08:00Greg,
“All right, let's think about this the...Greg, <br /><br />“<i>All right, let's think about this then.</i>”<br /><br />Well, whether the punishment of children has good or bad effects on their development is not a matter of philosophy but of science. And I find it interesting that natural law theory when exercised on a primitive physicalist level not only contradicts the Sermon of the Mount but also the deliverances of psychology. Perhaps Thomists should reconsider this matter. On the positive side I expect science to discover that the realization of the ethics of the Sermon of the Mount is a good ultimate goal to be set by society. The future wellbeing or even survival of humanity might depend on it. <br /><br />And as I said in the context of our discussion on capital punishment the parenting of children is a bad analogy in any case, since the relationship between state and citizens is entirely different in nature than the relationship between parents and children. A better analogy for the latter would be the relationship between God and creatures. <br /><br />Still, in this context I would like to comment on this:<br /><br />“<i>These are examples of punishments.</i>”<br /><br />I have suggested that the parent in a spirit of love and care should make certain her child experience the natural consequences of its misbehavior. From the point of view of the child this will be an unpleasant experience, which you may wish to therefore characterize as “punishment”. I don’t, for the concept of punishment as normally used entails punishing somebody for punishment’s sake, namely for the sake of retributive justice. And punishment is very often justified by its effect as a deterrent for others, and thus converts the punished person into a means (thus violating another generally accepted ethical principle, indeed one I think is entailed by natural law theory).<br /><br />Coming back to the example you suggested, is ostracism the natural consequence of hitting one’s sister? I think it is. Violent people, indeed mean people, are normally shunned by others and end up living lonely lives. <br /><br />“<i>My answer is obviously yes.</i>”<br /><br />I am sorry to hear that, for it leads me to the thought that you are missing out on the greatest beauty of the message of gospel. Which is the kind of person Christ was, and wants us to become like. <br />Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75089139463029793842017-12-03T21:48:22.346-08:002017-12-03T21:48:22.346-08:00Tim Finlay: I have no trouble at all sorting out t...Tim Finlay: <i>I have no trouble at all sorting out the "easy" case--it is obvious that heinous murder merits the death penalty. Having sorted that out, why am I not permitted to tackle a harder problem?</i><br /><br />I see; that wasn't clear. Yes, if we are starting from an established, well-defined position (such as Aquinas's view of the issue) and looking to understand it better, then that is different matter from trying to <i>answer</i> the question based on something else that people are still disagreeing about. And in fact the head of this thread was an attempt to argue against the death-penalty for murderers based on not liking it for heretics.<br /><br />It seemed closer to the latter than the former when you said: <i>If Ed and Joe accept the premise [...], then it seems to me that they should hold that it would be good for a nation to allow capital punishment for such an offense. </i><br /><br />(No, all that follows is that we can't deny the <i>possibility</i> on those grounds.)<br />Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50389928291231064652017-12-03T21:31:38.646-08:002017-12-03T21:31:38.646-08:00Thomas M. Cothran: Ed Feser called "dishonest...Thomas M. Cothran: <i>Ed Feser called "dishonest", making "unhinged remarks", guilty either of "misrepresentation or criminally negligent scholarship"</i><br /><br />I wasn't counting that (it's a plain fact that Ed <i>was</i> misrepresented); but if you do count it, doesn't that strengthen my point?<br /><br /><i>It should be clear which path I'm taking in these comments.</i><br /><br />It's not completely clear, because you didn't answer question (which, despite its facetious tone, was serious): did you mean, "Good luck trying to have a conversation like that in the current climate", or did you mean, "If you disagree with me you're barbaric"?<br /><br />Anyway, I appreciate that you raised this as a serious question, and did not mean that you would simply resort to name-calling. However, your starting point already disagrees with Feser's position and traditional Catholic teaching, so how can it be "relevant" to settling those questions? Surely we need to settle the basics (like what punishment is, etc.) first.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26026066491187095832017-12-03T12:16:05.782-08:002017-12-03T12:16:05.782-08:00In II-II q. 11, Aquinas first defines heresy, in a...In II-II q. 11, Aquinas first defines heresy, in a. 1, in terms of intending to assent to Christ but choosing teachings other than those Christ taught.<br /><br />How one compares that to what the Catholic Church teaches is another matter. There's a sort of "all things considered" judgment about what the Church teaches, in which case the answer is always: the true Catholic faith. But there's also a judgment about what "the Church" visibly teaches right now. You and I would agree that the Church does not teach that capital punishment is intrinsically immoral, but to a lot of people it appears that the Church does.<br /><br />But with that distinction in hand, consider your (1). John teaches p, knowing that what he thinks is merely "the Church" in scare quotes teaches not-p; but he thinks that the Church, like him, teaches p. In teaching p, he takes him to be correcting "the Church," not the Church.<br /><br />I think it's right to say that John in such a case is not intending to corrupt the faith, when he is (say) incorrect about the tension between the Church and "the Church."<br /><br />But one gets Aquinas's view on heresy in terms of the visible Church in a. 2 ad 3, and there the idea is that someone who obstinately disagrees with what has been defined by the universal Church, whose authority rests in the pope, will be a heretic. One really does get the sense, reading Aquinas, that at that point there is <i>necessarily</i> some bad faith; this is probably rooted in a confidence that he had and which we find more difficult that there's a point after which there can be no more honest doubt about the relationship between the Church and the visible Church.<br /><br />This sort of consideration seems to me to be what is operative in slipping from Aquinas's definition of heresy--in which heresy seems to be a matter just of going wrong materially in the faith--to an imputation of ill will. Besides obstinate and non-obstinate defense of one's error, though, Aquinas doesn't seem to be distinguishing between different kinds of heretics. (The latter of course aren't really heretics.)Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1361245135062880392017-12-03T11:43:56.178-08:002017-12-03T11:43:56.178-08:00Greg, maybe you're right. But let me pose a ...Greg, maybe you're right. But let me pose a question. Suppose John has come to conclude p is true, even though he knows that the Church teaches ~p is true, a direct contradiction. Is there an important difference between these 2 cases: <br /><br />(1) John has, by definitively affirming p while knowing the Church teaches ~p, ceased to hold the Catholic faith. Therefore, he is no longer a living member of the Church. Yet he (falsely) imagines himself to be in good standing in the Church, he consciously considers himself "part of the Church", and in trying to get others to believe p, he imagines that he will be improving the Church. John teaches p to others because he believes p is true and he wants others to believe the truth. He imagines this will perfect the Church, which he desires. <br /><br />(2) John has, by affirming p, ceased to hold the Catholic faith. John accepts that the Church therefore says that he has separated himself from her, and accepts his status as no longer a living member of the Church. He teaches p to others because he wants them to hold the truth, to join him in rejecting the Church, and to be part of something else in opposition. <br /><br />Is (2) fittingly described as "intends corruption of the faith"? I would say so. In teaching others to hold p, John is trying to destroy the institutional Church because he believes it is itself corrupted and only those who hold his version of the matter (i.e. who hold p) hold the truth. Thus he both intends the destruction of that institution which insists on ~p, and intends the cessation of anyone <i>believing</i> in ~P. <br /><br />Is (1) fittingly described as "intends the corruption of the faith"? Maybe, but less obviously so. If John subjectively considers that by getting others to believe p he is making the Church better, and making their faith more pure, calling this "intends the corruption of the faith" is an odd thing. <br /><br />Maybe Aquinas only meant the kind of heretics in my (2)? Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9550895415108912182017-12-03T11:24:30.811-08:002017-12-03T11:24:30.811-08:00There is a certain appeal to thinking that the rig...<i>There is a certain appeal to thinking that the right to life is inalienable (no human can give his right to life away), but that does not mean that life itself is inalienable (a human may give his life away for good, such as by falling on a grenade to protect fellow soldiers, or for ill, by committing murder and receiving the just punishment for that wrong).</i> <br /><br />I suspect that part of the philosophical difficulty is that the term "rights" here is fairly troublesome as a notion. Here are two reasons to approach the term with caution: first, to speak of a person who is dead and has <i>been</i> dead in such terms as "they (DO) have a right to life" - present tense - when nothing in the world can give it <i>back</i> to them, is odd indeed. So, did the murderer take away their right, indirectly, by taking away their life? That would be odd also. <br /><br />Secondly, suppose that God has so arranged his providential order so that a person will fall on the stairs, break his neck, and die. Did he have a "right to life" that was inalienable? Presumably. Did he lose it (his life)? Certainly. Did God violate his inalienable right? Well... obviously we don't want to say something like that. <br /><br />One way to (sort of) solve these problems is to say that what we mean by saying a person has this "right" to life is that everyone else in human society has no "right" to take it away. Or, better: no other human person is <i>doing right</i> when they take it away. Nobody, by their actions, can affect MY right to life. <br /><br />But the murderer does "give up" his right to life. So, what we mean by inalienable IN THIS CONTEXT seems to be that a person's right to life is his own in such a way that <i>no other</i> human person can <i>rightly</i> take his life, but the man can alienate his claim on his life through his OWN actions, and <i>then</i> some human person can rightly take his life. <br /><br />When a soldier falls on a grenade to protect his squad, he is <i>doing right</i> to do so, but he is not "taking his own life" in doing so. He is accepting a (probable) death in circumstances God has placed him where it is morally better for him to take an action to preserve others' life than to preserve his own. He is laying his life down for others, but he is not "taking" his own life. Since it was God who put him in that situation, he never had a "right" not to be faced with concrete situation that made such a demand on him. (This is, again, why the "inalienable right" is limited to the matters of what <i>other humans</i> may rightly do to him.) Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17566353611966025192017-12-03T09:46:25.869-08:002017-12-03T09:46:25.869-08:00My understanding then is that parental punishment ...<i>My understanding then is that parental punishment qua punishment is found to be counterproductive and its apparent good effects only superficial often hiding the actual damage.</i><br /><br />All right, let's think about this then.<br /><br /><i>[L]et my try to answer your question about what a parent should do when a boy repeatedly hits her sister: First of all the parent should think why that aggressive behavior has obtained.... I think the basic duty of the parent is to provide the good environment in which the psyche of her child will naturally mature (an environment characterized by loving attention and clear rules). When that environment is missing then children will react.</i><br /><br />You are overstating your case to take this as the central case of misbehavior in children. No family is perfect, and parents can be at fault for their children's misbehavior. But, at least after the Fall, there is no mystery about why a boy might hit his sister. She might have something that he wants, or she might have annoyed him, or he might be jealous of her. That his parents have not given him enough or the right sort of attention may or may not be the case, but there is no reason to think that's the default explanation.<br /><br />Anyway, let's move onto the case that matters.<br /><br /><i>But suppose that despite a good environment we have an aggressive behavior by the boy. What then? In this case too I think the parent should react not in a spirit of anger or accusation but in a spirit of love and sadness, and impose what is the natural consequence of the action.... So how should the parent respond exactly? The answer to this question depends on many factors and should be given by a psychologist – but let me offer some ideas just in order to clarify what I mean: I think that the natural consequence of violent behavior is ostracism; which in that case may be a physical separation of the boy and his sister.</i><br /><br />I'm afraid that you're equivocating and that you've moved the goalposts, Dianelos. The original proposal was that if a child, say, doesn't obey an instruction to get dressed for a party, then rather than punish him, the parent should just observe that the natural consequence of his failure to get ready is that he will be late for the party. This is, first of all, mere observation and advice; there is no imposition. And the natural consequence of the behavior is just its causal result.<br /><br />In these respects, that proposal is very much unlike the one currently on offer. The "natural consequence" is not what results from violent behavior; it is something that the parent needs to impose, if it's going to occur at all, because otherwise it wouldn't happen, because ostracism is not really a typical causal concomitant of hitting one's sister. The parent is not merely observing to the boy that a consequence of the his violence is that his bed is going to wind up in the corridor, and he is going to eat alone; the parent is going to move it, and the child will not be permitted to eat with the family.<br /><br />These are examples of <i>punishments</i>. And the "natural consequence" has gone from being the typical causal concomitant to being... a punishment that fits the crime.<br /><br />I have this sense that if the Sermon on the Mount is a call to eliminate punishment, then it is not merely a call to find another word for it.<br /><br /><i>You notice though Greg that you did not give a straight answer.</i><br /><br />I responded in that way because your musing presumed that I had answered in bad faith, and I thought that was tendentious. My answer is obviously yes.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46153748206789003482017-12-03T00:46:06.511-08:002017-12-03T00:46:06.511-08:00[continues from above]
“I would sooner give it th...[continues from above]<br /><br />“<i>I would sooner give it than try to convince him that parental punishment isn't punishment.</i>”<br /><br />You notice though Greg that you did not give a straight answer. <br /><br />I am starting to become old and when a contemplate human life from the perspective of having spent the greater part of it I realize that all worldly victories, large and small (such as winning a debate) are vain. Indeed comically vain. The only thing that matters is what we end up carrying in our soul. And therefore the only thing that matters is our relationship with Christ. Who is a person, not simple and not theoretical or abstract. But complex and concrete, more concrete than any wall, and more liberating than any door. Moreover one’s experience and relationship with the divine ground of reality is both tortuous and joyful as all personal relations are. Thus (and here I am answering to Tony) as one cannot strike a personal relationship with a book or with an idea, in the same way the truth that is Christ is only found in one’s relationship with Him. “Personal relationship with Christ” perhaps sounds like a rare or sophisticated thing but is anything but; Christ is who makes all things so that relationship is realized in all we do in life. Even atheists have a relationship with Christ albeit they are unaware of it. I ask you to consider that in our daily experience of life there is a personal “thou” present behind all things. Philosophy, theology, prayer and the life in the church, all help us bring that “thou” into relief, help us realize the meaning and relevance of that presence. And thus help us make it more powerful; it’s like the difference between knowing about somebody there and actually living with somebody here. <br />Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19585325309364896062017-12-03T00:44:43.893-08:002017-12-03T00:44:43.893-08:00Greg,
“The attempt to claim that parental punishm...Greg,<br /><br />“<i>The attempt to claim that parental punishment is not real punishment is simply desperate.</i>”<br /><br />I see now I haven’t expressed myself well. I do agree that many parents punish their children while thinking it’s a good thing. Of course they do. I was rather speaking of what they should do. I was using “parent” in the ideal sense, as in theology we often use concepts in their ideal sense too (for example in the central case of “love”). <br /><br />And I think parents should not punish their children not only in the ethical sense, but also in the scientific sense. A huge part of psychology concerns human relations including the upbringing of children, and psychology is a science too, a sciene in which we use rationality to find out truths and spread them around. My understanding then is that parental punishment qua punishment is found to be counterproductive and its apparent good effects only superficial often hiding the actual damage. We have left the theological discourse, but let my try to answer your question about what a parent should do when a boy repeatedly hits her sister: First of all the parent should think why that aggressive behavior has obtained; many of the problems of children have their cause in a dysfunctional family life. I think the basic duty of the parent is to provide the good environment in which the psyche of her child will naturally mature (an environment characterized by loving attention and clear rules). When that environment is missing then children will react. For example children are biologically programmed to call the attention of their parents, so when they are starved for attention they will resort to that kind of behavior which they discover most probably will elicit a parental reaction. Whether that reaction is positive or negative turns out to be secondary. In such cases then the parent may punish the child for something which at its root is her own failing. But suppose that despite a good environment we have an aggressive behavior by the boy. What then? In this case too I think the parent should react not in a spirit of anger or accusation but in a spirit of love and sadness, and impose what is the natural consequence of the action. While having as the goal the reformation of her boy’s psyche – and not, say, to show who is the master here. So how should the parent respond exactly? The answer to this question depends on many factors and should be given by a psychologist – but let me offer some ideas just in order to clarify what I mean: I think that the natural consequence of violent behavior is ostracism; which in that case may be a physical separation of the boy and his sister. For example if they share the same bedroom then the boy’s bed is moved to the corridor. Or the boy has to eat to alone in the kitchen while the family shares the table. At the same time love is not denied to the boy and any change in his behavior is rewarded until things return to normal. - Again, that’s my understanding of the deliverances of psychology, which in my experience of bringing up a child have worked rather well. <br /><br />[continues below]Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61376308495027178762017-12-02T19:19:48.566-08:002017-12-02T19:19:48.566-08:00In our highly sentimental, profoundly worldly, and...In our highly sentimental, profoundly worldly, and spineless culture, capital punishment is viewed as evil, whereas a normal person would view it as self-evident and its abolition as criminal. A person who murders a human being has committed a mortal offense--in short his entire human life has been wasted because he has forfeited his possibility of gaining immortality. A murderer ought to feel the deepest contrition for his crime and the desire to save his soul by atoning for it. This, precisely, is what capital punishment offers to a believer. Contrition and atonement purify the soul and opens it to the priceless grace of salvation.Brendannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45939425384658037742017-12-02T11:43:48.716-08:002017-12-02T11:43:48.716-08:00Tony, in regard to your question regarding the exc...Tony, in regard to your question regarding the excerpt I quoted from Stern and Jones, I believe you are thinking along the correct lines. The inalienability is imposed from a source, nature or nature's God, outside human will. Stern and Jones are pointing out that the concept of "inalienable" rights, which are clearly recognized in the organic law of the United States, conflicts with the modern legal philosophy, which has more or less abandoned natural law as a source of law (whether approaching that from a traditional, new, or Lockean perspective) and focuses on human will as the source of the only law that matters in the legal context. I continue to puzzle over it, particularly the extent to which a judge can, should, or must take account of natural law when opining about the law or about the law's application in a given case. But that is all somewhat off the main reason I posted. I was more interested in any thoughts about whether the distinction between the inalienability of the right to something versus the inalienability of the thing itself holds up philosophically. There is a certain appeal to thinking that the right to life is inalienable (no human can give his right to life away), but that does not mean that life itself is inalienable (a human may give his life away for good, such as by falling on a grenade to protect fellow soldiers, or for ill, by committing murder and receiving the just punishment for that wrong). That thought appears to explain why the founders had no problem discussing the right to life as inalienable while at the same time stating that the state could take someone's life (not the right to life) provided the person was given due process. <br /><br />JDhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12350021438376002415noreply@blogger.com